Anton Gerashchenko
@Gerashchenko_en
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1h
Belarus has become Russia’s nuclear staging ground.
Belarus has not been annexed. But functionally, it has already become part of Russia. Lukashenko has long existed only with the Kremlin’s permission.
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Lukashenko officially appeared to be a bystander - yet missiles and columns of tanks moved through Belarusian territory. Russia used it as its own operational zone.
In March 2023, Putin announced the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. In December 2024, Russia and Belarus signed the Treaty on Security Guarantees that legalized permanent Russian bases and legally included Belarus in Russia’s nuclear strategy. Since mid-2025, around 2,000 Russian troops have been permanently stationed in Belarus, including air defense and aerospace units.
In December 2025, the Oreshnik ballistic missile entered combat duty near Krychaw. In May 2026, large-scale joint nuclear exercises were held: 64,000 troops, 200 missile launchers, 73 surface ships, and 13 submarines.
The nuclear sharing agreement marks a departure from Russia’s long-standing position, as Moscow spent decades criticizing NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements. Now it is reproducing the same model it once condemned.
The 2024 nuclear doctrine explicitly equated a conventional attack on Belarus with an attack on Russia - automatically creating conditions for a nuclear response.
Control over the warheads officially remains with Moscow. But Putin stated that Lukashenko himself would select targets for Oreshnik deployed in Belarus. In other words, the Belarusian president would bear public responsibility for missiles launched by Putin.
Now to the arsenal and the numbers.
As of March 2026, Russia possesses around 4,400 nuclear warheads in total, of which up to 2,000 are assigned to non-strategic tactical forces.
Belarus hosts Iskander-M - the 465th missile brigade in Asipovichy. Range: up to 500 km. Accuracy: 5-7 meters. Nuclear warhead: 10-50 kilotons. Vilnius is just 340 km away. Flight time: 3-4 minutes. NATO would have virtually no warning time.
Oreshnik belongs to another category. Speed exceeds 14,000 km/h. Up to six independent MIRV blocks, each capable of deploying up to six sub-warheads. Range exceeds 5,500 km. Interception by modern air defense systems is almost impossible.
From Belarusian positions, Oreshnik can reach an airbase in Poland in 11 minutes and NATO headquarters in Brussels in 17 minutes. Berlin, Ramstein, and Warsaw all fall within range.
According to Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, only three missiles had been produced at the time of deployment. One was used against Dnipro in November 2024. One was destroyed in Kapustin Yar during a joint operation involving Ukraine’s Security Service, Defense Intelligence, and Foreign Intelligence Service. The Kremlin plans to produce up to six missiles per year.
There is also Lida airbase - just 40 km from the Lithuanian border. Modified Su-25 aircraft are capable of carrying nuclear bombs.
The most dangerous problem is neither range nor speed. It is the impossibility of identification. Until the moment of impact, it is impossible to determine whether Oreshnik carries a nuclear or conventional warhead.
Every launch is an automatic nuclear alarm regardless of the actual payload. This ambiguity is a strategic weapon no less important than the warhead itself.
Now to the likely scenarios.
️ The most likely scenario is not total nuclear war. It is a "demonstration strike": a single low-yield tactical strike against a peripheral military base - for example, an airfield in Poland or the Baltics. The goal is not destruction but testing Article 5. The Kremlin’s logic: "You will not launch a nuclear response over a single tactical strike."
️ The second scenario is an Oreshnik strike against a NATO logistics hub: Rzeszów, Ramstein, Warsaw. Most likely with conventional warheads. But this cannot be confirmed before impact. Even a conventional strike under the carrier’s nuclear ambiguity could freeze weapons transit to Ukraine.
Shock and fear of escalation alone would be a sufficient outcome for the Kremlin.
️ The third scenario is a strike on a nuclear power plant with a conventional warhead. A radiological effect without the formal use of weapons of mass destruction. Maximum psychological pressure on Europe.
️ The fourth: a new ground offensive against Ukraine launched from Belarusian territory under nuclear blackmail.
NATO freezes, Ukraine becomes isolated, and the frontline shrinks by 400 kilometers.
Finally, let’s turn to the West’s response - or the absence of one.
No symmetrical nuclear response followed. NATO did not deploy nuclear weapons in the Baltics or Poland. The response remained conventional: additional brigades and expanded air defense.
New START expired in February 2026. No new treaty exists. Verification of nuclear arsenals is effectively absent. The United States abandoned the "voluntary compliance with limits" proposed by Russia. Patriot and THAAD were not designed to intercept targets at Mach 10 with maneuvering flight trajectories.
Kyiv directly called Belarus’s transformation into a "nuclear outpost" near NATO borders an unprecedented challenge to the global security architecture and a dangerous precedent that de facto legitimizes nuclear proliferation among authoritarian regimes.
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