INTL Region In Focus: The Sahel, it's issues with terrorism, it's coups and it's future

[Plain Jane]

Sudan’s paramilitaries seize a key area along with the border with Libya and Egypt

Sudanese paramilitaries have claimed the seizure of a strategic area along the border with neighboring Libya and Egypt.

apnews.com

Sudan’s paramilitaries seize a key area along with the border with Libya and Egypt​

Updated 5:31 AM EDT, June 12, 2025
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CAIRO (AP) — Sudanese paramilitaries at war with the country’s military for over two years claimed to have seized a strategic area along the border with neighboring Libya and Egypt.

The Rapid Support Forces said in a statement Wednesday that they captured the triangular zone, fortifying their presence along Sudan’ s already volatile border with chaos-stricken Libya.

The RSF’s announcement came hours after the military said it had evacuated the area as part of “its defensive arrangements to repel aggression” by the paramilitaries.

On Tuesday the military accused the forces of powerful Libyan commander Khalifa Hifter of supporting the RSF’s attack on the area, in a “blatant aggression against Sudan, its land, and its people.”

Hifter’s forces, which control eastern and southern Libya, rejected the claim, saying in a statement that the Sudanese accusations were “a blatant attempt to export the Sudanese internal crisis and create a virtual external enemy.”

The attack on the border area was the latest twist in Sudan’s civil war which erupted in April 2023 when tensions between the Sudanese army and RSF exploded with street battles in the capital, Khartoum that quickly spread across the country.

The war has killed at least 24,000 people, though the number is likely far higher. It has driven about 13 million people from their homes, including 4 million who crossed into neighboring countries. It created the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, and parts of the country have been pushed into famine.

The fighting has been marked by atrocities including mass rape and ethnically motivated killings that amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, especially in Darfur, according to the U.N. and international rights groups.

 

[Plain Jane]

Several killed as separatists clash with Malian army, Russian allies in the conflict-hit north

Malian army says its soldiers clashed with members of an armed separatist group in the country's north, resulting in the death of 10 separatists.

apnews.com

Several killed as separatists clash with Malian army, Russian allies in the conflict-hit north​

By ASSOCIATED PRESS
Updated 5:56 PM EDT, June 13, 2025
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BAMAKO, Mali (AP) — Malian security forces clashed with members of an armed separatist group over two days, resulting in the deaths of 10 separatists, the Malian army said Friday. The Azawad separatists said it killed dozens of Malian soldiers and members of a Kremlin-controlled armed force.

The clashes began with a military offensive in the northern Kidal region on Thursday, the Malian army said in a statement. On Friday, the Malian military’s logistics convoy was ambushed before the attack was repelled, it added.

The separatists reported they killed “dozens” of Malian soldiers and fighters with the Kremlin-controlled African Corps in the ambush.

The Azawad separatist movement has been fighting for years to create the state of Azawad in northern Mali. They once drove security forces out of the region before a 2015 peace deal that has since collapsed was signed to pave the way for some ex-rebels to be integrated into the Malian military.


“We recovered 12 trucks loaded with cereals, tankers full of diesel, one military pickup, and one armored vehicles from the 30 vehicles in the convoy,” Mohamed Maouloud Ramadan, spokesman for the Azawad separatists, said in a statement that acknowledged the death of three of their members.

Viral videos shared by the separatists showed military trucks on fire in a large swathe of desert land amid gunfire as gun-wielding hooded young men posed in front of the trucks. The videos also showed bodies with uniforms that resemble those of the Malian army. The Associated Press could not independently verify the videos.

The latest clashes show how difficult it is for security forces in Mali to operate in difficult terrains like Kidal, according to Rida Lyammouri, a Sahel expert at the Morocco-based Policy Center for the New South think tank.

“It’s difficult to gather actionable intelligence to protect their convoys, and this gives a significant advantage to armed and jihadist groups”, said Lyammouri.

The latest attack occurred days after Russia’s mercenary group Wagner – which for more than three years helped Malian security forces in the fight against armed groups – announced it was leaving the country. The Africa Corps, under the direct command of the Russian defense ministry, said it will remain in Mali.


There are around 2,000 mercenaries in Mali, according to U.S. officials. It is unclear how many are with Wagner and how many are part of the Africa Corps

 

[Plain Jane]

Sierra Leone's President Bio to be the next ECOWAS chairman with region in turmoil

Sierra Leone’s President Julius Maada Bio has been chosen to be the next chairman of the West African economic bloc, ECOWAS.

apnews.com

Sierra Leone’s President Bio to be the next ECOWAS chairman with region in turmoil​

DYEPKAZAH SHIBAYAN WILSON MCMAKIN
Updated 3:20 PM EDT, June 22, 2025
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ABUJA, Nigeria (AP) — Sierra Leone’s President Julius Maada Bio was chosen on Sunday to be the next chairman of the West African economic bloc, ECOWAS.

The Economic Community of West African States, known as ECOWAS, was founded in 1975, and is facing challenges due to rising violence, member departures and economic disturbances.
In a statement following Sunday’s announcement, Bio promised to prioritize democracy, security cooperation, economic integration and institutional credibility.

“We are still confronting insecurity in the Sahel and coastal states, terrorism, political instability, illicit arms flow and transnational organized crimes continue to test the resilience of our nations and the effectiveness of our institutions,” he said.

Bio is currently serving his second term as president after a contested election two years ago in the coastal West African country.

He was president when ECOWAS imposed severe sanctions on Niger following a coup two years ago. Niger cited the sanctions as one of the reasons for leaving the bloc. Sierra Leone was one of the countries that supported a military intervention in the country in 2023.

At home, Bio is facing an ongoing synthetic drug crisis and a stagnating economy.

Bio’s new position comes as the region faces its most severe crisis in decades with jihadist forces controlling vast swaths of the Sahel, a semi-arid region south of the Sahara.


In the past few years, ECOWAS has struggled with the departure of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger which have all faced military coups. All three juntas left the bloc, and created their own security partnership, the Alliance of Sahel States. They have cut ties with the traditional Western allies, ousting French and American military forces, and instead sought new security ties with Russia.

The three countries have been the hardest hit by jihadist violence in recent years.

 

[Plain Jane]

Sudan civil war overwhelms border town in neighbor Chad as refugees find little help

Sudan's civil war has overwhelmed a border town in neighboring Chad. Nearly a quarter-million refugees have arrived in Adre and the humanitarian frontline on the edge of one of the world’s most devastating wars is in danger.

apnews.com

Sudan civil war overwhelms border town in neighbor Chad as refugees find little help​

Refugees wait for food distribution at the Tine transit camp in Chad’s Wadi Fara province Saturday, May 3, 2025. (AP Photo/Caitlin Kelly)
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By CAITLIN KELLY
Updated 5:25 AM EDT, June 29, 2025

ADRE, Chad (AP) — Fatima Omas Abdullah wakes up every morning with aches and pains from sleeping on bare ground for almost two years. She did not expect Sudan’s civil war to displace her for so long into neighboring Chad.

“There is nothing here,” she said, crying and shaking the straw door of her makeshift home. Since April 2023, she has been in the Adre transit camp a few hundred meters from the Sudanese border, along with almost a quarter-million others fleeing the fighting.

Now the U.S.- backed aid system that kept hundreds of thousands like Abdullah alive on the edge of one of the world’s most devastating wars is fraying. Under the Trump administration, key foreign aid has been slashed and funding withdrawn from United Nations programs that feed, treat and shelter refugees.

In 2024, the U.S. contributed $39.3 million to the emergency response in Chad. So far this year, it has contributed about $6.8 million, the U.N. says. Overall, only 13% of the requested money to support refugees in Chad this year has come in from all donors, according to U.N. data.

In Adre, humanitarian services were already limited as refugees are meant to move to more established camps deeper inside Chad.

Many Sudanese, however, choose to stay. Some are heartened by the military’s recent successes against rival paramilitary forces in the capital, Khartoum. They have swelled the population of this remote, arid community that was never meant to hold so many. Prices have shot up. Competition over water is growing.

Refugees arrive at the Tine transit camp in Chad’s Wadi Fara province Saturday, May 3, 2025. (AP Photo/Caitlin Kelly)

Adre isn’t alone. As the fighting inside Sudan’s remote Darfur region shifts, the stream of refugees has created a new, more isolated transit camp called Tine. Since late April, 46,000 people have arrived.

With the aid cuts, there is even less to offer them there.

235,000 Sudanese in a border town​

Adre has become a fragile frontline for an estimated 235,000 Sudanese. They are among the 1.2 million who have fled into eastern Chad.

Before the civil war, Adre was a town of about 40,000. As Sudanese began to arrive, sympathetic residents with longtime cross-border ties offered them land.

Now there is a sea of markets and shelters, along with signs of Sudanese intending to stay. Some refugees are constructing multi-story buildings.

Sudanese-run businesses form one of Adre’s largest markets. Locals and refugees barter in Sudanese pounds for everything from produce to watches.

“There is respect between the communities,” said resident Asadiq Hamid Abdullah, who runs a donkey cart. “But everyone is complaining that the food is more expensive.”

Chad is one of the world’s poorest countries, with almost 50% of the population living below the poverty line.

Locals say the price of water has quadrupled since the start of Sudan’s civil war as demand rises. Sudanese women told The Associated Press that fights had broken out at the few water pumps for them, installed by the International Committee of the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders.

Even food aid could run out shortly. The U.N. World Food Program says funding to support Sudanese refugees in Adre is guaranteed only until July, as the U.S. aid cuts force a 30% reduction in staff worldwide. The U.N. refugee agency has seen 30% of its funding cut for this area, eastern Chad.

Samia Ahmed, who cradled her 3-year-old and was pregnant with her second child, said she has found work cleaning and doing laundry because the WFP rations don’t last the month.

“I see a gloomy future,” she said.

Sudanese try to fill aid gaps​

Sudanese are trying to fill gaps in aid, running private schools and their own humanitarian area with a health clinic and women’s center.

Local and U.N. authorities, however, are increasing the pressure on them to leave Adre. There are too many people here, they say.

“A vast city,” said Hamit Hadjer Abdullai with Chad’s National Commission for the Reception and Reintegration of Refugees.

World Food Program supplies wait for distribution in Adre, Chad, Thursday, May 8, 2025. (AP Photo/Caitlin Kelly)
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He said crime was increasing. Police warn of the Colombians, a Sudanese gang. Locals said it operates with impunity, though Abdullai claimed that seven leaders have been jailed.

"People must move,” said Benoit Kayembe Mukendi, the U.N. refugee agency’s local representative. “For security reasons and for their protection.”

As the Chadian population begins to demand their land back, Mukendi warned of a bigger security issue ahead.

But most Sudanese won’t go. The AP spoke to dozens who said they had been relocated to camps and returned to Adre to be closer to their homeland and the transit camp’s economic opportunities.

There are risks. Zohal Abdullah Hamad was relocated but returned to run a coffee stand. One day, a nearby argument escalated and gunfire broke out. Hamad was shot in the gut.

“I became cold. I was immobile,” she said, crying as she recalled the pain. She said she has closed her business.

The latest Sudanese arrivals to Adre have no chance to establish themselves. On the order of local authorities, they are moved immediately to other camps. The U.N. said it is transporting 2,000 of them a day.

In Tine, arriving Sudanese find nothing​

The new and rapidly growing camp of Tine, around 180 kilometers (111 miles) north of Adre, has seen 46,000 refugees arrive since late April from Northern Darfur.

Their sheer numbers caused a U.N. refugee representative to gasp.

Thousands jostle for meager portions of food distributed by community kitchens. They sleep on the ground in the open desert, shaded by branches and strips of fabric. They bring witness accounts of attacks in Zamzam and El-Fasher: rape, robbery, relatives shot before their eyes.

With the U.S. aid cuts, the U.N. and partners cannot respond as before, when people began to pour into Adre after the start of the war, U.N. representative Jean Paul Habamungu Samvura said.

“If we have another Adre here … it will be a nightmare.”

(More photos at the link.)

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Institute for the Study of War

The growing divide between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian federal government threatens to kill the Pretoria peace agreement and return violence to Tigray. The schism has likely prompted the TPLF to recalibrate its ties with

www.understandingwar.org

Tigray Tensions; IS Sahel Offensive: Africa File, June 26, 2025​

Jun 26, 2025 - ISW Press

To receive the weekly Africa File or triweekly Congo War Security Review via email, please subscribe here. Follow CTP on X, LinkedIn, and BlueSky.
Authors: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson
Contributors: Ellery White, Edie Tesfaye, and Miles Charles
Key Takeaways:

• Ethiopia. The growing divide between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian federal government threatens to kill the Pretoria peace agreement and return violence to Tigray. The schism has likely prompted the TPLF to recalibrate its ties with Eritrea, which has exacerbated tensions between the TPLF and Ethiopia and Ethiopia and Eritrea.
• Sahel. IS Sahel Province (ISSP) has launched a coordinated offensive across its area of operations, particularly in Niger, that highlights its growing capacity. ISSP and al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen are slowly encircling Niamey and attacking the various ground lines of communication that link the capital with the rest of the country.
• Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces launched a major attack in southern Sudan against a key Sudanese Armed Forces position, which is a node between central Sudan, Darfur, and lucrative oil infrastructure in southern Sudan.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo. CTP will cover the US-mediated peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda in a special edition of the Congo War Security Review on June 27. You can subscribe here. The special edition text will also be retroactively added to this Africa File page on June 27.

Assessments:
Ethiopia
Authors: Kathryn Tyson with Edie Tesfaye
The Ethiopian federal government is backing a new Tigrayan political party to rival the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which exacerbates the divide between the TPLF and the Ethiopian federal government. The former head of the federally backed Tigray Interim Administration (TIA), Getachew Reda, established a new Tigray political party known as the Tigray Democratic Solidarity Party in April 2025.[1] Ethiopia’s election authority gave Reda’s party a preliminary registration certificate on May 26.[2] French media reported that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is supporting the new Tigray Democratic Solidarity Party to challenge TPLF dominance in Tigray.[3] The Ethiopian National Election Board denied the TPLF its political party status in May 2025, citing the TPLF’s failure to implement “corrective measures” ordered by the board.[4] The TPLF rejected the decision and said that the refusal to reinstate the TPLF’s political status poses a “grave threat” to the Pretoria agreement.[5]
The latest disagreement is part of a yearslong rivalry between TPLF factions over the implementation of the Pretoria peace agreement that ended the Tigray war.[6] TIA critics have accused the TIA of acting in the interests of the federal government, while the TIA has accused the TPLF of trying to regain control over Tigray.[7] Unfulfilled aspects of the Pretoria agreement have exacerbated these tensions. The schism became violent in March 2025 after hardline factions of the TPLF aligned with TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael effectively couped Reda and the TIA in March 2025. Gebremichael-aligned forces attacked TIA offices, opened fire on civilians, and detained local TIA leaders.[8] Several European governments warned against travel to Ethiopia and encouraged their citizens to either leave or stock up on supplies in case the situation deteriorated.[9]
The schism has likely prompted the TPLF to recalibrate its ties with Eritrea, which has exacerbated TPLF-Ethiopia tensions and Eritrea-Ethiopia tensions and increased the risk of violence in Tigray. TPLF leadership said that it intended to strengthen its relationship with Eritrea in May 2025 in a message commemorating Eritrea’s Independence Day.[10] Gebremichael said in a speech on June 22 that the TPLF intends to strengthen Tigray-Eritrea relations.[11] Unspecified Ethiopian federal authorities accused TPLF leaders in March 2025 of reaching “covert arrangements” with Eritrea to possibly reignite conflict Tigray.[12]
Ethiopia and Eritrea’s relationship has deteriorated since the end of the Tigray war in 2022.[13] Abiy has made inflammatory statements since 2023 that Ethiopian Red Sea access, which Ethiopia lost when Eritrea became independent in 1993, was an existential issue and “natural right” that Ethiopia would fight to acquire if not through diplomacy.[14] Eritrea increased cooperation with Egypt, which is one of Ethiopia’s main geopolitical rivals due in large part to Egypt’s staunch opposition to Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project on the Nile River, as part of a de facto anti-Ethiopian axis throughout 2024.[15] American, European, and Tigrayan officials warned in early 2025 that a war between the two countries could be imminent after Eritrea implemented a nationwide military mobilization in February and Ethiopia deployed troops toward the Eritrean border in March.[16]
Read more about Ethiopia-Eritrea relations in CTP’s Ethiopia Special Edition
The growing tensions threaten to effectively kill the Pretoria peace agreement, which is still largely unimplemented. These failures have driven tensions between the TIA, TPLF, and Ethiopian federal government. Federal authorities have lifted aid restrictions nominally, but humanitarian access remains severely limited in parts of central, western, and northwestern Tigray.[17] Ongoing insecurity and the Ethiopian government’s systematic obstruction of aid deliveries have impeded food and medical aid distribution.[18] Amhara regional forces and Eritrean military units remain entrenched in contested areas of Tigray, including Western Tigray and border regions, despite Pretoria agreement provisions requiring their withdrawal.[19] The presence of these forces continues to obstruct the return of internally displaced persons and has been linked to human rights violations.[20] Although the TPLF has surrendered some heavy weapons, the broader disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process remains stalled.[21] TPLF units have refused to fully disarm until Eritrean and Amhara forces fully withdraw.[22]
Sahel
Author: Liam Karr with Miles Charles
Islamic State Sahel Province’s (ISSP’s) latest offensive shows the group’s growing capacity across its area of operations, particularly in Niger. ISSP has increased the rate and scale of its attacks since late May. Hundreds of ISSP militants overran the Nigerian base at Banibangou and the adjacent town on June 19. Nigerien officials claimed the attackers killed 34 soldiers, wounded 14, and ransacked local buildings.[23] The attacks followed two of the deadliest ISSP attacks in Mali and Niger, respectively, when the group claimed to kill more than 50 Nigerien soldiers in an attack in the Tahoua region on May 25 and 42 Malian soldiers in an attack on Tessit on June 4.[24] ISSP separately massacred at least 70 civilians on June 19, 150 miles west of Banibangou in a commune less than 20 miles from the Burkinabe border.[25] The attack fits ISSP’s well-established strategy of establishing control through coercion, fear, and violence among “uncooperative” communities.[26]
Figure 1. IS Sahel Offensive Along Mali-Niger Border

https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/20250626%20WAF%20AF-ISSP%20Offensive%20Battlemap.png

Source: Liam Karr.
ISSP likely coordinated the offensive among its various military zones to augment its capacity and maximize the impact of the offensive. ISSP has targeted Banibangou, Eknewane, and Tessit previously in major attacks, but it has never conducted this many major attacks in less than a month.[27] The three military targets are spread across three of ISSP’s five military zones, signaling that ISSP central leadership coordinated with regional commanders to launch major attacks over the same period. The individual attacks likely involved ISSP forces from adjacent zones—a tactic ISSP has used previously to achieve overwhelming force concentration—given the scale of the attacks and their proximity to adjacent military zones.[28]
ISSP is using its support zones along the Mali-Niger border to spread deeper into Niger, including southward toward Niamey. ISSP’s rate of engagements along the Mali-Niger border has decreased so far in 2025.[29] The attacks that ISSP has conducted have been extremely deadly, however. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data has also recorded an increased number of ISSP support activities in the Tillaberi region and continued reports of ISSP control in the Tahoua region, which CTP has assessed previously is part of a major ISSP control hub that includes a significant portion of Mali’s Menaka region.[30] These trends indicate that ISSP is now able to move more freely and stage larger attacks along the border.
The ISSP attack on Banibangou further signals that ISSP has isolated many army installations and major population centers near the Malian border in northern Tillaberi. ISSP conducted a diversionary rocket attack against Inates—near the Malian border 95 miles northwest of Banibangou—to prevent the base from sending reinforcements.[31] This delay allowed militants to fully overrun the base and adjacent town for several hours before reinforcements arrived from Ouallam, which is over 90 miles southwest of Banibangou via the N24 highway.[32] ISSP has isolated other district capitals closer to the Burkinabe border since 2024, with some soldiers allegedly unwilling to follow orders without recieving additional intelligence and air support.[33]
Northern Tillaberi is a key defensive line for Nigerien forces protecting the capital. Banibangou is a lynchpin to the N24 and other highways that connect mostly rural areas north of Niamey. ISSP has been less active near Banibangou, Ouallam, and surrounding rural areas north of Niamey in recent years compared to other areas of northwestern Niger.[34] CTP has assessed previously that ISSP has had less success in these areas due in part to local peace agreements that have degraded ISSP’s ability to recruit locally.[35]
Figure 2. ISSP and JNIM Encircle Niamey

https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/20250626%20WAF%20AF-ISSP-JNIM%20Niger.png

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.
ISSP and al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) are slowly encircling Niamey and attacking the various ground lines of communication that link the capital with the rest of the country. Greater ISSP presence in Banibangou and Ouallam departments would create a third pressure point north of Niamey, as ISSP is already active along the other two major highways that run north from Niamey. The group attacks civilians and security forces along the N1 road northwest of Niamey and sporadically claims activity around Tillaberi city, which lies just over 50 miles away from Niamey along the N1. The group also clashes with security forces on the N23 road northeast of Niamey as close as Balleyara, which is also 50 miles from the capital along the N23. JNIM attacks security forces on the roads southwest of Niamey, and ISSP has significantly increased the rate of attacks on the southern segment of the N1 highway that runs along the Niger-Nigeria border southeast of Niamey in 2025.
ISSP may have launched its latest offensive to regain media attention after JNIM’s high-publicity activity in the last month. JNIM and ISSP are major rivals and have gone through various iterations of fighting that have resulted in hundreds of casualties.[36] This rivalry extends to the media and propaganda realm, where each group tries to paint itself as the more legitimate alternative.[37] JNIM carried out a string of high-publicity attacks between early May and early June, including attacks where it overran provincial centers and its fighters posed for pictures in government offices and central roundabouts.[38] The timing of ISSP’s offensive—and its focus on large-scale attacks and high-publicity targets—indicates an effort to match JNIM’s success.
Sudan
Author: Kathryn Tyson with Ellery White
The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) launched a major attack against a key Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) position in West Kordofan, southern Sudan. The RSF on June 20 launched its largest coordinated offensive against the SAF’s 22nd Infantry Division headquarters in Babanusa since the RSF began besieging the town in 2023.[39] The attack followed two days of RSF artillery shelling against Babanusa and SAF drone strikes targeting RSF positions on the city’s outskirts.[40] The SAF repelled the offensive but remains vulnerable as the SAF has been unable to send reinforcements and the division relies on irregular airdrops for essential supplies.[41] The RSF reportedly deployed new reinforcements to the city over the past week to encircle the town from the north and east, according to local witnesses.[42]
Babanusa is the last major SAF stronghold in West Kordofan, a region that serves as a logistic corridor between the RSF’s center of gravity in Darfur and central Sudan. The RSF has captured nearly all major towns and military positions in West Kordofan over the past year.[43] The RSF captured al Fula, the West Kordofan state capital, in June 2024, as well as al Nahud and al Khwai in May 2025.[44] The loss of al Fula and al Nahud prevents the SAF from using the bases to threaten Darfur.[45] Important transportation junctions, such as al Khwai, additionally facilitate RSF supply lines and troop movements.[46]

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

Figure 3. Sudan COT Map

https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/2025-06-26%20Sudan%20CoT.png

Source: Kathryn Tyson; Thomas Van Linge.
Control of Babanusa is also key to accessing lucrative oil infrastructure in southern Sudan. Several oil production sites are located near Babanusa, and the town lies on a highway linking West Kordofan to Heglig, a major oil-producing area approximately 248 miles southeast of Babanusa.[47] The RSF seeks to attack the SAF 90th Infantry Brigade Command in Heglig, according to unspecified military sources cited by Egyptian media.[48] The Heglig oilfield previously accounted for half of Sudan’s oil output in the early 2010s, before South Sudan’s secession in 2011.[49]
Figure 4. Regional COT Map

https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/2025-06-26%20Kordofan%20CoT.png

Source: Kathryn Tyson; Thomas Van Linge.
The RSF will gain greater leverage over the SAF and South Sudanese government with control over the segment of a pipeline carrying oil from South Sudan to Sudan that runs through Heglig. The pipeline carries crude oil from South Sudan through Sudanese territory to Port Sudan.[50] These cross-border oil flows are vital for both countries.[51] The SAF collects transit fees—reportedly hundreds of millions of dollars annually before the civil war—that provide a critical source of hard currency, and oil comprises approximately 98 percent of landlocked South Sudan’s budget.[52] The RSF reached an agreement with the Sudanese government and other armed groups that control territory where the pipeline runs to allow for repairs in January 2025 after damage to the pipeline forced Sudan to declare force majeure on its oil exports in March 2024.[53] Control over more of the pipeline gives the RSF more leverage to extract greater rents and concessions in negotiations. RSF control over another segment of the pipeline would increase the RSF’s opportunities to disrupt operations and extract protection money and other concessions from the SAF and South Sudan.
Africa File Data Cutoff: June 26, 2025, at 10 a.m.
The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

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[1] Ethiopia situation update (11 June 2025) - Ethiopia Peace Observatory https://addisstandard.com/getachew-...marking-shift-in-tigrays-political-landscape/
[2] Ethiopia situation update (11 June 2025) - Ethiopia Peace Observatory
[3] Ethiopia : Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's young Tigrayan guard
[4] Ethiopia's Election Board Revokes TPLF's Legal Status
[5] https://addisstandard.com/news-anal...ing-recognition-dispute-with-electoral-board/
[6] Two years after the Pretoria agreement, unrest still looms in Tigray - October 2024 - Ethiopia Peace Observatory
[7] https://theafricainsight.substack.com/p/the-sub-saharan-security-review-a72; Clashes in Tigray’s Disputed Territories Threaten Peace Deal - February 2024 - Ethiopia Peace Observatory https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia...s-livestock-bd11f55a42b4705a2da5c01afbd7cc74; Ethiopia’s Tigrayan rebels start handing over heavy weapons
[8] https://addisstandard.com/tigray-in...ecessary-assistance-warns-of-looming-danger/; https://x.com/reda_getachew/status/1899501893509955655; Debretsion Faction Unleash Attacks Tigray; Many Casualties Reported in Mekelle https://x.com/breaking_bre/status/1899472486728654919; https://x.com/Wolde_Yabele/status/1899499344690110645; https://x.com/WegahtaFacts/status/1899572738450493725; https://x.com/sajid_nadeem78/status/1899531712717353298; https://www.bbc.com/tigrinya/articles/ckg8z77278wo
[9] https://www.criticalthreats.org/ana...war-and-plunge-the-horn-of-africa-into-crisis
[10] https://www.dw.com/am/ግንቦት-20-በዓል-ት...xdVzspuQ1PkRRNzbOA_aem_xAcbb5NQ54GEqG8No-ALCQ
[11] https://addisstandard.com/tplf-chai...arns-pretoria-deal-facing-worsening-setbacks/
[12] https://www.bbc.com/amharic/articles/cr52l245nvyo;

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gRxRWa04QdQ

[13] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/...eritrea-slide-closer-war-amid-tigray-upheaval
[14] https://www.criticalthreats.org/ana...war-and-plunge-the-horn-of-africa-into-crisis
[15] https://www.criticalthreats.org/ana...ar-and-plunge-the-horn-of-africa-into-crisis; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-eritrea-path-war-tigray-officials-warn-2025-03-13/
[16] https://www.criticalthreats.org/ana...war-and-plunge-the-horn-of-africa-into-crisis
[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/afric...cies-say-us-urges-immediate-help-2022-11-11/; https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/famine-aid-ethiopia/
[18] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c10l2vvjy9lo; https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/08/world/africa/ethiopia-us-food-aid.html
[19] https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/...er-struggle-tigray-risks-ethiopias-peace-deal
[20] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/01/world/africa/eritrea-ethiopia-tigray-war.html
[21] https://worldpeacefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/DDR-in-Tigray-Memo-20230829.pdf; https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/44716/; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...-start-handing-over-weapons-to-ethiopian-army
[22] https://martinplaut.com/2022/12/19/ethiopias-winner-takes-all-politics-threatens-tigray-peace-deal/
[23] https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1935990999953592365; https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique...n=twitter&utm_source=nonli&utm_medium=social; https://x.com/WerbCharlie/status/1935814896656040233
[24] https://newsng dot ng/niger-death-toll-from-eknewan-attack-rises-to-64-as-more-soldiers-succumb-to-injuries; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/169213...mique-fait-plusieurs-morts-au-sein-de-larmee/
[25] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/170020...que-qui-a-fait-des-dizaines-de-morts-a-manda; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/arti...ieres-du-burkina-et-du-mali_6615600_3212.html
[26] https://acleddata.com/2024/09/30/ne...ate-in-the-sahel-aims-for-regional-expansion; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/arti...ieres-du-burkina-et-du-mali_6615600_3212.html
[27] https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique...a-plus-meurtrière-contre-l-armée-depuis-2019; https://acleddata.com/2024/09/30/ne...ate-in-the-sahel-aims-for-regional-expansion; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) database, available at www.acleddata.com
[28] https://acleddata.com/2024/09/30/ne...tate-in-the-sahel-aims-for-regional-expansion
[29] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com
[30] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-areas-of-operation-in-the-sahel#NWNiger
[31] https://theafricainsight.substack.com/p/the-sub-saharan-security-review-ea0
[32] https://theafricainsight.substack.com/p/the-sub-saharan-security-review-ea0
[33] https://www.criticalthreats.org/ana...rangles-roadways-in-niger-ankara-declaration; https://www.barrons.com/amp/news/ni...soldiers-killed-near-burkina-border-26ea9f61; https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1815756431322194079; https://x.com/ZagazOlaMakama/status/1828078412553920970; https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1830623095964442675; https://x.com/ighazer/status/1848690573714043320; https://x.com/ighazer/status/1938220879856447607
[34] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com
[35] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-one-year-after-nigers-coup
[36] https://acleddata.com/2024/09/30/ne...ate-in-the-sahel-aims-for-regional-expansion; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-16-2023; https://www.criticalthreats.org/bri...inked-militants-take-control-in-northern-mali
[37] https://www.mei.edu/publications/sc...slamic-state-are-battling-legitimacy-sahelian
[38] https://x.com/brantphilip1978/status/1921699678384435547; https://x.com/casusbellii/status/1921683642625019975; https://www.criticalthreats.org/ana...ionalizes-nigeria-tripoli-clashes#BurkinaFaso
[39] https://sudantribune.net/article301984/
[40] https://www.madamasr.com/en/2025/06...er-triangle-military-airstrikes-on-nyala-con/
[41] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudan-army-repels-major-attack-on
[42] https://www.madamasr.com/en/2025/06...r-triangle-military-airstrikes-on-nyala-con/; https://sudantribune.com/article301728/
[43] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudan-army-repels-major-attack-on
[44] https://sudantribune.com/article301529/ ; https://english.aawsat.com/arab-wor...rt-forces-seize-al-fula-west-kordofan-capital
[45] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudan-army-repels-major-attack-on
[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ances-across-sudan-despite-rsf-drone-strikes; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rsf-attack-al-khiwai-west-kordofan; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rsf-attack-al-khiwai-west-kordofan
[47] https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/babanusa-oil-workers-protest-over-entitlements
[48] https://www.madamasr.com/en/2025/06...er-triangle-military-airstrikes-on-nyala-con/
[49] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/factbox-sudans-heglig-oilfield-idUSBRE83I0LZ/
[50] https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sit...S-HSBA-Situation-Update-2024-Sudan-Oil-EN.pdf
[51] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/kordofan-conflict-spirals-in-dangerous?utm_source=publication-search; https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sit...S-HSBA-Situation-Update-2024-Sudan-Oil-EN.pdf
[52] https://sudantribune.com/article65100/; https://sudantribune.com/article300347
[53] https://sudantribune.com/article300347/

 

[Plain Jane]

Ethiopia completes the power-generating dam on the Nile that caused a dispute with Egypt

Ethiopia’s prime minister says the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile has been completed. Egypt has long opposed the dam as a potential threat to its water supply.

apnews.com

Ethiopia completes the power-generating dam on the Nile that caused a dispute with Egypt​

This grab taken from video shows Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, Ethiopia, Feb. 20, 2022. (AP Photo)
Read More
By SAMUEL GETACHEW and RODNEY MUHUMUZA
Updated 8:46 PM EDT, July 3, 2025

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia (AP) — Ethiopia’s prime minister said Thursday that a controversial power dam on the Nile is now complete, a major milestone for his country amid a dispute with Egypt over equitable sharing of the water.

Egypt has long opposed the dam because of concerns it would deplete its share of Nile River waters. Egypt has referred to the dam, known as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, as an existential threat because the Arab world’s most populous country relies almost entirely on the Nile to supply water for agriculture and its more than 100 million people.

Negotiations between Ethiopia and Egypt over the years have not led to a pact, and questions remain about how much water Ethiopia will release downstream if a drought occurs.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in his address to lawmakers Thursday, said his government is “preparing for its official inauguration” in September.


“While there are those who believe it should be disrupted before that moment, we reaffirm our commitment: the dam will be inaugurated,” he said.

Abiy said his country “remains committed to ensuring that our growth does not come at the expense of our Egyptian and Sudanese brothers and sisters.”

"We believe in shared progress, shared energy, and shared water,” he said. “Prosperity for one should mean prosperity for all.”

Ethiopia and Egypt have been trying to find an agreement for years over the $4 billion dam, which Ethiopia began building in 2011. Tensions over the dam, the largest in Africa, once were so high that some observers feared the two countries might go to war over it.



But Ethiopia won the diplomatic support of upstream nations such as Uganda, home to a regional partnership of 10 countries that last year signed an accord on the equitable use of water resources from the Nile River basin.

The accord of the partnership, known as the Nile Basin Initiative, came into force in October without being ratified by Egypt or Sudan.


The dam, on the Blue Nile near the Sudan border, began producing power in 2022. The project is expected to ultimately produce over 6,000 megawatts of electricity, which is double Ethiopia’s current output and enough to make the East African nation of 120 million a net energy exporter.

The dam is located about 500 kilometers (311 miles) northwest of the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa. It is 1,800 meters long and 175 meters high, and is backed by a reservoir that can hold up to 74 billion cubic meters of water, according to the main contractor.

Ethiopia insists the dam is a crucial development that will help pull millions of its citizens out of poverty and become a major power exporter.

It was not immediately possible to get a comment from Egypt, which has long asserted its rights to Nile water according to the terms of a colonial-era agreement.

The agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom gave downstream Egypt and Sudan rights to the Nile water, with Egypt taking the majority.

That agreement, first signed in 1929, took no account of the other nations along the river basin that have demanded a more equitable accord.

___ Muhumuza contributed from Kampala, Uganda.

 

[Plain Jane]

France withdraws from Senegal, ending its permanent military presence in West Africa

The French military has completed its withdrawal from Senegal, its last West African country with a permanent troop presence, amid waning regional influence.

apnews.com

France withdraws from Senegal, ending its permanent military presence in West Africa​

By BABACAR DIONE and MARK BANCHEREAU
Updated 1:31 PM EDT, July 17, 2025
Share

​

DAKAR, Senegal (AP) — The French military completed its withdrawal from Senegal on Thursday, its last West African country with a permanent troop presence, amid waning regional influence in recent years.

France has faced opposition from leaders of some of its former colonies in Africa over what they described as a demeaning and heavy-handed approach to the continent.

The French military handed over Camp Geille, its largest base in Senegal, along with a nearby air facility, to the Senegalese government during a ceremony in the capital, Dakar.
Gen. Pascal Ianni, head of French forces in Africa, said the handover marked a new phase in military ties.

“It is part of France’s decision to end permanent milit1:31 PM EDTary bases in West and Central Africa, and responds to the Senegalese authorities’ desire to no longer host permanent foreign forces on their territory,” he said.

Senegal’s military chief, Gen. Mbaye Cissé, said the withdrawal supports the country’s new defense strategy.

"Its primary goal is to affirm the autonomy of the Senegalese armed forces while contributing to peace in the subregion, in Africa, and globally,” Gen. Cissé said.

The ceremony marked the completion of a three-month withdrawal of roughly 350 French troops from the West African country, which began in March.

France’s military had been present in Senegal since it gained independence from France in 1960, under military cooperation agreements between the two countries.

The withdrawal followed a call by Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye last year for all foreign troops to leave, citing Senegal’s sovereignty as incompatible with hosting foreign bases.

Senegal’s new government has taken a hard-line stance on the presence of French troops as part of a larger regional backlash against what many see as the legacy of an oppressive colonial empire.

France has said it is planning to sharply reduce its presence at all its bases in Africa except in the eastern African country of Djibouti. It said it would instead provide defense training or targeted military support, based on needs expressed by those countries.

France has suffered setbacks in Africa recently, including in Chad and the Ivory Coast where it handed over its last military bases earlier this year.

They follow the ousting of French forces in recent years in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, where military-led governments have turned to Russia instead for military support.

Around 350 French servicemen are still present in Gabon, where the army has turned its base into a camp shared with the central African nation, in the Ivory Coast, where some 80 French servicemen advise and train the Ivorian military and in Djibouti, the last African country where France has a permanent military presence, with around 1,500 troops.

 

[Housecarl]

So all of those "migrants" are just "house guests"?.......

Posted for fair use.....

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/west-africas-security-woes-no-longer-frances-concern-minister-says-2025-07-25/

West Africa's security woes no longer France's concern, minister says​

By Tim Cocks
July 25, 2025 7:44 AM PDT Updated 12 hours ago

JOHANNESBURG, July 25 (Reuters) - The insecurity plaguing West Africa is no longer France's concern, its state minister for ties with Francophone countries and international partnerships said on Friday, a week after Paris handed over control of its last major military base in the region.

Thani Mohamed-Soilihi was speaking to journalists in a phone briefing in South Africa, where he was attending the Group of 20 top economies' week of discussions on global development.

"I'm sorry to say, but it no longer concerns us," Mohamed-Soilihi said, in answer to a Reuters question about the risk of insecurity posed by France's military absence.

"That's a shame, because everyone can see the difference between (now and then)," he added. "But we are looking for other ways to maintain ties (that are) not necessarily military."

In the past three years, France has gradually dismantled its once-substantial military presence in its African ex-colonies, where for decades it had beaten back jihadist militants, arrested armed criminals, rescued several presidents from armed rebellions - and, in earlier times, backed coups itself.

Since 2022, France has pulled its soldiers out of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, after military coups brought in leaders hostile to the French presence. Chad - a linchpin of the West's war against jihadists in the Sahel - abruptly ended its security cooperation pact with its former colonial master in November.

More than a decade of insurgencies in the Sahel have displaced millions and engendered economic collapse, with violence pushing further south towards West Africa's coast. The last two months have seen a surge in jihadist attacks, making them one of the deadliest periods of the Sahel's history.

"We continue to deal with countries that so wish," Mohamed-Soilihi said. "But ... France won't be able to respond to the security problems of countries with which there is no longer a relationship."

Reporting by Tim Cocks; Editing by Kevin Liffey

 

[Knoxville's Joker]

So all of those "migrants" are just "house guests"?.......

Posted for fair use.....

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/west-africas-security-woes-no-longer-frances-concern-minister-says-2025-07-25/

West Africa's security woes no longer France's concern, minister says​

By Tim Cocks
July 25, 2025 7:44 AM PDT Updated 12 hours ago

JOHANNESBURG, July 25 (Reuters) - The insecurity plaguing West Africa is no longer France's concern, its state minister for ties with Francophone countries and international partnerships said on Friday, a week after Paris handed over control of its last major military base in the region.

Thani Mohamed-Soilihi was speaking to journalists in a phone briefing in South Africa, where he was attending the Group of 20 top economies' week of discussions on global development.

"I'm sorry to say, but it no longer concerns us," Mohamed-Soilihi said, in answer to a Reuters question about the risk of insecurity posed by France's military absence.

"That's a shame, because everyone can see the difference between (now and then)," he added. "But we are looking for other ways to maintain ties (that are) not necessarily military."

In the past three years, France has gradually dismantled its once-substantial military presence in its African ex-colonies, where for decades it had beaten back jihadist militants, arrested armed criminals, rescued several presidents from armed rebellions - and, in earlier times, backed coups itself.

Since 2022, France has pulled its soldiers out of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, after military coups brought in leaders hostile to the French presence. Chad - a linchpin of the West's war against jihadists in the Sahel - abruptly ended its security cooperation pact with its former colonial master in November.

More than a decade of insurgencies in the Sahel have displaced millions and engendered economic collapse, with violence pushing further south towards West Africa's coast. The last two months have seen a surge in jihadist attacks, making them one of the deadliest periods of the Sahel's history.

"We continue to deal with countries that so wish," Mohamed-Soilihi said. "But ... France won't be able to respond to the security problems of countries with which there is no longer a relationship."

Reporting by Tim Cocks; Editing by Kevin Liffey

Most of the rejection of french presence was due to a lot of the lunacy Europe was trying to push down the local's throats...

 

[Housecarl]

Most of the rejection of french presence was due to a lot of the lunacy Europe was trying to push down the local's throats...

Very true.

 

[Plain Jane]

Most of the rejection of french presence was due to a lot of the lunacy Europe was trying to push down the local's throats...

Plus Russia is providing the security and allowing these West African countries to keep more of the revenues from mining, drilling, etc.

 

[Plain Jane]

Sudan accuses the UAE of funding Colombian mercenaries to fight alongside the RSF in civil war

Sudan has accused the United Arab Emirates of sending Colombian mercenaries to fight alongside the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces against the military in the country’s civil war.

apnews.com

World News

Sudan accuses the UAE of funding Colombian mercenaries to fight alongside the RSF in civil war​

This is a locator map for Sudan with its capital, Khartoum. (AP Photo)
By ASSOCIATED PRESS
Updated 12:17 PM EDT, August 5, 2025

CAIRO (AP) — Sudan has accused the United Arab Emirates of sending Colombian mercenaries to fight alongside the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces against the military in the country’s civil war.

The foreign ministry said in a statement Monday that the Sudanese government has “irrefutable evidence” confirming mercenaries from Colombia and some neighboring African countries were sponsored and financed by Emirati authorities. The statement didn’t share the evidence or name the neighboring countries.

“This unprecedented phenomenon poses a serious threat to peace and security in the region and across the continent,” the foreign ministry said, asserting that hundreds of thousands of mercenaries were hired from across the African continent.

In an emailed statement to The Associated Press, the UAE’s foreign affairs ministry said the government “categorically rejects” the allegations and denied involvement in the war by backing armed groups.

"The UAE emphasizes that these claims are merely attempts to derail the peace process and evade the moral, legal, and humanitarian obligations to end the conflict and pave the way for a transitional process that reflects the aspirations of the Sudanese people for security, stability and development,” the statement by the ministry’s media office added.

There was no immediate response from Colombia.

The civil war in Sudan erupted in April 2023 in Khartoum before spreading across the country following simmering tensions between the RSF and the army. The fighting has killed over 40,000 people, displaced as many as 12 million and pushed many to the brink of famine.

Sudan has long accused the UAE of being involved in the war by supplying the RSF with weapons, but the Gulf country has denied that claim.

In November, an Amnesty International report said armored vehicles manufactured by the UAE and equipped with French defense systems had been captured by the Sudanese military. A spokesperson for the Emirati government said at the time that the UAE was the “target of a coordinated disinformation campaign aimed at undermining our foreign policy, regional role and humanitarian efforts.”

Sudan’s army and the RSF both have been accused of committing atrocities like ethnic cleansing, extrajudicial killings and sexual violence against civilians, including children.

 

[Plain Jane]

Russia asks Central African Republic to replace Wagner with state-run Africa Corps and pay for it

Officials in the Central African Republic have said that Russia has called on the country to replace the private Wagner mercenary group with Moscow’s state-run Africa Corps and requested payment for further security services.

apnews.com

Russia asks Central African Republic to replace Wagner with state-run Africa Corps and pay for it​

By JEAN-FERNAND KOENA and MARK BANCHEREAU
Updated 9:16 AM EDT, August 6, 2025
Share

​

BANGUI, Central African Republic (AP) — Officials in the Central African Republic have said that Russia has called on the country to replace the private Wagner mercenary group with Moscow’s state-run Africa Corps and requested payment for further security services.

The Central African Republic’s government has been reluctant to agree to Moscow’s demands, because it sees Wagner as more effective and they prefer to pay for services with minerals, not in cash.

For years, Wagner has been in Central African Republic, where they are protecting President Faustin Archange Touadera and his government, and helped him win a 2023 constitutional referendum that could extend his power indefinitely. In exchange, they’ve enjoyed access to the country’s rich minerals, including gold.

But Russia has been trying to transition from Wagner to Africa Corps since Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, was killed in a plane crash in 2023. The Wagner mercenaries were replaced earlier this year in Mali.

A Central African Republic military official told The Associated Press on Tuesday that the Russian deputy defense minister made the demands about a shift to Africa Corps and payment for its services earlier this year during several visits to the country.

The official said government authorities are reluctant to agree, because they believe the private-run Wagner would be more effective than Africa Corps, which is under direct command of the Russian defense ministry.

Wagner has “connections with the officers, are feared operationally and have the resources,” said the official, who wasn’t allowed to publicly discuss the matter so spoke on condition of anonymity.

The military official said that according to the Russian demands, the Central African Republic “must not only cover the costs of Africa Corps personnel, but also pay significant sums of money to Russia, amounting to billions of CFA francs (millions of dollars).

“But authorities in Bangui said they are unable to pay the amount,” the official said. “Instead, they hope to compensate Russia with strategic and mineral resources, notably gold, uranium, and iron.”

A senior Central African lawmaker with direct knowledge of the negotiations confirmed the demands by Russia to the AP.

“We discussed it, and the government needs to make proposals,” said the lawmaker, who who wasn’t authorized to talk to reporters about the issue so spoke on condition of anonymity.

There are also questions regarding the Kremlin’s demand for payment. Both officials who spoke with the AP didn’t mention a specific amount, but they suggested that it was too much for the country to pay.

Russia’s Defense Ministry didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

The Central African Republic has been in conflict since 2013 when predominantly Muslim rebels seized power and forced the president from office. A 2019 peace deal was signed but six of the 14 armed groups involved in the deal withdrew from it. Wagner is credited for helping prevent the rebels from retaking the capital in 2021.

Unlike Wagner, which fights rebels alongside government forces, Africa Corps is more focused on training and that could be a contentious issues for both countries, said Ulf Laessing, head of the Sahel program at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

“In Mali, they forced them to accept the change,” Laessing said. “I don’t think the Central African Republic has options since they chased away the Europeans.”


France, the Central African Republic’s former colonial ruler, had a significant military presence in the country since it’s independence in 1960, but withdrew its last troops in 2022 after a fallout with authorities.

___

Mark Banchereau reported from Dakar, Senegal.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-air-force-rescues-76-kidnap-victims-official-says-2025-08-24/

Nigeria Air Force rescues 76 kidnap victims, official says​

By Reuters
August 24, 2025 4:30 AM PDT Updated 11 hours ago

ABUJA, Aug 24 (Reuters) - The Nigerian Air Force has rescued 76 kidnap victims, including women and children, after a precision air strike on a bandit stronghold in northwest Katsina State, authorities said on Saturday.

The operation, targeting Pauwa Hill in Kankara Local Government Area, was part of a manhunt for a gang leader named Babaro who has been linked to a mosque attack last week in the town of Malumfashi in northwest Nigeria.

One child died during the rescue, the state’s Internal Security Ministry said, but it was not clear if there were any other casualties among the kidnap victims or the gang members.

The Air Force did not immediately respond to phone calls and messages seeking comment.

The air strike could mark a breakthrough in efforts to dismantle criminal networks in northwest Nigeria, where armed gangs have terrorised rural communities for years.

Reporting by Camillus Eboh; Writing by Ben Ezeamalu; Editing by David Holmes

 

[Plain Jane]

Burkina Faso bans homosexuality with prison terms and fines for offenders

Burkina Faso’s parliament has passed a law banning homosexuality. Offenders will face two to five years in prison.

apnews.com

Burkina Faso bans homosexuality with prison terms and fines for offenders​

Burkina Faso President Ibrahim Traore arrives to the Grand Palace at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, on May 10, 2025. (Stanislav Krasilnikov/RIA Novosti via AP, file)
Read More
Updated 6:28 AM EDT, September 2, 2025

​

OUAGADOUGOU, Burkina Faso (AP) — Burkina Faso’s parliament has passed a law banning homosexuality with offenders facing two to five years in prison, the state broadcaster reported late Monday.
The amended family code was approved by the parliament on Monday in an unanimous vote that puts the code into effect more than a year after it was approved by the military government of Capt. Ibrahim Traore.

Burkina Faso joins the list of more than half of Africa’s 54 countries that have laws banning homosexuality with the penalties ranging from several years in prison to the death penalty. The laws, though criticized abroad, enjoy popularity in the countries where locals and officials have criticized homosexuality as behavior imported from abroad and not a sexual orientation.

The new law goes into effect immediately with individuals in same-sex relationships risking prison sentences as well as fines, Justice Minister Edasso Rodrigue Bayala said during a briefing broadcast by the state TV. He described homosexual acts as “bizarre behavior.”

Officials touted the new law as a recognition of “marriage and family values” in Burkina Faso.

"You will go before the judge,” the justice minister said, addressing offenders.

Burkina Faso has been run by the military following a coup in 2022 that the soldiers said was to stabilize the country amid a worsening security crisis and provide better governance.



Rights group, however, accuse the junta of clamping down on human rights with the rampant arrest and military conscription of critics.


Since coming to power in September 2022 after Burkina Faso’s second coup that year, the junta leader Traore has also positioned himself as a pan-African leader with rhetoric of independence from the West — a message that often resonates with Africa’s young population.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use......

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-us-west-africa-and-sahel-challenge

The US’ West Africa and Sahel Challenge​

August 31, 2025
By: Liam Karr

Washington needs to counter Russian propaganda in the region, and highlight that a US partnership is a win-win for the Sahel and West Africa.​

The Trump administration’s push for greater US engagement with West Africa is a smart move. The region is a focal point for geopolitical competition with China and Russia, counterterrorism efforts that bolster US security, and business potential for American investors.

However, the United States will face obstacles from within and without as it works to grow partnerships in the Gulf of Guinea, which lies along Africa’s western coast, and the Sahel, which includes neighboring landlocked countries in the lower reaches of the Sahara Desert. American officials should develop a framework that balances competing US priorities on defense, democracy, human rights, and immigration with the needs of regional partners.

To address counterterrorism interests, US officials have traveled to the Sahel to re-engage with the Alliance of Sahel States, comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. In this region, defense is a top priority, as the United States and African partners seek to degrade rapidly strengthening Al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates. American military officials describe the Sahel as the “epicenter” of global terrorism and warn that these groups could develop the ability to attack the US homeland.

The military juntas that control the three countries distanced themselves from the West after taking power and turned to Russia for support. Niger’s junta kicked out 1,000 US troops who were helping fight the terror groups and assumed control over a $110 million US-built drone base in 2024. Russian private military corporation Wagner Group has troops in all three countries.

Russia’s failures have left these countries in need, but the military regimes’ poor democratic and human rights track records limit possible US assistance. US law restricts most foreign and military aid to coup governments until a democratically elected government retakes office. US law also prohibits government assistance to foreign security forces credibly implicated in gross human rights violations. These laws exist to align US aid with American strategic interests by avoiding American support for abusive security forces that can create anti-American sentiment and agitate insurgencies.

To bridge this gap, US officials should encourage their Sahelian counterparts to take credible steps to address these issues, thereby qualifying for waivers that would enable greater US aid. This will be a challenge, as Burkinabe and Malian security forces have perpetrated several atrocities that violate US laws, and all three junta leaders have repeatedly extended their stay in power.

How American officials frame the issue will be critical. US officials should focus on discussing human rights abuses as a shared security concern, given their counterproductive nature, instead of overemphasizing US values. Until then, US officials should focus on providing non-lethal assistance and intelligence sharing as legally allowed. This cooperation will facilitate more effective counterinsurgency operations, save lives, and rebuild trust with these partners.

Greater cooperation could unlock future opportunities for critical mineral access, although this is highly unlikely in the short term. While gold, lithium, and uranium deposits can be found across the Sahel, US companies are highly unlikely to invest given the precarious security situation. This authoritarian shift has also created a hostile business environment, further limiting US private investment.

Counterterrorism is also on the agenda in the Gulf of Guinea. Countries like Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo have sought to grow defense ties with the United States to help confront insurgents. They are seeking to distance themselves from France, and the United States can help ensure Russia does not further fill the void. All three countries receive funding from America’s Global Fragility Act and are becoming increasingly important US defense partners. Congress and the administration should ensure this trajectory continues.

Through strengthened ties, the United States can also open economic opportunities. The Togolese port of Lomé—partially owned by a multinational shipping company with US stakeholders—is poised to become a regional shipping hub and gateway. Côte d’Ivoire ranks among the top ten countries on the continent in terms of GDP and GDP growth, and can serve as a conduit for American investment across the region.

A clear approach is key to preventing Russia, which is playing a zero-sum game and seeks to lock the United States out, from playing spoiler. The Kremlin views its Sahel alliance as a strategic project to help strengthen Russian influence on the continent. Russia’s position in Libya and the Sahel creates a suite of opportunities—ranging from conventional threats to irregular tools, such as weaponizing migration—for Russia to destabilize Europe. The Kremlin’s growing inroads into coastal West Africa threaten US partnerships and strengthen Russia’s ability to project power into the Atlantic, posing a long-term risk for NATO and ultimately the United States.

Moscow’s favored strategy is to use pro-Russian politicians, civil society actors, and media to falsely portray America as an exploitative power—a tactic that consistent messaging and engagement from the United States can stymie. The Trump administration is well-positioned to speak the sovereigntist, “Africa First” language prevalent in West Africa, and capitalize on it by highlighting how a US partnership is a win-win for all involved. This framing can make clear—to African officials and the public—that any anti-US Russian activities are for Moscow’s benefit, not the region’s gain.

The United States will have to balance its immigration priorities as it works with these countries, having already restricted the entry of Nigerien and Togolese citizens due to high visa overstay rates. Benin, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire could also face a travel ban—a move that has recently drawn backlash from African leaders.

The opportunities for the Trump administration in West Africa are numerous and go beyond efforts in the Gulf of Guinea and Sahel to include Trump’s summit with leaders of five other coastal West African countries in early July. However, the challenges in the Gulf of Guinea and Sahel are unique, and US officials must be prepared to deftly navigate internal obstacles while standing strong against Russia to make serious headway.

About the Author: Liam Karr​

Liam Karr is the Africa team lead for the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.

 

[Plain Jane]

BANGUI, Central African Republic (AP) — Officials in the Central African Republic have said that Russia has called on the country to replace the private Wagner mercenary group with Moscow’s state-run Africa Corps and requested payment for further security services.

The Central African Republic’s government has been reluctant to agree to Moscow’s demands, because it sees Wagner as more effective and they prefer to pay for services with minerals, not in cash.

In this region, defense is a top priority, as the United States and African partners seek to degrade rapidly strengthening Al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates. American military officials describe the Sahel as the “epicenter” of global terrorism and warn that these groups could develop the ability to attack the US homeland.

The French were run out because they were ineffective and paid very little for the minerals there. The Russians have taken some losses and don't need the minerals. Their tougher tactics have also been questioned but by entities opposed to Russia. And the terrorists just keep multiplying.

 

[Housecarl]

The French were run out because they were ineffective and paid very little for the minerals there. The Russians have taken some losses and don't need the minerals. Their tougher tactics have also been questioned but by entities opposed to Russia. And the terrorists just keep multiplying.

A big part of the problem in the region is that the governments fear that raising and training an effective force against the Jihadists will also be a threat to their own regimes.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use......

https://www.wsj.com/arts-culture/books/the-second-emancipation-review-imagining-africa-united-b8e0e3cc?mod=Searchresults&pos=11&page=1

‘The Second Emancipation’ Review: Imagining Africa United​

The 20th-century Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah saw an opportunity to move Africa past the fragmentation left behind by colonial powers.​

By Robert D. Kaplan
Aug. 29, 2025 12:00 pm ET

Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of Ghana from its independence in 1957 to his overthrow in a military coup in 1966, was in his day as important as Nelson Mandela of South Africa and Mohandas Gandhi of India. “For a shining moment mid-century,” writes Howard W. French, “Nkrumah turned Ghana into a fountainhead of emancipation from European domination, which was followed by a wave of pan-Africanism that seized” not only Africa, but the minds of leading African-Americans. Nkrumah led the way, even though he is today mostly forgotten. His country, tucked under the great bulge of West Africa, wasn’t large. Nkrumah wasn’t vastly corrupt and grandiose like Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire or Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. And as a socialist-tinged intellectual who flirted with the nonaligned Third World, he was held in suspicion in Washington and other Western capitals. But he vividly comprehended that African development was impeded by its fragmentation—its Balkanized puzzle pieces of tiny countries, the legacy of colonialism, made little economic or geographical sense. Overcoming such debilitating divisions constituted his life’s work, explains Mr. French in “The Second Emancipation: Nkrumah, Pan-Africanism, and Global Blackness at High Tide.”

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The Second Emancipation: Nkrumah, Pan-Africanism, and Global Blackness at High Tide

Mr. French, a multilingual professor of journalism at Columbia University and a former New York Times foreign correspondent, employs Nkrumah’s life story to demonstrate the blunt fact of a “global color line—the categorical discrimination against dark-skinned people”—that both poisons and destabilizes international politics. Yet the links between Africa and black America, beyond the institution of slavery, didn’t happen naturally or by accident, but peaked in the mid-20th century through a process the author traces through the lives of prominent individuals: Nkrumah himself, W.E.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, George Padmore and others. This is a sprawling book, and the better for it. Mr. French has delivered a panoramic, sympathetic, yet analytical portrait of a global black movement, deepened by his own family connections with West Africa.

He writes about little-known West African intellectuals and colonial officials in the wake of the 1884-85 Berlin Conference that partitioned colonial Africa among the European powers, and recreates Harlem in the early 20th century, with its fancy-dress elegance, where Nkrumah “felt immediately at home.” This wasn’t an easy time for Nkrumah, who experienced bouts of homelessness in the northeastern U.S. while he attended a historically black college in Pennsylvania, working night shifts to pay his way. But he intellectually matured, reading Marx and Lenin but also the 19th-century Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini, who abhorred Marxism. “By now, Nkrumah’s compass was fixed on the liberation of his continent,” Mr. French writes. Nkrumah would turn out to be an unusual African strongman: a man of books and the arguments they induce rather than of the gun and military uniform. And he came to power just as Africa was catching the world’s imagination at the still-young United Nations. The U.N., conceived of as a venue for the postwar great powers, quickly transformed itself—largely through the liberation of dozens of African states—into an arena for the airing of Third World grievances. This was part of the “high tide” of global blackness the author refers to in his subtitle: a time of numerically powerful and hopeful African states merging with a Pan-African consciousness among black elites in America and the West.

13 Books We Read This Week​

The adventurous life of Robert Louis Stevenson, a dream of African unity, Vermeer’s genius and more.

Mr. French’s story gets more somber and complicated as Nkrumah rises to power and the newly independent African states, Ghana included, experience their own internal frustrations. For all ages are ages of transition; the process of independence itself hardly ended European machinations on the continent. France, for example, drew reassurance from its influence in Africa after its defeat and occupation by Germany. Africa became the near-abroad where the “paradoxically haughty” France could show off its power.

Though Mr. French has some good words to say about the ultraradical Third World intellectual Frantz Fanon and more than a few criticisms for the moderate Republican president Dwight Eisenhower, he is too good a reporter to be ideological. Instead he locates Nkrumah’s tragedy in the budding personality cult that began to develop in the years before Nkrumah even returned home, when he formed a group with an “almost juvenile-sounding blood rite” in which an oath of loyalty was pronounced to the person of Nkrumah himself.

Nkrumah’s return home in 1947 saw him rise almost immediately to the top of the indigenous hierarchy, where he formed a “positive action” independence movement based on the nonviolence of India’s Gandhi. He was imprisoned by the British authorities in an old slave fort as almost an obligatory gesture before becoming the prime minister of the Gold Coast, as British-ruled Ghana was then called. This brought him into a tense relationship with its governor, Charles Arden-Clarke, who was, in Mr. French’s memorable words, “the perfect embodiment of British cosmological bluster,” with his plumed helmet and “constellation of medals.” Their clashes helped hone Nkrumah’s political and negotiating skills.

Ghana was the first sub-Saharan African colony to achieve independence, on March 6, 1957, with Nkrumah installed as its leader. The following year he made a triumphant state visit to the U.S., having established relationships with such disparate figures as the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. and Vice President Richard Nixon. “At the moment, he was arguably the most compelling and important statesman in what we now call the Global South,” the author writes.

Alas, though Nkrumah had long assailed the colonial borders that divided ethnic and tribal groups, and called for a federation of African states, nearly every state in Africa remained simultaneously too small and too large to make sense politically. Even diminutive Ghana was divided ethnically and tribally. Such relations were too complex and fluid to coexist with the hard and false borders erected by European colonialists. And with weak educational and institutional development, ethnic and tribal divisions become all the more paramount.

Nkrumah had inherited a former British colony that was profoundly weak internally. This had a role in Nkrumah’s own decline. Frustrated and under attack, he lashed out with deportation and detention laws, even as his own cult of personality blossomed. The personality cults that became common in sub-Saharan Africa had some roots in colonialism. Newly minted leaders had to “invent traditions from scratch,” leading to baroque syncretic creations of endless titles and bemedaled uniforms.

Moreover, due to the rampant corruption of its weak or nonexistent institutions, there was wealth accumulation at the top, even as most of the Ghanaian populace remained poor. And so Nkrumah’s rule itself declined. There were assassination attempts, which understandably fed his paranoia. The 1961 assassination (with Western connivance) of the Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba shook Nkrumah to the core.

Perhaps the most understanding assessment of Nkrumah was provided by the former U.S. ambassador William P. Mahoney in a 1975 interview: “He had a scintillating personality. He was a tremendously impressive man to meet. I think he was a man with all kinds of problems, we all have them of course.”

After the 1966 coup that removed him from power, Nkrumah went into exile in Guinea, where he continued to inspire radical black American leaders such as Stokely Carmichael. Nkrumah died in 1972 in a Romanian hospital from prostate cancer. Following his overthrow, Ghanaians experienced “ever more brazen corruption, resurgent tribalism, and political executions under a variety of regimes,” Mr. French writes. Though a democracy since 1992, “the economic takeoff that Nkrumah dreamed of has never been attained.” Thus Ghana and much of sub-Saharan Africa haven’t experienced the fantastic growth of Southeast Asia, for instance.

At the end of his epic narrative, Mr. French offers no easy answer for this disappointment. For most of history, sub-Saharan Africa has been burdened by relative geographical isolation, with comparatively few deep-water ports and the barrier of the desert that hindered trade routes from Europe and the greater Middle East. It also has a challenging climate—tropical soils aren’t that fertile. But technology in all its manifestations is plunging both Africa and the West into the crosscurrents of an increasingly globalized world, where Africa may yet find its salvation. As the fastest-growing part of the world in population, Africa will matter more and more. And Mr. French is an expert guide to its nuances.

Mr. Kaplan is the author of “Waste Land: A World in Permanent Crisis.” He holds the Robert Strausz-Hupé Chair in Geopolitics at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the August 30, 2025, print edition as 'Imagining An Africa United'.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Jihadis kill dozens in Nigeria's northeast, residents say – DW – 09/06/2025

The attack marks a major setback for the government's counterinsurgency operations and efforts to return internally displaced people to their villages.

www.dw.com

ConflictsNigeria

Jihadis kill dozens in Nigeria's northeast, residents say​

Srinivas Mazumdaru with Reuters, AFP
6 hours ago6 hours ago

The attack marks a major setback for the government's counterinsurgency operations and efforts to return internally displaced people to their villages.

Jihadis killed at least 60 people in northeastern Nigeria, including several soldiers, news agencies Reuters and AFP reported on Saturday, citing residents and official sources.

The attack took place on Friday night in the town of Darul Jama, in Borno state. Reuters and DW reporters identified the jihadist attackers as members of the notorious Boko Haram group.

Many of the victims had returned to the town only recently after years of displacement.

What do we know about the Borno attack?​

Residents said the attack on Darul Jama began around 8:30 p.m. (1930 GMT) on Friday.

Dozens of armed fighters arrived on motorbikes and began shooting indiscriminately.

They also set homes ablaze.

"They went house to house, killing men and leaving women behind. Almost every household is affected," the traditional head of Darul Jama, who requested anonymity, told Reuters.

He said 70 bodies had been recovered by Saturday morning, with more residents still missing.

Malam Bukar, who fled into the countryside with his wife and three children, said: "They came shouting, shooting everyone in sight."

"When we returned at dawn, bodies were everywhere," he told AFP.

How effective are the counterinsurgency operations?​

Boko Haram has been waging a bloody insurgency to establish an Islamic caliphate in northeast Nigeria since 2009.

The violence has so far claimed around 40,000 lives and displaced over two million people.

A splinter group called Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), formed in 2016, has also been launching attacks across the region.

According to a tally by Good Governance Africa, a nonprofit, the first six months of 2025 saw a resurgence in jihadist activity, with some 300 attacks killing about 500 civilians.

Nigeria's military says it has stepped up counterinsurgency operations in recent months to try to curb the activities of these outfits.

But the latest attack raises questions about the effectiveness of the security operations.

It also marks a setback for efforts to close down camps for the internally displaced people and return them to their villages.

Gunmen target Chinese workers​

In a separate incident, gunmen killed eight security officials and kidnapped Chinese workers in Edo state in southern Nigeria.

It happened on Friday when a group of suspected armed kidnappers attacked a convoy of the paramilitary Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and Chinese nationals working for local BUA Cement.

NSCDC spokesperson Afolabi Babawale told Reuters four Chinese workers who were kidnapped were rescued but one was missing.

Eight operatives from the agency were killed and four were seriously injured, he added.

Edited by: Rana Taha

 

[jward]

bbc.com

Borno State: Boko Haram kills at least 60 in overnight attack​

---

The jihadist group Boko Haram has killed more than 60 people in an overnight attack in Nigeria's north-eastern Borno State, local officials say.

On Friday night militants struck the village of Darul Jamal, home to a military base on the Nigeria-Cameroon border, killing at least five soldiers.
The Nigerian Air Force said it killed 30 militants in strikes after receiving reports of the raid on the village, where residents had recently returned following years of displacement.
The attack comes amid a resurgence in jihadist activity in Nigeria's north-east, with Boko Haram fights and rivals, the West African branch of the Islamic State group, stepping up attacks.
More than 20 houses and 10 buses were destroyed in Darul Jamal, while at least 13 drivers and labourers, who had been working on reconstruction efforts in the town were killed, Reuters reported.

Visiting the village on Saturday, Borno Governor Babagana Zulum said: "It's very sad, this community was resettled some months ago and they went about their normal business," he told AFP news agency.
"The numerical strength of the Nigerian army is not enough to contain the situation," he said, adding that a newly established force called the Forest Guards was set to bolster security personnel in the embattled region.
Nigerian Air Force spokesperson Ehimen Ejodame said surveillance revealed militants "fleeing northwards from the town towards nearby bushes," on Friday night.
"In a series of three precise and successive strikes, the fleeing terrorists were decisively engaged, resulting in the neutralisation of over 30 insurgents," he said.

The military has intensified operations in north-eastern Nigeria this year, following persistent targeted attacks on its formations and installations.
In April, Governor Zulum warned that Boko Haram was making a comeback after its fighters staged a series of attacks and seized control of some parts of the state.
Borno has been at the centre of a 15-year insurgency by the militant group, which has forced more than two million people to flee their homes and killed more than 40,000.

At the height of its powers in 2015, Boko Haram controlled huge areas in Borno state before being beaten back.
The fight against the militants became even more challenging after neighbouring Niger withdrew its troops from a regional force set up to tackle the jihadist group.
Boko Haram gained international notoriety in April 2014 when it kidnapped more than 270 schoolgirls from the town of Chibok, also in Borno state.


Borno State: Boko Haram kills at least 60 in overnight attack

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use......

Stove-Piped and Surveilled: The Erosion of Sahelian Intelligence Networks in an Era of Great Power Competition | Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University

Military takeovers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are splintering Sahel security as Russia and China supplant multilateral efforts.

smallwarsjournal.com

Essay| The Latest

Stove-Piped and Surveilled: The Erosion of Sahelian Intelligence Networks in an Era of Great Power Competition​

by David Heiner, by Rosa Huffman | 09.05.2025 at 06:00am

A wave of military takeovers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has triggered a broad regional realignment away from Western-backed security frameworks like the G-5 Sahel and Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Disillusionment with ECOWAS over its perceived emphasis on political conformity rather than tailored security responses escalated in July 2023 when ECOWAS issued a formal ultimatum to Niger, demanding the reinstatement of President Mohamed Bazoum and threatening military intervention. In response, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2023 and formally withdrew from ECOWAS in January 2024.

In contrast to multilateral efforts, security partnerships with Russia and China offer these regimes rapid material support, elite protection, and non-interference, an appealing alternative for leaders facing internal unrest and legitimacy crises. This article argues that the collapse of multilateral intelligence-sharing platforms and the rise of bilateral partnerships with Russia and China are fragmenting Sahelian intelligence networks, degrading counterterrorism capacity, and accelerating instability across the region. The erosion of coordinated ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), SIGINT (signals intelligence), and HUMINT (human intelligence) platforms has left security forces blind to fast-moving extremist threats, while Russia and China construct surveillance models designed to entrench authoritarian control rather than foster regional cooperation.

The G5 Sahel and MNJTF: Pillars of a Collapsing Architecture

The G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) and the MNJTF served as the region’s primary institutional platforms for intelligence sharing and counterterrorism cooperation. Established in 2017 from an earlier intergovernmental framework, the FC-G5S included Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. It was structured around five operational sectors with joint command and was tasked with cross-border counterterrorism missions, combating organized crime, and restoring state control in insecure zones. Despite limited funding and operational constraints, the force facilitated basic intelligence fusion through sector-level hubs and coordination with Western actors. INTERPOL supported the FC-G5S Police Component, integrating biometric and explosives data into battlefield assessments and enabling limited connectivity to the I-24/7 global database. These capabilities, while far from comprehensive, represented the backbone of early warning systems and actionable threat alerts. AES member states’ withdrawal collapsed this architecture, and with it, the limited but functional systems for cross-border intelligence cooperation.

The MNJTF, created in 2014 under African Union authorization, brought together Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin with headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad, and sector commands across the Lake Chad region. As with the G5 Sahel, these efforts were made possible through donor support and technical assistance from Western partners. However, the task force struggled with uneven capabilities, inconsistent rules of engagement, and limited interoperability among national forces. Intelligence integration remained shallow, and long-term strategic gains proved elusive. However, the MNJTF achieved tactical successes, including retaking territory, dismantling insurgent camps, and rescuing hostages during operations like Operation Yancin Tafki in 2019 and Operation Lake Sanity in 2022. These victories demonstrated the force’s potential when coordination and resources were available. With the withdrawal of Niger and Burkina Faso, the MNJTF’s operational reach and political cohesion have been severely undermined, further reducing the region’s already limited ability to conduct integrated threat tracking.

Operational Gaps: The Degradation of ISR, SIGINT, and HUMINT​

The withdrawal of key international partners from the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin has significantly degraded intelligence capabilities across multiple domains. The Sahel has few formal intelligence fusion centers, but de facto platforms once played key roles in integrating intelligence disciplines such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); signals intelligence (SIGINT); human intelligence (HUMINT); and open-source intelligence (OSINT). These included EUCAP support cells, French military intelligence nodes, and ad hoc operations centers linked to the G5 Sahel and MNJTF. Their dismantling has resulted in the stove piping of information, limited dissemination, and slower analytical processing. France’s drawdown of Operation Barkhane and the closure of US and French drone bases in Niamey have removed essential aerial surveillance platforms, including fixed-wing aircraft and Reaper drones. These platforms once enabled persistent coverage of jihadist transit corridors and supported joint targeting operations. With the dissolution of joint operations centers, real-time technical feeds are no longer integrated across sectors, and situational awareness has deteriorated in areas where violent extremist groups remain highly mobile and technologically adaptive.

Human intelligence collection in the Sahel region has also suffered significant setbacks due to the physical withdrawal of international advisors and the gradual attrition of local informant networks. Many of these human sources were developed over years of embedded cooperation within French military operations in the Sahel and the European Union Capacity Building Mission in the Sahel (EUCAP Sahel), which played critical roles in training, mentoring, and facilitating The departure of foreign personnel has disrupted these established channels, leading to the loss, compromise, or silencing of informants who were vital for providing timely early warning of ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and insurgent troop movements. Without them, national forces lack real-time situational awareness, reducing the effectiveness of kinetic operations and increasing the likelihood of delayed or failed interdictions. Coordination mechanisms for deconfliction and strike prioritization have also been lost, impairing both precision and force protection.

Emergence of Alternative Security Providers: Russia’s Wagner, to the Africa Corps Group Model​

Russia’s growing role in the Sahel reflects a pivot from multilateral security cooperation toward regime-centric partnerships that fragment regional counterterrorism efforts. As Western counterterrorism partnerships erode, Russia has moved to fill the strategic vacuum in the Sahel by expanding the footprint of the Wagner Group, a Kremlin-linked private military company. Wagner initially entered Mali in late 2021 under a bilateral agreement with the transitional government led by Assimi Goïta, reportedly in exchange for mining concessions and political support. While Russian officials claim Wagner operatives—now operating as Africa Corps under the Russian Ministry of Defense—provide counterterrorism assistance, the group’s activities focus overwhelmingly on regime protection, elite security, and suppression of dissent. Units have been linked to extrajudicial killings, particularly in central Mali, where Wagner fighters alongside the Malian army perpetrated the March 2022 Moura massacre, resulting in over 500 civilian deaths.

By embedding closed security structures within host regimes, Russia has sidelined regional cooperation mechanisms and diminished multilateral oversight. Despite claims of Russian withdrawal in early 2024 following internal leadership turmoil and the death of Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group has not fully vacated the Sahel. Elements rebranded under the Russian Ministry of Defense or affiliated contractors remain active. In Burkina Faso, Wagner personnel have reportedly trained presidential guard units and deployed to protect key mining and infrastructure sites. Similar reports suggest a limited advisory presence in Niger, where Russia has sought diplomatic overtures to the junta.

Wagner’s intelligence model is designed to prioritize secrecy and unilateral control, undermining early warning systems and joint threat analysis, reflecting a broader Russian tendency to prioritize operational secrecy and unilateral control over multilateral coordination. There is no established mechanism for sharing intelligence with regional partners or multilateral bodies such as the African Union or INTERPOL. Instead, tactical information collected via drone surveillance, reconnaissance patrols, or local informant networks is typically retained within closed circuits, accessible to host governments and Russian handlers. Wagner has flown Orlan-10 surveillance drones in Mali since 2020, allowing them to draw on imagery to guide both regime protection and resource extraction efforts. Wagner also purchased two commercial satellites from the Chinese firm Beijing Yunze Technology Co. Ltd. to aid intelligence operations. Russia’s broader approach to security partnerships in Africa operates without a coherent public strategy and instead with plausible deniability, regime survival, and the consolidation of influence rather than collective threat mitigation.

Continued......

 

[Housecarl]

Continued......

Russia’s intelligence doctrine is built on strategic manipulation rather than cooperative security, weakening its reliability as a counterterrorism partner. For Russia, intelligence serves to project and retain power. Intelligence sharing, particularly for counter-terrorism purposes, has historically been used to gain a strategic advantage and undermine the West. Rather than gathering robust intelligence, the Russian FSB frequently relies on limited information, leading to broad, indiscriminate targeting rather than the precise identification of extremists. During its intervention in the Syrian civil war from 2015 to 2025, Russia leveraged intelligence sharing with the United States under the guise of joint counterterrorism and collective security operations to gain greater monitoring capabilities of the US and territorial advantage in Syria. Russia’s intelligence approach prioritizes political relevance over collaboration. It forms bilateral partnerships focused on regime stability, viewing those misaligned with internal interests as unproductive, highlighting the risks of relying on Russian intelligence in the Sahel.

Russia’s intelligence posture in the Sahel reflects a broader shift away from collective security and toward transactional, regime-centric partnerships that fragment regional coordination. By treating intelligence as a tool of political leverage rather than shared security, Russia degrades early warning systems, obstructs multilateral threat tracking, and erodes trust between states. Its presence entrenches a model in which authoritarian stability is prioritized over long-term counterterrorism effectiveness, accelerating the region’s descent into disjointed and opaque security governance.

China’s Security Offer: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Strategic Access​

China’s expanding security role in Africa reflects a model of influence that emphasizes surveillance and regime preservation over shared regional threat mitigation. China has steadily increased its security footprint in Africa through its Global Security Initiative (GSI), a diplomatic and defense strategy unveiled by President Xi Jinping in 2022 to reshape international security norms around the principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and regime preservation. Through collective stability initiatives, China’s GSI seeks to bridge gaps between security frameworks, particularly following the recent fragmentation with the formation of AES. While China has avoided deploying military personnel in the Sahel, it has pursued bilateral security agreements that emphasize technological capacity-building and surveillance-driven governance.

By promoting surveillance-driven governance tools over interoperable intelligence platforms, China substitutes internal control for regional coordination. Central to China’s security model in Africa is the export of integrated surveillance systems, primarily through state-owned enterprises such as Huawei and the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC). These platforms are most prominently exemplified by the Safe Cities initiative, which deploys facial recognition cameras, license plate readers, AI-assisted video analytics, and centralized command centers for real-time policing. In Burkina Faso, the “Smart Burkina” project will deploy 900 surveillance cameras across Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, supported by a national fiber-optic network, centralized command centers, and hundreds of mobile and vehicle-mounted terminals. In Nigeria, Kaduna State signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Huawei Technologies in May 2024 to advance a Smart City Project aimed at enhancing security, efficiency, and digital governance. These systems significantly enhance domestic intelligence collection and urban threat monitoring capabilities. Huawei and CETC platforms also provide the Chinese government with potential access to vast surveillance networks, enabling offensive monitoring of population behavior and control over key sectors such as mining, manufacturing, education, and logistics. Rather than facilitating intelligence-sharing, these technologies reflect broader Chinese goals of regime support, strategic access, and long-term economic entrenchment under the banner of digital sovereignty.

China has also provided training programs for cybersecurity officers, biometric data technicians, and digital forensics teams. Partnerships with institutions like the Chinese People’s Public Security University facilitate training exchanges, while joint initiatives with Chinese telecommunications providers have established encrypted data storage hubs under national jurisdiction. These efforts reinforce data sovereignty and ensure that intelligence gathered through Chinese platforms remains outside Western or multilateral access. At the 2024 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit, Beijing pledged $140 million in security assistance to the continent. Over the following three years, China committed to training 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 law enforcement officers, including joint exercises, expanded Chinese defense attaché presence, and the hosting of African officers in Chinese cities.

These initiatives underscore China’s growing role in shaping Africa’s security environment, enhancing regime surveillance while offering little utility for regional counterterrorism coordination due to data sovereignty and unilateral intelligence collection. Chinese systems are not interoperable with NATO-standard ISR platforms or Western geospatial intelligence feeds, and information is unlikely to be shared amidst increasing animosity with the United States and partner nations. Moreover, the terms of engagement often include data exclusivity clauses, preventing even friendly governments from sharing collected intelligence externally. The Global Data Security Initiative emphasizes “cyber sovereignty” and autonomy for individual nations. China’s rhetoric surrounding non-interference discourages cooperation on shared security goals. Sahelian states aligned with China gain tools for internal control but lose capacity for integrated regional threat assessment and response.

Shifting Norms: The Decline of Western-Led Security Governance​

The security models offered by Russia and China reflect a clear departure from the multilateral, transparency-based frameworks once promoted by Western actors. The Wagner and GSI models emphasize regime security, bilateral control, and non-interference, in contrast to Western priorities of interoperability, civilian oversight, and regional coordination. As a result, intelligence sharing becomes transactional and asymmetrical. Platforms such as AFRICOM’s ISR sharing networks, INTERPOL’s I-24/7 system, and EU-supported security-sector reform programs are sidelined, and cross-border coordination is replaced by fragmented national silos. This divergence has undermined regional early warning systems and reduced the frequency, precision, and effectiveness of joint counterterrorism responses.

Conclusion: How Fragmentation Fuels Extremist Expansion​

The erosion of intelligence capabilities and the rise of alternative security providers have created a permissive environment for jihadist expansion. Groups like ISWAP and JNIM now operate with greater freedom in border regions, while national forces struggle with diminished ISR coverage and degraded HUMINT and SIGINT networks. Arrest operations and kinetic strikes occur less frequently and are more likely to fail. Strategically, fragmented politics and misaligned partnerships erode cohesion and complicate international support. Without a unified counterterrorism architecture, external assistance risks dispersing efforts rather than reinforcing regional capacity.

This emerging security order carries grave risks. If current trajectories continue, the Sahel may become a testing ground for surveillance-driven, regime-centric models that sacrifice long-term stability. Counterterrorism becomes performative, with intelligence systems consolidating elite power instead of addressing shared threats. Jihadist actors exploit these gaps, embedding them in ungoverned spaces and further weakening fragile states.

To reverse this trend, Western and regional actors must rethink intelligence cooperation. Rather than multilateral frameworks, international partners should support adaptable, sovereignty-conscious models that strengthen localized capabilities while incentivizing transparency and interoperability. Sustained investment not only in matériel, but in training, liaison networks, and analytical infrastructure, is essential to restoring early warning and deterring extremist expansion. The longer the region remains fragmented, the harder it will be to reclaim ground lost to authoritarian influence and transnational militancy.

 

[Plain Jane]

As Ethiopia launches Africa's biggest dam, citizens are hopeful despite concerns by Egypt and Sudan

Ethiopia will inaugurate the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam along the Blue Nile on Tuesday. It is expected to produce more than 5,000 megawatts, part of which will be exported to neighboring countries.

apnews.com

As Ethiopia launches Africa’s biggest dam, citizens are hopeful despite concerns by Egypt and Sudan​

EVELYNE MUSAMBI and AMANUEL GEBREMEDHIN BIRHANE
Updated 5:10 AM EDT, September 8, 2025
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ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia (AP) — Fanuse Adete is among those Ethiopians looking forward to finally getting connected to the national electricity grid when the Grand Renaissance Dam, which will be inaugurated Tuesday, becomes fully operational.

The 38-year-old widowed mother of seven, who lives in the Menabichu district just 10 kilometers (6 miles) outside the capital, Addis Ababa, currently survives on kerosene lamps and candles to light up her mud-walled hut at night.

“Previously, our daily lives relied on kerosene lamps and charcoal, which posed significant challenges. We would transport firewood to the market, selling it to buy kerosene and bread for our children. However, with the completion of the dam, our entire community is now happy,” she said, while lighting up firewood to make Ethiopian coffee.


Ethiopia will inaugurate the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam along the Blue Nile on Tuesday. It is expected to produce more than 5,000 megawatts, doubling Ethiopia’s current output, part of which will be exported to neighboring countries.

People alight an electric bus on the streets of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Friday, Sept. 6, 2025. (AP Photo/Brian Inganga)

The dam, whose construction began in 2011, has raised concerns from neighboring Egypt and Sudan over the potential reduction of water levels downstream.

Despite the formation of a joint panel to discuss the sharing of the Blue Nile water, tensions remain high and some, like Egypt, have termed the move a security risk, saying it could lead to drought downstream.

But Ethiopia insists that the towering dam will not only benefit its more than 100 million people, but also its neighbors, and sees it as an opportunity to become Africa’s leading electricity exporter.

Ethiopian Water Minister Habtamu Itefa said his country has no intention of harming any of the neighboring countries.


“So the way forward is: let’s work together for more investment. Let’s join hands to propose more projects that can benefit all of us, wherever they may be. This can be scaled up to Nile Basin countries—to Uganda, to Tanzania, to Rwanda, to D.R.C., to South Sudan, to Kenya, to Ethiopia, to Egypt as well,” he said.

Water experts in downstream Egypt say the dam has reduced the amount of water the country receives, and the government had to come up with short-term solutions such as reducing annual consumption and recycling irrigation water.

“Egypt was able to overcome this shortage through Egypt’s High Dam, which has a water reserve that is used to replace what was lost due to the GERD. But we can’t always rely on this reserve for water supply,” said Abbas Sharaky, a professor of geology and water resources at Cairo University.

Sudanese experts say seasonal flooding has decreased during the dam’s filling, but they warn that uncoordinated water releases could lead to sudden flooding or extended dry periods.

But Itefa said that so far, the water levels recorded downstream during the dry season were “three to four-fold what they used to get before the dam.”

“This means, at the expense of the dam we built, they can have their irrigation land. Three to four-fold, they can increase that, because we are providing more water during the dry months. It is a blessing for them,” said the minister.

Yacob Arsano, who teaches hydro politics in the Nile Basin at Addis Ababa University, said Ethiopia was “very careful” with the design and planning of the dam to ensure water flows downstream throughout the year.

“Egypt continues to receive the water. Ethiopia continues to send water. So that is the remaining fact and for which how to organize such a shared use of water resources depends on the two sides. All of the upstream and downstream countries need to sit down properly and soberly,” he said.

For Ethiopians, the prospect of increased electricity supply to enhance development is welcome news. Amakelech Debalke Gebre-Giorgis, a mother of two in Addis Ababa, is looking forward to it.

"We want to see more development, and we want to see more electricity become part of our daily life, and we’re all excited,” said the mother of two.

Children rehearse for the inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Saturday, Sept. 6, 2025. (AP Photo/Brian Inganga)

 

[Plain Jane]

Sudan's Hidden War: Muslim Brotherhood's Grip On Army Threatens Regional Stability, Global Trade | ZeroHedge

ZeroHedge - On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero

www.zerohedge.com

Sudan's Hidden War: Muslim Brotherhood's Grip On Army Threatens Regional Stability, Global Trade​

by Tyler Durden
Thursday, Sep 11, 2025 - 03:30 AM
Authored by Anna Mahjar-Barducci via The Gatestone Institute,
Sudan's brutal civil war, often overshadowed by global headlines, is not just a clash between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and their former military allies turned rivals, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). It is a calculated power grab by the Muslim Brotherhood, which appears to be using the SAF as a Trojan horse to dominate northeast Africa and the Red Sea, a critical artery for global commerce.

Despite recent moves by SAF leader General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan to curb Islamist influence, presumably at the request of the United States or Egypt, the efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has deep roots in his army, to achieve control of Sudan, northeast Africa and the Red Sea, signal a dangerous threat that could disrupt oil supplies, inflate global prices, and revive Sudan as a terrorist hub, imperiling Western interests.

The Muslim Brotherhood, sponsored by Qatar, appears to be hijacking the SAF to stage a takeover, recycling old alliances under new guises. Despite recent concessions to the United States and Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood's grip in Sudan -- backed by Qatar and Iran -- threatens regional and global stability, potentially including freedom of passage in the Red Sea. The U.S. would do well to intensify sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and support regional actors in efforts to dismantle these networks.

The Muslim Brotherhood's influence is increasingly recognized as a global threat by governments in countries such as the United States and France. A May 21, 2025 report requested by the French government on the Muslim Brotherhood's role in France and Europe, detailed the threats posed by the Islamist movement shaping "parallel Islamic ecosystems," challenging Western secular values.

A Legacy of Islamist Control​

Sudan's descent into chaos began in 1989, when General Omar Al-Bashir, backed by the Muslim Brotherhood's National Islamic Front, seized power. For three decades, his regime orchestrated genocides in South Sudan and Darfur, sheltered Osama bin Laden from 1992 to 1997, and enabled Al-Qaeda's attacks, including the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Bashir's regime also funneled Iranian missiles to Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and supported Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, making Sudan a global extremist stronghold.

The 2019 ouster of Al-Bashir had sparked hopes for democracy, but Burhan's 2021 coup against the transitional government and the 2023 war with the RSF, which wanted to defeat Burhan and his Muslim Brotherhood allies and take over the country, crushed those dreams. Beneath the surface, the Muslim Brotherhood — known in Sudan as the Islamic Movement — has entrenched itself in the SAF, and turned it into a tool for their regional ambitions to take control of northeast Africa and the Red Sea.

The Muslim Brotherhood is not just allied with the SAF; individuals in it seem to be steering the SAF to take total control of Sudan in order to make it the Muslim Brotherhood's stronghold in Africa and the Middle East.


Sudan, at the crossroads of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, happens to be in an extremely critical strategic position. It has access to the Red Sea and vital trade routes such as the Suez Canal, and is also a crucial transit point for migrants traveling from the Horn of Africa and the Sahel to North Africa, then on to Europe.

The SAF is infiltrated by jihadist factions such as the Al-Bara Bin Malik Brigade (the Muslim Brotherhood's local military arm), the Bunyan Al-Marsous Brigade, and Justice and Equality Movement rebels led by Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim. These groups, tied to Bashir's ruthless National Intelligence and Security Service, frame their fight as a "jihad" against the RSF, which is backed by Sudan's secular civil society.

Social media videos show the Al-Bara Bin Malik Brigade, in Omdurman, halting RSF advances and bolstering SAF operations in Khartoum. A retired officer told the media that Islamic extremists have filled critical infantry gaps. Ali Ahmed Karti, the U.S.-sanctioned Islamic Movement leader, is, as reported by Arab media outlets, a key orchestrator of the SAF-Muslim Brotherhood alliance. Since his student days, Karti has organized Brotherhood loyalists in the army, and later packed the SAF with jihadists.

Reports in the Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat reveal that after 1989, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, which was aligned with the Bashir government, purged thousands of non-fundamentalist officers, assassinating some, and took control of admissions to the Military Colleges. By 2019, the SAF was ideologically aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood.

It was Karti's ideological influence that apparently derailed the possibility of a civilian-led transitional government in Sudan after the October 2021 military coup. Karti also unleashed jihadist battalions, which were rebranded as Burhan's "Popular Resistance."

This summer, there seemed to be cracks in the alliance between the SAF and the Muslim Brotherhood. In August, Burhan fired five senior generals who are Islamic extremists, including General Nasreddin, head of the SAF Armored Corps, whom the Muslim Brotherhood had reportedly been grooming as a potential successor to Burhan. One analyst suggested that the five generals were dismissed after Burhan met with U.S. Special Envoy Mossad Boulos in Switzerland, on August 11, 2025. Researcher Mujahid Ahmed, however, warns that the Muslim Brotherhood's influence persists, extending into civilian institutions, especially the foreign affairs and justice ministries. According to the Ayin Network, Al-Burhan apparently still relies on Karti and Bashir's loyalist, Ahmed Haroun, for battlefield support, indicating a tactical, not total, break.

Iran's Arms and Qatar's Role


Iran has been supplying the Muslim Brotherhood-SAF axis with arms, including Ababil-3 and Mohajer-6 drones, which were delivered to Port Sudan in March and June 2024. Satellite imagery viewed by the BBC confirms their presence at a military site near Khartoum. Iran's support of this Muslim Brotherhood-SAF axis, tied to its ambitions to have a presence in the Red Sea, coincides with the Brotherhood's goals: namely, threatening U.S. allies such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Why It Matters to the West

The Red Sea handles 10-15% of the world's maritime commerce, including vital oil and gas shipments. In a conflict, the Muslim Brotherhood-controlled Sudan, using the SAF as a proxy, could choke this route as the Houthis have been doing, thereby spiking prices and impairing American and other economies. The Muslim Brotherhood's ties to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State risk turning Sudan into a terrorist base targeting Western and allied Middle Eastern interests.

Trump's Sudan Gamble

The Trump administration is navigating a tightrope, trying, it seems, to balance Egypt's pro-SAF stance. Egypt is actively supporting the SAF to bolster its stability as a national institution, while simultaneously working to curb the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and its sponsor, Qatar. Ayin Network noted that Egypt insists "the SAF must remain central to any post-war political order." Burhan's "cosmetic" purge of Islamist generals shows that he can indeed be influenced by Egypt and by the United States, but his reliance on the Muslim Brotherhood's financial and military support limits his ability to implement any reforms .

A Global Wake-Up Call

Sudan is evidently very much a part of the Muslim Brotherhood's global agenda. Ignoring events there will only allow a hostile stronghold to emerge in a region strategically vital for the interests of the West.

 

[Plain Jane]

Military-run Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger pull out of key international court

Ruling military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger say the three countries are withdrawing from the International Criminal Court.

apnews.com

Military-run Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger pull out of key international court​

Updated 4:39 AM EDT, September 23, 2025
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BAMAKO, Mali (AP) — Ruling military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger say the three countries are withdrawing from the International Criminal Court, accusing the global tribunal of what they say is selective justice.

The pullout was not unexpected in the wake of the coups that brought the juntas to power in the three western African countries. The ICC, based in The Hague, is the world’s permanent global tribunal for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

Since the coups, the three countries’ military leaders abandoned longtime partners, including the West and the West Africa regional bloc. They have established new alliances, mainly with Russia, whose President Vladimir Putin faces an arrest warrant by the ICC over Russia’s war in Ukraine.

In a joint statement late on Monday announcing their withdrawal, the three said the ICC has become an “instrument of neocolonial repression in the hands of imperialism,” without elaborating on the allegation. The juntas also said they are seeking more “sovereignty” and hinted at a local option to the court.

The withdrawal process from the ICC takes at least a year to complete. Earlier this year, Hungary also announced its withdrawal from the court.

 

[Plain Jane]

Bill Maher's Unexpected Rant Targets A Crisis Ignored By The Media | ZeroHedge

ZeroHedge - On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero

www.zerohedge.com

Bill Maher's Unexpected Rant Targets A Crisis Ignored By The Media​

by Tyler Durden
Monday, Sep 29, 2025 - 07:20 AM
Via VigilantFox.com,
Something terrible is happening in Nigeria, and too few Americans, even Republicans, know it exists.

For years, Nigeria has been one of the most dangerous countries in the world to be a Christian. Radical groups like Boko Haram and Fulani militants have waged relentless campaigns of terror, massacring villages, kidnapping women and children, and destroying churches.



According to leading human rights groups, over 15 million Christians have been displaced since 2009, tens of thousands killed, and more than 19,000 churches burned to the ground. Survivors describe a systematic attempt to erase Christianity from vast regions of the country.

Despite these staggering numbers, the story rarely breaks into Western headlines, and the silence has left millions unaware of the scale of the crisis.

However, that chilling reality got exposed on Bill Maher’s show on Friday.

Maher, a proud atheist, had a surprising moment on air when he called out this slaughter of Christians that the media ignores.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1971778531882316036

View: https://twitter.com/VigilantFox/status/1971778531882316036?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1971778531882316036%7Ctwgr%5E116b8865330fa83abde7851a7d01df4cfeb9aea9%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.zerohedge.com%2Fgeopolitical%2Fbill-mahers-unexpected-rant-targets-crisis-ignored-media


“If you don’t know what’s going on in Nigeria, your media sources SUCK,” Maher said bluntly.

“You are in a BUBBLE. I’m not a Christian, but they are systematically killing the Christians in Nigeria,” he continued.

“They’ve killed over 100,000 since 2009. They’ve burned 18,000 churches… They are literally attempting to wipe out the Christian population of an entire country.”

Pointing to the focus on Gaza, Maher asked, “Where are the kids protesting this?”

His diatribe drew a huge applause from the crowd, and a big thank you from Rep. Nancy Mace (R – South Carolina) for putting a spotlight on the crisis.

“Absolutely,” Maher responded.

For once, this story got the attention it deserved. And it took a classic liberal like Bill Maher — not the media — to put a spotlight on one of the greatest humanitarian crises of our time.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Shabaab claims prison assault in Mogadishu

Shabaab, Al Qaeda’s branch for East Africa, claimed yesterday’s assault on Somalia’s Godka Jilacow prison in Mogadishu. The facility is operated by Somalia’s national intelligence service, representing a major intelligence failure.

www.longwarjournal.org

Shabaab claims prison assault in Mogadishu​

By Caleb Weiss | October 5, 2025 | @Caleb_Weiss7

Somalia’s capital of Mogadishu was yet again the victim of a brazen terrorist attack conducted by Shabaab, Al Qaeda’s branch for East Africa. Yesterday, at least seven Shabaab gunmen stormed the Godka Jilacow prison, operated by Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), freeing dozens of prisoners and holding the facility for several hours. The assault represents another intelligence failure by government authorities regarding the jihadist group.

Much like other Shabaab assaults on military outposts and security facilities, yesterday’s attack began with a suicide car bomb on the prison’s main gate before gunmen entered the facility and attacked guards, freed prisoners, and took control of the prison. According to the Somali government, the suicide car bomb utilized a truck disguised as a NISA vehicle, while the Shabaab militants were dressed as Somali security personnel.

Exact figures from the raid are scarce. Dozens of prisoners are believed to have escaped, though some were later recaptured. Security casualties also remain unclear, but fatalities are expected given the scale and duration of the attack, with Somali security forces only regaining control over the facility early Sunday morning.

Shabaab was quick to claim the prison assault, releasing a statement online claiming it was part of an operation dubbed “Support for the Oppressed” and that the explicit goal was to “free all the Muslim prisoners the apostates had been holding and torturing there.” The statement also confirmed the use of a suicide bombing, marking at least the 22nd such bombing in Somalia so far this year, according to data compiled by FDD’s Long War Journal.

Shabaab has a history of using disguised operatives to infiltrate security facilities, such as earlier this year, when a suicide bomber detonated himself during a Somali army recruitment drive. That Shabaab was able to utilize not only NISA uniforms but also a vehicle disguised as one of the agency’s represents a significant intel failure and only further exemplifies the ability of Shabaab to infiltrate deep into Somalia’s security agencies.

The Al Qaeda branch also has a long history of prison breaks and assaults. Last year, Shabaab inmates in Mogadishu’s Central Prison staged a revolt in an attempt to escape. In 2021, Shabaab freed hundreds of prisoners after raiding Bosaso’s central prison in northern Somalia. In 2020, Shabaab inmates mounted a revolt in Mogadishu’s Central Prison, while in 2017, the group detonated a suicide car bomb outside the prison’s walls in another attempt to free prisoners.

The assault on the Godka Jilacow prison also came just hours after the Somali government lifted security restrictions on over 50 roads in Mogadishu to show that the capital is now safer. It is so far unclear if this easing of restrictions had anything to do with the prison assault—it is likely just a coincidence—but the move further highlights the city’s remaining security concerns and Shabaab’s lingering ability to deeply penetrate Mogadishu’s security installations.

Importance of jihadist prison breaks

Jailbreaks can often be a boon for jihadist groups, including Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and others. In addition to the significant propaganda value of such operations, these incidents can swell ranks, reinforce capabilities by freeing more highly trained individuals, and provide groups with a new sense of direction after springing leaders and key personnel.

It is for these reasons that jailbreaks are specifically a major part of the Islamic State’s overall global strategy, for example, and are often called for by the group’s central leadership as part of its long-term “Breaking the Walls” policy that originated during the Iraq War.

In recent years, the Islamic State has mounted significant prison breaks in northeastern Syria, eastern Afghanistan, just outside of Nigeria’s capital city of Abuja, across Central Asia, and twice in eastern Congo in the cities of Beni and Butembo. Several of these incidents came after Islamic State leaders publicly called for such operations.

Al Qaeda has also placed increased emphasis on its cadres launching prison breaks, particularly in Africa. For example, between 2018 and 2020, Al Qaeda’s Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), its official branch in West Africa, launched several prison breaks in Mali and Burkina Faso. These operations garnered explicit praise from Al Qaeda’s General Command (its overall global leadership), which also told JNIM to continue such attempts.

Shabaab’s statement about yesterday’s prison assault in Mogadishu spoke to the ideological importance of such operations, saying:

[The assault] targeted the enemy’s main artery and resulted in the liberation of Muslim prisoners who had been subjected to injustice and oppression at the hands of the apostates. Today, they have returned free to their families and regions. […] [The military leadership] asks God to accept the martyrs who sacrificed their lives to uphold the word of God, eradicate polytheism and disbelief from the earth, and support the oppressed Muslims suffering in the prisons of the Crusaders and apostates.

As jihadi leaders from both the Islamic State and Al Qaeda continue to call for such operations, prison assaults and mutinies will likely continue.

Caleb Weiss is an editor of FDD's Long War Journal and a senior analyst at the Bridgeway Foundation, where he focuses on the spread of the Islamic State in Central Africa.

 

[Plain Jane]

Desperate search for fuel in Mali's capital as al-Qaida-linked group enforces blockade

Residents in Mali's capital, Bamako, are struggling with a fuel shortage due to a blockade by a militant group linked to al-Qaida.

apnews.com

Desperate search for fuel in Mali’s capital as al-Qaida-linked group enforces blockade​

BABA AHMED
Updated 10:50 PM EDT, October 7, 2025

​

BAMAKO, Mali (AP) — Endless lines stretched in front of gas stations in Mali’s capital Bamako late into Monday night, as commuters desperately tried to find fuel. Residents are starting to feel the impact of a blockade on fuel imports to the city declared in early September by a militant group affiliated with al-Qaida.

Amadou Berthé, a bank employee in Bamako, said he traveled 20 kilometers (12 miles) by motorcycle taxi to find gas for his car, which broke down due to a lack of fuel as he was returning from work

“I’ve been to more than 20 gas stations and still can’t find any fuel,” Berthé said, sitting on the back of the motorcycle with an empty jerry can on his knees.

Militants from Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) have relentlessly attacked fuel tankers coming from neighboring Senegal and Ivory Coast, plunging the capital of the landlocked West African country into crisis. Despite being one of Africa’s top gold producers, Mali is ranked the sixth least developed nation in the world, with nearly half its population living below the national poverty line.

Some oil importers in Mali have started to use alternative ways of bringing fuel into the country in order to protect their staff and their businesses.

"I transport fuel in my tankers from Dakar (the capital of Senegal) to the border with Mali, where I sell it to traders who then take the risk of bringing it into Mali,” a Malian fuel importer, who spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear of reprisals, told the AP.


“Of course, I don’t earn much, but it’s the only way I’ve found to keep my employees and tanker trucks safe,” the importer said.

Analysts say the blockade poses huge risks for the fragile local economy and is a significant setback for Mali’s military junta, which took power in 2021 promising to improve security.

Instead, attacks from militants linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State group have intensified in recent months.

Beverly Ochieng, an analyst at the Control Risks Group consulting firm, said JNIM is using the blockade to pressure commercial operators and residents to distance themselves from the military authorities, therefore undermining the government’s legitimacy and authority.

JNIM is one of several armed groups operating in the Sahel, a vast strip of semi-arid desert stretching from North Africa to West Africa, where an insurgency is spreading rapidly with large-scale attacks.

In a report released last month, the Malian Petroleum Importers Association said over 100 tanker trucks had been burned and destroyed by JNIM fighters.

Videos on social media in recent weeks show what appears to be truck drivers being held hostage by JNIM and calling for their release. The Associated Press was unable to independently verify the footage.

According to their relatives, some tanker drivers were also killed by the militants.

Lamine Kounta, a 38-year-old Bamako resident, said two of his cousins from Ivory Coast, a driver and his apprentice, were killed by JNIM fighters at the end of September in the Sikasso region, near the border with Ivory Coast.

“They had nothing to do with this crisis or Mali. My cousins worked for an Ivorian road construction company and were in Mali to get equipment when they encountered JNIM fighters, who killed them,” he said.

In a press release, the Ivorian company CIVOTECH confirmed the deaths of two fuel tanker drivers and an apprentice driver on Sept. 21 in the Sikasso region.

In response to the embargo, the Malian army has started escorting some truck convoys on the roads between Bamako and the borders with Senegal and Ivory Coast.


In a statement on Monday, the army said it destroyed the hideouts of the JNIM fighters responsible for a recent attack on a tanker convoy in the Kolondiéba area, near the border with Ivory Coast.

 

[jward]

George
@BehizyTweets

While at a burial of more slaughtered Nigerian Christians, this pastor made a plea to President Trump to come to their rescue.

"Please tell Trump to save our life in Nigeria."

More than 7,000 Nigerian Christians have been slaughtered by Islamic insurgents so far this year.

The United States should absolutely use soft power to put maximum pressure on the regime in charge of Nigeria. Trump listed Nigeria as a “Country of Particular Concern” in his first term to apply pressure on them to stop the massacre, but in 2021, the Biden State Department reversed it, claiming the violence wasn’t about religious persecution but the impact of climate change.

YOU CAN'T MAKE THIS UP!!!
rt 1

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1979604738225377569

View: https://twitter.com/BehizyTweets/status/1979604738225377569

 

[Plain Jane]

Sudan's capital is targeted by paramilitary drone attack for third day

A Sudanese paramilitary force has targeted the capital and main airport with drones. The attack came just a day after the first passenger flight in two years landed in the city.

apnews.com

Sudan’s capital is targeted by paramilitary drone attack for third day​

This is a locator map for Sudan with its capital, Khartoum. (AP Photo)
By FAY ABUELGASIM
Updated 5:02 AM EDT, October 23, 2025

BEIRUT (AP) — A Sudanese paramilitary force targeted the country’s capital and its main airport on Thursday with drones, just a day after the first passenger flight in two years landed in the city, according to military officials and local media.

The attack by the Rapid Support Forces came as the group seeks to maintain pressure against Sudan’s military while the deadlocked conflict grinds on.

The Sudanese military intercepted the drones, which caused no damage, said a military official who spoke on condition of anonymity since he was not authorized to speak to journalists. The RSF and the military did not immediately acknowledge the attack.

War broke out in Sudan in 2023, when the Sudanese military and the RSF, once allies, turned on each other, leading to widespread fighting across the country.

The Sudanese military retook the capital, Khartoum, from the paramilitary force in March, but it needed months to repair Khartoum International Airport before the local Badr airlines landed a plane there on Wednesday.

The drone attack came as the International Organization for Migration and other U.N. agencies called for “urgent international attention on the crisis in Sudan, to address the immense suffering and growing dangers to the population.”

In a joint statement, the organizations called for the “immediate cessation of hostilities and protection of civilians, especially children, and unhindered humanitarian access to all affected populations, including a UN presence throughout the country.”


The fighting has killed at least 40,000 people, according to the World Health Organization. Some 30 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in the country, making it the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.

One of hardest hit areas is Darfur and Kordofan, where fighting has intensified between the army and rival paramilitaries and has been the epicenter of the violence in the country. Famine has been detected in many parts of Darfur and Kordofan.

El-Fasher, the provincial capital of North Darfur province, has been under siege for over a year. The U.N. and other aid groups warn that 260,000 civilians remain trapped in the city.


“What I witnessed in Darfur and elsewhere this week is a stark reminder of what is at stake: Children facing hunger, disease and the collapse of essential services,” said Ted Chaiban, UNICEF’s deputy executive director, in a statement.

“Entire communities are surviving in conditions that defy dignity,” Chaiban added

 

[Plain Jane]

Delete

 

[Plain Jane]

Mali closes schools, unis, as jihadis block fuel supply

Schools and universities in Mali have closed amid fuel shortages as jihadi militants block fuel imports to the capital.

www.dw.com

Mali closes schools, unis, as jihadis block fuel supply​

Timothy Jones AP, AFP
15 hours ago15 hours ago
Schools and universities in Mali have closed amid fuel shortages as jihadi militants block fuel imports to the capital.


Mali's military junta has closed schools and universities across the Sahel country amid a blockade on fuel imports from neighboring states by Islamist militants.

Mali, along with the other junta-ruled Central Sahel countries of Burkina Faso and Niger, has long struggled with an insurgency by several armed groups, some of which are allied with the terror networks al-Qaeda and the so-called "Islamic State" (IS).

What is behind the school closure in Mali?​

In an announcement on state television on Sunday, Education Minister Amadou Sy Savan said classes would be suspended for two weeks from Monday "due to disruptions in fuel supplies that are affecting the movement of school staff."

He said authorities were "doing everything possible" to restore normal fuel supplies before schools and universities reopen on November 10.

The move comes as militants from the al-Qaida-backed Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin group have maintained a ban on fuel imports to Mali since early September.

The blockade has negatively impacted the country's already feeble economy, causing the price of commodities and transport to rise.

The capital, Bamako, has seen huge queues form at gas stations.

The junta has announced fuel restrictions "until further notice," saying it would give priority to emergency vehicles such as ambulances and hearses, and to those used for public transit and goods transport.

What is the impact of the fuel blockade?​

Mali relies on imports of fuel for its domestic needs, meaning that the blockade represents a major challenge for the military junta that took power in 2020 while pledging to stabilize the security situation in the country.

After expelling French forces, the junta turned to Russian mercenary units such as the Wagner Group to help fight the rebels, but analysts say it has made little difference to the poor security situation.

The Malian military has tried to escort some fuel trucks stranded at the border to Bamako, with limited success, as several of the vehicles were attacked by the militants.

Edited by: Kieran Burke

 

[Plain Jane]

Sudan's army withdraws from last stronghold in Darfur region

The Sudanese army on Monday withdrew from El-Fasher, its last stronghold in the Darfur region as the city was seized by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group following an 18-month siege that…

www.france24.com

Sudan's army withdraws from last stronghold in Darfur region​

Africa
The Sudanese army on Monday withdrew from El-Fasher, its last stronghold in the Darfur region as the city was seized by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group following an 18-month siege that left citizens on the brink of famine. The fall of El-Fasher could herald another split of Sudan, more than a decade after South Sudan’s creation.
Issued on: 27/10/2025 - 10:17Modified: 27/10/2025 - 22:24
5 minReading time

By:
FRANCE 24

Sudan army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan said on Monday that "the army has withdrawn from El-Fasher", following an announcement that the city was seized by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group.


"We have agreed to withdraw the army from El-Fasher to a safer location," Sudan's de facto ruler said in a speech broadcast on national television, asserting that his side "will take revenge" and fight "until this land is purified".

The statement was the first by al-Burhan acknowledging the loss in El-Fasher after the RSF, whose army troops have been fighting since April 2023, announced their victory in the city in western Darfur on Sunday.

Medical groups earlier reported dozens of civilians killed in the violence.

The army's withdrawal from the city of El-Fasher left over a quarter-million people – half of them children – under the control of the RSF, and aid groups reported chaotic scenes Monday, including battles between RSF and departing troops and their remaining allies. The UN accused the RSF of executing civilians.

The fall of El-Fasher to the RSF could herald another split of Sudan, more than a decade after South Sudan’s creation. The latest war started in April 2023 when tension between the military and RSF exploded into fighting in the capital, Khartoum, and elsewhere in the northeastern African country.

Footage posted on social media since Sunday shows RSF fighters celebrating in and around the former army base in El-Fasher. According to one video, the paramilitary’s deputy commander, Abdulrahim Dagalo, called on his fighters not to loot or target civilians.

Other footage shows RSF fighters shooting and beating people as they attempt to flee. Many were shown detained. RSF fighters were heard shouting “falangayat” at detainees – a racist term used to refer to African tribes in Darfur as slaves. Outraged Sudanese took to social media to denounce the attacks.

Military officials confirmed that troops had vacated the base on Sunday and retreated to another line of defence under heavy RSF shelling and artillery. By late Monday, al-Burhan said military officers decided to withdraw from the city entirely in hopes of sparing the civilian population from further violence.

The army retreated because of “the systemic destruction, and the systemic killing of civilians” by the RSF, he said in a televised speech, adding that the army hoped to “spare the citizens and the rest of the city from destruction”.

Resistance Committees in El-Fasher, a grassroots group tracking the war, reported earlier Monday that fighting was raging around the army base's airfield, as well as on the western side of the city. The group said the Sudanese troops had no visible air support in El-Fasher to try and fend off RSF attacks.

The UN Human Rights Office said in a statement that RSF fighters reportedly carried out atrocities in El-Fasher, including “summary executions" of civilians trying to flee their attacks, “with indications of ethnic motivations for killings".

Volker Turk, the UN high commissioner for human rights, said the “risk of further large-scale, ethnically motivated violations and atrocities in El-Fasher is mounting by the day”.

Satellite images analysed by The Associated Press showed the headquarters of the military’s 6th Division, with the roofs of multiple buildings damaged. The layout of the headquarters corresponded to details seen in footage released by the RSF, showing their fighters gathering around one bullet-scarred building, heralding their capture of the city.

Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab also confirmed through satellite imagery that the paramilitaries advanced as far as the 6th Division headquarters, with “significant evidence of close-quarter battle in the area”. The lab said in a statement Sunday that it identified activities likely showing RSF taking prisoners in and around the airfield.

The Sudan Doctor Network, a medical group tracking the war, described the RSF attack as a “heinous massacre” and said dozens of people were killed.

RSF fighters rampaged through parts of El-Fasher, looting hospitals and other medical facilities and “destroying what remained of essential life-supporting and health care infrastructure", the network said in a statement.

The Darfur Network for Human Rights said the RSF detained over 1,000 civilians, describing it as “systematic targeting of civilians, arbitrary detentions and potential acts amounting to war crimes”.

Among the detained was a local journalist, one of the few left in the city, according to the Sudanese Journalists' Union. The group warned about potential “mass violations” in El-Fasher, similar to what happened in another Darfur city, Geneina, in 2023 when RSF fighters killed hundreds.

Surviving on animal feed': Escaping residents describe siege of Sudan's al-Fashir

© France 24
01:45
The Doctors’ Union, the professional umbrella of Sudanese physicians, said RSF turned El-Fasher into a “brutal killing field”, calling its practices in Sudan a “barbaric policy that aims at terrorizing and annihilating civilians.” The group urged the international community to classify the RSF as a terrorist organisation.

UN humanitarian chief Tom Fletcher expressed “deep alarm” at reports of civilian casualties and forced displacement in El-Fasher.
“Hundreds of thousands of civilians are trapped and terrified – shelled, starving and without access to food, health care or safety,” he said in a statement. He called for “safe, rapid and unimpeded humanitarian access” to the population that remained.

Before Sunday’s attack, there were 260,000 civilians, half of them children, trapped in El-Fasher, according to the UN children’s agency.

Read moreSudan war's devastating impact on women and girls
The UN's International Organization for Migration said more than 26,000 people had fled their homes as of Monday, retreating to rural areas and to the overwhelmed nearby town of Tawila.
Elsewhere, RSF fighters ran riot in the town of Bara in the central Kordofan region over the weekend, killing at least 47 people, including nine women, the Sudan Doctor Network said.

The RSF grew out of the notorious Janjaweed Arab militias that brutalised the Sudanese during the Darfur conflict in the 2000s.
The latest war has killed over 40,000 people and created the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with part of the country, including the El-Fasher area, plunged into famine. Over 14 million people have fled their homes.

The conflict has been marked by gross atrocities, including ethnically motivated killings and rape, according to the UN and rights groups.

The International Criminal Court has said it was investigating alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.
(FRANCE 24 with AP and AFP)

 

[jward]

Open Source Intel
@Osint613
BREAKING:

U.S. President Donald Trump on Nigeria: "I am hereby instructing our Department of War to prepare for possible action. If we attack, it will be fast, vicious, and sweet, just like the terrorist thugs attack our CHERISHED Christians! WARNING: THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT BETTER MOVE FAST!"

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1984724316949529038

View: https://twitter.com/Osint613/status/1984724316949529038

 

[jward]

longwarjournal.org

Analysis: Islamic State redoubles call for jihad in Sudan, urges foreign fighters to migrate​

---

As news of more mass atrocities committed by the United Arab Emirates-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) circulates, the Islamic State has again called for jihad in Sudan. In this week’s Al Naba newsletter, the global jihadist organization made its second call to arms for Sudan this year, while also encouraging foreign fighters to migrate to the country.
“Among the remnants of nationalism produced by contemporary ignorance is the denial, neglect, and disavowal of the wounds of Muslims, as long as they do not affect the original homeland in which that ‘nationalist’ being was raised,” the Islamic State’s editorial began. The group claimed that nationalism is the reason that Sudanese Muslims suffer within the current conflict.

“Nationalism compels the people of each region or country to attend to their own problems and issues […] while attending to the issues of another country is considered interference in its affairs and a violation of its sovereignty,” the piece stated. Therefore, the Islamic State argued, “The tragedy of Sudan does not obligate the Muslims of the world to act because it is an internal Sudanese matter!”

The Islamic State’s editorial board also chastised various world governments for their inaction due to “their political interests,” arguing that this causes inaction from their citizenry as nationalistic interests align with those of the state. This sentiment is meant as a sharp rebuke of various Middle Eastern regimes, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Iran (among others), that have taken opposing sides in the Sudanese conflict.

The jihadist group’s editorial argued that Muslims should disavow nationalism, turn inward towards Islam, and lean on the Ummah [worldwide Islamic community]. “The Libyan Muslim cares about the plight of the Muslims of Sudan just as the Chechen Muslim cares about the plight of the Muslims of Syria, and the Nigerian Muslim grieves for the wounds of his Iraqi Muslim brother […] this is the Islam we know,” the newsletter stated.
Further, it argued, “This Islamic unity, which makes a Muslim rise up for the suffering of his brother wherever he may be—in Burma, Gaza, or Sudan—can only be achieved by dismantling its obstacles and breaking down the borders and restrictions that prevent it.”

Thus, the Islamic State claimed that the time for jihad in Sudan is now. “It is incumbent upon the Muslims, especially the Islamic youth in Egypt and Libya, to strive for liberation from the shackles of their homelands and to take serious action to support their brothers in Sudan,” the editorial stated.

It continued, “They [fighters from Egypt and Libya] must exploit this turbulent and open environment to pave the way for a prolonged jihad. […] Sudan is a fertile ground, if it ignites, it will have a profound impact on the entire region.” The editorial also argued that a Sudanese jihad would help expel the foreign interference in the country.

The group’s specific mention of foreign fighters from Egypt and Libya is likely due to their geographic proximity to Sudan and because Islamic State networks in Sudan have previously supported Islamic State groups in both countries. Thus, the jihadist group’s leadership is asking for these fighters to return the favor in Sudan.
“So, heal your wounds with monotheism and jihad, cast off the garments of nationalism, and follow the prophetic footsteps,” the editorial concluded.

The second call for jihad this year
This week’s editorial is the second time this year that the Islamic State has called for jihad in Sudan. In January, another editorial in Al Naba was quite explicit in calling for the downfall of both the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), as well as their respective leaders, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti) and Abdul Fattah al Burhan.

Both the RSF and SAF were instruments of power under the regime of former dictator Omar al Bashir. Following Bashir’s deposition in early 2019, a transitional government led by both civilians and the military headed Sudan until October 2021, when the SAF removed all civilian leadership and declared a state of military rule. The SAF and RSF then vied for power and influence under the military regime, until the tensions finally turned to open bloodshed in April 2023.

Both the SAF and RSF have been accused of committing mass atrocities and grave human rights abuses since the civil war began. Earlier this week, the RSF, which is heavily armed and funded by the UAE, took the strategic city of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. Since then, videos have emerged of RSF fighters deliberately killing civilians, atrocities that have been so large that they can be seen from orbit.
The Islamic State’s previous editorial in January explicitly stated that “[Abdel Fattah] al Burhan and [Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo] Hemeti are enemies of Islam, as such they must be opposed, disbelieved in, and neither of them should be relied upon, no matter the outcome of the war between them.”

However, the earlier editorial was more directed at Sudanese Muslims. For instance, it stated, “This is a message to the Muslim youth and mujahideen inside Sudan about working diligently to exploit the situation for the benefit of jihad, either through recruitment or preparation, in order to establish a nucleus that confronts the short-term dangers and help establish a long-term jihad.”
Given that little has happened with regard to the Islamic State in Sudan since the group’s first call to arms, the plea likely fell on the deaf ears of many Sudanese Muslims. Thus, the Islamic State may now be focusing its efforts on getting foreigners to start the Sudanese jihad instead.

Jihadism in Sudan
Though the Islamic State is just now publicly calling for jihad inside Sudan this year, it has quietly operated in the country with a dedicated cell since at least 2019—though recruiters and facilitators had been active before then. Sudanese fighters were among the largest foreign component of the Islamic State in Libya during the group’s height in 2016, for instance.

Sudanese authorities previously attempted to quash the relatively small network by periodically announcing raids or arrests of Islamic State members, such as in September and October 2021, when authorities arrested over a dozen members and killed several others across Khartoum.
Nevertheless, the Islamic State’s Sudanese network has persisted. However, it does not yet appear to be a network for attacks; rather, it is used for finances, procurement, and logistics that support other Islamic State wings.

The United Nations Sanctions and Monitoring Team has periodically reported on this network. In July 2023, its report noted that the Islamic State’s network in Sudan contains between 100 and 200 people and is headed by a veteran Iraqi jihadist, Abu Bakr al Iraqi, who is a blood relative of former Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.
Under Iraqi’s leadership, the network has been described as a “logistical and financial base […] from which transit and investment would take place.” The report also noted that Iraqi operates and maintains an array of businesses across Sudan and Turkey, from which the profits are used to support the Islamic State throughout Africa, most notably its West Africa and Sahel Provinces.

Though the UN report doesn’t mention this, it is likely the Sudan cell also helped support the Islamic State’s Somalia Province, as Sudanese fighters represented a significant component of that group’s foreign fighters. The terrorist group’s Sudan network may assist additional Islamic State wings in Africa as well, though this support is unclear.
Not much else is known about the Islamic State’s activities inside Sudan. However, with the group’s now-open call for jihad inside the country, a close eye should be kept on this network, as it may transition from a support role into an operational/attack one.

The Islamic State clearly already has a skeleton in place from which it could build a new so-called ‘province’ within the overall group’s structure. However, whether or not the Islamic State feels confident enough to transition to open warfare in Sudan remains a significant question. Since its first call to arms in January, not much has come to fruition for the group in Sudan.

Al Qaeda, the Islamic State’s rival, has also tried to foment jihad inside Sudan. For instance, in October 2022, Abu Hudhayfah al Sudani, a veteran member of Al Qaeda, released a booklet in which he called for jihad, providing a guide that prospective jihadists could use to form a unified group in his native Sudan.
So far, however, nothing has seemingly come from Al Qaeda’s call to jihad either—at least, publicly. That said, the group has often operated more secretively than the Islamic State and thus could have some sort of clandestine cell.
It is also worth noting that Islamists are already fighting alongside the SAF, particularly the Al Baraa bin Malik Battalion, and other groups within the broader “Popular Resistance” umbrella under the tutelage of Sudan’s military. Jihadists and other Islamists have also been freed in prison breaks since the civil war started.

Al Qaeda has a longer history inside the country than the Islamic State, as it was once based there in the early 1990s. The terrorist group has maintained various cells in Sudan throughout the years, including in Salamah, a suburb of Khartoum, in 2007; a cell in the Dinder National Park in 2012; and two organizations, Ansar al Tawhid and Al Qaeda in the Land of Two Niles, in the late 2000s to early 2010s.

In more recent years, Al Qaeda has not been particularly active inside Sudan. However, as Abu Hudhayfah al Sudani’s booklet made clear, the group obviously wishes to be. Whether or not the group makes a more concerted public effort in the face of the Islamic State’s separate call to arms remains to be seen. Regardless, both global jihadi giants are currently floundering in attempting to mobilize a public armed presence in the conflict. It remains to be seen how effective the Islamic State’s new pitch to foreign fighters will be.
Both global jihadist organizations have now openly called for jihad in Sudan, and the Islamic State is known to already have an active network structure inside the country. As the Sudan’s civil war continues to drag on and deteriorate into additional chaos and atrocities, these jihadist groups may find more opportunities to publicly latch onto events and catapult themselves into the conflict.

Caleb Weiss is an editor of FDD's Long War Journal and a senior analyst at the Bridgeway Foundation, where he focuses on the spread of the Islamic State in Central Africa.

Tags: Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Rapid Support Forces, RSF, SAF, Sudan, Sudanese Armed Forces

Analysis: Islamic State redoubles call for jihad in Sudan, urges foreign fighters to migrate

For the second time this year, the Islamic State explicitly called for its supporters and other Muslims to take up arms in Sudan under its name. Simultaneously, it urged foreign fighters, particularly from North Africa, to travel to the country to partake in this jihad.

www.longwarjournal.org

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use......

How al-Qaida-linked jihadist group JNIM is bringing Mali to its knees

Political instability and fuel shortages caused by rebel group is driving Mali to brink of becoming Islamist republic

www.theguardian.com

Mali

How al-Qaida-linked jihadist group JNIM is bringing Mali to its knees​

Political instability and fuel shortages caused by rebel group is driving Mali to brink of becoming Islamist republic


Eromo Egbejule in Abidjan
Sat 1 Nov 2025 10.00 EDT
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Armed groups of JNIM fighters have blocked key routes used by fuel tankers, disrupting supply lines to the capital Bamako and other regions across Mali.

The al-Qaida-linked jihadist group Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) is gradually converging on Mali’s capital, Bamako, with increasing attacks in recent weeks, including on army-backed convoys.

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[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

JNIM jihadists advance on Bamako amid fuel crisis in Mali | Ukraine news - #Mezha

Armed jihadist group JNIM linked to Al-Qaeda advances toward Mali's capital Bamako, causing fuel shortages and escalating regional instability in the Sahel.

mezha.net

JNIM jihadists advance on Bamako amid fuel crisis in Mali​

Sunday, 2 November 2025, 20:13

As stated by CNN

A heavily armed jihadist group linked to al-Qaeda is closing in on Bamako, the capital of Mali. The country’s military regime and its Russian partners are fighting jihadists who are increasingly affecting the lives of civilians across many Sahel regions.

Fuel in Bamako is running out, as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam al-Muslimin (JNIM) cuts off routes to the capital, attacks military patrols, and sets ambushes for fuel tankers.

As the situation worsens, calls are being issued worldwide for citizens to leave the city. At one point, Britain and the United States stressed the need for evacuation: the UK government advised leaving the city whenever possible using available flights, while the U.S. State Department cited the “insufficient predictability of the security situation in Bamako” as a basis for evacuation.

As the crisis approaches, long queues appear at fuel stations: motorcycles and other vehicles wait for fuel. Some local media report cases where fuel stocks are seized by law enforcement. Schools and colleges are closed due to fuel shortages.

Over the last two months, JNIM has intensified attacks on fuel supply, ambushing fuel tankers along roads between Ivory Coast and Senegal.

In mid-September militants attacked a convoy of more than 100 fuel tankers, setting fire to about half of them, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), which tracks conflicts.

Jihadists have also neutralized large stocks of weapons within security forces and demonstrated the ability to use drones, according to CEP, which analyzes terrorist groups.

“JNIM has expanded its tactics,” said terrorism analyst Daniele Garofalo for CNN, adding that the organization has launched “economic warfare campaigns with roadblocks, extortion and taxation, and fuel blockades.”
– Daniele Garofalo, CNN

In a video statement released last month, JNIM spokesman Abu Hudayfa al-Bambari urged people to cooperate in areas controlled by the group, stopping at its checkpoints, and advised against traveling in convoys of military equipment.

Government forces have stepped up patrols and conducted several helicopter strikes, claiming to have killed dozens of militants. Yet, attacks continue, leading to an even greater fuel shortage across the region and isolating government garrisons.

JNIM operates in Mali and neighboring countries – Burkina Faso and Niger – and also has influence in the Sahel region. The group was formed in 2017 as a coalition of jihadist factions and immediately pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda.

This summer it launched an economic campaign in western Mali: “attacking factories, industrial facilities, infrastructure projects, and artisanal gold mining in artisanal markets,” according to Garofalo.

“JNIM has demonstrated a new level of coordination, conducting operations hundreds of kilometers apart from one another,” he added.

“JNIM has demonstrated a new level of coordination, conducting operations hundreds of kilometers apart from one another.”
– Daniele Garofalo, CNN

Russian mercenaries have been deployed in Mali since 2021, initially as part of the Wagner group, and now under the name Africa Corps. They have not halted the militants’ advance and have sustained heavy losses.

Last year, JNIM claimed “complex ambushes” against a convoy of Russian contractors and Malian soldiers in the north of the country, resulting in Russian casualties. A Human Rights Watch report notes that the regime and its Russian partners recorded dozens of extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances of ethnic Fulani, whom they accuse of cooperating with JNIM.

“There is evidence that the regime and its Russian patrons committed dozens of extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances of ethnic Fulani… whom they accuse of collaborating with JNIM.”
– Human Rights Watch

Mali and neighboring countries – Burkina Faso and Niger – are also experiencing prolonged instability. CEP warns that JNIM continues to expand its activity in the region: in July, dozens of attacks were recorded across three countries.

There are currently no signs that the militants are preparing an open assault on Bamako. Experts say the strategy is to squeeze the capital and sustain instability to weaken the government, while continuing attacks. At the same time, government forces are focused on maintaining territorial control and ensuring minimal supplies.

“JNIM has become very adept at voicing the grievances and demands of the minority population.”
– Daniele Garofalo, CNN

“However, turning this pressure into changes in power requires a serious escalation of actions, which is not yet common practice,” Garofalo concluded. According to him, JNIM’s aim is to systematically weaken the junta and reduce its control over local communities.

According to CEP, Mali could become the first country where al-Qaeda exerts deep influence on politics. The expert Fitton-Brown noted that the Bamako junta does not have significant external support: “they have effectively driven out the French and parted ways with the UN and the regional ECOWAS format; Russians will not be an alternative for them.”

“JNIM will ultimately push for a government more under their influence in Bamako, even if they do not take control of the city themselves, and will accept something softer than a regime tied to al-Qaeda.”
– Edmund Fitton-Brown

In sum, analysts anticipate possible crisis scenarios in the Sahel, but the exact consequences remain uncertain. The next moves by jihadist groups and the response of the international community will shape developments in Mali and at the regional level in the coming months.

Outlook for the Sahel Situation​

Experts forecast growing influence of groups in the region and potential upheavals for civilians. At the same time, international players are seeking ways to stabilize and support official governments in the region to prevent further escalation.
Don’t miss other news:

• Tuareg organizations accuse Mali, Burkina Faso forces, and Russian mercenaries of war crimes and crimes against humanity, filing complaints with the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

 

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Mali Joins Madagascar, Tanzania, Niger, And Sudan As US Issues New Travel Advisory Amid Heightened Risks Of Unrest, Weak Governance, And Uncertainty Across Africa - Travel And Tour World

Mali joins Madagascar, Tanzania, Niger, and Sudan as the US issues new travel advisory amid heightened risks of unrest, weak governance, and uncertainty across Africa.

www.travelandtourworld.com

Mali Joins Madagascar, Tanzania, Niger, And Sudan As US Issues New Travel Advisory Amid Heightened Risks Of Unrest, Weak Governance, And Uncertainty Across Africa​

Published on November 3, 2025

Mali joins Madagascar, Tanzania, Niger, and Sudan as the US issues new travel advisory amid heightened risks of unrest, weak governance, and uncertainty across Africa. The United States has raised its warnings for these five nations, reflecting growing concerns over political instability, escalating violence, and the breakdown of essential state institutions. As conflicts intensify and governance structures falter, these countries face significant challenges in maintaining security, stability, and international confidence, with far-reaching implications for both the local populations and foreign travelers.

In the latest update from United States Department of State, Mali has been added to the list of African countries with heightened travel warnings. This development marks an alarming shift in the political landscape of Africa, with several countries facing growing political instability, terrorism, and governance challenges that have raised concerns globally. Along with Mali, Madagascar, Tanzania, Niger, and Sudan have also seen their travel advisories updated due to escalating risks in these regions.

This piece explores the current political climate in these countries and the increasing concerns over their ability to maintain security, as well as the broader implications for international travel and regional stability.

Mali: A Nation in the Grip of Conflict​

Mali, once a beacon of stability in West Africa, has seen its situation rapidly deteriorate in recent years. The U.S. has now officially placed Mali under a Level 4: Do Not Travel advisory, signaling a critical breakdown in security.

• Violence and Armed Conflict: Violent insurgencies, particularly in the northern and central regions, have rendered large portions of Mali inaccessible. The presence of extremist groups like AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and local militias has resulted in frequent attacks on civilians and military forces alike.
• Diplomatic Tensions: The political climate has been further exacerbated by tensions with international actors. In addition to ongoing insurgencies, Mali’s political instability led to the evacuation of non-essential U.S. embassy staff.
• Consequences for Tourism and Economic Growth: With the U.S. urging citizens to avoid travel to Mali, the country faces not only a security crisis but also a severe blow to its tourism and business sectors. The lack of international confidence could delay any potential recovery for the nation’s economy.

Madagascar: Political Demonstrations and Rising Crime​

Madagascar, an island nation known for its biodiversity and tourist attractions, has also seen its travel advisory raised to Level 3: Reconsider Travel.

• Political Unrest: Madagascar has been experiencing an uptick in political demonstrations, some of which have turned violent. The protests, driven by dissatisfaction with government policies, have disrupted daily life and contributed to the worsening security environment.
• Rising Crime: Violent crime rates have escalated, with reports of targeted attacks on tourists and locals. The situation has become dire enough to compel the U.S. to issue warnings about the risks of travel.
• Impacts on the Tourism Industry: The tourism industry, which is a major economic driver in Madagascar, faces significant losses as travelers avoid the country due to rising safety concerns. The economic fallout may also affect Madagascar’s efforts to attract international investments.

Tanzania: Election-Related Violence and Social Unrest​

Tanzania, a country known for its stunning wildlife and thriving tourism industry, has recently seen its travel advisory elevated to Level 3 due to increasing risks.

• Election-Related Violence: With elections being a sensitive issue in Tanzania, the political climate has been fraught with tension. Clashes between protesters and security forces have become more frequent, particularly surrounding election periods.
• Targeting of Minority Groups: Another key issue leading to the advisory is the reported targeting of LGBTQ+ individuals. These groups face increasing hostility, making Tanzania a challenging destination for certain international travelers.
• Tourism and Business Disruptions: The rise in unrest could hurt Tanzania’s image as a safe tourism destination, potentially discouraging travelers. The long-term effect may be a slowdown in the country’s tourism sector, one of the main contributors to its GDP.

Niger: Terrorism, Crime, and Political Instability​

Niger, located in the Sahel region of Africa, has also seen its travel advisory raised to Level 3 by the U.S. government.

• Security Threats: Niger is no stranger to extremist activities, particularly from terrorist groups like Boko Haram and ISIS. The threat of kidnapping, terrorist attacks, and violent crime is a persistent concern, especially in the rural and border areas.
• Political Unrest: In addition to the security threats, Niger’s political landscape is fraught with instability. The political unrest following recent power struggles has created an environment of uncertainty that further destabilizes the country.
• Economic Impacts: With the rising danger, international businesses and tourists are now more hesitant to engage with Niger. This decline in foreign interest could exacerbate the economic struggles the country already faces, including a reliance on foreign aid and natural resources like uranium.

Sudan: Civil War and Diplomatic Breakdown​

Sudan, another key African nation, is experiencing a period of profound instability. The U.S. has issued a Level 4: Do Not Travel advisory, reflecting the dire conditions in the country.

• Civil War: Sudan has been embroiled in a brutal civil war between the military and paramilitary forces since 2023. The violence has led to thousands of deaths and displaced millions of people. The U.S. Embassy in Khartoum remains closed, and the U.S. government has been unable to offer consular support.
• Governance Collapse: The governance system in Sudan has completely collapsed, with multiple factions vying for power, leading to widespread lawlessness. Humanitarian organizations have also struggled to operate due to the dangerous environment.
• Economic Impact and Humanitarian Crisis: As the conflict rages on, Sudan’s economy has all but collapsed, and the humanitarian crisis deepens. The country’s once-booming oil sector is now in ruins, and recovery efforts will be hindered as long as the violence persists.

The Bigger Picture: Africa’s Governance Struggles​

These countries—Mali, Madagascar, Tanzania, Niger, and Sudan—share a common thread: governance failures. While many African nations are facing challenges of terrorism, insurgencies, and violent extremism, the root causes of instability often lie in political dysfunction and weak state institutions.

• Weak Institutions and Corruption: Endemic corruption, coupled with power struggles, has led to weakened institutions across these countries. This environment has allowed extremist groups to exploit the situation and further destabilize regions already struggling with governance issues.
• The Role of Foreign Influence: The United States’ heightened focus on these nations is not just a humanitarian response but is also strategic. Countries like Niger, Mali, and Sudan hold valuable resources such as uranium, gold, and lithium—materials critical for the future of global energy and technology markets. The U.S. may be expanding its military and diplomatic presence under the guise of security concerns, positioning itself to gain leverage over these resources.

The new travel advisories for Mali, Madagascar, Tanzania, Niger, and Sudan highlight a growing crisis in Africa—one not just of violence and extremism but of political decay and poor governance. While the U.S. and other international actors continue to monitor the situation, it is clear that these nations face an uphill battle in restoring stability and security.

• International Support: Greater international support, both in terms of humanitarian aid and political reform, will be necessary to address the root causes of instability. Without this, the prospects for peace and stability in these countries remain grim.
• The Role of Tourism: As travel advisories continue to impact these countries, the tourism industry faces significant losses. Yet, tourism remains one of the most viable sectors for economic recovery. However, without a stable political climate, foreign visitors will likely continue to stay away.

Mali joins Madagascar, Tanzania, Niger, and Sudan as the US issues new travel advisory amid heightened risks of unrest, weak governance, and uncertainty across Africa. These countries are grappling with escalating political instability, security threats, and deteriorating state institutions, prompting the US to caution against travel to these regions.

The situation in Africa, as reflected in the U.S. travel advisories, underscores the urgent need for global cooperation to tackle both political instability and the rise of extremism. These challenges are not just about the safety of travelers; they are about the future of nations struggling to rebuild and reclaim their stability.