INTL Japanese Gov't Legal Watchdog - No specific ban on Nuclear Weapons in Constitution

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201603190027

No specific ban on N-weapons, says key Cabinet legal expert

March 19, 2016
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN

The head of the nation's legal watchdog said Japan's Constitution does not necessarily ban the use of nuclear weapons, but qualified the remark by saying their use is restricted under domestic and international laws.

“I am not thinking that the use of all kinds of nuclear weapons is banned under the Constitution,” Yusuke Yokobatake, director-general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, told the Upper House Budget Committee on March 18 in response to a question from Shinkun Haku of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan.

He made the remark after saying, “Limitations exist (on the use of nuclear weapons) under Japanese laws and international laws.”

Given the Japanese government's policy of “three non-nuclear principles” to not possess or manufacture nuclear weapons or allow them into Japanese territory, it is extremely rare for a person in Yokobatake's position to mention the use of nuclear weapons, even though he also referred to limitations.

“Nuclear weapons are a kind of weapon. My understanding is that, irrespective of whether they are nuclear weapons or not, any weapons should be used under the limitations permitted by domestic laws and international laws,” Yokobatake said.

In a news conference the same day, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga doused any notion of Japan using a nuclear weapon, saying, "Impossible."

However, Suga did not take issue with the substance of Yokobatake’s argument.

"I have received a report from the Cabinet Legislation Bureau that he (Yokobatake) made the reply based on remarks made by officials of the bureau in the Diet in the past,” Suga said.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/20...-japans-use-nuclear-weapons-cabinet-official/

National / Politics

Constitution does not specifically ban Japan’s use of nuclear weapons: Cabinet official

JIJI
Mar 19, 2016

Japan’s Constitution does not necessarily ban the use of nuclear weapons, Yusuke Yokobatake, director-general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, said Friday.

“We don’t think that the use of all kinds of nuclear weapons is prohibited under the Constitution,” the head of the constitutional watchdog told the House of Councilors’ Budget Committee in response to a question from Shinkun Haku of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan.

But “the use of weapons, not just nuclear arms, is restricted under domestic and international laws,” Yokobatake also said, adding that the use of nuclear weapons by Japan is unrealistic.

The remarks may cause repercussions at home and abroad, although they are in line with the government’s past statements, including a 1959 remark by former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi.

The government sticks to the country’s nonnuclear principles of not possessing, not producing and not allowing the entry of nuclear weapons into the country.

At a press conference the same day, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga flatly denied the possibility of Japan using a nuclear weapon. “The government does not think of such a thing at all,” he said.

During the parliamentary meeting, the DPJ lawmaker also asked whether it is possible for Japan to use a nuclear weapon overseas as it engages in collective self-defense, or uses force to help an ally under attack.

Yokobatake denied the possibility. “There has been no change in our view that we cannot send overseas a force that is beyond the minimum required to defend our country,” he said.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/th...ow-abe-redesigned-japans-foreign-policy-15522

The Architect: How Abe Redesigned Japan¡¯s Foreign Policy

Piyush Singh
March 17, 2016

Starting in early 2013, Japan¡¯s Foreign policy turned resurgent with an eye on China. After years of dormant foreign policy, Japan under Prime Minister Shinz¨* Abe has moved with vigor to secure its international and security interests, resolving the wartime sexual slavery [4] issue with South Korea, securing a strategic partnership with India and opening up Japan¡¯s defense industry after years of a self-imposed ban. This is done with a focus on China¡¯s rise and its implications for the regional security architecture. Abe sees China as a revisionist power and is preparing for a future in which Japan has to contend with China as the main geopolitical force in the Asia-Pacific. He has concentrated his national and international policies on Japan¡¯s changing national security objectives, with both a national and an international perspective regarding its foreign policy and security objectives.

National Obstacles

Abe¡¯s biggest opponent in the alteration of the pacifist constitution and revamped military posture are his own citizens. After the brutal experience of WWII, the Japanese have long been content to remain a dormant power under the safeguards of the U.S. security alliance. The Japan-U.S. alliance has stood the test of the time, but the principles on which it was signed are now antiquated [5]. Japan faces a changing and potentially aggressive neighborhood in the form of North Korea and its nuclear ambitions, followed by China's rising power projections in recent years. Abe revised Article 9 [6] of the constitution, which addresses renouncing war as a means to settle international disputes. He felt that the article was demeaning to the citizens of Japan, and hence wanted Japan to realign itself as an equal power, alongside the United States, based on its economy as well as military strength.

China Threat

Japan-China relations have been fraught since WWII, with each nation invoking wartime rituals to remind each other of the horrors committed in the past. In his remorseful speech last year, Shinz¨* Abe apologized for the crimes Japan committed during WWII, but argued that it does not mean future generations Japanese [7] have to keep apologizing for the same mistakes, ignoring its evolving security environment. The Japan-China rivalry goes back millennia, and though they share a highly profitable economic relationship they are not likely to become friends anytime soon.

China¡¯s military reform and modernization are what spurred Abe into action. He realized the current security needs of the country cannot be met under a 1950s pacifist constitution, especially Article 9. Starting in 1990, China began a rapid modernization of its military forces with a particular focus on its navy. China¡¯s forays into what Japan considers its territorial waters in the East China Sea and its aggressive action in South China Sea sounded alarm bells in Tokyo, and Abe feared that a rising China would become a more aggressive China and concerned the international community would move toward appeasement [8].

International Agenda

Shinz¨* Abe, in his first term as prime minister spoke of an Asia Security Diamond to counter the threat of China in the Asia-Pacific. Though not yet formalized, this initiative continues to gain traction among the proposed member-states. The Security Diamond would include Australia, India, the United States and Japan. [9]

India is an important piece of Abe¡¯s national security puzzle. India holds a key to resisting China¡¯s rise, both militarily and economically. As China¡¯s economy slows, one may expect the Chinese to create disturbances along the Indian border so as to divert attention from pressing issues at home. India has showed great restraint in its military posture with regards to Chinese aggressiveness, in part, because it knows the sort of negative impact a different approach would have on its economy. Investing in India is not only an economic choice for Japan, but also a strategic one. It is investing in its future as a rising power, and is projected to invest over 10 billion dollars in India over the course of the next five years. [10] Many in Japan, frowned upon the Indo-Japan nuclear deal, including members of both the main political parties, but it was India¡¯s potential which Abe wanted to tap into for Japan¡¯s security interests. It remains to be seen whether India can utilize all this largess to truly build itself as economic superpower.

Abe is also improving ties with Russia, mainly for the energy potential the relationship possesses. He is also concentrated on Africa [11] and Central Asia, two areas where China has a large advantage. Additionally, defense relations with ASEAN Countries are on an upswing, mainly due to increased Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Shinz¨* Abe hopes to build an alliance out of these countries to secure Japan¡¯s security and energy demands, the latter of which it is heavily dependent on others for.

Shinz¨* Abe¡¯s foreign policy is different from many of his predecessors. He is an out-and-out reformer, both on the international stage and domestically, and his domestic economic success fuels his diplomacy. And in this diplomacy, he has shaken Japan out of a self-imposed security apathy and plotted a more pragmatic national course. Under Abe, Japan is working to make itself ready to take its role in global power politics more seriously and to create a meaningful impact promoting world peace and prosperity.

Piyush Singh [12] is Junior Research Associate at Takshashila Institution, a strategic affairs think tank in India. This article [13] originally appeared in the Bridge.

Image [14]: Flickr/ Presidencia de la Rep¨²blica Mexicana.

Tags
Japan [15]Shinzo Abe [16]Security [17]defense [18]foreign policy [19]
Topics
Security [20] [3]

Links:
[1] http://nationalinterest.org/blog/th...ow-abe-redesigned-japans-foreign-policy-15522
[2] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/piyush-singh
[3] http://twitter.com/share
[4] http://www.wsj.com/articles/comfort-women-deal-faces-backlash-in-seoul-1451557585
[5] http://www.theatlantic.com/internat...its-time-to-rethink-your-relationship/262916/
[6] http://www.cfr.org/japan/shinzo-abe/p36523
[7] http://www.theguardian.com/world/20...w-apology-second-world-war-anniversary-speech
[8] http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/...-to-use-its-voice-as-part-of-chinese-led-bank
[9] http://logos.nationalinterest.in/2014/02/the-significance-of-asias-democratic-security-diamond/
[10] http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-12-13/news/69006246_1_pm-shinzo-abe-india-fund-oda
[11] http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/20...th-funds-for-peace-and-security/#.VqknE8f-Tdl
[12] https://twitter.com/Piyushs7
[13] http://www.thestrategybridge.com/th...resurgent-foreign-policy-architect-shinzo-abe
[14] https://www.flickr.com/photos/presi...Vay-e9L8QA-osLXrH-e9ErFX-ouAwC4-obj4tu-e9JyxN
[15] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/japan
[16] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/shinzo-abe
[17] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/security
[18] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/defense
[19] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/foreign-policy
[20] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/security

 

[Oreally]

typical subtle japanese way of doing things.

everyone has to know that must already have devices ready to go, when needed. maybe two weeks assembly time, HC?

 

[Housecarl]

typical subtle japanese way of doing things.

everyone has to know that must already have devices ready to go, when needed. maybe two weeks assembly time, HC?

Yeah, that's what caught my eye, made me lead the new WoW thread with this and start this stand alone one.

As to assembly time, probably less than that; a lot less.

IMHO, the "gadgets" are already tested, assembled and stored and the "pits" are separately located (whether that means in another facility or the next isle over in a bunker is anyone's guess).

I'm guessing if they've got them they're both gravity bombs and a modification to either the Harpoons they've got from the US for their subs or their Type 80 Air-to-Ship Missile.

The Type 80 has been in service since 1980, is inertial guided and has terminal active radar homing. The warhead is 330 lbs of HE and is already set up for attacking land targets as well as shipping.

Those attributes would make it a natural for a warhead swap. Simpler to hide and deny than a dedicated nuclear system and would be nearly seamless in integrating into existing platforms (was arming their old F-1 (akin to the Anglo-French Jaguar) the F-4EJ and the F-2). An air-launched system would give the most flexibility operationally. The trade off is responsiveness compared to a ballistic missile, though as a crisis started to brew that wouldn't be as much of an issue.

http://i2.wp.com/newpacificinstitute.org/jsw/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/画像s288.jpg?resize=300,225

http://livedoor.blogimg.jp/mumbo122/imgs/2/b/2bd67476.jpg

http://www.uraken.net/sozai/railstation/kaji01/photo/0007.jpg

Probably the biggest "tell" in terms of "dual use" is the new solid fueled Epsilon SLV which replaced the older M-V SLV. One of this new system's claims to fame is that it only needs a team of 8 using laptops to control the launching of it; the M-V needed 150 people.

 

[Housecarl]

From October 31, 2015.....China's and North Korea's (and it wouldn't make Seoul all that happy either).....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china’s-ultimate-nightmare-japan-armed-nuclear-weapons-14214

China’s Ultimate Nightmare: Japan Armed With Nuclear Weapons

A nuclear Japan would make China’s security situation much more complex than it is now.

Kyle Mizokami
October 31, 2015

It is perhaps China’s greatest nightmare: a nuclear-armed Japan. Permanently anchored off the Asian mainland, bristling with nuclear weapons, a nuclear Japan would make China’s security situation much more complex than it is now, and force China to revise both its nuclear doctrine and increase its nuclear arsenal.

To be perfectly clear, Japan has no intention of building nuclear weapons. In fact, it has a strong aversion to nukes, having been the only country to actually be on the receiving end of a nuclear strike on its cities. Japan’s strategic situation would have to grow very dire for it to undertake such a drastic and expensive option.

At the same time, China has no interest in provoking Japan into building them. China’s nuclear “no first use” policy is in part aimed at reassuring Japan that, unless it were attacked first with nuclear weapons, it will not use them in wartime. Japan has no nukes, therefore, if China holds to its word, Japan should be reassured. “If” and “should” being the operative words here.

Still, it’s an interesting proposition. Nuclear phobias and the lack of a pressing need aside, there’s certainly no reason why Japan,the third largest economy in the world, couldn’t build nukes.

What would a Japanese nuclear deterrent look like? Let’s examine the traditional nuclear triad of land-based ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and ballistic missile submarines and each leg of the triad’s suitability for Japan’s circumstance. For the sake of argument, let’s say Japan can choose just one leg to invest in.

We’ll also set the number of nukes at roughly 300. Japan’s high population density would mean that the destruction of just a handful of cities could kill or injure the majority of the country’s civilian population. Against an adversary such as Russia or China, Japan must be able to inflict similar losses.

Land-based missiles

Japan could invest in a small arsenal of land-based missiles, each carrying one or more nuclear warheads. The missiles could be stationed in hardened silos, like the American Minuteman III [4], or on mobile launchers like the Russian RS-24 Yars [5]. A Japanese ICBM would be smaller, not needing the range and fuel to reach North America. The ability to reach all of China, European Russia and the Middle East would be sufficient.

Eventually, Japan might settle on a force of 100 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, each equipped with three 100 kiloton warheads. The missiles could be based in hardened silos in eastern Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost island, or moved around on mobile launchers.

This is the least survivable of the three ideas. Japan’s close proximity to China means that in the event of a nuclear attack from the latter it would need to have a “launch on warning” doctrine to ensure the missiles survived. That would considerably increase the possibility of accidental nuclear war, as a hardware or software malfunction in Japan’s early warning system could be incorrectly interpreted as an attack.

Geography makes land basing even less attractive. Japan’s high population density makes it impossible to find a location for 100 missile silos that would not would invite terrible collateral damage in the event of attack. Even basing them in remote places like the northern Island of Hokkaido would incur needless risk. Mobile launchers would be far too large and heavy to travel Japan’s road network, unless a separate track were built somewhere. Even that would make their positioning more predictable.

Another option might be to exploit Japan’s extensive rail network.

Strategic bombers

Japan could build a wing of stealthy bombers to deliver cruise missiles and nuclear gravity bombs. Such an aircraft could fly nuclear penetration missions against adversaries, knocking out enemy nuclear weapons, command and control and other counterforce targets. Nuclear bombers would give Japanese strategic warfare planners the flexibility to go after multiple targets or change the targets in mid-flight. Nuclear bombers can be recalled at any point in the mission.

A bomber scheme could involve three squadrons of twenty-four bombers each, for a total of seventy-two jets, each the size of an FB-111 [6]strike aircraft. Each bomber would carry four short-range attack missiles, each with a 100 kiloton yield, for a total of 288 nuclear weapons.

Geography also makes strategic bombers unlikely. A lightning attack against Japan’s bomber bases could wipe out the entire force on the ground before they are given the order to scramble. If tankers are necessary for the bombers to reach their targets, the destruction of the Japanese tanker force would make the bombers irrelevant. Furthermore, advances in air defense technology could make the bombers dangerously vulnerable.

Japan could, like the U.S. Air Force’s Strategic Air Command of old, maintain a force of bombers permanently in the air, but that would be expensive and require enough bombers in the air (and aerial tankers) at any one time inflict a punishing blow. The cost and complexity of standing up and maintaining such a force would be prohibitive.

Ballistic Missile Submarines

This is the most attractive option. Ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable platform—as long as at least one were out on patrol at all times. Each Japanese “boomer” could just sail east to the Mid-Pacific to relative safety; any anti-submarine warfare ships and planes sent by Russia or China to hunt it would have to get past Japan itself.

Japan could persuade the United States to share submarine, missile and warhead technology with it the way it does with the United Kingdom. Of the three basing schemes, the defensive nature of sea-based deterrent is probably the most likely the United States would agree to help with. Depending on the timeline, Japan could even end up funding certain parts of the Ohio Replacement Program—particularly the missile.

In a sea-basing scheme Japan could emulate China, France or the United Kingdom, maintaining a force of five ballistic missile submarines, each equipped with sixteen nuclear-tipped missiles. Each missile would be equipped with four 100 kiloton warheads. The one submarine on patrol at all times would be equipped with sixty-four warheads.

There are some drawbacks. Ballistic missile submarines would be more difficult to keep in contact with during a crisis. Finally, if only two out of five submarines are on patrol at any time only 128 warheads would be available.

Obviously, under current circumstances, it’s not in anyone’s interests for Japan to have nuclear weapons. Still, it must be recognized that if pushed, it could certainly do so. Although a long ways off, all sides should remember that increasingly strained relations between Japan, China, and Russia could make a bad situation much, much worse.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami [7].

Image: Flickr/U.S. Government [8]

Tags
Japan [9]China [10]Nuclear weapons [11]
Topics
Security [12]
Regions
Asia [13] [3]

Links:
[1] http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china’s-ultimate-nightmare-japan-armed-nuclear-weapons-14214
[2] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/kyle-mizokami
[3] http://twitter.com/share
[4] http://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/icbm/lgm-30_3.htm
[5] https://www.rt.com/news/yars-missile-russia-launch-729/
[6] http://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber/fb-111.htm
[7] http://twitter.com/kylemizokami
[8] https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Redwing_Apache.jpg
[9] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/japan
[10] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/china
[11] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/nuclear-weapons
[12] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/security
[13] http://nationalinterest.org/region/asia

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.iiss.org/en/events/event...ias-latent-nuclear-powers-us-book-launch-2d5f

Asia's Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan

Book Launch
Mark Fitzpatrick, Executive Director, IISS–US
Robert Gallucci, Former State Department Special Envoy for North Korea Nuclear Negotiations
IISS–US, Washington DC
Thursday 17 March, 10–11am EST

Video
https://youtu.be/M3oXpK4yaKQ

Under what conditions would the democracies in Northeast Asia seek to join the nuclear weapons club? Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are threshold nuclear powers by virtue of their robust civilian nuclear energy programs. All three once pursued nuclear weapons and all face growing security threats from nuclear-armed adversaries. IISS-US Executive Director Mark Fitzpatrick's latest book, Asia's Latent Nuclear Powers, analyses these past nuclear pursuits and current proliferation drivers.

A discussion and Q&A session on Asia's Latent Nuclear Powers and nuclear diplomacy in Northeast Asia was held with Executive Director Mark Fitzpatrick and Robert Gallucci, former State Department special envoy and dean of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. This event was on the record and was webcast live on the IISS website. Copies of the book are available for sale on our website.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

After ten years heading the IISS Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme, Mark Fitzpatrick moved to Washington in December 2015 to also take on the role of Executive Director of the office here. Mr. Fitzpatrick's research focus is on preventing nuclear dangers through non-proliferation, nuclear security and arms control. He has lectured throughout Europe, North America and Asia and is a frequent commentator on proliferation and disarmament on BBC, NPR and other news outlets. He is a founding member of the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium and a member of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Nuclear Security.


Ambassador Robert Gallucci served as Dean of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service for 13 years until he left in July 2009 to become president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. He was appointed dean in 1996, after 21 years of distinguished service in a variety of government positions, focusing on international security. As Ambassador-at-Large and Special Envoy for the US Department of State, he dealt with the threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. He was chief U.S. negotiator during the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994, and served as Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs and as Deputy Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission overseeing the disarmament of Iraq following the first Gulf War.

The meeting was chaired by Jennifer Golden, Managing Director, IISS-US. The meeting took place at IISS-US, 2121 K Street NW, Suite 801, Washington, DC 20037.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://edaccessible.com/2016/03/18/...-footing-and-washingtons-need-to-be-decisive/

Japan Inching Toward Nuclear War Footing and Washington¡¦s Need to be Decisive

March 18, 2016 ˆAedaccessible

[This is the debut of BRINK¡¦s GeoWatch column, a bi-monthly feature.]

Japan is rattling a nuclear sword of innuendo through a series of calculated political moves, signalling that its path to a nuclear bomb may be more forthright than its allies and enemies want to believe.

It was recently reported that the United States had dispatched two ships used to transport nuclear material, the Pacific Heron and Pacific Egret, to Japan to bring back an estimated 330 kilograms of plutonium. France, the UK and the U.S. supplied this material to Japan, ostensibly for research purposes. The plutonium is being transferred before a scheduled nuclear security summit to be held in Washington, D.C. It had been a source of contention internationally since 2006 when Japan¡¦s the Foreign Minister at the time, Taro Aso, told a parliamentary committee on security issues that ¡§Japan is capable of producing nuclear weapons, but we are not saying we have plans to possess nuclear weapons.¡¨

While Aso¡¦s comment was almost certainly made in regard to North Korea¡¦s nuclear tests, regional governments made use of the opportunity Aso¡¦s remark presented to voice their disquiet.

The disquiet some of Japan¡¦s neighbors felt could have been predicated on a 2010 finding by a Japanese government-appointed panel that previous administrations had lied to the Japanese public about nuclear weapons being stored in the country. It confirmed the existence of secret Cold War-era agreements allowing the U.S. to import nuclear weapons into Japan, in violation of its non-nuclear policies. Those neighbors would undoubtedly have been even more disturbed had they known that the Pentagon¡¦s Joint Chiefs of Staff had considered giving Japan¡¦s Self-Defense Forces atomic weapons in the 1950s under an arrangement similar to NATO¡¦s nuclear-sharing agreement.

Ironically, tensions between China and the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait in 1954 led to nuclear weapons stored on Okinawa. Their numbers grew to an estimated 1,200 by 1967, but all had been removed by the time that control of Okinawa was handed back to Japan in May 1972. The Pentagon, however, retained the non-nuclear components of these weapons in other bases in Japan in the hope that nuclear weapons could be deployed there once again. When China carried out its first nuclear test in 1964, Japan¡¦s Prime Minister Eisaku Sato remarked to U.S. Ambassador Edwin Reischauer that Japan should also develop nuclear weapons.


With its strong space and rocket programs, Japan could create a military-focused nuclear program, if warranted.

Not-So-Stealthy Political Moves and Motives

Japan has put in place various pieces of legislative constraints on acquiring nuclear weapons. For instance, the Basic Law on Atomic Energy, which was enacted in 1955, stipulates that any research and use of nuclear energy must be restricted to peaceful uses. In June 2012, however, Japan¡¦s Diet amended the Basic Law by inserting the phrase ¡§national security,¡¨ thus indicating that national security could also be an element of the use of nuclear power. This led to the almost immediate criticism that Japan could now use nuclear technology for military purposes.

There is some validity to this criticism. In contrast to general opinion, there is no true constitutional prohibition of nuclear weapons. The famous Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution casts aside war as a ¡§sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.¡¨ This Article has been amended over time to suit contemporary factors. In the aftermath of the Korean War, Clause 2 of Article 9, which states that ¡§land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained¡¨ was reinterpreted so as to permit a ¡§military capability that does not exceed the minimum necessary level for self-defense.¡¨ This gave rise to Japan¡¦s Self-Defense Forces. Taken to its logical conclusion, however, that interpretation implies that nuclear weapons could also be permissible, provided they remained within that minimum necessary level. Interestingly, Prime Minister Abe used this interpretation during his first administration in 2006 to acquire a military in place of the Self-Defense Forces.

Japan has shed many of the constraints imposed upon its defense policies. In 1992, for instance, a ban on its troops abroad was lifted to enable the Self-Defense Force to send armed troops to Iraq. In 2001, in-flight tanker-aircraft and helicopter carriers (the latter, for all intents and purposes, aircraft carriers) were procured, thus effectively nullifying a ban on power projection. In 2003, Tokyo announced that it would explore ballistic missile defense systems with Washington, negating a ban on joint military research, and in 2014, announced that it would supply missile interceptor componentry to the U.S. and UK, thus ending its self-imposed ban on arms exports. It is currently in the process of bidding to export its Soryu-class submarines to Australia. As former South Korean ambassador to Japan Kwon Chulhyun concluded in 2012, Japan was ¡§getting rid of the obstacles one by one as the opportunity offers. In the long term, I guess it is preparing for a nuclear weapon.¡¨

Since Abe became Prime Minister for the second time in December 2012, Japan¡¦s military evolution has grown faster. Even before his second tenure, however, statements were made in regard to Japan¡¦s nuclear stance. Soon after the Fukushima disaster in 2011, when many Japanese questioned the safety of nuclear power stations, the former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba said, ¡§We should keep [the] nuclear fuel cycle, which is backed by ¡¥enrichment and reprocessing¡¦ in order to maintain ¡¥technical deterrence.¡¦¡¨ Similarly, just prior to being appointed to the post of Defense Minister in 2012, Satoshi Morimoto said that commercial nuclear power reactors have ¡§very great defensive deterrent functions.¡¨

Such hedging has given rise to the idea of Japan¡¦s bomb in the basement. Coupled with strong space and rocket-launch programs, Japan could easily create a military-focused nuclear program if it felt that was warranted.

Conventional wisdom has it that Japan would be committing a grave mistake if it were to develop nuclear weapons. This is undoubtedly true. China would probably lead the regional and international charge to impose political, diplomatic, military and economic sanctions on Japan¡Xand no doubt without the slightest trace of irony. Arguably, the greater danger to any such overt move by Japan would arise from sanctions that Washington would bring to bear on it. Japan¡¦s continued reliance on the extended deterrence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella depends completely on its (Japan¡¦s) perceptions of whether Washington has the political will to convert the threat its nuclear weapons pose into action should Japan be attacked by, say, China, Russia or North Korea. Given the U.S.¡¦s increasing vulnerability to Chinese nuclear weapons and Washington¡¦s seeming political inability to effectively counter China¡¦s activities in the South China Sea, Tokyo has every reason to question U.S. ability or determination to ensure its security.

Any Japanese move toward creating a nuclear deterrent could, however, see the U.S. withdraw from any defense agreement with Tokyo and impose economic and other sanctions on it. This could partly be because Washington could see its own influence in East Asia being reduced. It would be easier to coerce Japan into foregoing any nuclear deterrent than it would be to pressure China into withdrawing the threat it used to provoke Japan into creating the deterrent in the first place. There could come a time, nevertheless, when Japan saw itself at an existential risk and with no real guarantee of support from its allies. In such a case, sanctions or no sanctions, it would undoubtedly develop nuclear weapons. It behooves Washington, therefore, to take such steps as Tokyo feels are required to ensure that Japan feels its security is guaranteed inasmuch as it can be. Failure to do so could see the start of a nuclear race between China and Japan that would probably draw in the other two nascent regional nuclear powers¡XSouth Korea and Taiwan¡Xboth of whom could also lose faith in the U.S.¡¦s extended deterrence model.

Washington must act decisively and forcefully to prevent such an outcome by countering (and being seen to be effectively countering) China in the South and East China Seas. Any less could lead to a far worse scenario.

from Brink ¡V The Edge of Risk http://ift.tt/1Lu7V3M
via IFTTT

 

[night driver]

The only real delay in arming will likely be in finding the proper screw driver to bolt them together....

It's reasonably safe to assume that the units have been tested, and properly maintained.


The public adjustment of positions and the statements you have above is HIGHLY interesting (in "interesting times" sort of things), and bodes awkwardly for a NUMBER of players in the South China Sea/Senkaku/Sprately square dance...


This is likely as close to a Nuke War Footing as the Japanese will go publicly.

As for the US withdrawing the Umbrella, IMO this would be a HUGE error on the US part. The Umbrella is as much a protection as it is a limit on Japan...

 

[Housecarl]

Part of the problem is with US foreign policy behavior over the last 7 to 15 years, I'm guessing a lot of US allies are having concerns about the reliability and parameters of the US "umbrella".

In the cast of the "big three", Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, between the amount of history they have to digest between them, and the US relationships with them are "vulnerable" to influence by the relationship the US has with the PRC, they're all probably feeling like they're all on the extreme sharp end.

With the PRC literally throwing its weight around and the US responses to them, as well as their arguably client state North Korea, is only going to encourage consideration of having contingencies in place for the potential of the US waffling or wavering in the event of things going stupider in the region.

Though Taiwan is probably the most exposed, the extra dynamics that the Kim regime throw into planning for South Korea and Japan makes things all the more problematic and would encourage the consideration, if not development, of independent deterrent capability for them, if for no other reason than to make the Party in Beijing take their concerns independently expressed more seriously.

The Mizokami article (post #6) is I think going a bit overboard on the actual available numbers of aircraft and missiles on alert in his estimations for anything other than the equivalent of DEFCON 2 or 1. In the case of aircraft, maybe 12 out of the 72 postulated aircraft would be on alert at any given time. Probably the best model to look at would be the French Force de Dissuasion/Force de frappe tirad circa 1980.

The air component was made up of a force of Mirage IV bombers organized into nine squadrons of four aircraft (2 pairs—one aircraft carrying the nuclear bomb, one a buddy-refueling tanker), with three wings being responsible for three squadrons each. Of the active inventory of 36 aircraft, rotated with 26 reserve aircraft, initially they were kept on alert with 12 in the air, 12 on 4 minute alert and 12 on 45 minute alert. They later bought KC-135s from the US to increase the versatility of the force. Their aircraft carrier aircraft also had a nuclear mission.

The submarine component became operational in 1971 with four SSBNs (later six but now back to four new boats giving the ability to keep two on patrol as needed), keeping one on patrol at all times starting with 16 single warhead SLBMs, later evolving to newer MIRVd missiles starting in 1985.

A land component was added by the French in 1971 consisting of 18 silo based single warhead IRBMs. The force was retired in 1999 when the second series of single warhead IRBMs were considered obsolete and their threat target, the Soviet Union no longer existed. Army assigned short range nuclear missiles intended to blunt a Soviet/Warsaw Pact ground invasion were withdrawn by 1995.

For a road mobile system that Mizokami discounted as too unruly, a system with the reach to keep the PRC and North Korea "in check" along the lines of the Pershing 2's proposed four stage variant (proposed as a LGM-118 Peacekeeper replacement), though three stages would do it for those purposes.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.americanthinker.com/blog...d_for_a_revitalized_us_nuclear_deterrent.html

March 20, 2016

Japan's security concerns and the need for a revitalized U.S. nuclear deterrent

By Sierra Rayne
Comments 6

Historically the poster child for non-proliferation and disarmament, Japan has recently begun to more openly contemplate development of nuclear weapons. While the populace may overwhelmingly oppose nuclear armament, many government and policy leaders are advocating a more autonomous foreign policy in response to a changing security environment.

This change in policy to a more assertive and less defensive stance could be seen when, in 2015, Japan's legislature approved a bill that removed limits on combat imposed by its constitution, thus opening the door to military action in defense of its allies in conflicts abroad. Until now, Japanese participation in overseas exploits has been largely restricted to humanitarian activities.

Japan has long advocated against nuclear proliferation and has itself pledged not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons in line with its three non-nuclear principles: not to allow the manufacture, possession, or importation of nuclear weapons. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it placed itself under the treaty obligation as a non-nuclear weapons state.

A 2009 Congressional Research Service paper reported that while this may be the default position of Japan, a changing security environment in the past has often resulted in a strategic reassessment:

Despite multiple reiterations of Japan's non-nuclear status, this orthodoxy has been challenged on several occasions, usually when Japan has felt strategic vulnerability. Probably the most prominent episode occurred in the mid-1960s: China tested a nuclear device for the first time in 1964, and the United States was engaged in the Vietnam War. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato secretly commissioned several academics to produce a study exploring the costs and benefits of Japan's possible nuclearization, the so-called "1968/70 Internal Report." Another secret investigation into Japan's nuclear option was done by the Japan Defense Agency in 1995 as Japan assessed its standing in the new post-Cold War environment after the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994 and as the international community was considering the indefinite extension of the NPT.

The implication is that threats to its security today will lead Japan to reconsider its nuclear strategy in the future.

Japan perceives China as one of its greatest security threats. As China continues to modernize and expand its military, the threat becomes more acute. North Korea's ongoing tests of nuclear devices and delivery vehicles have also altered the strategic dynamics in the East Asia region.

Exchanging basing rights for security and protection under the U.S. deterrence umbrella after WWII, any significant change in the United States' commitment to maintaining its nuclear deterrence structure would have profound implications for Japan's defense policy. A strengthened U.S.-China relationship and the ongoing buildup of nuclear weapons capacity by North Korea may call into question whether the U.S. will continue to exert dominance in East Asia to the extent needed to adequately defend Japanese interests.

Japan began researching nuclear weapons development during WWII. Today, with one of the world's most advanced civilian nuclear power programs and a highly technologically sophisticated society, many believe that Japan could develop nuclear weapons in a matter of months should it choose to do so.

Despite being a non-nuclear state, Japan has long been committed to developing and maintaining a full-spectrum fuel cycle capability. The Rokkasho reprocessing facility is due to come online in 2016 and will be capable of producing eight tons of weapons-grade plutonium annually. Japan already has 48 tons of plutonium stockpiled and a defense and space industry capable of producing advanced delivery systems.

As China gets ever more expansive in its territorial ambitions, and North Korea continues to flex its military muscle, other Asian countries are put on the defensive over issues that may be unlikely to trigger the extended deterrence promised by the U.S. If the U.S.-Japan alliance weakens, for example as a result of closer U.S.-China ties or a softening of the negotiating position on North Korea's denuclearization, it may strengthen the argument of advocates pushing for Japan to develop its own independent deterrence.

Some on the other side contend that a conflict between the U.S. and China would endanger U.S.-Japan relations by allowing the pro-nuclear weapons advocates to argue "that Washington lacked the capabilities and the political will necessary to retain its leading position in East Asia ... [and to] push for Japan to emerge as a heavily armed country able to protect itself in a newly multipolar Asia."

Regardless of which scenario ultimately plays out, the U.S. needs to reassure Japan that it will continue to provide security and the protection of its nuclear umbrella. This can be done only if the United States modernizes and enhances its nuclear arsenal both to act as a deterrent against its own adversaries and to reassure allies of its ongoing commitment to the geopolitical stability of the Asia-Pacific.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/japan-sticks-nuclear-arms-pledge-trump-remark-37973188

Japan Sticks to Non-Nuclear Arms Pledge After Trump Remark

By The Associated Press·TOKYO — Mar 28, 2016, 2:14 PM ET

Japan's government said Monday that it will stick to its policy of not possessing nuclear weapons, after U.S. presidential hopeful Donald Trump said he would be open to the idea of Japan and South Korea having their own atomic arsenals.

Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga told reporters that the country's "three principles" of not owning, making or allowing nuclear weapons "remain an important basic policy of the government."

Trump said in an interview with The New York Times published Sunday that asking Japan and South Korea to pay more for their own defense "could mean nuclear."

He said the issue "at some point is something that we have to talk about."

Suga, Japan's top government spokesman, declined to comment specifically on Trump's statement, saying he is only running for the presidency at this point. Suga expressed confidence that the U.S.-Japan alliance will remain a pillar of Japanese policy, no matter who wins the U.S. presidential election in November.

The U.S. stations tens of thousands of troops in Japan and South Korea, and both are key U.S. allies in the Pacific. Trump said he would withdraw those troops if Japan and South Korea don't contribute more to their cost.

South Korean Defense Ministry spokesman Moon Sang Gyun said he had no comment on Trump's remarks. Asked in general about a U.S. troop withdrawal, he said South Korea believes that its alliance with the United States remains strong.

North Korea's development of nuclear weapons has prompted questions about whether other Asian nations would feel the need to follow suit.

State Department spokesman John Kirby also declined to address Trump's statement, but said nothing has changed about the seriousness with which the U.S. takes its treaty commitments to Japan and South Korea and its view on the need for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

 

[night driver]

WHat I find interesting is that Suga said that with a straight face...


Though it may be that as Finance Minister he hasn't been fully read in...


If this were Russia, I'd be chortling about Maskirovka but I simply don't know if the Japanese have that concept. Sun Tzu was Chinese so he isn't a lot of help here.


Can't REALLY decide whether or not this is a carefully scripted play obfuscating where they REALLY are in terms of JDF's.

(Though it is starting to look like a classic Fan Dance with what they are saying and un-saying...

NB...Classic Fan Dancers wore enough clothes that even when performing, Mrs Grundy would NOT have been seriously distressed...LOL)

 

[Housecarl]

WHat I find interesting is that Suga said that with a straight face...


Though it may be that as Finance Minister he hasn't been fully read in...


If this were Russia, I'd be chortling about Maskirovka but I simply don't know if the Japanese have that concept. Sun Tzu was Chinese so he isn't a lot of help here.


Can't REALLY decide whether or not this is a carefully scripted play obfuscating where they REALLY are in terms of JDF's.

(Though it is starting to look like a classic Fan Dance with what they are saying and un-saying...

NB...Classic Fan Dancers wore enough clothes that even when performing, Mrs Grundy would NOT have been seriously distressed...LOL)

Look to Musashi's "The Book of Five Rings"....

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-defence-idUSKCN0WV053

World | Mon Mar 28, 2016 11:01pm EDT
Related: World, Japan

Japan public divided as laws easing limits on military take effect

TOKYO | By Linda Sieg


Laws loosening the limits of Japan's pacifist constitution on its military took effect on Tuesday as surveys showed the public remained divided over a change that allows Japanese troops to fight overseas for the first time since World War Two.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has said the security legislation, the biggest change in Japan's defense policy since the creation of its military in 1954, is vital to meet new challenges including a rising China.

Critics say the changes, which triggered mass demonstrations ahead of their enactment last September, violate the pacifist constitution and increase the risk of involvement in foreign wars. Opposition parties plan to campaign for the laws' repeal in an upper house election in July.

The legislation "is vital to prevent wars and protect the people's lives and livelihoods amid an increasingly severe security environment surrounding our country," Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga told a news conference.

"The government will first preserve the peace through diplomacy and there is no change at all in our policy of proactive diplomacy for that purpose," he added.

Japan's ally the United States has welcomed the changes, which allow the military to fight in aid of friendly countries that come under attack if Japan's security is also threatened.

But China, where bitter memories of Tokyo's wartime aggression run deep, has repeatedly expressed concern about the legislation, based on a controversial re-interpretation of the pacifist constitution.

The main opposition Democratic Party and other opposition groups are raising the issue ahead of the upper house election amid speculation Abe may also call a snap poll for the powerful lower chamber. How much traction the issue is unclear.

A voter survey by the Yomiuri newspaper published on Tuesday showed 47 percent did not approve of the changes against 38 percent who did. That compared to 58 percent who opposed the legislation last September versus 31 percent who approved.

However, in a separate survey by the Nikkei business daily, only 35 percent said the legislation should be repealed, while 43 percent said it should remain in place.


(Additional reporting by Kaori Kaneko; Editing by Simon Cameron-Moore)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.ibtimes.com/japans-const...s-shinzo-abes-government-after-donald-2347884

Japan's Constitution Allows Nuclear Weapons, Says Shinzo Abe's Government After Donald Trump Comments

By Julia Glum @superjulia On 04/04/16 AT 9:21 AM

Japan's constitution does not ban the country from having nuclear weapons, contrary to popular belief, government officials under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe insisted recently.

Japan's executive branch, called the Cabinet, wrote in a response to lawmakers' inquiries Friday that the nation could own and use nukes, the Asahi Shimbun reported. But it then noted that the government "firmly maintains a policy principle that it does not possess nuclear weapons of any type under the three non-nuclear principles.”

The statement concerned Article 9 of Japan's constitution, which condemns war and establishes the country as a pacifist nation. The 1947 regulation prohibits Japan from having a traditional military and also renounces offensive weapons, according to the Council on Foreign Relations.

The provision has been reinterpreted over the past few decades, most recently by Abe, who in 2012 started his second period as prime minister. In July 2014, Abe allowed Japan's Self-Defense Forces to become more assertive and militarily assist foreign countries, in part to strengthen the relationship between Japan and the United States, the New York Times reported.

Last week, Abe's government referenced a 1978 address by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda suggesting nuclear weapons were constitutionally OK, the Asahi Shimbun reported. “Even if it involves nuclear weapons, the Constitution does not necessarily ban the possession of them as long as they are restricted to such a minimum necessary level,” it read.

Jun Okumura, a scholar at Tokyo's Meiji Institute for Global Affairs, told the South China Morning Post the recent announcement was likely "something of a surprise to the Japanese public." But residents might not need to worry: Yasuhisa Kawamura, a representative of the Japanese foreign affairs ministry, declared at a Nuclear Security Summit Friday that "it is unthinkable that Japan use or possess nuclear weapons," USA Today reported.

Japan's defense mechanisms also made international news recently when American presidential candidate Donald Trump suggested Japan and South Korea start to protect themselves "against this maniac in North Korea" instead of relying on U.S. troops, according to CNN.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/japans-nuclear-weapons-conundrum/

Japan's Nuclear Weapons Conundrum

Even while Japan pushes for a world free of nuclear weapons, it recognizes the importance of a nuclear deterrence.

By Mina Pollmann
April 06, 2016

Since 1967, when then-Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato introduced the “three non-nuclear principles,” Japan has existed in a state of contradiction when it comes to the question of nuclear weapons’ place in the world: while Japanese leaders call for the global abolition of nuclear weapons, they simultaneously acknowledge the importance of nuclear deterrence and Japan’s reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Consider this strikingly vivid example: In 1974, when Sato was preparing to accept the Nobel Peace Prize for his non-nuclear principles, which is Japan’s policy to not manufacture, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons, he asked then-U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger whether the five nuclear powers would consider renouncing the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons.

Kissinger rejected the proposal, saying, “If we were to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, there would be a great danger for Japan,” specifically vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China. Sato apparently acquiesced to this view, as he did not float the idea in his acceptance speech. The next year, in 1975, the United States officially announced it would extend the “nuclear umbrella” to Japan.

Four decades later, Japanese leaders again are spearheading the initiative to rid the world of nuclear weapons. And this time, the United States has shown greater reciprocity toward Japan’s more limited ambitions.

When the Group of Seven’s (G7) foreign ministers gather in Japan later this week, it will be the first time that a U.S. secretary of state will visit the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, dedicated to the victims of the 1945 atomic bombing. Explaining the significance of this event, Japan’s Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida remarked to journalists, “For the purpose of building momentum for realizing a world free of nuclear weapons, it is very important for world leaders to visit an A-bomb site and see firsthand the realities of atomic bombing.”

Kishida, a Hiroshima native who will chair the upcoming G7 foreign ministers meeting, has also expressed his desire to announce a “Hiroshima declaration,” which would promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Items that could be worked into such a declaration include a call for visits to cities hit by atomic bombs and greater transparency for nuclear forces.

However, among Japan’s political elites, there remains a hard-nosed realism that begrudgingly accepts the utility of nuclear weapons. This realism has surfaced in the recent debate over their constitutionality.

On March 18, Yusuke Yokobatake, director-general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, told the Upper House Budget Committee that, even though domestic and international laws limit the use of nuclear weapons, Japan’s Constitution does not necessarily ban nuclear weapons.

Shinzo Abe’s Cabinet further clarified its position in a written statement provided on April 1. Even though the government continues to uphold the three non-nuclear principles, the statement argued that Article 9 does not prohibit the country from possessing the minimum armed forces needed for self-defense, and there is no distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons when it comes to this minimum requirement.

“Even if it involves nuclear weapons, the Constitution does not necessarily ban the possession of them as long as they are restricted to such a minimum necessary level,” the statement said. In this, Abe’s Cabinet is not necessarily breaking new ground, as it conforms to then-Prime Minsiter Takeo Fukuda’s position, articulated as far back as 1978.

But even as Japanese lawmakers rhetorically reaffirm Japan’s right to unilaterally do what it must to defend itself, in practice, Japan will continue to rely on the United States to be its ultimate trump card. It is the U.S. commitment to Japan’s defense that has, in Obama’s words, “prevented the possibilities of a nuclear escalation and conflict” in this particularly fraught part of the world.

These conflicting desires – a desire to see a world free of nuclear weapons, and a desire to be protected from potential aggressors with nuclear capabilities through robust nuclear deterrence – will coexist in Japan for the foreseeable future.

 

[night driver]

And the fan dancer shows BOTH a long, shapely, undraped leg and an alluring arm....this particular fan dance is getting VERY interesting...

 

[Housecarl]

And the fan dancer shows BOTH a long, shapely, undraped leg and an alluring arm....this particular fan dance is getting VERY interesting...

Yeah, between this and the more open talk in South Korea about getting their own nukes things are definitely getting "interesting".