intothatgoodnight
. . .
A dab of geo-engineering and the intended direction of said downwind could **suddenly** shift into another unintended and unfortunate direction. <ahem>
intothegoodnight
INTL India - China border crisis (Main Thread)
- Thread starter lonestar09
- Start date
intothegoodnight
northern watch
TB Fanatic
1911user
Veteran Member
longer article previously posted about Wolf Warrior diplomats
INTL - China’s ‘Wolf Warrior’ Diplomats Are Ready to Fight (WSJ - Long)
Posted as an aid to understanding China. Last night, a Patreon channel I follow was recommending that everyone have and read NWSS (Nuclear War Survival Skills), just in case. Seems like prudent advice considering China's belligerence...
northern watch
TB Fanatic
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Of course the numbers are relatively small, look at the environment and terrain. If you put a bunch of fat gun toting paper pushers and prison camp guards in those mountains they would pass out or have coronaries.
In many respects China has already ‘captured’ strategic ground in region finger 4. Now they are securing the new land by adding bunkers and firing positions. India was caught unawares and by the time they reacted China traded 20 more dead troops for a more forward and better tactical position.
To be honest India doesn’t have much time to recover the lost territory. If I was India I would find another location on LAC and do the exact same thing China is doing. Move forward, declare disputed land yours and quickly build bunkers and reinforce. It would be interesting to see how China handles a big helping of poop sandwich.
northern watch
TB Fanatic
northern watch
TB Fanatic
northern watch
TB Fanatic
northern watch
TB Fanatic
jward
passin' thru
More 'bout those MiGs & Sukhoi-30mkis
Eye on China: India to get Rs 38,900-cr defence upgrade amid border dispute
By Ajai Shukla | New Delhi | Last Updated at July 02 2020 23:39 IST
Topics defence expenditure | Sukhoi-30MKI | Sukhoi-30 fighter jet
The ministry of defence (MoD) has acknowledged the seriousness of the situation in Ladakh, where Indian soldiers are facing off against Chinese intruders, by approving the purchase of weapons and equipment worth Rs 38,900 crore.
“In the current situation and the need to strengthen the armed forces for the defence of our borders, and in line with our Prime Minister’s clarion call for ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ (self-sufficient India), the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), in its meeting of July 2 held under the chairmanship of Defence Minister Rajnath Singh accorded approval for capital acquisitions of various platforms and equipment required by the Indian armed forces. Proposals for an approximate cost of Rs 38,900 crore were approved,” the MoD stated on Thursday.
“Further, addressing the long-felt need of the Indian Air Force (IAF) to increase its fighter squadrons, the DAC also approved the proposal for procurement of 21 MiG-29 fighters, along with upgrade of existing 59 MiG-29s and procurement of 12 Sukhoi-30MKI aircraft,” said the MoD.
The ministry said procurement from Russia and upgrade of MiG-29s would cost about Rs 7,418 crore, while Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) would build the Sukhoi-30MKI fighters in Nashik for an estimated Rs 10,730 crore.
ALSO READ: India, China corps commanders' meet gives no sign on agreement to disengage
The MoD stated that, given its “focus on indigenous design and development”, the bulk of the clearances — worth Rs 31,130 crore — have been accorded for indigenously built weaponry. The indigenous equipment “involves Indian defence industry with participation of several MSMEs (medium, small, and micro enterprises) as prime tier vendors. The indigenous content in some of these projects is up to 80 per cent of the project cost”, said the MoD.
Indian companies are building much of this equipment — worth Rs 20,400 crore — based on technology transferred to them by the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO). These include the Astra air-to-air missile, software defined radio (SDR), munitions for Pinaka multi-barrelled rocket launchers and Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs), said DRDO Chairman G Satheesh Reddy.
The Astra missile, for which the first order will now be processed, is an indigenous design triumph. It is in the “beyond visual range” (BVR) class of air-to-air missiles, fired from fighter aircraft to destroy fast manoeuvring enemy targets by day or night. The Astra missile is being integrated with Sukhoi-30MKI.
The MoD said the clearance for the Pinaka MBRL would allow additional Pinaka regiments to be raised, boosting the Army’s attack capabilities. Pinaka is all-weather, indirect fire rocket system that delivers a lethal punch from multiple rockets to area targets such as enemy troops in the open, armoured and soft-skinned vehicles and fuel and ammunition dumps.
Funding has been allocated for the development programme of the Nirbhay “long-range land attack cruise missile” that engages targets up to 1,000 kms away. The DRDO say it has “developed, demonstrated and matured critical cruise missile technologies such as aerodynamic configuration, vertical launch using solid booster, thrust vector control system, booster separation, in-flight wing deployment, in-flight engine start and long range way-point navigation system. Seeker development and testing by DRDO laboratories are demonstrated and is at a high level of readiness.”
posted for fair use
wap.business-standard.com
Eye on China: India to get Rs 38,900-cr defence upgrade amid border dispute
By Ajai Shukla | New Delhi | Last Updated at July 02 2020 23:39 IST
Topics defence expenditure | Sukhoi-30MKI | Sukhoi-30 fighter jet
The ministry of defence (MoD) has acknowledged the seriousness of the situation in Ladakh, where Indian soldiers are facing off against Chinese intruders, by approving the purchase of weapons and equipment worth Rs 38,900 crore.
“In the current situation and the need to strengthen the armed forces for the defence of our borders, and in line with our Prime Minister’s clarion call for ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ (self-sufficient India), the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), in its meeting of July 2 held under the chairmanship of Defence Minister Rajnath Singh accorded approval for capital acquisitions of various platforms and equipment required by the Indian armed forces. Proposals for an approximate cost of Rs 38,900 crore were approved,” the MoD stated on Thursday.
“Further, addressing the long-felt need of the Indian Air Force (IAF) to increase its fighter squadrons, the DAC also approved the proposal for procurement of 21 MiG-29 fighters, along with upgrade of existing 59 MiG-29s and procurement of 12 Sukhoi-30MKI aircraft,” said the MoD.
The ministry said procurement from Russia and upgrade of MiG-29s would cost about Rs 7,418 crore, while Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) would build the Sukhoi-30MKI fighters in Nashik for an estimated Rs 10,730 crore.
ALSO READ: India, China corps commanders' meet gives no sign on agreement to disengage
The MoD stated that, given its “focus on indigenous design and development”, the bulk of the clearances — worth Rs 31,130 crore — have been accorded for indigenously built weaponry. The indigenous equipment “involves Indian defence industry with participation of several MSMEs (medium, small, and micro enterprises) as prime tier vendors. The indigenous content in some of these projects is up to 80 per cent of the project cost”, said the MoD.
Indian companies are building much of this equipment — worth Rs 20,400 crore — based on technology transferred to them by the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO). These include the Astra air-to-air missile, software defined radio (SDR), munitions for Pinaka multi-barrelled rocket launchers and Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs), said DRDO Chairman G Satheesh Reddy.
The Astra missile, for which the first order will now be processed, is an indigenous design triumph. It is in the “beyond visual range” (BVR) class of air-to-air missiles, fired from fighter aircraft to destroy fast manoeuvring enemy targets by day or night. The Astra missile is being integrated with Sukhoi-30MKI.
The MoD said the clearance for the Pinaka MBRL would allow additional Pinaka regiments to be raised, boosting the Army’s attack capabilities. Pinaka is all-weather, indirect fire rocket system that delivers a lethal punch from multiple rockets to area targets such as enemy troops in the open, armoured and soft-skinned vehicles and fuel and ammunition dumps.
Funding has been allocated for the development programme of the Nirbhay “long-range land attack cruise missile” that engages targets up to 1,000 kms away. The DRDO say it has “developed, demonstrated and matured critical cruise missile technologies such as aerodynamic configuration, vertical launch using solid booster, thrust vector control system, booster separation, in-flight wing deployment, in-flight engine start and long range way-point navigation system. Seeker development and testing by DRDO laboratories are demonstrated and is at a high level of readiness.”
posted for fair use
Eye on China: India to get Rs 38,900-cr defence upgrade amid border dispute
To buy 21 MiG-29s, 12 Sukhoi-30MKI aircraft, upgrade existing 59 MiG-29s
Melodi
Disaster Cat
I couldn't get just the one twitter bit to copy, but while we all knew that China and Pakistan had some common objectives, announcing they're working together is (in my mind) just a few more steps before they start recalling ambassadors.
I noticed the usual "do not buy the enemy products" is already in full swing (Tik Tok) which means it is really Tick Tock time in real-world terms...
I noticed the usual "do not buy the enemy products" is already in full swing (Tik Tok) which means it is really Tick Tock time in real-world terms...
When the switch trips on this, I don't think there will be time to recall ambassadors.
So India has an estimated 140 to 150 nuclear warheads, Pakistan's estimated to have 150 to 160 nuclear warheads and the PRC is estimated to have at least 300 to 400 warheads but enough uranium and plutonium in stock for at least a thousand.....
Posted for fair use.....
theprint.in
India can’t afford to be defensive against China like it has been with Pakistan on terror
Avoiding war with China will cost Delhi in long run. Beijing’s LAC aggression will return.
Rajesh Rajagopalan 2 July, 2020 12:48 pm IST
Indian governments have traditionally been risk-averse; the Narendra Modi government is only slightly less so, at least when it comes to externally directed action.
Which is why it was surprising when on Monday, a highly-placed Indian government source was quoted as saying that considering China’s unrelenting stance on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, India was willing to consider a military pushback. India will not worry about consequences because, according to the official, “if you start thinking of consequences, you will not be able to move forward”.
This appeared to be clearly foolish, as actions do have consequences which need to be considered before implementing. This is particularly true of military action against China. Such action could escalate to a full-scale war that can lead to not only immediate and obvious military consequences, but also long-term political, economic and diplomatic effects.
It is unlikely that the Modi government is not worrying about the consequence of a potential military pushback.
Also read: Three cold wars involving China are dragging India into conflicts it is not ready for
India’s diplomatic history
There are consequences to both action and inaction. When considering consequences, inaction and indecision may (possibly) have the short-term benefit of helping tide over a problem. But it also carries with it the potential for negative longer-term consequences that also have to be calculated. Indeed, inaction and indecision have repeatedly hurt India’s foreign policy and security interests.
Examples from India’s diplomatic history should illustrate this. Not conducting a nuclear test in the 1960s ensured that India was left out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that continues to have negative consequences, five decades later. India was repeatedly subject to technology sanctions, and is still struggling to get into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), all because it is not a member of the NPT. It is unclear if India could have conducted a successful nuclear test in the 1960s, but we don’t know for sure because India did not even attempt to do so. So opposed was Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to a nuclear bomb, that he asked Britain for cost estimates expressly to counter Homi Bhabha’s public claims that a nuclear programme was inexpensive. The British provided it, while keeping secret an internal report that said India could develop a bomb “with little technical difficulty and very little additional cost”. The exaggerated cost estimate helped tide over an immediate problem, but India is still dealing with its long-term negative consequences.
Throughout the next three decades, even after India tested a “device” in 1974, Indian governments worried about immediate consequences of becoming a nuclear power — sanctions, cost — before finally taking the plunge in 1998. Sanctions followed, but they were easily weathered, while the long-term consequences still haunt India.
Another example is how India repeatedly held back from militarily responding to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. It feared military escalation and possibly international intervention or pressure, and expected benefits for ‘good behavior’. Neither materialised. When India did retaliate with the surgical strike and the Balakot attack, the fear of escalation and international pressure turned out to be unfounded.
India’s capture of Siachen in 1984 provides a rare counterexample. Despite the continuing cost in terms of human life, the strategic costs, if India had not launched Operation Meghdoot, can be easily imagined, especially in the current context. Simply put, in estimating costs and benefits, India needs to look at not just the immediate effects of action and non-action, but also the long term effects.
Also read: Why can’t China retaliate to Modi’s virtual strike? There is no Indian TikTok to be punished
Cost-benefit analysis
Thus, while taking military action at the LAC will likely be costly, any judgement needs to be weighed against the cost of inaction. In general, it is not advisable to consider war against a stronger foe. But three qualifiers need to be considered too. First, while China is much more powerful overall, this imbalance may not yet be as significant at the LAC where the forces are at least matched. Second, India’s relative weakness has an advantage: anything other than an unambiguous victory will be perceived as a loss for China.
Finally, avoiding war may prove to be expensive in the longer term if it signals irresoluteness. China will be emboldened. Left unchallenged, there is a good chance it will push India again. China’s behavior does not suggest that this will be its last nibble. So, the question may be as much about deterrence, as it is about war. If it was only a question of war for immediate objectives, the answer is simple — the stakes may not be worth the cost. But if it is the former, there could be long term consequences because deterrence requires demonstrating resolve. There will be consequences further afield too, on India’s potential partners in the region, and ultimately on whether any coalition is possible to maintain a non-hegemonised Asia.
Talk of military pushback also assumes adequate military preparation. Both Indian military history and the Modi government’s previous actions should sound a cautionary note. Moreover, the Indian military has traditionally been oriented and prepared for defensive military action at the LAC, not offensive. Finally, public signaling such as this also raises a commitment problem: if China does not back down, New Delhi risks additional damage to its credibility, if it does not follow through with its threat.
The author is a professor in International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. Views are personal.
Posted for fair use.....
India can't afford to be defensive against China like it has been with Pakistan on terror
Avoiding war with China will cost Delhi in long run. Beijing’s LAC aggression will return.
theprint.in
India can’t afford to be defensive against China like it has been with Pakistan on terror
Avoiding war with China will cost Delhi in long run. Beijing’s LAC aggression will return.
Rajesh Rajagopalan 2 July, 2020 12:48 pm IST
Indian governments have traditionally been risk-averse; the Narendra Modi government is only slightly less so, at least when it comes to externally directed action.
Which is why it was surprising when on Monday, a highly-placed Indian government source was quoted as saying that considering China’s unrelenting stance on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, India was willing to consider a military pushback. India will not worry about consequences because, according to the official, “if you start thinking of consequences, you will not be able to move forward”.
This appeared to be clearly foolish, as actions do have consequences which need to be considered before implementing. This is particularly true of military action against China. Such action could escalate to a full-scale war that can lead to not only immediate and obvious military consequences, but also long-term political, economic and diplomatic effects.
It is unlikely that the Modi government is not worrying about the consequence of a potential military pushback.
Also read: Three cold wars involving China are dragging India into conflicts it is not ready for
India’s diplomatic history
There are consequences to both action and inaction. When considering consequences, inaction and indecision may (possibly) have the short-term benefit of helping tide over a problem. But it also carries with it the potential for negative longer-term consequences that also have to be calculated. Indeed, inaction and indecision have repeatedly hurt India’s foreign policy and security interests.
Examples from India’s diplomatic history should illustrate this. Not conducting a nuclear test in the 1960s ensured that India was left out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that continues to have negative consequences, five decades later. India was repeatedly subject to technology sanctions, and is still struggling to get into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), all because it is not a member of the NPT. It is unclear if India could have conducted a successful nuclear test in the 1960s, but we don’t know for sure because India did not even attempt to do so. So opposed was Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to a nuclear bomb, that he asked Britain for cost estimates expressly to counter Homi Bhabha’s public claims that a nuclear programme was inexpensive. The British provided it, while keeping secret an internal report that said India could develop a bomb “with little technical difficulty and very little additional cost”. The exaggerated cost estimate helped tide over an immediate problem, but India is still dealing with its long-term negative consequences.
Throughout the next three decades, even after India tested a “device” in 1974, Indian governments worried about immediate consequences of becoming a nuclear power — sanctions, cost — before finally taking the plunge in 1998. Sanctions followed, but they were easily weathered, while the long-term consequences still haunt India.
Another example is how India repeatedly held back from militarily responding to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. It feared military escalation and possibly international intervention or pressure, and expected benefits for ‘good behavior’. Neither materialised. When India did retaliate with the surgical strike and the Balakot attack, the fear of escalation and international pressure turned out to be unfounded.
India’s capture of Siachen in 1984 provides a rare counterexample. Despite the continuing cost in terms of human life, the strategic costs, if India had not launched Operation Meghdoot, can be easily imagined, especially in the current context. Simply put, in estimating costs and benefits, India needs to look at not just the immediate effects of action and non-action, but also the long term effects.
Also read: Why can’t China retaliate to Modi’s virtual strike? There is no Indian TikTok to be punished
Cost-benefit analysis
Thus, while taking military action at the LAC will likely be costly, any judgement needs to be weighed against the cost of inaction. In general, it is not advisable to consider war against a stronger foe. But three qualifiers need to be considered too. First, while China is much more powerful overall, this imbalance may not yet be as significant at the LAC where the forces are at least matched. Second, India’s relative weakness has an advantage: anything other than an unambiguous victory will be perceived as a loss for China.
Finally, avoiding war may prove to be expensive in the longer term if it signals irresoluteness. China will be emboldened. Left unchallenged, there is a good chance it will push India again. China’s behavior does not suggest that this will be its last nibble. So, the question may be as much about deterrence, as it is about war. If it was only a question of war for immediate objectives, the answer is simple — the stakes may not be worth the cost. But if it is the former, there could be long term consequences because deterrence requires demonstrating resolve. There will be consequences further afield too, on India’s potential partners in the region, and ultimately on whether any coalition is possible to maintain a non-hegemonised Asia.
Talk of military pushback also assumes adequate military preparation. Both Indian military history and the Modi government’s previous actions should sound a cautionary note. Moreover, the Indian military has traditionally been oriented and prepared for defensive military action at the LAC, not offensive. Finally, public signaling such as this also raises a commitment problem: if China does not back down, New Delhi risks additional damage to its credibility, if it does not follow through with its threat.
The author is a professor in International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. Views are personal.
Last edited:
Posted for fair use.....
sputniknews.com
Ex-Indian Envoy: In Two-Front War, China's Gains Will be More Offset by Loss of Int’l Credibility
© REUTERS / Danish Ismail
Opinion
15:17 GMT 02.07.2020(updated 15:54 GMT 02.07.2020) Get short URL
by Aakriti Sharma
266
New Delhi (Sputnik): Amid a long border stand-off and the first combat in 45 years between India and China, intelligence reports have claimed that Pakistan has increased military activities on its side of Kashmir. An Indian parliamentary panel has warned the government of a “two-front war” scenario and asked to prepare for it.
Amid reports of the Pakistani Army allegedly moving troops to Gilgit-Baltistan and its side of Kashmir as well as a long border stand-off with China, an Indian parliamentary panel has alerted the government about a “two-front war” scenario and asked to be prepared for such an eventuality.
Indian intelligence sources on Wednesday claimed that Pakistan has moved 20,000 soldiers to Gilgit-Baltistan and its side of Kashmir. The development comes days after China reportedly landed a refuelling aircraft in Skardu in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. However, the claim was denied by the Pakistani Armed Forces on Thursday.
Some Indian media reports have quoted intelligence sources as saying that Chinese officials are holding talks with cadres of the terror outfit Al Badr to incite violence in Jammu and Kashmir.
On the other hand, mirroring the Chinese deployment across the Line of Actual Control, India has also engaged in amassing troops and armour along the border. The third round of Corps Commander-level talks on 30 June indicated disengagement, but satellite images continue to reflect otherwise.
Former High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and prominent figure in India’s foreign policy matters Gopalaswami Parthasarathy talks to Sputnik about the impact of Pakistan-China ties on the country amidst the heated border confrontation.
Sputnik: Over the course of a week, the State Bank of Pakistan received $1.3 billion in loan disbursements from Chinese banks and the two countries signed a $2.4 billion investment deal for the Kohala Hydel Power Project. All of this comes amid the border stand-off. How is this targeted at India?
G. Parthasarathy: China, for over the last 40 years, has helped Pakistan not only economically but also with the designs and equipment for producing nuclear weapons, missiles, and defence equipment ranging from rifles to fighter aircraft, to tanks to submarines, so China for 44 years has been following this policy to contain India by using Pakistan. This [Chinese investment in Pakistan] is nothing new.
Sputnik: With China's military movements opposite eastern Ladakh via the Pakistan territory of Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, is there a possibility of a two-front war?
G. Parthasarathy: In 1971, we were worried they [China] may even deploy troops on the border, but they were deterred to do so due to the Indo-Soviet treaty. Now they are not only helping Pakistan, but also installing governments in our neighbourhood which are not friendly to India, whether it is Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh or Nepal. These Chinese attempts to contain India are part of their long term policy to remain the predominant power in Asia.
If China does that [goes for a two-front war], it will find that the gains it makes will be more offset by the loss of its international credibility. It will be regarded as a warmonger.
Sputnik: Despite the pandemic, France has assured the delivery of Rafale fighter jets by the end of July. Both the US and France have offered help amid the stand-off with China. Will India accept military offers from these countries?
G. Parthasarathy: There is no question of accepting or rejecting it [help from US and France]. It is taken for granted. It will certainly make China think carefully and pause.
© REUTERS / Abhishek N. Chinnappa
A Rafale fighter jet performs during the Aero India air show at Yelahanka air base in the southern Indian city of Bengaluru February 18, 2015
Sputnik: With India at loggerheads with both China and Pakistan, and Beijing’s efforts to increase its presence in South Asian countries, for example Nepal, what should be India’s strategy?
G. Parthasarathy: India needs to have good relations with all its neighbours and encourage other countries which think like us and support us and to back those neighbours whom we back.
With regards to Nepal, I don’t know if we are going to cut the development aid or not. It’s a hard decision to take, because you may just be hurting people who are friendly to you so that has to be a carefully considered decision.
As long as that [Chinese presence in India’s neighbouring countries] does not hurt relations with India, either in terms of economic interest or national security, fine, they may have good relations with whomever they want. But if they take decisions which adversely affect our relations, then we have to be concerned.
The views and opinions expressed in the article do not necessarily reflect those of Sputnik.
Ex-Indian Envoy: In Two-Front War, China's Gains Will be More Offset by Loss of Int’l Credibility
New Delhi (Sputnik): Amid a long border stand-off and the first combat in 45 years between India and China, intelligence reports have claimed that Pakistan has increased military activities on its side of Kashmir. An Indian parliamentary...
sputniknews.com
Ex-Indian Envoy: In Two-Front War, China's Gains Will be More Offset by Loss of Int’l Credibility
© REUTERS / Danish Ismail
Opinion
15:17 GMT 02.07.2020(updated 15:54 GMT 02.07.2020) Get short URL
by Aakriti Sharma
266
New Delhi (Sputnik): Amid a long border stand-off and the first combat in 45 years between India and China, intelligence reports have claimed that Pakistan has increased military activities on its side of Kashmir. An Indian parliamentary panel has warned the government of a “two-front war” scenario and asked to prepare for it.
Amid reports of the Pakistani Army allegedly moving troops to Gilgit-Baltistan and its side of Kashmir as well as a long border stand-off with China, an Indian parliamentary panel has alerted the government about a “two-front war” scenario and asked to be prepared for such an eventuality.
Indian intelligence sources on Wednesday claimed that Pakistan has moved 20,000 soldiers to Gilgit-Baltistan and its side of Kashmir. The development comes days after China reportedly landed a refuelling aircraft in Skardu in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. However, the claim was denied by the Pakistani Armed Forces on Thursday.
Some Indian media reports have quoted intelligence sources as saying that Chinese officials are holding talks with cadres of the terror outfit Al Badr to incite violence in Jammu and Kashmir.
On the other hand, mirroring the Chinese deployment across the Line of Actual Control, India has also engaged in amassing troops and armour along the border. The third round of Corps Commander-level talks on 30 June indicated disengagement, but satellite images continue to reflect otherwise.
Former High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and prominent figure in India’s foreign policy matters Gopalaswami Parthasarathy talks to Sputnik about the impact of Pakistan-China ties on the country amidst the heated border confrontation.
Sputnik: Over the course of a week, the State Bank of Pakistan received $1.3 billion in loan disbursements from Chinese banks and the two countries signed a $2.4 billion investment deal for the Kohala Hydel Power Project. All of this comes amid the border stand-off. How is this targeted at India?
G. Parthasarathy: China, for over the last 40 years, has helped Pakistan not only economically but also with the designs and equipment for producing nuclear weapons, missiles, and defence equipment ranging from rifles to fighter aircraft, to tanks to submarines, so China for 44 years has been following this policy to contain India by using Pakistan. This [Chinese investment in Pakistan] is nothing new.
Sputnik: With China's military movements opposite eastern Ladakh via the Pakistan territory of Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, is there a possibility of a two-front war?
G. Parthasarathy: In 1971, we were worried they [China] may even deploy troops on the border, but they were deterred to do so due to the Indo-Soviet treaty. Now they are not only helping Pakistan, but also installing governments in our neighbourhood which are not friendly to India, whether it is Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh or Nepal. These Chinese attempts to contain India are part of their long term policy to remain the predominant power in Asia.
If China does that [goes for a two-front war], it will find that the gains it makes will be more offset by the loss of its international credibility. It will be regarded as a warmonger.
Sputnik: Despite the pandemic, France has assured the delivery of Rafale fighter jets by the end of July. Both the US and France have offered help amid the stand-off with China. Will India accept military offers from these countries?
G. Parthasarathy: There is no question of accepting or rejecting it [help from US and France]. It is taken for granted. It will certainly make China think carefully and pause.
© REUTERS / Abhishek N. Chinnappa
A Rafale fighter jet performs during the Aero India air show at Yelahanka air base in the southern Indian city of Bengaluru February 18, 2015
Sputnik: With India at loggerheads with both China and Pakistan, and Beijing’s efforts to increase its presence in South Asian countries, for example Nepal, what should be India’s strategy?
G. Parthasarathy: India needs to have good relations with all its neighbours and encourage other countries which think like us and support us and to back those neighbours whom we back.
With regards to Nepal, I don’t know if we are going to cut the development aid or not. It’s a hard decision to take, because you may just be hurting people who are friendly to you so that has to be a carefully considered decision.
As long as that [Chinese presence in India’s neighbouring countries] does not hurt relations with India, either in terms of economic interest or national security, fine, they may have good relations with whomever they want. But if they take decisions which adversely affect our relations, then we have to be concerned.
The views and opinions expressed in the article do not necessarily reflect those of Sputnik.
Posted for fair use.....
www.businessworld.in
China Has Become India’s Number One Security Threat: Former Chief of Army Staff
Time has come to dispel China’s assumption that its aggression will bring us to the negotiating table and concede something for the sake of peace.
02 July, 2020
by BW Online Bureau
General V P Malik, Former Chief of Army Staff, says that it is time for India to reset and recalibrate relations with China. “For too long, India has hesitated to impose cost on China. Time has come to dispel China’s assumption that its aggression will bring us to the negotiating table and concede something for the sake of peace,” he said during the LeaderSpeak programme organized by All India Management Association (AIMA). “China has become India’s number one security threat,” he declared.
General Malik was speaking on the future of India’s security in an online interaction with India’s business leaders. The interaction was moderated by Mr Sanjay Kirloskar, President, AIMA and Chairman & Managing Director, Kirloskar Brothers. Miss Rekha Sethi, Director General, AIMA anchored the session.
Mr Kirloskar pointed out that China was showing great confidence by taking on all its neighbours on all sides at the same time. General Malik said that India needed to have good relations with its neighbours and keep an eye on their relationship with China. “We cannot give them total freedom. We need to remind them of our national interest,” he said. He also advised working with other countries to isolate China internationally.
Talking about the anxiety about China’s military strength, General Malik said that though Chinese forces were superior in technology, India had better men behind the gun. “Indian troops are more committed and experienced in mountain warfare,” he said.
India’s line of control with China will now become like the line of control with Pakistan, General Malik said. “Himalayan border requires ramping up of military capability to dissuade China,” he said. “Earlier we never thought of a two front war. Now, we are thinking about it,” he added.
Commenting on a suggestion to change India’s nuclear weapon doctrine of no first use to deter China, General Malik said that several Indian governments have considered that and decided to stick with the existing doctrine. “The present policy is the right thing as a declared policy,” he said.
On the timing of Chinese aggression and its coincidence with economic difficulties in that country, General Malik said that leadership tries to divert the attention of the people during times of economic difficulties. “May be that is why China is taking panga with all its neighbours,” he remarked.
General Malik attributed China’s recent territorial encroachments to President Xi’s promise to the Chinese people to restore territories that belonged to the Middle Kingdom in medieval times. He said that China sees Ladakh, Arunachal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal as five fingers of the palm that is Tibet. He said that China has its eyes on border areas in Himachal and Uttarakhand also.
On the issue of China building a dam to control waters of Brahamputra, General Malik said that 60%-65% of the water in the river was contributed by rainfall on the Indian side of the Himalaya and a Chinese dam will not stop Brahamputra’s flow.
Diplomacy should be given full chance to resolve the Galwan valley faceoff despite talks not yielding satisfactory results so far, General Malik advised. “Any application of force will escalate rapidly…It can become a Kargil like situation,” he said. However, he does not see the two nuclear nations opting for a full- fledged war.
China Has Become India’s Number One Security Threat: Former Chief of Army Staff
Time has come to dispel China’s assumption that its aggression will bring us to the negotiating table and concede something for the sake of peace., , china, Former Chief of Army Staff
www.businessworld.in
China Has Become India’s Number One Security Threat: Former Chief of Army Staff
Time has come to dispel China’s assumption that its aggression will bring us to the negotiating table and concede something for the sake of peace.
02 July, 2020
by BW Online Bureau
General V P Malik, Former Chief of Army Staff, says that it is time for India to reset and recalibrate relations with China. “For too long, India has hesitated to impose cost on China. Time has come to dispel China’s assumption that its aggression will bring us to the negotiating table and concede something for the sake of peace,” he said during the LeaderSpeak programme organized by All India Management Association (AIMA). “China has become India’s number one security threat,” he declared.
General Malik was speaking on the future of India’s security in an online interaction with India’s business leaders. The interaction was moderated by Mr Sanjay Kirloskar, President, AIMA and Chairman & Managing Director, Kirloskar Brothers. Miss Rekha Sethi, Director General, AIMA anchored the session.
Mr Kirloskar pointed out that China was showing great confidence by taking on all its neighbours on all sides at the same time. General Malik said that India needed to have good relations with its neighbours and keep an eye on their relationship with China. “We cannot give them total freedom. We need to remind them of our national interest,” he said. He also advised working with other countries to isolate China internationally.
Talking about the anxiety about China’s military strength, General Malik said that though Chinese forces were superior in technology, India had better men behind the gun. “Indian troops are more committed and experienced in mountain warfare,” he said.
India’s line of control with China will now become like the line of control with Pakistan, General Malik said. “Himalayan border requires ramping up of military capability to dissuade China,” he said. “Earlier we never thought of a two front war. Now, we are thinking about it,” he added.
Commenting on a suggestion to change India’s nuclear weapon doctrine of no first use to deter China, General Malik said that several Indian governments have considered that and decided to stick with the existing doctrine. “The present policy is the right thing as a declared policy,” he said.
On the timing of Chinese aggression and its coincidence with economic difficulties in that country, General Malik said that leadership tries to divert the attention of the people during times of economic difficulties. “May be that is why China is taking panga with all its neighbours,” he remarked.
General Malik attributed China’s recent territorial encroachments to President Xi’s promise to the Chinese people to restore territories that belonged to the Middle Kingdom in medieval times. He said that China sees Ladakh, Arunachal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal as five fingers of the palm that is Tibet. He said that China has its eyes on border areas in Himachal and Uttarakhand also.
On the issue of China building a dam to control waters of Brahamputra, General Malik said that 60%-65% of the water in the river was contributed by rainfall on the Indian side of the Himalaya and a Chinese dam will not stop Brahamputra’s flow.
Diplomacy should be given full chance to resolve the Galwan valley faceoff despite talks not yielding satisfactory results so far, General Malik advised. “Any application of force will escalate rapidly…It can become a Kargil like situation,” he said. However, he does not see the two nuclear nations opting for a full- fledged war.
Posted for fair use.....
India’s Pangong Pickle: New Delhi’s Options After Its Clash with China
Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang
July 2, 2020
Commentary
In early May, “fist fights and stone-pelting” broke out between Chinese and Indian troops at two separate sites along their disputed border. India and China are no strangers to border incidents — even prolonged standoffs — so the skirmishes were newsworthy but not especially noteworthy.
By the end of the month, Indian and Chinese media had focused attention on several points along the Indian territory of Ladakh in the western sector of the disputed border, known as the Line of Actual Control. In this sector, that official name for the boundary is a misnomer: There is no agreement on where any “line” is, nor is there a clear mutual delineation of the territory under “actual control” of either party. By the end of the month, this episode involved a level of military activity that was at least comparable to a multi-month standoff at Doklam near the Bhutan-India-China trijunction in 2017. Despite the regularity of Sino-Indian border standoffs, there had not been a fatality or shot fired on the border since 1975. This was in part because India and China agreed to confidence-building measures in 1993, 1996, and 2013 in an effort to prevent the use of force — especially deadly force — in the border dispute.
That record of nonfatal confrontation collapsed on June 15 when simmering tensions boiled over and Indian and Chinese forces engaged in a brutal brawl in the Galwan Valley. Involving stones and nail-studded clubs but no firearms, this clash claimed the lives of at least 20 Indian soldiers — including a commanding officer — and an unknown number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces. It was the bloodiest confrontation on the Sino-Indian frontier in over half a century.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi now faces a daunting strategic predicament. Having already seized several tactically important positions, China is not going to just pack up and go home. Yet India’s military options to compel a Chinese retreat are poor, forcing Modi to weigh the dangers of escalation against the certainty of strategic humiliation if India does nothing to restore the status quo. Options between full-scale war and capitulation — such as limited attacks to expel Chinese forces or indirect military, diplomatic, and economic efforts to coerce withdrawal — carry their own substantial risks, including the very real possibility that they will not work. These already-difficult calculations take place in the context of a COVID-19 outbreak in India that is slowly churning through some of the country’s largest cities while devastating its economy. Modi’s position is unenviable as he considers his responses. His options range from bad, to worse, to truly ugly.
China’s Moves On the Border
India’s efforts at “quiet diplomacy,” its standard playbook during border standoffs with China, have thus far failed. While local military commanders reportedly reached a preliminary agreement to disengage on June 6, there was apparently still disagreement over whether China would have to abandon a position near what India calls Patrol Point 14, at a bend in the Galwan River from which China can observe Indian military movements.
While Indian troops were trying to remove the newly established Chinese position, tempers finally exploded on June 15, and forces that had been arrayed against each other for weeks at high altitude and under harsh conditions finally clashed. Although military disengagement talks continue, they appear stalled, with China apparently slow-rolling by continuing to blame India for the clash and using talks to schedule further talks, all the while gaining time to consolidate its defenses at a few tactically important positions.
Why is China risking a conflict with its nuclear-armed neighbor amidst a global pandemic? China has been remarkably opaque, so there are more hypotheses than answers. As Yun Sun and M. Taylor Fravel have observed, the pandemic may have heightened Chinese concerns about domestic political legitimacy and therefore sovereignty — not just with respect to India but elsewhere as well, such as Hong Kong. These concerns may have magnified Chinese leaders’ preexisting desire to arrest Indian road- and bridge-building on the frontier that might weaken China’s ability to defend disputed terrain. Beijing may additionally fear that New Delhi’s August 2019 decision to change the constitutional status of Kashmir and Ladakh was a precursor to additional Indian moves along the border, notably over the disputed region of Aksai Chin, that need to be deterred. China’s limited messaging — and its habit of lying — makes it hard to distinguish between whether China is motivated by fear of future Indian nibbling at Aksai Chin, a key plateau linking Tibet to the rest of China, or by opportunism, seeing a chance to gain territory on the cheap from an India distracted by economic and public health challenges. Or, perhaps, Beijing is simply trying to teach New Delhi a lesson that in Asia’s pecking order, China is number one.
What we do know is that the scope and swath of China’s recent incursions seems different this time. The Chinese military pressed not at one point as in the past, but at several tactically important pressure points with thousands of forces across hundreds of kilometers: at Pangong Lake, Hot Springs, Galwan Valley, and Depsang Plains. There are concerning reports that China may be opening, or preparing to open, fronts in Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector of the disputed border. The buildup seems orchestrated by senior PLA leaders, rather than the product of local commander freelancing, and in several places Indian officials believe China has pushed forces beyond points it previously claimed. Whether this is into “Indian territory” or not is hotly debated, but there is no doubt China is attempting to change the status quo through a series of faits accomplis. Shallow incursions in the Galwan Valley and on the Depsang Plains give China significant vantage points over — and the potential to cut off — India’s recently constructed all-weather motorway, the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulet Beg Oldi Road, along the Line of Actual Control, as well as critical feeder roads to the line itself. Elsewhere, China may be less concerned about interdicting Indian roads, and more interested in securing a buffer to protect National Highway 219, the key artery connecting Tibet with the rest of China. If China is worried about India unilaterally fortifying or settling the boundary, or paranoid about Indian Home Minister Amit Shah’s recent statements about reclaiming Aksai Chin, taking these points may help prevent that. Regardless, it is clear that the Chinese military came to play, and does not intend to go away quickly or easily.
India’s Options Going Forward: From Bad to Worse to Ugly
India was surprised by the scale of China’s incursions and was initially caught unprepared. It now faces the difficult challenge of trying to restore the status quo. Unfortunately, the best time to resist a fait accompli is before it is fully completed. As research by Dan Altman shows, if a fait accompli is not quickly resisted or reversed, it becomes more difficult to do so over time as the aggressor consolidates and fortifies its position, establishing a new normal. Of 59 land grabs around the world where the aggressor held territory at the end of a militarized international dispute, Altman finds 47 where the aggressor held that territory uninterrupted for the next 10 years. Those are enviable odds for China’s ability to retain its new real estate in the Himalayas.
Continued.....
India’s Pangong Pickle: New Delhi’s Options After Its Clash with China - War on the Rocks
In early May, “fist fights and stone-pelting” broke out between Chinese and Indian troops at two separate sites along their disputed border. India and
warontherocks.com
India’s Pangong Pickle: New Delhi’s Options After Its Clash with China
Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang
July 2, 2020
Commentary
In early May, “fist fights and stone-pelting” broke out between Chinese and Indian troops at two separate sites along their disputed border. India and China are no strangers to border incidents — even prolonged standoffs — so the skirmishes were newsworthy but not especially noteworthy.
By the end of the month, Indian and Chinese media had focused attention on several points along the Indian territory of Ladakh in the western sector of the disputed border, known as the Line of Actual Control. In this sector, that official name for the boundary is a misnomer: There is no agreement on where any “line” is, nor is there a clear mutual delineation of the territory under “actual control” of either party. By the end of the month, this episode involved a level of military activity that was at least comparable to a multi-month standoff at Doklam near the Bhutan-India-China trijunction in 2017. Despite the regularity of Sino-Indian border standoffs, there had not been a fatality or shot fired on the border since 1975. This was in part because India and China agreed to confidence-building measures in 1993, 1996, and 2013 in an effort to prevent the use of force — especially deadly force — in the border dispute.
That record of nonfatal confrontation collapsed on June 15 when simmering tensions boiled over and Indian and Chinese forces engaged in a brutal brawl in the Galwan Valley. Involving stones and nail-studded clubs but no firearms, this clash claimed the lives of at least 20 Indian soldiers — including a commanding officer — and an unknown number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces. It was the bloodiest confrontation on the Sino-Indian frontier in over half a century.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi now faces a daunting strategic predicament. Having already seized several tactically important positions, China is not going to just pack up and go home. Yet India’s military options to compel a Chinese retreat are poor, forcing Modi to weigh the dangers of escalation against the certainty of strategic humiliation if India does nothing to restore the status quo. Options between full-scale war and capitulation — such as limited attacks to expel Chinese forces or indirect military, diplomatic, and economic efforts to coerce withdrawal — carry their own substantial risks, including the very real possibility that they will not work. These already-difficult calculations take place in the context of a COVID-19 outbreak in India that is slowly churning through some of the country’s largest cities while devastating its economy. Modi’s position is unenviable as he considers his responses. His options range from bad, to worse, to truly ugly.
China’s Moves On the Border
India’s efforts at “quiet diplomacy,” its standard playbook during border standoffs with China, have thus far failed. While local military commanders reportedly reached a preliminary agreement to disengage on June 6, there was apparently still disagreement over whether China would have to abandon a position near what India calls Patrol Point 14, at a bend in the Galwan River from which China can observe Indian military movements.
While Indian troops were trying to remove the newly established Chinese position, tempers finally exploded on June 15, and forces that had been arrayed against each other for weeks at high altitude and under harsh conditions finally clashed. Although military disengagement talks continue, they appear stalled, with China apparently slow-rolling by continuing to blame India for the clash and using talks to schedule further talks, all the while gaining time to consolidate its defenses at a few tactically important positions.
Why is China risking a conflict with its nuclear-armed neighbor amidst a global pandemic? China has been remarkably opaque, so there are more hypotheses than answers. As Yun Sun and M. Taylor Fravel have observed, the pandemic may have heightened Chinese concerns about domestic political legitimacy and therefore sovereignty — not just with respect to India but elsewhere as well, such as Hong Kong. These concerns may have magnified Chinese leaders’ preexisting desire to arrest Indian road- and bridge-building on the frontier that might weaken China’s ability to defend disputed terrain. Beijing may additionally fear that New Delhi’s August 2019 decision to change the constitutional status of Kashmir and Ladakh was a precursor to additional Indian moves along the border, notably over the disputed region of Aksai Chin, that need to be deterred. China’s limited messaging — and its habit of lying — makes it hard to distinguish between whether China is motivated by fear of future Indian nibbling at Aksai Chin, a key plateau linking Tibet to the rest of China, or by opportunism, seeing a chance to gain territory on the cheap from an India distracted by economic and public health challenges. Or, perhaps, Beijing is simply trying to teach New Delhi a lesson that in Asia’s pecking order, China is number one.
What we do know is that the scope and swath of China’s recent incursions seems different this time. The Chinese military pressed not at one point as in the past, but at several tactically important pressure points with thousands of forces across hundreds of kilometers: at Pangong Lake, Hot Springs, Galwan Valley, and Depsang Plains. There are concerning reports that China may be opening, or preparing to open, fronts in Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector of the disputed border. The buildup seems orchestrated by senior PLA leaders, rather than the product of local commander freelancing, and in several places Indian officials believe China has pushed forces beyond points it previously claimed. Whether this is into “Indian territory” or not is hotly debated, but there is no doubt China is attempting to change the status quo through a series of faits accomplis. Shallow incursions in the Galwan Valley and on the Depsang Plains give China significant vantage points over — and the potential to cut off — India’s recently constructed all-weather motorway, the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulet Beg Oldi Road, along the Line of Actual Control, as well as critical feeder roads to the line itself. Elsewhere, China may be less concerned about interdicting Indian roads, and more interested in securing a buffer to protect National Highway 219, the key artery connecting Tibet with the rest of China. If China is worried about India unilaterally fortifying or settling the boundary, or paranoid about Indian Home Minister Amit Shah’s recent statements about reclaiming Aksai Chin, taking these points may help prevent that. Regardless, it is clear that the Chinese military came to play, and does not intend to go away quickly or easily.
India’s Options Going Forward: From Bad to Worse to Ugly
India was surprised by the scale of China’s incursions and was initially caught unprepared. It now faces the difficult challenge of trying to restore the status quo. Unfortunately, the best time to resist a fait accompli is before it is fully completed. As research by Dan Altman shows, if a fait accompli is not quickly resisted or reversed, it becomes more difficult to do so over time as the aggressor consolidates and fortifies its position, establishing a new normal. Of 59 land grabs around the world where the aggressor held territory at the end of a militarized international dispute, Altman finds 47 where the aggressor held that territory uninterrupted for the next 10 years. Those are enviable odds for China’s ability to retain its new real estate in the Himalayas.
Continued.....
Continued.....
With the PLA firmly ensconced at points further along Pangong Lake, Galwan Valley, and Depsang, and with time on China’s side, what are India’s options? First, it needs to stop the bleeding. The Indian Army has to deter Chinese forces from acquiring more territory, both at the current incursion points and at other potential points of vulnerability. This means adopting a robust defensive posture that denies any deeper incursions at the existing friction points. New Delhi should also identify any additional vulnerable points along its frontier with China, focus intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets on detecting potential Chinese threats to those points, and deploy forces to deny the PLA additional gains elsewhere. Simply put, India cannot afford additional fronts or any deeper penetration where it has already suffered losses.
This will be easier said than done. China has not seized positions willy nilly: In many locations it holds positions precisely because they are valuable and easier to defend than alternative claim lines. For India, stopping additional transgressions thus risks advertent escalation if it must meet Chinese penetrations head-on. There is also the growing risk of inadvertent escalation if tempers flare again — altitude and harsh conditions stress the short fuse forces may have in this area — or if there is an accident, for example involving helicopters operating in bad weather and difficult terrain, or between the speedboats that both countries deploy on Pangong Lake. Aidan Milliff correctly points out that the mountainous, high-altitude terrain in eastern Ladakh may inhibit fears of a large-scale war, but that same terrain creates “multiple windows of opportunity at the tactical level” that might provoke clashes, many of which could prove deadly. Although India’s military mobilization is now substantial, with both ground and air forces shifted to the theater and postured to deter further Chinese penetration, China has also amassed substantial forces in depth along with artillery and air power. Moreover, India has eliminated previous restrictions on the use of firearms at the border and granted “complete freedom of action” to military commanders to respond to “extraordinary situations” after the June 15 clash, and it should be assumed that China has done the same. All the ingredients for further loss of life persist, then, even if India’s sole goal is to stop further Chinese incursions.
If India is successful in preventing additional losses, in the medium to long term how can it attempt to restore the pre-May status quo? The problem with faits accomplis is that the defender’s options to reverse them once completed range from bad to worse to downright ugly. There are really only three options, all of which are difficult to achieve in practice.
The first option is to try to expel Chinese forces directly. This means amassing enough military power to successfully execute limited offensives at the points China now occupies and drive PLA forces back, in order to reestablish control of the lost territory or at least deny Chinese control thereof. This is a substantial amount of terrain stretching approximately 200 kilometers, from the Depsang Plains in the north past the Galwan Valley incursion, and beyond the Hot Springs transgression to Pangong Lake further south, where China has apparently seized several additional kilometers of lakefront property.
There are two problems with the direct expulsion option. First, time is on China’s side. The PLA is consolidating its new positions, making it more difficult for India to undertake limited coordinated offensives at any one point, let alone all of them. Second, the mountainous terrain likely benefits the defender — in this case Chinese troops who now occupy large portions of the disputed territory — because amassing enough forces and firepower to dislodge a fortified position with limited offensives may be nearly impossible now without significant escalation. India might have to open up a new front to put pressure on Chinese lines at more tactically vulnerable points or use artillery or airpower — or both — on or behind the Line of Actual Control for the first time in decades, inviting unpredictable responses from China.
The second option available to India is to indirectly expel Chinese forces by generating leverage at other points or in other domains, and trade for withdrawal. New Delhi could symmetrically seize equivalent, relatively undefended, territory on the “Chinese side” of the border and trade it in a negotiation, or punish China elsewhere through other means. Such asymmetric punishment might include actions in another theater (e.g., the South China Sea), economic pressure, or diplomatic moves that signal India’s increasing willingness to align with a broader coalition to contain an aggressive China.
Here, India’s options are again limited and unattractive. There are certainly places along the disputed border where India possesses local advantages, such as it showed in Chumar in 2014, and could theoretically seize land to trade away to restore the status quo ante. Unfortunately, India’s prospects for doing so now without the element of surprise are limited, as China will have likely anticipated such retaliation and improved its defenses in those areas, neutralizing many of India’s advantages. In the maritime domain, India’s navy certainly matches well with the PLA Navy in the Indian Ocean region, but its punitive options beyond that (e.g., in the South China Sea or western Pacific) are extremely limited. Furthermore, the track record of naval pressure achieving results on land is not inspiring and at best, as Julian Corbett observed long ago, “its effects must always be slow.”
India’s non-military options are also realistically limited. Economically, the two countries’ trade balance favors China, and India is dependent on China for key inputs in major sectors — such as active ingredients in pharmaceuticals or microchips in electronics — that are not easy to replace quickly. Even before the border crisis, India was seeking to curtail Chinese direct investment, which is fairly modest in scale though arguably disproportionately influential in certain areas such as India’s startup sector. India can also ban specific Chinese consumer goods and services, as it did on June 29 when it blocked nearly 60 mobile applications including TikTok, denying Chinese companies access to Indian users and data. However, in many areas these moves will prove more irksome or symbolic — and unenforceable — than coercive. Although India may attempt to reduce economic activity with China in the long term, its ability to do so in a timeframe that compels withdrawal from the heights of eastern Ladakh is limited. China is likely betting that any economic punishment will hurt India more than it hurts China, the world’s second-largest economy and one on which India depends for much of its vertical supply chain.
Diplomatically, India may seek to strengthen its alignment with the United States and/or the other members of the “Quad” of democratic powers in Asia, Australia and Japan. But, such moves were already afoot before the latest crisis, and any further alignment with the West faces speedbumps — such as India’s heavy dependence on Russian frontline military equipment — that will not suddenly disappear overnight. Most diplomatic moves are not likely to be painful enough to China to incentivize relinquishing valuable territory it now holds, and may merely reinforce Chinese hawks’ belief that India was always anti-China and merited preventive action as a result.
The third option is perhaps the ugliest, strategically and politically: India may have no choice but to accept China’s faits accomplis and anesthetize the domestic fallout by exploiting the ambiguity around the definition and non-delineation of the Line of Actual Control, claiming that it is not Indian territory, which of course depends on the definitions of “Indian,” “territory,” and frankly, “is.” There are hints that the Indian government is preparing itself and the domestic public to do just this, as Modi himself stated that no Chinese forces were on “Indian territory” after an all-party meeting on June 19. Subsequent clarifications only served to generate confusion. But faced with few military, diplomatic, or economic options to reverse Beijing’s faits accomplis, New Delhi may have no choice but to quietly accept them. The risk, of course, is that this approach may only further embolden China to be more aggressive toward India or seize additional territory. Even if ceding these particular points to China does not amount to a tactical loss for India on the ground, the broader impact of doing so could be quite costly.
In order to prevent future land grabs, India might have to mobilize a much larger force along the 2,000-plus mile border. Already, retired senior officers are talking of the need to turn the Line of Actual Control into something akin to the heavily militarized and fenced Line of Control that divides Indian- from Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Attempting something this ambitious would be challenging during good times, and virtually impossible in the midst of a pandemic forecast to cause a 4.5 percent contraction in the Indian economy this year — the worst economic crisis India has faced in a generation. A New Delhi distracted by border disputes with China cannot focus on the broader strategic competition with Beijing, gives Pakistan some breathing room, and weakens itself by diverting precious resources to defending inhospitable terrain in the hinterland. Quiet acceptance of the accumulated Chinese revisions of the territorial status quo could amount to one of India’s greatest geopolitical and strategic setbacks in decades.
Looking Ahead
India finds itself in a very difficult position vis-à-vis China on their disputed border. At some point, India will have to determine how it could have allowed China to surprise it and execute faits accomplis in multiple places, and what the strategic and operational warning signs were that it missed or failed to act upon. But, at the moment, its immediate challenge is to stop the bleeding, which in and of itself has all the ingredients for a tense and potentially long and escalatory standoff between Asia’s two nuclear-armed giants. Even if it can halt additional gains by the Chinese military, New Delhi may find it difficult to restore the status quo, since its options range from bad to worse to ugly. This is precisely why faits accomplis are so attractive to states, and why they are so important to reverse quickly, before they are completed and consolidated. In international politics, possession is not just nine-tenths of the law, it is the law.
Christopher Clary is an assistant professor of political science at the University at Albany, State University of New York and a nonresident fellow with the Stimson Center’s South Asia Program. Vipin Narang is an associate professor of political science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
With the PLA firmly ensconced at points further along Pangong Lake, Galwan Valley, and Depsang, and with time on China’s side, what are India’s options? First, it needs to stop the bleeding. The Indian Army has to deter Chinese forces from acquiring more territory, both at the current incursion points and at other potential points of vulnerability. This means adopting a robust defensive posture that denies any deeper incursions at the existing friction points. New Delhi should also identify any additional vulnerable points along its frontier with China, focus intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets on detecting potential Chinese threats to those points, and deploy forces to deny the PLA additional gains elsewhere. Simply put, India cannot afford additional fronts or any deeper penetration where it has already suffered losses.
This will be easier said than done. China has not seized positions willy nilly: In many locations it holds positions precisely because they are valuable and easier to defend than alternative claim lines. For India, stopping additional transgressions thus risks advertent escalation if it must meet Chinese penetrations head-on. There is also the growing risk of inadvertent escalation if tempers flare again — altitude and harsh conditions stress the short fuse forces may have in this area — or if there is an accident, for example involving helicopters operating in bad weather and difficult terrain, or between the speedboats that both countries deploy on Pangong Lake. Aidan Milliff correctly points out that the mountainous, high-altitude terrain in eastern Ladakh may inhibit fears of a large-scale war, but that same terrain creates “multiple windows of opportunity at the tactical level” that might provoke clashes, many of which could prove deadly. Although India’s military mobilization is now substantial, with both ground and air forces shifted to the theater and postured to deter further Chinese penetration, China has also amassed substantial forces in depth along with artillery and air power. Moreover, India has eliminated previous restrictions on the use of firearms at the border and granted “complete freedom of action” to military commanders to respond to “extraordinary situations” after the June 15 clash, and it should be assumed that China has done the same. All the ingredients for further loss of life persist, then, even if India’s sole goal is to stop further Chinese incursions.
If India is successful in preventing additional losses, in the medium to long term how can it attempt to restore the pre-May status quo? The problem with faits accomplis is that the defender’s options to reverse them once completed range from bad to worse to downright ugly. There are really only three options, all of which are difficult to achieve in practice.
The first option is to try to expel Chinese forces directly. This means amassing enough military power to successfully execute limited offensives at the points China now occupies and drive PLA forces back, in order to reestablish control of the lost territory or at least deny Chinese control thereof. This is a substantial amount of terrain stretching approximately 200 kilometers, from the Depsang Plains in the north past the Galwan Valley incursion, and beyond the Hot Springs transgression to Pangong Lake further south, where China has apparently seized several additional kilometers of lakefront property.
There are two problems with the direct expulsion option. First, time is on China’s side. The PLA is consolidating its new positions, making it more difficult for India to undertake limited coordinated offensives at any one point, let alone all of them. Second, the mountainous terrain likely benefits the defender — in this case Chinese troops who now occupy large portions of the disputed territory — because amassing enough forces and firepower to dislodge a fortified position with limited offensives may be nearly impossible now without significant escalation. India might have to open up a new front to put pressure on Chinese lines at more tactically vulnerable points or use artillery or airpower — or both — on or behind the Line of Actual Control for the first time in decades, inviting unpredictable responses from China.
The second option available to India is to indirectly expel Chinese forces by generating leverage at other points or in other domains, and trade for withdrawal. New Delhi could symmetrically seize equivalent, relatively undefended, territory on the “Chinese side” of the border and trade it in a negotiation, or punish China elsewhere through other means. Such asymmetric punishment might include actions in another theater (e.g., the South China Sea), economic pressure, or diplomatic moves that signal India’s increasing willingness to align with a broader coalition to contain an aggressive China.
Here, India’s options are again limited and unattractive. There are certainly places along the disputed border where India possesses local advantages, such as it showed in Chumar in 2014, and could theoretically seize land to trade away to restore the status quo ante. Unfortunately, India’s prospects for doing so now without the element of surprise are limited, as China will have likely anticipated such retaliation and improved its defenses in those areas, neutralizing many of India’s advantages. In the maritime domain, India’s navy certainly matches well with the PLA Navy in the Indian Ocean region, but its punitive options beyond that (e.g., in the South China Sea or western Pacific) are extremely limited. Furthermore, the track record of naval pressure achieving results on land is not inspiring and at best, as Julian Corbett observed long ago, “its effects must always be slow.”
India’s non-military options are also realistically limited. Economically, the two countries’ trade balance favors China, and India is dependent on China for key inputs in major sectors — such as active ingredients in pharmaceuticals or microchips in electronics — that are not easy to replace quickly. Even before the border crisis, India was seeking to curtail Chinese direct investment, which is fairly modest in scale though arguably disproportionately influential in certain areas such as India’s startup sector. India can also ban specific Chinese consumer goods and services, as it did on June 29 when it blocked nearly 60 mobile applications including TikTok, denying Chinese companies access to Indian users and data. However, in many areas these moves will prove more irksome or symbolic — and unenforceable — than coercive. Although India may attempt to reduce economic activity with China in the long term, its ability to do so in a timeframe that compels withdrawal from the heights of eastern Ladakh is limited. China is likely betting that any economic punishment will hurt India more than it hurts China, the world’s second-largest economy and one on which India depends for much of its vertical supply chain.
Diplomatically, India may seek to strengthen its alignment with the United States and/or the other members of the “Quad” of democratic powers in Asia, Australia and Japan. But, such moves were already afoot before the latest crisis, and any further alignment with the West faces speedbumps — such as India’s heavy dependence on Russian frontline military equipment — that will not suddenly disappear overnight. Most diplomatic moves are not likely to be painful enough to China to incentivize relinquishing valuable territory it now holds, and may merely reinforce Chinese hawks’ belief that India was always anti-China and merited preventive action as a result.
The third option is perhaps the ugliest, strategically and politically: India may have no choice but to accept China’s faits accomplis and anesthetize the domestic fallout by exploiting the ambiguity around the definition and non-delineation of the Line of Actual Control, claiming that it is not Indian territory, which of course depends on the definitions of “Indian,” “territory,” and frankly, “is.” There are hints that the Indian government is preparing itself and the domestic public to do just this, as Modi himself stated that no Chinese forces were on “Indian territory” after an all-party meeting on June 19. Subsequent clarifications only served to generate confusion. But faced with few military, diplomatic, or economic options to reverse Beijing’s faits accomplis, New Delhi may have no choice but to quietly accept them. The risk, of course, is that this approach may only further embolden China to be more aggressive toward India or seize additional territory. Even if ceding these particular points to China does not amount to a tactical loss for India on the ground, the broader impact of doing so could be quite costly.
In order to prevent future land grabs, India might have to mobilize a much larger force along the 2,000-plus mile border. Already, retired senior officers are talking of the need to turn the Line of Actual Control into something akin to the heavily militarized and fenced Line of Control that divides Indian- from Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Attempting something this ambitious would be challenging during good times, and virtually impossible in the midst of a pandemic forecast to cause a 4.5 percent contraction in the Indian economy this year — the worst economic crisis India has faced in a generation. A New Delhi distracted by border disputes with China cannot focus on the broader strategic competition with Beijing, gives Pakistan some breathing room, and weakens itself by diverting precious resources to defending inhospitable terrain in the hinterland. Quiet acceptance of the accumulated Chinese revisions of the territorial status quo could amount to one of India’s greatest geopolitical and strategic setbacks in decades.
Looking Ahead
India finds itself in a very difficult position vis-à-vis China on their disputed border. At some point, India will have to determine how it could have allowed China to surprise it and execute faits accomplis in multiple places, and what the strategic and operational warning signs were that it missed or failed to act upon. But, at the moment, its immediate challenge is to stop the bleeding, which in and of itself has all the ingredients for a tense and potentially long and escalatory standoff between Asia’s two nuclear-armed giants. Even if it can halt additional gains by the Chinese military, New Delhi may find it difficult to restore the status quo, since its options range from bad to worse to ugly. This is precisely why faits accomplis are so attractive to states, and why they are so important to reverse quickly, before they are completed and consolidated. In international politics, possession is not just nine-tenths of the law, it is the law.
Christopher Clary is an assistant professor of political science at the University at Albany, State University of New York and a nonresident fellow with the Stimson Center’s South Asia Program. Vipin Narang is an associate professor of political science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Posted for fair use.....
PM Modi addresses Indian Army on India-China border — ‘The enemies of India have seen your fire and fury’
Prabhjote Gill
1 hour ago
“The enemies of India have seen your fire and fury,” Modi told the troops. “When the protection of the country in your hands and you resolute thoughts, there is unbreakable trust. And, citizens India are not worried thanks to you,” he added thanking the troops for their bravery. Modi asserted that the Indian troops' operating at such a height and difficult terrain is an homage to India's strength that no other country can match.
He added that India had always pursued the path of peace. "We have always worked towards for the protection of humanity. We have given our life for it," said Modi. At the same, he added that those who are weak can never initiate steps for peace — bravery and courage is a prerequisite for peace.
Modi visits Ladakh
Earlier today, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrived in Leh to review the ongoing border conflict with China. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian addressed the issue stating, “Not party should engage in any action that may escalate the situation at this point.”
“India and China are in communication and negotiations on lowering the temperatures through military and diplomatic channels,” he added.
This is the first time that Modi has visited the region since the two sides have been engaged in a standoff since May. He was accompanied by the Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat and Army Chief General MM Naravane.
"You give the citizens of India strength to work day and night — pushing forward and strengthening the idea of an atmanirbhar (self-reliant) country," he told the troops during his address.
Also Read
© Provided by Business Insider IndiaPM Narendra Modi visits Ladakh – two weeks after the Galwan valley standoff with China
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh was originally supposed to visit the area but his visit was reportedly deferred. Instead, Modi is scheduled to meet the soldiers who injured during the clash between Indian and Chinese troops on June 15 that led to the death of 20 Indian soldier and an undisclosed number on the Chinese side.
“The bravery that you and your compatriots showed, a message has gone to the world about India’s strength. Nation rests peacefully because of your bravery,” Modi told the troops.
The Prime Minister is also going to speak to Lieutenant General Harinder Singh who has been leading the military talks on India’s side. There have been three high-level military discussions so far — one on June 6, another on June 22 and the latest on June 30. Both sides have agreed to disengage in a phased and step-by-step manner.
“We expect the Chinese side to sincerely follow up and ensure the expeditious restoration of peace and tranquillity in the border areas as per bilateral agreements and protocols,” India’s Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson, Anurag Srivastava said during the press conference yesterday evening.
PM Modi addresses Indian Army on India-China border — ‘The enemies of India have seen your fire and fury’
Prabhjote Gill
1 hour ago
- Indian Prime Minster Narendra Modi addressed the troops in Ladakh today, July 3.
- "The enemies of India have seen your fire and fury," he said.
- This is Modi’s first visit to Ladakh since the two sides have been locked in a standoff since early May and the June 15 clash that led to the death of 20 Indian soldiers.
“The enemies of India have seen your fire and fury,” Modi told the troops. “When the protection of the country in your hands and you resolute thoughts, there is unbreakable trust. And, citizens India are not worried thanks to you,” he added thanking the troops for their bravery. Modi asserted that the Indian troops' operating at such a height and difficult terrain is an homage to India's strength that no other country can match.
He added that India had always pursued the path of peace. "We have always worked towards for the protection of humanity. We have given our life for it," said Modi. At the same, he added that those who are weak can never initiate steps for peace — bravery and courage is a prerequisite for peace.
Modi visits Ladakh
Earlier today, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrived in Leh to review the ongoing border conflict with China. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian addressed the issue stating, “Not party should engage in any action that may escalate the situation at this point.”
“India and China are in communication and negotiations on lowering the temperatures through military and diplomatic channels,” he added.
This is the first time that Modi has visited the region since the two sides have been engaged in a standoff since May. He was accompanied by the Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat and Army Chief General MM Naravane.
"You give the citizens of India strength to work day and night — pushing forward and strengthening the idea of an atmanirbhar (self-reliant) country," he told the troops during his address.
Also Read
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh was originally supposed to visit the area but his visit was reportedly deferred. Instead, Modi is scheduled to meet the soldiers who injured during the clash between Indian and Chinese troops on June 15 that led to the death of 20 Indian soldier and an undisclosed number on the Chinese side.
“The bravery that you and your compatriots showed, a message has gone to the world about India’s strength. Nation rests peacefully because of your bravery,” Modi told the troops.
The Prime Minister is also going to speak to Lieutenant General Harinder Singh who has been leading the military talks on India’s side. There have been three high-level military discussions so far — one on June 6, another on June 22 and the latest on June 30. Both sides have agreed to disengage in a phased and step-by-step manner.
“We expect the Chinese side to sincerely follow up and ensure the expeditious restoration of peace and tranquillity in the border areas as per bilateral agreements and protocols,” India’s Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson, Anurag Srivastava said during the press conference yesterday evening.
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Someone in Beijing made a few assumptions too many......
jward
passin' thru
Indo-Pacific News
@IndoPac_Info
Possible Indian Air force aircraft strength between 2020-2025 (both years are estimated December numbers)
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1279310923031670784?s=20
jward
passin' thru
Indo-Pacific News
@IndoPac_Info
Coverage by six Brahmos LR batteries with five land batteries deployed at Gujarat, Laccadives, A&N Islands, Tamil Nadu, Odisha & a sixth battery on a DDG sailing near Duqm Oman.
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1279310919785275392?s=20
@IndoPac_Info
Coverage by six Brahmos LR batteries with five land batteries deployed at Gujarat, Laccadives, A&N Islands, Tamil Nadu, Odisha & a sixth battery on a DDG sailing near Duqm Oman.
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1279310919785275392?s=20
jward
passin' thru
Foreign Policy
Reading Between The Lines: The Long Term Implications of DAC Approvals
The Defence acquisition council of India on 02/07/2020 approved Rs38900cr approx $5.18Bn worth of military equipment for the Indian military. This acquisition plan includes Rs31130 Cr worth of Equipment that will be developed/manufactured/assembled within India including a spend of Rs20,400 Cr or $2.72Bn on design and development proposals alone. This article will elucidate how and why some of the items approved yesterday could go far beyond adding just another weapons system to the large and varied arsenal of the Indian military and could in fact structurally change the way the Indian Army defends our borders.
Astra missile
The approval for acquisition of an initial tranche of 248 Astra mk 1 BVRAAM missiles is poised to change things for the Indian Air force in multiple ways. The Indian Airforce is the fourth largest airforce globally by fleet size. That said it is a force that till date has been completely dependent on imports for the primary weapons used in air to air combat today. All air to air missiles currently utilized by the IAF are imports from Russia, Israel and France. This has created a situation wherein different missile stocks have to be maintained for different squadrons given that the Israeli, Russian and French missiles are not compatible with all aircraft across the fleet. The entry of Astra into the arsenal is poised to reduce this dependency as it will be qualified for almost all Russian, Indian and French origin combat aircraft in service. This will reduce logistical costs and help build a common pool of AAMs almost any aircraft in the IAF fleet will be able to use.
While the Indian Air Force will be inducting the 150km range French METEOR BVRAAM into its arsenal as well, fact is the Meteor is a silver bullet which will only be used with the small force of Rafale the Indian Air force will shortly operate .The AstraMk1 due to its universality across the fleet will in all likelihood be the BVRAAM most IAF pilots can ever expect to use to engage targets at standoff ranges greater than 100km, add to that the fact that the ASTRA has a lock on after launch capability and can lock onto and target an opponent aircraft by itself the possibilities for combat usage of the same by the IAF increase manifold .The acquisition cost of the Astra at an estimated Rs 6Cr each is also far lower than the nearly Rs 18Cr each METEOR costs.
The ASTRA is the first of at least four indigenous BVRAAM missiles that should enter service with the Indian Air force by 2030 with the 150km ranged ASTRA mk2, the 220km SFDR missile and a monster 500km Brahmos based AWACS killer AAM also in development.
PINAKA Ammunition
Most haven’t noticed how the Indian Army has slowly but surely boosted its rocket artillery firepower in the last two decades with the induction of seven PINAKA MBRL regiments till date.
Another three Regiments are under order with a total of 22 PINAKA MBRL regiments planned by 2030. In fact, all going well, the Indian Army may treble its Rocket artillery component from 10 Regiments in 2010 to 22 PINAKA + 6 SMERCH regiments by 2030. The basic increase in numbers aside the PINAKA represents a significant upgrade in terms of technology over the old workhorse BM-22 GRAD.
The current order most likely refers to the Guided Extended Range PINAKA which can fire GPS guided rockets up to a range of 90km. These rockets nearly treble the range as compared to the basic Grad while using GPS signals from the indigenous IRNSS constellation to hit targets at longer ranges with greater accuracy. This gives artillery commanders on the ground the ability to support operations across various sectors of an emerging front simultaneously.
The image shows the coverage of how only 3 guided PINAKA could cover operations across the LAC.
Moreover, it is worth noting that while an unguided SMERCH 90km range round costs more than RS 1 Cr a similar ranged guided PINAKA round comes in for only Rs 50Lakh each.
BMP-2 Upgrade
The DAC also accorded its approval for an armament upgrade for the 2600 odd BMP-2 ICVs in service with the Indian Army. This has long been in discussion with the former defence minister announcing an upgrade for all 2600BMP-2 units in service to the BMP-2M standard in 2013. That deal was never signed though as an alternative Rs 60,000cr plan from 2009 to develop and acquire 2600 units of a Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) with the participation of the private sector pushed it to the backburner. The private sector defence firms which evinced interests in the ambitious FICV project included Mahindra and Mahindra, Reliance Defence, L&T, Tata Motors and Bharat Forge. The FICV plan has now stalled with the latest media reports indicating that an OFB +DRDO project product may also join the fray by 2024-25.
This in turn has necessitated that the earlier plan of upgradation of the BMP-2 units be reinvigorated. The BMP-2 upgrade will see the Indian Army maintain a credible reasonably modern IFV capability well into the 2030’s. This upgrade project is now expected to be offered to some private sector participants as the FICV project 7 should help build an ecosystem of privately owned armoured vehicle production in India.
Long Range Land Attack Cruise missile.
The DAC also accorded approval to the development of a 1500km range land attack cruise missile with Surface, submarine and air launched version to be developed. Apart from this Defence reporting website Livefist reported here link that there would be a final series of trials for the 1000km Nirbhay missile this winter after which the long ranged cruise missile would enter service. Livefist also reported on the Range extension program for the Brahmos being well underway which should see a 900km ranged version enter trials soon. The Brahmos development plan is most intriguing and could see the Indian Navy move to secure both seas around the peninsula with 24x7 coverage by land-based 900+km range Brahmos batteries.
During Operation Trident in 1971 the Indian Navy attacked Karachi harbour with Styx missiles launched by Vidyut Class Missile boats, a future war could see all surfaced assets of the Pakistan Navy attacked simultaneously across the length and breadth of the Arabian Sea by Long Range Brahmos Batteries. Similar batteries deployed on the East coast would cover the entirety of the Bay of Bengal and Malacca Straits on a constant basis giving India unparalleled maritime security.
Coverage by six Brahmos LR batteries with five land batteries deployed at Gujarat, Laccadives, A&N Islands, Tamil Nadu, Odisha & a sixth battery on a DDG sailing near Duqm Oman.
MIG-29 & SU-30MKI
The DAC also accorded its approval to a long pending plan to upgrade 59 MIG29 aircraft of the Indian Air force while also giving its approval for the acquisition of a further 21 upgraded airframes from Russia at a total cost of Rs7418cr. A similar acquisition of 12 SU-30MKI along with a package of items to resolve fleet maintenance issues was also approved at a cost of Rs 10730Cr. While 11 planes of the SU-30MKI acquisition will go to replace 11 crashed jets the 12th is most interesting as it is reportedly slated to be turned into a DRDO testbed to test technologies for all upcoming programmes.
This will provide the DRDO its own testbed aircraft for various development programs like the Super Sukhoi which will see a new indigenous mission computer and possibly even an enlarged derivative of the UTTAM AESA Radar incorporated into and tested using this testbed. Also coming up is an indigenous IRST and EW jamming suite that should be test flown on the SU30MKI testbed. This Testbed aircraft will also likely be used to test all new Air launched weapons. Likelihood of it being used to test a 110Kn Engine currently under development for the AMCA also exists.
That said the MIG29 and SU30MKI acquisitions will help the IAF maintain a credible force structure and in fact boost its numbers going forward to 2025 if the LCAMk1A and MMRCA deals are quickly closed as well.
Possible Indian Air force aircraft strength between 2020-2025(both years estimated December numbers)
Software Defined Radios
Apart from this, the DAC also accorded approvals for Software defined radios to be acquired for the Indian Army. It is worth noting this is likely to be a DPSU contract given that in 2019 the Indian Navy became the first of the three services to order 260 SDRs from Bharat Electricals Limited at a total cost of Rs 490Cr only. The Indian Army version of the SDR has earlier been exhibited at DEFEXPO 7 will be a light 4kg unit that will let units share information quickly over a closed encrypted network.
In conclusion, it would be prudent to note that the DAC approval though is just a beginning and each acquisition must now pass through various stages before a contract is actually signed. These are in no way going to alter the conflict in Ladakh as is erroneously being reported on multiple fora. That said these systems once developed and acquired will help increase the overall security of India Manifold and as in the case of the Brahmos-ER help set up an Anti-access area denial network as well.
Image Credits: News On Air
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed within this article are the personal opinions of the author. MyIndMakers is not responsible for the accuracy, completeness, suitability, or validity of any information on this article. All information is provided on an as-is basis. The information, facts or opinions appearing in the article do not reflect the views of MyindMakers and it does not assume any responsibility or liability for the same.
posted for fair use
myind.net
Reading Between The Lines: The Long Term Implications of DAC Approvals
- In article
- 11:22 AM, Jul 04, 2020
- Soumik Pyne
The Defence acquisition council of India on 02/07/2020 approved Rs38900cr approx $5.18Bn worth of military equipment for the Indian military. This acquisition plan includes Rs31130 Cr worth of Equipment that will be developed/manufactured/assembled within India including a spend of Rs20,400 Cr or $2.72Bn on design and development proposals alone. This article will elucidate how and why some of the items approved yesterday could go far beyond adding just another weapons system to the large and varied arsenal of the Indian military and could in fact structurally change the way the Indian Army defends our borders.
Astra missile
The approval for acquisition of an initial tranche of 248 Astra mk 1 BVRAAM missiles is poised to change things for the Indian Air force in multiple ways. The Indian Airforce is the fourth largest airforce globally by fleet size. That said it is a force that till date has been completely dependent on imports for the primary weapons used in air to air combat today. All air to air missiles currently utilized by the IAF are imports from Russia, Israel and France. This has created a situation wherein different missile stocks have to be maintained for different squadrons given that the Israeli, Russian and French missiles are not compatible with all aircraft across the fleet. The entry of Astra into the arsenal is poised to reduce this dependency as it will be qualified for almost all Russian, Indian and French origin combat aircraft in service. This will reduce logistical costs and help build a common pool of AAMs almost any aircraft in the IAF fleet will be able to use.
While the Indian Air Force will be inducting the 150km range French METEOR BVRAAM into its arsenal as well, fact is the Meteor is a silver bullet which will only be used with the small force of Rafale the Indian Air force will shortly operate .The AstraMk1 due to its universality across the fleet will in all likelihood be the BVRAAM most IAF pilots can ever expect to use to engage targets at standoff ranges greater than 100km, add to that the fact that the ASTRA has a lock on after launch capability and can lock onto and target an opponent aircraft by itself the possibilities for combat usage of the same by the IAF increase manifold .The acquisition cost of the Astra at an estimated Rs 6Cr each is also far lower than the nearly Rs 18Cr each METEOR costs.
The ASTRA is the first of at least four indigenous BVRAAM missiles that should enter service with the Indian Air force by 2030 with the 150km ranged ASTRA mk2, the 220km SFDR missile and a monster 500km Brahmos based AWACS killer AAM also in development.
PINAKA Ammunition
Most haven’t noticed how the Indian Army has slowly but surely boosted its rocket artillery firepower in the last two decades with the induction of seven PINAKA MBRL regiments till date.
Another three Regiments are under order with a total of 22 PINAKA MBRL regiments planned by 2030. In fact, all going well, the Indian Army may treble its Rocket artillery component from 10 Regiments in 2010 to 22 PINAKA + 6 SMERCH regiments by 2030. The basic increase in numbers aside the PINAKA represents a significant upgrade in terms of technology over the old workhorse BM-22 GRAD.
The current order most likely refers to the Guided Extended Range PINAKA which can fire GPS guided rockets up to a range of 90km. These rockets nearly treble the range as compared to the basic Grad while using GPS signals from the indigenous IRNSS constellation to hit targets at longer ranges with greater accuracy. This gives artillery commanders on the ground the ability to support operations across various sectors of an emerging front simultaneously.
The image shows the coverage of how only 3 guided PINAKA could cover operations across the LAC.
Moreover, it is worth noting that while an unguided SMERCH 90km range round costs more than RS 1 Cr a similar ranged guided PINAKA round comes in for only Rs 50Lakh each.
BMP-2 Upgrade
The DAC also accorded its approval for an armament upgrade for the 2600 odd BMP-2 ICVs in service with the Indian Army. This has long been in discussion with the former defence minister announcing an upgrade for all 2600BMP-2 units in service to the BMP-2M standard in 2013. That deal was never signed though as an alternative Rs 60,000cr plan from 2009 to develop and acquire 2600 units of a Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) with the participation of the private sector pushed it to the backburner. The private sector defence firms which evinced interests in the ambitious FICV project included Mahindra and Mahindra, Reliance Defence, L&T, Tata Motors and Bharat Forge. The FICV plan has now stalled with the latest media reports indicating that an OFB +DRDO project product may also join the fray by 2024-25.
This in turn has necessitated that the earlier plan of upgradation of the BMP-2 units be reinvigorated. The BMP-2 upgrade will see the Indian Army maintain a credible reasonably modern IFV capability well into the 2030’s. This upgrade project is now expected to be offered to some private sector participants as the FICV project 7 should help build an ecosystem of privately owned armoured vehicle production in India.
Long Range Land Attack Cruise missile.
The DAC also accorded approval to the development of a 1500km range land attack cruise missile with Surface, submarine and air launched version to be developed. Apart from this Defence reporting website Livefist reported here link that there would be a final series of trials for the 1000km Nirbhay missile this winter after which the long ranged cruise missile would enter service. Livefist also reported on the Range extension program for the Brahmos being well underway which should see a 900km ranged version enter trials soon. The Brahmos development plan is most intriguing and could see the Indian Navy move to secure both seas around the peninsula with 24x7 coverage by land-based 900+km range Brahmos batteries.
During Operation Trident in 1971 the Indian Navy attacked Karachi harbour with Styx missiles launched by Vidyut Class Missile boats, a future war could see all surfaced assets of the Pakistan Navy attacked simultaneously across the length and breadth of the Arabian Sea by Long Range Brahmos Batteries. Similar batteries deployed on the East coast would cover the entirety of the Bay of Bengal and Malacca Straits on a constant basis giving India unparalleled maritime security.
Coverage by six Brahmos LR batteries with five land batteries deployed at Gujarat, Laccadives, A&N Islands, Tamil Nadu, Odisha & a sixth battery on a DDG sailing near Duqm Oman.
MIG-29 & SU-30MKI
The DAC also accorded its approval to a long pending plan to upgrade 59 MIG29 aircraft of the Indian Air force while also giving its approval for the acquisition of a further 21 upgraded airframes from Russia at a total cost of Rs7418cr. A similar acquisition of 12 SU-30MKI along with a package of items to resolve fleet maintenance issues was also approved at a cost of Rs 10730Cr. While 11 planes of the SU-30MKI acquisition will go to replace 11 crashed jets the 12th is most interesting as it is reportedly slated to be turned into a DRDO testbed to test technologies for all upcoming programmes.
This will provide the DRDO its own testbed aircraft for various development programs like the Super Sukhoi which will see a new indigenous mission computer and possibly even an enlarged derivative of the UTTAM AESA Radar incorporated into and tested using this testbed. Also coming up is an indigenous IRST and EW jamming suite that should be test flown on the SU30MKI testbed. This Testbed aircraft will also likely be used to test all new Air launched weapons. Likelihood of it being used to test a 110Kn Engine currently under development for the AMCA also exists.
That said the MIG29 and SU30MKI acquisitions will help the IAF maintain a credible force structure and in fact boost its numbers going forward to 2025 if the LCAMk1A and MMRCA deals are quickly closed as well.
Possible Indian Air force aircraft strength between 2020-2025(both years estimated December numbers)
Software Defined Radios
Apart from this, the DAC also accorded approvals for Software defined radios to be acquired for the Indian Army. It is worth noting this is likely to be a DPSU contract given that in 2019 the Indian Navy became the first of the three services to order 260 SDRs from Bharat Electricals Limited at a total cost of Rs 490Cr only. The Indian Army version of the SDR has earlier been exhibited at DEFEXPO 7 will be a light 4kg unit that will let units share information quickly over a closed encrypted network.
In conclusion, it would be prudent to note that the DAC approval though is just a beginning and each acquisition must now pass through various stages before a contract is actually signed. These are in no way going to alter the conflict in Ladakh as is erroneously being reported on multiple fora. That said these systems once developed and acquired will help increase the overall security of India Manifold and as in the case of the Brahmos-ER help set up an Anti-access area denial network as well.
Image Credits: News On Air
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed within this article are the personal opinions of the author. MyIndMakers is not responsible for the accuracy, completeness, suitability, or validity of any information on this article. All information is provided on an as-is basis. The information, facts or opinions appearing in the article do not reflect the views of MyindMakers and it does not assume any responsibility or liability for the same.
posted for fair use
Reading Between The Lines The Long Term Implications of DAC Approvals
The Defence acquisition council of India on 02/07/2020 approved Rs38900cr approx $5.18Bn worth of military equipment for the Indian military. This acquisition plan includes Rs31130 Cr worth of Equipment that will be developed/manufactured/assembled within India including a spend of Rs20,400 Cr...
Posted for fair use.....
www.hindustantimes.com
China says it has border dispute with Bhutan too
Bhutan and China have held 24 rounds of talks between 1984 and 2016 to settle their border issue and, according to discussions in the Bhutanese parliament and other public records of these meetings, the discussions have only centred on disputes in the western and central sections of the boundary.
india Updated: Jul 05, 2020 02:19 IST
Sutirtho Patranobis and Rezaul H Laskar
Hindustan Times, Beijing/New Delhi
China on Saturday officially stated for the first time it has a boundary dispute with Bhutan in the eastern sector, a development with significant implications for India as the region borders Arunachal Pradesh, which is also claimed by Beijing.
The Chinese foreign ministry, in a statement issued to Hindustan Times, said the China-Bhutan boundary has never been delimited and there “have been disputes over the eastern, central and western sections for a long time”. The statement in Mandarin further said “a third party should not point fingers” in the China-Bhutan border issue – an apparent reference to India.
Also read: US supercarriers in South China Sea, ambitious Beijing stretched on multiple fronts
Bhutan and China have held 24 rounds of talks between 1984 and 2016 to settle their border issue and, according to discussions in the Bhutanese parliament and other public records of these meetings, the discussions have only centred on disputes in the western and central sections of the boundary.
People familiar with developments in Thimphu said on condition of anonymity that the eastern section has never figured in the border talks. “The two sides had said things had been narrowed down to the central and western sections and there was even talk of a package deal to settle the issue. If the Chinese position on the eastern section was legitimate, it should have been brought up earlier,” said one of the people cited above.
An expert from Bhutan who has tracked the talks added: “This is an entirely new claim. There are signed minutes of the meetings from both sides narrowing the disputes to only the western and central sections.”
There was no immediate reaction to China’s claim from Indian officials. However, China’s claim came against the backdrop of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s assertion during a visit to Ladakh on Friday that the “era of expansionism” is over – which was perceived as a signal to Beijing about New Delhi’s determination to defend its frontiers.
Without elaborating on the actual areas of dispute, the Chinese foreign ministry’s statement said: “The boundary between China and Bhutan has never been delimited. There have been disputes over the eastern, central and western sectors for a long time, and there are no new disputed areas.
“China always stands for a negotiated package solution to the China-Bhutan boundary issue,” added the statement, provided by the foreign ministry after HT reached out for a response to reports about China objecting to a grant request for Sakteng wildlife sanctuary in eastern Bhutan’s Trashigang district at a virtual meeting of the Washington-based Global Environment Facility (GEF) in June. The sanctuary, located in the easternmost part of Bhutan, covers 650 sq km.
Also read: China opens border dispute with India ally Bhutan
At the meeting, Chinese representative Zhongjing Wang claimed the sanctuary was located in an area disputed between Bhutan and China. Aparna Subramani, an Indian official serving as an executive director in the World Bank and representing Bhutan at the meeting, said the Chinese claim was not “unchallenged”.
A majority of GEF’s council subsequently approved funding for the project while the Chinese representative abstained and didn’t join the decision. Official documents issued by GEF showed Sakteng sanctuary as part of Bhutan’s territory.
The Chinese representative’s attempts to formally record his country’s objections through an amendment of GEF’s documents did not receive consensus. Bhutan’s views were also made part of the record: “Bhutan totally rejects the claim made by the Council Member of China. Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary is an integral and sovereign territory of Bhutan and at no point during the boundary discussions between Bhutan and China has it featured as a disputed area.”
In addition to registering its position at GEF, Bhutan’s foreign ministry issued a demarche or formal diplomatic representation to the Chinese embassy in New Delhi on the matter, people familiar with developments said.
Apart from India, Bhutan is the only other country with a land boundary dispute with China. Beijing and Thimphu currently don’t have diplomatic relations, though the Chinese envoy in New Delhi informally looks after relations with Bhutan.
Experts believe China’s move is aimed at opening new fronts to increase the pressure on India amid the stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
Sangeeta Thapliyal of the School of International Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, a leading expert on the Himalayan region, said: “Bhutan’s Trashigang is at a tri-junction with India and China and opposite West Kameng district in Arunachal Pradesh, and this area has never been raised in Bhutan-China border talks. This is aimed at pressuring India and Bhutan and also challenging India’s relationship with Bhutan.
“China is seeking to open up more theatres and this is a continuation of the policy to pressure India through the Himalayas. This is clearly a form of signalling by China amid the border stand-off.”
The India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty of 2007 enjoins both sides to “cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests”, and experts believe the Chinese move, like the intrusions in Doklam in 2017 that also triggered a standoff, is aimed at driving a wedge between New Delhi and Thimphu.
The Bhutan-China border talks have focused on differences over 495 sq km in Jakurlung and Pasamlung valleys in the central section and 269 sq km in western Bhutan, including the Doklam plateau.
The so-called “package deal” offered by China to Bhutan reportedly involved Beijing giving up its claim in the central section and part of the western section in exchange for access to around 100 sq km in Doklam, which would bring China closer to India’s vulnerable “chicken’s neck” or the Siliguri corridor.
Tenzing Lamsang, editor of The Bhutanese newspaper, said the eastern section now being claimed by China “is very much Bhutanese with a large Bhutanese population and traditional Dzongs (medieval fortresses) and two Bhutanese districts since time immemorial”. The Chinese claim would only “undermine the boundary talks”, he tweeted.
The Chinese foreign ministry’s statement said the country has been in communication with Bhutan on the border issue through bilateral channels. “There is a ministerial boundary-talks mechanism and an expert group on boundary issues at the department level,” it said.
“Both sides agreed to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution in the spirit of friendly consultation and mutual understanding and accommodation. Pending the final settlement of the border issue the two sides are committed to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas,” it added.
China says it has border dispute with Bhutan too
Bhutan and China have held 24 rounds of talks between 1984 and 2016 to settle their border issue and, according to discussions in the Bhutanese parliament and other public records of these meetings, the discussions have only centred on disputes in the western and central sections of the boundary.
China says it has border dispute with Bhutan too
Bhutan and China have held 24 rounds of talks between 1984 and 2016 to settle their border issue and, according to discussions in the Bhutanese parliament and other public records of these meetings, the discussions have only centred on disputes in the western and central sections of the boundary.
india Updated: Jul 05, 2020 02:19 IST
Sutirtho Patranobis and Rezaul H Laskar
Hindustan Times, Beijing/New Delhi
China on Saturday officially stated for the first time it has a boundary dispute with Bhutan in the eastern sector, a development with significant implications for India as the region borders Arunachal Pradesh, which is also claimed by Beijing.
The Chinese foreign ministry, in a statement issued to Hindustan Times, said the China-Bhutan boundary has never been delimited and there “have been disputes over the eastern, central and western sections for a long time”. The statement in Mandarin further said “a third party should not point fingers” in the China-Bhutan border issue – an apparent reference to India.
Also read: US supercarriers in South China Sea, ambitious Beijing stretched on multiple fronts
Bhutan and China have held 24 rounds of talks between 1984 and 2016 to settle their border issue and, according to discussions in the Bhutanese parliament and other public records of these meetings, the discussions have only centred on disputes in the western and central sections of the boundary.
People familiar with developments in Thimphu said on condition of anonymity that the eastern section has never figured in the border talks. “The two sides had said things had been narrowed down to the central and western sections and there was even talk of a package deal to settle the issue. If the Chinese position on the eastern section was legitimate, it should have been brought up earlier,” said one of the people cited above.
An expert from Bhutan who has tracked the talks added: “This is an entirely new claim. There are signed minutes of the meetings from both sides narrowing the disputes to only the western and central sections.”
There was no immediate reaction to China’s claim from Indian officials. However, China’s claim came against the backdrop of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s assertion during a visit to Ladakh on Friday that the “era of expansionism” is over – which was perceived as a signal to Beijing about New Delhi’s determination to defend its frontiers.
Without elaborating on the actual areas of dispute, the Chinese foreign ministry’s statement said: “The boundary between China and Bhutan has never been delimited. There have been disputes over the eastern, central and western sectors for a long time, and there are no new disputed areas.
“China always stands for a negotiated package solution to the China-Bhutan boundary issue,” added the statement, provided by the foreign ministry after HT reached out for a response to reports about China objecting to a grant request for Sakteng wildlife sanctuary in eastern Bhutan’s Trashigang district at a virtual meeting of the Washington-based Global Environment Facility (GEF) in June. The sanctuary, located in the easternmost part of Bhutan, covers 650 sq km.
Also read: China opens border dispute with India ally Bhutan
At the meeting, Chinese representative Zhongjing Wang claimed the sanctuary was located in an area disputed between Bhutan and China. Aparna Subramani, an Indian official serving as an executive director in the World Bank and representing Bhutan at the meeting, said the Chinese claim was not “unchallenged”.
A majority of GEF’s council subsequently approved funding for the project while the Chinese representative abstained and didn’t join the decision. Official documents issued by GEF showed Sakteng sanctuary as part of Bhutan’s territory.
The Chinese representative’s attempts to formally record his country’s objections through an amendment of GEF’s documents did not receive consensus. Bhutan’s views were also made part of the record: “Bhutan totally rejects the claim made by the Council Member of China. Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary is an integral and sovereign territory of Bhutan and at no point during the boundary discussions between Bhutan and China has it featured as a disputed area.”
In addition to registering its position at GEF, Bhutan’s foreign ministry issued a demarche or formal diplomatic representation to the Chinese embassy in New Delhi on the matter, people familiar with developments said.
Apart from India, Bhutan is the only other country with a land boundary dispute with China. Beijing and Thimphu currently don’t have diplomatic relations, though the Chinese envoy in New Delhi informally looks after relations with Bhutan.
Experts believe China’s move is aimed at opening new fronts to increase the pressure on India amid the stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
Sangeeta Thapliyal of the School of International Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, a leading expert on the Himalayan region, said: “Bhutan’s Trashigang is at a tri-junction with India and China and opposite West Kameng district in Arunachal Pradesh, and this area has never been raised in Bhutan-China border talks. This is aimed at pressuring India and Bhutan and also challenging India’s relationship with Bhutan.
“China is seeking to open up more theatres and this is a continuation of the policy to pressure India through the Himalayas. This is clearly a form of signalling by China amid the border stand-off.”
The India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty of 2007 enjoins both sides to “cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests”, and experts believe the Chinese move, like the intrusions in Doklam in 2017 that also triggered a standoff, is aimed at driving a wedge between New Delhi and Thimphu.
The Bhutan-China border talks have focused on differences over 495 sq km in Jakurlung and Pasamlung valleys in the central section and 269 sq km in western Bhutan, including the Doklam plateau.
The so-called “package deal” offered by China to Bhutan reportedly involved Beijing giving up its claim in the central section and part of the western section in exchange for access to around 100 sq km in Doklam, which would bring China closer to India’s vulnerable “chicken’s neck” or the Siliguri corridor.
Tenzing Lamsang, editor of The Bhutanese newspaper, said the eastern section now being claimed by China “is very much Bhutanese with a large Bhutanese population and traditional Dzongs (medieval fortresses) and two Bhutanese districts since time immemorial”. The Chinese claim would only “undermine the boundary talks”, he tweeted.
The Chinese foreign ministry’s statement said the country has been in communication with Bhutan on the border issue through bilateral channels. “There is a ministerial boundary-talks mechanism and an expert group on boundary issues at the department level,” it said.
“Both sides agreed to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution in the spirit of friendly consultation and mutual understanding and accommodation. Pending the final settlement of the border issue the two sides are committed to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas,” it added.
Hummm.....
Posted for fair use.....
India not giving in, will hold its ground against China
Abhinandan Mishra
“The talks are revolving around this broad premise. The situation on the ground has to go back to as it was in April. We have been telling them, directly and indirectly, that we have made up our minds (as to how seriously Indian government is seeing this whole development). The military presence on both sides is ‘huge’. Both of us know that things cannot be resolved by using force and ultimately it will have to be resolved through talks. Having said that, our attitude is of acting ‘aggressively’ now rather than waiting for things to happen on their own. Things are moving at multiple levels, the results of some of them will be seen in the coming days, and some in the coming months,” a government official said, while sharing the overall policy-wise sentiment of the Narendra Modi government which is dealing with one of its biggest challenges.
Last week, India banned the use of 59 mobile applications that were of Chinese origin while also banning the involvement of any Chinese company, including those which are working in joint ventures, to participate in the lucrative national highway projects in the country. The official source said that if things do not move at the LAC as the Government of India wants it to, in the coming few days, policymakers will be taking more decisions that will ensure that China does not get access to one of the biggest markets in the world.
“We are the biggest market in the world. In the coming days, it might happen that we will not allow their products or products of other MNCs that are being manufactured in China to be sold in India. The MNCs will have to shift their plants and factories to other countries if they want to sell their products in India. We might even have to take a decision regarding allowing Chinese goods using our supply routes to go to the West. Despite being affected by Covid-19, Indians have been spending more money than citizens of other countries. Come Diwali, if things do not improve at the LAC, the huge money that Indian consumers have been spending for years on Chinese goods, will be spent on products that are not of Chinese origin,” the official said.
The government, according to the official, has given enough signals to both public and private enterprises, officially and unofficially, that it will not encourage any more investments from Chinese companies as it wants to reduce Chinese imports to India by at least two-thirds of what it is now by the end of this year.
The first big step towards this objective, the official added, would be barring Chinese companies from investing and earning from the upcoming 5G market in India. “We have done our studies and we can bring the 5G environment without them (Chinese companies). However, Chinese telcos have already invested a huge amount of time and resources in anticipation of the 5G rollout. No option is off the table (regarding barring Chinese telcos),” the official added.
Another official stated that things are moving at a very rapid pace when it comes to recalibrating ties, especially when it comes to military coordination with the United States and Australia, both of whom have their own problems with Xi Jinping-led China.
“The Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) is going to play a major role in the coming days in the region surrounding India. Australia is facing the same problems of an expansionist China and naturally we are working together in this context. China is fast losing influential friends across the world. Those who are sitting quietly right now, will have no choice but to take a call soon to secure their territorial integrity, including Nepal,” he said.
The first lot of Rafale fighters (six pieces), which were originally slated to be delivered in February-March next year, will now land in India by the end of this month. Earlier last month, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, who was on a visit to Russia, made arrangements for the quick procurement and supply of additional arms and ammunition in the wake of the stand-off at the LAC. All the items on the procurement list, the official added, were accepted and will reach India soon.
The understanding among policymakers is that the economy will be running smoothly and would have recovered from the shock of Covid-19 by mid-September, October.
“Market sentiments are already on an upward trend, the worst is over and now demand will again come back, even if slowly, leading to normalcy of supply. A lot of money and food grains have been transferred into the system and they have already started reaching the beneficiaries. The result of other various government initiatives (related to economy) will start becoming visible soon,” another official said while explaining the reasons for the positive sentiments.
As per multiple independent surveys, India will continue to attract maximum investments, after China, in the Asia-Pacific (APAC) region in the coming months. According to the latest assessment by Bain & Company, a global management consulting firm (Asia-Pacific Private Equity Report 2020), though China remained the top market for investments, India’s challenge to its position at the top is intensifying.
The report stated that in 2019, investments in India grew faster than any other market across the region, taking its investment value higher than other major APAC economies such as South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The country’s investment value was also higher than the Southeast Asia average. As per the report, there were more than 1,000 deals last year, a significant number of which were large deals in excess of $100 million. As a result, the overall sum of investments registered a 70% jump from 2018, and was more than 100% higher than the average of the previous half decade. In 2019, India’s internet and tech sector represented 28% of the Asia-Pacific market, twice its share in 2015.
Posted for fair use.....
India not giving in, will hold its ground against China - The Sunday Guardian Live
New Delhi: India will continue to hold its ground militarily and economically against China even as it continues to engage with the Chinese at the
www.sundayguardianlive.com
India not giving in, will hold its ground against China
Abhinandan Mishra
- Published
- :
- July 4, 2020,
- 10:21 pm
- |
- Updated
- :
- July 4, 2020,
- 10:21 PM
“The talks are revolving around this broad premise. The situation on the ground has to go back to as it was in April. We have been telling them, directly and indirectly, that we have made up our minds (as to how seriously Indian government is seeing this whole development). The military presence on both sides is ‘huge’. Both of us know that things cannot be resolved by using force and ultimately it will have to be resolved through talks. Having said that, our attitude is of acting ‘aggressively’ now rather than waiting for things to happen on their own. Things are moving at multiple levels, the results of some of them will be seen in the coming days, and some in the coming months,” a government official said, while sharing the overall policy-wise sentiment of the Narendra Modi government which is dealing with one of its biggest challenges.
Last week, India banned the use of 59 mobile applications that were of Chinese origin while also banning the involvement of any Chinese company, including those which are working in joint ventures, to participate in the lucrative national highway projects in the country. The official source said that if things do not move at the LAC as the Government of India wants it to, in the coming few days, policymakers will be taking more decisions that will ensure that China does not get access to one of the biggest markets in the world.
“We are the biggest market in the world. In the coming days, it might happen that we will not allow their products or products of other MNCs that are being manufactured in China to be sold in India. The MNCs will have to shift their plants and factories to other countries if they want to sell their products in India. We might even have to take a decision regarding allowing Chinese goods using our supply routes to go to the West. Despite being affected by Covid-19, Indians have been spending more money than citizens of other countries. Come Diwali, if things do not improve at the LAC, the huge money that Indian consumers have been spending for years on Chinese goods, will be spent on products that are not of Chinese origin,” the official said.
The government, according to the official, has given enough signals to both public and private enterprises, officially and unofficially, that it will not encourage any more investments from Chinese companies as it wants to reduce Chinese imports to India by at least two-thirds of what it is now by the end of this year.
The first big step towards this objective, the official added, would be barring Chinese companies from investing and earning from the upcoming 5G market in India. “We have done our studies and we can bring the 5G environment without them (Chinese companies). However, Chinese telcos have already invested a huge amount of time and resources in anticipation of the 5G rollout. No option is off the table (regarding barring Chinese telcos),” the official added.
Another official stated that things are moving at a very rapid pace when it comes to recalibrating ties, especially when it comes to military coordination with the United States and Australia, both of whom have their own problems with Xi Jinping-led China.
“The Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) is going to play a major role in the coming days in the region surrounding India. Australia is facing the same problems of an expansionist China and naturally we are working together in this context. China is fast losing influential friends across the world. Those who are sitting quietly right now, will have no choice but to take a call soon to secure their territorial integrity, including Nepal,” he said.
The first lot of Rafale fighters (six pieces), which were originally slated to be delivered in February-March next year, will now land in India by the end of this month. Earlier last month, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, who was on a visit to Russia, made arrangements for the quick procurement and supply of additional arms and ammunition in the wake of the stand-off at the LAC. All the items on the procurement list, the official added, were accepted and will reach India soon.
The understanding among policymakers is that the economy will be running smoothly and would have recovered from the shock of Covid-19 by mid-September, October.
“Market sentiments are already on an upward trend, the worst is over and now demand will again come back, even if slowly, leading to normalcy of supply. A lot of money and food grains have been transferred into the system and they have already started reaching the beneficiaries. The result of other various government initiatives (related to economy) will start becoming visible soon,” another official said while explaining the reasons for the positive sentiments.
As per multiple independent surveys, India will continue to attract maximum investments, after China, in the Asia-Pacific (APAC) region in the coming months. According to the latest assessment by Bain & Company, a global management consulting firm (Asia-Pacific Private Equity Report 2020), though China remained the top market for investments, India’s challenge to its position at the top is intensifying.
The report stated that in 2019, investments in India grew faster than any other market across the region, taking its investment value higher than other major APAC economies such as South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The country’s investment value was also higher than the Southeast Asia average. As per the report, there were more than 1,000 deals last year, a significant number of which were large deals in excess of $100 million. As a result, the overall sum of investments registered a 70% jump from 2018, and was more than 100% higher than the average of the previous half decade. In 2019, India’s internet and tech sector represented 28% of the Asia-Pacific market, twice its share in 2015.
China cannot at this time return to the April lines. Xi does control the internal Chinese media and has heavy sway in many western media so any change could be positioned in a positive light. But, Xi attackto gain more ground for China presupposed noise from India but eventual acceptance.
This would be followed by completing the swallow of Hong Kong and the eventual grab for Taiwan.
China has entered a new stage where instead of quietly building up economically and militarily and trying to isolate the US in the region they have gone full Imperial Japan.
The switch is significant because the timing was planned to be about 10 years down the road.
Xi may be feeling the pressure both from Trumps economic trade dispute and the worlds (sorry NY Times CNN) correctly blaming China for Corona Virus impacts. To back away from India would empower anti Xi factions within the CCP and threaten his hold on power.
So China is boxed in by their clumsy land grab and this lack of options places all the flexibility with India. China has to dig into and reinforce fixed positions. There is likely a tremendous amount of useful position and strength information being made available from other non involved actors. India can choose whatever timetable they wish and can attack the fixed positions without using front line troops.
India could choose not to act but the feeling on the ground based on reports seems decidedly not to placate China. In any conflict the only wild card will be China’s desperate calling in Pakistan chip to pressure India. Unfortunately independently neither China nor India would go nuk but how much control will China have on what Pakistan does.
Xi has fumbled into this, and seems to have fumbled a lot recently.
This would be followed by completing the swallow of Hong Kong and the eventual grab for Taiwan.
China has entered a new stage where instead of quietly building up economically and militarily and trying to isolate the US in the region they have gone full Imperial Japan.
The switch is significant because the timing was planned to be about 10 years down the road.
Xi may be feeling the pressure both from Trumps economic trade dispute and the worlds (sorry NY Times CNN) correctly blaming China for Corona Virus impacts. To back away from India would empower anti Xi factions within the CCP and threaten his hold on power.
So China is boxed in by their clumsy land grab and this lack of options places all the flexibility with India. China has to dig into and reinforce fixed positions. There is likely a tremendous amount of useful position and strength information being made available from other non involved actors. India can choose whatever timetable they wish and can attack the fixed positions without using front line troops.
India could choose not to act but the feeling on the ground based on reports seems decidedly not to placate China. In any conflict the only wild card will be China’s desperate calling in Pakistan chip to pressure India. Unfortunately independently neither China nor India would go nuk but how much control will China have on what Pakistan does.
Xi has fumbled into this, and seems to have fumbled a lot recently.
Posted for fair use.....
eurasiantimes.com
Asia Pacific
Ladakh Now, Kashmir Next: Why India-China War Is An Attractive Option For Many In India?
I now believe that a big event is needed for the resolution of the Kashmir issue, and the India-China war could be that big thing – J&K resident
Published
2 days ago
on
July 3, 2020
By
EurAsian Times Desk
As India-China border standoff continues in Ladakh, people living in the Kashmir Valley see war as an attractive option. Kashmiris living in Jammu and Kashmir are rejoicing at the prospect of a war between India and China and expect something positive from the border clashes.
Kashmiris have taken to social media to share computer-generated images sarcastically reminding India about its inability to halt Chinese aggression. The pictures shared in Kashmir are completely in contrast to the anti-China images being shared in other parts of India.
Images shared include Chinese President Xi Jinping wearing a traditional Kashmiri garb preparing a traditional wazwan meal while another image shows Xi’s face superimposed over a local bus driver who is calling out to commuters that the bus is headed to Ladakh – the place where Indian and Chinese troops clashed.
Apart from the trolling on social media platforms, Kashmiris are also discussing the possibility of Chinese military occupying the disputed region. “Ladakh Kheow Chenan (Ladakh has been taken over by China)” is the most discussed topic these days. During a demonstration on June 21 in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir’s largest city, protesters mocked the police by chanting “Cheen aya Cheen aya (China is coming)” slogans.
According to experts at EurAsian Times, discontent and gloom amongst Kashmiris have been on the rise since the abrogation of Article 370. The scrapping of Article 370 took away the special status enjoyed by the Kashmir and divided the state into two Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh.
Most importantly, the abrogation of Article 370 by PM Narendra Modi led Indian government quashed the possibility of an independent Kashmir, a dream envisaged by many Kashmiris.
Following the historic decision, Kashmiris living in the union territory have complained about increased military presence, detention of people on arbitrary grounds and, lack of internet services and lockdowns.
Speaking to Nikkei Asian Review, Waqas Ahmad from Srinagar said that abrogation of Article 370 was the last nail in the coffin and it broke the back of every Kashmiri and the fear of settlement of outsiders seems a reality to all Kashmiris.
So far, the Indian government has granted 25,000 domicile certificates to non-locals which allows them to get a residency certificate for education, employment and buying land.
For Kashmiris, China Brings Hope
While Chinese aggression has been condemned by Indians across the length and breadth of the country, Kashmiris have endorsed China’s aggressive move. For them, the introduction of China spells ‘hope’.
Younis Ali, a political science student in Pulwama, explains the logic behind supporting the Chinese. He says that Kashmiris have tried everything to forward their cause including peaceful protests and militancy, but neither has yielded any results.
”I now believe that a big event is needed for the resolution of the Kashmir issue, and the India-China war could be that big thing,” Ali says.
Specialists on Kashmir also agree with what locals say. Gowhar Geelani, an experienced journalist Kashmir, says that people are of the view that a new geopolitical situation could be to their advantage in terms of ending the political uncertainty in Kashmir. He also noted that Pakistan’s weak economy and military “has also led some to pin their hopes on a stronger China.”
Michael Kugelman, a South Asia expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, explains that Kashmiri joy stems from seeing their oppressor bogged down by an emboldened, aspiring superpower that is a bitter rival of New Delhi and a close friend of Islamabad.
Speaking about human rights violation in the region, Ashok Swain a professor at Uppsala University in Sweden, says that Kashmiris are excited about the Ladakh clash because of the perception that China has become a party to the Kashmir conflict, after experiencing hopelessness and despair with “the near silence of the international community over serious human rights violation.
According to a report on the human rights situation in Jammu and Kashmir that covers the first six months of this year, at least 229 killings in different instances of violence have taken place in the region.
The report cites “extrajudicial executions of at least 32 civilians in J&K, besides killings of 143 militants and 54 armed forces personnel.” It was put out by the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, a prominent human rights group.
Swain adds that with the introduction of China into the Kashmir conflict, India has lost the military and diplomatic advantage it enjoyed over Pakistan. China’s open opposition Article 370 as well as the strength it showed in the border clash have revived the hope of Kashmiris of an open alliance between Pakistan and China on the Kashmir issue.
At present, New Delhi and Beijing are looking for a peaceful solution to the conflict in Ladakh. Today PM Narendra Modi flew to Leh, Ladakh to take stock of the situation, boost the morale of troops and send a covert message to Beijing.
China was quick to announce its displeasure over Modi’s surprise visit to Ladakh and warned Indian from taking any action that may escalate the situation.
New Delhi and Beijing have been at each other’s throats since the first week of June. Both countries have engaged in the rapid military infrastructure development, troop buildup, air patrols, weapon deployment and even fistfights, which ended with casualties on both sides.
Ladakh Now, Kashmir Next: Why India-China War Is An Attractive Option For Many In India?
I now believe that a big event is needed for the resolution of the Kashmir issue, and the India-China war could be that big thing - J&K resident
eurasiantimes.com
Asia Pacific
Ladakh Now, Kashmir Next: Why India-China War Is An Attractive Option For Many In India?
I now believe that a big event is needed for the resolution of the Kashmir issue, and the India-China war could be that big thing – J&K resident
Published
2 days ago
on
July 3, 2020
By
EurAsian Times Desk
As India-China border standoff continues in Ladakh, people living in the Kashmir Valley see war as an attractive option. Kashmiris living in Jammu and Kashmir are rejoicing at the prospect of a war between India and China and expect something positive from the border clashes.
Kashmiris have taken to social media to share computer-generated images sarcastically reminding India about its inability to halt Chinese aggression. The pictures shared in Kashmir are completely in contrast to the anti-China images being shared in other parts of India.
Images shared include Chinese President Xi Jinping wearing a traditional Kashmiri garb preparing a traditional wazwan meal while another image shows Xi’s face superimposed over a local bus driver who is calling out to commuters that the bus is headed to Ladakh – the place where Indian and Chinese troops clashed.
Apart from the trolling on social media platforms, Kashmiris are also discussing the possibility of Chinese military occupying the disputed region. “Ladakh Kheow Chenan (Ladakh has been taken over by China)” is the most discussed topic these days. During a demonstration on June 21 in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir’s largest city, protesters mocked the police by chanting “Cheen aya Cheen aya (China is coming)” slogans.
According to experts at EurAsian Times, discontent and gloom amongst Kashmiris have been on the rise since the abrogation of Article 370. The scrapping of Article 370 took away the special status enjoyed by the Kashmir and divided the state into two Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh.
Most importantly, the abrogation of Article 370 by PM Narendra Modi led Indian government quashed the possibility of an independent Kashmir, a dream envisaged by many Kashmiris.
Following the historic decision, Kashmiris living in the union territory have complained about increased military presence, detention of people on arbitrary grounds and, lack of internet services and lockdowns.
Speaking to Nikkei Asian Review, Waqas Ahmad from Srinagar said that abrogation of Article 370 was the last nail in the coffin and it broke the back of every Kashmiri and the fear of settlement of outsiders seems a reality to all Kashmiris.
So far, the Indian government has granted 25,000 domicile certificates to non-locals which allows them to get a residency certificate for education, employment and buying land.
For Kashmiris, China Brings Hope
While Chinese aggression has been condemned by Indians across the length and breadth of the country, Kashmiris have endorsed China’s aggressive move. For them, the introduction of China spells ‘hope’.
Younis Ali, a political science student in Pulwama, explains the logic behind supporting the Chinese. He says that Kashmiris have tried everything to forward their cause including peaceful protests and militancy, but neither has yielded any results.
”I now believe that a big event is needed for the resolution of the Kashmir issue, and the India-China war could be that big thing,” Ali says.
Specialists on Kashmir also agree with what locals say. Gowhar Geelani, an experienced journalist Kashmir, says that people are of the view that a new geopolitical situation could be to their advantage in terms of ending the political uncertainty in Kashmir. He also noted that Pakistan’s weak economy and military “has also led some to pin their hopes on a stronger China.”
Michael Kugelman, a South Asia expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, explains that Kashmiri joy stems from seeing their oppressor bogged down by an emboldened, aspiring superpower that is a bitter rival of New Delhi and a close friend of Islamabad.
Speaking about human rights violation in the region, Ashok Swain a professor at Uppsala University in Sweden, says that Kashmiris are excited about the Ladakh clash because of the perception that China has become a party to the Kashmir conflict, after experiencing hopelessness and despair with “the near silence of the international community over serious human rights violation.
According to a report on the human rights situation in Jammu and Kashmir that covers the first six months of this year, at least 229 killings in different instances of violence have taken place in the region.
The report cites “extrajudicial executions of at least 32 civilians in J&K, besides killings of 143 militants and 54 armed forces personnel.” It was put out by the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, a prominent human rights group.
Swain adds that with the introduction of China into the Kashmir conflict, India has lost the military and diplomatic advantage it enjoyed over Pakistan. China’s open opposition Article 370 as well as the strength it showed in the border clash have revived the hope of Kashmiris of an open alliance between Pakistan and China on the Kashmir issue.
At present, New Delhi and Beijing are looking for a peaceful solution to the conflict in Ladakh. Today PM Narendra Modi flew to Leh, Ladakh to take stock of the situation, boost the morale of troops and send a covert message to Beijing.
China was quick to announce its displeasure over Modi’s surprise visit to Ladakh and warned Indian from taking any action that may escalate the situation.
New Delhi and Beijing have been at each other’s throats since the first week of June. Both countries have engaged in the rapid military infrastructure development, troop buildup, air patrols, weapon deployment and even fistfights, which ended with casualties on both sides.
Plain Jane
Just Plain Jane
We'll see how long this lasts.
www.reuters.com
NEWS
JULY 6, 2020 / 5:11 AM / UPDATED 3 HOURS AGO
China begins pulling back troops near site of India border clash, Indian sources say
Sanjeev Miglani, Huizhong Wu
3 MIN READ
NEW DELHI/BEIJING (Reuters) - China began pulling back troops from along its contested border with India on Monday, Indian government sources said, following a clash between the two countries last month in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed.
Troops fought for hours with rods and clubs on the night of June 15, with some falling to their deaths in the freezing waters of the Galwan river in the western Himalayas.
China has yet to confirm whether it suffered casualties. The Indian deaths are the highest along the border in more than five decades, a dramatic escalation that led to weeks of talks between senior military officials on how to ease tensions.
On Monday the Chinese military was seen dismantling tents and structures at a site in the Galwan valley near to where the latest clash took place, said the Indian government sources, who declined to be identified as they are not authorised to speak to the media.
Vehicles were seen withdrawing from the area, as well as at Hotsprings and Gogra - two other contested border zones - the sources said.
India’s national security advisor Ajit Doval and Wang Yi, one of China’s top diplomats, had “a frank and in-depth exchange of views” on Sunday regarding the border, according to briefing notes by both countries released on Monday.
Both sides said they had agreed to a significant disengagement of troops. India’s note also said both sides had agreed to respect the existing Line of Actual Control (LAC) reflecting positions along the contested section of border. This reference was not included in Beijing’s note on the meeting.
In response to a question on whether China had moved back equipment in the Galwan valley, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said both sides were “taking effective measures to disengage and ease the situation on the border”.
“We hope India will meet China halfway and take concrete measures to carry out what both sides agreed to, continue to closely communicate through diplomatic and military channels, and work together to cool down the situation at the border,” Zhao told a news conference on Monday.
Reporting by Sanjeev Miglani and Alasdair Pal in New Delhi and Huizhong Wu in Beijing; Writing by Alasdair Pal; Editing by Peter Graff
Our Standards:The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
China begins pulling back troops near site of India border clash, Indian sources say
China began pulling back troops from along its contested border with India on Monday, Indian government sources said, following a clash between the two countries last month in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed.
www.reuters.com
NEWS
JULY 6, 2020 / 5:11 AM / UPDATED 3 HOURS AGO
China begins pulling back troops near site of India border clash, Indian sources say
Sanjeev Miglani, Huizhong Wu
3 MIN READ
NEW DELHI/BEIJING (Reuters) - China began pulling back troops from along its contested border with India on Monday, Indian government sources said, following a clash between the two countries last month in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed.
Troops fought for hours with rods and clubs on the night of June 15, with some falling to their deaths in the freezing waters of the Galwan river in the western Himalayas.
China has yet to confirm whether it suffered casualties. The Indian deaths are the highest along the border in more than five decades, a dramatic escalation that led to weeks of talks between senior military officials on how to ease tensions.
On Monday the Chinese military was seen dismantling tents and structures at a site in the Galwan valley near to where the latest clash took place, said the Indian government sources, who declined to be identified as they are not authorised to speak to the media.
Vehicles were seen withdrawing from the area, as well as at Hotsprings and Gogra - two other contested border zones - the sources said.
India’s national security advisor Ajit Doval and Wang Yi, one of China’s top diplomats, had “a frank and in-depth exchange of views” on Sunday regarding the border, according to briefing notes by both countries released on Monday.
Both sides said they had agreed to a significant disengagement of troops. India’s note also said both sides had agreed to respect the existing Line of Actual Control (LAC) reflecting positions along the contested section of border. This reference was not included in Beijing’s note on the meeting.
In response to a question on whether China had moved back equipment in the Galwan valley, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said both sides were “taking effective measures to disengage and ease the situation on the border”.
“We hope India will meet China halfway and take concrete measures to carry out what both sides agreed to, continue to closely communicate through diplomatic and military channels, and work together to cool down the situation at the border,” Zhao told a news conference on Monday.
Reporting by Sanjeev Miglani and Alasdair Pal in New Delhi and Huizhong Wu in Beijing; Writing by Alasdair Pal; Editing by Peter Graff
Our Standards:The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
jward
passin' thru
EndGameWW3
@EndGameWW3
·
1h
PLA troops ‘completely move out’ of Galwan as India-China head towards total disengagement https://theprint.in/defence/pla-troops-completely-move-out-of-galwan-as-india-china-head-towards-total-disengagement/455701/
via
@ThePrintIndia
View: https://twitter.com/EndGameWW3/status/1280173556870111233?s=20
Article posted in it's entirety below
@EndGameWW3
·
1h
PLA troops ‘completely move out’ of Galwan as India-China head towards total disengagement https://theprint.in/defence/pla-troops-completely-move-out-of-galwan-as-india-china-head-towards-total-disengagement/455701/
via
@ThePrintIndia
View: https://twitter.com/EndGameWW3/status/1280173556870111233?s=20
Article posted in it's entirety below
PLA troops ‘completely move out’ of Galwan as India-China head towards total disengagement
India and China have begun a second attempt at disengagement in Ladakh after a 61-day stand-off along the western sector of the LAC.
Snehesh Alex Philip, Nayanima Basu and Amrita Nayak Dutta 6 July, 2020 9:06 pm IST
File image of Indian soldiers in Ladakh | By special arrangement
Text Size:
New Delhi: The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) “completely moved out” of the Indian side of the Galwan Valley area Monday as India and China began disengagement in Ladakh after a 61-day intense stand-off, ThePrint has learnt. However, sources said the Indian Army remained cautious about sounding too optimistic.
While the Chinese have initiated disengagement steps at Gogra and in the Hot Spring Area, they continue to hold fort at Finger 4 at Pangong Lake. However, sources said the “movement of a few men and vehicles backwards was noticed” at Pangong Lake, where Chinese soldiers had come up to 8 km inside Indian territory. Government sources described the movement as “non-tangible”.
The disengagement exercise launched Monday came a day after the special representatives of India and China, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, respectively, held a detailed phone conversation where they agreed on the “earliest complete disengagement of the troops along the LAC and de-escalation from India-China border areas for full restoration of peace and tranquility”.
This is the second attempt at disengagement — the first followed a meeting between corps commander-level officers on 6 June but culminated in the 15 June Galwan Valley clash, which killed 20 Indian soldiers, after the Chinese refused to fulfil their part of the agreement.
The whole process, sources said, will be long-drawn-out.
Sources underlined that it will be “premature” to say the stand-off is over as “any unfavourable” incident like that of 15 June can take place until “tempers on both sides cool down completely”. The leadership on both sides, the sources said, will continue to remain in contact 24×7.
Both India and China will begin a 72-hour verification process to make sure each side has fulfilled the commitment before the next round of disengagement is initiated.
Also Read: It’s time for China, Pakistan, even India to rethink the fantasy Modi called expansionism
‘Buffer zone’
Ladakh constitutes the western sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Several spots along the border — Galwan Valley, Depsang Plains and Hot Spring — have been sites of stand-offs since April-May in light of Chinese incursions.
As part of the fresh disengagement, China has moved back by about 1.5-2 km in various locations, while the pullback by India is a “little less” since Indians were anyway in their own territory, sources said.
Both sides have agreed to what is being described as a “buffer zone”, which would be an area where neither side carries out any construction or patrolling activity and would differ from location to location, the sources said.
This means the Chinese troops will be closer to the LAC than Indian soldiers, and it will be some time before India can resume its normal patrols up to Patrol Point 14 in Galwan Valley, and patrol points 15, 17 and 17A in the Hot Spring area.
No specific time has been agreed upon regarding how long the buffer zone will exist, the sources added, saying it is a confidence-building measure for restoration of status quo as of early April.
The disengagement comes at a time when the flow in the Galwan river has increased due to snowmelt, according to inputs, making it difficult for both India and China to sustain troop build-up in the area.
At the Galwan Valley, government sources told ThePrint, the PLA has moved out completely from the Indian side of the LAC into their own territory.
The pullback region included the area called Y-Junction, which is located 1.5 km from the LAC. The Chinese had intruded into this area and built observation posts and numerous tents, the sources said.
The eventual gameplan of Chinese incursions in the Galwan Valley seemed to be to prevent India from carrying out any new construction beyond the confluence of the Shyok-Galwan river.
The Chinese also sought to restrict Indian patrols to the same point, located 4.5 km from the LAC, rather than until Patrol Point 14, which is 500 metres from the border (according to the 1960 claim line of China) and marks the status quo before the PLA incursions began in May.
In Hot Spring area and at Gogra post, the sources added, the Chinese had started dismantling tents and moving back men and vehicles from inside the Indian side of the LAC.
“The process will most likely be completed by tomorrow. Here, as per the schedule, they are supposed to move back about two km. Once they do this, they will be on their side of the LAC,” a source said.
Giving details about the Pangong Lake area, where the Chinese have occupied areas up to Finger 4, about 8 km inside Indian territory that starts from Finger 8, sources said there has “not been any tangible movement”.
“There has been some movement in terms of few vehicles and men going back from Finger 4. However, they continue to hold the position,” another source said.
Also Read: From Nathu La to Galwan, India has been trapped in reaction-mode to China’s aggression
‘Doval and Wang hold cordial talks’
Diplomatic- and military-level talks aimed at resolving border tensions had been underway between India and China since May. On Sunday, a telephone conversation was held between Doval and Wang, the special representatives appointed by India and China to discuss boundary-related matters.
Over an hour-long “cordial” phone call, the two are said to have held “a frank and in-depth exchange of views” on the border standoff.
According to sources, both the representatives discussed the Galwan Valley clash separately and assessed the reasons that led to it.
Their talks were “based on the commitment” reached by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the two informal summits of Wuhan (2018) and Mamallapuram (2019) when they vowed that differences should not be allowed to become disputes.
“They agreed that it was necessary to ensure at the earliest complete disengagement of the troops along the LAC and de-escalation from India-China border areas for full restoration of peace and tranquillity,” the Ministry of External Affairs said in a statement Monday. “In this regard they further agreed that both sides should complete the ongoing disengagement process along the LAC expeditiously.”
The two also agreed to the fact that it is critical to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas and that it is “essential for the further development of our bilateral relations”.
According to the MEA statement, both Wang and Doval agreed to stay in touch to ensure “full and enduring” restoration of peace and tranquility. Bilateral agreements dating back to 1993 that lay down specific protocols on the LAC issue were discussed as well.
These pacts are: The Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, 1993; the 1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC; the 2005 Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of the Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC; the 2012 Agreement on the Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs; and 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement.
The two representatives also decided that “both sides should strictly respect and observe the Line of Actual Control and should not take any unilateral action to alter the status quo and work together to avoid any incident in the future that could disturb peace and tranquillity in border areas”.
The special representative talks had been under consideration ever since External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Wang held a phone call on 17 June, sources told ThePrint.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement on the Doval-Wang dialogue that both sides “should pay great attention to the current complex situation facing China-India bilateral relations, and work together to overcome and turn it around as soon as possible”.
“Not long ago, what happened in the western part of the border between China and India in the Galwan Valley is very clear. China will continue to effectively defend its territorial sovereignty and the border area and peace,” the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Monday.
“Both sides should adhere to the strategic assessment that instead of posing threats, the two countries provide each other with development opportunities,” it added.
PLA troops 'completely move out' of Galwan as India-China head towards total disengagement
India and China have begun a second attempt at disengagement in Ladakh after a 61-day stand-off along the western sector of the LAC.
jward
passin' thru
EndGameWW3
@EndGameWW3
2h
US flexes military muscle at China as Beijing draws down in its border spat with India http://toi.in/PO66_Z/a24gkvia
@timesofindia
View: https://twitter.com/EndGameWW3/status/1280173922433093634?s=20
Article posted in it's entirety below:
@EndGameWW3
2h
US flexes military muscle at China as Beijing draws down in its border spat with India http://toi.in/PO66_Z/a24gkvia
@timesofindia
View: https://twitter.com/EndGameWW3/status/1280173922433093634?s=20
Article posted in it's entirety below:
US flexes military muscle at China as Beijing draws down in its border spat with India
Chidanand Rajghatta | TNN | Updated: Jul 6, 2020, 22:58 IST
Picture courtesy: Twitter | @USNavy
WASHINGTON: The United States is flexing its military muscle at China on behalf of India and other Asian allies and partners, amid signs that Washington is finally ready to take some punitive action against Beijing for its role in spreading the coronavirus pandemic around the globe.
In the clearest sign yet that the Trump White House will not back down from its position as a pre-eminent power in the Pacific and beyond, Trump’s chief of staff Mark Meadows told Fox News on Monday that the US military "will continue to stand strong whether it's in relationship to a conflict between India and China or anywhere else."
"We're not going to stand by and let China or anyone the take the reins in terms of being the most powerful dominant force, whether it's in that region or over here," Meadows said, disclosing the President Trump is on course to sign executive orders to "make sure that China is addressed, how we bring manufacturing back from overseas to make sure the American worker is supported."
Plain Jane
Just Plain Jane
Zerohedge
ZeroHedge - On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero
www.zerohedge.com
China & India Agree To 1km Buffer Zone, Troop Pullback After Deadly Border Clash
by Tyler Durden
Mon, 07/06/2020 - 19:20
TwitterFacebookRedditEmailPrint
Following the deadly June 15 India-China border fight which had the highest casualties of any skirmish between the two along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in fifty years, Indian and Chinese officers have conducted multiple deescalation talks as each country's media saber rattles, and as India has retaliated economically against Beijing.
These talks have led to a major breakthrough apparently, as on Monday both sides have announced the establishment of a sizable buffer zone along the LAC in the Galwan River valley, requiring each to move troop positions away from the site.
Modi in Ladakh on July 3, via ANI/Financial ExpressThis after especially a semi-permanent PLA build-up was observed in the region, and as Indian troops responded by sending tanks and armored units.
The buffer zone agreement was reportedly firmed up Sunday during a phone call between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, which agreed to immediate mutual disengagement.
An Indian government statement said "it was necessary to ensure at the earliest complete disengagement osf the troops along the LAC and de-escalation from India-China border areas." The statement as widely reported in Indian media said further: "In this regard they further agreed that both sides should complete the ongoing disengagement process along the LAC expeditiously."
Regional media also said both sides have already begun the one kilometer pull-back from the disputed border line:
Ahead of this days ago, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a visit to the Ladakh region in solidarity with troops stationed at the remote Himalayan border area.
Via Defense Aviation PostThe Chinese foreign minister confirmed Monday that both countries have "agreed to follow the important consensus reached by leaders of the two countries".
This came after at least three rounds of high level military talks held in the Ladakh region, potentially ending soaring tensions which for nearly a month grabbed international headlines and had analysts fearing to nuclear armed neighbors could be headed for a border war
jward
passin' thru
Daulat Beg Oldi: Flashpoint of the Himalayas
Situation Reports - July 6, 2020
By Amitava Mukherjee
There is a strange story behind the ongoing stand-off between India and China in the Himalayas. On the northwestern corner of Ladakh, the epicenter of the present Indo-China confrontation, there is a place called Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), situated at a height of 16,700 feet. Its strategic value is immense given the fact that the place lies at the feet of the Karakoram Pass, which separates India from China’s Xinjiang province. Moreover, the distance between DBO and the China border is only 8 kilometers; it is also only 9 kilometers away from the Aksai Chin, a disputed territory through which China has built an all-weather road connecting Tibet with Xinjiang.
It is natural that China is concerned about India’s growing presence in Daulat Beg Oldi, because India has a military post and an airstrip here. This airstrip was created during the Indo-China war of 1962, but has been lying unused since 1965 because a topographical imbalance was noticed at that time after a mild earthquake. In 1962, China had easily overrun India’s military outpost in DBO. Since then, through to 2008, it did not figure prominently in Beijing’s strategic planning in the Himalayas.
But that all changed in 2008 when the Indian Air Force decided to reactivate the DBO airstrip.
Files requesting permission for reactivation were gathering dust in India’s defense ministry as a pusillanimous attitude had taken hold of ministers and bureaucrats there so as not to offend China by any ‘bold venture’ in the Himalayas. However, reactivation of the DBO airstrip was necessary for sending regular supply of resources and ammunition to military posts situated in isolated and hostile terrain. The IAF top brass decided to take a risk. Without caring for permission from the ministry, it landed a AN-32 cargo aircraft on the airstrip. Thus, it came to be reactivated, and instantly brought about a huge change in the tactical scenario of the western sector of the Indo-China border.
The change is really momentous. For understanding it properly we must turn our attention to the infrastructural developments that India has been carrying on in the sector. The reason behind China’s easy success in Daulat Beg Oldi in 1962 was that the Indian post lacked proper resupply. This was natural because there was no road traversable by trucks leading there. Only two routes existed for reaching the remote DBO military post: one along the Nubra valley, traversing through the Saser La pass, at a height of approximately 16,000 feet. This is a foot track and would require three to four days to cover. Only mule trains can possibly be used here. This was the route that India was forced to look to during the 1962 war. The second route used to run along the Shyok river, the Depsang La pass, and the Depsang plains at almost the same height. This route was unusable, as it not only did it take more days to reach DBO, but was also subject to seasonal floods from the Shyok river that would render the route unpassable.
To fix this logistical shortcoming, India has recently completed an all-weather, motorable road from Dabruk via Shyok and then to Daulat Beg Oldi (the DSDBO road) which will connect Leh, the headquarters of Ladakh, with DBO in a very short time span of just six hours. Moreover, India has laid stress on constructing quite a few east-west feeder roads bisecting the main DSDBO road at certain points. This is enough to unnerve China. With stream of supplies along the new DSDBO road and quick airlifting of army personnel by dint of the DBO airstrip, the Indian army may be in a position to launch scissor-like attacks into China’s Xinjiang province through the Karakoram Pass, and endanger not only the province but the bordering Gilgit-Baltistan of Pakistan through which China is constructing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor(CPEC), the principal lifeline of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The DSDBO road allows other possibilities too. Using one of the feeder road that passes through the Galwan Valley, Indian patrol parties can easily reach the Tibet border and launch attacks inside Tibet as well. So the Tibet-Xinjiang road will be vulnerable at many points – not just in Tibet and Xinjiang, but in Aksai Chin too. This can put China’s territorial integrity under great stress, speak nothing of the threat to its grand BRI project. This is the reason behind the clash at Galwan Valley, where both the sides lost their soldiers. China will most likely try to control the mountain ridges which would give them a commanding position vis-à-vis not only the feeder road but the main DSDBO road as well.
Both the countries are in belligerent mood along the Line of Actual Control. It is pointless to compare respective strengths of India and China. Both Beijing and New Delhi must understand that war is no solution and there is no mutual difference which cannot be sorted out through talks. It is hoped that political leadership of the two countries understand this.
posted for fair use
Situation Reports - July 6, 2020
By Amitava Mukherjee
There is a strange story behind the ongoing stand-off between India and China in the Himalayas. On the northwestern corner of Ladakh, the epicenter of the present Indo-China confrontation, there is a place called Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), situated at a height of 16,700 feet. Its strategic value is immense given the fact that the place lies at the feet of the Karakoram Pass, which separates India from China’s Xinjiang province. Moreover, the distance between DBO and the China border is only 8 kilometers; it is also only 9 kilometers away from the Aksai Chin, a disputed territory through which China has built an all-weather road connecting Tibet with Xinjiang.
It is natural that China is concerned about India’s growing presence in Daulat Beg Oldi, because India has a military post and an airstrip here. This airstrip was created during the Indo-China war of 1962, but has been lying unused since 1965 because a topographical imbalance was noticed at that time after a mild earthquake. In 1962, China had easily overrun India’s military outpost in DBO. Since then, through to 2008, it did not figure prominently in Beijing’s strategic planning in the Himalayas.
But that all changed in 2008 when the Indian Air Force decided to reactivate the DBO airstrip.
Files requesting permission for reactivation were gathering dust in India’s defense ministry as a pusillanimous attitude had taken hold of ministers and bureaucrats there so as not to offend China by any ‘bold venture’ in the Himalayas. However, reactivation of the DBO airstrip was necessary for sending regular supply of resources and ammunition to military posts situated in isolated and hostile terrain. The IAF top brass decided to take a risk. Without caring for permission from the ministry, it landed a AN-32 cargo aircraft on the airstrip. Thus, it came to be reactivated, and instantly brought about a huge change in the tactical scenario of the western sector of the Indo-China border.
The change is really momentous. For understanding it properly we must turn our attention to the infrastructural developments that India has been carrying on in the sector. The reason behind China’s easy success in Daulat Beg Oldi in 1962 was that the Indian post lacked proper resupply. This was natural because there was no road traversable by trucks leading there. Only two routes existed for reaching the remote DBO military post: one along the Nubra valley, traversing through the Saser La pass, at a height of approximately 16,000 feet. This is a foot track and would require three to four days to cover. Only mule trains can possibly be used here. This was the route that India was forced to look to during the 1962 war. The second route used to run along the Shyok river, the Depsang La pass, and the Depsang plains at almost the same height. This route was unusable, as it not only did it take more days to reach DBO, but was also subject to seasonal floods from the Shyok river that would render the route unpassable.
To fix this logistical shortcoming, India has recently completed an all-weather, motorable road from Dabruk via Shyok and then to Daulat Beg Oldi (the DSDBO road) which will connect Leh, the headquarters of Ladakh, with DBO in a very short time span of just six hours. Moreover, India has laid stress on constructing quite a few east-west feeder roads bisecting the main DSDBO road at certain points. This is enough to unnerve China. With stream of supplies along the new DSDBO road and quick airlifting of army personnel by dint of the DBO airstrip, the Indian army may be in a position to launch scissor-like attacks into China’s Xinjiang province through the Karakoram Pass, and endanger not only the province but the bordering Gilgit-Baltistan of Pakistan through which China is constructing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor(CPEC), the principal lifeline of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The DSDBO road allows other possibilities too. Using one of the feeder road that passes through the Galwan Valley, Indian patrol parties can easily reach the Tibet border and launch attacks inside Tibet as well. So the Tibet-Xinjiang road will be vulnerable at many points – not just in Tibet and Xinjiang, but in Aksai Chin too. This can put China’s territorial integrity under great stress, speak nothing of the threat to its grand BRI project. This is the reason behind the clash at Galwan Valley, where both the sides lost their soldiers. China will most likely try to control the mountain ridges which would give them a commanding position vis-à-vis not only the feeder road but the main DSDBO road as well.
Both the countries are in belligerent mood along the Line of Actual Control. It is pointless to compare respective strengths of India and China. Both Beijing and New Delhi must understand that war is no solution and there is no mutual difference which cannot be sorted out through talks. It is hoped that political leadership of the two countries understand this.
posted for fair use
Daulat Beg Oldi: Flashpoint of the Himalayas | Geopolitical Monitor
Ground-level changes are altering the strategic balance and fueling conflict between India and China in the Himalayas.
www.geopoliticalmonitor.com
northern watch
TB Fanatic
northern watch
TB Fanatic
d-atis
@detresfa_
An Integrated Situation Map visualising the current #China line of communication across #AksaiChin connecting key #IndiaChinaStandOffpositions, including supply lines & currently known PLA camps - with inputs from
@SimTack
11:35 AM · Jul 6, 2020
@detresfa_
An Integrated Situation Map visualising the current #China line of communication across #AksaiChin connecting key #IndiaChinaStandOffpositions, including supply lines & currently known PLA camps - with inputs from
@SimTack
11:35 AM · Jul 6, 2020
northern watch
TB Fanatic
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Indo-Pacific News
@IndoPac_Info
Jul 4
Coverage by six Brahmos LR batteries with five land batteries deployed at Gujarat, Laccadives, A&N Islands, Tamil Nadu, Odisha & a sixth battery on a DDG sailing near Duqm Oman.
What goes on in Duqm Oman?
UK Secures Naval Base in Duqm
February 2019
Britain and Oman have signed a new joint defense agreement confirming the Royal Navy's ability to call at the new Port of Duqm. The new greenfield port has enough depth and space to accommodate the HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales, the service's new ski-jump carriers.
"It is a pleasure to sign this agreement, bringing us even closer to one of our most important partners. This is an historic landmark moment between our two nations and is a significant reinforcement of our mutual security," said UK defense secretary Gavin Williamson in a statement.
The UK Ministry of Defense says that Duqm conveys a strategic advantage for Britain's "East of Suez" naval presence. It is located on the Arabian Sea, near enough to geopolitical hot spots in the Persian Gulf to be useful, but still on the Indian Ocean side of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran periodically threatens to close this narrow choke point in retaliation for American sanctions, and Duqm's accessibility would be less affected in the event of a closure (relative to the large ports within the Gulf).
The site's other important strategic feature is a $4.6 billion, 230,000 bpd oil refinery, which is now under construction. The new facility is designed to optimize production for light and middle distillates.
The UK has already established a Joint Logistics Support Base (UKJLSB) at Duqm, a permanent naval outpost that is operated by Oman Drydock Company and Babcock on a 37-year lease. British forces tested out the port during recent joint exercises with the Omani military, including the logistics for 200 military vehicles, three helicopters and all associated munitions.
"The agreement will ensure that these facilities are available for use long into the future, allowing the UK to maintain a presence in the region," said the UK Ministry of Defense in a statement.
For commercial shipping, the Omani government intends to market Port of Duqm as a "safe, stable and business-friendly destination for industrial and economic investment," leveraging the country's reputation as a peaceful place in a tense region. The port project currently features a multipurpose terminal with mobile cranes and a dry bulk pier; with further develpment, Oman hopes to build out a 1.5 million TEU container terminal at the site, and hopes to add a rail link to the rest of the nation's railroad network.
- Maritime Executive
@IndoPac_Info
Jul 4
Coverage by six Brahmos LR batteries with five land batteries deployed at Gujarat, Laccadives, A&N Islands, Tamil Nadu, Odisha & a sixth battery on a DDG sailing near Duqm Oman.
What goes on in Duqm Oman?
UK Secures Naval Base in Duqm
February 2019
Britain and Oman have signed a new joint defense agreement confirming the Royal Navy's ability to call at the new Port of Duqm. The new greenfield port has enough depth and space to accommodate the HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales, the service's new ski-jump carriers.
"It is a pleasure to sign this agreement, bringing us even closer to one of our most important partners. This is an historic landmark moment between our two nations and is a significant reinforcement of our mutual security," said UK defense secretary Gavin Williamson in a statement.
The UK Ministry of Defense says that Duqm conveys a strategic advantage for Britain's "East of Suez" naval presence. It is located on the Arabian Sea, near enough to geopolitical hot spots in the Persian Gulf to be useful, but still on the Indian Ocean side of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran periodically threatens to close this narrow choke point in retaliation for American sanctions, and Duqm's accessibility would be less affected in the event of a closure (relative to the large ports within the Gulf).
The site's other important strategic feature is a $4.6 billion, 230,000 bpd oil refinery, which is now under construction. The new facility is designed to optimize production for light and middle distillates.
The UK has already established a Joint Logistics Support Base (UKJLSB) at Duqm, a permanent naval outpost that is operated by Oman Drydock Company and Babcock on a 37-year lease. British forces tested out the port during recent joint exercises with the Omani military, including the logistics for 200 military vehicles, three helicopters and all associated munitions.
"The agreement will ensure that these facilities are available for use long into the future, allowing the UK to maintain a presence in the region," said the UK Ministry of Defense in a statement.
For commercial shipping, the Omani government intends to market Port of Duqm as a "safe, stable and business-friendly destination for industrial and economic investment," leveraging the country's reputation as a peaceful place in a tense region. The port project currently features a multipurpose terminal with mobile cranes and a dry bulk pier; with further develpment, Oman hopes to build out a 1.5 million TEU container terminal at the site, and hopes to add a rail link to the rest of the nation's railroad network.
- Maritime Executive
