WAR CHINA THREATENS TO INVADE TAIWAN

jward

passin' thru
Hmm. Any particular reason you'd cite for that conclusion?
Looks like SSDD out there at the moment
 

jward

passin' thru
theepochtimes.com


Inside the CCP’s Plan to Conquer Taiwan and Then the World​



News Analysis
On a crisp sunny day in October, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping appeared in full military fatigues at a command center in eastern China and ordered the regime’s military wing to prepare for any war.
Though such bellicosity has become something of the norm in Chinese communist diplomacy, the looming threat of an invasion of Taiwan and a much anticipated meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden rendered the words more potent.
Indeed, just days later, Xi met with Biden in Indonesia. Shortly after the talk, Biden said that there was no need for a new Cold War and that the United States would pursue peace and stability with China in the Taiwan Strait.
The CCP issued a statement of its own mere hours later, quoting Xi.
Cross-Strait peace and stability and Taiwan independence are as irreconcilable as water and fire, Xi said, according to state-owned propaganda outlet Global Times.

A missile is launched from an unspecified location in China on Aug. 4, 2022. The Chinese military fired missiles into waters near Taiwan as part of its planned exercises on Aug. 4. (CCTV via AP)
It was just the latest statement from the CCP threatening the lives of so-called “separatist” forces in Taiwan, a label that Xi and his regime apply to the president of Taiwan and virtually all of the island’s democratically-elected government.
The rhetoric of war emanating from the communist regime at every turn as of late has been equally matched by its military development. Now, a growing number of experts believe that a CCP invasion of Taiwan is not only likely, but inevitable, and that such a war would be just one step on the path to supplanting the United States from its position as leader of the global order.

James Fanell, a government fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy in Switzerland and former director of intelligence and information operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, explained that the CCP is playing a long game.
“Due to the continuing guidance of the past three leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, the PRC has been on a 20-plus year military modernization program,” Fanell said, using an acronym for the official name of communist China, the People’s Republic of China.
The CCP’s military wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), had a two-pronged goal, he said: To seize Taiwan, and topple America from its place of prominence on the global stage.
“This ongoing PLA modernization program is aimed at supporting the CCP’s strategic ambition to displace the United States from the Indo-Pacific, and to ultimately restore the PRC to what they believe is China’s rightful position as the leader of the world,” Fanell said.
“Today that entails leading the global order across all levers of national power, especially in the military domain, both conventional and nuclear.”
China’s sole operational aircraft carrier, the Liaoning (front), sailing with other ships during a drill at sea in April 2018. (AFP via Getty Images)

Total Military Superiority

Speaking on the subject of conventional military buildup earlier in the year, Dakota Wood, a senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, said that China’s military now numerically dwarfed that of the United States in almost every area of measurement, and that the CCP would have the advantage of numerous land, air, and sea-based systems in any conflict.
“Numerically, it’s very concerning,” Wood said during an Oct. 18 interview with NTD, a sister media outlet of The Epoch Times. “As an example, we’ve got fewer than 300 ships in the U.S. Navy. Of those, 100 are at sea on any day. Of that 100, about 60 are in the western Pacific.”

“The Chinese navy alone is 360 ships,” Wood added. “So, just in numbers, even if our ships are far better than theirs, it’s still a 6-to-1 disadvantage.”
Fannell said that this numeral superiority was the result of an effort decades in the making and spanning numerous CCP leaders.
“The initial focus of the PRC’s military modernization program beginning in the early 2000s was largely focused on asymmetric weapons, like anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles,” Fanell said.
Such investments, Fanell said, initially helped to build out the regime’s “counter-intervention” strategy. More commonly referred to as “anti-access/area-denial” in the West, the counter-intervention strategy was designed to block U.S. forces from engaging in the Indo-Pacific, thereby ensuring no Western intervention was possible for a CCP invasion of Taiwan or the forced acquisition of other claimed territories in the South and East China Seas.

“For the next 20 years the PRC’s Central Military Commission prioritized the build-up of its Navy to provide the PLA an overmatch of anti-access and area-denial forces,” Fanell said, referring to the regime’s top military body.
“During that time we saw the initial focus on the build-up of the PLA Navy’s submarine forces and over the past decade that focus shifted into mass production of frigates, destroyers, cruisers, and large deck amphibious warships. The culmination of the naval modernization program was epitomized by the fielding of three aircraft carriers.”
Sailors stand on the deck of the new type 055 guide missile destroyer Nanchang of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy as it participates in a naval parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of China’s PLA Navy in the sea near Qingdao, in eastern China’s Shandong Province on April 23, 2019. (Mark Schiefelbein/AFP via Getty Images)
Such vessels include the Type 075, an amphibious assault ship vital to future missions aimed at conquering Taiwan, and the Type 055, a heavy cruiser now capable of launching hypersonic nuclear missiles designed to target U.S. aircraft carriers operating in the Indo-Pacific. That armament, according to Naval News, could make the CCP’s cruisers “the most heavily armed warships worldwide.”

These new vessels and armaments are thus serving to transition the CCP’s navy from mere numerical superiority to a qualitative advantage as well, capable not only of preventing the United States from effectively deterring conflict, but also of overcoming American forces in open battle with next-generation weapons.
According to Fanell, that development has not been limited to China’s navy, but also extends to its ground and air forces.
The CCP’s conventional military development is far from the most concerning part of its quest for hard power, however, and only scratches the surface of what the regime hopes to accomplish through military might.
“In the past two years we have seen the CMC [Central Military Commission] shift focus again to a new generation of asymmetric weapons such as hypersonic missiles and swarming unmanned systems from the sea, air, and land,” Fanell said.
“Most importantly, CCP leaders have embarked on what may be the most threatening weapons development to date: the massive build up of the PRC’s nuclear arsenal,” Fanell said.
China’s DF-41 nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles are seen during a military parade at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China, on Oct. 1, 2019. (GREG BAKER/AFP via Getty Images)

Nuclear Breakout

The CCP has steadily worked to expand and modernize its nuclear arsenal across the triad of land, sea, and air capabilities and the discovery of over a hundred new missile silos in the deserts of western China in the past two years did little to quell fears of a new bid by the communist power to double down on nuclear terror.
The vast expansion of the regime’s nuclear arsenal, which the Pentagon anticipates will reach 1,000 weapons by 2030, is not the only problem for the United States, however. Indeed, the drastic improvement in the quality of technology of China’s weapons may be an even larger threat.
The regime’s new hypersonic and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), such as the CCP’s Dongfeng-41 (DF-41), boast multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) systems. These systems allow each missile to be armed with multiple warheads (10 in the case of the DF-41), each of which can strike out at its own target while the missile is in orbit.
 

jward

passin' thru
Thus, each of the CCP’s 1,000 new nuclear weapons could boast as many as 10 nuclear warheads. As such, if the CCP has already built enough DF-41s to stock all of its newly constructed silos, it could have increased its nuclear warhead stockpile fourteen times over.
“In the space of 24 months the PLA Rocket Forces built 350 new ICBM silos in Central and Western China,” Fanell said. “These new silos are assessed to support the DF-41 ICBM.”
“With each missile having ten multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, this development has increased the PRC’s nuclear arsenal from some 250 warheads to over 3,500.”
Much to the chagrin of Western analysts, however, it is impossible to say with certainty how many nuclear weapons or warheads the regime actually has in its possession, as the CCP co-locates its nuclear and conventional missiles so that prying eyes can never be certain if a silo is housing a regular missile or a nuclear one.
The situation led Adm. Charles Richard, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, to assert that the regime was engaged in a ‘strategic breakout’ that would enable it to meet and then exceed the United States’ own capabilities.
“As I assess our level of deterrence against China, the ship is slowly sinking,” Richard said during a speech earlier this year.
“It is sinking slowly, but it is sinking, as fundamentally they are putting capability in the field faster than we are.”
Military vehicles carrying DF-5B intercontinental ballistic missiles participate in a military parade at Tiananmen Square in Beijing on Oct. 1, 2019. (Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images)
It was a grim assessment, but one with which Fanell ultimately agreed. Moreover, Fanell warned, such a nuclear breakout could presage a change in the regime’s military doctrine concerning the use nuclear weapons in a conflict. The CCP formally maintains a policy of no first use, meaning that it has vowed not to initiate nuclear conflict and to never use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

“This ‘strategic breakout’ portends to shift the PRC’s so-called ‘no first use’ policy to one of ‘first use’ where Beijing can threaten nuclear blackmail against the U.S. and its allies from coming to Taiwan’s defense,” Fanell said.
“This change is by far the most destabilizing PRC military modernization to date, one that will directly affect Taiwan’s freedom, regional stability in the Indo-Pacific, and even shift the global balance of power in the near and long term.”
To that end, the CCP has consistently refused to partake in talks aimed at nuclear non-proliferation and, according to the U.S. defense strategy, is explicitly expanding and modernizing its own nuclear arsenal with the purpose of threatening the United States.

Likewise, the CCP’s ambition to create a multipolar world with itself at the center of world events is central to its core strategic goal of displacing the United States. Thus, while the United States seeks solutions to diplomatic and military quandaries that will maintain the status quo, the CCP has no intention of doing anything of the sort. The regime’s goal is to destroy the status quo, not to preserve it.
Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall addressed this very subject during a talk in September.
“One of the most significant changes has been the nuclear breakout of China,” Kendall said.
“The only nation-state that [now] has the capacity, the resources, and the strategic intent to really threaten the United States as a leader in the world … is China.”
Epoch Times Photo
Taiwanese domestically built Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF) take part in the live-fire, anti-landing Han Kuang military exercise, which simulates an enemy invasion, in Taichung, Taiwan on July 16, 2020. (Reuters/Ann Wang)

‘The Invasion Will Come’

To answer the question of why all this newfound bombast? Why the shiny new military and nuclear weapons? The answer appears simple enough: The CCP intends to use overwhelming force in the near future and, by most accounts, its first target will be Taiwan.
The CCP claims that Taiwan is a rogue province of China that must be united with the mainland, and refuses to rule out the use of force to achieve this goal. Its leadership has indeed explicitly threatened war on the issue numerous times.
Taiwan has never been controlled by the CCP, however. The island nation has been self-governed since 1949 and boasts a thriving democratic government and market economy.

Washington, meanwhile, diplomatically recognizes China but does not endorse the CCP’s claims over Taiwan, while also maintaining economic and legal ties with Taipei which bind it to provide the arms necessary for the island’s defense.
Much of the worry among Western analysts and strategists have thus focused on how the United States and its allies can deter an ever-expanding PLA from gobbling up Taiwan.
But some believe that the invasion cannot be prevented, only fought.
Retired Air Force Brig. Gen. Robert Spalding said that the tension over the situation between the CCP, Taiwan, and the United States would end in conflict, and that it was too late to deter such an outcome.
“The situation will be resolved,” Spalding said. “It will be resolved when the Chinese invade Taiwan. There is no way to deter it.”

“The resolution is the invasion and the invasion will come at the time of China’s choosing. There’s nothing we can do at this point to stop it.”
To that end, Spalding said that the CCP’s military and foreign policy toward the United States was clearly oriented to push Washington away from entering such a conflict in the defense of Taiwan. Regardless of the outcome, Spalding said, such a war would in global catastrophe and, perhaps, nuclear war.
Regardless, the regime was committed to destroying Taiwan’s democratic way of life with force, according to Spalding, also a contributor to The Epoch Times. CCP leadership was smart enough to understand that the free Taiwanese people would never voluntarily unite with communist China.
“They’re not going to abandon their military force when it comes to taking Taiwan,” he said.
“They think that that’s the only way to get reunification.”

And the regime is likely right in that regard, Spalding said. Taiwan is Asia’s most thriving democracy with a world-class market economy and a populace that enjoys broad civil and political freedoms.
“There’s no way that they’re going to convince the Taiwanese people through peaceful means to join China after what they did to Hong Kong,” he said, referring to Beijing’s brutal suppression of the Asian financial hub.
“There is no way that the Taiwanese population is going to want to come under the yoke of the Chinese Communist Party,” he added.
“Everybody’s eyes are wide open. The only question to ask is when is that invasion going to come?”
U.S. President Joe Biden meets with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G20 leaders’ summit in Bali, Indonesia, on Nov. 14, 2022. (Kevin Lamarque/Reuters)

US Must Acknowledge New Cold War

On the issue of Taiwan and the inevitability of catastrophic conflict, Fanell offered a more hopeful stance, believing that the deterrence of such a war was still possible, though requiring immediate and vigorous action from the United States.
“In order to take on this threat, the United States must first acknowledge that the threat is existential and one that it must dominate the ‘whole of government’ agenda regardless of which political party is in power,” Fanell said.
“As it relates to the military realm, the U.S. must reprioritize its national security strategy away from one of cooperation and competition with the PRC to one of a war footing against the CCP, which is in a Cold War with the U.S.”
To that end, Fanell called on Congress to pass a bill to expand the U.S. Navy to at least 355 combat vessels in the same kind of massive increase achieved by legislation in 1940, when the United States expanded its maritime power to defeat the Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II.

Similarly, he said, the United States would need to further arm Taiwan, Japan, and its other allies with weapons capable of sinking PLA fleets. While many such sales had already been approved by Congress, he noted, bureaucratic red tape and regulations were slowing the flow of weapons to the point that orders placed by Taiwan now would not reach the island for years to come in some cases.
“The bureaucratic red tape must be set aside and the munitions must begin to flow, even in this year,” Fanell said.
Ultimately, Fanell said, the CCP was in a war with the United States, albeit a cold one. And the United States would have no hope of winning that war or preventing a global conflict if it did not admit such a new cold war existed.
Only through its own expansion and modernization, Fanell said, could the United States hope to remain in its place as leader of the free world.

“Ultimately, the U.S. must build up both conventional and nuclear force posture, along with a combined command and control structure for those forces,” Fanell said.
“[Such is necessary] in order to force CCP leaders back to the ‘drawing board’ to reconsider the success of any attempt to invade Taiwan or conduct any other such act of military expansionism.”
 

jward

passin' thru
(..but not Ukraine..)



EndGameWW3
@EndGameWW3


Bloomberg: The US administration notified Congress of a deal to sell about 100 of the most advanced Patriot missiles to Taiwan.
Bloomberg: The estimated $882 million military deal with Taiwan also includes radar and other support equipment.
 

China Connection

TB Fanatic
With chain stores closing in the U.S. etc, China's manufacturing industry will be closing down. Howdo you control the population? They were planing to start war last month.


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jward

passin' thru

China's territorial threats reach far beyond Taiwan​


Michael Rubin​




India China What Dispute

FILE - In this Oct. 21, 2012 file photo, an Indian girl poses for photos with an Indian flag at the Indo China border in Bumla at an altitude of 15,700 feet (4,700 meters) above sea level in Arunachal Pradesh, India. For more than 50 years, it has pitted India against China - a smoldering dispute over who should control a swath of land larger than Austria. Two militaries have skirmished. A brief, bloody war has been fought. And today, thousands of soldiers from both countries sit deployed along their shared frontier, doing little but watching each other. (AP Photo/Anupam Nath, File)
In 1937, Chinese revolutionary leader Mao Zedong told hagiographer Edgar Snow, "If the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies to [Taiwan]."

Someone might want to tell Chinese President Xi Jinping that. Following House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's (D-CA) visit to Taiwan , Xi doubled down on threats to invade the island nation. Never mind the fact that Taiwan has never been part of China . "We will not renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all necessary measures," a new Chinese Communist Party white paper subsequently declared. Beijing may feel its bluster works. Four times now, President Joe Biden has promised to defend Taiwan, only to have his aides then walk back his statements.
Xi’s disdain toward Taiwanese self-rule is real, but he might mean such bluster to distract the United States from other territorial goals. After all, Xi knows an attack on Taiwan could mean wider war. Xi would likely have to kneecap Singapore , where the U.S. Navy keeps the bulk of its JP-5 aviation fuel, to prevent carrier-based warplanes from coming to Taiwan’s defense. He might also need to launch a preemptive strike on Japan, which increasingly sees Taiwan as the first line of its own defense.

Xi’s ambitions might be further west. Consider Bhutan, for example: In 2017, the People’s Liberation Army pushed into Bhutanese territory in the Doklum Valley, where the borders of India, China, and the mountainous kingdom of Bhutan converge. While Chinese forces agreed to withdraw after the Indian Army came to Bhutan’s defense, over subsequent years, China resumed its incursion. Facing no consequence, earlier this year, Xi again ordered Chinese troops to push several miles into Bhutan, which is peaceful and its army negligible. Xi may want to do to Bhutan what Mao did to Tibet — that is, erase its independence. Nor is Bhutan alone. Chinese troops recently moved Nepalese border posts to expand Chinese territory at that Himalayan country’s expense, though it appears Beijing believes it can simply co-opt Nepalese politicians to undermine that country’s sovereignty, much as it already has Pakistan.
Then there is Ladakh, an Indian union territory. Sixty years ago, while the Cuban missile crisis distracted the U.S., China invaded Aksai Chin, a Maryland-sized portion of Ladakh. Not only does the People’s Liberation Army continue to occupy that territory, but Xi seeks to expand his conquest, even at the risk of war with India.

In October 2022, I drove across the 17,480-foot Tanglang La Pass to visit Pangong Lake, which spans the India-China border. It is a tense area. In May 2020, Chinese troops set upon Indian soldiers across the Line of Actual Control. A month later, Chinese forces attacked Indian troops in the nearby Galwan Valley, bludgeoning them with barbed wire-wrapped clubs and stabbing them with shivs. Chinese troops continue to force nomads onto Indian territory to justify Chinese claims, and the People’s Liberation Army builds roads and structures on Indian land. Ladakh may seem peripheral, but a Chinese push to regional capital Leh would put Chinese troops less than 400 miles from the Indian capital of New Delhi.
When China attacked Aksai Chin, it did so along two fronts more than 600 miles apart. Beijing might repeat that tactic by simultaneously attacking in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state Xi also claims . This would not only challenge India logistically, but it would be far more difficult for Washington to counter given how both fronts would be landlocked and hundreds of miles inland.

Then, of course, there is the South China Sea. The nine-dash line that Xi uses to stake China’s claim is historical fiction. For too long, however, the U.S. and regional states have emboldened China by allowing it to get away with what effectively is the largest maritime territory grab in modern history.
So make no mistake: Taiwan is in China’s sights, but it is not alone. It is necessary to deter China across the entirety of its southern border.

Michael Rubin ( @mrubin1971 ) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner's Beltway Confidential. He is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
 

jward

passin' thru
https://twitter.com/Alex_agvg
Alex Ve
lez-Gree
@Alex_agvg


Today, Senator Hawley sent a letter to Secretary of State Tony Blinken about concerns that arms transfers to Ukraine are impeding America's ability to arm Taiwan. Full letter at the link. Key excerpts highlighted in this thread. 1/8
"Taiwan is more important for US national interests than Ukraine. Seizing Taiwan is Beijing’s next step toward dominating the Indo-Pacific. If Beijing succeeds, it would have dire ramifications for US national security, as well as our economic security &
freedom of action" 2/8
"Averting the real and growing threat from China requires us to expedite delivery to Taiwan of the weapons it needs to defend itself—provided Taiwan commits to an asymmetric defense, significantly increases its own defense spending, and pursues necessary defense reforms." 3/8
"Administration officials will no doubt point out that the mechanisms for delivering weapons to Ukraine and Taiwan differ...But this explanation does little to allay concerns. Regardless of the weapons’ source, if both TWN and UKR need them, they should go to Taiwan first." 4/8
"Nor does the United States have the luxury of waiting for China to invade Taiwan before we send weapons to the island. It will be exceedingly difficult to deliver weapons to Taiwan after a contingency begins due to Taiwan’s susceptibility to Chinese blockade." 5/8
"Moreover, the whole purpose of sending weapons now is to deter any conflict. Waiting jeopardizes this goal." 6/8
"None of this is to say we should sell or otherwise provide weapons to Taiwan absent conditions. To the contrary, all U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan should be strictly conditioned to ensure they are used as effectively as possible in support of an asymmetric defense strategy." 7/8
"The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified...that arming Taiwan would help to reduce operational risk to US forces. How do you explain why it is worth arming Ukraine over Taiwan if that could leave US forces in greater danger in the event of a Taiwan contingency?" 8/8




December 6, 2022
The Honorable Antony Blinken
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Secretary Blinken,
I write with concern about reports that U.S. arms transfers to Ukraine are impeding our ability to
prevent a war in Asia by supplying Taiwan with the weapons it needs to deter a Chinese invasion.
We should be clear: Taiwan is more important for U.S. national interests than Ukraine. Seizing
Taiwan is Beijing’s next step toward dominating the Indo-Pacific region. If Beijing succeeds, it
would have dire ramifications for Americans’ national security, as well as our economic security
and freedom of action. We must not let this happen. Averting the real and growing threat from
China requires us to expedite delivery to Taiwan of the weapons it needs to defend itself—provided
Taiwan commits to an asymmetric defense, significantly increases its own defense spending, and
pursues necessary defense reforms.
Your Administration, however, is doing the reverse. You are prioritizing arms to Ukraine over our
vital security interests in Asia. This is not a tenable position. Last month, you personally
acknowledged, “There has been a change in the approach from Beijing toward Taiwan in recent
years,” and that Beijing is now “determined to pursue reunification on a much faster timeline.” i
This is consistent with Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines’s assessment that China
poses an “acute” threat to Taiwan between now and 2030. ii It also aligns with warnings from
defense officials, including former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Phil
Davidson, who testified that Beijing may invade Taiwan as soon as 2027. iii
Despite the increasingly urgent threat, however, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission recently found that “[t]he diversion of existing stocks of weapons and munitions to
Ukraine and pandemic-related supply chain issues has exacerbated a sizeable backlog in the
delivery of weapons already approved for sale to Taiwan, undermining the island’s readiness.” iv
A Wall Street Journal report echoed the Commission’s findings.v The report states, “The flow of
weapons to Ukraine is now running up against the longer-term demands of a U.S. strategy to arm
Taiwan to help it defend itself against a possible invasion by China.” It goes on to say that the
backlog for Taiwan “has grown to $18.7 billion,” up from “more than $14 billion” a year ago. The
backlog reportedly includes Javelin anti-tank weapons and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. These
weapons are vital to an asymmetric defense of Taiwan, but they have yet to arrive in Taiwan, even
as the Administration has sent thousands to Ukraine. vi


Administration officials will no doubt point out that the mechanisms for delivering weapons to
Ukraine and Taiwan differ. Many weapons headed to Ukraine, for instance, come from existing
U.S. stocks. But this explanation does little to allay concerns. Regardless of the weapons’ source,
if both Taiwan and Ukraine need them, they should go to Taiwan first.
Nor does the United States have the luxury of waiting for China to invade Taiwan before we send
weapons to the island. It will be exceedingly difficult to deliver weapons to Taiwan after a
contingency begins due to Taiwan’s susceptibility to Chinese blockade. Moreover, the whole
purpose of sending weapons now is to deter any conflict. Waiting jeopardizes this goal.
None of this is to say we should sell or otherwise provide weapons to Taiwan absent conditions.
To the contrary, all U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan should be strictly conditioned to ensure they are
used as effectively as possible in support of an asymmetric defense strategy. Among other things,
that means tying U.S. transfers to Taiwanese defense spending increases and defense reforms. It
also means providing Taiwan the right capabilities. Fighter jets, tanks, and the like will do little to
deter or defeat an invasion. In contrast, Javelins, Stingers, HIMARS rocket launchers, and related
weapons are ideal for an asymmetric defense strategy and should be sent to Taiwan as quickly as
possible—not diverted to or delayed on account of Ukraine.
These concerns in mind, I request your written responses to the following questions no later than
December 16, 2022:
1. Is it true that both Ukraine and Taiwan would benefit from some of the same capabilities
to defend themselves? If so, please provide a list of such capabilities.
2. Is it true the United States has sent weapons to Ukraine that could also be used for an
asymmetric defense of Taiwan? If so, please provide a list of such weapons, along with an
explanation for why the Administration prioritized Ukraine over Taiwan in these cases.
3. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified in April 2022 that arming Taiwan would
help to reduce operational risk to U.S. forces. vii How do you explain why it is worth arming
Ukraine over Taiwan if that could leave U.S. forces in greater danger in the event of a
Taiwan contingency?
4. The Chairman also testified that arming Taiwan would help to bolster deterrence against
China. Does sending weapons to Ukraine that could also be used for an asymmetric defense
of Taiwan weaken deterrence against China?
5. Going forward, will the Administration commit to prioritizing delivering weapons to
Taiwan ahead of Ukraine and other countries? If so, how will you ensure this is done
rapidly and effectively, at scale? If the Administration feels it is unable to deliver weapons
to Taiwan ahead of other countries for legal reasons, please explain why.


6. How can Germany or other NATO allies do more to arm Ukraine, so the United States can
focus more of its scarce resources on arming Taiwan?
Thank you for your attention to this important and increasingly urgent matter.
Sincerely,
Josh Hawley
United States Senator
CC:
The Honorable Lloyd J. Austin, III
Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
i Ellen Francis, “China Plans to Seize Taiwan On ‘Much Faster Timeline,’ Blinken Says,” The Washington Post,
October 18, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/18/china-seize-taiwan-plan-blinken/.
ii Katie Bo Lillis, Michael Conte, Jennifer Hansler and Veronica Stracqualursi, “US Intelligence Officials Warn
China is ‘Working Hard’ to Be Able to Take Over Taiwan Militarily,” CNN, May 10, 2022,
iii Mallory Shelbourne, “Davidson: China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan In ‘Next Six Years’” USNI News,
March 9, 2021, Davidson: China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan In 'Next Six Years' - USNI News
years.
iv 2022 Annual Report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 15, 2022,
2022 Annual Report to Congress, 618.
v Gordon Lubold, Doug Cameron, and Nancy Youssef, “U.S. Effort to Arm Taiwan Faces New Challenge With
Ukraine Conflict,” The Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-effort-to-arm-
taiwan-faces-new-challenge-with-ukraine-conflict-11669559116.
vi Mark F. Cancian, “Is the United States Running out of Weapons to Send to Ukraine?”, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, September 16, 2022,
vii Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Department of Defense Budget Posture in Review of the Defense
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2023 and the Future Years Defense Program, 117th Cong., April 7, 2022,
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/22-26_04-07-2022.pdf, 107.
 

jward

passin' thru
EndGameWW3
@EndGameWW3

Update: Reuters: The US House of Representatives and Senate approve the allocation of billions of dollars in aid
to Taiwan in the coming years.
9:13 PM · Dec 6, 2022
 

jward

passin' thru
The US State Department approves the sale of aircraft equipment and spare parts to Taiwan at a value of $330 million.

Taiwanese Ministry of Defense: Washington's approval of the aircraft spare parts deal supports us in confronting Chinese military activity.
 

jward

passin' thru

China Repeats Claim to Taiwan Strait as U.S. Ally Eyes Naval Presence​


John Feng



China renewed its claim to the Taiwan Strait this week, after Canada's top diplomat said Ottawa would deploy more warships to the region to ensure the vital passage remained an international waterway.
This summer, Beijing and Washington began publicly airing conflicting viewpoints on the status of the waters, over which the former claims jurisdiction, but which the latter argues grants foreign commercial and military vessels a right to unimpeded use. The legal basis for China's position revolves around its claim to Taiwan itself, which neither the United States nor Canada officially recognizes.

The U.S. sails naval assets through the strait on a near-monthly basis to assert navigational rights. In September, a frigate from the Royal Canadian Navy and a U.S. Navy destroyer conducted their only joint transit of the year so far. Melanie Joly, Canada's foreign minister, has promised more of the same.
"We have made it clear on multiple occasions that China has sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Taiwan Strait," China's foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told a regular briefing on Monday.
"China always respects the navigational rights that countries are entitled to in accordance with international law. However, we firmly reject any country's provocation and threat against China's sovereignty and security in the name of freedom of navigation," said Mao.

The Royal Canadian Navy Halifax-class frigate HMCS Vancouver passes the U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Higgins while conducting integrated operations on September 19, 2022, in the South China Sea. China renewed its claim to the Taiwan Strait this week. Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Donavan K. Patubo/U.S. Navy
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, which China has ratified, but the U.S. hasn't, grants coastal states a 12-nautical mile territorial sea, the use of which by foreign vessels is at the state's discretion. Beyond that zone, however, vessels have a right to navigate the "high seas," commonly called international waters, including through straits.

This right technically wouldn't apply if Taiwan were recognized as part of Chinese territory. But when Washington established diplomatic ties with Beijing in 1979, it acknowledged, rather than recognized, Chinese claims to the island. When Ottawa did the same in 1970, it similarly took note, rather than endorsed, Beijing's claim.
U.S. Navy warships that transit the Taiwan Strait emphasize their use of "a corridor in the strait that is beyond the territorial sea of any coastal state."

"The United States will continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, and that includes transiting through the Taiwan Strait," a U.S. government spokesperson told Newsweek in June.
Joly told the Financial Times that Western allies needed to ensure the waterway "remains an international strait." The passage sits at the northeastern mouth of the South China Sea, which the U.N. estimates hosts one-third of global maritime trade. Some 40 percent of the EU's trade goes through the strait, the bloc's foreign affairs chief, Josep Borrell, said recently.
"We will continue to enforce the international rules-based order when it comes to the Taiwan Strait. And that's why also we had a frigate going through the Taiwan Strait this summer, along with the Americans, [and] we're looking to have more frigates going through it," Joly was quoted as saying in the FT on Monday.
Ottawa has military assets in East Asia as part of its contribution to enforcing U.N. Security Council sanctions on North Korea. Canadian air force pilots also have had a number of well-documented run-ins with their Chinese counterparts in the East China Sea.

Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy, announced last week, promised further engagement on security matters in the region. Joly said Canada would increase its warship presence from one to three, while also posting more diplomats and military attachés throughout the region. She also previewed more investment in the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance with the U.S., the U.K., Australia and New Zealand.
"We know we have to do more to play a role in the security of the region," Joly said. "We need to invest in deterrence because we believe . . . it is the best way to, at the end of the day, respect international norms," the paper quoted her as saying.

Separately, the Pentagon also released its annual China Military Power Report last week. The document said Beijing was likely to continue military, diplomatic, information and economic pressure on Taiwan to compel the island's unification with China. Taipei rejects Beijing's sovereignty claims.
The report also projected that China's nuclear stockpile could grow to 1,500 warheads by 2035 if it continued its current rate of expansion.
Do you have a tip on a world news story that Newsweek should be covering? Do you have a question about cross-strait relations? Let us know via worldnews@newsweek.com.
 

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Pentagon, Chinese analysts agree US can’t win in Taiwan Strait​


David P. Goldman​




China’s satellite coverage in the Western Pacific has doubled since 2018, the Pentagon reported last week in its annual assessment of the Chinese military. That gives China the ability to detect American surface ships with an array of sensors that can guide its 2,000 land-based missiles to moving targets, including US aircraft carriers.
The Defense Department’s November 29 report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” reflects a grimly realistic rethinking of China’s military capacity in its home theater.
China hawk Elbridge Colby, a prominent advocate of a Western Pacific military buildup to deny China access to its adjacent seas, tweeted on November 6, “Senior flag officers are saying we’re on a trajectory to get crushed in a war with China, which would likely be the most important war since WWII, God forbid.”
The strategic takeaway is that the United States cannot win a firefight close to China’s coast, and can’t defend Taiwan whether it wants to or not. That view in the Joe Biden administration’s Department of Defense (DOD) persuaded the president to discuss “guardrails” against military confrontation in his November summit with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping.

Republican hawks appear to have come to the same conclusion. The United States will enact a scorched-earth policy in Taiwan, destroying its semiconductor industry, if the PRC seizes the island, former Trump national security adviser Robert O’Brien told a conference at the Richard Nixon Foundation on November 10, reports army-technology.com.
“If China takes Taiwan and takes those factories intact – which I don’t think we would ever allow – they have a monopoly over chips the way OPEC has a monopoly, or even more than the way OPEC has a monopoly over oil,” O’Brien said.
A much-read paper by two Army War College professors published this year proposes that “the United States and Taiwan should lay plans for a targeted scorched-earth strategy that would render Taiwan not just unattractive if ever seized by force, but positively costly to maintain.”

“This could be done most effectively by threatening to destroy facilities belonging to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the most important chipmaker in the world and China’s most important supplier.”
O’Brien evidently agrees with the Pentagon’s assessment that the US can’t win a war in the Taiwan Strait, proposing – apropos of the Vietnam War’s most celebrated sound bite – to destroy the island in order to save it.
Anti-ship missiles are the 21st-century equivalent of the torpedo and dive bombers that banished the battleship from military budgets after the 1941 sinking of the Bismarck by the British and the sinking of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales by the Japanese. Surface ships, including aircraft carriers, can’t defend against modern missiles that can downlink guidance data from reconnaissance satellites.
The DOD report states that the PLA Rocket Force’s “conventionally armed CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) ASBM variant gives the PLA the capability to conduct long-range precision strikes against ships, including aircraft carriers, out to the Western Pacific.”
“The [People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s] ground-based missile forces complement the air and sea-based precision strike capabilities of the PLAAF and PLAN.… DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km, is fitted with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV), and is reportedly capable of rapidly reloading in the field.
“The PLARF continues to grow its inventory of DF-26 IRBMs, which it first revealed in 2015 and fielded in 2016. The multi-role DF-26 is designed to rapidly swap conventional and nuclear warheads and is capable of conducting precision land-attack and anti-ship strikes in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea from mainland China.
“In 2020, China fired anti-ship ballistic missiles against a moving target in the South China Sea.”
China tested these weapons thoroughly, the Pentagon report adds:
“In 2021, the PLARF launched approximately 135 ballistic missiles for testing and training, more than the rest of the world combined excluding ballistic missile employment in conflict zones. The DF-17 passed several tests successfully and is deployed operationally.
“While the DF-17 is primarily a conventional platform, it may be equipped with nuclear warheads. In 2020, a PRC-based military expert described the primary purpose of the DF-17 as striking foreign military bases and fleets in the Western Pacific.”
Key to the effectiveness of anti-ship missiles is satellite intelligence and electronic warfare measures. As the Pentagon reports:
“China employs a robust space-based ISR [intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance] capability designed to enhance its worldwide situational awareness. Used for military and civilian remote sensing and mapping, terrestrial and maritime surveillance, and intelligence collection, China’s ISR satellites are capable of providing electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery as well as electronic and signals intelligence data.”
Most important:
“As of the end of 2021, China’s ISR satellite fleet contained more than 260 systems – a quantity second only to the United States, and nearly doubling China’s in-orbit systems since 2018.”
Satellite signals can be jammed or spoofed (misdirected to show incorrect coordinates), but
“The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, and satellite navigation … the PRC continues to develop a variety of counter-space capabilities designed to limit or prevent an adversary’s use of space-based assets during crisis or conflict.
“In addition to the development of directed energy weapons and satellite jammers, the PLA has an operational ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missile intended to target low-Earth orbit satellites, and the PRC probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.
“PLA [electronic warfare] units routinely train to conduct jamming and anti-jamming operations against multiple communication and radar systems and Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite systems during force-on-force exercises.
“These exercises test operational units’ understanding of EW weapons, equipment, and procedures and they also enable operators to improve confidence in their ability to operate effectively in a complex electromagnetic environment.”
China’s military has improved quality as well as quantity, according to the Pentagon:
“Recent improvements to China’s space-based ISR capabilities emphasize the development, procurement, and use of increasingly capable satellites with digital camera technology as well as space-based radar for all-weather, 24-hour coverage.
“These improvements increase China’s monitoring capabilities – including observation of US aircraft carriers, expeditionary strike groups, and deployed air wings. Space capabilities will enhance potential PLA military operations farther from the Chinese coast.”
Overall, the Pentagon’s readout on China’s missile and satellite capability is virtually identical to the estimation of Chinese analysts, for example, the widely read military columnist Chen Feng in the prominent Chinese website “The Observer” (guancha.cn). In a November 27 report, Chen explained why an array of small satellites can achieve precise real-time target location:
“Small satellites are not only small, lightweight, and low-cost, but also operate in low orbits. In terms of space ISR, one is worth nearly three. This is true for optical and radar imaging, as well as for signal interception. So the actual reconnaissance capability of small satellites is no weaker than large satellites, and commercial Synthetic Aperture Radar small satellites in the United States and China are able to reach 0.5-meter resolution.
“Optical imaging has always had the advantage of high resolution, which is also a very mature technology. In the era of digital imaging, there is no longer a need to use the re-entry capsule to send the film back to the ground when the satellite is overhead.”
Synthetic aperture radar, Chen explains, “is not applicable to moving targets, but most of the intelligence can be interpreted from still images, and the similarities and movement can be inferred from differences between the before and after still images can also be inferred from the movement.”
A lead satellite may detect a suspicious object, and follow-up satellites “can be switched to a detailed investigation mode, and relay the results of detailed investigation.” Other satellites with electromagnetic rather than optical sensors can conduct real-time triangulation.

In addition to its satellite ISR capability, Chen says, the other half of China’s reconnaissance capability consists of “unmanned aircraft, unmanned boats, submarines, and networked land-based radar, and undersea hydroacoustic monitoring.”
China, Chen concludes, does not yet have global ISR capability, “but theater coverage has been achieved.”
In the past, the US Navy has insisted that a combination of electronic warfare measures and anti-missile defenses can defend US capital ships against Chinese attack. This year, the navy’s top officer Admiral Jonathan Greenert told reporters that a combination of spoofing (feeding false position coordinates to an incoming missile), masking electronic emissions, and anti-missile systems like Aegis can defend US carriers.
But as Gabriel Honrada reported on August 14, US anti-missile systems like Aegis or Patriot aren’t effective against missiles honing in from a high trajectory. China’s DF-21 and other anti-ship missiles are designed to ascend to the stratosphere and strike vertically.

Electronic countermeasures, moreover, are less effective against multiple sensors. China’s tiered system of sequenced optical, as well as electromagnetic reconnaissance combined with air and sea drones, is getting harder, if not impossible, to spoof. And China’s missile force is so large that it can inflict devastating damage even with a high error rate.
Apart from its formidable inventory of conventional missiles, China has developed hypersonic glide vehicles that hug the ground and maneuver at the speed of intercontinental ballistic missiles, or several times the speed of sound. No conventional missile defense can stop HGVs.

Apart from its missile force, China has about 800 fourth-generation fighters deployed at its coast and close to 200 fifth-generation (stealth) fighters. As the Pentagon report notes, China has corrected the most important deficiency in its domestic warplane production, namely jet engines:
“China’s decades-long efforts to improve domestic aircraft engine production are starting to produce results with the J-10 and J-20 fighters switching to domestically produced WS-10 engines by the end of 2021. China’s first domestically produced high-bypass turbofan, the WS-20, has also entered flight testing on the Y-20 heavy transport and probably will replace imported Russian engines by the end of 2022.”
A noteworthy observation in the new Pentagon report is that China now has only 30,000 marines, compared with a US Marine Corps of about 200,000 including reserves. Only 200 Chinese marines are deployed outside the country, at China’s sole overseas base in Djibouti. China has about 14,000 special forces versus an American count of about 75,000. This isn’t consistent with the report’s claim that China wants to “project power globally.”

Pentagon, Chinese analysts agree US can’t win in Taiwan Strait
 

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China Sends Most Bombers Toward Taiwan in at Least Two Years​


ByBloomberg News


  • 18 bombers fly near Taiwan after visit by top member of LDP
  • China signals its anger at visits by boosting size of sorties
December 13, 2022 at 12:44 AM CST
China’s military sent its biggest daily sortie of bombers into the Taiwan Strait in at least two years, in apparent show of displeasure over a visit by a key member of Japan’s ruling party.
The 18 H-6 strategic bombers — the most in Bloomberg-compiled data going back to September 2020 — were part of a sortie of 29 warplanes that Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said it detected as of early Tuesday. Three Chinese naval vessels were also spotted.

 

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Is China Planning to Attack Taiwan? A Careful Consideration of Available Evidence Says No​


Timothy R. Heath

Is China preparing to invade Taiwan within the next two decades? In the past year, fears that war could break out in the Taiwan Strait have grown palpable, owing in large part to the shock of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Conflict scenarios that once seemed inconceivable have become a frightening reality. Commentators warn that Beijing could be tempted to follow Moscow’s example and attack a neighbor which it has long regarded as illegitimate.

U.S. military commanders have issued grim warnings about the possibility of such an attack in the near future. In March 2021, Adm. Philip Davidson, Pacific Fleet commander, warned that China could take military action against Taiwan by 2027. Adm. Michael Gilday, chief of naval operations, added that he could “not rule out” a Chinese attempt to invade as early as 2023. Top specialists on China have lent support to the alarming assessment. In a recent poll, 63 percent of respondents believed an invasion to be “possible within the next 10 years.”

These fears have spurred striking political responses in Western capitals. To dissuade Beijing, President Joseph Biden has issued multiple statements clarifying U.S. willingness to help Taiwan defeat Chinese aggression. U.S. military leaders, dismayed by the results of war games that suggested U.S. forces could suffer devastating losses in a cross-strait conflict, have vowed major overhauls of the armed forces. Allied governments have stepped up preparations as well. Japan has increased defense spending amid fears of a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan and Australia has inked a deal with the United States and the United Kingdom for nuclear submarines to patrol farther from its shores.


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China’s demands for unification are not new, of course. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Beijing has insisted on the goal of unification. But for many years the risk of war seemed low because either the Chinese military was too weak or because Beijing was too distracted by other priorities, such as rapid economic growth. However, in the past year, three pieces of evidence have, for many, dramatically elevated the likelihood of war. The first consists of intelligence reports regarding the preparation of Chinese military options for Taiwan by 2027. The second consists of statements by senior officials that stress the imperative of unification. The third consists of growing Chinese military advantage over U.S. forces near Taiwan.

Although the collective evidence appears persuasive, a closer examination shows that their significance has been seriously overstated. Moreover, there is a conspicuous lack of evidence that the government has decided to pursue a military solution to the island. China might someday choose to attack the island, but the most compelling evidence of that possibility would consist of indications that the government had prioritized Taiwan unification above other policy goals. The United States should continue to maintain its deterrence posture but refrain from overstating the threat and thereby misjudge the cross-strait situation.

Chinese Military Preparations by 2027

The first and perhaps most striking piece of evidence consists of intelligence reports that Chinese President Xi Jinping has directed the People’s Liberation Army to prepare military options against Taiwan by 2027.There is no reason to doubt the veracity of the intelligence reports. However, the significance of the instructions passed by Xi is far from clear. Where and how did Xi pass these instructions? What do they mean?

The context for such remarks matters a great deal. In China’s political system, the most important decisions regarding national strategy are made by the top leaders in the Politburo Standing Committee. A decision to change the country’s current prioritization of peaceful development in favor of a more militarily aggressive strategy to conquer Taiwan would certainly merit such a meeting, if only to promote the illusion of consensus behind such a radical departure from the current strategy. However, there is no evidence that such an exceptional meeting ever took place. Bolstering this point, CIA Director David Cohen clarified that Xi “had not made the decision” to attack Taiwan.

Although Cohen did not provide details, his comments suggest that Xi probably gave the instructions at the annual Central Military Commission work meeting. This makes sense because Xi annually convenes a senior military leadership meeting at which he provides security guidance for the coming year. This is traditionally considered the most important meeting of the year for the military’s leadership. At these meetings, the Central Military Commission Chair typically provides directions to the military on how to support the country’s national strategy. Sample tasks include actions to reform the command structure and improve the quality of training. But, crucially, the Central Military Commission is empowered only to prepare and execute strategies and policies consistent with those determined by the supreme civilian leadership — namely, the Politburo Standing Committee. Thus, in the meeting Xi apparently directed the military to carry out preparations for a Taiwan contingency by 2027 but to otherwise operate in accordance with the current Taiwan strategy that prioritizes peaceful methods. This interpretation is consistent with Cohen’s public observation that Beijing still “intends to get control” of Taiwan through “non-military means.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley’s characterization of Xi’s remarks lends support to that interpretation. Milley commented that Xi’s instructions appear to be about “capability, not an intent to attack or seize.”

Dates and Goals for PLA Modernization

Both Cohen’s and Milley’s interpretations support the view that Beijing currently prioritizes peaceful methods to achieve unification. However, their comments hint at the possibility that Xi’s intentions could change over time. Many observers have in fact put forward the suggestion that Xi may adopt aggressive options once the military completes its preparations by 2027. Some analysts have cited this possibility in arguing for robust deterrence posture now as a way to dissuade Xi from considering military action by that date. But why would China announce a deadline for military preparations? The 2027 date is said to point to Xi’s hopes that he can achieve unification before turning too old or before he concludes his third term as General Secretary. But that is not the only possible interpretation. It is not even the most plausible for four reasons. First, there is no evidence to support the claim that the timeline is driven by Xi’s personal considerations. Second, Chinese leaders routinely direct the military to prepare for Taiwan contingencies. Third, setting dates for modernization goals is an exceedingly common practice. And fourth, Chinese leaders have a variety of reasons for setting dates for modernization goals that do not have anything to do with an intent to attack.

First, despite predictions to the contrary, there is no evidence to support the speculation that the “prepare military options by 2027” goal is tied to either Xi’s age or the end of his third term in office. The reasoning is also specious given that, to date, Xi has proven extremely cautious in his use of the military. It is true that Xi has overseen the expansion of “gray zone” operations against rival claimants in the First Island Chain. China and India also clashed in a lethal brawl under Xi’s watch, although Beijing subsequently sought to deescalate tensions. However, although Xi has been repressive and brutal in many ways, he has not engaged in any of the type of combat operations that Russia undertook in Georgia, Chechnya, Syria, and Ukraine’s Crimean region prior to invading Ukraine in 2022. It would be unprecedented, risky in the extreme, and frankly bizarre for a major power like China to refrain from testing its military in even a limited combat operation before launching an attack that could escalate into a major war with the world’s premier military, that of the United States.

Second, it is not by itself especially noteworthy that Xi directed the military to prepare for a Taiwan contingency — or any other contingency for that matter. One of the military’s most important jobs, after all, is precisely to prepare for contingencies. Nor is it unusual for the military leadership to regard Taiwan as a top security threat. Taiwan has been the People’s Liberation Army’s top security challenge for over two decades. Moreover, all militaries plan for contingencies with designated potential adversaries in mind. U.S. defense strategy documents make clear that the U.S. military, for example, regards China, Russia, and others as potential threats and plans for contingencies accordingly. This does not mean the United States has any intention of attacking either China or Russia, of course.

Third, the linking of modernization goals to dates is an exceedingly common Chinese practice. Reflecting a legacy from the era of a planned economy, Beijing regularly sets dates for modernization goals. China sets goals for national modernization efforts in regular increments in its five-year plans, for example. But it also sets development goals that coincide with special anniversaries, in part to bolster the Chinese Communist Party’s prestige and authority. For example, China’s development goals for the “China Dream” coincide with the centennial of the nation’s founding in 2049. In the early 2000s, reports surfaced that suggested Chinese leaders had “secret plans” to invade Taiwan by 2020. Yet the reports proved inaccurate because Western experts misunderstood the meaning of the date. In fact, the 2020 date for military modernization was tied to broader development goals that coincided with the centennial of the Chinese Communist Party’s founding in 2021. China did not invade Taiwan in 2021, but it did hold a lavish parade to showcase the military’s achievements in modernization and whip up patriotic enthusiasm. Analysts may be committing the same mistake about the reports of military modernization goals set for 2027. The significance of 2027, as Chinese military news websites explain, lies in the fact that it will be the 100th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army’s founding. It’s a pretty safe bet that Beijing will hold an extravagant military parade in 2027.

Fourth, the military’s modernization goals serve a variety of political and military purposes, none of which imply any intent to actually start a war. Deterrence of a potential secession move by Taiwan remains one compelling reason. But there are others. Although experts focus almost exclusively on official statements regarding Taiwan, Chinese leaders have placed equal emphasis on the goal of building a strong military as a sign of a powerful and successful China. Annually, China holds many lavish military parades and exercises, all of which receive extensive coverage in Chinese media. This practice, which has continued since the country’s founding by Mao Zedong, serve an important role in bolstering patriotism and legitimizing Communist Party rule.

Building a powerful military is also an important source of political power for the country’s supreme leader. Xi’s power hinges, in part, on his command of the military, which helps explain why he is often photographed in military uniforms or settings. Responsible primarily for foreign policy and the military, China’s central government actually controls a far smaller share of overall government spending than is the case for Western governments. The overwhelming majority of government revenue and spending is handled by the provincial governments, who thus have access to the most lucrative sources of revenue and extensive patronage networks. Xi thus has a strong political incentive to improve the gleaming appearance of an impressive military in part as a way to underscore his authority, bolster public support, and cow rival elites who are flush with wealth and supporters.

Yet one more important purpose of such modernization goals is to keep the military focused on its goal of becoming more professional and resist tendencies of slipping into corruption and lethargy. Xi’s instructions to remain focused on its military duties takes place within the context of a broader effort to improve the overall modernization, competence, and effectiveness of the government, which authorities regard as critical to realizing the country’s goals of national revival. Consistent with this broader imperative, Xi has repeatedly called on the military to improve its combat readiness, which is another way of saying the military should become more competent at its job.

The point is not to dismiss as trivial Xi’s instructions to the People’s Liberation Army as insignificant. The instructions are noteworthy, but nothing about the instructions themselves tell us anything about Chinese intent to attack Taiwan. What is required is clearer evidence of leadership intent to finally conquer the island.

Chinese Statements on Taiwan

This raises the second widely cited piece of evidence: government statements that emphasize the imperative of unification. Xi stated in 2019, for example, that Taiwan “must and will be reunited with China.” At the 20th Party Congress held in 2022, Xi described “China’s complete reunification” as a “natural requirement for realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Under Xi, China also issued a white paper on Taiwan that refused to renounce the use of force.

Once again, the fact that Xi and the Chinese government made these statements cannot be doubted. The quotes are available for anyone to read in publicly available media reports. But what do they mean? Top China specialists have claimed that the statements show Xi aims to “complete unification by 2049.” Such statements certainly appear compelling on the surface, but a closer look suggests their significance is overstated for several reasons.

The first point to note is that all Chinese leaders since Mao have regularly issued such uncompromising proclamations. Jiang Zemin declared at the 16th Party Congress in 2002, “The Taiwan question must not be allowed to drag on indefinitely” and pledged that the “complete reunification of the motherland” will be achieved at an unspecified “early date.” Hu Jintao stated at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 that the “complete reunification of China is an irresistible historical process.” He added that “any separatist attempt for Taiwan independence” is “doomed to fail.” Consistent with the recent white paper, previous versions also refused to rule out the use of force to resolve the issue. If the tone of statements issued by Xi’s government departs from his predecessors, the difference is slight.

Second, what the government did not say or do is equally or even more noteworthy. There is nothing in the 20th Party Congress report or any of Xi’s speeches that expresses the notion that China had reached the “limits of its forbearance” or that demand some sort of immediate steps towards unification. Nor is there any evidence that the government had begun taking practical steps to prepare for military conquest.

As best as outsiders can tell, Beijing has not directed studies by relevant government ministries to plan for the occupation and administration of Taiwan. Nor have central leaders begun to indoctrinate cadres on the imperative of gaining Taiwan through military efforts if necessary. Such indoctrination is essential for cadres to understand what and why they must adjust their duties to prepare for a potentially catastrophic war situation. Neither has Beijing made any effort to rally public sentiment in favor of war against the island. Central leaders need to socialize people to the importance and potential dangers of war to gain public support for a course of action that would very likely shock the public, lead to severe economic disruption, and expose many people to serious harm or death. National unification may be a popular idea among Chinese citizens, but war isn’t. Data on popular views are of course difficult to come by given the controlled political environment, but available surveys by Western scholars show an overwhelming preference for peaceful methods to achieve unification with Taiwan. For Beijing to launch a war without bothering to cultivate the public’s support would risk throwing the country into utter turmoil.

Above all, there is no evidence that the government is seriously contemplating abandoning its peaceful unification strategy. Such a reprioritization would be necessary because the current approach has essentially paid lip service to the imperative of Taiwan unification while prioritizing other goals such as economic growth and the maintenance of a stable international environment to facilitate national development. Xi has rebranded the pursuit of a national rejuvenation as the “China Dream,” but his vision shares considerable continuity with that of his predecessors. As with the previous governments, Xi’s demands for unification have coincided with tolerance for the island’s de facto independence as he pursued other more pressing goals such as reenergizing a flagging economy, grappling with corruption, managing unrest over the country’s “Zero Covid” restrictions, and implementing geo-economic projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Given these higher priorities, Xi, like his predecessors, has to date made little effort to force the matter of unification.

China’s Military Advantage Near Taiwan

The absence of evidence that China has revised its national strategy to prioritize unification is especially critical because the third widely cited piece of evidence — that of an increasingly powerful Chinese military — remains unpersuasive without it. In recent years, China has developed an immense inventory of advanced aircraft, warships, missiles, and ground forces that outclassed in every way Taiwan’s stagnant military. China’s improved capabilities also pose an increasingly lethal threat to U.S. forces that might intervene in a Taiwan conflict. In the past two years, war games that tested how U.S. forces might fare against the revamped People’s Liberation Army yielded grim results. Numerous iterations held at different think tanks showed that China could inflict massive losses on U.S. forces in a war over Taiwan and in some cases defeat a U.S. intervention. There is no reason to doubt the warnings by U.S. military leaders that China poses an increasingly formidable threat in any Taiwan contingency.
 

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Yet here, too, the significance of these trends may be overstated. Despite its growing military strength, it is impossible for Beijing to know with any certainty what would happen once war began. Even if we assume China has gained the upper hand militarily in the area near Taiwan, that provides far less advantage than it appears. As Russia is learning in the Ukraine, the United States learned recently in Afghanistan, and military historians have long noted, war involves so many factors that how fighting might progress or conclude is impossible to predict. Underscoring this point, the wargames favored at U.S. think tanks typically explore the devastating first few days of conflict but rarely consider what might happen afterwards. Analysts scarcely explored how a U.S.-Chinense conflict could evolve into a much broader systemic war. In short, war with the United States remains such a high-risk, potentially catastrophic development, that even with China’s military advances, only a radical shift in risk tolerance and policy prioritization could possibly justify Beijing’s willingness to consider this possibility.

The evidence to date remains weak that China is seriously considering an attack on Taiwan, but that does not preclude the possibility that future Chinese leaders might change their mind. How could we tell if Beijing had begun to seriously contemplate an attack on Taiwan? The most important indicators would be those related to a political decision to pursue unification through military options and prepare the nation accordingly. Evidence that top leaders had agreed to prioritize unification above the myriad domestic and foreign policy goals that currently comprise the core of the “China Dream” would be of the highest importance. Indications that the leaders had made such a decision would be evident in steps that the government had taken to prepare for war. Central and provincial government ministries would probably, for example, begin stockpiling, improve defenses, and take measures to insulate the country’s economy to external shocks. Party cadres would likely undergo extensive indoctrination on the importance of reunification and on their duties to support a war effort accordingly. Propaganda, mass rallies, and fiery speeches by top leaders would aim to bolster public support and prepare the populace psychologically for the hardships to come. The political preparations would need to equal, at the very least, the very similar types of activity that characterized Chinese preparations for its last major, large-scale conflict — that of the Korean War. After all, the danger of mass civilian death and economic disruption today is much higher than was the case in the Korean War, owing to the realities of global economic interdependence and advent of modern military technologies such as long-range missiles capable of striking many targets along China’s densely populated coast, to say nothing of the disruptive potential of cyber warfare or the perils of nuclear weapons.

Vladimir Putin, whose attack on Ukraine has inspired much of the angst about a potential Chinese attack, provides a case study of how an autocrat like Xi or a successor could behave in the lead up to war. Although Western analysts may not have understood their significance, Putin for years carried out an escalating series of increasingly shrill tirades and rants about Ukraine. Putin’s government listed numerous grievances and issued dire warnings about developments regarded as unacceptable, including the expansion of NATO and the aiding and abetting of “terrorist activities” against Russian nationals in the Ukraine. He also directed the Russian military to carry numerous attacks against neighbors starting in 2008. In short, Putin sent clear and unambivalent signals about Russia’s intent and willingness to attack for years and months prior to invasion. China under Xi has made no such gestures regarding Taiwan.

For some, the possibility of war, however remote, is reason enough to enhance the U.S. deterrence posture. There is no question that a strong U.S. deterrent posture can help incentivize Beijing to avoid ever contemplating an attack. But accurate assessments of Chinese intentions do matter. Underestimating an adversary, as the United States and the West did with Putin, can lead to inadequate preparations and potential disaster for the victim of aggression, as nearly happened to Ukraine. But overestimating a rival state’s willingness to risk conflict carries its own drawbacks. An exaggerated sense of danger can exacerbate tensions and aggravate perceptions of hostile intent. This could in turn incentivize a rival to adopt more aggressive behavior and thereby accelerate a security dilemma. Moreover, the United States could grant China more leverage in the relationship than is warranted. Out of a desire to reduce a risk of war that is perceived to be higher than it really is, Washington may grant concessions that may not be necessary. And finally, the opportunity costs incurred by an exaggerated fear of war might be considerable. Given the competing demands for military resources and tightening budget constraints, this is not an insignificant point. Massive investments in deterrence capabilities near Taiwan will have to come at the cost of resources that could have been allocated elsewhere.

Despite China’s growing military power, there remain formidable disincentives for China to ever consider going down this route. The risks and uncertainties of great power war remain immense and the potential gains of conquering Taiwan debatable especially given the potential for a war to escalate to catastrophic levels. It is important to closely monitor Chinese military developments and ensure appropriate deterrence. But it is also important not to overstate the threat and thereby misjudge the situation. A more accurate grasp of the meaning and logic of Chinese statements and behavior can help the United States and its allies to make well-informed and reasonable responses to developments in the Taiwan Strait.

Is China Planning to Attack Taiwan? A Careful Consideration of Available Evidence Says No - War on the Rocks
 

jward

passin' thru
China conducts ‘strike drills’ around Taiwan sea and airspace, citing provocation
Al Arabiya English


China’s military said it had conducted “strike drills” in the sea and airspace around Taiwan on Sunday in response to unspecified “provocation” from the democratically-governed island and the United States.

Taiwan, which China claims as its own territory, has complained of repeated Chinese military activity nearby over the past three years or so as Beijing seeks to pressure Taipei to accept Chinese sovereignty.

China staged war games around Taiwan in August following a visit to Taipei by then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and on Saturday it condemned the United States for a new defense authorization law that boosts military assistance for Taiwan.

In a brief statement, the Eastern Theatre Command of China’s People’s Liberation Army said it had carried out “joint combat readiness patrols and joint firepower strike drills” around Taiwan, though it did not specify the exact location.

“This is a resolute response to the current escalation of collusion and provocation from the United States and Taiwan,” it added, without giving details.

“Theatre forces will take all necessary measures to resolutely defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Taiwan’s defense ministry declined immediate comment.

The ministry publishes a daily report at 9 a.m. (0100 GMT) of Chinese military activities near the island over the previous 24 hours.

The United States is Taiwan’s most important international backer and arms supplier, despite the absence of formal diplomatic ties. US arms sales to Taiwan are a constant irritant in Beijing’s relations with Washington.

Taiwan’s military is dwarfed by that of its huge neighbor China. Its air force in particular has come under strain from having to scramble repeatedly to see off Chinese incursions near the island over the past three years or so.

The Chinese drills coincided with newly elected city mayors and county chiefs in Taiwan taking up their positions following local elections on the island last month, in which the ruling Democratic Progressive Party was trounced.

China has never renounced using force to bring Taiwan under its control. Taiwan strongly disputes China’s sovereignty claims, saying only the island’s 23 million people can decide their future.
 

jward

passin' thru
The Spectator Index
@spectatorindex

BREAKING: Taiwan says China used 71 warplanes in military exercises over the weekend, with over 40 sorties crossing into Taiwan's air defense area.

9:46 PM · Dec 25, 2022
 

jward

passin' thru

Taiwan will extend length of compulsory military service amid growing pressure from China​


Sky

3–4 minutes



Taiwan is preparing to extend the length of compulsory military service from four months to one year, according to a senior government official.
The official told Reuters news agency that the change was among a number that would be discussed at a national security meeting later today.

The meeting, called by Taiwan's president Tsai Ing-wen, is expected to look at ways to boost the island's defence capability in the face of growing pressure from China.


Reuters' source said: "China's various unilateral behaviours have become a major concern for regional security."
Changes will come into effect in 2024, the official said, and they would also include tougher training for conscripts, combat instruction used by US forces and more rigorous shooting exercises.

Ms Tsai's office confirmed the meeting and that she would announce measures in a news conference shortly afterwards, but Taiwan's defence ministry declined to comment.
Taiwan's defence priorities were different when tensions appeared to be easing - compulsory military service was cut from two years to four months to appeal to younger voters, while the military itself moved gradually from a conscript force to a professional one.
https://news.sky.com/story/covid-in...ould-be-infected-by-end-of-next-week-12773063
But China has stepped up its military harassment of the island over recent years and Ms Tsai's security team has been reviewing Taiwan's military since 2020.

On Monday, more than 70 Chinese aircraft ventured into Taiwan's air defence zone - China's largest incursion yet.
China also staged military drills near Taiwan in August, in response to a visit to Taipei by then-US house speaker Nancy Pelosi.

The Chinese government claims democratic Taiwan must return to China, and has stepped up its military harassment of the island in recent years.
But Taiwan rejects China's claims of sovereignty.
 

jward

passin' thru
The Spectator Index
@spectatorindex

BREAKING: Taiwan says China used 71 warplanes in military exercises over the weekend, with over 40 sorties crossing into Taiwan's air defense area.

9:46 PM · Dec 25, 2022

China sends 71 aircraft in largest incursion of Taiwan air defense​


Reuters


In its largest reported incursion to date, 71 Chinese aircraft including fighter jets and drones entered Taiwan's air defense identification zone in the past 24 hours, the authorities claimed Monday.
Of the aircraft, 43 also crossed the Taiwan Strait's median line, an unofficial buffer between the two sides that lies within the defense zone, Taiwan's Defense Ministry said in a report, as Beijing continues military activities close to the Chinese-claimed island.

Taiwan's official Central News Agency said it was the largest Chinese air force incursion to date, although there was no sense of alarm on the island, which has witnessed a steady increase in Chinese pressure in recent years.
China, which claims Taiwan as its own territory, said it had conducted "strike drills" in the sea and airspace around Taiwan on Sunday in response to what it said was provocation from the democratically governed island and the United States.

Taiwan, which strongly rejects China's sovereignty claims, said the drills showed Beijing was destroying regional peace and trying to intimidate Taiwan's people.
The office of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen said Tsai will call a high-level national security meeting Tuesday morning to discuss reinforcing the island's civil defense system, followed by a press conference on new civil defense measures.
The statement gave no details, but the defense ministry has said it was considering extending compulsory military service beyond four months, as the war in Ukraine and rising tensions with Beijing renewed discussion about how to respond to Chinese military pressure.
"The more preparations we make, the less likely there will be rash attempts of aggression. The more united we are, the stronger and safer Taiwan would become," Tsai told a military ceremony Monday.

During the latest incursion, several Chinese planes, mostly fighter jets, briefly crossed the median line in the sensitive Taiwan Strait before returning to China, according to a map provided by Taiwan's Defense Ministry. Seven Chinese navy ships were also detected near Taiwan, the ministry said.
China's military also sent early warning, electronic warfare and antisubmarine aircraft, as well as drones, into Taiwan's southern air defense identification zone, or ADIZ, according to the report, which detailed Chinese activities near Taiwan over the 24 hours to 6 a.m. (10 p.m. GMT on Sunday).
Taipei has complained of repeated missions by the Chinese air force over the last two years, often in southern areas of its ADIZ.

Taiwan sent unspecified combat aircraft to warn away the Chinese planes, while missile systems monitored their flight, the ministry said, using standard wording for its response.
China has stepped up its diplomatic, military and economic pressure in recent years on the self-governed island to accept Beijing's rule. Taiwan's government says it wants peace but will defend itself if attacked.
 

Grumphau

Veteran Member
Report from Forward Observer. Strong indications of Chinese action on Taiwan in next 30 days. First action likely to be embargo on Taiwan followed by possible military intervention later in spring if coercive measures are not successful.

View: https://youtu.be/RYRNM1Hke5I

RT 52:14
China-Taiwan relevant material starts at about 20:50
 

Henry Bowman

Veteran Member
Report from Forward Observer. Strong indications of Chinese action on Taiwan in next 30 days. First action likely to be embargo on Taiwan followed by possible military intervention later in spring if coercive measures are not successful.

View: https://youtu.be/RYRNM1Hke5I

RT 52:14
China-Taiwan relevant material starts at about 20:50
FO is phenomenal with the info they give out. They usually don't give stuff this in-depth on you tube 1st unless it is pretty important, they are certainly NOT ones to do things just for views.

Thanks for posting this.
 

jward

passin' thru
Indo-Pacific News - Geo-Politics & Military News
@IndoPac_Info

1) Map of the area where a #Chinese Navy J-11 fighter jet came within 20 feet of US Air Force RC-135 aircraft, (Reuters at first said 10 feet-3 meters).
Map Via @SpeckleBelly64
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1608630421700608001?s=20


2) Video of the #Chinese Navy J-11 fighter jet that came within 20 feet of #US Air Force RC-135 aircraft.
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1608639162609209344?s=20
 

jward

passin' thru

U.S. warship sails through sensitive Taiwan Strait; China angered​


3 minute readJanuary 5, 20238:28 PM CSTLast Updated 10 hours ago

4–5 minutes



The USS Chung-Hoon passes the USS Arizona Memorial during ceremonies honoring the 73rd anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor at the World War II Valor in the Pacific National Monument in Honolulu, Hawaii.

[1/2] The USS Chung-Hoon passes the USS Arizona Memorial during ceremonies honoring the 73rd anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor at the World War II Valor in the Pacific National Monument in Honolulu, Hawaii December 7, 2014. REUTERS/Hugh Gentry/File Photo
WASHINGTON, Jan 5 (Reuters) - A U.S. warship sailed through the sensitive Taiwan Strait on Thursday, part of what the U.S. military calls routine activity but which has riled China.
In recent years, U.S. warships, and on occasion those from allied nations such as Britain and Canada, have sailed through the strait, drawing the ire of China, which claims Taiwan against the objections of its democratically elected government.
In a statement, the U.S. military said the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer Chung-Hoon carried out the transit.

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"Chung-Hoon’s transit through the Taiwan Strait demonstrates the United States’ commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific," the statement added.
In a statement, Liu Pengyu, spokesman for China's embassy in Washington, said China firmly opposed the move and urged the United States to "immediately stop provoking troubles, escalating tensions and undermining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait."

Latest Updates​

"U.S. warships frequently flex muscles in the name of exercising freedom of navigation. This is not about keeping the region free and open," the statement said.
"China will continue to stay on high alert and is ready to respond to all threats and provocations at any time, and will resolutely safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity."
A spokesman for the Eastern Theatre Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army said it organised troops to monitor and guard the ship's transit, and "all movements were under control".
Taiwan's Defense Ministry said the ship sailed in a northerly direction through the strait, that its forces had monitored its passage and observed nothing out of the ordinary.
The narrow Taiwan Strait has been a frequent source of military tension since the defeated Republic of China government fled to Taiwan in 1949 after losing a civil war with the communists, who established the People's Republic of China.
The United States has no formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but is bound by law to provide the island with the means to defend itself.
China has never ruled out using force to bring Taiwan under its control. Taiwan vows to defend itself if attacked, saying Beijing's sovereignty claims are void as the People's Republic of China has never governed the island.
A Chinese military plane came within 10 feet (3 m) of a U.S. air force aircraft in the contested South China Sea last month and forced it to take evasive maneuvers to avoid a collision in international airspace.
The close encounter followed what the United States has called a recent trend of increasingly dangerous behavior by Chinese military aircraft.

Register for free to Reuters and know the full story​

Reporting by Idrees Ali; Additional reporting by Yimou Lee in Taipei and Liz Lee in Beijing; Editing by Lisa Shumaker, Leslie Adler and Raju Gopalakrishnan
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-warship-sails-through-sensitive-taiwan-strait-2023-01-05/
 

jward

passin' thru

South Korea would play role in a Taiwan contingency​


Sungmin Cho​



South Korean and US Marines train jointly. The seven-decades bilateral securithy alliance is now being supplemented with an economic security alliance that raises serious challenges for Korean industry. Photo: AFP / Kim Jae-Hwan

As South Korea’s military has grown stronger, the United States now expects it to play a larger role in maintaining regional stability.
General Paul LaCamera, the commander of the US Forces Korea (USFK), stated that, “given the international reach of the South Korean military, opportunities are emerging for alliance cooperation beyond the Korean Peninsula.”
The former secretary of defense Mark Esper was more explicit. In the event of a contingency in the Taiwan Strait, he said, “certainly there would be a support role” for South Korea. “I would imagine coming off the Korean Peninsula to support any type of Taiwan scenario.”

Indeed, there are important precedents. South Korea provided military support for the US war efforts in Vietnam and Iraq, and its air force and navy could likewise be deployed to the Taiwan Strait to fight with the United States.
But South Korea’s military involvement would surely trigger China’s retaliation. China has shown the pattern of “killing the chicken to scare the monkey” when confronted with multiple players, as seen in the South China Sea.
South Korea is the chicken in this case. Chinese media publicly refer to the country as “the weakest link” of the US alliance system in East Asia. China’s missiles can easily reach South Korea’s bases, and the People’s Liberation Army Navy will block or attack South Korean naval vessels in the Yellow Sea even before they sail to the Taiwan Strait.
North Korea is also likely to exploit the situation because the US focus would be distracted if conflict were to occur in the Taiwan Strait. Such an event would create an opportunity for North Korea to speed up its advancement in missile and nuclear capabilities.

North Korea’s concurrent military provocations may also help China divide the US military assets between the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula.
Map highlighting proximity of South Korea and Taiwan: Wikipedia
Pyongyang already has begun to comment on the Taiwan issue. For example, Kim Jong Un sent “a letter of solidarity” to Beijing after US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. This is North Korea’s strategic signaling of potential support for China in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Perhaps for these reasons, the South Korean government has been cautious in clarifying its potential role in a Taiwan contingency.

During the summit with President Joe Biden in May 2022, President Yoon Suk-yeol agreed to insert “the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” in the joint statement. But President Yoon did not meet with Speaker Pelosi when she visited South Korea after her trip to Taiwan.

Likewise, while South Korea’s minister of defense and the US secretary of defense reaffirmed the importance of peace in the Taiwan Strait in December 2021, South Korea’s vice defense minister revealed that there had been no discussion between the two governments about South Korea’s role in a Taiwan contingency.
Surprisingly, the South Korean people are ready to support South Korea’s positive contribution to the defense of Taiwan.
According to a survey conducted by the Seoul daily Joong-Ang Ilbo and the East Asia Institute in August, only 18% of respondents opposed any involvement of South Korea in a Taiwan contingency, while 22.5% said they would support its participation in the joint military operation with the US forces.
In the same survey, 42% responded that South Korea’s military role should be limited to providing rear-area support for US forces. Overall, 64.5% of South Korean respondents agreed that South Korea should provide direct or indirect support for US military operations in a Taiwan contingency.
In sum, South Korea is most likely to provide indirect support for the US forces in a Taiwan contingency. The USFK commander has hinted that the contingency planning for the forces’ involvement in the Taiwan Strait is under development.

Due to China’s potential retaliation and North Korea’s opportunistic provocations on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea’s direct involvement in combat operations would most likely create two fronts of crises.
Therefore, in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, South Korea’s primary focus should be to deter North Korea’s aggression while providing rear-area support for US operations – for example, through base access, provision of ammunitions, noncombatant evacuation and noncombat operations such as maintenance of weapon systems and augmentation of US reconnaissance capabilities.
Camp Humphreys, 50 miles south of Seoul, is the largest overseas US military base. Photo: US Army
Critics may argue that the diversification of the USFK’s role to the region beyond the Korean Peninsula is concerning, given North Korea’s military threats and improvement in missile and nuclear capabilities. But they need to acknowledge the new reality that the United States and South Korea must be prepared for multiple contingencies in different locations.

The need to discuss the division of labor between allies should not be misconstrued as a “decoupling” of the alliance. In this context, regardless of the real probability of China’s invasion of Taiwan, the issue is already a matter of alliance management between the United States and South Korea.
Sungmin Cho is a Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). The views in this commentary are his own and do not represent those of the APCSS or the US Department of Defense.
This article was originally published by the National Bureau of Asian Research. Asia Times is republishing it with permission.


 

jward

passin' thru
https://twitter.com/alert5
Alert 5
@alert5


Seven people in Taiwan have been detained on suspicion of spying for China at the Kaohsiung Branch of the Taiwan High Prosecutors Office. The group includes a retired Air Force Colonel and three active military officers in the Air Force and Navy.
The investigation into the case is ongoing and it is believed that the retired colonel, Liu, recruited at least six other officers into his spy ring and received payments from the Chinese through a shell company.

Taiwan air force and navy officers detained on suspicion of spying for China​






Seven people in Taiwan have been detained on suspicion of spying for China at the Kaohsiung Branch of the Taiwan High Prosecutors Office. The group includes a retired Air Force Colonel and three active military officers in the Air Force and Navy.


Three other three active officers have been released on bail.
The investigation into the case is ongoing and it is believed that the retired colonel, Liu, recruited at least six other officers into his spy ring and received payments from the Chinese through a shell company. The Taiwan Ministry of National Defense has stated that the case was exposed through tip-offs from military personnel and that it will cooperate with prosecutors in their investigation.
Liu was recruited by the Chinese after retiring from the Air Force in 2013. He was then alleged to have used his personnel connections in the military to recruit other active military officers in the Navy and Air Force to join in the spying activities. The investigation into the case is ongoing.
For more information, hit the Source below
 

jward

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China carries out combat drills around Taiwan again​


2 minute readJanuary 8, 2023
7:36 PM CST
Last Updated an hour ago​


BEIJING, Jan 9 (Reuters) - China's military said it had carried out combat drills around Taiwan on Sunday, the second such exercises in less than a month, with the island's defence ministry reporting it detected 57 Chinese aircraft.
China views democratically-governed Taiwan as its own territory and has been ramping up military, political and economic pressure to assert those claims.
The People's Liberation Army's Eastern Theatre Command said in a statement late on Sunday that its forces had organised "joint combat readiness patrols and actual combat drills" in the sea and airspace around Taiwan, focused on land strikes and sea assaults.

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The aim of the exercises was to test joint combat capabilities and "resolutely counter the provocative actions of external forces and Taiwan independence separatist forces", it added in a brief statement.
Taiwan's defence ministry said on Monday that over the previous 24 hours it had detected 57 Chinese aircraft and four naval vessels operating around the island, including 28 aircraft which flew into Taiwan's air defence zone.

Latest Updates​

Some of those 28 crossed the Taiwan Strait median line, an unofficial buffer between the two sides, including Su-30 and J-16 fighters, while two nuclear-capable H-6 bombers flew to the south of Taiwan, according to a ministry provided map.
China carried out similar exercises late last month, with Taiwan reporting that 43 Chinese aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait's median line.

China, which has never renounced the use of force to bring the island under its control, has been carrying out regular military incursions into the waters and air space near Taiwan over the past three years.
China carried out war games around Taiwan last August following a visit to Taipei by the then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.

Taiwan strongly rejects Beijing's sovereignty claims, saying only the island's 23 million people can decide their future.
Beijing has been particularly angered by U.S. support for Taiwan, including weapons sales.
The United States, like most countries, has no formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan but is the island's most important arms supplier and internationally backer.

Register for free to Reuters and know the full story​

Reporting by Beijing newsroom; Writing by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Himani Sarkar and Lincoln Feast
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
 

jward

passin' thru
國防部 Ministry of National Defense, R.O.C.
@MoNDefense
1h

57 PLA aircraft and 4 PLAN vessels around Taiwan were detected by 6 a.m.(UTC+8) today. R.O.C. Armed Forces have monitored the situation and tasked CAP aircraft, Navy vessels, and land-based missile systems to respond these activities.
28 of the detected aircraft(BZK-005 UAV RECCC*3, J-11*6, SU-30*2, J-10*2, J-16*12, H-6*2, and KJ-500)had crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ, flight paths as illustrated.
(Another PLAAF attack training pattern.?)
View: https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1612257576540082182?s=20
 

danielboon

TB Fanatic

War game suggests Chinese invasion of Taiwan would fail at a huge cost to US, Chinese and Taiwanese militaries​

Brad Lendon Oren Liebermann
By Brad Lendon and Oren Liebermann, CNN
Updated 6:45 AM EST, Mon January 9, 2023











CNN —
A Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2026 would result in thousands of casualties among Chinese, United States, Taiwanese and Japanese forces, and it would be unlikely to result in a victory for Beijing, according to a prominent independent Washington think tank, which conducted war game simulations of a possible conflict that is preoccupying military and political leaders in Asia and Washington.
A war over Taiwan could leave a victorious US military in as crippled a state as the Chinese forces it defeated.
At the end of the conflict, at least two US aircraft carriers would lie at the bottom of the Pacific and China’s modern navy, which is the largest in the world, would be in “shambles.”
Those are among the conclusions the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), made after running what it claims is one of the most extensive war-game simulations ever conducted on a possible conflict over Taiwan, the democratically ruled island of 24 million that the Chinese Communist Party claims as part of its sovereign territory despite never having controlled it.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping has refused to rule out the use of military force to bring the island under Beijing’s control.
J-10 fighter jets of Chinese air force's August 1 Aerobatic Team perform during the 2022 Airshow on November 10, 2022 in Zhuhai, Guangdong province of China.

China carries out military exercises near Taiwan and Japan, sending 47 aircraft across Taiwan Strait in 'strike drill'

CNN reviewed an advance copy of the report – titled “The First Battle of the Next War” – on the two dozen war scenarios run by CSIS, which said the project was necessary because previous government and private war simulations have been too narrow or too opaque to give the public and policymakers a true look at how conflict across the Taiwan Strait might play out.
“There’s no unclassified war game out there looking at the US-China conflict,” said Mark Cancian, one of the three project leaders and a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Of the games that are unclassified, they’re usually only done once or twice.”
CSIS ran this war game 24 times to answer two fundamental questions: would the invasion succeed and at what cost?
The likely answers to those two questions are no and enormous, the CSIS report said.
“The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of service members. Such losses would damage the US global position for many years,” the report said. In most scenarios, the US Navy lost two aircraft carriers and 10 to 20 large surface combatants. Approximately 3,200 US troops would be killed in three weeks of combat, nearly half of what the US lost in two decades of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.
“China also suffers heavily. Its navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and tens of thousands of soldiers are prisoners of war,” it said. The report estimated China would suffer about 10,000 troops killed and lose 155 combat aircraft and 138 major ships.












Taiwan would be devastated​

The scenarios paint a bleak future for Taiwan, even if a Chinese invasion doesn’t succeed.
“While Taiwan’s military is unbroken, it is severely degraded and left to defend a damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic services,” the report. The island’s army would suffer about 3,500 casualties, and all 26 destroyers and frigates in its navy will be sunk, the report said.
Japan is likely to lose more than 100 combat aircraft and 26 warships while US military bases on its home territory come under Chinese attack, the report found.
But CSIS said it did not want its report to imply a war over Taiwan “is inevitable or even probable.”
“The Chinese leadership might adopt a strategy of diplomatic isolation, gray zone pressure, or economic coercion against Taiwan,” it said.
Taiwanese flags during the National Day celebration in Keelung, Taiwan, on Monday, October 10, 2022.

Biden administration approves $180 million arms sale to Taiwan

Dan Grazier, a senior defense policy fellow at the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), sees an outright Chinese invasion of Taiwan as extremely unlikely. Such a military operation would immediately disrupt the imports and exports upon which the Chinese economy relies for its very survival, Grazier told CNN, and interrupting this trade risks the collapse of the Chinese economy in short order. China relies on imports of food and fuel to drive their economic engine, Grazier said, and they have little room to maneuver.
“The Chinese are going to do everything they can in my estimation to avoid a military conflict with anybody,” Grazier said. To challenge the United States for global dominance, they’ll use industrial and economic power instead of military force.
But Pentagon leaders have labeled China as America’s “pacing threat,” and last year’s China Military Power report mandated by Congress said “the PLA increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include increased flights into Taiwan’s claimed air defense identification zone and conducting exercises focused on the potential seizure of one of Taiwan’s outlying islands.”
In August, the visit of then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to the island prompted a wide-ranging display of PLA military might, which included sending missiles over the island as well as into the waters of Japan’s exclusive economic zone.












China increasing military pressure​

Since then, Beijing has stepped up aggressive military pressure tactics on the island, sending fighter jets across the median line of the Taiwan Strait, the body of water separating Taiwan and China and into the island’s air defense identification zone – a buffer of airspace commonly referred to as an ADIZ.
And speaking about Taiwan at the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress in October, Chinese leader Xi Jinping won large applause when he said China would “strive for peaceful reunification” — but then gave a grim warning, saying “we will never promise to renounce the use of force and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.”
The Biden administration has been steadfast in its support for the island as provided by the Taiwan Relations Act, which said Washington will provide the island with the means to defend itself without committing US troops to that defense.
Taiwan flags are seen at the Ministry of National Defence in Taipei, Taiwan, December 26, 2022.

Taiwan extends mandatory military service period to counter China threat

The recently signed National Defense Authorization Act commits the US to a program to modernize Taiwan’s military and provides for $10 billion of security assistance over five years, a strong sign of long-term bipartisan support for the island.
Biden, however, has said more than once that US military personnel would defend Taiwan if the Chinese military were to launch an invasion, even as the Pentagon has insisted there is no change in Washington’s “One China” policy.
Under the “One China” policy, the US acknowledges China’s position that Taiwan is part of China, but has never officially recognized Beijing’s claim to the self-governing island.
“Wars happen even when objective analysis might indicate that the attacker might not be successful,” said Cancian.
The CSIS report said for US troops to prevent China from ultimately taking control of Taiwan, there were four constants that emerged among the 24 war game iterations it ran:
Taiwan’s ground forces must be able to contain Chinese beachheads; the US must be able to use its bases in Japan for combat operations; the US must have long-range anti-ship missiles to hit the PLA Navy from afar and “en masse”; and the US needs to fully arm Taiwan before shooting starts and jump into any conflict with its own forces immediately.












No ‘Ukraine model’ for Taiwan​

“There is no ‘Ukraine model’ for Taiwan,” the report said, referring to how US and Western aid slowly trickled in to Ukraine well after Russia’s invasion of its neighbor started and no US or NATO troops are actively fighting against Russia.
“Once the war begins, it’s impossible to get any troops or supplies onto Taiwan, so it’s a very different situation from Ukraine where the United States and its allies have been able to send supplies continuously to Ukraine,” said Cancian. “Whatever the Taiwanese are going to fight the war with, they have to have that when the war begins.”
Washington will need to begin acting soon if it’s to meet some of the CSIS recommendations for success in a Taiwan conflict, the think tank said.
Those include, fortifying US bases in Japan and Guam against Chinese missile attacks; moving its naval forces to smaller and more survivable ships; prioritizing submarines; prioritizing sustainable bomber forces over fighter forces; but producing more cheaper fighters; and pushing Taiwan toward a similar strategy, arming itself with more simple weapons platforms rather than expensive ships that are unlikely to survive a Chinese first strike.
Those policies would make winning less costly for the US military, but the toll would still be high, the CSIS report said.
“The United States might win a pyrrhic victory, suffering more in the long run than the ‘defeated’ Chinese.”
“Victory is not everything,” the report said. https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/taiwan-invasion-war-game-intl-hnk-ml/index.html
 

jward

passin' thru

Taiwan calls on Germany to help maintain 'regional order'​


2 minute read
January 9, 2023
10:18 PM CST
Last Updated an hour ago​



TAIPEI, Jan 10 (Reuters) - Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen called on Germany on Tuesday to help maintain "regional order" during a meeting with senior German lawmakers who are visiting the island on a trip that Beijing has condemned.
Taiwan, which China claims as its own territory, has been heartened by support from Western democratic allies in the face of stepped-up Chinese military threats, including war games staged by China near the island in August.
Meeting the lawmakers at the presidential office, Tsai said that in the face of "authoritarian expansionism", democracies must stand together.

"Starting next year, Taiwan's mandatory military service will be extended to one year. This will bolster our defence capabilities and demonstrate our determination to defend our homeland and safeguard democracy," she said, referring to an announcement last month.

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"We look forward to Taiwan, Germany and other democratic partners jointly maintaining the regional order and prosperity."
While Germany, like most countries, has no formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, Berlin is working on a new strategy taking a more sober look at its relations with China and aiming to reduce its dependence on Asia's economic superpower.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, the head of Germany's parliamentary defence committee and a member of Chancellor Olaf Scholz's junior coalition partner Free Democrats (FDP), told Tsai that Germany and Taiwan are friends.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine was a wake up call for the whole world, Strack-Zimmermann said.
"That's the reason why we come to your country, to your wonderful island, to say (to) the world that we stand close together as democratic states," she added.

China has expressed anger at the trip, with its foreign ministry on Monday alluding to Germany's World War Two past.
"We want to point out that the root cause of the Taiwan issue stems precisely from the law of the jungle, hegemony, colonialism and militarism that were once rampant in the world. China was deeply impacted by that. Germany has a deep and tragic historical lesson in that," Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said.
Taiwan rejects China's sovereignty claims, saying only the island's 23 million people can decide their future.

Register for free to Reuters and know the full story​

Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Additional reporting by Yew Lun Tian in Beijing; Editing by Neil Fullick
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
 

Abert

Veteran Member

War game suggests Chinese invasion of Taiwan would fail at a huge cost to US, Chinese and Taiwanese militaries​

Brad Lendon Oren Liebermann
By Brad Lendon and Oren Liebermann, CNN
Updated 6:45 AM EST, Mon January 9, 2023











CNN —
A Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2026 would result in thousands of casualties among Chinese, United States, Taiwanese and Japanese forces, and it would be unlikely to result in a victory for Beijing, according to a prominent independent Washington think tank, which conducted war game simulations of a possible conflict that is preoccupying military and political leaders in Asia and Washington.
A war over Taiwan could leave a victorious US military in as crippled a state as the Chinese forces it defeated.
At the end of the conflict, at least two US aircraft carriers would lie at the bottom of the Pacific and China’s modern navy, which is the largest in the world, would be in “shambles.”
Those are among the conclusions the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), made after running what it claims is one of the most extensive war-game simulations ever conducted on a possible conflict over Taiwan, the democratically ruled island of 24 million that the Chinese Communist Party claims as part of its sovereign territory despite never having controlled it.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping has refused to rule out the use of military force to bring the island under Beijing’s control.
J-10 fighter jets of Chinese air force's August 1 Aerobatic Team perform during the 2022 Airshow on November 10, 2022 in Zhuhai, Guangdong province of China. 's August 1 Aerobatic Team perform during the 2022 Airshow on November 10, 2022 in Zhuhai, Guangdong province of China.
China carries out military exercises near Taiwan and Japan, sending 47 aircraft across Taiwan Strait in 'strike drill'
CNN reviewed an advance copy of the report – titled “The First Battle of the Next War” – on the two dozen war scenarios run by CSIS, which said the project was necessary because previous government and private war simulations have been too narrow or too opaque to give the public and policymakers a true look at how conflict across the Taiwan Strait might play out.
“There’s no unclassified war game out there looking at the US-China conflict,” said Mark Cancian, one of the three project leaders and a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Of the games that are unclassified, they’re usually only done once or twice.”
CSIS ran this war game 24 times to answer two fundamental questions: would the invasion succeed and at what cost?
The likely answers to those two questions are no and enormous, the CSIS report said.
“The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of service members. Such losses would damage the US global position for many years,” the report said. In most scenarios, the US Navy lost two aircraft carriers and 10 to 20 large surface combatants. Approximately 3,200 US troops would be killed in three weeks of combat, nearly half of what the US lost in two decades of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.
“China also suffers heavily. Its navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and tens of thousands of soldiers are prisoners of war,” it said. The report estimated China would suffer about 10,000 troops killed and lose 155 combat aircraft and 138 major ships.












Taiwan would be devastated​

The scenarios paint a bleak future for Taiwan, even if a Chinese invasion doesn’t succeed.
“While Taiwan’s military is unbroken, it is severely degraded and left to defend a damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic services,” the report. The island’s army would suffer about 3,500 casualties, and all 26 destroyers and frigates in its navy will be sunk, the report said.
Japan is likely to lose more than 100 combat aircraft and 26 warships while US military bases on its home territory come under Chinese attack, the report found.
But CSIS said it did not want its report to imply a war over Taiwan “is inevitable or even probable.”
“The Chinese leadership might adopt a strategy of diplomatic isolation, gray zone pressure, or economic coercion against Taiwan,” it said.
Taiwanese flags during the National Day celebration in Keelung, Taiwan, on Monday, October 10, 2022.
Biden administration approves $180 million arms sale to Taiwan
Dan Grazier, a senior defense policy fellow at the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), sees an outright Chinese invasion of Taiwan as extremely unlikely. Such a military operation would immediately disrupt the imports and exports upon which the Chinese economy relies for its very survival, Grazier told CNN, and interrupting this trade risks the collapse of the Chinese economy in short order. China relies on imports of food and fuel to drive their economic engine, Grazier said, and they have little room to maneuver.
“The Chinese are going to do everything they can in my estimation to avoid a military conflict with anybody,” Grazier said. To challenge the United States for global dominance, they’ll use industrial and economic power instead of military force.
But Pentagon leaders have labeled China as America’s “pacing threat,” and last year’s China Military Power report mandated by Congress said “the PLA increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include increased flights into Taiwan’s claimed air defense identification zone and conducting exercises focused on the potential seizure of one of Taiwan’s outlying islands.”
In August, the visit of then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to the island prompted a wide-ranging display of PLA military might, which included sending missiles over the island as well as into the waters of Japan’s exclusive economic zone.












China increasing military pressure​

Since then, Beijing has stepped up aggressive military pressure tactics on the island, sending fighter jets across the median line of the Taiwan Strait, the body of water separating Taiwan and China and into the island’s air defense identification zone – a buffer of airspace commonly referred to as an ADIZ.
And speaking about Taiwan at the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress in October, Chinese leader Xi Jinping won large applause when he said China would “strive for peaceful reunification” — but then gave a grim warning, saying “we will never promise to renounce the use of force and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.”
The Biden administration has been steadfast in its support for the island as provided by the Taiwan Relations Act, which said Washington will provide the island with the means to defend itself without committing US troops to that defense.
Taiwan flags are seen at the Ministry of National Defence in Taipei, Taiwan, December 26, 2022.
Taiwan extends mandatory military service period to counter China threat
The recently signed National Defense Authorization Act commits the US to a program to modernize Taiwan’s military and provides for $10 billion of security assistance over five years, a strong sign of long-term bipartisan support for the island.
Biden, however, has said more than once that US military personnel would defend Taiwan if the Chinese military were to launch an invasion, even as the Pentagon has insisted there is no change in Washington’s “One China” policy.
Under the “One China” policy, the US acknowledges China’s position that Taiwan is part of China, but has never officially recognized Beijing’s claim to the self-governing island.
“Wars happen even when objective analysis might indicate that the attacker might not be successful,” said Cancian.
The CSIS report said for US troops to prevent China from ultimately taking control of Taiwan, there were four constants that emerged among the 24 war game iterations it ran:
Taiwan’s ground forces must be able to contain Chinese beachheads; the US must be able to use its bases in Japan for combat operations; the US must have long-range anti-ship missiles to hit the PLA Navy from afar and “en masse”; and the US needs to fully arm Taiwan before shooting starts and jump into any conflict with its own forces immediately.












No ‘Ukraine model’ for Taiwan​

“There is no ‘Ukraine model’ for Taiwan,” the report said, referring to how US and Western aid slowly trickled in to Ukraine well after Russia’s invasion of its neighbor started and no US or NATO troops are actively fighting against Russia.
“Once the war begins, it’s impossible to get any troops or supplies onto Taiwan, so it’s a very different situation from Ukraine where the United States and its allies have been able to send supplies continuously to Ukraine,” said Cancian. “Whatever the Taiwanese are going to fight the war with, they have to have that when the war begins.”
Washington will need to begin acting soon if it’s to meet some of the CSIS recommendations for success in a Taiwan conflict, the think tank said.
Those include, fortifying US bases in Japan and Guam against Chinese missile attacks; moving its naval forces to smaller and more survivable ships; prioritizing submarines; prioritizing sustainable bomber forces over fighter forces; but producing more cheaper fighters; and pushing Taiwan toward a similar strategy, arming itself with more simple weapons platforms rather than expensive ships that are unlikely to survive a Chinese first strike.
Those policies would make winning less costly for the US military, but the toll would still be high, the CSIS report said.
“The United States might win a pyrrhic victory, suffering more in the long run than the ‘defeated’ Chinese.”
“Victory is not everything,” the report said. https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/taiwan-invasion-war-game-intl-hnk-ml/index.html
So - The same "Experts" that claim Ukraine is Winning - Predict Taiwan & the US would defeat China
 
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