WAR 07-11-2020-to-07-17-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Army Says Long Range Missiles Will Help Air Force, Not Compete
The military services are working together on how to use long-range, land-based missiles to destroy enemy anti-aircraft defenses, says the director of artillery modernization at Army Futures Command.

By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. on July 16, 2020 at 4:15 PM

WASHINGTON: “The services are unified by the pacing threat,” Army Brig. Gen. John Rafferty told me, dismissing reports of service rivalries over land-based missiles.


Last week, retired Air Force three-star Dave Deptula denounced the Army’s drive to develop long-range missiles as “ridiculous,” a costly and redundant bid for a mission that he said aircraft do much better. This week, the Army officer overseeing those missile programs, Brig. Gen. Rafferty, reached out to Breaking Defense to offer a rebuttal.


Army Futures Command’s director of Long Range Precision Fires said he doesn’t see the “infighting between services over roles and missions” described in a recent Breaking Defense article. To the contrary, Rafferty’s team is looking for new ways to “work together, from a command & control and a targeting standpoint, with the Navy and the Air Force,” he said. “That’s coming in our experimentation, [which] really begins to pick up speed in the fall and into in ’21 and ’22.”



The Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines all recognize that:


  • Russia and China are investing heavily in layered anti-aircraft and anti-ship defenses – known as Anti-Access/Area Denial – and
  • “We need a comprehensive approach to take this down,” Rafferty said. “The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” That means a mix of subsonic, supersonic, and hypersonic weapons, land-based and air-dropped and submarine-launched, manned and unmanned, all striking the enemy from different ranges, altitudes, launch sites, and speeds.
Army-operated land-based missiles, especially with the new radar-seeking sensors now in testing, can target enemy radars, command posts, and surface-to-surface missile launchers. If the Army missiles get shot down, well, at least nobody died. If they strike home, the resulting damage to enemy air defenses will reduce the risk to the other services’ pilots. Having that option adds a lot to the joint effort, Rafferty said, for a relatively modest cost.

“We’re not investing enormous force structure up front into these things,” said Rafferty. Of the Long-Range Precision Fires projects that the Army is pursuing, Extended Range Cannon Artillery is upgrading existing Paladin howitzers; the Precision Strike Missile will be fired by existing Army rocket launchers (HIMARS and MLRS); the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon will enter service as a single battery of four launcher trucks and eight prototype missiles in 2023; and the Strategic Long-Range Cannon is still experimental.


“We’re pretty modest in our goals for quantities,” he said, “recognizing [both] cost [and] the effect that can be gained by a small unit of these — in the context of a joint force, not in and of themselves.”





Deptula vs. Artillery


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Deptula “mischaracterizes” the situation between the services,” Rafferty said. “There’s always going to be competition for resources, but I don’t think this one is about roles and missions.”


The Army is not trying to challenge the division of labor laid down at the famous 1948 meeting in Key West, Fla. between the chiefs of the Army, Navy and the newly-independent Air Force. There’s plenty of precedent within that framework for the Army to have surface-launched missiles that can fire one thousand miles or more, Rafferty said.

“I don’t think we need to go back to Key West, although I wouldn’t mind a trip there to discuss it,” Rafferty told me. “The Army had the Pershing missile during our lifetimes, and it played a key role in great-power competition.”


Back in the 1980s, the competition was against the Soviet Union, and it was dominated by nuclear weapons like the Pershing II. These days, the military competition with Russia, China, and co. is driven largely by advances in long-range precision-guided weapons, the satellite and airborne sensors that find targets for them, and the computer networks that pass data from “sensor to shooter.”


Wikimedia Commons

US Army Pershing II ballistic missiles, later banned by the 1987 INF Treaty.

The Pentagon wants to build a unified mega-network for Joint All Domain Command & Control (JADC2) that can link any sensor to any shooter across land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. But the current reality is that each service has its own networks – often, multiple networks – that often connect only via one-off technical kludges or cumbersome manual work-arounds.


All the services are “unified by the idea that we have to improve our sensor to shooter timelines in order to fight and win in the future, and that’s proving to be a pretty powerful shared motivation,” Rafferty said. “For years we have been exploring — I refer to them sometimes as trick shots: lots of little sensor to shooter exercises that explore different ways that we can do things more quickly.”


“We can do this,” Rafferty said. The challenge is scaling up from “trick shots” to a large-scale war. There’s already a worldwide system of satellite and aerial surveillance – largely created by the Air Force – that the Army just needs to tap into, he said, rather than expensively recreate.


But why buy new Army land-based missiles when we already have thousands of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps strike planes, plus Tomahawk cruise missiles launched by Navy surface warships and submarines?


Army photo

An Army HIMARS launcher fires Lockheed’s prototype Precision Strike Missile for the first time in December, 2019.

Army Advantages


At the most basic level, Army artillery units do things differently from naval vessels or air squadrons, so they add another problem for an enemy to solve. In some cases, land-based missiles have advantages over air- or sea-launched ones.


Concealability is one such. While aircraft and even surface warships can be designed with stealth features to hide from radar, they’re never invisible, and there’s nothing at sea or in the air to hide behind. Airbases, meanwhile, are notoriously large and static targets. But for artillery units, camouflage can be as cheap and simple as slapping on a coat of green paint, erecting some netting with tree branches on top, or driving into a tunnel. Indeed, as North Korea has shown, a wheeled missile launcher under a mountain is even harder to find than a submarine under the ocean. (Of course the enemy has to roll that artillery into the open to use it.)


The US and its allies, for all their surveillance technology, struggled to find Saddam’s SCUD missile launchers in 1991 and 2003, Rafferty notes. And that was in the open desert, not the more varied terrain of Eastern Europe or Pacific islands. Even the largest artillery systems the Army is developing, the semitrailer-mounted Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon and the Strategic Long-Range Cannon supergun, will still be small enough to conceal, he said.


Range is another. While most military aircraft can refuel in mid-air, extending flight indefinitely, the fuel tankers are lumbering and unstealthy aircraft too vulnerable to fly close to Russian or Chinese-style air defenses. Without refueling, the Air Force’s handful of strategic bombers can still fly thousands of miles, but the vast majority of US strike aircraft are fighters – F-15s, F-16s, F-18s, and the new stealthy F-35s – with ranges in the hundreds of miles. The Army expects both the LRHW missile and the SLRC supergun – whose shells are rocket-propelled and precision-guided – to hit targets over a thousand miles away. Sure, an enemy like Russia or China can still shoot back at such ranges, but they have far fewer (and more expensive) options for thousand-mile shots than for shooting down US aircraft heading towards their territory.


A third potential advantage is complexity. It’s much simpler to launch a missile off the back of a truck than from an aircraft, surface ship, or submarine, and that can make land-based systems cheaper and quicker to develop. The Army’s prototype hypersonic missile, for instance, is set to enter service a year before the Navy integrates their version of the same design into submarine launch tubes, while air-launched weapons seem even further out.


“[With] the surface to surface variant of a hypersonic system.. the Army can get there fastest [and] buy time for the other services to develop similar capabilities,” Rafferty said. “It is somewhat of a race, but not in between the services. The race is against a pacing threat… This is a great power competition.”
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
I don't know what it is but I'm impressed:

View attachment 208873

It's a Carl Gustaf 84 mm recoilless rifle....

Posted for fair use.....

Carl-Gustaf M4 Multi-Role Weapon System
Carl-Gustaf M4 (CGM4) is a man-portable, shoulder-launched weapon system designed and developed by Swedish defence and security firm Saab to meet a wide range of modern combat needs of infantry forces.

The next-generation multi-role weapon system can be deployed in anti-insurgency / peacekeeping missions and traditional force-on-force conflicts in urban or complex combat environmental conditions.

It is used to destroy armoured tanks with add-on armour protection, to neutralise landing craft and bunkers and to clear obstacles. It is also used to engage enemies in buildings.

The artillery system was launched at the 2014 Association of the US Army (AUSA) annual meeting and exposition held in Washington DC. It is known as the M3A1 Multi-Role Anti-Armor Anti-Personnel Weapon System (MAAWS) in the US.

Slovakia became the first country to deploy the system, following deliveries made in July 2017.
Carl-Gustaf M4 weapon system development

The Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) is a combat-proven, laser-guided 70mm rocket system designed and manufactured by BAE Systems in collaboration with the US Government.

The Carl-Gustaf M4 weapon system is an advanced derivative of the Carl-Gustaf M3 multipurpose, shoulder-fired recoilless weapon.

Saab conducted a live-fire demonstration of the Carl-Gustaf M4 artillery system at its Bofors Test Center in Karlskoga, Sweden, in September 2014. The system performed a comprehensive series of successful firings against fixed and moving targets during the ground combat systems demonstration.

Customers are offered sub-calibre trainers and full-calibre practice rounds, as well as simulators, to meet their training needs.
Design and features of the multi-role weapon system

The CGM4 features a lightweight, flexible design incorporating titanium-made components and improved carbon fibre wrapping. The recoilless rifle offers enhanced agility and tactical flexibility, allowing military forces to engage multiple tactical targets.

It has a length of less than 1,000mm and weighs less than 7kg, making it easy to carry. A crew of two, including a gunner and a loader, can operate the system.

The weapon system features improved ergonomics and is equipped with an adjustable shoulder rest and front grip. It is also fitted with an integrated shot counter for enhanced logistics and maintenance, and is provided with dual-mode safety features.
Sighting systems

The Carl-Gustaf M4 artillery system is attached with standard clip-on telescopic sight on a picatinny rail, allowing users to install thermal sights or image intensifiers for night-time combat.

Additional sighting systems, including open sight, red dot and intelligent sights, can be optionally mounted based on specific needs of the customer.
Ammunition

The Carl-Gustaf M4 is flexible, with a wide range of existing and future ammunition types, including anti-armour, anti-structure, multi-role, anti-personnel, and support rounds such as smoke and illumination.

It is also compatible with programmable ammunition to provide dismounted soldiers with advanced capability.
Carl-Gustaf weapon system

Carl-Gustaf weapon systems are in service with more than 40 countries. The launch variant Carl-Gustaf M1 entered service in 1948, whereas the second variant Carl-Gustaf M2 became operational in 1964.

Also referred to as MAAWS in the US, the third variant Carl-Gustaf M3 has been in service with the US Army Rangers and US Special Operations Force since 1991. The 1,065m-long, 10kg system features airburst capability and is compatible with various types of ammunition.
Orders and deliveries of Carl-Gustaf M4 weapon system

Saab secured a contract from the launch customer, Slovak Republic in September 2015, for the supply Carl-Gustaf M4 system.

Saab signed a contract with the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to deliver ammunition for MAAWS in October 2015.

In January 2016, Saab secured a contract worth approximately $164m (Skr1.4bn) to supply ammunition for the Carl-Gustaf weapon system to an undisclosed customer. A $14.5m (Skr122m) contract was awarded by the Swedish Defence Material Administration (FMV) in August the same year for the supply of Carl-Gustaf M4 ammunition.

The fourth contract for the Carl-Gustaf M4 weapon system was placed from an undisclosed customer in December 2016.

The FMV signed a framework agreement with Saab in April 2018 to purchase the Carl-Gustaf ammunition for the Swedish Armed Forces for a base period of three years with a four-year extension option. Orders were placed in May 2018.

Saab received an order worth $16m (Skr135m) from the US Department of Defense (DoD) for the Carl-Gustaf ammunition in June 2018.

The company also received an order valued $12.7m (Skr110m) from the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency (NDMA) in the same month, under framework agreement signed by the NDMA in September 2017.

The Estonian Centre for Defence Investment placed a Carl-Gustaf ammunition order worth $20.8m (Skr186m) in July 2018, under the framework agreement signed by the FMV.
Australian Army placed orders for the supply of undisclosed number of Carl-Gustaf M4 systems in September 2018.

The Latvian Ministry of Defense awarded a $21.12m (Skr170m) order for Carl-Gustaf ammunition in October 2018.

A month later, Saab was awarded an order to deliver Carl-Gustaf M4 weapon systems to the Slovenian Armed Forces.

Saab received orders for the delivery of Carl-Gustaf M4 worth $54.32m (Skr492m) from an undisclosed customer in December 2018.

The US DoD placed $16m (Skr145m) orders from the US DoD for the supply of Carl-Gustaf ammunition in January 2019. A month later, the US Army and Saab entered an agreement worth $19m (Skr170m) for the delivery of Carl-Gustaf M4 weapon systems.

The Australian Army placed orders worth $18m (Skr168m) for Carl-Gustaf ammunition in April 2019.
 

jward

passin' thru
China’s growing power in Central Asia & Middle East: Challenge for the US
China and Russia are complimenting each other in Central Asia and China's growing power across Middle East is reducing US influence in the region. This may explain shrill US criticism against China but will that prevent the rise of Chinese dragon? Examines Shane Quinn, a British Analyst. Interesting! Informative!

Shane Quinn
-
July 13, 2020
China Middle East









China’s increasing presence on the international scene is an undeniable threat to the US-led world order. Critical to China’s emergence as a major power this century, has been its widening influence in the Central Asian states.
Central Asia, rich in mineral reserves, is among the earth’s most strategically important regions. Control over Central Asia ensures access to raw materials such as oil or gas, while it stands as a “guardpost” against US hegemony over the Persian Gulf further south.

Considerably bigger in size than India, Central Asia consists of five nations, by far the largest is Kazakhstan followed by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Central Asia remains sparsely populated with just over 70 million people in total; this is mainly because 60% of its land mass comprises of desert terrain; yet it is studded also with little known, towering peaks and vast, treeless steppes.
Central Asia is bordered by Russia and China to the north and east; to the west lies the Caucasus and Caspian Sea; while the energy laden Middle East is not far to the south-west.

Central Asia: China & Russia enter, US Exits
Then US Secretary of State Colin Powell had said as early as February 2002, “America will have a continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of a kind that we could not have dreamed of before [9/11]”. However, the dream that Powell spoke of regarding Central Asia ended six years ago.
Read more: Corona virus in Middle East is at ‘critical threshold’: WHO

In July 2014, the Pentagon was compelled to leave its last remaining Central Asian base in Kyrgyzstan – which US forces were utilising for over 12 years – after the Kyrgyz parliament voted in favour of evicting US forces.

Iran and China have quietly drafted a sweeping economic and security partnership that would vastly extend China’s influence in the Middle East, throwing Iran an economic lifeline and creating new flash points with the U.S.Defying U.S., China and Iran Near Trade and Military Partnership
FIEDMC | Making Tracks of Success
https://www.globalvillagespace.com?bsa_pro_id=77&bsa_pro_url=1
— The New York Times (@nytimes) July 11, 2020





In December 2001 the American military had taken over the Manas Air Base in northern Kyrgyzstan, located near the capital Bishkek, in order to assist operations in the war it was waging in Afghanistan a few hundreds miles south.

The Kyrgyzstani government preferred instead pursuing closer relations with Russia and China. Much of the thinking behind the US presence in Kyrgyzstan, was to provide a platform for commanding oil or gas reserves in surrounding areas, along with curbing Chinese and Russian designs in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan is strategically situated; it shares a 660 mile frontier with Xinjiang, China’s crucially significant north-western province.

US Afghanistan Attack: Planned long before 9/11

Contrary to what was often claimed, the October 2001 US-run invasion of Afghanistan had been planned months before the 9/11 attacks. In mid-July 2001 American officials told Pakistan’s former Foreign Secretary, Niaz Naik, that the Pentagon was preparing an attack on Afghanistan, scheduled to be launched in October of that year.

Read more: Foreign policy calculus: Is China swapping the Middle East with Africa?

It takes longer than four weeks to prepare an invasion of a sizeable country, let alone one on the other side of the world. Afghanistan, which lies adjacent to the Middle East, was viewed by Western politicians as a major pipeline route; through which natural resources could be sent originating from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.

American dominance of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, both formerly part of the USSR, further weakened Russia and was seen moreover as important to the “success” of the war in Afghanistan.

The South Caucasus states, Georgia and Azerbaijan, were pawns in the transport of heavy US weaponry and NATO troops bound for Afghanistan. Azerbaijan, bordering Iran, could be used also as a launchpad for US forces should they get the green light to invade Iran.

The prominent Polish-American diplomat, Zbigniew Brzezinski, recognised that mastery over Central Asia is pivotal to holding sway over encompassing areas. China’s pre-eminence today in Central Asia would therefore have caused considerable concern for Brzezinski.

China Biggest investor in Central Asia and Middle East

Beijing is gradually constructing a 21st century Silk Road, with the intent not only to increasingly draw Central Asia under Chinese influence, but of extending its clout to the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean. China is already the largest investor in Central Asia and now the Middle East.

This latter region, the Middle East, contains 48% of the planet’s known oil reserves and 43% of all natural gas sources. It has long been highly prized. US planners believed that ascendancy over the Middle East would grant a nation “substantial control of the world”, as noted in May 1951 by Adolf Berle, president Franklin Roosevelt’s former close adviser.

Berle’s opinion was supported by General Dwight Eisenhower, soon to be president, who called the Middle East “the most strategically important area in the world”.

Read more: USA-China battle it out in the Middle East

In February 1944, Roosevelt himself informed the British ambassador to the US, Lord Halifax, that the oil of Iran “is yours. We share the oil of Iraq and Kuwait. As for Saudi Arabian oil, it’s ours”.

China has been Iran’s largest trading partner for years. In 2019 for example, Iranian investments with China amounted to at least $20 billion and Beijing is the top purchaser of crude oil from Iran.

At the root of the ongoing shrill criticisms by the West pertaining to Chinese policies, is down to Beijing’s growing challenge to US power which is under pressure across the globe.

Central Asia: Politics of Infrastructure & oil pipelines

Over the past decade Beijing has completed expansive infrastructure in Central Asia, such as the Central Asia-China gas pipeline, that is over 2,200 miles long. It stretches across Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan before reaching its destination in China’s Xinjiang province.

Turkmenistan contains the fourth biggest natural gas reserves in the world, and is the greatest supplier of that resource to China. Turkmenistan’s largest investor by far is China, and last year almost 90% of her exports were sold to Beijing. While Washington was wielding its sledgehammer this century, China has engineered ambitious financial projects and the development of alliances on a grand scale.

Beijing is aware of the historical and strategic importance of Central Asia to its neighbour Russia, and has treaded carefully. Since the Soviet Union’s demise in 1991, Chinese strategies in Central Asia have largely been complimentary and cooperative with Moscow.

Successful early efforts to overcome border disputes was a factor behind Beijing founding the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 1996 alongside Russia – with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan likewise joining this association at its outset, in their stated goals of tackling terrorism and separatism.

Read more: Middle East problems amplified by coronavirus

The CIA and Pentagon were already supporting covert operations by extremist networks with links to Osama bin Laden in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans; Washington was in addition using foreign operatives to promote instability in Central Asia.

For one of the major powers, it is striking that China has very little history of committing armed aggression, i.e., attacks on other countries, proxy wars, and so on. This stands in contrast to its Western rivals.

Xinjiang, China’s biggest province, is pivotal to Beijing’s aspirations. Throughout this century, Xinjiang has been the second largest oil producing area of China, behind Heilongjiang province.

Gwadar-Kashgar Oil Pipeline: China’s Strategic Defence

Xinjiang furthermore is China’s main entry point into Central Asia, while there are long-held plans by Beijing to connect the city of Kashgar, in western Xinjiang, over a thousand miles south towards the Arabian Sea, at Pakistan’s port of Gwadar.

The proposed Gwadar-Kashgar oil pipeline is currently undergoing assessment, and expected to receive approval for a length of 2,414 kilometres, equivalent to 1,400 miles. The Chinese government desires its commencement as quickly as possible, and construction may start by the year 2023.

Gwadar lies a short distance from the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf, some of the most vital oil shipping lanes. Yet logistics for the Gwadar-Kashgar pipeline will be arduous, as it must bypass rocky areas and high mountain passes.

China’s maritime deliveries, which account for about 80% of its oil imports, travel over round-about distances of up to 10,000 miles. These shipments take between eight to 12 weeks to arrive at the port of Shanghai in eastern China. A Chinese pipeline to Gwadar would reduce this distance to less than 2,000 miles, and allow Beijing to avoid waters patrolled by US destroyers.

Read more: Prisoner swap between Israel & Hamas: Can we expect peace in Middle East?

Most significantly, the Gwadar-Kashgar pipeline would assist China in continuing to broaden its scope in the Middle East. Were this to be achieved, further US global decline could only unfold. American power in the Middle East has regressed this century, in large part self-inflicted because of its invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Middle East is central to the progress of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The Chinese have advanced again here through non-military means, and with caution, outlining to their war weary Middle East counterparts that they wish to pursue policies of dialogue and financial investments.

Beijing’s non-military approach Vs American interventionism

Beijing has steered clear of regional hostilities in the Middle East, in order not to stoke more unrest in a land greatly destabilised by the US-led wars and spawning of terrorist organisations.

In January 2020 Yasser Elnaggar, an experienced Egyptian diplomat and scholar, noted that, “the economies of the Middle East are shifting away from their longstanding ties with the US toward economically powerful China – a move that may have long-term implications for the economic and political dynamics of the region”. Elnaggar discerned that the Middle East and North African nations “welcomed China and its financing models with open arms”.

Various leaders in the Middle East have visited Beijing on more than one occasion since 2014. Many of the trips involved the ratification of significant economic agreements, connected to the Belt and Road Initiative. The Americans have been notable in their absence from these deals. A number of the contracts signed relate to clean energy projects, as the Middle East and North African states align their development plans with the Belt and Road, exploring alternatives to fossil fuels.

Read more: After Middle East, Canada fires Indian expat for spreading Islamophobia

US involvement in the Middle East has of course primarily been concerned with oil. This was one of the reasons that Washington had previously supported Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator; that is, when Saddam was amenable to their interests. That relationship had changed by the beginning of the 21st century.

Moniz Bandeira, the Brazilian historian and intellectual, wrote that, “Iraq didn’t threaten the United States or any other country of the West. Instead, it threatened American and British oil companies.

Saddam Hussein had signed contracts with the large Russian company Lukoil, was in negotiations with Total from France, and had begun to replace the dollar by the euro as the currency for oil transactions. His removal would make room for the entry of British and American firms such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell and British Petroleum”.

Secret documents from March 2001 – which the US Department of Commerce was forced to declassify in the summer of 2003 – reveals that an “energy task force” headed by Dick Cheney, the US vice-president, had developed two extensive maps pertaining to Iraq.

Sketching the oil fields, pipelines, refineries and terminals they would oversee there. Cheney had close ties to the oil industry, and two other maps were drawn up by his task force, detailing the projects and companies that wanted to manage the oil in Iraq. This was planned two years before the actual invasion of that country and, it can be added, prior also to 9/11

Shane Quinn, a British author, has contributed on a regular basis to Global Research and his articles have been published by American news outlets People’s World, MintPress News, Morning Star in Britain and Venezuela’s Orinoco Tribune. The opinion in this article is the author’s own and does not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Global Village Space.

posted for fair use
 
Last edited:

jward

passin' thru
Beijing should change tack on South China Sea to avoid conflict with US, analyst says
  • As relations deteriorate and Washington toughens its stance, the contested waterway is likely to be a flashpoint, regional security expert says
  • Managing tensions with its Southeast Asian neighbours is seen as a key task
Laura Zhou

Laura Zhou in Beijing
Published: 12:00am, 16 Jul, 2020
Updated: 1:08pm, 16 Jul, 2020



The US Navy holds a drill in the South China Sea on July 6. Washington has rejected China’s claims in the disputed waters. Photo: EPA-EFE

The US Navy holds a drill in the South China Sea on July 6. Washington has rejected China’s claims in the disputed waters. Photo: EPA-EFE
Beijing needs to reassess its strategies in
the South China Sea
as relations with Washington are in free fall and the disputed waterway is likely to be a flashpoint, a Chinese regional security expert says.
While policy advisers will be looking at different scenarios for the protracted struggle between the two superpowers in the region, managing tensions with its Southeast Asian neighbours was a key task for Beijing, according to Chen Xiangmiao, an associate researcher with the National Institute for South China Sea Studies on Hainan Island.
“If there is a maritime clash with [rival claimants] Vietnam, Malaysia or the Philippines, the US will have an excuse to step in, and that could trigger a direct military conflict between China and the US,” Chen said.
“[But] as long as the rival claimants can exercise restraint and don’t take sides between China and the US, I think the risk of conflict can remain under control.”


Washington’s hardened position on Beijing’s claims in South China Sea heightens US-China tensions
Chen’s assessment came as Washington toughened its stance on the South China Sea,
raising concerns about the possibility of military conflict
between Beijing and Washington – already at loggerheads over issues ranging from trade to human rights and Hong Kong.


US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a statement on Monday that
the US formally opposes a swathe of Chinese claims
to waters and the rights to seabed resources within the so-called nine-dash line that encompasses almost all of the South China Sea. The move was seen by some Chinese observers as Washington abandoning its previous position of neutrality on territorial disputes in the waterway.

South China Sea: key moments in a decades-long dispute
14 Jul 2020
1594953707461.png

“We used to say that the South China Sea issue could affect overall Sino-US relations. But now the South China Sea issue has become [part of Washington’s] comprehensive strategy to contain China,” Chen said. “China will need to examine the relationship between the South China Sea issue and overall Sino-US ties.”

He continued: “Is decoupling [between China and the US] possible? My assessment is that it is not likely. But if the relationship between China and the US continues to worsen, then the South China Sea issue could become the tipping point that leads to a [military] clash.”

According to Chen, Beijing needed to prepare for the US taking a tougher approach, including more flexing of its military muscle in the strategic waterway and pressing its regional partners and allies to take a stronger stand against China.
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In one scenario, Chen said the US could send its coastguard in response to what it sees as a growing threat from China’s “grey zone” operations by coastguard vessels and maritime militia, which Beijing has been accused of using to expand its presence in the South China Sea.

Chen said likely countermeasures from Beijing included setting up an air defence identification zone in the South China Sea and accelerating its infrastructure-building in the disputed waters

“[China’s actions will] depend on the perceived threat from the US,” Chen said. “If the US or rival claimants such as Vietnam make any unilateral move, I wouldn’t rule out any possibility.”


China hits back at US after Pompeo says most of Beijing’s claims in South China Sea are illegal
Zhang Mingliang, a Southeast Asian affairs expert with Jinan University in Guangzhou, said Beijing needed to improve relations with its neighbours, and that could include providing public services.

“China’s capacity to provide public services to the region has significantly increased because of its rapid infrastructure-building in the South China Sea,” Zhang said.
“China may need do something now, for example, open facilities that serve common interests in the region. That could help ease suspicions [among rival claimants] – especially when China’s theoretical evidence [for its territorial claims] in the South China Sea doesn’t really convince anyone.”
The under-the-radar South China Sea projects Beijing uses to cement its claims
15 Jul 2020
1594953707492.png

China is negotiating with the Philippines on their territorial dispute and it has been pushing Malaysia to set up a separate “bilateral consultation mechanism” for theirs – something critics say is a “divide and conquer” tactic by Beijing.
There have also been signs that Vietnam – one of the most vocal critics of Beijing’s assertive behaviour in the South China Sea – could make a similar move to the Philippines,
which took its case to an international tribunal in The Hague in 2016
. The tribunal ruled in favour of the Philippines, calling China’s claim illegal, but Beijing rejected the decision.
Chen said Beijing may need to step up efforts on bilateral negotiations “to ensure there are no miscalculations that would escalate tensions, particularly as rivalry between China and the US boils over”.


The South China Sea dispute explained
China is pushing for a code of conduct with the 10-member
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean)
, which it sees as a way to manage the disputes without intervention by the US and other countries. Beijing wants the negotiations finished by 2021, but talks have been postponed because of the coronavirus pandemic.
Observers said Pompeo’s statement could drive Asean members to conclude talks on the code as swiftly as possible.
“The latest US move could mean that at least some Asean parties feel more emboldened to push their respective agendas on the South China Sea in the negotiations with Beijing,” said Collin Koh, a research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.
“For Asean member states, the fear of intensified Sino-US rivalry and rising tensions in the South China Sea would mean having to stress the urgency of promulgating this code,” Koh said.
.
posted for fair use
video & notes @ source:

 

jward

passin' thru
.
India, China locked in secretive border talks
Indian defense chief set to visit front line of border standoff but it's still not clear if disengagement is what China has in mind
by Sumit Sharma July 16, 2020




India-China-Troops-HImalayas-e1594568611292.jpg
Indian and Chinese troops at a Himalayan mountain border outpost in a file photo. Image: AFP

Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh will visit the front line in Ladakh on Friday, as top army generals from India and China negotiate disengagement from the region after deadly skirmishes.
Singh is likely to meet the top brass in the Indian forces and encourage troops guarding the region after China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) encroached into Indian territory in several sectors of Ladakh in May and June.
Singh’s visit follows tough negotiations between generals on both sides on China’s encroachment into the Pangong Tso lake area. Talks started before noon on Tuesday and continued until 2am on Wednesday.
While there was no official briefing or explanation of the on-the-ground situation or status of the talks, the Indian Army said both sides were committed to complete disengagement.
“This process is intricate and requires constant verification. They are taking it forward through regular meetings at the diplomatic and military level,” the Indian Army said on Thursday.


Rajnath-Singh.jpg
India’s Defense Minister Rajnath Singh has been in talks with his Chinese counterparts. Photo: AFP/Evgeny Biyatov/Sputnik
Analysts remain divided on how quickly the talks can result in a lasting solution. Some say the talks could take longer than a few weeks. The solution may still not be to everyone’s liking since India would seek the withdrawal of Chinese forces to the pre-April 2020 positions.
The Chinese, sensing that as occupiers they have a better bargaining position, may try to extract more and may not withdraw fully to the pre-incursion positions.
Commenting on the fourth commander-level talks between the two countries, Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said the sides were making positive progress in further disengaging front line troops in the western section of the border.
“We hope the Indian side can meet us halfway to implement our consensus with real actions, and jointly safeguard peace and tranquility in the border area,” Hua was quoted by the People’s Daily as saying. Hua said the talks also helped to ease the border situation.
The disengagement talks were a result of the July 6 agreement between India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi to “strictly respect and observe the line of actual control and not take any unilateral action to alter the status quo and work together to avoid any incident in the future that could disturb peace and tranquility in border areas.”

The PLA had earlier withdrawn partially from the Galwan Valley. The Indian side had not provided any official clarity earlier on the extent of the Chinese occupation in Galwan Valley. Some analysts and retired generals see the Chinese withdrawal as partial.
Even after the July 6 agreement to disengage and de-escalate, the Chinese presented a tougher posture, hinting at its claim over the land it encroached upon.
“China will continue firmly safeguarding our territorial sovereignty as well as peace and tranquility in the border areas,” the Chinese embassy said on July 6. “The right and wrong of what recently happened at the Galwan Valley in the western sector of the China-India boundary is very clear.”
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jward

passin' thru
Disclose.tv
@disclosetv

2h

BREAKING - Russia declared sudden **battle readiness check** for Southern, Western Military District, marines and airborne troops, North and Pacific Fleets. 150 000 troops involved, 27 000 of weaponry and vehicles, 414 aircraft, 106 vessels.
Russian Ministry of Defense: the goal of sudden battle readiness check - to ensure the "security" of Russia in South-Western direction.
The south-west direction is potentially Ukraine or Armenia.



Eleonore Thümmel
@Voiceof08375797

1h

Replying to
@disclosetv
and
@EndGameWW3
Armenia is SE of Moscow. Libya is SW of Moscow. Take your pick.

Ash-Greninja
@AshGren65006874

6m

Likely Ukraine

View: https://twitter.com/AshGren65006874/status/1284063462033850370?s=20
 

danielboon

TB Fanatic
Disclose.tv
@disclosetv

2h

BREAKING - Russia declared sudden **battle readiness check** for Southern, Western Military District, marines and airborne troops, North and Pacific Fleets. 150 000 troops involved, 27 000 of weaponry and vehicles, 414 aircraft, 106 vessels.
Russian Ministry of Defense: the goal of sudden battle readiness check - to ensure the "security" of Russia in South-Western direction.
The south-west direction is potentially Ukraine or Armenia.
Eleonore Thümmel
@Voiceof08375797

1h

Replying to
@disclosetv
and
@EndGameWW3
Armenia is SE of Moscow. Libya is SW of Moscow. Take your pick.

Ash-Greninja
@AshGren65006874

6m

Likely Ukraine

View: https://twitter.com/AshGren65006874/status/1284063462033850370?s=20
Oh boy
 

jward

passin' thru
Russia Loosens Its Belt
Russia’s foreign minister bowed out of China’s high-level Belt and Road meeting. Is Moscow finally signaling its discontent over the initiative?
By Ankur Shah | July 16, 2020, 10:12 AM
The Vladimir Rusanov, a liquefied natural gas tanker ship, arrives in China from Russia

The Vladimir Rusanov, a liquefied natural gas tanker ship, is seen following its arrival in Nantong City, eastern China's Jiangsu province, on July 19, 2018, following its journey from Russia's Arctic Yamal peninsula. AFP via Getty Images


Last month, China held a virtual conference on the Belt and Road Initiative. Hosted by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the high-level meeting was, in the words of Chinese President Xi Jinping, “an opportunity to discuss a collective response to COVID-19, advance Belt and Road cooperation, and strengthen international solidarity.”
As a testament to the infrastructure and investment project’s clout, the event was attended by ministerial-level officials from 25 countries. Even the director-general of the World Health Organization was present to parrot the party line about turning the Belt and Road Initiative “into a true ‘Health Silk Road’”—central to Xi’s efforts to position China as a global leader in health care.

But one face was noticeably missing: Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister. To the dozens gathered virtually, Lavrov delivered a written statement, and an ambassador at large attended in his place.
In truth, Russia could barely be counted among the participants to begin with. Though both nations have spent years claiming a close relationship and commitment to the project, Russia has long been an absent partner.
Though both nations have spent years claiming a close relationship and commitment to the project, Russia has long been an absent partner.
But Moscow’s unwillingness to even put in a proper appearance at the latest forum suggests a subtle change in approach: It no longer feels obliged to bow before Beijing’s Belt and Road. This leaves China in a difficult position. As Beijing continues to roll out infrastructure and investment in Russia’s backyard and undermine its influence in the former Soviet Union, it needs, at the very least, tacit acceptance of the initiative from Russia. The last thing China wants is any hint of backlash from Russia over the Belt and Road, especially at a time when so many of its other partners are pushing back against the initiative. Any step back from Moscow also reveals to the United States and Europe a vulnerability in an otherwise maturing Sino-Russian entente.

Russia’s diluted attendance shows where its true interests lie. “Russia is not part of the BRI. It is only a supporter of Chinese global outreach as long as it is in Russia’s interests,” said Igor Denisov, a senior research fellow at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.
This standpoint contradicts the official narratives that both countries have long spun about the Belt and Road Initiative. Since 2014, Beijing has consistently framed Moscow as its most integral partner. In 2019, an influential Chinese think tank named Russia the most involved partner country in the program, ranking highest in “political coordination” and “facilities connectivity.” Even in the context of the current coronavirus pandemic, which has created friction at the land border between the two neighbors, Chinese state media has continued to promote Belt and Road connectivity between China and Russia for helping to increase Chinese trade with Europe.

For its part, Russia rarely turns down superficial opportunities to showcase its ties with China. President Vladimir Putin is a regular attendee at Beijing’s biennial Belt and Road Forum. At last year’s Valdai Discussion Club, Putin for the first time described ties with China as “alliance-like,” enjoying “an unprecedently high level of trust and cooperation.” He has primarily pushed for economic and political engagement with the Belt and Road Initiative by promoting its compatibility with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, an economic union in the post-Soviet space. In what was then considered a landmark agreement, in 2015 the countries agreed to integrate the two initiatives.
By 2019, China had yet to deem any of the union’s projects worthy of the “Belt and Road” label. But despite the public rhetoric harmonizing Xi and Putin’s premier foreign-policy projects, there is little tangible evidence to show that Russia is even an official partner country of the Belt and Road Initiative. Of 40 transportation projects proposed by the Eurasian Economic Union to China in 2017, every single one was rejected. By 2019, China had yet to deem any of the union’s projects worthy of the “Belt and Road” label. A senior Russian government official interviewed in July 2019 told Bobo Lo, a nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute, that the needle has barely shifted since the political declaration.

The strategic ties that do exist between the two countries exist almost entirely outside the Belt and Road framework—in spite of the branding to the contrary. Yamal LNG, a liquified natural gas project in northern Russia, is a case in point. In 2016, the Silk Road Fund, a Chinese government investment vehicle for Belt and Road, acquired a 9.9 percent stake in the project, and it has since been repackaged as part of what’s known as the Polar Silk Road. Still, Lo said in an interview: “Yamal LNG has precious little to do with BRI. It is simply a bilateral project between China and Russia.”
Simultaneously, China is also able to acquire access to key strategic sectors of Russia’s economy in a way that was inconceivable a decade ago. For Russia’s part, Chinese investment is much needed to fill the gap left by Western firms since sanctions were enforced in 2014. But for all of the bluster around the Belt and Road Initiative, the overall rate of Chinese investment in Russia remains very low. In 2017, China’s total foreign direct investment into Russia totaled just $140 million, a minute portion of Russia’s total $25.3 billion inflows. This pales in comparison to the $50 billion China has offered to pump into neighboring Pakistan through the Belt and Road.
Read More

Indian students wear masks of China's President Xi Jinping
Welcome to the Belt and Road Pandemic
There’s one difference between the Wuhan virus and previous outbreaks in the region: China is now impossible to quarantine.
Voice | Laurie Garrett

Pakistan's Prime Minister Imran Khan speaks with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in Beijing.
Belt and Road Tests China’s Image in Pakistan
As China’s presence in Pakistan grows, the countries’ special relationship could be strained.
Argument | Daud Khattak

The contradiction between China’s continual celebration of Russia’s importance to the Belt and Road and the lack of opportunities it affords it has become a source of frustration among the Russian business community. Apart from flagship projects that gain momentum after being endorsed by the political elite, especially members of Putin’s inner circle, projects that are not high-profile often fail to draw Chinese interest and investment. A look back at the second Belt and Road Forum in 2019 confirms China’s restraint, showing that of China’s 283 tangible deliverables, only 15 are related to Russia.

Russia’s corruption and its underdeveloped infrastructure have long kept away foreign investors. Now, those same shortcomings are discouraging Chinese investment, according to Jonathan Hillman, the director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Of 91 projects launched as part of a Program of Cooperation between Northeast China and Russia’s Far East, which began in 2009 and was shut down in 2018, only 15 were in the implementation phase as of 2015. According to Hillman, shortcomings such as these may be discouraging Chinese investment.
After years of patchy participation, Russia’s public distancing from the Belt and Road program comes at a time when the initiative is already suffering major setbacks.
After years of patchy participation, Russia’s public distancing from the Belt and Road program comes at a time when the initiative is already suffering major setbacks.
A recent survey by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs foundthat 20 percent of Belt and Road projects have been “seriously affected” by the global pandemic, with a further 30 to 40 percent “somewhat affected.” Fears of a global recession have provoked China’s partners to review the viability of Belt and Road projects in their countries. This may lead to renegotiations, or even project cancellations.

Whether Russia’s involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative will diminish further is unclear. Lo believes that there is an internal understanding that Moscow must not get any closer to Beijing in order to signal on the world stage that it is still an independent strategic actor. China is well aware of Russia’s potential to be a spoiler in international relations. Having become the increasingly dominant partner in the bilateral relationship, Beijing will have to be even more careful in managing Moscow within the Belt and Road.




Ankur Shah is a British Indian writer focused on China and Russia. He has written for the Economist, UNESCO, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

posted for fair use
 
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jward

passin' thru
Fri, 07/17/2020 - 10:29am
The Battle of Debaltseve: a Hybrid Army in a Classic Battle of Encirclement
By Randy Noorman

Introduction
Around noon, on February 10th, 2015, a woman looks out of her apartment near Kramatorsk airfield in eastern Ukraine, when rockets start impacting the surrounding buildings. Though audibly scared by the explosions, she continues filming the barrage, which is aimed at the Ukrainian military headquarters located near the airfield. Situated at least 80 kilometersaway from the Frontline, the long range artillery barrage, conducted by heavy multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), is part of a large scale Russian backed separatist offensive to close the pocket around the small city of Debaltseve.[1]
During the War in Donbas, in the midst of what has universally been labeled a “hybrid environment” and what the Ukrainian military itself called an “Anti-Terrorist Operation” or ATO, the actual fighting was highlighted and to a certain degree concluded, by a classic battle of encirclement. Although underneath the visible conventional layer, hybrid elements were present both in the form of the composite organization of the forces involved and the employment of certain non-linear elements like information warfare and special operations, functioning as a force multiplier for the separatist elements.[2] Likewise, a number of sophisticated technologies and related procedures were employed to augment existing conventional tactical activities. Lasting from January 22th until February 18th, 2015, the battle that raged in and around the city of Debaltseve has only a few comparisons in scale and intensity in post-war European history, notably being Sarajevo and Grozny. While the estimated numbers regarding the forces involved vary greatly, it is safe to state that somewhere between 5.000 and 8.000 Ukrainian troops were deployed within the salient surrounding the city.[3] The Russian backed separatist or “hybrid army” which was trying to envelop them, perhaps even numbering up to 19.000.[4]
Nearly succumbing to the threat of complete encirclement and possible annihilation, Ukrainian units were ultimately forced into a headlong retreat. The withdrawal, however, soon degenerated into a rout when multiple retreating columns came under separatist attacks, suffering heavy casualties in the process. Although the fighting, lasting for nearly a month, was undoubtedly the largest engagement in the Donbas War, besides traditional friction, intentionally propagated disinformation has further complicated a reliable portrayal of events. Especially regarding the strength and composition of the forces embroiled, as Russia has consistently denied any form of military involvement. The aim of this article therefore is to shed some light on the Russian hybrid forces involved, while providing a vivid and, where possible, detailed description of the events as they unfolded.

Prelude
Following the Russian annexation of Crimea (February/March 2014) and the subsequent insurrection in the Donbas region, the Ukrainian military slowly but steadily regained control over separatist self-proclaimed territory in Luhansk and Donets oblasts. Years of neglect had seriously undermined the combat capability of the regular Ukrainian army, which led to the emergence of numerous territorial- and volunteer battalions during the spring of 2014.[5] Using whatever meager units available, they created blocking positions in order to prevent further spreading of Russian backed separatist forces throughout the area. Thereafter, focus was aimed at separating the separatist strongholds from the Russian border, in order to cutoff Russian support.[6] However, this was deemed futile, to a large extend due to large-scale Russian cross-border artillery attacks inside Ukrainian territory, probably numbering up to hundreds of strikes over the course of 2014.[7] Most notably the one near Zelenopillya, on July 11th, 2014, in which 122mm “Grad” rockets aimed at a Ukrainian column put a whole armored battalion out of action, killing dozens and wounding up to a hundred soldiers.[8]
After various unsuccessful efforts to recapture the cities of Luhansk and Donetsk, ATO forces shifted their center of gravity towards the area around Debaltseve. Attempting to separate the DPR and LPR forces from one another, Debaltseve was recaptured on July 29th. Thereafter ATO forces abandoned their envelopment efforts along the border and continued pushing eastwards from Debaltseve along Donets Ridge, further splitting the separatist territory in half.[9] On August 24th, however, at least eight Russian Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG) and, in all likelihood, several Spetsnaz units unexpectedly crossed the border in a counteroffensive in support of the separatists, aimed towards the preservation of both breakaway republics.[10] Presumably with even more formations assembling at the Russian side of the border.[11] Ukrainian units who were in the midst of capturing the city of Ilovaisk, soon found themselves surrounded by strong Russian hybrid forces. After several days under relentless Russian artillery barrages, the Ukrainian commander was able to negotiate, what seemed to be a peaceful withdrawal, back towards Ukrainian held positions further to the west. On August 30th, however, about ten kilometers on their way out of the city, moving in a column of up to sixty vehicles, they ran into a well-prepared ambush, lasting for several kilometers. Separatists, backed up by strong regular Russian troops, almost entirely destroyed the Ukrainian column. Killing hundreds, perhaps even up to a 1.000 Ukrainian soldiers in the process, while capturing another 500.[12] For the Ukrainian army it was the single deadliest encounter of the entire war. Confronted with this direct Russian intervention, ATO headquarters decided to go on to the defensive, while the Russian hybrid army consolidated its gains. Thereafter, during the fall of 2014, after signing the Minsk I agreement on September 5th, the Frontline more or less stabilized, with Ukrainian forces still firmly in control of the Debaltseve salient.[13] While the number of Russian troops steadily increased, especially regarding ‘volunteers’ within the separatist ranks, actual combat involvement of regular Russian units diminished and for a large part moved to the rear.[14] In late November hostilities again increased, when Russian backed separatists launched an assault against Ukrainian held Donetsk Airport, were fighting continued until January 21st, 2015. Thereafter, with the airport firmly in separatist hands, the Russian hybrid army’s offensive aimed at encircling the Debaltseve salient was unleashed.

Russian Involvement
At the time of the intervention, in August 2014, Russian troops inside Ukraine numbered somewhere between 3.500 and 6.500. With operations in all likelihood being directed from Russia’s Southern Military Districts headquarters in Rostov-on-Don.[15] This number rose to almost 10.000 around the time of the Debaltseve operation. To generate this level of involvement, the Russian Ministry of Defense created a rotating system, in which units from all Russian military districts and almost every field army participated. Usually organized into BTGs, these were generally derived from a single division or brigade and deployed at the center of gravity, where they were used as shock troops alongside less trained separatist forces.[16] BTGs usually consisted of motorized or mechanized infantry, tanks and dedicated artillery, occasionally reinforced by specialized units, depending on its mission.[17] At the time of the Debaltseve operation, however, probably due to ongoing casualties and manpower shortage, tactical units originating from different regiments, brigades and divisions were often combined into mixed ad hoc company- or battalion level formations.[18] Regular separatist formations were reinforced with so-called volunteers and supported by Russian military advisors, often with Spetsnaz operators or GRU operatives attached, especially for the conduct of reconnaissance and sabotage missions.[19] Its field commanders, meanwhile, were incorporated into a command structure that was indirectly controlled by Russian staff officers on both the tactical and operational level, creating an appearance of separatist independence.[20]
Besides maneuver units, substantial numbers of troops were stationed at the Russian side of the border, from where they provided logistical support, training and conducted cross-border artillery strikes in support of operations.[21]Besides training and advising DPR/LPR militias and often leading them into combat, Russia also provided a large number of specialized military personnel, intended to operate complex weapon systems.[22] A SNAR-10M1 battlefield surveillance radar was observed in and around Debaltseve during the fighting, to help locate the movement of Ukrainian units.[23] Probably, the Russian Zoopark-1 counter battery radar was also used, in order to pinpoint Ukrainian artillery batteries.[24] As well as a number of UAVs, like the Orlan-10, Forpost and Granat-1 and 2 used for reconnaissance and fire adjustment of artillery strikes.[25] Likewise, typical for Russian military operations, a large complement of Electronic Warfare (EW) systems were deployed, potentially in combination with UAVs. Some of them were positioned in advance, monitoring alterations within the electromagnetic spectrum from the outset of operations. Others were used for jamming Ukrainian communications as well as detection, identification, direction- and location finding for the conduct of accurate artillery fire during combat operations.[26]
At the beginning of the conflict a lot of Soviet legacy vehicles and weapon systems, like BM-21 Grads and Ukrainian build T-64 tanks, were smuggled into Ukraine, in order to provide the separatists with heavy weapons. Material the Ukrainians themselves were also using, as to help conceal the scope of Russian involvement. However, as the conflict progressed and equipment losses increased, more and more modern Russian military equipment found its way into the conflict zone.[27] Their unit-markings usually painted over and often replaced with a white open square.[28] Investigative journalism websites like “Bellingcat” and “Inform Napalm” attained considerable success in identifying Russian military hardware and personnel covertly being deployed into Eastern Ukraine.
Russia also fielded a number of paramilitary organizations as proxy forces, in order to supplement the ranks of the separatists with more experienced fighters. There were Russians, Cossacks, Chechens and even Serbians, among others. Notably, a unit of around 600 Cossacks played an important role in encircling Debaltseve and capturing the city.[29] Another more well-known organization was the “Russian Orthodox Army,” which lost about 50 men during the fighting.[30] Chechens volunteers were actually present on both sides of the conflict, with the “Vostok” battalion in support of the separatists, although not involved in the fighting near Debaltseve, while the pro-Ukrainian Dzhokhar Dudayev battalion actually participated in the defense of the city.[31] Ukrainian security service SBU also identified over 200 mercenaries from Wagner PMC being involved in the fighting, its members suffering well over 50 casualties.[32] Another Russian PMC called E.N.O.T. Corps, was presumably involved in supplying the separatists with weapons and equipment, while offering facilities for artillery and engineer training and instruction in the fields of intelligence and military planning.[33] However, notwithstanding the scale and diversity of Russian military support, separatist forces probably bore the brunt of the regular day to day fighting. Militiamen, to a large degree Don-Cossacks themselves, although considerably strengthened by individual Russian volunteers and often led by actual Russian military commanders.[34]
Picture1.png
Map showing a (probably incomplete) number of strongpoint, separatist advances, primary clashes and Ukrainian withdrawal.
 

jward

passin' thru
First Phase
Ukrainian forces showed a mixture of regular army formations, supplemented by National Guard- and volunteer battalions, often showing a large disparity in levels of training and using a wide array of uniforms and equipment. The 128th mechanized mountain brigade was at the core of the Ukrainian forces in defense of Debaltseve and its battalions, 15th mountain and 21st mechanized, took up positions along the entire eastern part of the salient. Additionally, there were a number of mechanized, National Guard- and territorial defense battalions of mixed size, origin and quality, as well as independent artillery, reconnaissance and Spetsnaz formations. Most notably, the 40th “Kryvbas” mechanized volunteer battalion guarded the north-eastern perimeter, near the village of Novohryhorivka. The 25th “Kyivska Rus” mechanized infantry battalion, former Kiev territorial defense battalion, initially deployed at the eastern villages of Nikishyne and Ridkodub, but was active across the entire front over the course of the battle. Along with the well-known “Donbas” National Guard volunteer battalion.[35] The latter being one of the largest volunteer battalions, veterans of the Battle of Ilovaisk and sometimes being referred to as the “little black men,” as opposed to the “little green men” deployed by Russia. According to ATO headquarters, the Russian hybrid forces around Debaltseve outnumbered Ukrainian forces by approximately 2:1 in infantry, 2:1 in armored fighting vehicles, especially in tanks and over 7:1 in artillery, howitzers, mortars and MLRS combined.[36] Ukrainian units along the defense perimeter were therefore organized into strong points, mostly occupying essential terrain features and blocking possible avenues of advance, often supported by tank elements of both the 1st and 17th tank brigades.

After a 242-day siege, Russian backed separatists finally captured Donetsk Airport on January 21, killing or capturing the last of the “Cyborgs,” as the Russians came to call the Ukrainian defenders when referring to their perseverance and bravery.[37] From January 22 onwards, Ukrainian units in defense of Debaltseve came under several small scale attacks, all of which were repelled.[38] Their positions meanwhile, were being shelled by separatist artillery, to which Ukrainian artillery actively conducted counter-battery fire.[39] At the same time, the Ukrainians observed several Russian armored columns and BTGs moving from the border towards the area around Debaltseve.[40] The Russian hybrid army was concentrating its shock troops for the upcoming offensive. They were organized into two different strike groups, positioned north and south of the bottleneck, in order to close the bulge and trap the remaining Ukrainian units inside. The northeastern so-called “Brjankovska” group, was formed around the 4th “Batman” brigade, supported by elements of the “Prizrak” (Ghost) brigade, known to be the best fighting unit of both the DPR and LPR. While the southwestern “Horlivka” strike group was comprised out of the 3rd and so-called “Oplot” and “Kalmius” brigades.[41] To hinder Ukrainian communications during the assault, a Russian R-330Zh “Zhitel” automated jamming station was deployed near Horlivka, probably belonging to 18th separate motor rifle brigade, 58th army and originating from Chechnya.[42]

The village of Svetlodarsk, situated about 15 kilometers north-west of Debaltseve, was temporarily occupied by units belonging to the Horlivka group on January 24, threatening the M3 highway, serving as the logistical supply line from Artemivsk towards Debaltseve, that was soon dubbed “the road of life.”[43] A Ukrainian counter-attack, however, managed to recapture the village.[44] On January 25, the battle erupted in earnest, with separatists conducting massive artillery strikes against Ukrainian positions all along the defensive perimeter, using howitzers, Grad rocket, mortars and even tanks in a direct fire role.[45] Nine kilometers north of Debaltseve, near the village of Sanzharivka, height 307.5 likewise played a crucial role in covering the M3 approach, this time from the north. Manning strong point “Valera” on top of the hill, was a platoon belonging to 15th battalion of the 128th brigade. Equipped with just two BMP-2s, a few heavy machine guns and several types of grenade launchers, they were reinforced with a single T-64 tank, belonging to the 17th brigade. Its ammunition seized from a separatists T-64 that was taken out in front of the position the day before.[46] On January 25, the first in a series of attacks was launched against the strong point, when up to five separatist tanks assaulted the position, accompanied by, possibly Wagner, mercenary infantry.[47]The defenders of Valera were able to repel the attack, destroying four out of five tanks in close combat and thereby preventing the separatist completing the encirclement from the north.[48]

Over the course of the next few days the fighting around Debaltseve intensified, with separatist artillery regularly shelling Ukrainian positions. By January 27, Ukrainian intelligence had identified some five BTGs, three independent artillery groups are several smaller assault detachments.[49] The Horlivka strike group alone assembled some 2000 men, supported by 22 tanks and 34 armored fighting vehicles.[50] That same day they launched their initial assaults against Ukrainian defenses around the village of Vuhlehirsk, located at the western edge of the Debaltseve bridgehead, all of which were repulsed.[51] To the north, near Sanzharivka, strong point Valera repelled another Wagner assault on January 28, destroying multiple tanks and other vehicles, as well as two KAMAZ-43269 “Dozor” or “Vystrel” armored personnel carriers, which were in use only with the army of the Russian Federation.[52] Around the same time units belonging to Russia’s 200th motor rifle brigade were identified, also taking part in the repeated assaults against height 307.5, which was soon labeled the “meat grinder” by separatist troops.[53] When on January 29, elements of the 128th Brigade repelled several major separatist assaults along its eastern perimeter, aimed against the villages of Chornukhyne, Ridkodub and Nikishyne, the Horlivka group renewed its advance towards Vuhlehirsk, a key position in defending the Debaltseve bulge against encirclement.[54]

Early morning, after a preparatory artillery bombardment, elements of the 13th “Chernihov” battalion and “Svitiaz” special police unit defending the village, were attacked by strong armored units belonging to the 3rd and Oplot motorized rifle brigades. After several hours of hard fighting the Ukrainian defenders were forced to abandon their strong points and the Russian backed separatists were able to gain control over the town. Four separatist tanks together with several armored vehicles were destroyed by anti-tank mines and 13th battalions attached tank support. One of these was a T-72B1, which was not part of the Ukrainian tank inventory, taken out on top of strongpoint “Vovk.” In the following days, elements of the 25th Kyivska Rus battalion abandoned their positions around Nikishyne in the eastern sector, pulling back to join 1st battalion/30th brigade and the 2nd Donbas and 1st Kulchytskyi National Guard battalions in a series of counterattacks aimed to retake Vuhlehirsk.[55] Violent clashes between Ukrainian and Russian tanks occurred, with Ukrainian reconnaissance units even managing to penetrate into the center of the town.[56] Although ultimately the attack failed in recapturing the village, the rapid Ukrainian counterattacks, in close cooperation with artillery, did enable them to block any further separatist advance in the direction of Debaltseve. Meanwhile, with fighting closing in on the city, civilians started evacuating the city in large numbers, thereby risking the ongoing artillery shelling.[57]

On February 1, in another attempt to close the corridor from the north, separatists again attacked several Ukrainian strongpoints. At “Sasha,” located on the southern outskirts of Troitske, approximately 100 separatist fighters managed to get into the rear of the Ukrainian position unseen. Assaulting at dawn, they initially managed to surprise the defenders, seizing one tank and clearing the dugouts with hand grenades. While the Ukrainian soldiers fought desperately to withstand the onslaught, a reserve formation of two T-64 tanks belonging to 3rd battalion-17th tank brigade, along with accompanying infantry, rushed to their aid. Dodging incoming RPGs as they approached the strongpoint, the tanks inflicted numerous casualties upon what turned out to be mercenaries and after expending much of their ammunition managed to repulse the attack.[58] Near the village of Ridkodub, situated at the eastern part of the Frontline, Russian hybrid forces attacked strongpoint “Stanislav.” It was manned by a company of six tanks from17th tank brigade, of which only one was deemed operational, along with some infantry belonging to the 25th Kyivska Rus battalion. Nonetheless, they succeeded in holding their position. Destroying two T-64 tanks which were traced back to 7th motorized rifle brigade, coming from Russia’s Southern Military District.[59] Further north, meanwhile, near Chernukhino, Isa Munayev, commander of the Chechen volunteer “Dudayev” battalion fighting alongside the Ukrainians, was killed while conducting a reconnaissance patrol.[60]

Six days of continuous artillery shelling finally came to an end on February 2.[61] The first phase of the battle of Debaltseve was over and with the Russian hybrid forces temporarily suspending offensive operations, the intensity of combat slowly but steadily decreased.[62] Some of the regular Russian units who had been involved in the fighting over the previous days, were identified as the 8th Guards- and 18th Guards Motor-Rifle brigades, as well as 25th Spetsnaz regiment, all deriving from Russia’s Southern Military District. Along with 5th tank- and 83rd air assault brigade all the way from Eastern Military District, some of its personnel heaving distinct Asian features.[63] The latter losing a Russian Orlan-10 drone above Debaltseve on February 3.[64] That day a one-day-ceasefire was agreed upon between the separatist forces and the Ukrainian units, although around midday salvos of Grad rockets were again unleashed upon the city’s defenders. By that time an estimated 8.000 civilians had already fled the Debaltseve area.[65] While Ukrainian forces kept separatist concentration areas under sustained artillery shelling, shortage of available combat troops forced them to maintain a static defensive posture. The Russians, meanwhile, continued pouring in fresh units and equipment, in preparation for the second phase of the battle.[66]



Second Phase
The days directly following the short-lived ceasefire, overall combat activity around Debaltseve remained at a relatively low level, with the notable exception of a SU-25 “Frogfoot” ground-attack plane strafing Ukrainian positions. Separatists claimed deploying a SU-25 that was supposedly captured from the Ukrainian air force. ATO headquarters subsequently denied this, emphasizing the probability of a Russian airplane instead.[67] Meanwhile, separatist forces continued regrouping, reinforcing and redistributing men and material for the upcoming renewal of the Debaltseve offensive.[68]Multiple Russian hybrid tactical groups were again identified closing in on the city through Altsjevsk and Krasnyj Loetsj, positioning themselves on both sides of the salient.[69] At the northern sector of the bottle neck, Cossack formations were replaced by combined tactical groups, containing both Russian soldiers and mercenaries.[70] Despite separatist artillery shelling the M3 MSR on a daily basis, Ukrainian convoys continued bringing in supplies and ammunition and evacuate the wounded.[71] Ukrainian artillery on the other hand regularly conducted pre-emptive strikes against separatist assembly areas, in order to hamper their preparations.[72] A humanitarian corridor was temporarily created to enable the remaining civilians to escape the upcoming onslaught.[73] Initial preparatory artillery bombardments beginning on February 8 finally, however, made an end to the brief lull in the fighting and signaled the upcoming renewal of the offensive.[74]
 

jward

passin' thru
On February 9, separatist assaults were again launched along the entire length of the Debaltseve salient. Ukrainian artillery batteries for their part inflicted considerable casualties, but only partly succeeded in delaying the advance.[75] Early that morning a group of Russian mercenaries coming out of Vuhlehirsk managed to approach the M3, passing by the village of Kalynivka through a series of ravines and forested areas. Upon reaching the M3, they placed mines on the road, effectively cutting the MSR running from Debaltseve towards Artemivsk. Supported by elements of Russian 25th Spetsnaz regiment and 5th tank brigade, they continued their advance, capturing the crucial village of Lohvynovo, which had contained only one observation post manned by troops from 54th Ukrainian Intelligence Battalion. For the next six hours the Ukrainian high command failed to inform all of its units that the MSR was now blocked, resulting in numerous Ukrainian convoys being ambushed, losing several vehicles and dozens of men killed or captured.[76] Ironically, 1st battalion/30th mechanized brigade had occupied a string of six strong defensive positions, covering all approaches from the area around Vuhlehirsk towards Lohvynovo, until they had been ordered to pull back the day just before the attack. When they were ordered to advance again twelve hours later in order to recapture Lohvynovo, the attack soon slackened, after two of their T-64s were destroyed by anti-tank missiles.[77] With the M3 now closed to Ukrainian convoys, the high command ordered the establishment of Task Force “Bars” operating from Luhanske, with the mission of safely directing supply convoys along the country roads running parallel to the M3.[78]

The following day the separatists launched the previously mentioned long range artillery strike against the Ukrainian headquarters at Kramatorsk airfield, resulting in 8 civilians and 4 Ukrainian soldiers killed and further wounding over 60 people.[79] The strike was conducted by two BM-30 “Smerch” heavy MLRS positioned near Horlivka, using satellite navigation and geo-referencing technology to coordinate the strike.[80] Although the separatists by now claimed to have surrounded the entire salient, Ukrainian high command maintained that the encirclement was not yet complete. In reality, however, whilst not entirely cut off, all of the roads leading in and out of the city were under continued and effective separatist artillery shelling. At the same time, at the eastern edge of the bulge, the attacks also continued. While the Ukrainians, after two weeks of heavy street fighting, were forced to abandon the village of Chornukhyne, Ukrainian Grad attacks inflicted heavy losses upon the Prizrak (Ghost) brigade.[81] Several Ukrainian counterattacks were also undertaken in order to recapture Lohvynovo, all to no avail.[82] It was not until the next day that the separatists were temporarily forced to abandon the village, due to ongoing Ukrainian artillery shelling, only to recapture it again the day after.[83]

In the run-up towards the implementation of the Minsk II agreement on February 15 (signed on February 12), the Russian hybrid army’s offensive shifted into a higher gear. The fighting for the control of Lohvynovo continued, with Ukrainian units emanating from 24th, 30th and 92th brigades, 1st tank brigade, 79th airborne brigade as well as the Donbas battalion attacking from the north in force. The following tank clash, on February 12, resulted in Russia’s 5th tank brigade losing 8 of their T-72Bs, against 4 Ukrainian T-64BMs “Bulat” tanks. Despite this battlefield success, however, they were not able to press on the attack.[84] Around the same time a Russian R-166-0.5 radio station was spotted inside Lohvynovo, which enabled its operators to establish a secure radio connection over distances between 500 and 1000 kilometers, possibly indicating command and control over the operation coming directly from Russia.[85] That night, another 50 Russian tanks, together with 40 Grad, 9A52-4 “Tornado” and BM-27 “Uragan” MLRS crossed the Ukrainian border near Izvarino, farther raising the level of Russian involvement.[86] Three days later a British pro-Russian journalist unintentionally disclosed the degree of Russian military presence, when he filmed a column of Russian T-72B3 tanks at the frontline near Debaltseve.[87] Around the same time, northeast of the city, a sergeant from 25th battalion acting as a forward observer, famously managed to knock out a T-72B3, destroying it with a single shot of indirect fire, conducted by a Msta-B 152mm howitzer belonging the 55th artillery brigade.[88]

With Russian forces increasingly incapable of replacing rising losses, different units were merged together and continued the attack, despite ongoing artillery shelling.[89] On February 14 therefore, elements of the 136th Guards motor rifle brigade and 25th Spetsnaz regiment who had occupied Lohvynovo, were relieved by a combined formation from 27th Guards motor rifle brigade and 217th Guards airborne regiment.[90] Nonetheless, apart from a couple of tracks running through open fields, the encirclement was maintained and while the Ukrainians were slowly beginning to prepare a withdrawal, some units already started to undertake small scale breakout attempts.[91] The next day, while reporting on the fighting around Debaltseve, Russian media channel “Life News” unintentionally exposed the extent of Russian involvement even further by showing vehicles with clear markings belonging to 136th Guards motor rifle brigade, originating from Buynaksk in Russia’s Southern Military District.[92]

As a result of the Russian hybrid army’s failure to fully achieve their objective of capturing Debaltseve before the Minsk II cease-fire agreement was to go into effect at midnight February 15th, they simply chose to ignore it. No longer regarding the surrounded city as part of the actual Frontline, but as an internal issue instead.[93] That same day the remaining Ukrainian troops in Debaltseve received a mass text message on their cell phones, telling them that “they won’t be killed if they surrender.”[94] Presumably emitted through the use of Russian “Leer-3” EW systems or possibly even portable transmitters, messages like these were regularly sent in order to destabilize Ukrainian defenses by means of demotivating their troops.[95] Early morning next day started with massive artillery strikes all along the Frontline, leading to a record number totalling 101 artillery strikes on February 16th, including by a number of massive 203mm 2S7 “Pion” self-propelled guns.[96] Ukrainians claimed that for every salvo they fired, they received 10 to 15 salvos in return. The Russians especially demonstrated their advanced Reconnaissance Fire Complex, culminating in an increased sensor-to-shooter capability. Effectively linking artillery to intelligence, resulting in precision targeting in near-real time through the employment of radars for conducting counter-battery fire, Electronic Warfare systems and especially UAVs.[97] Accounts of Ukrainian soldiers being targeted by artillery, just seconds after being spotted by a UAV or after making use of their phones, were numerous over the course of the battle.

The area east of the M3, between Lohvynovo and Novohryhorivka, as well between Lozove en Kalynivka to its west, was now firmly in control of separatist forces. Although Ukrainian artillery succeeded in in destroying part of a rebel convoy, comprising around 30 tracked and wheeled vehicles, on its way from Alchevsk towards Debaltseve, the separatist advance continued relentlessly. South of Novohryhorivka and Nizhniy Lozove they captured a number of hills overlooking the last county roads leading out of the encirclement.[98] With the Ukrainian troops finally surrendering the entire area around Chornukhyne, the eastern flank of the salient now also started to collapse completely.[99] Around the same time, using massive artillery and tank support, separatist forces broke through around Verhulivka. From there they continued advancing towards the eastern city outskirts, entering Debaltseve and conquering its important railroad junction on the 17th.[100]

Meanwhile, the likely sighting of a Russian general named Lentsov within the city of Debaltseve that day, raised yet more questions about the true depth of Russian military involvement.[101] With two-thirds of the city swiftly under separatist control and heavy street fighting underway, several Ukrainian units now started to fall back in order to escape the encirclement.[102] West of Debaltseve the 25th Kyivska Rus battalion in defenseof Komuna, was already close to getting overrun.[103] While ATO headquarters was still in denial of the impending disaster, separatists claimed that by then it was no longer possible for Ukrainian troops to escape the pocket, without suffering considerable casualties. Rumors were even going around that the Kyivska Rus battalion had already requested a safe corridor out of the city.[104] 40th Kryvbas battalion, being surrounded for almost two days while guarding the north-eastern perimeter, had lost two of its strongpoints called “Moisha” and “Kopie” that morning, with around 100 troops being captured in the process.[105] Unable to evacuate their killed and wounded and ammunition running dangerously low, morale started to disintegrate.[106] Around 50 men in defense of strongpoint “Zenith,” were able to successfully withdraw 20 kilometers on foot, finally reaching Luhanske at 04:40 early next morning.[107] After that, only around 60 soldiers still remained at 40th Kryvbas battalion headquarters.[108] Under the sound of distant artillery explosions, half of them were able to make it towards 128th brigade headquarters, located near Lohvynovo along the M3, where they joined in the retreat ordered by the 128th brigade’s commander that evening.[109]
 

jward

passin' thru
Withdrawal
And thus began the controversial withdrawal, which according to official Ukrainian statements was planned in advance and generally executed in an orderly fashion. Those who were there, however, largely tell a different story about the events as they occurred. The plan, as it was explained afterwards, encompassed three different stages. Initially, 128th brigades most southeastern formations, deployed between Maloorivka and Orlovo-Ivanivka, were to fall back towards the city center. They were to be followed by the units positioned around Chornukhyne. Finally, the remainder of the troops in defense of the city itself, among whom presumably 13th battalion and the remnants of 40th battalion, would join in the retreat. During these phases, 128th brigades 15th battalion was to take the lead, with its 21st battalion together with elements of 30th brigade forming the rearguard.[110] From there on, five different columns were to be organized, which in turn would withdraw from the encirclement by means of two different routes.[111] Flanks protection was to be conducted by paratroopers belonging to the elite 95th Air Assault brigade and a combined Spetsnaz formation, with troops belonging to 3rd and 8th Special Purpose Regiments as well as 73rd Naval Special Purpose Center. Every available artillery piece was to be used to cover the movements along the pre-planned routes. The whole operation was planned to be executed between 18:00 on the 17th and 08:00 on the morning of the 18th.[112] Supposedly, the order to withdraw was given to the appropriate commanders just a few hours in advance, although, due to failing communications, it did not reach all of the intended units, who nonetheless withdrew on their own initiative. According to the Ukrainian high command, however, Semen Semenchenko, the commander of the Donbas battalion, disclosed secret information concerning the routes chosen on his Facebook page, just hours before the withdrawal was to commence. Semenchenko, who was also a member of the Ukrainian Parliament, on his part accused the Ukrainian high command of gross incompetents regarding to what was about to happen.[113]

One of those five columns was organized at the site of the 128th brigade’s headquarters near Lohvynovo, just after midnight, to where the remainder of 40th battalion had moved. It numbered around 100 vehicles and over a 1000 troops.[114] Exhausted, low on supplies and confronted with superior enemy numbers, the troops set out around 03:00 as one of the last columns trying to escape the encirclement, while making use of the final hours of darkness. With control over a few secondary roads supposedly still disputed and open to Ukrainian units, Ukrainian artillery was doing its best cover the retreat and counter further separatist attacks.[115] In the middle of the night, in minus twenty degrees Celsius and total black-out conditions while maintaining strict radio silence, the column began moving back towards Debaltseve, in order to link up with other remaining Ukrainian units around the southern edge of Novohryhorivka. After the link up the column continued north, passing through between Novohryhorivka and Lohvynovo, passing Nyzhnje towards Mironivskiy and Luhanske and from there onwards towards Artemivsk. Ukrainian paratroopers and special forces had meanwhile taken possession of a number of heights north of Lohvynovo, to enable them to cover the retreating columns. The separatists, however soon became aware of their presence and engaged them from the high-rise buildings.[116] The column itself soon started to come under repeated attack, by both indirect and direct fire, gradually claiming its toll on the weary troops. Around 07:30 that morning, they stumbled into an enemy tank platoon which had taken up position on a ridge line ahead. The tanks started firing straight into the convoy of trucks, some of whom quickly left the column out into the open fields, in order to present a smaller target.[117] While 128th brigade’s remaining BMPs and T-64s did their best to protect the trucks, some of them were destroyed by enemy fire, while others broke down or got stuck, sentencing those on board to a certain death or capture by the enemy.[118] Around a dozen wounded and many more killed were left behind, while the survivors tried to make it to safety across a final 500 meters of open ground, with artillery shells exploding all around them.[119] It was just a small part of the scenery that was looking alike in every direction.

As to the other columns, those who left first initially managed to escape the enemy encirclement relatively unscratched, only to come under increasing attack when daylight arose. Regarding those who were last to withdraw, they presumably did not fare much better as compared to the 128th brigade’s column as described above. At least one of the other columns took the more northerly route, leaving Novohryhorivka in the direction of Troitske.[120]Some of the initial larger columns probably disintegrated under the relentless assaults into smaller detachments, each trying to find their way out of the inferno. One of these smaller groupings, also formed by elements of the 128th brigade, consisted of twelve vehicles, of which only one made it through back to Ukrainian lines.[121] According to one witness, his company, belonging to 13th battalion and probably as one of the last units to depart, reached Artemivsk during the afternoon on February 18, with only 45 out of its original complement of 150 men left.[122] A member of 25th battalion stated that only 14 out of a total of 100 in his unit survived the ordeal.[123] Some reports even went as far by stating that only about 150 of 128th brigade’s original complement of 2000 troops were ultimately able to reach Artemivsk alive.[124]Strayed groups and individual stragglers, however, raised these numbers back to a higher degree over the days directly following the withdrawal.[125] Soldiers without compasses or maps simply had to follow the abandoned vehicles for directions.[126] Nonetheless, decimated units, bringing with them all kinds of heavy equipment, as well as individual vehicles, most of them damaged by incoming fire, streamed into Artemivsk all day during February 18 and continued well into the day after. The whole range of Soviet legacy vehicles was passing by, some of them being pulled, others managing on their own power. Ambulances drove on and off in order to transport the many wounded towards the nearby hospitals. Meanwhile, soldiers everywhere were expressing their discontent about the way ATO headquarters had executed the operation.



Aftermath
By February 19th, the Russian hybrid army was firmly in control of the city of Debaltseve. One tactical group, containing both tanks and armored vehicles, continued to advance towards Luhanske, but was halted by Ukrainian artillery fire.[127]Around the same time the ATO spokesman declared the redeployment of Ukrainian forces towards a new defensive line to be almost completed.[128] The Battle of Debaltseve was nearing its end and with it came time to reflect on what had occurred. There was widespread criticism among the Ukrainian troops regarding their military leadership and the manner in which it had conducted the operations. Semen Semenchenko, together with commanders of other Ukrainian “right wing” volunteer units, even went as far as to announce their intentions of establishing their own military headquarters, parallel to the official General Staff.[129] Despite the fact that the Minsk II agreement did not put an end to the fighting as a whole and the Battle of Debaltseve did not end the war, it did turn out to be the last major offensive, at least until the present day.[130] Although the conflict has continued ever since, the city has remained in separatist hands, with combat operations across the Donbas degenerating into what one American colonel described as fighting “World War One with technology.”[131]

Several separatist videos made during the aftermath of the fighting showed Debaltseve and the surrounding area devastated by artillery, littered with dead bodies and burned-out wreckages. Some of them with their turrets completely blown off, as well as numerous Ukrainian armored vehicles, trucks, lots of ammunition and other military hardware left behind damaged or intact.[132] Sources would soon start to contradict each other in no small amount as to how many of the troops actually made it out alive. Those who managed to reach Artemivsk repeatedly spoke of hundreds of dead, with many more troops, dead and alive, supposedly having been left behind.[133] Ukrainian President Poroshenko contradicted this during the afternoon on February 18th, declaring that 128th brigade, elements of 30th brigade, 25th and 40th battalions as well as National Guard units, together forming 80% of the troops involved, all had left Debaltseve intact.[134] He spoke of a “planned and orderly withdrawal,”[135] officially suffering 136 killed and 331 wounded over the course of the battle (January 27th to February 18th), not including volunteer battalions.[136] By evening a total of 2.475 troops had supposedly withdrawn from Debaltseve, together with 200 pieces of military hardware.[137] According to the separatists, however, Ukrainian losses numbered well up to 3.000 killed or captured and many more wounded, with a large portion of Ukrainian armor and equipment abandoned or destroyed.[138] According to a United Nations situation report dated February 27th, approximately 17.000 civilians had fled the city, from a pre-war population numbering 25.000 inhabitants. Around 2.000 refugees returned to Debaltseve within a week after the fighting had ended. When the smoke lifted, over 500 bodies, most of them civilians, were discovered within the ruined buildings. With the survivors in dire need of almost every basic need, the new rebel authorities provided for the initial requirements, while humanitarian assistance increased soon after hostilities were over.[139]

Although ATO headquarters maintained the relatively low casualty rate, the local morgue in Artemivsk received dozens of bodies over the course of the day.[140] Soldiers belonging to Ukrainian the 44th artillery brigade covering the retreat stated that; “they were packing huge artillery trucks full of dead bodies.[141] Western journalists witnessing the Ukrainian troops streaming back into Artemivsk, likewise raised their doubts regarding the Ukrainian headquarters version of events.[142] According to the reconnaissance commander belonging to the 25th Kyivska Rus battalion, estimated Ukrainian losses must have been somewhere between 400-500 men killed, against approximately 2900 separatists.[143] Two weeks later Ukrainian authorities reluctantly confirmed the transfer of another 50 bodies, from soldiers who had died in the defense of Debaltseve.[144] According to a report containing material assembled by the former Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, at least 70 active duty Russian servicemen had been killed in action during the battle, not counting volunteers, mercenaries and proxies.[145]

In conclusion, it seems highly likely that Ukrainian casualty numbers lay much higher than officially admitted, while on the other hand separatists losses probably significantly exceeded those of Ukraine. This outcome, although undoubtedly a Ukrainian defeat, at least made it a Pyrrhic victory for the Russian hybrid army. Despite these losses, however, Russian intervention was very effective in a number of ways. Over the course of the battle, as well as during the Donbas War as a whole, Russia demonstrated its innovative methods for increasing the combat capabilities of the separatist forces, while continuously, though increasingly unsuccessfully, denying Russian military involvement. First by raising the number of available combatants, while at the same time improving their war fighting capabilities, mainly through the integration of highly trained Russian military personnel and the transfer of sophisticated weapons systems. Secondly by effectively integrating state-of-the-art technologies into regular tactical activities and the employment of traditional Russian military characteristics like the emphases on massive firepower. All in all, although occasionally resembling to siege warfare, the battle had displayed a hybrid army, using a variety of methods, executing a classical battle of encirclement.

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extensive footnotes at source
 

danielboon

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US spy plane appears in South China Sea amid increased tensions with Beijing
By
News Desk
-
2020-07-16
0


One of the US Navy’s MQ-4C Triton high altitude long endurance (HALE) reconnaissance drones was spotted entering the South China Sea on Wednesday – the latest addition to an increasingly long list of US spy planes plying the waterway in recent months.
The unmanned aerial vehicle was spotted entering the northern end of the South China Sea via the Bashi Channel on Wednesday, where it seemed to zero-in on some object of interest before departing the region.

Sputnik reported in January on the stationing of the US Navy’s first two MQ-4C Tritons on Guam, at the far side of the Philippine Sea from the Bashi Channel, noting at the time that the aircraft’s wide radius of operations would allow it to enter parts of the strategic waterway where Washington disputes many of China’s claims of sovereignty.
While one day the US Navy hopes to use Tritons, which it specially adapted from the Air Force’s RQ-4 Global Hawk for nautical surveillance, to patrol the entire western Pacific region, for now appearances of the Tritons remain relatively rare.
Their deployment to Guam represents the achievement of early operational capability (EOC) for the unmanned aircraft, which will only see more regular use once testers are satisfied they’ve ironed out many of the system’s remaining bugs. According to The Diplomat, that could be achieved sometime next year.
The Triton is reportedly capable of staying aloft for more than 24 hours at a time and can soar at altitudes up to 10 miles, or 53,000 feet. It is unarmed.
ALSO READ US deploys 2 aircraft carriers to South China Sea in show of force towards Beijing
However, the Navy and Air Force have a bevy of surveillance aircraft in the region, which have recently been flying daily patrols across the South China Sea, East China Sea and Philippine Sea.
The day prior, an E-8C Joint STARS aircraft, a massive electronic intelligence, surveillance and command and control platform modified from a Boeing 707 airliner, was spotted patrolling the waters off Guangdong Province, near Hong Kong.

Source: Sputnik


 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Fighting destabilizes the Russian periphery — and threatens US interests
By James J. Coyle, opinion contributor — 07/17/20 03:00 PM EDT 69 Comments
The views expressed by contributors are their own and not the view of The Hill

The cauldron of war continues to boil beneath the surface of the “frozen” Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. For the first time since 2016, firefights have broken out between the two sides, including the use of artillery, tanks and armed drones.

There is no demilitarized zone between the two sides, only a line of contact that has remained largely unchanged since 1994. About one soldier a month is killed by sniper fire across the contested region. On July 12, however, soldiers on the front line awoke to find the status quo had been altered: Armenia installed a new position on the border that gave them a tactical advantage in the area.

According to Armenia, Azerbaijan was unwilling to accept unilateral changes outside of the Minsk Peace Process and its forces pushed back. According to Azerbaijan, Armenia launched an unprovoked attack across the international border.

The fighting has resulted in at least 16 fatalities, including an Azerbaijani major general who was second in command to its Third Army Corps. Eleven of the dead were Azerbaijani soldiers, four were Armenian soldiers, and one was a 76-year-old Azerbaijani civilian.

The conflict revolves around control of the former autonomous region of Nagorno Karabakh and surrounding areas. This area, considered under international law and recognized by even the government of Armenia as being part of Azerbaijan, has been occupied by Armenia for more than 25 years. The European Court of Human Rights declared Armenia to be an occupying force, and the United Nations Security Council has issued four resolutions (UNSCR 822, 853, 874 and 884) rejecting the seizure of territories by force and demanding that Armenian forces withdraw from the occupied areas.

What makes the current fighting unique is that it is not along the Nagorno Karabakh line of contact, but across the Armenian-Azerbaijan international border. This new conflict zone, Tovuz, is near the Caspian oil and gas pipelines to Western Europe. Fighting in this area easily could expand into a conflict that would include NATO members who rely on the energy flow.

Armenia has been able to hold onto the territory because of the armed support of its ally, Russia. During the 1992-1994 war, Armenia granted Russia the rights to three military bases that house at least 5,000 Russian troops. When asked if Russia would respond to an armed attempt by Azerbaijan to reclaim its own territory, Moscow always has answered ambiguously. Armenian military doctrine holds that Russia is the guarantor of the country’s military security, and in the past few years Russia equipped its military bases in Armenian Gyumri and Erebuni with MiG-29 fighters, Mi-24 helicopters, and more than 70 tanks, armored vehicles and artillery systems.

In 2015, Nagorno-Karabakh’s officials told the Daily Beast in interviews that neither Armenia nor Nagorno-Karabakh could survive without Russia’s support in the conflict with Azerbaijan. (At the same time, Moscow is Azerbaijan’s leading weapons supplier.)

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reportedly has called the leaders of both countries, and his foreign ministry issued a news release urging restraint by both sides. Other than words, however, Moscow has taken no steps to stop the fighting. The Kremlin-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization, of which Armenia is a member, was supposed to discuss the violence but the meeting was cancelled for unknown reasons.
Most Americans likely have never heard of the areas under discussion, but there are important American interests at stake. Azerbaijan is an alternate source of energy for American allies in Europe and Israel, and fighting in the Tovuz area threatens that. Azerbaijan also is developing into an international transportation and telecommunications center. Armenia is the homeland for a large diaspora community in America. Both countries have contributed troops to American efforts in Afghanistan. The continued fighting makes a mockery of America’s role as a co-chair of the Minsk Peace Process, which is supposed to negotiate an end to the conflict.

There are dead soldiers and a flaunting of international law, the European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations, but Russia continues to solidify its military position in its near abroad. America should use its diplomatic and economic muscle to bring the parties back to the negotiating table before things get out of hand or Russia strengthens its position even more.

James J. Coyle, Ph.D., is CEO of Coyle International Consulting Inc., specializing in international security issues, and an adjunct professor at Pepperdine University’s School of Public Policy. He served in a number of U.S. government positions, including as director of Middle East Studies, U.S. Army War College. He is the author of “Russia’s Border Wars and Frozen Conflicts.”
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Published 1 hour ago
Chinese spokesperson says US should 'stop playing dumb' on nuclear arms agreement
White House officials have called for a new nuclear arms agreement between Russia, China and the US
By Caitlin McFall | Fox News
Video

Pompeo: If we're going to fight for freedoms abroad we need to protect them at home

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo discusses the importance of human rights with Bill Hemmer.

China has dismissed U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's calls for the United Nations Security Council to extend the Iranian arms embargo, citing concerns that the regime will become an arms dealer – with the suppliers being Russia and China.

Pompeo said in press conference this week that the U.S. has intelligence which suggests “that China will sell weapons systems to Iran” and that “Iranians believe that China will sell systems to Iran.”
The embargo, which prevents Iran from being able to purchase or sell arms, is a part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also referred to as the Iran nuclear deal.
The deal is set to expire on Oct. 18.

RUSSIA CALLS US’S NEWEST STANCE ON NUCLEAR ARMS AGREEMENT 'UNDIPLOMATIC,' CONSIDERS NOT EXTENDING

“Pompeo's remarks are totally unreasonable and apparently an excuse to push the U.N. Security Council to extend arms embargo against Iran,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said in a press conference Friday.

“Without violating international obligations including Security Council resolutions, China can carry out normal arms trade cooperation with any country and such cooperation is beyond reproach.”

President Trump pulled out of the arms agreement in 2018, calling the Obama-era deal “decaying and rotten.”

Intelligence officials and U.N member states warned that the move could destabilize the region’s security.

“The U.S. has no right to criticize China on this issue. It unsigned the Arms Trade Treaty last year while China recently just joined it,” Hua said Friday.

“The two countries' attitudes towards international rules stand in such sharp contrast that they are self-explanatory.”

Pompeo also warned the U.N. last month that should the embargo expire, Iran will be able to purchase “Russian-made fighter jets” which have the capability to strike “up to a 3,000-kilometer radius, putting cities like Riyadh, New Delhi, Rome, and Warsaw in Iranian crosshairs.”

POMPEO: IF UN LETS IRAN ARMS EMBARGO EXPIRE, IT WILL 'BETRAY' IDEALS OF PEACE, SECURITY

Pompeo suggested that China and Iran are already working to establish a relationship in arms sales.

“I think Europeans should stare at that and realize that the risk of this is real and that the work between Iran and the Chinese Communist Party may well commence rapidly and robustly on October 19th if we’re not successful at extending the U.N. arms embargo,” Pompeo said this week.

The Trump administration is also pushing to have a new nuclear arms deal with Russia that includes China – though a top Russia diplomat, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said he was not optimistic this agreement would be met.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which was signed in 2010 by former President Barack Obama and then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, was made in accordance with the original nuclear arms deal from 1987 and worked to further eliminate the creation and stockpiles of nuclear arms.

RUSSIA, CHINA BLOCK LATEST UN SECURITY COUNCIL ATTEMPT TO EXTEND SYRIA CROSS-BORDER AID PROGRAM

President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin pulled out of the 1987 nuclear arms treaty last year, leaving the START treaty as the only nuclear non-proliferation agreement between the two countries.

Should the treaty expire, it would be the first time the U.S. and Russia were not united in a nuclear arms agreement since the Cold War.

Lavrov said that Russia would be willing to extend the treaty which is set to expire in Feb. 2021 without contingencies, but the U.S. is demanding that China sign the new agreement as well.

China has repeatedly said they will not enter into an agreement that requires they reduce their nuclear arms.

“The U.S. has conducted more nuclear testing than others, over a thousand at home and abroad, causing unspeakable damage to other countries' ecological environment,” Hua said Friday. “By dragging China into this issue, it seeks to let itself off the hook and out of the straitjacket.”

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She added that China was one of the first signatories of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, an agreement that bans all testing of nuclear weapons, in 1996.

“We hope the U.S. will stop playing dumb,” Hua said from Friday’s press conference.
“With the largest nuclear arsenal, the US should respond to international concern, earnestly fulfill its special and primary responsibilities to nuclear disarmament, respond positively to Russia's call on extending the New START and further drastically reduce its nuclear arms stockpile.”
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

How Iran’s Missile Arsenal Holds The Middle East Hostage – Analysis
July 18, 2020 Arab News 0 Comments
By Arab News

By Christopher Hamill-Stewart

The month of July has seen multiple attempted missile and drone strikes by Houthi forces on civilian targets in Saudi Arabia.

The latest was a failed attack on July 14, which has at once focused global attention on Tehran’s outsized missile program and highlighted how the regime used its proxy armies and arsenal of weapons to sow chaos across the Middle East.

A 2019 report by the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) laid bare the extent of Iran’s commitment to its missile program and made it clear that these weapons presented a stark threat to Saudi Arabia and the wider region.

Iran’s missile arsenal was by far the largest in the Middle East, the report warned. Run entirely by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and with a price tag (estimated at billions of dollars per year) that was accelerating the collapse of the domestic economy, these weapons were a core part of Iran’s aggressive foreign policy.

Experts told Arab News that Iran’s missiles were not only dangerous pieces of weaponry in themselves, but were being held in dangerous hands, and were the pillar of a hostile and belligerent foreign policy.

The threat of the IRGC’s missiles, analysts and the CSIS report confirmed, could not be underestimated. An all-out missile assault on a nearby country, such as Saudi Arabia or the UAE, “would overwhelm virtually any missile-defense system,” the CSIS study claimed.

The range of Iran’s missiles, from roughly 300 km to 2,000 km and above, posed a unique challenge to Saudi Arabia — especially given Tehran’s hostility toward the Kingdom — and also presented a catastrophic threat to states throughout the Middle East.

Ian Williams, deputy director of the CSIS’ missile defense project, told Arab News that the ability to overwhelm any air defenses was a central part of the Iranian strategy.

He said Tehran realized that it could not “outright defeat the US and GCC (partners), but if they (the Iranians) can make such a conflict painful enough, they can deter external threats in all but the most extreme circumstances.”

As Iran’s relationships with its neighbors and the US have turned sour, and its economic situation spirals further out of control, the regime has been increasingly preoccupied with its own survival. This has not, however, meant that Iran has taken a step back from its truculent geopolitical posture.

“Iran is using its missiles as a means of power projection. We see this in its missile attacks in Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia,” Williams added.

Tehran had also been upgrading its arsenal in recent years, “making big strides in increasing the accuracy and lethality of its missiles,” he said. “Iran is increasingly able to use its missiles to make effective attacks on enemy military bases and formations, rather than just a terror weapon to attack cities.”

Dr. Christopher Bolan, professor of Middle East security studies at the US Army War College, said that as sanctions bit and Iran’s conventional military was undermined by poor leadership, Tehran was increasingly reliant on using and exporting ballistic missiles to its proxy forces throughout the region.

“Iran has equipped several of its closest proxy forces — the Houthis, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Kata’ib Hezbollah — with advanced missile capabilities that have been used to strike targets in Saudi Arabia, northern Israel, and in Iraq respectively,” he told Arab News.
“Iran has cultivated a regionwide network of proxy forces that have the potential to inflict significant damage on US or allied interests, with the added advantage of providing Tehran with a degree of cover and plausible deniability.

“In Iran’s national security strategy, these proxies are an essential element of deterrence,” Bolan said.
The evidence that Tehran was leaning further into this strategy was abundant. This year, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Iran’s most powerful ally in Iraq, was suspected of having been responsible for a series of missile attacks in the country, including one that killed two American soldiers and one British service member.

The Sept. 14, 2019, attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais, too, provided ample evidence of how Tehran mobilized its proxy forces to strike terror. Claimed by the Houthi rebels at the time, the sophistication of the attacks meant that they would have been impossible without Iranian assistance and arms.

As Tuesday’s attempted Houthi strike on the Kingdom demonstrated, these tactics were still being actively pursued by Tehran to this day.

Samuel Hickey, a research analyst at the Washington-based Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, told Arab News: “Iran often operates in the gray zone between war and peace.

“This strategy helps Iran further its security goals, while not necessarily provoking direct retaliation,” he said, adding that it also created “uncertainty in how adversaries should respond.”

All experts that spoke with Arab News testified to the uniquely difficult task of responding effectively to the Iranian missile threat.

If pushed too hard, they agreed, the Iranians could lay waste to swathes of the Middle East, while likely destroying themselves in the process. But if appeasement continued, there was every indication that the IRGC would continue to destabilize the region, proliferate ballistic missiles, and accelerate its pursuit of nuclear arms.

“The Iranian missile threat cannot be negated, only mitigated,” Bolan said. The first step, he added, was already in motion, that being “strengthening the missile defense capabilities of the Arab Gulf states.”

But he pointed out that improvements were still required in that first line of defense. “More work needs to be done to integrate these disparate national systems into a regional network capable of detection of launches.”

The US, Bolan said, could play a pivotal role in guaranteeing the safety of the Kingdom and wider GCC.

“The US should continue to bolster the individual national missile defense capabilities of regional allies, and (act as) a primary deterrent to Iranian missile strikes,” he added.

He noted that the US should use its position as a key ally to many states in the Middle East to push for greater integration, which would “create a more effective regionwide missile defense capability.”

As things stood, Tehran continued to put ballistic missiles, and the means to use them, into the hands of terrorists. Individual strikes could come from Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, or Syria, but at the source of every missile fired was Iranian technology and Iranian funding.

Enhanced missile defenses and cooperation between the Kingdom and its allies would mitigate the Iranian threat, but it was clear that, until Tehran gave up its misguided pursuit of regional hegemony, its weapons would pose a constant threat to those that sought stability and prosperity.

Home » How Iran’s Missile Arsenal Holds The Middle East Hostage – Analysis
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Arab News is Saudi Arabia's first English-language newspaper. It was founded in 1975 by Hisham and Mohammed Ali Hafiz. Today, it is one of 29 publications produced by Saudi Research & Publishing Company (SRPC), a subsidiary of Saudi Research & Marketing Group (SRMG).
 

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Renewed Armenian-Azerbaijani Fighting Threatens to Escalate Further
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 104
By: Pavel Felgenhauer


July 16, 2020 05:53 PM Age: 1 day

Armenian and Azerbaijani military forces are engaged in their most serious armed confrontation since the so-called Four-Day War of April 2016, when hundreds of soldiers on both sides were reportedly killed and wounded along the Line of Contact, which marks the frontier of Azerbaijan’s occupied territories in and around Karabakh (see EDM, May 5, 2016). This time, the fighting began on July 12, 2020, on the internationally recognized Azerbaijani-Armenian border, well north of Karabakh. During the Nagorno-Karabakh War in the 1990s, Yerevan refused to acknowledge its direct involvement with the forces of the breakaway self-proclaimed “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”—until then an autonomous region in Soviet Azerbaijan and mostly populated by Armenians. Large-scale fighting in Karabakh ended in 1994, with a ceasefire and a decisive Armenian victory. Armenian forces took over all of Karabakh as well as occupied a surrounding buffer zone that was previously populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis. All attempts to broker a political solution to the conflict by the so-called Minsk Group, co-chaired by the United States, Russia and France, or efforts by Moscow separately, have been deadlocked since. Skirmishes between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces have occurred regularly up and down the LoC; but as long as they remained low-key, the outside world paid little attention.

In the latest clashes (see EDM, July 14), both sides have reportedly used mortars, missiles and heavy guns. The Azerbaijani military has employed Israeli-made drones over Armenia for reconnaissance missions and, reportedly, for aerial attack. Yerevan demonstrated footage of what appeared to be the destruction of at least one Israeli-made Erbit Hermes 900 drone. Both sides have reported casualties, including one Azerbaijani general. Each government has accused the other of “aggression and provocation.” To date, there have been no verified reports of civilian casualties, and neither side has tried to cross the border or occupy any enemy territory in recent days. Azerbaijan and Armenia have both reported a lull in the fighting on July 15; but on July 16, mutual artillery shelling resumed (Militarynews.ru, July 16).

The two South Caucasus rivals have been building up their respective armed forces for years, in anticipation of a possible full-scale showdown. Azerbaijan has the advantage of a constant stream of oil and natural gas export revenues, allowing for a much larger defense budget compared to its neighbor. Armenia was buying almost exclusively Russian hardware on credit, while Azerbaijan has purchased weapons from Russia and other countries, including modern Israeli-made drones and precision-guided, semi-ballistic long-range LORA missiles that can hit any target inside Armenia or occupied Karabakh. Azerbaijan wields drones and third-generation Israeli and South Korean anti-tank missiles that neither Armenia nor Russia have in their inventories. The Armenian military (together with the proxy Karabakh army) possesses a large number of mostly Soviet-era tanks and other heavy weapons; but its Azerbaijani opponent holds a serious qualitative edge. Armenia additionally has Soviet-made R-17 (Scud-B) ballistic missiles as well as some more modern and accurate Iskander semi-ballistic missiles that could hit sensitive targets deep inside Azerbaijan, including oil and gas installations. However, the Azerbaijani military command has announced that such attacks would result in retaliatory targeting of the Armenian nuclear power plant at Metsamor, 36 kilometers west of Yerevan, probably using precision-guided LORA missiles. A precision strike at Metsamor—the only nuclear plant in the South Caucasus—could possibly cause a 1986 Chernobyl-style radioactive contamination disaster (Interfax, July 16).

Armenia is largely regionally isolated and semi-surrounded by hostile Azerbaijan and Turkey. The country does have a relatively close and friendly relationship with Iran, its main trading partner and home to a large and influential Armenian community (as well as a sizeable ethnic-Azerbaijani minority). But Iran’s international pariah status puts a stigma on Armenia in Israel and in the United States. At the same time, Armenia is a long-time Russian ally, a member of the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Yet, the sitting Armenian leader, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power two years ago, in a popular protest revolt that overthrow a Moscow-friendly regime, is seen in Russia with serious suspicion as a pro-Western revolutionary. Moscow has good relations with the autocratic regime of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and wants to dominate the entire region up to the former Soviet border with Turkey and Iran—a strategy requiring alliances not exclusively with Yerevan, but also with Baku and Tbilisi. Its presumed CSTO obligations notwithstanding, Russia resists being pulled into a conflict with Azerbaijan. Since the fighting is on Armenia’s state border, Yerevan requested an emergency CSTO council meeting, which was planned for July 13, but then called off without explanation. The Armenian embassy in Moscow called for CSTO support and solidarity “in deterring Azerbaijani attacks and possible hostile Turkish intervention” (TASS, July 14). On July 14, in Moscow, the CSTO council gathered for a regular meeting and announced, “The member nations were informed by the Armenian representative about the armed clashes and acknowledged the fact of being briefed” (RIA Novosti, July 14). Yerevan was only able to encourage its treaty allies to make a call for a ceasefire.

It seems neither Aliyev nor Pashinyan wants further escalation, but public opinion in both countries appears to be more belligerent. Angry demonstrations have broken out in Baku, with participants calling for war and the “liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh.” Azerbaijani police used water cannons to disperse the crowds (RBC, July 15). Under heightened public pressure, an uncontrolled escalation of tit-for-tat strikes may begin expanding the fighting along the border to Karabakh, and attacks against strategic targets could commence. Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar announced that Turkey’s military will support Azerbaijan against “Armenian aggression” (Lenta.ru, July 14). Russia has a military base in Armenia, which hosts several thousand ground troops, plus armor, fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles. These forces are not there to fight Azerbaijan but to deter Turkey (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). But if push comes to shove, the massive Turkish military would have the upper hand in the South Caucasus, while sending Russian military reinforcements to Armenia through Georgia would be a problem. If the present Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict is not stopped soon by a serious ceasefire, a nightmare scenario could suddenly emerge out of the recently published Russian nuclear doctrine: A devastating attack against Russia (or its allies) that warrants the practical use of nuclear deterrence to deescalate (see EDM, June 4).
 
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