WAR 05-26-2018-to-06-01-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(322) 05-05-2018-to-05-11-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...5-11-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(323) 05-12-2018-to-05-18-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
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(324) 05-19-2018-to-05-25-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
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https://www.defensenews.com/congres...tens-retaliation-if-new-bill-stops-f-35-sale/

Congress

Turkey threatens retaliation if new bill stops F-35 sale

By: Joe Gould  
1 day ago

WASHINGTON — The Turkish government has vowed reprisals if the U.S. Congress passes a defense policy bill that prevents the sale of Lockheed Martin-made F-35 fighter jets to Ankara.

The Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday passed its version of the $716 billion National Defense Authorization Act with language that directs the Pentagon to submit a plan to Congress to remove the NATO ally from participation in the F-35 program.

“According to agreement, everybody has a mission and we expect everyone to fulfill these missions,” said Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman Hami Aksoy, Ahval reports. “Such steps are breach of the spirit of our alliance with the U.S. As our minister stated, if such steps are taken, we will have no other choice but to respond accordingly.”

Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlüt Cavuşoğlu said earlier this month the country would retaliate, after the House version of the NDAA was unveiled. That bill contains a broader prohibition on any foreign military sales to Turkey until the Pentagon reports to Congress on the impact of U.S.-Turkey tensions.

The Senate approved its version of the massive bill after meeting behind closed doors this week, but the text of the bill itself is not expected for about another week. The panel was steered by its No. 2 Republican, Sen. Jim Inhofe, of Oklahoma, as its chairman, Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., was battling brain cancer at home in Arizona.

The NDAA is several steps from becoming law. The House passed its version earlier Thursday, and the Senate must pass its version before the two are reconciled over the summer into a final bill for both chambers to pass.

One provision in the SASC-passed NDAA says the Senate believes Turkey should be sanctioned if it completes the purchase of the S-400 long-range air and anti-missile defense system from Russia.

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Future of F-35 in Italy remains a mystery under new government

Two populist parties on the brink of forming Italy’s first populist government claim strong backing to the country’s defense industry. But specifics remain murky.

By: Tom Kington

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Separate language from Sens. Thom Tillis, R-N.C., Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H., and James Lankford, R-Okla., targets the F-35 sale. It directs a report with timelines to remove the Turkish government from participation in the F-35 program with the least impact on other international program partners.

The lawmakers cited Turkey’s imprisonment of American Pastor Andrew Brunson as well as the S-400 deal. Turkish officials have said the purchase is a matter of national sovereignty, but NATO members have expressed concerns because the S-400 is not interoperable with NATO systems.

“I truly wish we could instead be working to pass an NDAA that would strengthen the relationship between Turkey and the United States,” Tillis said. “However, the Turkish government’s recent actions, including the wrongful treatment of Pastor Brunson, has made this congressional response both necessary and appropriate.”

“There is tremendous hesitancy [about] transferring sensitive F-35 planes and technology to a nation who has purchased a Russian air defense system designed to shoot these very planes down,” Shaheen said in a statement. “This amendment is meant to give the Departments of State and Defense the guidance and congressional support they need to ensure that this does not happen at this time.”

The congressional action comes as the Trump administration pressures Ankara to rethink the S-400 purchase, which was announced in December.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo testified Thursday on Capitol Hill that he had spoken with Cavuşoğlu in recent days to push for Brunson’s return and implore Ankara not to buy the S-400.

Turkey’s capacity to access the F-35, he said, “is still very much a live issue.”

U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchison called the purchase “very serious” at a public forum on Wednesday.

“They’re a very important partner,” she said of Turkey. “But no partner in NATO has ever purchased a Russian system that is not capable of being interoperable with our NATO systems.”

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[Housecarl]

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https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/26/world/asia/kim-summit-trump.html

Keeping Summit Hopes Alive Suggests Kim Jong-un May Need a Deal

By Choe Sang-Hun
May 26, 2018
Comments 75

SEOUL, South Korea — Ever since Kim Jong-un took over as the young, untested ruler of North Korea seven years ago, he has promised his country a future free from deprivation.

In his first speech as leader, he vowed that North Koreans, millions of whom starved during a famine in the 1990s, would never again have to tighten their belts. Last year, he apologized to the nation for failing to live up to that pledge, expressing how “anxious and remorseful” it made him.

Then, this year, he proclaimed a new shift to North Korea’s 25 million people: Now that the nation possessed a nuclear arsenal, it could change gears and start building a prosperous economy, after years of international sanctions.

So when President Trump on Thursday abruptly canceled their much anticipated summit meeting on June 12, the North Korean response was remarkably diplomatic and cordial, holding open the hope that the meeting could still take place, after all.

In a sign of just how important the summit is to Mr. Kim, he held an unexpected meeting on Saturday with President Moon Jae-in of South Korea to discuss how to salvage it, just the second time the two Korean leaders had ever met.

The measured response to the cancellation, and the extraordinary diplomatic scramble that followed, was a strong reminder, analysts said, that Mr. Kim not only wants a diplomatic deal with the United States. He may need one.

“North Korea can still survive under sanctions, especially if China helps it,” said Shin Beom-chul, a senior fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul. “But as long as sanctions are there, Kim Jong-un can never deliver the kind of rapid economic growth he has promised for his people.”

https://static01.nyt.com/images/201...6kim-satellite-jumbo.jpg?quality=90&auto=webp
North Korea lies at night in near darkness between the bright lights of China, above it to the northwest, and South Korea. The point of light is Pyongyang, the capital.CreditSatellite imagery from NASA

Mr. Kim’s stated desire to continue engaging with Mr. Trump — even after such a high-profile snub — does not necessarily mean the North Korean leader is willing to renounce his nuclear arsenal, the primary American demand.

No matter how painful sanctions may be, analysts say, Mr. Kim would be unwilling to give up his nuclear weapons unless an accord left him feeling completely safe without them. The security of his family-run regime is a nonnegotiable priority.

North Korea has emphasized that it wants security guarantees and will not trade its nuclear arsenal for economic benefits alone. It has also rejected assertions that it has been pressured into talks because of the pain of sanctions, adding that it does not expect help from the United States in pursuing economic development.

Indeed, the North Korean economy has been growing as much as 1 to 5 percent annually under Mr. Kim’s rule, because of a limited embrace of market forces by his government and, until late last year, loopholes in the multiple rounds of sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council.

Still, his apparent willingness to continue diplomatic efforts does suggest that Mr. Kim, 34, may be under pressure to satisfy rising expectations in North Korea for economic gains and shake off the painful grip of sanctions.

While largely depicted as a nuclear provocateur in the outside world, Mr. Kim is determined to be the face of a modern and more open North Korea at home. He has erected new buildings and repainted old ones in Pyongyang, the capital, attended a concert by a South Korean girl band and let a state orchestra play American pop music.

Mr. Kim has also sent party officials to China to learn its economic policies, and has even admitted to other failures during his supposedly faultless leadership, like a botched satellite launch in 2012. When he met with South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-in, last month and invited him to Pyongyang, he asked Mr. Moon to fly there because North Korea’s roads and trains were in such “embarrassing” condition.

The contrasts between the North and South are particularly stark. North Korea generates a tiny fraction — less than 5 percent, by some estimates — of the electricity that South Korea does, leaving passengers stranded for hours in immobilized trains because of widespread power shortages, according to defectors from the country.

Video

The dueling economic realities of the two countries are on clear display from space: Even now, nighttime satellite photos show the southern half of the Korean Peninsula splotched with bright lights, while Mr. Kim’s North is shrouded in darkness, with only a pinprick of light indicating the location of Pyongyang, where the nation’s elite lives.

Without a doubt, North Korea has come a long way since the 1990s, when mass starvation stalked the population and the country was so energy-starved that travelers camped out in stations for days waiting for trains.

Since taking over after the death of his father, Kim Jong-il, Mr. Kim has installed water parks, ski resorts, a new airport, skyscrapers and even a dolphinarium. Cellphones have become a common consumer item in North Korean cities, although the country remains mostly shuttered from the global internet.

But for all his efforts to portray himself as vigorous, approachable and goal-oriented, there is a limit to how far Mr. Kim can go under international sanctions, analysts say.

The domestic pressures on him are compounded in some ways by the growth of markets he has introduced and the emergence of a moneyed class in Pyongyang. Under Mr. Kim, a new generation is growing up exposed to DVDs and flash drives of South Korean soap operas and movies, raising expectations for a better quality of life.

Mr. Kim has the power to rule his country and suppress dissent through extreme brutality. There is no political opposition.

He is believed to have ordered dozens of executions, including the killing of his own uncle, and North Korea still runs a network of prison gulags. Mr. Kim keeps the elite on its toes by frequently purging and reshuffling senior military and party officials.

But he is also eager to be seen as “people loving.’’ Building a “strong socialist country” is his catchphrase.

Recent visitors say Pyongyang looks more colorful and prosperous than it did a decade ago, with stores stocked with imported and domestically produced foods. But conditions outside the capital remain dismal, with widespread malnutrition among children and nursing mothers, according to United Nations relief agencies.

The most recent round of sanctions in the American-led “maximum pressure” campaign has undercut North Korea’s ability to earn hard currency needed to buy imports. Since September, the United Nations Security Council has banned all major North Korean exports, including coal, iron ore, seafood and textiles. If enforced fully, the sanctions could eliminate 90 percent of the country’s total exports.

North Korean exports to China, which account for more than 90 percent of the North’s international trade, fell by one-third to $1.65 billion last year, with volumes plunging by as much as 95 percent in recent months. The United Nations sanctions also cut the North’s imports of refined petroleum products by 90 percent, causing gasoline prices to double.

Many mines and factories have closed for lack of raw materials or export orders, according to South Korean and Japanese news organizations.

Investors and fishermen have deserted fishing ports, after lucrative exports to China were blocked. Last year, four North Korean soldiers defected to South Korea through the heavily armed border. One of them braved a hail of bullets while fleeing. When South Korean doctors operated on him, they found his intestines riddled with worms.

There is no sign of a return to mass starvation, experts say, and the country is believed to still earn substantial amounts of cash through smuggling, hacking and weapons sales.

Mr. Trump’s surprise decision to withdraw from the summit meeting could also play into Mr. Kim’s favor, especially if China — North Korea’s main trading partner — blames Washington and chooses not to enforce sanctions as vigorously.

In the weeks leading up the meeting, Mr. Kim had taken very public steps to lay the groundwork for negotiations, including releasing three American prisoners and suspending weapons tests. On Thursday, he demolished his country’s only nuclear test site.

Then, just hours later, Mr. Trump abruptly pulled out of the summit. Instead of reacting with rancor, the North Koreans put out a calm response, saying they would do “everything we can for the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.”

Mr. Trump softened his tone on Friday, saying a meeting might take place after all, but the diplomatic seesawing by the American president suddenly made Mr. Kim look like a reliable and consistent negotiating partner.

“Kim has perfected the most dramatic makeover within a few months,” said Lee Sung-yoon, a professor of Korean studies at Tufts University. “He’s gone from pariah to statesman, from madman to gracious, well-prepared leader who knows his brief.”

Some analysts said Mr. Trump’s initial decision to scrap the summit meeting was a hiccup before a return to dialogue.

Others said that if the two nations failed to get diplomacy back on track quickly, Mr. Kim could feel growing pressure to resume weapons tests to pressure the United States and “salvage his fallen status at home and abroad,” said Cheon Seong-whun, an analyst at the Asan institute in Seoul.

While Mr. Kim may wield tremendous power, his longevity as North Korea’s undisputed leader is not guaranteed.

Mr. Kim’s engagement with Mr. Trump may be unsettling to senior figures in North Korea’s military who worry that he could, in fact, relinquish the country’s nuclear arsenal, which he has called a “treasured sword” that ensures the country’s survival.

At the same time, Mr. Kim’s failure to meet the expectations he has raised for greater prosperity at home could anger the people who already have had a taste of a more affluent life.

“The group around Kim that are living reasonably well and benefiting from the way he’s kind of running things is relatively large,” said Scott Seaman, a Korea analyst at the Eurasia Group, a consultancy in Washington. “That could mean you don’t want to tick it off.”

Like many dictators, Mr. Seaman said, “This is a guy who goes to sleep at night not knowing whether he’s going to wake up.”

 

[Housecarl]

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/brazils-...ite-dispatch-military-161430022--finance.html

Brazil's truckers protest drags on despite dispatch of military

By Flavia Bohone and Marcelo Teixeira, Reuters • May 26, 2018

SAO PAULO (Reuters) - A truckers protest over diesel prices in Brazil that is hurting supplies of fuel, food and medicines continued for the sixth day on Saturday despite President Michel Temer ordering the military to clear blocked roads the day before.

Major cities have declared a state of emergency as gas stations and airports ran out of fuel, supermarket shelves went bare and hospitals said they were running out of supplies. Public transport and trash collection were reduced or halted across the country and prices for some food items jumped.

The government said there were fewer blockades on major highways across the country on Saturday compared to Friday. However, the main entity representing truckers, ABCAM, said they have not changed their main argument that they will call off protests only when federal taxes over diesel are scrapped.

Negotiators for several trucker groups initially agreed on Thursday to suspend the protests as the government vowed to subsidize and stabilize diesel prices, which may cost 5 billion reais ($1.4 billion) this year.

To win over truckers the government promised to extend for 30 days a 10-percent diesel price cut announced by state-led oil company Petroleo Brasileiro SA.

But truckers say they want a definitive solution, saying they will end the protest only when a decision to eliminate federal diesel taxes is published in the official gazette.

Local TV showed footage of federal forces being deployed over the night to some critical areas to help police remove trucks from highways.

There were no reports of violence, but main roads remained blocked in the morning, including a key transport ring around Sao Paulo, the country's largest city.

Some business sectors that depend on daily supplies were suffering.

Lack of animal feed may cause one billion birds and 20 million hogs to die, Brazilian meat group ABPA said, adding that more than 150 poultry and pork processing plants had indefinitely suspended production.

Brazil's sugar industry, the world's largest, is slowly halting cane harvest operations as machines ran out of fuel.

Blockades continue to prevent trucks from entering the port of Santos, Latin America's largest, and oilseeds crushing group Abiove said soy exports would halt on Saturday if truckers did not allow access to major ports.

Auto production, which contributes about a quarter of Brazil's industrial output, ground to a halt on Friday.

Authorities said even after roads are completely cleared, it would still take several days to normalize supplies.


(Reporting by Flavia Bohone and Marcelo Teixeira; Editing by Chizu Nomiyama)

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[Housecarl]

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https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/2011-iraq-relates-syria-today

How 2011 Iraq Relates to Syria Today

MAY 26, 2018 | THE CIPHER BRIEF STAFF

Following the near destruction of ISIS in Iraq and in the U.S. “zone” in northeastern Syria, and then a call recently by the President Donald Trump to pull out of Syria, administration officials, pundits and foreign leaders have all urged the president to keep troops in Syria. As justification, these officials—including Secretary Mattis—often cite deleterious effects of the U.S. troop pullout from Iraq in 2011, including the breakdown of the Iraqi political system and ISIS’s 2014 sweep of Sunni Arab areas.

But such analogies, even when true, need context. President Bush agreed with Iraq in 2008 to withdraw U.S. troops by December 2011. But President Obama then sought a residual training/advisory presence of 5,000 troops post-2011, not for combat missions but in part for political motives with Iraq and regional states. Such “presence missions,” even if not primarily combat-oriented are common political tools, e.g., U.S. naval presence in the Gulf, U.S. battalion in the Sinai. In the end, however, the Iraqi parliament balked at legal immunities for U.S. soldiers, and troops had to be withdrawn in accordance with the 2008 agreement. Then Iraq fell apart.

In considering the “Syria today” analogy, it is important to note that a post-2011 U.S. Iraq presence could not, as some imagined, have had the same impact on Iraqi internal governance and security as did 100,000 plus American combat troops 2003-9. Such troops would have been guests in a sovereign country with no combat role—but however few, they could have helped cope with ISIS’s rise by signaling U.S. commitment, important for many Iraqis including then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, paranoid about a return of the Sunni-Arab centric Baathists. Furthermore, U.S. forces ”in harm’s way” command Washington attention in ways no ambassador can.

Finally, any U.S. presence changes the calculations of other actors, hostile or friendly. Had a small U.S. force been accepted by Baghdad, Iraq would have been welcomed more by other Arab states fearing its vulnerability to Iran (and thus Iran’s brutal effort to block such a presence). Even ISIS might have opted for a more cautious assault on Iraq in 2014. (A handful of U.S. troops helped keep a million Warsaw Pact soldiers from overrunning Berlin. The 1949 withdrawal of a U.S. military training mission from Korea opened the door to invasion.)

But while “presence” per se provides certain abstract political cards such as commitment and focus, to have a real role any U.S. military presence in—or air cover over—northeastern Syria after final defeat of ISIS must have specific military and political missions. This is doubly important because unlike in Iraq where the U.S. now is trying again to keep a residual military presence, the U.S. will never be “invited” to stay in Syria by the Assad regime. Eliminating ISIS remnants and assuring they never return to northeastern Syria can remain the ”official” mission (that helps get around Assad’s opposition and meets the Congress’s “anti-terrorist” authorization). But this mission says nothing about the larger goal as apparently discussed in the president’s meetings with Macron: to pressure the Assad regime and contain Iran.

A U.S. military presence in the northeast (and around al Tanf in the south), given U.S. air control and on-the-ground allies, does deny those areas to Assad and his allies, complicates in a crisis any major ground reinforcements from Iran to Syria (as the routes parallel U.S. positions), and provides a ”platform” for potential political or military opposition to Damascus by the Syrian population; these missions are generally similar to those successfully executed with the U.S.-British no-fly zone over Kurdish areas of northern Iraq 1991-2003. But even such military presence and capabilities do not automatically generate political success in the larger Syrian conflict.

Rather, the presence must be tied to an overall military-diplomatic-economic plan in response to Damascus’ grave threats to its own citizens and the region. Such a plan could be based on UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015), which acknowledges Assad’s threats, along with cooperation with Turkey’s troops in northwestern Syria (and deconfliction between them and Syrian Kurds allied with the U.S.), common efforts with Israel and nearby Arab states, and a block on both international reconstruction assistance and transfer of northeastern oil fields to Assad, absent an acceptable political outcome.

Such a plan cannot guarantee results, but by tying down Moscow, Teheran and Damascus with the specter of stalemate, it would provide what is missing today—a reason for them to compromise on Syria’s future. Conversely, a total U.S. air and ground pullout would, as the 2011 analogy demonstrates, endanger conflict and chaos, but this time even more serious than from ISIS—U.S. allies Israel, Turkey and possibly Saudi Arabia pulled into confused combat with the Assad-Iran-Russian alliance, without an American referee.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/ar...o-25-mexicos-presidential-election-challenged

MEXICAN CARTEL STRATEGIC NOTE NO. 25: MEXICO’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CHALLENGED BY MURDERS/ASSASSINATIONS OF POLITICIANS

John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker



Mexico’s General Election will be held on 1 July 2018. This year’s election will include the Presidential election for the new Sexenio as well as for 128 members of the Senate and 500 members of the Chamber of Deputies. State and local elections are also being held for 8 governors, the head of government for Mexico City, and a variety of municipal officials, including mayors, municipal judges, and council members.[1] A significant number of politicians and candidates have been killed in election-related attacks from organized crime groups in the build up to the election.



Key Information: Kevin Sieff, “36 local candidates have been assassinated in Mexico. And the election is still 2 months away.” Washington Post, 20 May 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...hs-away/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.cc7e7a0ce666 :

MEXICO CITY — This election season has been the most violent in Mexico’s recent history, with 36 candidates killed since September, and dozens of other politicians and campaign officials slaughtered.



That macabre statistic has created a fresh challenge for the country’s political parties: They are now trying to fill dozens of candidacies left open by the assassinations…



Criminal groups are using violence to try to influence candidates, analysts say, and establish their power over local and state politics. In some cases, they might be targeting politicians who have refused to show them deference or pay them off. In other cases, candidates might have formed alliances with one criminal group, and later been targeted by a rival group.



“The old model was that criminal organizations had to pay rent to politicians for protection from government authorities,” said Chris Kyle, an anthropologist and expert on Guerrero at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. “Now, the relationship is the other way around. If you want to occupy office, you have to pay the criminal organizations.”

Key Information: Jorge Valencia, “Dismantling Democracy: Nearly 100 Politicians In Small-Town Mexico Murdered Since September.” Fronteras, 18 May 2018, https://fronterasdesk.org/content/6...iticians-small-town-mexico-murdered-september :

[M]ore than 90 candidates or public office holders who have been killed in small towns across Mexico since the beginning of the country’s campaign season last September, according to a tally by the Mexico City-based risk analysis firm Etellekt.



That means about one candidate or public official has been killed every three days since the country’s campaign season began last year, as organized crime is threatening to interrupt the electoral process in dozens of small-town elections across the country.



Rivera’s home state of Guerrero has seen the worst of it, with 21 homicides, according to Etellekt’s tally. Even Bishop Salvador Rangel, who oversees Tierra Caliente for the Catholic church, has tried to intercede with local cartel leaders to not kill candidates for public office, with little success.



For Rangel, one thing is clear: “Democracy is spiraling backwards in Mexico,” he said…



Organized crime’s use of violence to influence local elections date to at least the 1990s, but are more noticeable in this year’s elections because many local elections are coinciding with the presidential elections, Ley said.



Cartels use local elections to access, for example, the police chief or the warden of the local jail, Ley said.



“This is a way in which they can begin to influence local appointments that are crucial for their own activity, so there’s a logic behind it,” Ley said.

Key Information: Kent Paterson, “Murder and other violence plague Mexico’s elections.” NMPolitics.net, 10 May 2018, http://nmpolitics.net/index/2018/05/murder-and-other-violence-plague-mexicos-elections/ :

[A] recent report by the private security consulting firm Etelleket chalked up 173 aggressions against politically-associated individuals between Sept. 8 of last year and April 8 of this year, plus aggressions against 30 family members. The casualty list included 77 murders, a number representing a sharp increase from the 2015 mid-term elections when 70 aggressions (including 21 murders) were counted by Etellekt.



Recent violence directed against politically active individuals and/or family members has occurred in many regions of Mexico, but is most marked in the states of Guerrero, Oaxaca, Puebla, Veracruz and Mexico, according to Etelleket.



While Etelleket’s findings bore the quality of a loud wake up call, politically tainted violence has only increased since the report was released.



A review of Mexican media accounts tallies 14 additional relevant slayings since April 8, boosting the murder roll to 91.

Key Information: “Narcos seek to control elections of mayors, Congress: governor.” Mexico News Daily, 11 May 2018, https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/narcos-seek-to-control-elections-of-mayors-congress-governor/ :

Criminal gangs want to control municipal governments, state lawmakers



The governor of Guerrero warned yesterday [10 May 2018] that organized crime is seeking to influence the electoral process in the state in order to gain control of the next generation of mayors and members of state Congress and the regions they will represent.



Héctor Astudillo explained in a radio interview that “criminal groups don’t only try to extort money [from politicians] but also to control territory through the authorities.”



The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) governor cited the state’s notoriously-dangerous Tierra Caliente region as a prime example.



“This region suffers from this serious problem. The interference [comes from] these groups who are not satisfied with controlling the transport of drugs from the high parts [of the state] but are also interested in controlling the municipal governments and those who are going to be representatives in the state Congress,” he added.

Key Information: “La lista de políticos asesinados en México en las últimas semanas.” Excelsior, 13 March 2018, http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2018/03/13/1226009 :

Así, el proceso electoral que inició el 8 de septiembre de 2017 se ha teñido de rojo, por el asesinato de 63 candidatos a puestos de elección, así como alcaldes, exalcaldes, regidores e integrantes de partidos políticos en diferentes entidades del país.



Los políticos fueron asesinados con armas de fuego, calcinados, o incluso sus cuerpos fueron encontrados desmembrados, como fue el caso de Jaime Rodríguez González, regidor de Jolalpa, Puebla, en octubre de 2017.



El registro de los homicidios contra candidatos, políticos y expolíticos, así como militantes que lleva a cabo Excélsior, indica que el mayor número se registró en Guerrero, donde a poco más de seis meses de iniciar el proceso, suman 11 muertes.

Key Information: Sandra Weiss, “Narco cartels target politicians as Mexico’s elections near.” Deutsche Welle, 22 April 2018, http://p.dw.com/p/2wTV6 :

In recent months, about 80 Mexican politicians have been shot, knifed, beaten or burned to death; some have even been dismembered. Last year was the country’s deadliest overall in decades , and in most cases the killers remain at large — some statistics put the unsolved rate at 97 percent of Mexico’s staggering murder tally — but officials largely blame organized crime for the politicians’ deaths. The investigative journalist Jose Reveles said motives included voter intimidation and revenge on leaders who ally with rival criminal organizations or even stand up to cartels. Though the killings of politicians in such large numbers is a relatively new phenomenon, journalists , activists and other noncombatants have long been targeted by cartels…



Edgardo Buscaglia, the president of the Institute for Citizens Action in Mexico (IAC) and a research scholar of law and economics at Columbia University in the United States, speaks of an “electoral farce” following the killings. And the national mayors association, the ANAC, has reminded authorities that, unlike national lawmakers in Mexico City — who are protected by bodyguards and go to work in the relatively secure Saint Lazarus Legislative Palace — local leaders find themselves in consistent mortal danger. One hundred and seventy-two have been killed since 2006, when Mexico launched its war on drugs, Reveles said. Just last year, Mayor Robell Uriostegui had to be evacuated by military helicopter from Teloloapan after he was surrounded by members of an organized crime group.



“Narcopolitics isn’t some vague threat,” Reveles said. “It’s a reality.” He estimates that about 45 percent of all municipalities in Mexico are controlled by organized crime and that the numbers will only get worse.



Mexico has a “weak state, co-opted by the mafia,” Buscaglia said. Citing a report by Global Financial Integrity, he added that the country has “the third largest underground economy — after China and Russia.”

Analysis



Mexico’s 2018 General elections are scheduled for 1 July 2018. This year’s elections will include the Presidential election as well as over 3,000 elections for members of the national Senate and Chamber of Deputies, 8 governors (in Chiapas, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Morelos, Puebla, Tabasco, Veracruz, and Yucatán), the head of government for Mexico City (CDMX), and numerous municipal officials (mayors, municipal judges, and council members). Over 90 politicians have been killed in the build up to these elections. Guerrero, with 21 candidates killed thus far, is a significant hot spot.[2]



The intensity of the pre-election violence was recounted by long-time Border Zone journalist Kent Paterson: “On Sunday, the bullet-ridden body of Eduardo Aragón Caraveo, Chihuahua City leader of the PES [Partido Encuentro Social] who went missing May 4, was recovered in the trunk of his vehicle. The PES is one of three parties that form López Obrador’s Together We Will Make History electoral coalition.” Patterson continued: “In a separate attack on Sunday, an estimated 250-300 gunmen descended on the community of Ignacio Zaragoza, Chihuahua, leaving in their wake at least four dead, including PRD [Partido de la Revolución Democrática] city council candidate and campaign coordinator Liliana Garcia, who was kidnapped and then murdered.” In addition, Patterson noted that: “According to El Diario de Juárez, gunmen also burned properties belonging to PRD politician Felipe Mendoza and Octavio Chaparro, head of the PRD in Ignacio Zaragoza.”[3]



In Guerrero, for example, Abel Montúfar—a PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) candidate with law enforcement connections for the state’s legislature—was murdered on Tuesday (8 May 2018) and, that same evening, “a Mexican military patrol was ambushed near a ranch linked to the slain politician’s family. According to a Mexican military communique posted on Aristegui Noticias, three soldiers were killed and three wounded. No arrests were immediately announced.”[4]



The direct confrontation between organized crime and the state is a continuing feature of Mexico’s drug war and ‘criminal insurgency’ which, in this case, is triggering a concerted governmental response. According to Guerrero’s governor, “To combat the continuing violence and prevent criminal groups from gaining political power, a joint state and federal security operation is being prepared for Tierra Caliente.” Governor Astudillo continued, “It’s time to go in with greater authority in Tierra Caliente because unfortunately in some cases politics is mixing with crime . . . we can’t allow there to be mayors and [state Congress] representatives that are controlled by criminal groups.”[5]



In the past, violence against politicians has largely been a feature at the state and municipal level, with criminal power struggles connected to gaining political influence over co-opted officials (elected officials like mayors, municipal judges, and police). Kent Patterson observed that: “In Guerrero and Chihuahua, for instance, violent disputes between drug gangs frame the local context,” while in Puebla, Veracruz and Hidalgo, organized bands of petroleum thieves known as huachicoleros who “rob gasoline from Pemex pipelines for a brisk black market, stand as important factors.”[6]



Patterson also noted that “In Guerrero, crime and violence are likewise raising serious concerns among staff and representatives of the National Electoral Institute [Instituto Nacional Electoral] (INE), the official agency charged with organizing the July 1 elections. At an INE session in the state capital of Chilpancingo last week, INE personnel denounced that their trainers [poll worker] had suffered robberies of cell phones and money, warnings to not walk streets at certain hours and other incidences of intimidation.”[7] This fear was realized when an INE worker was murdered by unknown gunmen while driving home from work Sunday night (20 May 2018) in Alpoyeca, Gurerro.[8]



As David Shirk of the Justice in Mexico program at the University of San Diego has noted, “What is clear is that local authorities have taken the brunt of violent attacks against public officials since the start of a decade-long, nationwide surge in homicides.”[9] In addition, as Shirk assessed, “many local politicians are assassinated for complex reasons seemingly unrelated to organized crime, including political rivalries, inter-personal conflicts, and intra-familial violence. Also, as Calderón’s study reveals by including former-mayors in her analysis, a large number of former government officials are also targeted for violence, presumably well after they are of strategic value to criminal organizations.”[10]



It is clear that organized crime (gangs and criminal cartels) in Mexico is confronting the state during this election season. As a recent Los Angels Times report concluded: “The slain candidates represented a range of political affiliations and movements, suggesting that the killings are more about local power grabs and gang rivalries than national conflicts among parties.”[11]



The complex rationales behind this violence likely has several dimensions, some of them related to criminal competition with the state and battles for control of political processes that require state-criminal collusion (co-option) in order to ensure freedom of movement and profit from the illicit economies. Similar concerns about gang influence in Brazil’s upcoming elections also exist.[12]



Contextually, increased incidence of assassinations in Mexico during the 2005 and 2015 time period have been linked to “increases in political pluralization and criminal fragmentation.”[13] Specifically, we are seeing that “Mexican politicians are now targeted for accepting illicit money as well as for standing up to criminals. Moreover, this violence is evidence of an alarming and persistent pattern in Mexico of politicians enlisting criminal organizations to eliminate their political competition.”[14] Hence, local, regional, and national level criminal organizations are co-opting the democratic political process while at the same time political candidates—and to varying extent the political parties they represent—are actively utilizing and allying with criminal organizations for their own benefit.[15]



The wide scale use of political assassinations in the promotion of criminal impunity and enclave narco-state emergence, as well as furthering the agenda of disenfranchised, marginalized, and even dominant, political parties in Mexican politics is reminiscent of political insurgency and emergent civil war behaviors. Contemporary political assassinations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, and historical ones perpetrated in Vietnam, are illustrative of this insurgent technique.[16] While criminal insurgency behaviors and motivators are initially different than classical (e.g. Maoist), and even radical Islamist insurgent forms, at the more advanced and metastasized levels de facto politicization takes place. That is to say, once a cartel plaza boss controls the mayor’s office, the courts, the police, and the local media then the decisions and policies they enact are inherently political in nature and a usurpation of democratic governance and sovereign prerogative.



Further study of the dynamic between criminal and political competition leading to micro and macro narco-democratic, authoritarian, and even warlordist, futures within states is necessary.[17] This strategic note focusing on recent political assassinations in Mexico—as an expression of this dynamic—is a contribution to that exploration.



End Notes



[1] “Mexico 2018 Election Overview,” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy (n.d.), https://www.bakerinstitute.org/mexico-2018-election-overview/ . In addition, analysis of threat potentials related to the election can also be found (behind a pay wall) at Etellekt. Their most recent analysis in Spanish: Etellekt, Cuarto Informe de Violencia Política en México 2018, 10 May 2018, http://www.etellekt.com/reporte/cuarto-informe-de-violencia-politica-en-mexico.html is mentioned in several recent news reports, including those referenced here.



[2] See ‘Key Information’ entries, especially Jorge Valencia, “Dismantling Democracy: Nearly 100 Politicians In Small-Town Mexico Murdered Since September.” Fronteras, 18 May 2018, https://fronterasdesk.org/content/6...iticians-small-town-mexico-murdered-september .



[3] Kent Patterson, “Murder and other violence plague Mexico’s elections.” NMPolitics.net, 10 May 2018, http://nmpolitics.net/index/2018/05/murder-and-other-violence-plague-mexicos-elections/ .



[4] Ibid. Also see “Candidato asesinado en Guerrero denunció amenazas al inicio de la campaña (Video).” Aristegui Noticias, 9 May 2018, https://aristeguinoticias.com/0905/mexico/numeralia-del-terror-en-tierra-caliente-guerrero-video/ and “Cae uno por asesinato de tres militares en Guerrero.” Aristegui Noticias, 13 May 2018, https://aristeguinoticias.com/1305/mexico/cae-uno-por-asesinato-de-tres-militares-en-guerrero/ .



[5] “Narcos seek to control elections of mayors, Congress: governor.” Mexico News Daily, 11 May 2018, https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/narcos-seek-to-control-elections-of-mayors-congress-governor/ and Rogelio Agustín, “Narco ‘quieren controlar a los diputados y alcaldes’: Astudillo.” Milenio, 11 May 2018, http://www.milenio.com/estados/narc...o-crimen_organizado-milenio_0_1173482650.html .



[6] Kent Patterson, “Murder and other violence plague Mexico’s elections.” NMPolitics.net, 10 May 2018.



[7] Ibid.



[8] “Asesinan en Guerrero a capacitador del INE.” Aristegui Noticias, 21 May 2018, https://aristeguinoticias.com/2105/mexico/asesinan-en-guerrero-a-capacitador-del-ine/ .



[9] David Shirk, “New Justice in Mexico Working Paper: Assassinations Target Local Candidates and Officials in Lead Up to 2018 Mexican Elections.” Justice in Mexico, 7 January 2018, https://justiceinmexico.org/mayors-killed-mexico-2000-2017/ .



[10] Ibid.



[11] Patrick J. McDonnell, “Widespread killings of candidates cast shadow over Mexican elections.” Los Angeles Times, 10 April 2018, http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-elect-violence-20180410-story.html .



[12] John P. Sullivan, José de Arimatéia da Cruz and Robert J. Bunker, “Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 9: Concerns About Potential Gang (PCC-Primeiro Comando da Capital & CV-Comando Vermelho) Influence on Upcoming Brazilian Elections.” Small Wars Journal, 25 January 2018, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-9.



[13] Laura Ross Blume, “The Old Rules No Longer Apply: Explaining Narco-Assassinations of Mexican Politicians.” Journal of Politics in Latin America. 1/2017, p. 59, https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/download/1036/1043 . For additional information, see Mike LaSusa, “More than 80 Mexico Mayors Murdered Since 2006.” InSight Crime. 11 August 2016, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/more-than-80-mexico-mayors-murdered-since-2006/ .



[14] Laura Ross Blume, “The Old Rules No Longer Apply: Explaining Narco-Assassinations of Mexican Politicians,” p. 59.



[15] See Nils Gilman, “The Twin Insurgency.” The American Interest, Vol. 9, No. 6, 15 June 2014, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/06/15/the-twin-insurgency/ for a discussion of the interaction between criminal and plutocratic insurgencies and John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, “Drug Cartels, Street Gangs, and Warlords.” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 13, Issue 2, 2002, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592310208559180?journalCode=fswi20 for a discussion of the influence of armed (criminal) non-state groups on the solvency of nation-state institutions,



[16] See, for instance, Rod Nordland, “Taliban Aim at Officials in a Wave of Killings.” New York Times. 9 June 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/world/asia/10taliban.html . For a general introduction to the logic behind the use of such assassinations, see Arie Perliger, The Rationale of Political Assassinations. West Point: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 12 February 2015, https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/20...Of-Political-Assassinations-February20151.pdf .



[17] A precondition of such futures—at least in the case of Mexico derived from PRD (Partido de la Revolucion Democratica) assassination focused research—is “the failure of the legal system to function as a system of restraint for killings.” See Sara Schatz, Murder and Politics in Mexico: Political Killings in the Partido de la Revolucion Democratica and its Consequences. New York: Springer, 2011.



Sources



Rogelio Agustín, “Narco ‘quieren controlar a los diputados y alcaldes’: Astudillo.” Milenio, 11 May 2018, http://www.milenio.com/estados/narc...o-crimen_organizado-milenio_0_1173482650.html .



Patrick J. McDonnell, “Widespread killings of candidates cast shadow over Mexican elections.” Los Angeles Times, 10 April 2018, http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-elect-violence-20180410-story.html .



“Narcos seek to control elections of mayors, Congress: governor.” Mexico News Daily, 11 May 2018, https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/narcos-seek-to-control-elections-of-mayors-congress-governor/ .



Kent Paterson, “Murder and other violence plague Mexico’s elections.” NMPolitics.net, 10 May 2018, http://nmpolitics.net/index/2018/05/murder-and-other-violence-plague-mexicos-elections/ .



David Shirk, “New Justice in Mexico Working Paper: Assassinations Target Local Candidates and Officials in Lead Up to 2018 Mexican Elections.” Justice in Mexico, 7 January 2018, https://justiceinmexico.org/mayors-killed-mexico-2000-2017/ .



Kevin Sieff, “36 local candidates have been assassinated in Mexico. And the election is still 2 months away.” Washington Post, 20 May 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...hs-away/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.cc7e7a0ce666 .



Jorge Valencia, “Dismantling Democracy: Nearly 100 Politicians In Small-Town Mexico Murdered Since September.” Fronteras, 18 May 2018, https://fronterasdesk.org/content/6...iticians-small-town-mexico-murdered-september .



Sandra Weiss, “Narco cartels target politicians as Mexico's elections near.” Deutsche Welle, 22 April 2018, http://p.dw.com/p/2wTV6 .



For Additional Reading



Laura Y. Calderón, An Analysis of Mayoral Assassinations in Mexico, 2000-17 . San Diego: University of San Diego, Justice in Mexico Project, 2018.



Luis Jorge Garay-Salamanca and Eduardo Salcedo-Albarán, Drug Trafficking, Corruption and States (A Small Wars Journal—El Centro and Vortex Foundation Book). Bloomington: iUniverse, 2015.



John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency: A Small Wars Journal-El Centro Anthology . Bloomington: iUniverse, 2012.

Categories: Mexican Cartel Note - El Centro
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About the Author(s)

John P. Sullivan
John P. Sullivan is a career police officer. He currently serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. He is also an adjunct researcher at the Vortex Foundation in Bogotá, Colombia; a senior research fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST); and a senior fellow at Small Wars Journal-El Centro. He is co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (Routledge, 2006) and Global Biosecurity: Threats and Responses (Routledge, 2010) and co-author of Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency: A Small Wars Journal-El Centro Anthology (iUniverse, 2011) and Studies in Gangs and Cartels (Routledge, 2013). He completed the CREATE Executive Program in Counter-Terrorism at the University of Southern California and holds a Bachelor of Arts in Government form the College of William and Mary, a Master of Arts in Urban Affairs and Policy Analysis from the New School for Social Research, and a PhD, doctorate in Information and Knowledge Society, from the Internet Interdisciplinary Institute (IN3) at the Open University of Catalonia (Universitat Oberta de Catalunya) in Barcelona. His doctoral thesis was ‘Mexico’s Drug War: Cartels, Gangs, Sovereignty and the Network State.” His current research focus is the impact of transnational organized crime on sovereignty in Mexico and other countries.


Robert Bunker
Dr. Robert J. Bunker is an Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College and Adjunct Faculty, Division of Politics and Economics, Claremont Graduate University. He holds university degrees in political science, government, social science, anthropology-geography, behavioral science, and history and has undertaken hundreds of hours of counterterrorism training. Past professional associations include Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College; Futurist in Residence, Training and Development Division, Behavioral Science Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy, Quantico, VA; Staff Member (Consultant), Counter-OPFOR Program, National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center-West; and Adjunct Faculty, National Security Studies M.A. Program and Political Science Department, California State University, San Bernardino, CA. Dr. Bunker has hundreds of publications including Studies in Gangs and Cartels, with John Sullivan (Routledge, 2013), Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training, with Stephen Sloan (University of Oklahoma, 2011), and edited works, including Global Criminal and Sovereign Free Economies and the Demise of the Western Democracies: Dark Renaissance (Routledge, 2014), co-edited with Pamela Ligouri Bunker; Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico and the Americas: The Gangs and Cartels Wage War (Routledge, 2012); Narcos Over the Border: Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries (Routledge, 2011); Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers (Routledge, 2008); Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency (Routledge, 2005); and Non-State Threats and Future Wars (Routledge, 2002).

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[Doomer Doug]

Mexico is a failed narco state at this point. It will also be interesting to see if Erdogan responds to the collapse of his economy by invading somebody, Greece, Syria or Iraq.

Erdogan is wounded, and we know the wounded animal is the most dangerous.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...-sea-islands-claimed-by-beijing-idUSKCN1IS07W

WORLD NEWS MAY 27, 2018 / 1:56 AM / UPDATED 5 HOURS AGO

Exclusive: U.S. warships sail near South China Sea islands claimed by Beijing

Idrees Ali
4 MIN READ

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Two U.S. Navy warships sailed near South China Sea islands claimed by China on Sunday, two U.S. officials told Reuters, in a move that drew condemnation from Beijing as President Donald Trump seeks its continued cooperation on North Korea.

Video

The operation was the latest attempt to counter what Washington sees as Beijing’s efforts to limit freedom of navigation in the strategic waters.

While this operation had been planned months in advance, and similar operations have become routine, it comes at a particularly sensitive time and just days after the Pentagon uninvited China from a major U.S.-hosted naval drill.

The U.S. officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the Higgins guided-missile destroyer and the Antietam, a guided-missile cruiser, came within 12 nautical miles of the Paracel Islands, among a string of islets, reefs and shoals over which China has territorial disputes with its neighbors.

The U.S. military vessels carried out maneuvering operations near Tree, Lincoln, Triton and Woody islands in the Paracels, one of the officials said.

Trump’s cancellation of a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has put further strain on U.S.-China ties amid a trade dispute between the world’s two largest economies.

Critics of the operations, known as a “freedom of navigation,” have said that they have little impact on Chinese behavior and are largely symbolic.

RELATED COVERAGE
China condemns U.S. warships' South China Sea mission

The U.S. military has a long-standing position that its operations are carried out throughout the world, including in areas claimed by allies, and that they are separate from political considerations.

Satellite photographs taken on May 12 showed China appeared to have deployed truck-mounted surface-to-air missiles or anti-ship cruise missiles at Woody Island.

Earlier this month, China’s air force landed bombers on disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea as part of a training exercise in the region, triggering concern from Vietnam and the Philippines.

The U.S. military did not directly comment on Sunday’s operation, but said U.S. forces operate in the region daily.

“We conduct routine and regular Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), as we have done in the past and will continue to do in the future,” U.S. Pacific Fleet said in a statement.

China’s Defense Ministry expressed its anger, saying it had sent ships and aircraft to warn the U.S. warships to leave, saying they had entered the country’s territorial waters without permission.

The move “contravened Chinese and relevant international law, seriously infringed upon Chinese sovereignty (and) harmed strategic mutual trust between the two militaries,” it said.

In a separate statement, China’s Foreign Ministry urged the United States to stop such actions.

“China will continue to take all necessary measures to defend the country’s sovereignty and security,” it added, without elaborating.

CONTESTED SEA
Pentagon officials have long complained that China has not been candid enough about its rapid military build-up and using South China Sea islands to gather intelligence in the region.

In March, a U.S. Navy destroyer carried out a “freedom of navigation” operation close to Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands.

Chinese officials have accused Washington of viewing their country in suspicious, “Cold War” terms.

China’s claims in the South China Sea, through which about $5 trillion in shipborne trade passes each year, are contested by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.

The United States has said it would like to see more international participation in freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea.

Reporting by Idress Ali in Washington; Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in Beijing; Editing by Alexander Smith, Alexandra Hudson and Lisa Shumaker

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-44269498

Nicaragua unrest: Thousands join renewed anti-government rallies

27 May 2018

Thousands of protesters have marched in the Nicaraguan capital Managua and other cities to demand the resignation of President Daniel Ortega and his wife, Vice-President Rosario Murillo.

Demonstrators blocked main roads, waving placards and chanting slogans.

Weeks of anti-government protests have led to at least 76 people being killed in clashes with security forces.

The latest rallies took place after peace talks mediated by the Catholic Church broke down on Wednesday.

Four people were killed in clashes on Saturday, police and witnesses say.

"They want to take us off the streets at the point of bullets," said protest leader Francisca Ramírez, who led a rally in the north-west city of Leon.

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Street protests erupted last month when President Ortega approved cuts to pensions and social security.

He later revoked his plans but the demonstrations turned into broader unrest against his government.

Mr Ortega says criminals and gang members have infiltrated protest rallies but opposition activists accuse him of repression.

President Ortega is a former left-wing Sandinista guerrilla who helped to overthrow the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza in the 1970s.

However, his critics accuse him and his wife of also behaving like dictators.

Talks aimed at easing the crisis began earlier this month but have so far failed to resolve the deadlock.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm…...Is it just me or is everyone ignoring the elephant in the room, again, of allowing an enemy time and again a safe haven, ie "frenemy" Pakistan, in this specific situation? And that doesn't even get into ROE....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://breakingdefense.com/2018/05...winning-but-that-doesnt-mean-we-should-leave/

The Great Afghan Paradox

By most metrics the war in Afghanistan is going badly.

By James Kitfield
on May 28, 2018 at 4:01 AM
7 Comments

By most metrics the war in Afghanistan is going badly. According to the most recent quarterly report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the troop strength of Afghan Security Forces is in “sharp decline” even as the Taliban are on the march throughout the countryside.

The number of “security incidents” is similarly on the rise, to include a series of recent suicide bombings in Kabul, including one in late April attributed to Daesh (aka the Islamic State) that targeted and killed nine journalists and four police officers. Opium production skyrocketed by nearly 90 percent in 2017, and the Afghan government continues to rate near the bottom on Transparency International’s “Corruption Perception Index.” The publication Long War Journal, which tracks the conflict, recently estimated that the Taliban now “controls or contests” 58.5 percent of Afghanistan’s 407 districts, a high-water mark for the Islamist extremist group.

“The Taliban has seized the initiative and are dictating the pace and location of combat this fighting season, and they control or contest more Afghan territory than at any time since the United States ousted them from power back in 2001,” said Bill Roggio, a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, and editor of Long War Journal. He characterized the Trump administration’s “surge” from roughly 8,400 to 14,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and a stepped-up bombing campaign, as necessary but not sufficient to check the Taliban’s momentum. “The Obama surge [2009-2012] forced the Taliban to retreat from key strongholds but they regrouped in safe havens in Pakistan, and since the U.S. and NATO withdrawal in 2014 the Taliban has taken advantage of a dysfunctional Afghan government and security forces. Why the Trump administration thinks it can now defeat the Taliban with 14,000 ‘train and assist’ troops, when we failed to defeat them with over 100,000 U.S. combat troops, is beyond me.”

Gen. John Nicholson, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and NATO’s “Operation Resolute Support,” now confronts a familiar set of challenges. Afghan Security Forces number 313,728 on paper (army and police), but are declining as a result of attrition and recruiting problems, and Afghan units are wildly divergent in terms of quality. For its part, the Afghan government is riven by the corruption that attends a booming drug trade in a developing country. The government is also split by a barely workable “power sharing” arrangement between rivals President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, who now face another potentially disruptive presidential election scheduled for later this year. Despite the Trump administration freezing security aid to Pakistan, the Taliban and other extremists continue to enjoy sanctuary there that allows them to rest, regroup and plot in relative safety. Finally, Nicholson faces a ticking time clock back in Washington managed by a mercurial commander-in-chief in President Trump, and a war-weary Congress.

“All the trend lines suggest the Taliban has the initiative and momentum right now, and 14,000 U.S. trainers and advisers may not be enough to push the insurgents back on their heels. So this is a very dangerous period,” retired Lt. Gen. Dave Barno, former commander of U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan, thinks.

“The upcoming presidential elections are important both practically and symbolically, but with the Taliban targeting polling stations and election officials, and controlling or contesting a majority of the country by some estimates, I’m not sure you can hold a legitimate election,” said Barno, who noted that former National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, a key architect of the Trump administration’s Afghan strategy, is no longer in the White House.

“If the election scheduled for this year leads to greater volatility, as happened during the last election cycle, then I think you’re going to hear a lot more `time to throw in the towel’ sentiments voiced in Washington,” said Barno. “At that point it will be interesting to see if President Trump remains invested in Afghanistan, or if he goes back to his earlier position that we should leave, and risks ceding this space to the Taliban and ISIS. U.S. military leaders would see that as catastrophic.”

Indeed, U.S. military leaders have pushed back against a narrative of failure in Afghanistan, arguing that it is much too early to judge the impact of a campaign of additional troops and more aggressive tactics that only began last autumn. As recently as the end of 2016, they note, U.S. troops were still withdrawing from Afghanistan. With the Islamic State kicked out of most of the territory of its “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria, U.S. Central Command has shifted resources and key enablers such as airpower and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets to Afghanistan. As a result, the number of munitions dropped in the first quarter of 2018 was the highest recorded since reporting began in 2013, and is more than two-and-a-half times the amount dropped in the first quarter of 2017.

The Army’s new 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade is also in Afghanistan on its maiden deployment, and Resolute Support commanders have lifted restrictions so that advisers can push forward and work with lower-echelon units. Perhaps most importantly, the command has announced plans to double the size of Afghan Special Operations Forces, which have consistently prevailed over the Taliban on the battlefield.

“The American advised units – commandos and Special Forces – over the last several years have not been defeated in combat with the Taliban. Those that were not mentored by our units were being defeated,” Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis testified before the Senate Appropriations’ defense subcommittee on May 9. “As we…start having more NATO advisors working with them – mostly American but other NATO countries as well – then we will end up with more capable units in the field.”

Mattis also argued that the growing number of “security incidents” in the SIGAR report is misleading because it fails to distinguish between attacks initiated by the Taliban, and those initiated by Afghan Security Forces. “Who is initiating attacks is as important as the [total] number of attacks,” said Mattis, noting that Taliban initiated attacks – often directed at less risky “soft targets” – are down by 17 percent this year. “Where we are ambushing the Taliban, that means we have the initiative.”

Recent history suggests Mattis and his generals may have a point that it is premature to judge the impact of the Trump campaign. It was well over a year after U.S. forces redeployed to Iraq in the summer of 2014 to help rearm, retrain and assist derelict Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) before they began having notable success on the battlefield, first in recapturing Ramadi in December 2015, then in recapturing Falluja in June 2016, culminating in the recapture of Mosul from ISIS just last year.

“It looks good on paper that the U.S. has deployed the additional ‘train and assist’ forces, but it takes a lot of time to get people settled, and pushed out to forward units where they can have an impact. That process is probably only 40 percent completed, and it’s way too soon to judge whether it will be successful,” said Anthony Cordesman, one of the best defense analysts who works at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. In the meantime, the Taliban have so far proven incapable of capturing and holding major cities or provincial capitals, he noted, and it was never realistic to assume 14,000 U.S. troops would be decisive in ensuring Afghan Security Forces could defend the entire Afghan countryside. “We’re still in a war of attrition in Afghanistan, and while you can argue whether or not we’re losing, we’re clearly not winning.”

The Great Afghan Paradox arises from the fact that victory remains elusive and sometimes seems impossible even after seventeen years of fighting, while a defeat that cedes Afghanistan to Islamist terrorist groups with the blood of thousands of Westerners on their hands is all but unthinkable. Already Daesh has made inroads in the country and is claiming some of the most horrific suicide bombings there, for instance, and just last month U.S. forces killed Al Qaeda leader Hazrat Abbas and his bodyguard in an airstrike in the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar.

“We went to Afghanistan to eliminate the sanctuary where senior Al Qaeda leaders planned and conducted the initial training for the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, and we stayed to prevent the likes of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State from reestablishing sanctuary in an area that seems to have a magnetic attraction for them,” retired Gen. David Petraeus, formerly the commander of all U.S. and NATO troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq, told Breaking Defense.

The United States and its allies have largely succeeded in that mission, he said, and are doing so today with dramatic reductions in the number of troops and associated costs. “I’ve said before this is a generational struggle, and we may have to continue operations in Afghanistan for a considerable time to come,” Petraeus told me. “I don’t think throwing our hands up in the air and saying ‘Let’s go home’ is a good option.”

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm…..

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://breakingdefense.com/2018/05/stalingrad-was-small-multi-domain-ops-in-megacities/

Stalingrad Was Small: Multi-Domain Ops In Megacities

By Colin Clark
on May 25, 2018 at 2:15 AM
37 Comments

HONOLULU: As Seoul residents awaken to the whoomp, whoomp of the first North Korean shells and air raid sirens wail, millions pour from their apartments to the street, desperate for the shelter of the city’s 1,500 miles of deep tunnels.

Some stream to the city’s rivers, hoping to head south.

North Korean special operations troops, of course, have already mined some of the tunnels to create havoc. Others have earlier swept into the tunnels to prepare ambushes and establish communications throughout the city.

Relatively untrained in tunnel warfare and stripped of their usual advantages of communications, navigation and sensors because radio waves can’t penetrate the depth and length of the tunnels, South Korean and American troops are hamstrung as well by the huge numbers of civilians, whom the North Koreans are all too happy to shoot through when needed.

Those are just some of the challenges the US and its allies could face should war come with North Korea or China in one of Asia’s gigantic megacities like Seoul. Currently, there are no large-scale tunnel training facilities in the US, Most urban training facilities are fairly small, designed to improve troops’ tactical skill, not give them and their commanders lessons in how to navigate, communicate, command and fight in a megacity.

But the larger problem of how to fight and win in and around the world’s megacities is a fundamental challenge to US forces, whose doctrine has long been to surround, isolate and avoid large cities, Lt. Gen. Michael Bills, Joint Forces Korea Chief of Staff, told AUSA’s LANPAC conference Wednesday. It’s a crucial challenge for multi-domain operations because information, cyber and electronic warfare will be central to managing the fight.

(NOTE- The Army no longer refers to multi-domain battle, Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, head of Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), told the LANPAC conference on Tuesday, The new term is “more inclusive,” he said. Other speakers noted battle implies kinetics, death and destruction, while multi-domain operations may or may not involve kinetics.)

For scale, consider the Battle of Stalingrad, viewed by many military historians as the grimmest urban battle in history. While about 2 million troops battled for the city for five months, Stalingrad itself only had a population of 450,000 before the fighting started. But the casualties were astounding: 1.12 million Soviet soldiers, 768,000 German and allied troops.

The Battle of Mosul, which some have (I think incorrectly) compared to Stalingrad, lasted nine months, involved less than 150,000 troops, and resulted in roughly 15,000 casualties. And Mosul had a much, much larger population of about 1.5 million before the fighting started and after ISIS had taken control.

US and allied troops faced serious difficulties in prosecuting the battle against ISIS in Mosul. Deep tunnels protected ISIS fighters. Rubble reduced the effectiveness of American munitions in many cases, helping to disperse the force of weapons. The relentless pressure not to harm civilians drove actions that may have slowed progress.

But above all else neither Mosul nor Stalingrad exhibited anything close to the scale of a modern megacity such as Jakarta, a Seoul, a Tokyo, a Guangzhou or a Beijing.

“First of all, the challenge of megacities is unlike what we have had to deal with in the past,” said Russell Glenn, director of plans and policy for the G-2 at Army Training and Doctrine Command. Aside from enormous populations, incredible population densities and enormous size, they possess an incredibly wide range of infrastructure and incredibly varied social and cultural facets. They are also absolutely central to their countries’ economies, Glenn noted. For example, the GDP of the conurbation of Tokyo is greater than all of Spain’s, and is about same as Texas. Destroy that city and you destroy much of the Japanese economy.

From a strictly military point of view, it’s much more difficult to contain the effects of destruction and death wielded in a megacity, Townsend told AUSA’s LANPAC conference: “When you are out in a rural area or small village, you can probably contain or isolate the effect of your operations, including the things that you say, the things that you do, the destruction that you create, the casualties you inflict.”

Several speakers at the conference, including Gen. Bills, noted that while recent tech improvements, such as small hockey puck-sized communications repeaters for use in tunnels, are helpful, they face serious constraints posed by the cities’ size, the depth of their tunnels and their construction of reinforced concrete and other materials.

Also, destroying key cultural sites in a megacity can have enormous and difficult to foresee consequences not only in the city but throughout the country. One speaker compared military actions in a megacity to throwing a pebble in a pond — they keep rippling outwards.

Information and cyber operations will become much more important in such circumstances, as will training in languages and cultures to anticipate and manage responses.

If one thing became clear from the several panels at LANPAC that discussed megacities, it is that the scale of command and control, the need to preserve the city and its inhabitants as much as possible while still prosecuting combat operations are issues the US Army, and the US military in general, are just beginning to grapple with.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/worl...-death-afp/ar-AAxUHD2?ocid=spartanntp&ffid=gz

Israeli army raids West Bank Palestinian camp after soldier death: AFP

7 hrs ago

The Israeli army raided a Palestinian refugee camp in the occupied West Bank Monday, AFP journalists said, in an apparent hunt for suspects in the killing of a soldier.

Dozens of Israeli troops entered the Amari Refugee Camp in Ramallah in the early hours of Monday, closing off all the entrances, AFP journalists said.

At least 13 Palestinians were lightly or moderately injured during the raid as clashes broke out, the Palestinian Health Ministry said, with soldiers firing tear gas and bullets.

Residents said a number of Palestinians were arrested, though there was no immediate confirmation or statement from the army.

Israeli forces later withdrew from the camp.

It came days after an Israeli soldier was killed during a raid inside the camp.

Sergeant Ronen Lubarsky, 20, of the Duvdevan special forces unit, was struck on the head by a stone block thrown during an arrest raid Thursday and died early Saturday.

Israeli media said the block was a granite slab dropped from a third-floor window.

Those responsible were not arrested at the time.

Amari is located inside Ramallah, seat of the Palestinian Authority, in an area theoretically under the full control of the Palestinian government.

Israeli forces regularly carry out night raids in Palestinian-governed parts of the West Bank to arrest suspects they accuse of militant activities against Israel.

Amari, home to around 6,000 Palestinians according to the United Nations, is a regular flashpoint where Israeli raids have sparked fierce clashes in the past.

 

[Housecarl]

The Four Horsemen - 05/28 to 06/04
05/28/2018
Started by Ragnarok‎, Today 01:51 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?536927-The-Four-Horsemen-05-28-to-06-04



For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/worl...p-presence-to-deter-russia/ar-AAxW1Yx?ffid=gz

Poland seeks permanent US troop presence to deter Russia

Travis Fedschun
2 hours ago

Thousands of American troops could be permanently stationed in Poland as a deterrent to Russia, the country's defense minister said Monday, adding that he's has held talks with U.S. officials.

Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak told state Radio 1 he's recently held talks in Washington about having a permanent presence of U.S. troops in Poland, where they are currently on a rotational, temporary, though open-ended mission.

Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine has caused anxiety in the region, as Moscow has continued to support separatists in eastern Ukraine.

"The result of our efforts is that the U.S. Senate has contacted the Pentagon about an assessment of ... (the) permanent presence of U.S. troops in Poland," he said. "Such presence is of great importance because it deters the adversary."

U.S. and NATO troops were deployed to Poland and the region last year as a security assurance.

Russia has taken other steps seen as hostile in the region in recent years, and a Dutch-led investigation revealed Thursday that a Buk missile from a Russian military unit brought down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine in 2014. The passenger jet was on its way from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, when it was blown out of the sky over Ukraine on July 17, 2014. All 298 passengers and crew were killed.

Cisco's Talos cyberintelligence unit also warned last week that it has a high level of confidence the Russian government has hacked at least 500,000 routers and storage devices in an attempt to cause another enormous cyberattack on Ukraine.

-

RUSSIA HACKS 500,000 ROUTERS IN ATTEMPT TO ATTACK UKRAINE

-

In Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin's spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said that an expanding NATO's presence and infrastructure towards Russia's borders was an "expansionist" move.

"In general, when we record gradual expansion of NATO military structure towards our borders, when NATO infrastructure directly approaches our borders, this certainly does not contribute to security and stability on the continent in any way," Peskov told the TASS news agency. "On the contrary, these expansionist steps, certainly, result in counteractions of the Russian side to balance the parity which is violated every time this way."

Peskov said that a permanent deployment of U.S. troops in Poland is a "sovereign decision" but that the consequences for the "entire security on the continent" are evident.

The Onet.pl news portal reported that Poland is seeking the permanent deployment of a U.S. armored division and is offering up to $2 billion to help build the infrastructure. It says the defense ministry has written to U.S. politicians and the U.S. Congress with details of the proposal.

The ministry's press office confirmed to The Associated Press that such a document has been forwarded, but declined to give more details.

Fox News’ Chris Ciaccia, Ryan Gaydos, and The Associated Press contributed to this report.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://thestrategybridge.org/the-b...hancing-deterrence-in-the-new-cold-war-part-i

Israel’s Nuclear Strategy: Enhancing Deterrence in the New Cold War (Part I)

Louis René Beres May 29, 2018

"Oh ship of state, new waves push you out to sea...."
—Horace, Odes


By definition, as long as particular countries regard their nuclear status as an asset, every state that is a member of the so-called nuclear club is a direct beneficiary of the Cold War. This is because all core elements of any national nuclear strategy, whether actual or still-contemplated, were originally conceptualized, shaped, and even codified within the earlier bipolar struggles of post World War II international relations.[1] Nonetheless, as the world now enters into a more-or-less resurrected form of this initial struggle the strategic postures of each extant nuclear weapons state are being modified within the still-developing parameters of Cold War II.

These parameters, it follows, warrant very careful further study by both scholars and policy makers. Already, they are in constant flux, transient, changing in both foreseeable and prospectively unseen ways. Among other things, such critical parameters or boundaries will become increasingly vital and potentially even determinative. In this regard, a great deal will depend upon the precise manner in which this reborn bipolar rivalry impacts the various basic elements and circumstances of nuclear deterrence postures.

In turn, this manner will depend very considerably upon multiple and overlapping national nuclear power alignments with either Russia or the United States, or conceivably with both.

Antecedent to such starkly complex considerations, much will also depend upon the expected rationality or non-rationality of each relevant national nuclear power, and on certain plausible interactions or synergies between core nuclear adversaries and their respective alliances. Regarding the first concern, Israel's planners will need to bear in mind the timeless wisdom of German philosopher Karl Jaspers: "The rational is not thinkable without its other, the non-rational, and it never appears in reality without it."[2]

Never without it. This is an absolutely rudimentary understanding for anyone engaged in strategic nuclear matters. "Everything is very simple in war," counsels Carl von Clausewitz in On War, "but even the simplest thing is difficult."[3] Today, this correspondingly useful insight remains valid not only during periods of conflict, but also in those unsteady periods of latent hostility between possible or still-impending wars. Interestingly, this expected validity during a cold war was already seen by the seventeenth-century English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes. In his classic Leviathan, this early political thinker opines that a condition of war obtains not only during unambiguous periods of "actual fighting," but also whenever there merely exists a "known disposition thereto."[4]

Accordingly, even during the expansive pre-nuclear era in world politics, a precarious logic of deterrence existed within the global state of nature. Already, there was operative an evidently fearful condition of raw competition, corrosive violence, and seemingly perpetual anarchy.

Significantly, even for Hobbes, and long before the advent of any nuclear weapons, the worst state of war would have to be characterized by an utterly dreadful equality, a bellum omnium contra omnes wherein "the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest."[5]

In any such worst case configuration—most apparent today where nuclear proliferation had managed to continue without meaningfully effective inhibitions—the life of both individual human beings and entire states would inevitably be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."[6] For Israel, the shifting parameters of a Second Cold War and related issues of enemy rationality could have indeterminate or foreseeable effects upon its presumptive nuclear doctrine and strategy. This includes, of course, the various diverse issues surrounding choices between nuclear ambiguity and nuclear disclosure.

Historically, the former posture has prevailed unchallenged until today, and can be referred to metaphorically as Israel's bomb in the basement. Still, as a bipolar axis of conflict is now being aggressively reaffirmed in world politics, and as prospects for enemy irrationality are arguably greater than before, Jerusalem will soon have to make appropriate modifications to its nuclear deterrence doctrine and posture.

Until today, in principle at least, this national doctrine and posture have remained determinedly ambiguous. At the same time, traditional ambiguity had already been effectively breached at the highest possible level by two of Israel's prime ministers, first, by Shimon Peres, on December 22, 1995, and then again by Ehud Olmert on December 11, 2006. Peres, speaking to a group of Israeli newspaper and magazine editors, then affirmed publicly: "...give me peace, and we'll give up the atom. That's the whole story."[7]

When Olmert later offered similarly general but also revelatory remarks, they were widely—but wrongly—interpreted as mere "slips of the tongue."[8]

Today, as Moscow and Washington once again become recognizably bitter adversaries—most obviously in their fundamentally different positions and involvements in Syria and throughout the wider Middle East—a basic question must again be raised in Jerusalem: Is comprehensive nuclear secrecy necessarily in the best survival interests of the Jewish State?[9]

To respond effectively, Israel must start with the problematic assumption that in any such complex strategic matters, truth could sometimes be counter-intuitive. A full answer to this challenging query must therefore be grounded in the tangible expectations and exigencies of formal strategic doctrine. Whatever else Jerusalem may already have in mind concerning such indispensable doctrine, its response ought never be just a series of incremental ad hoc decisions or otherwise unreflective policies, that is, positions that are invented and re-invented from one specific crisis to the next.

Any purposeful loosening of Israeli nuclear ambiguity would need to be subtle, nuanced, more-or-less indirect, and visibly incremental. Contrary to the often parodied views of any such prospective disclosure that may be found in popular news stories or on television, this loosening would not have to take the expressly provocative form of openly forthright or otherwise official Israeli policy pronouncements. Instead, Israel’s nuclear status could be allowed to leak out on its own, thereby allowing a point to be made without precipitating any immediate sense of crisis.

Among other things, formal doctrine would represent the indispensable framework from which any gainfully pragmatic Israeli nuclear policy of ambiguity or disclosure could then be suitably extrapolated. In all military institutions and traditions, such doctrine must describe the tactical manner in which pertinent national forces ought to fight in plausible combat situations.

There is more. The central importance of codified Israeli military doctrine lies not only in the particular way it can animate, unify, and optimize national military forces, but also in the expectedly efficient manner that it can transmit certain desired messages to an enemy state, enemy states, or sub-state proxies. Understood in terms of Israel's strategic nuclear policy, any indiscriminate, across-the-board ambiguity could prove injurious to the country's national security rather than beneficial. Although possibly counter-intuitive, this is the case because any truly effective deterrence and defense could sometimes call for a military doctrine that is at least partially recognizable by adversary states, and also by certain sub-state proxies.

In order to persuade would-be adversaries not to strike first, in these circumstances a manifestly complex effort of dissuasion, projecting too much secrecy could quickly prove counter-productive.

In any routine military planning, having available options for strategic surprise can be helpful, if not fully prerequisite, to successful combat operations. But successful deterrence is another matter entirely. In order to persuade would-be adversaries not to strike first, in these circumstances a manifestly complex effort of dissuasion, projecting too much secrecy could quickly prove counter-productive.

In the matter of Israel and its potential enemies, any sincere military success must lie in credible deterrence, and not in actual war-fighting. Examined in terms of ancient Chinese military thought offered by Sun-Tzu in The Art of War, "Supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting."[9] With this worthy dictum in mind, there are times for Israel when successful deterrence policies could require the deliberate loosening of information that had formerly been tightly held. In essence, such information could concern Israel's capabilities, its intentions or both complex qualities taken together.

Looking ahead to the emerging Cold War II, such information would also need to be rendered compatible with Jerusalem's preferred and specific superpower alignments. More than likely, Jerusalem’s alignments will still favor ties to Washington over Moscow, but it is also not inconceivable that the current incoherence within relevant US foreign policies could temper this historical preference.

Sometimes, strategic truth must be counterintuitive. There are foreseeable circumstances wherein ordinary secrecy could actually be too much secrecy, thereby undermining any country's national security. We may recall, in this connection, a popular Cold War era movie in which Dr. Strangelove, an eccentric strategic advisor to the American president discovers, to his horror, that the existence of America's doomsday machine had never been made known in advance to the Soviets.

"The whole point of the doomsday machine is lost," complains Dr. Strangelove, "if you keep it a secret." To have been suitably deterred, the film instructs, and not too subtly, the Soviets ought to have first been given sufficiently prior warnings of the doomsday machine. This device, after all, had been designed solely to ensure the perceived automaticity of America's nuclear retaliatory response. Remembering the commonly-held strategic posture known as Mutually-Assured Destruction (MAD), this response would have been instantly recognizable to the Kremlin as massive and assuredly destructive.

As instruments of deterrence, nuclear weapons can succeed only in their protracted non-use.

It follows from all this that Israel's nuclear weapons must consistently remain oriented to deterrence ex ante, and not to actual war fighting or revenge ex post. As instruments of deterrence, nuclear weapons can succeed only in their protracted non-use. Once they have been used for tangible battle, deterrence by definition, will have failed. It is also worth noting that, once actually used, any traditional meanings of victory, especially if both sides are already nuclear, would instantly become moot.

The Cold War is over, and Israel's emerging deterrence relationship to a prospectively nuclear Iran is not reasonably analogous or even comparable to the historic American-Soviet Balance-of-Terror. Still, there are crucial elements of Cold War superpower antagonisms that will necessarily and substantially impact Israel's nuclear strategic choices. This means that Israel must never construct its own nuclear strategic doctrine and policy apart from various close assessments of US-Russian relations.

The Cold War is over, and Israel's emerging deterrence relationship to a prospectively nuclear Iran is not reasonably analogous or even comparable to the historic American-Soviet Balance-of-Terror.

There are also certain Cold War deterrence lessons to be learned and adapted by the Jewish State to the current situation. More precisely, any unmodified continuance of total nuclear ambiguity concerning Israel's (a) strategic targeting doctrine; (b) secure basing modes; and/or (c) capacity to penetrate a designated enemy's active air defenses, could cause a newly-nuclearizing or still-nuclearizing enemy state such as Iran to critically underestimate Israel's retaliatory capacity or resolve.

As a subsidiary but still urgent nuclear concern, Israeli planners will need to continually assess the capability and intentions of Pakistan, an already-nuclear Islamic state, and one that has openly declared a nuclear war fighting concept of national nuclear deterrence. Returning to the formative lexicon of the Cold War, this non-Arab Islamic state has made a formal shift from mutual assured destruction to nuclear utilization theory. In the specialized discourse and parlance of all orthodox nuclear strategic theory, this represents an overt shift from MAD (mutual assured destruction) to NUT (nuclear utilization theory).[10]

Going forward assorted uncertainties surrounding the presumed components of Israel's nuclear arsenal could lead enemy states to sometimes reach a wrong conclusion. In part, this is because Israel's willingness to make good on any threatened nuclear retaliation could then be seen, widely perhaps, as inversely related to weapon system destructiveness. Ironically, if Israel's nuclear weapons were sometime believed to be too destructive, they might not deter.

In the future, any continuing policy of complete ambiguity could cause an already nuclear enemy state to overestimate the first-strike vulnerability of Israel's nuclear forces. In part, at least, this overestimation could be the result of a too-complete silence concerning measures of protection that had been deployed to safeguard Israeli nuclear weapons. Such silence, in turn, could be the product of Israel's perceived alignments with one or the other current superpower by any then-relevant regional foe.

A related problem could be the product of certain Israeli doctrinal obfuscations regarding the country's defense potential, a silence that could be mistakenly understood by certain enemy states, as an indication of inadequate Israeli Ballistic Missile Defense. To be maximally useful, certain relevant strengths and capabilities of Arrow-3 and other interrelated and multi-layered elements of active defense could therefore need to be revealed, perhaps even in previously unimaginable operational detail.

Going forward, certain elements of strategic truth could be counter-intuitive. Once again, the then-prevailing conditions of Cold War II could expect to have certain meaningful impacts upon any such considered revelations.

Further examination of such prospective impacts can be found in Part II of this essay, forthcoming.

Louis René Beres is the author of many books and monographs dealing with nuclear strategy and nuclear war. His twelfth and latest book is Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel's Nuclear Strategy. He has lectured widely on law and strategy issues at both United States and Israeli military and intelligence institutions.

Notes


[1] In essence, hypothesizing the emergence of "Cold War II" means expecting the world system to become increasingly bipolar. For early writings by this author on the global security implications of such expanding bipolarity, see: Louis René Beres, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Reliability of Alliance Commitments," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 25, No.4., December 1972, pp. 702-710; Louis René Beres, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Tragedy of the Commons," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 26, No.4., December 1973, pp, 649-658; and Louis René Beres, "Guerillas, Terrorists, and Polarity: New Structural Models of World Politics," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 27, No.4., December 1974, pp. 624-636.
[2] Karl Jaspers, Reason and Existence, 1935; cited in Walter Kaufman, ed., Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre, New York, Meridian Books, 1956, p. 158
[3] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Chapter VI, "Friction in War," in Edward M. Collins, War, Politics and Power; Chicago; Henry Regnery Company, 1962, p. 131
[4] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter XIII, "Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery," (1651) in C.B. Macpherson, ed., New York, Penguin Books, 1968, p. 186
[5] Hobbes, Leviathan, op cit., p. 183
[6] Hobbes, Leviathan, op. cit., p. 186
[7] Louis René Beres, Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel's Nuclear Strategy (New York and London, Rowman & Litttlefield, 2016), p. xxix
[8] Beres, op. cit., p. xxix
[9] Sun-Tzu, The Art of War, Ralph D. Sawyer, tr., New York, Barnes & Noble, 1994, p. 129. See also: Louis René Beres, "Lessons for Israel from Ancient Chinese Military Thought: Facing Iranian Nuclearization with Sun-Tzu," Harvard National Security Journal, Harvard Law School, October 24, 2013
[10] Several of this author's earlier books deal expressly with the pertinent distinctions. See, for example, by Louis René Beres: The Management of World Power: A Theoretical Analysis; Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics; Reason and Realpolitik: US Foreign Policy and World Order; Mimicking Sisyphus: America's Countervailing Nuclear Strategy; Security or Armageddon: Israel's Nuclear Strategy; and Israel's Nuclear Strategy and US National Security (Tel Aviv), a 2016 monograph co-authored by Professor Beres and General (USA/ret.) Barry McCaffrey.

 

[danielboon]

ELINT News
ELINT News
@ELINTNews
#BREAKING: MASSIVE RED ALARM SIRENS ACROSS SOUTHERN ISRAEL RIGHT NOW
3:28 PM · May 29, 2018


ELINT News
ELINT News
@ELINTNews
·
1m
Replying to @ELINTNews
#BREAKING: Explosions now heard in the area

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Nidalgazaui
‏ @Nidalgazaui
8m8 minutes ago

#BIG! US backed #SDF will withdraw from #Manbij and #Turkey will care for security and stabilizing the region -Turkish FM

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Nidalgazaui
‏ @Nidalgazaui
3m3 minutes ago

#BREAKING: Turkey threatens to close US Incirlik airbase - Turkish FM

 

[Lilbitsnana]

manooch kargar
‏ @ma000111
56m56 minutes ago

by @SputnikInt

BREAKING: @RT_Erdogan #Turkey threatens to close #Incirlik air base for #US - foreign minister https://sptnkne.ws/hDfC pic.twitter.com/9bnJlNfxkf



posted for fair use and discussion

https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/...&utm_content=hDfC&utm_campaign=URL_shortening

Turkey Threatens to Deny US Access to Incirlik Base Amid F-35 Deal Tensions
© AP Photo /
Middle East
10:45 30.05.2018(updated 13:41 30.05.2018) Get short URL
8210

ANKARA (Sputnik) - If the United States does not supply F-35 stealth fighter jets to the Turkish Air Force, Ankara will satisfy its need for such warplanes "somewhere else," Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on Wednesday.

Turkey may close Incirlik air base for the US, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said.

"As regards the F-35 jets, I have no concerns, this contract is legally binding, it cannot be easily terminated. But if these jets are not supplied to Turkey, we will satisfy our needs somewhere else," Cavusoglu said, as quoted by the NTV broadcaster.

"There are no reasons why the US will not supply F-35s to us. We do not want to spoil relations with our US ally. The F-35 aircraft should be delivered to Turkey as planned. But in case of problems, Turkey will not be left without an alternative. It may buy [aircraft] both from Russia and from a NATO country. There is an agreement on F-35s, and if one side withdraws from it, the necessary steps will be taken," the minister added.

In this Wednesday, Sept. 2, 2015, file photo, an F-35 jet arrives at its new operational base at Hill Air Force Base, in northern Utah.
© AP Photo / Rick Bowmer
Israel Wants US to Keep F-35 'Upgrade Capabilities' Secret From Turkey – Reports
Secretary of the US Air Force Heather Wilson has said earlier that Washington is hopeful it can resolve some operational problems over Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system before sending F-35 stealth fighter jets to the Turkish Air Force.

On Sunday, the Yeni Safak media outlet reported Turkey could purchase Russian fifth-generation Su-57 fighter jets if the United States blocks deliveries of F-35 planes because of Ankara's decision to buy Russian S-400 air defense systems.

Earlier in April, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Wess Mitchell said Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 air defense system from Russia could negatively affect the delivery of the F-35 jets to Ankara. In addition, a group of senators comprising both Republicans and Democrats wants to block the supply of F-35s to Ankara due to the arrest of US Pastor Andrew Brunson, who is being tried on charges of aiding terrorist groups.

READ MORE: Turkey Cannot Confirm Plans to Purchase Su-57 Jets Instead of F-35 — Source

In December 2017, Russia and Turkey signed a loan agreement to supply S-400 air defense systems to Ankara. According to a statement by the Turkish defense industry secretariat, two S-400 batteries will be operated and serviced by the Turkish military.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Golan Heights



i24NEWS English
‏Verified account @i24NEWS_EN
2h2 hours ago

Russia's Lavrov: non-Syrian forces should vacate Israel border region 'soon' http://i24ne.ws/Vjjj30kfnqu


posted for fair use and disussion


Lavrov: non-Syrian forces should vacate Israel border region 'soon'
05/30/2018
4:06:25 AM
Updated on
05/30/2018
4:06:32 AM

Written by
i24NEWS


Russia's foreign minister Sergei Lavrov appeared Wednesday to urge Iranian forces to quickly leave Syria's southwestern corner, after over a year of diplomatic campaigning by Israel.

"I think that this should happen as soon as possible," Lavrov was quoted as saying by Russian news agencies, after outlining a plan to clear the Israel-Syria border area of non-government militants, chief among them Iran.

Rebels from a variety of anti-regime groups also hold territory near the Israeli border, and Damascus has said in recent weeks it is tilling the ground for an offensive to recapture the area.

The development raised alarm in Israel, which fears that total Syrian control of the border region would allow Iranian forces would be within a stone's throw of the Israeli-held Golan Heights.

Iran backs Syrian President Bashar Al Assad in the country's bitter civil war and Israel has frequently struck what it says are Iranian bases, weapons depots and other targets in Syria.

MENAHEM KAHANA (AFP) Israeli Merkava tanks are seen in a deployment area near the Syrian border in the Israel-annexed Golan Heights on May 10, 2018
MENAHEM KAHANA (AFP)

"As regards the confrontation between Israel and Iran in Syria, we have agreements on the southwestern de-escalation zone, these agreements have been reached between Russia, the United States and Jordan," Lavrov was quoted as saying Wednesday.

"Israel was informed about them as we were working on them. The [agreements] stipulate that this de-escalation zone should consolidate stability, while all non-Syrian forces must be withdrawn from this area."

Israel has long campaigned, particularly in the Kremlin, for pressure to be applied on Syria to curtail the number of Iranian forces allowed in the country.

Earlier this month Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps fired some 32 rockets towards the Israeli-held Golan Heights region from Syria, triggering a massive retaliation that Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman said wiped out large swathes of Iran's military infrastructure in the country.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Nidalgazaui
‏ @Nidalgazaui
3m3 minutes ago

#BREAKING: Several #ISIS attackers, armed with light weapons a suicide vests storming the headquarters of the Afghan Interior Ministry in the area 15 in the city of #Kabul, #Afghanistan

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Nidalgazaui
‏ @Nidalgazaui
2m2 minutes ago

US denies reports that #SDF will hand over #Manbij to #Turkey

 

[Housecarl]

manooch kargar
‏ @ma000111
56m56 minutes ago

by @SputnikInt

BREAKING: @RT_Erdogan #Turkey threatens to close #Incirlik air base for #US - foreign minister https://sptnkne.ws/hDfC pic.twitter.com/9bnJlNfxkf



posted for fair use and discussion

https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/...&utm_content=hDfC&utm_campaign=URL_shortening

Turkey Threatens to Deny US Access to Incirlik Base Amid F-35 Deal Tensions
© AP Photo /
Middle East
10:45 30.05.2018(updated 13:41 30.05.2018) Get short URL
8210

ANKARA (Sputnik) - If the United States does not supply F-35 stealth fighter jets to the Turkish Air Force, Ankara will satisfy its need for such warplanes "somewhere else," Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on Wednesday.

Turkey may close Incirlik air base for the US, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said.

"As regards the F-35 jets, I have no concerns, this contract is legally binding, it cannot be easily terminated. But if these jets are not supplied to Turkey, we will satisfy our needs somewhere else," Cavusoglu said, as quoted by the NTV broadcaster.

"There are no reasons why the US will not supply F-35s to us. We do not want to spoil relations with our US ally. The F-35 aircraft should be delivered to Turkey as planned. But in case of problems, Turkey will not be left without an alternative. It may buy [aircraft] both from Russia and from a NATO country. There is an agreement on F-35s, and if one side withdraws from it, the necessary steps will be taken," the minister added.

In this Wednesday, Sept. 2, 2015, file photo, an F-35 jet arrives at its new operational base at Hill Air Force Base, in northern Utah.
© AP Photo / Rick Bowmer
Israel Wants US to Keep F-35 'Upgrade Capabilities' Secret From Turkey – Reports
Secretary of the US Air Force Heather Wilson has said earlier that Washington is hopeful it can resolve some operational problems over Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system before sending F-35 stealth fighter jets to the Turkish Air Force.

On Sunday, the Yeni Safak media outlet reported Turkey could purchase Russian fifth-generation Su-57 fighter jets if the United States blocks deliveries of F-35 planes because of Ankara's decision to buy Russian S-400 air defense systems.

Earlier in April, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Wess Mitchell said Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 air defense system from Russia could negatively affect the delivery of the F-35 jets to Ankara. In addition, a group of senators comprising both Republicans and Democrats wants to block the supply of F-35s to Ankara due to the arrest of US Pastor Andrew Brunson, who is being tried on charges of aiding terrorist groups.

READ MORE: Turkey Cannot Confirm Plans to Purchase Su-57 Jets Instead of F-35 — Source

In December 2017, Russia and Turkey signed a loan agreement to supply S-400 air defense systems to Ankara. According to a statement by the Turkish defense industry secretariat, two S-400 batteries will be operated and serviced by the Turkish military.

Well we've all been expecting this....

 

[danielboon]

Turkey says plans for Syria's Manbij could be implemented by end of summer

Reuters|Published: 05.30.18 , 11:48
Plans for a roadmap in Syria's Manbij may be implemented before the end of the summer if Turkey and the United States reach an agreement, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on Wednesday.



Speaking at an interview with broadcaster AHaber, Cavusoglu said US and Turkish forces would control the Manbij region until a new administration was formed under the understanding reached with Washington. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5274672,00.html

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Nidalgazaui
‏ @Nidalgazaui
29m29 minutes ago

#BIG! US backed #SDF forces captured a long range air-to-ground missile from #ISIS in eastern #Syria

Note: IS has burried dozens of weapons, ammunitions, rockets, ATGM's and even vehicles & 2 little bird helicopters) in the Syrian and Iraqi desert

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DeePmxrW4AA6MMq.jpg:large

 

[Zagdid]

U.S. MILITARY WILL LEAVE SYRIA BASE IN DEAL WITH RUSSIA, REPORTS SAY
http://www.newsweek.com/us-military-will-give-major-syria-base-deal-russia-reports-say-948272 (fair use)

BY TOM O'CONNOR ON 5/29/18 AT 6:07 PM

The U.S. has reportedly considered abandoning one of its most significant military installations in Syria as it prepared to enter into talks with Russia and Jordan over a deteriorating security situation in the war-torn country's restive south.

The report, which first surfaced Sunday in Saudi Arabian newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, came as Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov said Tuesday that Moscow "supported the idea of holding a trilateral meeting at a level convenient for our partners," according to the state-run RIA Novosti. The U.S. and its Middle Eastern ally Jordan are opponents of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whose forces—backed by Russia and Iran—are planning a new offensive against rebels and jihadis across southern Syria.

The Saudi publication reported that, in order to prevent an escalation between longtime foes Iran and Israel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Satterfield was attempting to draw up a proposal for the trilateral meeting that would include the withdrawal of all Syrian and non-Syrian militias up to 15-and-a-half miles from the Jordanian border. Insurgents would also be transferred to the rebel-held province of Idlib and the Syria-Jordan border crossing would be opened.

In exchange, the U.S. would reportedly dismantle its military base in Al-Tanf, located in a pocket of Syrian rebel control near the Jordanian and Iraqi borders.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/proving-ground-irans-operational-strategy-syria

Proving Ground: Iran’s Operational Strategy in Syria

Nicholas Hargreaves-Heald
Sun, 05/27/2018 - 1:18am | 1 comment

Introduction


Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has proven to be a resilient and highly motivated U.S. adversary. Home to some 82 million citizens who are overwhelmingly (some 95%) Shi’a Muslim, Iran has been governed since 1979 by a radically anti-Western Theocratic Shi’a regime, controlled by the nation’s Supreme Leader and a cohort of religious authorities who claim power according to the ideological tenet of Wiliyat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist).[1] Over the past thirty-six years, Iran has sought to accomplish two integrally linked strategic goals: weaken Western, Israeli, and Saudi influence in the region, and improve Iranian influence across the globe. In essence, these goals are guided by a single strategic, religious, and political tenet, Sudur Inqilab (“Export of the Revolution”), which charges Iran’s people with spreading the spirit and ideals of the Islamic Revolution to all the oppressed peoples of the Earth.[2] In reality, however, this tenet has largely been used as a means of inspiring nationalist and religious support for Iranian efforts to accomplish strategic goals.

Throughout its history, however, Iran has largely lacked the military, financial, and political means to accomplish its aggressive strategic goals in a conventional manner, especially given the power of its adversaries. Iran does, however, enjoy a popular (though not universal) reputation among Shi’a Muslims (approximately 154 million people, or 10% of the world’s Muslim population[3]) as the rightful authority of the Shi’a faith and a legitimate Islamic state. This reputation affords the Islamic Republic unquantifiable religious and political influence, which it can leverage with global Shi’a populations. In light of this powerful available resource, Iranian military and political officials adopted an operational strategy which matched Iranian ways with Iranian means: unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare can be defined as “activities conducted to empower a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating [as]… as an underground or guerilla force.”[4] Since 1982, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have used their influence to form deep relationships with various Shi’a (and some Sunni) non-state armed groups, and provided them billions of dollars’ worth of weapons and training in order to empower them to attack Iranian adversaries. In many cases, Iran has not merely empowered these groups, but actively created them. Their strategy, therefore, is one of “extended” unconventional warfare, which seeks to create, develop, and control armed groups in order to undermine an adversary. In several cases, these proxy groups have attained legitimate political status in their host nation, thus granting Iran an avenue into that nation’s political arena and protecting the group from domestic political and military disputes. Consequently, Iran’s strategy cuts both ways: proxy forces both execute military operations against adversary targets and spread Iranian influence through the host nation in legitimate political arenas. This unconventional warfare operational strategy, therefore, allows Iran to utilize the religious authority at their disposal in order to pursue their strategic goals while (in theory) avoiding the overt political costs of their actions (namely outright war with a militarily superior adversary).[5] Throughout the past thirty-six years, Iranian operations of this type have allowed them to gain military footholds in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, and political influence in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria.

In most cases, Iranian support of these groups has followed a formula of Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA). TAA activities focus on supporting an external force with training, arms, expertise, and other resources so that the force can engage in operations. Such activities have, for many decades, been the hallmark of unconventional warfare campaigns where nation states wish to keep a low footprint and a high degree of plausible deniability (or simply avoid direct military involvement). TAA is also the activity of choice for a nation state which wishes to interfere in foreign affairs but lacks significant political support or military resources: it is relatively inexpensive in blood and treasure, and is often easy to mask in a guise of altruism. For the most part, this strategy has proved sufficient for Iran: the Islamic Republic has gained dozens of Shi’a proxy groups across the broader Middle East, who have fought for Iranian interests. It is, however, difficult to discern precisely how much influence Iran’s TAA activities have gained them among these groups: in other words, it is unclear whether Iran directly controls the actions of these groups, or if it merely works with them to accomplish shared goals.[6] Many authorities, therefore, question whether Iran’s proxy forces could ever be used for anything other than indigenous, irregular operations.

In 2011, however, civil war broke out in Syria between anti-government rebels and the ruling al-Assad regime, a key strategic ally to Iran since 1980. In response, Iran provided massive financial aid to the regime and sent hundreds of military advisors for TAA- but the Syrian Arab Armed Forces (SAA) was quickly placed on their heels. By 2014, SAA had lost over 60% of its fieldable force, and key geographic areas were falling into the hands of anti-regime rebels, including terrorist organizations like ISIS. [7] Iran responded by redoubling their efforts.

Less than 3 years later, Iranian proxy forces in Syria numbered close to 20,000, and had proven critical for an abrupt shift in the Assad regime’s fate. Pro-regime forces had retaken key strategic regions from Syrian rebel forces, and ISIS had been largely eliminated. But how had Iran so abruptly changed Assad’s fate? How was it that Iran, with only proxy force units, had been able to fight against capable and intractable Syrian rebels and anti-regime terrorists like ISIS? In effect, Iranian victories were accomplished by shifting beyond traditional TAA operations and introducing a rudimentary and conventional structure for Iran to organize, command, and control its fielded proxy groups as a unified force. This structure relies on embedding small Iranian conventional units with each proxy force to command and lead non-state fighters. According to Special Forces TRADOC FM 3-05.130, unconventional warfare operations can be conducted “by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations.”[8] Therefore, while this operational strategy does not represent an evolution for military theory, it does herald a new era of coordinated Iranian military capability: through its activities in Syria, Iran has demonstrated that it is capable of executing complex conventional operations against highly irregular threats by commanding and coordinating a hybrid conventional-irregular force structure. Although this strategy has proved successful, however, the long-term costs of these operations have proved difficult for Iran to bear.

Iranian TAA Operations, 1982-2015

To understand the shift in Iran’s operational strategy in Syria, it is necessary to first understand Iran’s previous unconventional warfare operations across the region. The majority of these operations have relied exclusively on various elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Created in 1979 as an elite force that answered directly to the Supreme Leader, the IRGC is a politico-military organization responsible for Iran’s irregular operations such as internal security, influence campaigns, and direct special operations.[9] The IRGC consists of Ground Force (IRGC-GF), Basij Mobilization Force (IRGC-B) for internal security, Aerospace Force (IRGC-AF), and Navy (IRGC-N).

During the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, however, the Supreme Leader called into being a specialized IRGC unit, Quds Force, which was specifically intended to empower Kurdish militias fighting against Saddam Hussein in Iraq.[10] Its role in Iranian strategy, however, soon expanded to include all unconventional warfare operations. Today, Quds Force (led by the enigmatic Major General Qassem Soleimani) is responsible for all of Iran’s TAA activities involving irregular proxy forces, including those operating within Syria.[11] Until Syria, Quds Force operated by embedding officers within elements of a proxy organization in order to train proxy fighters, advise organizational leaders, and organize logistics for military aid. They also acted as a bridge between Tehran and the proxy organization by relaying Iranian commands (if direct control was established), intelligence, and religious-political motivation. This method was designed to provide TAA and assert influence, while simultaneously giving the proxy organization the appearance of independent and indigenous development and maintaining some semblance of Iranian deniability. The three short cases below illustrate how Quds Force’s TAA activities with proxy organizations led to each proxy’s political and military success.

Lebanon

In 1982, a group of Lebanese Shi’a militants founded the insurgent-terrorist movement Hezbollah (now a U.S. designated terrorist organization) at the behest of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, and with the help of Quds Force.[12] Hezbollah, which is today led by the charismatic and pragmatic Hassan Nasrallah (who swears complete fealty to the Iranian Supreme Leader[13]), was specifically created to execute attacks against Israel, who had invaded Lebanon in 1982 in response to Palestinian attacks from southern Lebanon.[14] In the years to come, Hezbollah would prove to be the defining success story in Iranian Quds Force operations, and a model for all of Iran’s future relationships with non-state armed groups: by the end of 2006, Hezbollah had gained legitimacy as a Lebanese political party (1992), and become known as the both vanguard of the Arab fight with Israel and a legitimate defender of the Lebanese and (more broadly) Arab people.[15] They also experienced great success in waging a terrorist campaign against Western targets throughout the latter half of the 20th century, using tactics including: guerrilla and terrorist attacks against Western and Israeli forces from 1982-2000 and again in 2006; decades of kidnappings, hijackings, suicide and conventional bombings, and raids; and thousands of rocket attacks against Israel that continue today.[16] By 2007, Hezbollah’s military wing (formally recognized as a “resistance movement” by the Lebanese government) came to dwarf the Lebanese army, causing some experts to correctly identify Hezbollah as a “state within a state”.[17] Through all of these successes, Hezbollah remained integrally tied to Iran through complete obedience to the Supreme Leader, a shared religion, and a common religious-political ideology. For all intents and purposes, Hezbollah is merely an extension of the Iranian state in Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s success, however, has largely stemmed from Iran’s support, which included the training, advice, and assistance (TAA) of Quds Force. Even in Hezbollah’s nascence, Iran sent 1500 Quds Force advisors to train Hezbollah fighters and commanders.[18] Over the years to follow, embedded IRGC-QF officers arranged for Iran to provide Hezbollah with: Iranian made firearms, sniper rifles, AGRMs, and over 100,000 rockets; political, religious, and ideological motivation; and an estimated average of $200 million to $1 billion per year.[19] All of this support, however, fit neatly within Quds Force’s TAA limitations-- Iran never committed direct combat units to support Hezbollah’s operations (although it did insert Quds Force officers into Hezbollah’s command structure). Today, Hezbollah’s status has slightly declined in the face of the organization’s perceived sectarian motivations in the Syrian civil war, but it remains the most prominent Shi’a proxy force under Iranian control.

Iraq

Iranian success with Hezbollah in Lebanon throughout the latter part of the 20th century emboldened Quds Force to extend their unconventional warfare strategy to other states. Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the subsequent sectarian strife, Iran forged deep ties with existing anti-Western Iraqi Shi’a groups (and created numerous others) in order to drive out U.S. and coalition forces and improve Iranian influence in Iraq. All of these groups, however, share religious, ideological, and political goals that roughly align with Iran’s. Many have declared direct allegiance to the Supreme Leader and therefore Iran. By 2011, these groups (which would eventually become known as “Special Groups”) came to include: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Liwa al-Youm al-Mawud, Munazzama Badr, and the Sheibani Network.[20]

As early as 2003, IRGC-QF began training Special Groups in Najaf, Iraq. Training soon expanded to neighboring Iran, where Quds Force brought Hezbollah to advise fighters in IED construction, spy craft, and guerilla tactics for attacks against U.S., coalition, and Sunni targets in Iraq.[21] Quds Force also provided Iraqi Special Groups with operational guidance on targeting, logistics, and organizational structure.[22] By mid-2004, IRGC-QF had established an elaborate smuggling operation, which provided Special Groups with incredible amounts of assistance,[23] including: direct financial contributions of an estimated $9 to $36 million[24], materials for building thousands of IEDs, thousands of EFPs featuring passive infrared sensors[25], dozens of 122mm Grad and 240mm Fajr rockets, rocket propelled grenade launchers, and 60mm and 81mm IRAM mortars.[26] Despite Iranian TAA, however, it is difficult to discern what level of control Iran exerts over some Iraqi organizations—although many have declared allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader and are directly controlled by Quds Force, many others have nationalist goals, and simply accept Iranian aid.[27]

Although Quds Force did not participate in active combat operations in Iraq with Iraqi Special Groups, IRGC-QF or IRGC-GF is believed to have assassinated over 180 Iraqi Air Force officials[28] in 2010 and dozens of former Intelligence officers who participated in the Iran-Iraq war.[29] Iraq, therefore, may be considered the first real case of Iranian direct action within the host nation of a proxy force- but certainly not a case of combat coordination with proxy forces.

Yemen

Following the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, Iran began to provide extensive aid to the Houthis, a group of Zaidi Shi’ites from the mountains of Yemen who were engaged in a civil war with the Yemeni government and the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). By 2016, the Houthis had seized a significant amount of Yemeni territory, including ground bordering Saudi Arabia. Iranian support, which was intended to develop the Houthis into a massive security threat to Saudi Arabia, followed the classic Quds Force TAA formula. Iranian training (which continues today[30]) has reached thousands of Houthi rebels[31], including Houthi women who have been mobilized to fight invading GCC forces.[32] Interestingly, this training has largely been provided by Iranian proxy organizations, such as Lebanese Hezbollah[33] and Liwa Fatemiyoun, a group of Afghan Hazaras recruited from Afghan refugee camps in Iran. [34] Iranian military aid to the Houthis has included sniper rifles, RPGs, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and various small arms, in addition to more sophisticated weapons technology. American officials have assessed that Iran has provided the Houthis with short-range, Iranian made Qiam and Shahab-2 ballistic missiles to attack Saudi Arabia, Iran’s principal adversary in the Arabian peninsula.[35] The Houthis have launched dozens of these missiles (and others based on their design) at Saudi targets such as the al-Yamama Palace (December 2017)[36], the city of Najran (March 2018)[37], the capital city of Riyadh (March 2018)[38], and the Jizan Regional Airport (April 2018).[39] Authorities have also assessed that Quds Force provided the technology for the Houthi’s explosive, remote-controlled “drone boat”, which they used to attack a Saudi warship on January 30, 2017[40], and the use of an explosive-laden Qasef-1 “suicide” drone to attack a Saudi Patriot batteries in February, 2017.[41] On top of this, Quds Force has been reported to advise Houthi leaders off the battlefield, and encourage them to launch kinetic operations against GCC targets. [42]

There are, however, some indications that Iranian operations within Yemen are not limited to Quds Force’s standard TAA approach. Over the course of the last year, over forty IRGC (it is unclear whether these are Quds Force or IRGC-GF operatives) and dozens of Hezbollah casualties have been reported in Yemen.[43] While many of these casualties have been reported as the result of GCC airstrikes against Houthi targets far behind the front lines, almost a dozen have been reported to take place within a mile of active combat zones and front lines. Such casualties would suggest that Iranian forces are either actively participating in combat in Yemen or advising Houthi rebels close to the battlefield.[44] So far, however, there has only been limited evidence to support this hypothesis.[45]

Syria: The Proving Ground

In 2011, the Arab Spring arrived in Syria. Unlike in other countries where the government partially capitulated, Syria’s al-Assad regime labelled protesters as “terrorists” and ordered a brutal and violent crackdown. In response, Syrian anti-regime protesters organized into anti-regime militias, arming themselves and executing widespread, uncoordinated attacks on regime assets and personnel[46]. These attacks yielded increasingly brutal regime responses, including massacres and chemical attacks[47]. By 2013, the fight for Syria’s governance had become increasingly sectarian, with the Shi’a and Alawite minorities (mostly) supporting al-Assad’s government, and the Sunni majority (who had long felt alienated and subjugated under the government of Hafez and Bashar al-Assad) fighting to undermine it. Over one third of Syrian Alawite males had been killed by 2015,[48] and the religious nature of the fighting in Syria had attracted numerous terrorist organizations, including: ISIS and al-Nusra Front. By 2016, an estimated 470,000 people had been killed, and the tactical reality of the war had been overcome with chaos. [49]

Syria’s al-Assad regime and the Islamic Republic have long enjoyed a strategic partnership, based on a common anti-Israel ideology and a shared religious belief system. Although Syria is comprised of a 74% Sunni Muslim majority and a 3% Shi’a minority, the ruling regime and some 12% of the population is Alawite, an offshoot of Shi’ism which shares the central tenants of the Shi’a faith, but few religious practices[50]; in fact, the two faiths are close enough in essence that even many Shi’a cannot or do not understand the difference.[51] This shared faith ostensibly united the two nations decades ago: as the only Shi’a powers in the region (prior to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003), Iran and Syria both claimed to want Shi’a influence to increase in the Sunni dominated Middle East.[52] More realistically, however, the two nations are bound by common strategic goals (such as weakening Israeli, U.S., and Saudi influence in the Middle East[53]) and a mutually beneficial strategic alliance.[54] Since 1980, this alliance has yielded incredible economic benefits to both parties[55]: it has allowed Syria to enjoy the financial backing and religious legitimacy of the Islamic Republic, and provided Iran with an ally through which they can supply proxy groups like Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas.[56] Given the vital importance of these organizations (as well as others whose area of operations is close to Syria) to Iran’s regional strategy, Iran has vowed to commit any and all resources necessary to keep a friendly regime in Syria afloat.[57] Indeed, Iran has repeatedly painted the Syrian war as an existential threat: IRGC Intelligence head Mehdi Taeb claimed that, “if we lose Syria we won’t be able to hold Tehran.”[58] Although this claim is dubious, it demonstrates the seriousness of Iran’s resolve to keep the Assad regime afloat. At the very least, claims Professor Jubin Goodarzi at Webster University, “if Syria cannot continue to be an absolute ally of Iran, Tehran will not allow it to become an enemy.”[59]

To that end, Iranian has spent over $20 billion per year in Syria since 2011.[60] From 2011 to 2014, approximately 100-2000 Quds Force[61] officers engaged in TAA activities with the Syrian military.[62] By September 2015, however, it became clear that Quds Force’s efforts were in vain: although the regime started the war with some 300,000 troops, that number had dropped to some 150,000 by 2014[63]—and of those 150,000, only about 30,000 were combat ready.[64] Some of these forces were children under the age of 18.[65]

In 2015, therefore, desperation to keep Assad in power drove Iranian officials to field forces from their closest and most trusted proxy groups. These proxy forces numbered some 20,000 fighters in 2017 and included 3,000 from Pakistani Liwa Zaynab (formed from Pakistani Shi’ites), 4,000-12,000 troops from Afghan Liwa Fatemiyoun[66], 5,000 from Iraqi Special Groups (like Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah, and Munazzama Badr)[67], 8,000 from Hezbollah[68], and several hundred from Yemeni Houthis.[69] Iran has, therefore, “called in all its markers” in order to commit a major bulk of its key proxy forces to Syria and maintain the Assad government.

Proving Ground

In the years to follow, Iran developed a unified command and control structure to direct its complex network of conventional and irregular forces in Syria (which many have labelled as the Iranian “Expeditionary Force” or “Coalition”).[70] Essentially, this command and control structure replicated and expanded Quds Force methods: IRGC officers embed with proxy forces across Syria, where they act as battalion-level commanders for proxy fighters and participate in active combat operations involving their proxy force.[71] These officers report up the IRGC chain of command, culminating in senior IRGC personnel like Quds Force leader Major General Qassem Soleimani and Ground Force commander Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour. Also embedded with proxy forces are IRGC officers under the equivalent rank of lieutenant-colonel (taken from at least 19 Iranian divisions) who act as company and platoon level commanders on combat operations, and rotate every two months.[72] The number of soldiers embedded with each force must be large enough to allow for expected casualties, while maintaining command and control.[73] While it is unclear if these IRGC forces are part of Quds Force, Ground Force, or both, there are currently some 7,000 Iranian troops embedded with the 20,000 proxy forces in Syria[74]-- but it is likely that this number will increase by thousands in the years to come.[75] The proxy forces are, therefore, incorporated into the IRGC’s hierarchical force structure as conventional combat forces beholden to the IRGC chain of command. This innovation allows Iran to command all of its conventional and irregular forces from the same central command and control apparatus. Although this does not represent an innovation in military affairs, it is an interesting theoretical framework to consider: Iran has, essentially, shifted from a TAA-limited, unconventional warfare strategy to a hybrid unconventional warfare operational strategy, which relies on commanding and controlling irregular proxy units in conventional roles.[76]

This evolved strategy has been utilized in almost all of Iran’s key Syrian operations. Moreover, it has proved highly successful and allowed the Iranian Expeditionary Force to perform complex military maneuvers in Syria. In July 2015, IRGC-led proxy forces divided into several battle groups outside rebel-held Aleppo and penetrated rebel lines at multiple points, driving deep into rebel territory. Once they reached their target, they turned their assault 90 degrees, linked their lines, and encircled the rebel-held areas of Aleppo to enforce a rigid siege.[77] In late July, Jabhat Fath al Sham (formerly Al Nusrah Front) launched an enormous offensive to break out of the siege; although Iranian proxies lost some ground, they were able to launch a coordinated counter-offensive which regained lost ground.[78] Throughout the year of successful combat that followed, numerous IRGC officers at at least the battalion-level (lieutenant colonel and above) were killed in Aleppo on dates that coincided with proxy force offensives, indicating that they were actively planning proxy operations and leading such forces at (at least) a battalion level.[79] Other IRGC personnel at company and platoon level command ranks were killed on dates matching combat operations, showing that Iranian soldiers participated in combat operations with proxy forces on the ground in Aleppo.[80] By December, 2016, the rebel forces had been eliminated, and pro-regime forces declared control of Aleppo.[81] Following this date, command and sub-command level IRGC-GF casualties in Aleppo dropped dramatically.[82] In February, 2016, Iranian coalition forces participated in another major operation in Zahra and Nubl, cities to the northwest of Aleppo.[83] In essence, these operations were intended as a turning movement, forcing the rebels to retreat or launch a major military maneuver to the north to prevent interdiction of their lines of communication. Although these operations were successful in forcing the rebels to retreat, numerous IRGC-GF personnel were killed. Once again, these casualties occurred in conjunction with major proxy force offensives, indicating that Iranian forces were both leading and fighting with proxy forces.[84] Finally, hundreds of fighters from Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Special Groups, and Aghan Liwa al-Fatimiyoun (as well as an unknown number of IRGC ground forces) participated in joint operations with Russian and Syrian forces to retake the Syrian city of Palmyra in 2016.[85] In conjunction with these operations, Iran reported numerous commander and sub-commander level IRGC-GF casualties in Palmyra, indicating that Iran was again embedding IRGC-GF forces to command and fight with proxy forces.[86]

Yet, for all its successes, this operational strategy has its limitations: following Iranian coalition operations in Aleppo, for example, Iranian proxy forces participated in combat operations in Syria’s northern Lataika province [87]; but it would appear that IRGC forces did not participate with them. Presumably, this operational pause was to allow for Iran to rotate IRGC combat and command forces, resupply their arsenals in Syria, and plan future coordinated activities with Russia and the SAA.[88] It is, however, unclear whether or not IRGC commanders still issued commands from outside of the battlespace, or if these proxy forces were self-sufficient. If the latter, further research is warranted to understand how these units coordinated with each other and other pro-regime forces. Either way, the Lataika campaign is a prime example of the limits of Iran’s operational strategy: due to the covert nature of their direct involvement in combat, Iran is incapable of committing its IRGC forces to continuous combat operations with proxy forces in Syria.

Iranian activity in Syria, however, has caused direct and enormous gains for the Assad regime: as of April 2018, the regime ostensibly controls some 70% of Syria.[89] This result would have proved impossible without Iranian help, which provided a bulk of the fighting ground force manpower for pro-government forces; and, after seven years of fighting for the Assad regime, Iran feels that victory is in sight. [90] Iranian forces have begun to build military bases and Iranian outposts in southern Syria, where they will presumably remain upon the war’s conclusion.[91] For its commitment, Iran seems to have gained enormous influence within the Syrian state through proactive military and political measures.[92] Moreover, Iran has managed to create an additional non-state armed group out of Syria Shi’a militants[93], over which it exerts direct control. Presumably, this group (known as “Syrian Hezbollah”) will function in ways similar to Lebanese Hezbollah, and attempt to gain status as a political party within Syria in order to exert even greater Iranian influence on the Syrian regime.[94] Finally, on April 4, 2018, the United States announced that it would begin to withdraw its military from Syria.[95] Iranian state media sources have widely publicized this announcement, claiming that a U.S. withdrawal would signify an acceptance of defeat in Syria.[96]

The Costs

Iran’s perceived “victory” in Syria, however, has come at a steep cost. Almost 200 members of the IRGC have been killed since 2015[97], and proxy forces have suffered far worse: Hezbollah has sustained some 3,000 dead and 7,000 wounded[98], Liwa Fatemiyoun 2,000 dead and 8,000 injured[99], and Iraqi militias over 1,000 dead. In the face of these casualties, Iranian proxies are reported to be facing “crises of morale”.[100] Even Hezbollah, an organization renowned for its grit and fighting spirit, has seen declining morale and internal rifts regarding the righteousness of their increasingly sectarian fight in Syria.[101] Moreover, Iranian operations in Syria have cost an estimated $15-20 billion per year to maintain, in addition to approximately $5 billion per year loaned to the Assad regime[102], $1 billion paid annually to Lebanese Hezbollah[103], up to $36 million annually for Iraqi Special Groups, and unknown millions per year for Liwa Fatemiyoun and Liwa Zaynab. All told, this support amounts to some 6% of Iran’s total GDP.[104] Other estimates, however, put Iran’s total expenditures in Syria at closer to 13% of GDP.[105]

These expenses are especially severe given the current conditions of the Iranian economy. Since 2013 alone, the Iranian rial has dropped in value by over 250%, including a decrease of 60% since April 11, 2018.[106] Over the past five years, Iran’s GDP has floundered, falling by over $150 billion between 2011 and 2017, despite the relief of sanctions in 2015.[107] GDP growth has since dwindled to less than 5% per year.[108] Since 2011, Iranian inflation has risen by an average of 21%, with a high of 39% in 2013.[109] Finally, Iran’s unemployment rate of 12.5% is, as of 2017, one the world’s highest.[110] There are also signs that Iranian victories in Iraq and Syria may not yield the financial benefits Iran had hoped for. [111] Although Iran had hoped for the lion’s share of reconstruction contracts in both nations, they have instead gone to other firms within Iraq, Syria, and other Arab nations.[112]

To make matters worse, the international community has strongly condemned Iranian activity in Syria. In January 2018, the United States issued sanctions against Iran for their international support of proxy organizations in Syria[113]. In large part due to Iranian activities in Syria, U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on May 8, 2018.[114] The JCPOA required Iran to avoid development of its nuclear program in exchange for the unfreezing of over $100 billion dollars in Iranian assets. Although Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has declared that Iran will continue to honor the deal given the participation of the other signatories (namely E.U. nations), President Trump’s decision throws the entire deal into question and opens Iran up to further U.S. sanctions.[115] Indeed, U.S. set about to attack Iran’s unconventional warfare capabilities almost immediately following the withdrawal. On May 10 and 11, 2018, the United States levied biting sanctions against Iranian companies’ ad IRGC representatives[116] to specifically target the assets and financing of Quds Force and their proxy network. [117] On May 16, 2018, the U.S. Treasury department sanctioned five Hezbollah leaders, including General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah.[118] Finally, on May 22, 2018, the United States sanctioned five IRGC members for supplying Yemeni Houthis with weaponry which they then used against the GCC.[119] At the very least, then, the downfall of the JCPOA will have significant consequences for Iran’s unconventional warfare strategy. It is, however, extremely likely that additional U.S. sanctions will target the Iranian economy: both President Trump’s new National Security Advisor, John Bolton[120], and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo[121] have expressed a desire to issue harsh sanctions on Iran in order to force it to abandon its regional activities. It seems likely, therefore, that Iran’s economic woes will only deepen in the months and years to come.[122]

Continued...

 

[Housecarl]

Continued...

In the face of such hardship, which is directly related to Iranian support of non-state armed groups (especially in Syria), many Iranians have begun to question the regime’s spending.[123] In December 2017, protests erupted across Iran, decrying the billions of dollars that Iran has spent supporting various non-state groups across the region.[124] Over the following week, tens of thousands of Iranians crowded the streets of cities like Tehran and Mashhad, chanting phrases such as “not Gaza, not Lebanon, my life for Iran”, “leave Syria, think about us”, “death to [President] Rouhani” and “we don’t want an Islamic Republic”.[125] In response, the IRGC led a brutal crackdown, leaving over twenty dead, and largely subduing public demonstrations.[126] Although the IRGC claimed that the uprising had been quelled, social media continued to play out as a hotbed for the spread of protest messaging long after the final day.[127] Should the public discontent continue to mount, it is likely that the regime will resort to even more draconian measures, which in turn will likely merit an additional economic response from the international community which could deepen Iranian woes. It is unclear how the internal dynamics of Iran will be affected by the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. It is clear, however, that Iranian cooperation with non-state armed groups is taking a significant toll not only on the state’s economy, but also on its social and political fabric. As of 2017, the Fund for Peace listed Iran as the 49th most unstable nation in the world.[128]

Finally, Iran’s hard-line support of the Assad regime has alienated the broader Sunni Arab population, which largely supports Sunni Syrian rebels. Indeed, although Iran’s support of Hezbollah against the Israelis in 2006 gained the Islamic Republic widespread (if begrudging) respect among many Arabs[129], a 2017 poll by the Arab American Institute found that Arabs (other than Lebanese) held an overwhelmingly negative opinion of Iran, specifically because of their interference in Syria.[130] Iran’s actions in Syria have also directly affected its relationship with Hamas[131] (which ardently supported the anti-regime forces), resulting in the two partners breaking and repairing their relationship several times from 2012-2017.[132] Hamas, which has never truly been controlled by Iran like other proxy forces[133] has nevertheless been a critical strategic partner in their shared crusade against Israel. The breaks in their relationship, therefore, proved to significantly weaken Iran’s ability to attack a major adversary, and complicated their operations in the Levant.[134] More importantly, however, the problems between Hamas and Iran spilled into the relationship between Hamas and Hezbollah, which had long been harmonious.[135] This fractured relationship further endangered Hezbollah’s security in Lebanon, and Iranian-sponsored attacks against Israel. Although Iran[136] and Hezbollah[137] both seem to have repaired their relationships with Hamas in 2017, it is clear that Iranian actions in Syria are having additional costs abroad by are throwing its strategic partnerships into question.[138]

The Future

Iranian unconventional warfare activities since 1982 have proved extensive. Their successes in Lebanon and Iraq came in the face of some of the world’s most significant military, economic, and political powers. In Syria, these successes culminated in a cunning (albeit simple) augmentation of their previous operational approach which allowed for a unified Expeditionary Force capable of executing complex military maneuvers. In recent months, Iranian operations seem to have reduced in light of the decreasing necessity for such action.[139] If the direct Iranian role in Syria is indeed over, then a more thorough evaluation of all their Syrian operations is certainly warranted. Therefore, although Iranian activities in Syria should certainly not be celebrated, they must be evaluated objectively as impressive advancements in Iranian military sophistication.

While Iran has thus far been able to develop and maintain their modified unconventional warfare strategy in Syria, however, their capacity to do so in future situations may be limited by the growing economic and political costs of their unconventional warfare operational strategy. Thus far, the Iranian regime has decided to ignore or suppress their domestic instability, while seeking to further international influence: immediately following the protests in January, 2018, for example, Supreme Leader Khamenei approved an additional $4 dollars be allocated from Iranian reserves to military expenses.[140] Iran’s political history suggests that this will continue to be their approach—but, given the rising tide demanding change in Iran, it is likely that the regime will soon be at a crossroads: the future of the Islamic Republic, or the future of their unconventional warfare operations.



Appendix



1


Figure 1: Created by Author, 4/27/18





Figure 2: Created by Author, 4/27/18



2
[1]Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook: Iran, prepared by Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Intelligence Report (2018). (Accessed April 9, 2018), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html .

[2] Shmuel Bar, “Iranian Terrorist Policy and ‘Export of Revolution’, Herzliya Conference, 2009. (Accessed April 8, 2018), http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/2903Iranian.pdf .

[3] BBC Staff, “Sunnis and Shia in the Middle East”, BBC News, London, Dec. 19 2013 (Accessed April 10, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25434060 .

[4] Dr. Richard Shultz, “21st Century Irregular Warfare Paradigm—Revised April 2018”, Powerpoint Presentation, 2018, pg. 23.

[5] Dr. Kimberly Kagan, et al., “The Syrian Theater”, 2017. (Accessed pril 10, 2018), http://www.understandingwar.org/sit...CTP - The Syrian Theater - September 2017.pdf

[6] Figure 1 in the Appendix of this paper demonstrates the author’s assessment of the control that Iran exerts over each proxy group in its portfolio.

[7] Sylvia Westall, “Assad’s army stretched but still seen strong”, The Daily Star, Sept. 19, 2014. (Accessed April 7, 2018), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Mi...ched-but-still-seen-strong.ashx#axzz3E5YPzKAf .

[8] Department of the Army, “Field Manual No. 3-05.130: Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare”, September 2008. (Accessed April 3, 2018), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf

[9] Paul Bucala and Frederick W. Kagan, “Iran’s Evolving Way of War: How the IRGC Fights in Syria”, Critical Threats, March 2016. (Accessed April 12, 2018), https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-...Evolving_Way_of_War_IRGC_in_Syria_FINAL-1.pdf .

[10] Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence and Paramilitary Forces”, CSIS, August 16, 2017. (Accessed April 9, 2018), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/...s/media/csis/pubs/070816_cordesman_report.pdf

[11] Paul Bucala and Frederick W. Kagan, “Iran’s Evolving Way of War: How the IRGC Fights in Syria”.

[12] Joshua Gleis and Benedetta Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 38.

[13] Staff, “Iranian Website Published a speech delivered by Hezbollah Secretary General at a closed forum expressing total devotion to Iran’s Supreme Leader”, The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, April 19, 2018. (Accessed April 19, 2018), http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en...eader-similar-statements-issued-previously-h/ .

[14] Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 7-9.

[15] Norton, Hezbollah: A Short Story (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 101.

[16] Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: the Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 36.

[17] Hussain Abdul-Hussain “Hezbollah: A State Within a State”, May 2009 (Accessed March 4, 2018)

https://www.hudson.org/research/9801-hezbollah-a-state-within-a-state .

[18] Levitt, 36.

[19] Ibid., 12.

[20] Michael Knights, “The Evolution of Iran’s Special Groups in Iraq”, CTC Sentinel, vol. 3, (2010). (Accessed April 4, 2018), https://ctc.usma.edu/the-evolution-of-irans-special-groups-in-iraq/ .

[21] Dr. Kimberly Kagan, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government”, The Institute for the Study of War, 2007. (Accessed March 7, 2018), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/reports/IraqReport06.pdf .

[22] Staff, “U.S. accuses Hezbollah of aiding Iran in Iraq”, The New York Times, July 2, 2007. (Accessed March 7, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2007/07/02/world/africa/02iht-iraq.1.6442071.html

[23] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/reports/IraqReport06.pdf .

[24] Jim Garamone, “Iran Arming, Training Directing Terror Groups in Iraq, U.S. Official Says”, July 3, 2007. (Accessed March 10, 2018), https://www.army.mil/article/3890/i...ecting_terror_groups_in_iraq_us_official_says .

[25] Dr. Kimberly Kagan “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government.”

[26] Michael Kagan, “The Evolution of Iran’s Special Groups in Iraq”.

[27] Again, the author’s assessment of Iranian control over these groups can be seen in Figure 1 of the Appendix.

[28] Sam Dagher, “In Iraq, a very busy Iran”, The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 29, 2010. (Accessed March 23, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703994904575646911886138950 .

[29] Dr. Kimberly Kagan “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government.”

[30] The National Staff, “Iran embassy in Yemen transformed into rebel training grounds”, The National, April 12, 2018. (Accessed April 14, 2018), https://www.thenational.ae/world/me...nsformed-into-rebel-training-grounds-1.721000 .

[31] Islam Saif, “Who are the Iranian Revolutionary Guard leading Houthis in Yemen?”, al-Arabiya, January 1, 2018. (Accessed March 28, 2018), https://english.alarabiya.net/en/fe...Guard-officers-leading-Houthis-in-Yemen-.html .

[32] “Iran Regime’s Female Revolutionary Guards, Provide Military Training”, NCR-Iran, Sept. 17, 2017. (Accessed April 12, 2018), https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/terrori...ds-provide-military-training-for-houthi-women .

[33] Staff, “Fears of sanctions on Lebanon after new video ‘shows Hezbollah in Yemen’”, al-Arabiya, February 25, 2016. (Accessed March 20, 2018), https://english.alarabiya.net/en/we...fter-new-video-shows-Hezbollah-in-Yemen-.html

[34] Alexander Corbeil and Amarnath Amarasingam, “The Houthi Hezbollah: Iran’s Train-and-Equip Program in Sanaa”, Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2016. (Accessed March 28, 2018) https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-03-31/houthi-hezbollah .

[35] Press Corps, “Press Release: Ambassador Haley on Weapons of Iranian Origin Used in Attack on Saudi Arabia”, United States Mission to the United Nations, Nov. 7, 2017. (Accessed March 27, 2018), https://usun.state.gov/remarks/8090 .

[36] Jeremy Binnie, “Dossier shows ‘Iranian’ missile that landed in Saudi Arabia”, Janes, Nov. 17, 2017. (Accessed March 26, 2018), http://www.janes.com/article/75786/dossier-shows-iranian-missile-that-landed-in-saudi-arabia .

[37] Staff, “Houthi missile targeting Saudi Arabia’s Najran intercepted”, Arab News, March 31, 2018. (Accessed April 3, 2018), http://www.arabnews.com/node/1276641/saudi-arabia .

[38] Saeed al-Batati and Rick Gladstone, “Saudis claim to intercept 7 missiles fired at cities from Yemen”, The New York Times, March 25, 2018. (Accessed April 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/25/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-yemen-missile-houthi.html

[39] Staff, “Houthi Forces Claim to Score Direct Hit on Saudi Airport with Ballistic Missile in New Attack”, al-Masdar News, 2018 https://www.almasdarnews.com/articl...airport-with-ballistic-missile-in-new-attack/

[40]Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Houthi forces appear to be using Iranian-made drones to ram Saudi air defenses in Yemen, report says”, The Washington Post, March 22, 2017. (Accessed April 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...-in-yemen-report-says/?utm_term=.f216f82b5cc4 .

[41] Conflict Armament Research, Iranian Technology Transfers to Yemen, March 2017, http://www.conflictarm.com/download-file/?report_id=2465&file_id=2467

[42] Hanin Ghaddar, “The Houthis: A Yemeni Hezbollah?”, Majalla, Nov. 3, 2017. (Accessed March 26, 2018), http://eng.majalla.com/2017/11/article55254798/houthis-yemeni-hezbollah .

[43] Joshua Koontz and Joshua Koontz, “Iran’s Growing Casualty Count in Yemen”, War on the Rocks, June 1, 2017. (Accessed March 28, 2018), https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/irans-growing-casualty-count-in-yemen/ .

[44] Maher Farrukh, Tyler Nocita, and Emily Estelle, “Warning Update: Iran’s Hybrid Warfare in Yemen”, Critical Threats, March 26, 2017. (Accessed March 31, 2018), https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/warning-update-irans-hybrid-warfare-in-yemen

[45] Michael Knights, “Responding to Iran’s Arms Smuggling In Yemen”, The Washington Institute, December 2, 2017. (Accessed April 5, 2018), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/responding-to-irans-arms-smuggling-in-yemen .

[46] David S. Sorenson, Syria in Ruins (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2016), 5.

[47] “Staff, Syria war: What we know about Douma ‘chemical attack’ BBC News, April 16, 2018. (Accessed April 29, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43697084 .

[48] Ruth Sherlock, “In Syria’s war, Alawites pay heavy price for loyalty to Bashar al-Assad”, The Telegraph, April 7, 2015. (Accessed April 5, 2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wo...avy-price-for-loyalty-to-Bashar-al-Assad.html .

[49] Human Rights Watch Staff, “Syria, Events of 2016”, Human Rights Watch, November 2, 2016. (Accessed April 7, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/syria .

[50] Reese Erlich, Inside Syria, (New York: Prometheus Books, 2014), 126-127.

[51] Ibid., 152.

[52] For all their claims of representing Shi’a interests, the two states have largely used their Shi’a status as a lever of national power used to further strategic goals, rather than as a central strategic goal in and of itself. Syria’s al-Assad regime has, for the most part, attempted to distance itself from the Islamic faith for decades. Even Iran’s dedication to the Shi’a across the Middle East has been shown to be secondary to their other strategic goals, such as increasing Iranian influence and eroding Israeli and U.S. power in the region.

[53] Sorenson, 100-101

[54] Many scholars have commented on the relationship between Syria and Iran, asserting that Syria has ultimately proved to be more of a parasite than a partner. It is certainly true that Iran has devoted incredible resources to support Syria, and has received little financial benefit in return. This assertion, however, ignores the massive, geographic benefit that Syria brings to Iran.

[55] Mohsen Milani, “Why Tehran Won’t Abandon Assad(ism)”, CSIS, 2013. (Accessed March 15, 2018), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/...les/files/publication/TWQ_13Winter_Milani.pdf .

[56] Erlich, 146

[57] Sorenson, 102

[58] Karim Sadjadpour, “Iran’s Real Enemy in Syria”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 16, 2018. (Accessed April 21, 2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/16/iran-s-real-enemy-in-syria-pub-76085 .

[59] Erlich,146.

[60] Kenneth Pollack, “Pushing back on Iran part 3: The Syrian civil war”, AEI, February 14, 2018. (Accessed April 21, 2018), https://www.aei.org/publication/pushing-back-on-iran-part-3-the-syrian-civil-war/ .

[61] Christopher Kozak, “’An Army in All Corners’ Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria”, Institute for the Study of War, April 2015. (Accessed April 13, 2018), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/An Army in All Corners by Chris Kozak 1.pdf .

[62] Staff, “Syria footage sheds light on Iran’s involvement”, BBC News, October 30, 2013. (Accessed April 15, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-mi...ria-footage-sheds-light-on-iran-s-involvement .

[63] Sylvia Westall, “Assad’s army stretched but still seen strong”.

[64] Joseph Holliday, “The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War”, Institute for the Study of War, March 2013. (Accessed April 15, 2018), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/TheAssadRegime-web.pdf .

[65] Celine Ahmad, “Underage Teens Face Conscription in Assad’s Syrian Army”, News Deeply, Nov. 10, 2014. (Accessed March 28, 2018), https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/ar...teens-face-conscription-in-assads-syrian-army .

[66] “Iran Sending Thousands of Afghans to Fight in Syria”, Human Rights Watch, Jan 29, 2016. (Accessed March 27, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/29/iran-sending-thousands-afghans-fight-syria .

[67] Edwin Bakker, “Foreign Fighters in the Syria and Iraq Conflict: Statistics and Characteristics of a Rapidly Growing Phenomenon” in Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016), (Accessed April 15, 2018), https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-6265-099-2_2 .

[68] Nadav Pollak, “The Transformation of Hezbollah by its Involvement in Syria”,The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 2016. (Accessed April 15, 2018), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote35-Pollak-2.pdf .

[69] Ariel Ben Solomon, “Report: Yemen Houthis Fighting for Assad in Syria”, The Jerusalem Post, May 31, 2013. (Accessed April 14, 2018), https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Report-Yemen-Houthis-fighting-for-Assad-in-Syria-315005 .

[70] Paul Bucala and Frederick W. Kagan, “Iran’s Evolving Way of War: How the IRGC Fights in Syria”.

[71] Ibid.

[72]Christopher Kozak, “Iran’s Assad Regime”, Institute for the Study of War, March 2017. (Accessed March 20, 2018), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iran's Assad Regime.pdf .

[73] Ibid.

[74] Sam Dagher and Asa Fitch, “Iran Expands Role in Syria in Conjunction with Russia’s Airstrikes”,The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 2, 2015. (Accessed March 21, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-e...onjunction-with-russias-airstrikes-1443811030 .

[75] Staff, “Russia Agrees to 1000 more Iranian Troops Entering Syria”, The Middle East Monitor, August 26, 2017. (Accessed March 23, 2018), https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170826-russia-agrees-to-1000-more-iranian-troops-entering-syria/

[76] Readers should refer to Figure 2 in the appendix for an illustration of the network of the Iranian Expeditionary Force.

[77] Amir Toumaj, “Iranian Military Involvement in the Battle for Aleppo”, FDD’s Long War Journal, August 3, 2016. (Accessed April 9, 2018) https://www.longwarjournal.org/arch...tary-involvement-in-the-battle-for-aleppo.php

[78] Thomas Joscelyn, “Jihadists and Other Rebels Launch New Offensive in Aleppo” FDD’s Long War Journal, Oct. 30, 2016. (Accessed April 9, 2018), https://www.longwarjournal.org/arch...her-rebels-launch-new-offensive-in-aleppo.php .

[79] Amir Toumaj, “IRGC Special Forces Officers Death Highlights Involvement in Syria” FDD’s Long War Journal, Oct. 1, 2016. (Accessed April 9, 2018), https://www.longwarjournal.org/arch...ers-death-highlights-involvement-in-syria.php .

[80] Amir Toumaj, “Iranian Military Involvement in the Battle for Aleppo”.

[81] Amir Toumaj, “Array of pro-Syrian government forces advance in Aleppo”, FDD’s Long War Journal, Dec. 9, 2016. (Accessed April 9, 2018), https://www.longwarjournal.org/arch...yrian-government-forces-advance-in-aleppo.php .

[82] Ibid.

[83] Paul Bucala and Frederick W. Kagan, “Iran’s Evolving Way of War: How the IRGC Fights in Syria”.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Christopher Kozak, “Russian-Syrian-Iranian Coalition Seizes ISIS-Held Palmyra”, Institute for the Study of War, March 27, 2016. (Accessed April 11, 2018), http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/03/russian-syrian-iranian-coalition-seizes.html .

[86] Critical Threats Staff, “Iran News Round Up”, Critical Threats, March 16, 2016. (Accessed April 11, 2018), https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/iran-news-round-up/iran-news-round-up-march-16-2016-1 .

[87] Christopher Kozak, “Assad Regime Gains in Aleppo Alter Balance of Power in Northern Syria”, Institute for the Study of War, Feb. 5, 2016. (Accessed April 10, 2018), http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/02/assad-regime-gains-in-aleppo-alter.html .

[88] Paul Bucala and Frederick W. Kagan, “Iran’s Evolving Way of War: How the IRGC Fights in Syria”.

[89] Alia Chughtai, “Syrian civil war map: Who’s in control where”, al-Jazeera, April 15, 2018. (Accessed April 17, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2015/05/syria-country-divided-150529144229467.html .

[90] Karim Sadjadpour, “Iran’s Real Enemy in Syria”.

[91] Jack Khoury, Reuters, and Associated Press, “Russia outs Israel, Says Two Israeli Fighter Jets Struck Iranian Base in Syria”, Haaretz, Apr. 10, 2018. (Accessed April 11, 2018), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news...r-jets-struck-iranian-base-in-syria-1.5979943 .

[92] Iranian forces have largely hijacked the Assad regime’s power structure, building their own influence throughout Syria in place of the Assad regime. Their methods for doing so involve the recruitment of Syrian militias, military officials, and common citizens to their cause. Although this research was beyond the scope of this paper, it certainly bears further scrutiny.

[93] Although Syrian Hezbollah is a fascinating topic which bears further scrutiny, its development was not included in this paper given limited time and space. Readers may be interested to learn that the development of Syrian Hezbollah has (almost entirely) been handled by Lebanese Hezbollah, making Syrian Hezbollah a proxy to a proxy.

[94] Phillip Smyth, “How Iran Is Building Its Syrian Hezbollah”, The Washington Institute, March 8, 2016. (Accessed April 9, 2018), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-iran-is-building-its-syrian-hezbollah .

[95] Karen DeYoung and Shane Harris, “Trump instructs military to begin planning for withdrawal from Syria” The Washington Post, April 4, 2018. (Accessed April 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...9fe3c675a89_story.html?utm_term=.b7c178d6f22b .

[96] Dr. Raz Zimmt, “Spotlight on Iran: March 29-April 15, 2018”, The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, March 29, 2018. (Accessed April 11, 2018), http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/spotlight-iran-march-29-april-15-2018/ .

[97] Paul Bucala and Frederick W. Kagan, “Iran’s Evolving Way of War: How the IRGC Fights in Syria”.

[98] Colin P. Clarke “A Glass Half Empty? Taking Stock of Hezbollah’s Losses in Syria”, October 2017 (Accessed March 4, 2018)

https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/10/a-glass-half-empty-taking-stock-of-hezbollahs-losses.html

[99] http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/2...-for--bashar-al-assad-says-official-769805655

[100] “Israel’s Army Chief: Hezbollah Struggling with ‘Financial and Morale Crisis’”, Haaretz, Feb. 22, 2017. (Accessed April 12, 2018), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news...ng-with-financial-and-morale-crisis-1.5440429 .

[101] MEE Staff, “Hezbollah facing loss of morale over Syrian quagmire: Report”, The Middle East Eye, (Accessed April 13, 2018), http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/h...ric-push-peace-save-credibility-icg-852222126 .

[102] Ben Evansky, “Iran Spends Billions on Weapons Programs, Terrorism while Ignoring Iranians’ Basic Needs, Report Finds”, Fox News, Jan. 28, 2018. (Accessed April 10, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2018/0...noring-iranians-basic-needs-report-finds.html .

[103] Staff “Tehran’s proxy wars: how Iran spends its billions”, The Week, Jan. 2, 2018. (Accessed April 12, 2018), http://www.theweek.co.uk/in-depth/90676/tehran-s-proxy-wars-how-iran-spends-its-billions .

[104] “GDP growth (annual %)”, The World Bank, 2018. (Accessed April 13, 2018), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2016&locations=IR&start=2005&view=chart

[105] Ben Evansky, “Iran Spends Billions on Weapons Programs, Terrorism while Ignoring Iranians’ Basic Needs, Report Finds”.

[106] “United States Dollar – Iranian Rial”, Market Insider, 2018. (Accessed April 13, 2018), http://markets.businessinsider.com/currencies/usd-irr .

[107] “GDP growth (annual %)”, The World Bank,

[108] Ibid.

[109] “Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)”, The World Bank, 2018. (Accessed April 13, 2018), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=IR .

[110] Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook: Unemployment Rate, prepared by Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Intelligence Report (2018). (Accessed April 14, 2018), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2129rank.html .

[111] Ahmad Majidyar, “Iran eyes major role in Syria’s reconstruction”,The Middle East Institute, Jan. 9, 2018. (Accessed April 14, 2018), http://www.mei.edu/content/io/iran-eyes-major-role-syrias-reconstruction .

[112] Staff, “Iran Faces uphill battle to profit from its role in Syrian war” Financial Times, Feb. 13, 2018. (Accessed April 15, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/f5129c30-0d7f-11e8-8eb7-42f857ea9f09 .

[113] Felicia Schwartz, “U.S. Sanctions Iran Over Missile Program, Amid Protests”, The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 4, 2018. (Accessed April 16, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sanctions-iran-over-missile-program-amid-protests-1515099812 .

[114] Michael C. Bender, Michael R. Gordon, and Rebecca Ballhaus, “Trump Withdraws U.S. from Iran Accord”, May 8, 2018. (Accessed May 13, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-to-withdraw-u-s-from-iran-accord-1525800212 .

[115] Alex Ward, “Rouhani: Iran to stay in Iran nuclear deal—for now”, Vox.com, May 8, 2018. (Accessed May 13, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/5/8/17332830/iran-deal-rouhani-announcement-trump-netanyahu .

[116] Staff, “New U.S. Sanctions Target Iranian Revolutionary Guards”, Radio Free Europe, May 10, 2018. (Accessed May 21, 2018), https://www.rferl.org/a/u-s-sets-sa...nian-individuals-three-entities/29219836.html.

[117] Ian Tulley, “U.S. Raises Pressure on Iran With Sanctions on Currency Exchange”, The Wall Street Journal, May 11, 2018. (Accessed May 13, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sa...y-exchange-operations-in-the-u-a-e-1525973587

[118]Saleha Mohsin, “U.S. Sanctions Head of Hezbollah in Joint Action with Qatar”, Bloomberg, May 16, 2018. (Accessed May 22, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti...hezbollah-in-joint-action-with-qatar-jh9ilw52

[119] Max Greenwood, “US sanctions five Iranians over missile support to Houthis”, The Hill, May 22, 2018. (Accessed May 22, 2018), http://thehill.com/policy/internati...anians-in-connection-with-missile-support-for .

[120] John R. Bolton, “It’s time to name and sanction Iran’s terrorists”, AEI, April 16, 2017. (Accessed April 13, 2018), https://www.aei.org/publication/its-time-to-name-and-sanction-irans-terrorists/ .

[121] Mike Calia, Amanda Macia, Tom DiChristopher, “Secretary of State Mike Pompeo promises ‘strongest sanctions in history’ and vows US won’t allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon: ‘Not now, not ever’”, CNBC.com, May 21, 2018. (Accessed May 21, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/21/pom...wing-trumps-withdrawal-from-nuclear-deal.html .

[122]In the week prior to this paper’s publication, the E.U. reportedly made attempts to block future and current U.S. sanctions from affecting the Iranian economy. Although these moves will likely further strain the E.U.-U.S. relationship, the author assesses that they are unlikely to protect Iran’s financial resources for conducting unconventional warfare—any attempt by the E.U. to do so would be deeply incendiary, and result in significant political consequences for the E.U.

[123] Chirine Mouchantaf, “Iranian protest: ‘Military adventurism’ at the core of citizens outcry”, Defense News, Jan. 5, 2018. (Accessed April 14, 2018), https://www.defensenews.com/global/...y-adventurism-at-the-core-of-citizens-outcry/ .

[124] Asa Fitch, “Iran’s Spending on Foreign Proxies Raises Protesters Ire”, The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 2, 2018. (Accessed April 14, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-spending-on-foreign-proxies-raises-protesters-ire-1514920398 .

[125] “Rare public protests spread across Iran amid spiraling inflation”, The Telegraph, Dec. 29, 2017. (Accessed April 13, 2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/20...-spread-across-iran-amid-spiraling-inflation/ .

[126] “Iran protests: Supreme Leader Khamenei blames ‘enemies’”, BBC News, Jan. 2, 2018. (Accessed April 10, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42539445 .

[127] “Iran’s Guard Declares Victory Over Protesters, but Signs of Dissent Remain”, The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 7, 2018. (Accessed April 10, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/irania...fter-security-crackdown-on-streets-1515331766 .

[128] “Global Data”, The Fund for Peace, 2018. (Accessed April 9, 2018), http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/ .

[129] Erlich 147.

[130]Zogby Research Services, LLC, “Public Opinion 2017”, 2017. (Accessed April 10, 2018), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.n...ginal/1515524868/SBY2017_Final.pdf?1515524868 .

[131] Robert M. Danin, “Hamas Breaks From Syria”, Council on Foreign Relations, Feb. 29, 2012. (Accessed April 9, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/hamas-breaks-syria .

[132] Karin Brulliard, “Hamas ties to Syria and Iran in flux as region shifts”, The Washington Post, March 7, 2012. (Accessed April 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...ory.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.aa05a0997260 .

[133] Karim Sadjadpour and Bernard Gwertzmen, “Iran Supports Hamas, but Hamas Is No Iranian ‘Puppet’, Council on Foreign Relations, Jan. 7, 2009. (Accessed April 8, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/interview/iran-supports-hamas-hamas-no-iranian-puppet .

[134] “Hamas and Iran Rebuild Ties after Falling Out over Syria”, The Guardian, Jan. 9, 2014. (Accessed April 8, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/09/hamas-iran-rebuild-ties-falling-out-syria .

[135] Ariel Ben Solomon, “Report: Hezbollah Orders Hamas Out of Lebanon”, The Jerusalem Post, May 30, 2013. (Accessed April 9, 2018), http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Report-Hezbollah-orders-Hamas-out-of-Lebanon-314850 .

[136] TOI Staff, “Hamas Leader in Gaza: Ties with Iran now ‘fantastic’”, Times of Israel, August 28, 2017. (Accessed April 8, 2018), https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas...antastic-were-preparing-battle-for-palestine/ .

[137] “Hamas and Hezbollah Agree to Disagree on Syria”, Foreign Policy in Focus, February 7, 2014. (Accessed March 20, 2018), http://fpif.org/hamas-hezbollah-agree-disagree-syria/ .

[138] Staff, “Iran-Hamas Rapprochement: the Current Situation”,The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Jan. 9, 2018. (Accessed April 4, 2018), http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/iran-hamas-rapprochement-current-situation/ .

[139] Hamidreza Azizi, “5 reasons Iran is Staying out of Eastern Ghouta”, al-Monitor, April 2, 2018. (Accessed April 3, 2018), https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/or...uta-afrin-policy-russia-assad-evacuation.html .

[140] Amir Basiri, “Iran increases its military budget in response to nationwide protests”, Jan. 30, 2018. (Accessed April 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/...sponse-to-nationwide-protests/article/2647541 .

About the Author(s)
Nicholas Hargreaves-Heald
Nicholas Hargreaves-Heald is a master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a research intern with the U.S. Naval War College's Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG). He has previously conducted research for and published with the U.S. Army War College's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI). His work focuses broadly on irregular warfare, non-state armed groups, and the relationships between state and non-state actors. The views expressed in this report are the author's own and do not reflect those of the U.S. Government or the Fletcher School.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.9news.com.au/national/2...munist-party-interference-australian-politics

Top-secret report uncovers high-level Chinese interference in Australian politics

By Chris Uhlmann • Nine Network Political Editor
6:21pm May 28, 2018

A top-secret Government report has uncovered a decade-long attempt by the Chinese Communist Party to compromise Australia's major political parties.

9NEWS has confirmed the report says the CCP's operations are aimed at all levels of government and designed to gain access and influence over policy making.

Malcolm Turnbull commissioned the joint investigation in August 2016, combining the resources of domestic spy agency, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and the department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

The departmental effort was led by one of the Prime Minister's former advisers, John Garnaut.

Mr Turnbull had seen enough of what the investigation had turned up by May 2017 to order the Attorney General to significantly toughen Australia's laws on espionage and foreign interference.

It is those proposed laws – and the commentary around them – that have been a major factor in the recent chill in the relationship between Australia and China.

The Prime Minister referred to the existence of the secret report when he tabled the foreign interference bills in December.

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"The findings of the report are necessarily classified," Mr Turnbull said.

"But I can say the reasons for initiating this work were justified and the outcomes have galvanised us to take action.

"I'm introducing legislation to counter the threat of foreign states exerting improper influence over our system of government and our political landscape."

Mr Turnbull has not named China as being the country of most concern to Australia but the secret report does.

Mr Garnaut has left the public service and is now running a consultancy firm, JG Global, and in March he appeared before the powerful US House Armed Services Committee. His evidence focused on China and this testimony suggested his work on the report was global in its scope.

"Under the uncompromising leadership of President Xi Jinping, China's activities have become too brazen and aggressive to ignore," Mr Garnaut said.

"A re-evaluation is taking place in half-a-dozen established democracies around the world, including Australia and the United States. Many more are entering the conversation."

He said the Chinese Communist Party worked subtly by offering privileged access, building personal relationships and rewarding those who delivered. He did not refer to his secret report but noted the scope of the Chinse influence operations had appeared in media reports around the world.

"We know that this is happening in our universities, in business communities, in ethnic Chinese communities, in media and entertainment and in politics and government.”

RELATED: Political donor Dr Chau Chak Wing behind 2015 UN bribery scandal, Andrew Hastie tells Parliament

He said the Communist Party's systems were was so alien to Western eyes that "we have been having trouble seeing them let alone responding”.

"The party has been 'winning without fighting', to borrow some of its terminology," he said.

The existence of the secret report and the involvement of Mr Garnaut as one of its authors sheds light on what motivated the chair of Parliament's intelligence committee to make a dramatic public declaration last week.

Andrew Hastie used the cover of Parliamentary privilege to name a major Chinese Australian political donor, Dr Chau Chak Wing, in connection with a long-running United Nations bribery scandal.

Dr Chau has never been charged with any offence and he vigorously denies all the allegations.

Mr Hastie said he was moved to speak out because he believed that defamation actions were hampering the reporting.

"Defamation cases can have a chilling effect on our free press," Mr Hastie said.

Dr Chau has two defamation actions afoot and one names Fairfax Media as a respondent for articles written by Mr Garnaut, when he was that company's Asia Pacific Editor.

Mr Garnaut was contacted for comment but referred the inquiry on to his lawyer.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
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https://www.stripes.com/news/middle...iers-attack-afghan-interior-ministry-1.530091

Gunmen dressed as US soldiers attack Afghan Interior Ministry

By CHAD GARLAND AND ZUBAIR BABAKARKHAIL | STARS AND STRIPES
Published: May 30, 2018

KABUL, Afghanistan — Gunmen dressed as U.S. soldiers and traveling in a captured Humvee set off a suicide bomb and then tried to shoot their way into the Afghan Interior Ministry before being killed by government forces Wednesday, security officials said.

It’s not clear who carried out the attack — one of at least three that occurred in Afghanistan on Wednesday — that targeted the Interior Ministry’s compound a few hundred yards from Kabul’s airport and a coalition air base where Americans and their allies train Afghan forces.

Just after midday, a car bomb exploded at the entrance to the ministry compound, said Hashmat Stanekzai, spokesman for Kabul police.

“After that, several gunmen tried to get into the ministry, but they faced resistance by our security forces,” he said. “The attackers were not able to enter the ministry.”

The firefight ended a little more than two hour later, he said, and all the gunmen had been killed. He could not say how many other casualties there were besides the assailants.

At least one of the attackers was captured, Gen. John Nicholson, the top U.S. commander in the country, told reporters at the Pentagon via video conference later in the day.

But Nicholson disputed claims by the Islamic State group’s Afghanistan affiliate that it was responsible for the attack. Both the Taliban and ISIS have carried out attacks that have left hundreds dead in recent months. The Taliban, however, had not claimed responsibility for the attack.

The tactics smacked more of the Taliban’s Haqqani network, Nicholson said, referring to a brutal branch of the insurgent group considered its most capable. For example, their use of American uniforms and their targeting of a government facility.

“We have seen [American] uniforms used in the past,” the American general said. “It’s been well over a year since we’ve seen that.”

Gallery

ISIS attacks tend to be person-borne, involving suicide vests, and indiscriminate, often targeting Shiite minorities in the country.

The use of military uniforms and a vehicle was a concern, Nicholson said, as it might cause a hesitation or delay in responding to the attack. However, he said the Afghans responded as they should have.

“They did exactly what they were supposed to do,” he said.

The guards at the gate recognized that the uniforms were dated versions of those worn by U.S. soldiers and demanded the attackers exit the vehicle. That’s when the fighting started, Nicholson said, and one of the attackers detonated a suicide vest, killing himself and some of his fellow gunmen.

The Crisis Response Unit 222, a special police unit, responded to the attack and quickly killed the remaining assailants, Nicholson said.

Seven gunmen had attempted to enter the compound, said Interior Ministry spokesman Najib Danish. One police officer was killed and five were wounded, he said.

Washington Post reporter Dan Lamothe said on Twitter that the nearby coalition base was locked down for about an hour after the attack. In a later tweet, he said there were concerns that an attacker in a U.S. military uniform was on the base and that head counts were underway.

There was no breach of the NATO compound, said Lt. Col. Martin O’Donnell, a spokesman for the coalition in Kabul. He said all coalition troops had been accounted for after the attack.

Two other attacks occurred elsewhere in Afghanistan on Wednesday.

In eastern Logar province, suicide bombers attacked a police station in the morning, killing at least three police officers, including the station’s commander and the deputy director of traffic police for the provincial capital, Pul-e Alam, local media reported. A suicide car bomb was set off at the gates before three gunmen in suicide vests stormed the compound.

Four more police officers and eight civilians were wounded in the attack. Among the wounded were two children, the media reported. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.

Another early morning attack struck the capital of Kandahar province, when a suicide car bomb blast killed three civilians and wounded 13 others, a provincial official told reporters. It is unclear who carried out the attack, though the southern province is the Taliban’s historic heartland.

Afghan officials have said recently that their forces were battling militants in at least half of the country’s 34 provinces and that at least seven provincial capitals were under threat.

On Tuesday, Taliban fighters overran the center of Chora district in the southern province of Uruzgan. A provincial official who spoke to Stars and Stripes on condition of anonymity confirmed that Afghan security forces had withdrawn from the governor’s compound and police headquarters.

The militants were also threatening to overrun parts of Takhar province in the country’s north this week, claiming to have seized arms and equipment after seizing police checkpoints in the besieged Kwajah Ghar and Dasht-e Qalah districts along the Tajikistan border.

The Kabul attack comes nearly one year after a massive car bombing near the diplomatic zone of the city, which killed several hundred people on May 31, 2017.

Nicholson credited the response to the latest attack, and the fact that there has been no “mega” vehicle-borne attack in the past 12 months as a sign of improving Afghan security forces capabilities.

“We’ve had a slight reduction in the number of vehicle-borne (improvised explosive devices),” Nicholson said. “We’ve also seen … a reduction in Taliban and Haqqani activity … because of the very focused counter-terrorism effort on the networks that attack Kabul.”

However, he said a purported drop in Taliban and Haqqani attacks has been offset by increasing ISIS attacks.

Stars and Stripes reporter Corey Dickstein contributed to this report.

garland.chad@stripes.com
Twitter: @chadgarland

dickstein.corey@stripes.com
Twitter: @CDicksteinDC

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Intel Doge Retweeted
38 North
‏ @38NorthNK
29m29 minutes ago

Yongbyon remains active even amid US-DPRK talk about denuclearization.


I can't post all the pics, so if HC or someone could post the article, it would be great.

https://www.38north.org/2018/05/yongbyon053018/


North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center; Possible Preparation for Reprocessing Campaign in Early May?

By: 38 North
May 30, 2018Satellite Imagery

 

[Housecarl]

Intel Doge Retweeted
38 North
‏ @38NorthNK
29m29 minutes ago

Yongbyon remains active even amid US-DPRK talk about denuclearization.


I can't post all the pics, so if HC or someone could post the article, it would be great.

https://www.38north.org/2018/05/yongbyon053018/


North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center; Possible Preparation for Reprocessing Campaign in Early May?

By: 38 North
May 30, 2018Satellite Imagery

Here you go....Having problems with the images...


For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.38north.org/2018/05/yongbyon053018/

North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center; Possible Preparation for Reprocessing Campaign in Early May?

BY: 38 NORTH
MAY 30, 2018 SATELLITE IMAGERY

A 38 North exclusive with analysis by Frank V. Pabian, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Jack Liu.

Commercial satellite imagery of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center from May 6 indicates activity around the Radiochemical Laboratory’s Thermal Plant that could be early indications of possible reprocessing. However, it still remains unclear if that is the case since there is no sign of specialized railcars that are usually associated with this process.

Additionally, work related to the secondary cooling system of the 5 MWe Reactor continues, and the engineering office building at the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) nears completion.

Radiochemical Laboratory

On May 6, there was a light smoke plume emanating from the stack at the Radiochemical Laboratory Thermal Plant and the coal bins have been partially filled and groomed since April 17. Such activity in the past has been a signal for initial preparations for a reprocessing campaign. However, we would also expect to see specialized railcars nearby as well, which are not currently present.

Approximately 40 meters north of the cooling tower (where no vapor is present), a new foundation for a small structure was visible, but that foundation has changed little since first noted on imagery from April 17. What may be a small vehicle or equipment is present in front of the spent fuel reception building in the shipping/receiving area (but no specialized railcars), and there are several trucks in the motor pool area.

Figure 1. A light smoke plume can be seen at the Radiochemical Laboratory Thermal Plant and coal bins are partially filled.

Figure 2. At the Radiochemical Laboratory, work may have slowed on the new small structure foundation near the cooling tower. The foundation was not present on April 4 but was present on April 17.

Interestingly, there is a clump of dying trees (from unknown causes) about 800 meters north of the Radiochemical Laboratory, in close proximity to the location previously identified as the original (but undeclared) buried radioactive waste storage area for Yongbyon.

Figure 3. A patch of dying trees is seen near a buried radioactive waste storage area.

5 MWe Reactor and ELWR

At the 5 MWe reactor, the new upper cooling water pump house that—associated with modifications to the reactor’s secondary cooling system—now appears externally complete, with a new blue roof installed. Additionally, new dredging operations are underway, changing the configuration of the earthen water diversion dams downstream in the Kuryong River for purposes unclear.

Figure 4. New cooling water pump house for the 5 MWe reactor’s secondary cooling system seems externally complete and river dredging continues in the Kuryong River.

Figure 5. Close up of the new cooling water pump house.

At the ELWR, the new engineering office building is apparently four floors tall and the roof is being installed. Numerous vehicles and equipment pieces are present around the site.

Figure 6. Roof is being installed on the four-story engineering office building near the ELWR.

IRT Research Reactor

Two single story buildings were constructed in the IRT Research Reactor area between October 2017 and April 2018, providing additional evidence of continued investment in others areas at Yongbyon beyond the those associated with the plutonium production program.

Figure 7. Two new buildings now present near the IRT Research Reactor.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Intel Doge
‏ @IntelDoge
2m2 minutes ago

North Korean Yongban Nuclear Research Center reported activity.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Brad
‏ @usafshortwave
55m55 minutes ago

#Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has landed in North Korea according to KCNA.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm…..

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.voanews.com/a/voa-exclusive-pakistan-mulls-blocking-us-supply-lines-/4417524.html

Asia

VOA Exclusive: Pakistan Mulls Blocking US Supply Lines Into Afghanistan

May 31, 2018 7:40 AM
Ayaz Gul

ISLAMABAD — Pakistan says it is reassessing strained ties with the United States, a move that could lead to halting supply lines into Afghanistan where American troops are fighting insurgents to stabilize the war-ravaged country with the help of NATO allies.

Foreign Minister Khurram Dastgir Khan made the remarks to VOA exclusively a day before an international task force is to place Pakistan on a terrorism-financing watch list at the urging of U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration, a move likely to fuel Pakistan’s economic troubles.

The Paris-based Financial Action Task Force, or FATF decided in February to include Pakistan in its so-called "gray list” of nations that are not doing enough to curb terrorism financing.

The U.S.-led punitive move was part of Trump’s South Asia strategy he announced in August to pressure Pakistan to cut alleged ties to the Taliban and other terrorist groups waging deadly attacks on American forces in Afghanistan.

Islamabad denies charges it supports any terrorist groups and rejects “U.S. pressure tactics” as an attempt to blame Pakistan for international failures to end the Afghan conflict.

Bilateral relations have deteriorated to a point where no high-level interaction is happening these days between the two long time allies, Khan told VOA in a wide-ranging interview.

“We have reached an impasse in which we have this very strictly formal diplomatic communication is happening, so the U.S. ambassador in Islamabad comes and speaks to us in the Foreign Office and our ambassador in Washington goes and speaks to the State Department. But that’s not really communication, the two countries are not speaking to each other,” Khan said

Communication issues

He blamed the Trump administration’s “adamant” refusal to communicate for “the low ebb” in mutual ties.

“At the moment Pakistan is not being heard. Pakistan is just being vilified and castigated in Washington without being heard at all. It is this situation.”

The only communication that currently exists apart from the formal diplomatic interaction, Khan said, is that U.S. CENTCOM commander General John Votel has been speaking to Pakistan’s army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa.

“Formally Pakistan is still a major non-NATO ally and for the United States to actively target Pakistan in FATF, trampling over all regulations and precedents is by necessity forcing us to rethink,” lamented the Minister.

Pakistan is required under an agreement with FATF reached in February to work on an action plan to get itself removed from the gray list, otherwise the county faces the danger of being moved to the so-called "black list" of nations.

Pakistan's crisis-marred relationship suffered a serious blow on May 11 when Washington barred Pakistani diplomats in the United States from traveling beyond 40-kilometer radius from their posts without permission.

Islamabad responded by imposing a similar “permission regime” on American diplomats in the country. It also went a step further and withdrew a set of unilateral concessions Pakistani had granted Washington as a partner in “the war on terrorism” to ensure security cover for U.S. diplomats and officials in the country.

Diplomatic disagreement

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo last week told U.S. lawmakers American diplomats were being badly treated in Pakistan, charges Islamabad denied.

Pakistan has been receiving billions of dollars in financial assistance since joining the U.S.-led war on terrorism 17 years ago.

Khan, who also heads the defense ministry, acknowledged that American civilian and military financial assistance programs have over the years helped Islamabad meet its crucial budgetary shortfalls. But the expected financial support from Washington this year, he said, has dropped to ‘zero’ for the first time in a decade.

Minister Khan noted, however, that despite all the tensions and bitterness in mutual ties, Pakistan has kept its ground and air lines of communications open for U.S. and allied nations to ferry supplies to their troops in landlocked Afghanistan.

“Yes, we have to consider all options that are in front of us because it would appear to us that the U.S. is following what can be termed a non-violent compellence ((compellence is defined as the ability of one state to coerce another state into action, usually by threatening punishment. American economist Thomas C. Schelling, who won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2005, coined the word in his book 1966 Arms and Influence.)) of Pakistan,” the minister said when asked whether his country is close to shutting down the supply lines.

International forces heavily rely on Pakistani routes to haul supplies. Islamabad closed them once before, after a 2011 U.S. airstrike “mistakenly” killed two dozen Pakistani soldiers.

The action had forced the United States and NATO for months to use a mix of ground and sea routes called the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) running through other countries, including Russia.

But in the wake of Washington’s current tensions with Moscow analysts are skeptical whether NDN, though a much more costly and time consuming option, can still be availed under the circumstances.

Foreign Minister Khan underscored the need for the two countries to communicate and speak to each other despite maintaining divergent views on the war in Afghanistan, the longest in U.S. history.

“The fact that that longest (U.S.) war shows no sign of turning positive for the U.S. is all the the more reason that whatever differences or grievances we might have Pakistan and the U.S. should be communicating at different levels… because ultimately this is a relationship, at least in our view, bigger than Afghanistan and has been bigger than Afghanistan.”
Terror fight

Khan said at a time when U.S. and Western partners have “abandoned Pakistan to terrorism” and continue to ignore his country’s “unprecedented” sacrifices in fighting terrorist groups, Islamabad’s traditional ally China has stood by it and brought billions of dollars in historic direct Chinese investment.

“Russians are essentially (also) walking into a vacuum created by the absence of our American friends,” the minister said pointing to Pakistan’s rapidly improving relations with old rival Russia.

At a public talk in Washington last week, John Sopko, the U.S. Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), stopped short of dismissing Washington’s narrative of singling out Pakistan for the Afghan military stalemate.

“We keep referring to Pakistan as being the key problem. But the problem also was that the Afghan government at times was viewed very negatively by their local people and what you really need is to insert a government that the people support, a government that is not predatory, a government that is not a bunch of lawless warlords,” observed Sopko.

He went on to say that the U.S. policy of pouring in billions of dollars in these unstable environments contributed to the problem of creating more warlords and powerful people who took the law into their own hands.

“In essence, the government we introduced, particularly some of the Afghan local police forces, which were nothing other than warlord militias with some uniforms on, were just as bad as the terrorists before them,” said Sopko who is overseeing U.S. spending to identify fraud and to prevent it.

 

[Housecarl]

Well nobody should be surprised by this....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/may/30/us-invader-country-iraq-says-shia-cleric-muqtada-a/

Muqtada al-Sadr, Shia cleric, calls U.S. an 'invader country' in Iraq

By Carlo Muñoz - The Washington Times - Wednesday, May 30, 2018
Muqtada al-Sadr, the firebrand Shia cleric and head of Iraq’s newly elected ruling class, vowed on Wednesday to deny the U.S. any role in the country’s national security efforts, casting further doubt on the future of the American mission there.

“The U.S. is an invader country; we do not allow it to interfere at all,” Mr. Sadr said in a statement Wednesday, in response to queries regarding how his political coalition dubbed the Sairoon alliance plans to form a new Iraqi government, in the wake of the Islamic State or ISIS’s defeat in the country.

The proclamation comes at a tenuous time for U.S. military brass at the Pentagon, who are piecing together a plan to reshape the current Iraq mission — focused on dismantling the Islamic State terror group in the country — into a longer-term, more advisory and more multinational campaign akin to current American-led operations in Afghanistan.

The Trump administration is believed to have opened a communications backchannel to Mr. Sadr and his top aides to probe the cleric’s position toward the prospect of a long-term U.S. military presence.

Mr. Sadr’s political bloc captured over 40 percent of the parliamentary vote during last week’s elections, with the the Iranian-backed Fatah alliance coming in second place, according to voting results. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s Victory alliance came in third place, forcing Mr. Abadi’s party to form a ruling coalition with Tehran and the Sadrists.

The Shia cleric has repeatedly called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, threatening those troops could become targets of Shia paramilitary groups, such as the Madhi Army.

Prior to the rise of ISIS in Iraq, Mr. Sadr’s Mahdi Army and other Sadrists battled U.S. and coalition forces in Najaf and Sadr City during some of the worst fighting of the American occupation of the country in mid-2000.

While Mr. Sadr saved his harshest rhetoric on Wednesday for Washington’s continued presence in Iraq, he took a more conciliatory tone toward concerns the country may fall further under Iran’s sway once his coalition takes power.

“Iran is a neighboring country that fears for its interest and we hope it will not interfere in Iraqi affairs,” he said, according to the statement first reported by Turkish news outlet Anadolu Agency.

Mr. Sadr has gone to great lengths to distance himself from Iran and tried to head off a narrative that he’d do Tehran’s bidding once in power. But concerns remain in Washington and Baghdad that his opportunistic political strategy to build his power base in Iraq could lead to closer ties to Tehran.

Conversation 3

 

[Housecarl]

Well here's a "DOT"....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://theaviationist.com/2018/05/...s-mq-9-reaper-drone-operations-out-of-poland/

Almost Unnoticed, U.S. Air Force Begins MQ-9 Reaper Drone Operations out of Poland

May 30 2018 - 1 Comment

By Jacek Siminski
USAF deploys its MQ-9 Reaper Drones to Poland.
USAF issued a short release, suggesting that the service has deployed MQ-9 Reaper UAV systems to Poland. The drones would be stationed at the Mirosławiec Air Base, which is the Poland’s airbase dedicated to host the unmanned platforms. The release issued by the Americans reads as follows:

The United States and Poland have a standing relationship to address issues of regional and global security. To advance those interests, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, the air component of U.S. European Command, is operating MQ-9 Reaper remotely piloted aircraft at Miroslawiec Air Base as a visible expression of U.S. efforts to enhance regional stability. This mission, starting in May 2018, has been fully coordinated with the Polish government. It is designed to promote stability and security within the region and to strengthen relationships with NATO allies and other European partners.

The release, as we can see, is laconic and went by virtually unnoticed. It was issued on May 21 and does not specifiy how long the deployment is going to last. The Mirosławiec Airbase only operates smaller UAV platforms, hence Reapers would be a major addition to its capabilities.

The news issued by USAFE sparked some doubts and questions among the experts and defense media practitioners in Poland. Since the Polish MoD cancelled some of its drone procurement plans some time ago, shifting the priorities, the USAFE assets may act as a complementary measure filling in the capability gap – this is an opinion that has widely circulated in the Polish defense media public sphere. The experts suggest that no further procurement in the area of ISR (Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) would be pursued by the Polish MoD, making use of the US assets to complement the capabilities at hand even though, for what deals with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Strategic Missiles) that have been acquired by the Polish Air Force, there is concern about a capability gap when it comes to actually designating targets for this strategic weapon.

Dawid Kamizela who works an analyst for the Polish Dziennik Zbrojny outlet expressed his concern that the UAVs in Poland may not even boost the Polish ISR capabilities. In a conversation, he told us the following:

According to what we have seen when it comes to operational practice pertaining to the MQ-9, the detachment in Poland, most probably, solely deals with maintenance of the assets and take offs and landings. The core of the operational activities would be controlled from CONUS, and the intelligence gathered when the UAV is flying in the Polish airspace is also being sent to CONUS directly – it is not being collected in Poland, it does not even ‘touch’ any part of the Polish infrastructure. As worrying as it is, the above would mean that even if Poland receives any intelligence, it would not come in a form of raw data, but rather as an interpreted report. Taking the local awareness into account, along with the knowledge of local conditions and geopolitical factors, the US interpretation may differ from the conclusions that could potentially be formed by the Polish analysts in Warsaw. This sparks numerous doubts, when it comes to the actual boost of the Polish ISR capability.

The Polish military has no MALE UAVs at its disposal now, procurement is being planned as a part of the Zefir programme that has not, fortunately, been a subject to cuts. MQ-9 and Israeli Hermes 900 platforms are viable candidates here. The Israeli drones, as the Defence24 outlet notes, have already made their operational debut in the Polish airspace, during the NATO Summit hosted in Warsaw and the World Youth Day. Two Zefir packages, as Defence24 recalled, are to be acquired until 2022, with procurement of another two envisaged as an option after the aforesaid deadline.

According to the unofficial information we have obtained, the Reapers arrived in Poland on May 9 and they were transported via the NATO SALIS solution by two An-124 airlifters that landed at the Poznan airport.

1 Comment

Leroy • a day ago
Poland is the new Germany. NATO defense-wise. Germany seems not to take the danger posed by Russia seriously, but Poland certainly does. How much you ask? Well, ol' Leroy (your friend) is here to tell you:

Poland offers US up to $2B for permanent military base

Warsaw wants American boots on ground as protection against Russia.

"Poland wants a permanent U.S. military presence — and is willing to pony up as much as $2 billion to get it ...".

https://www.politico.eu/art...

It looks like Poland well understands the Russian threat. And so, btw, does Norway and Finland:

The Marines Sent Tanks From Secret Caves In Norway To Roll Up On Russia’s Doorstep

"Marines from the 4th Tank Battalion, 4th Marine Division withdrew tanks and weapons from secret caves in Norway earlier this month, taking them east to Finland, where, for the first time, they took part in the annual mechanized exercise called Arrow 18.

The drills took place from May 7 to May 18 in southern Finland, which shares a long border with Russia and has a history of conflict with its larger neighbor. It involved about 150 armored vehicles and 300 other military vehicles. Only 30 Marines took part, but they were joined by thousands of personnel from Norway and Finland."

https://taskandpurpose.com/...

So build your bridge to Crimea Mr. Putin, all while you DESTROY bridges, both economic and military, with your neighbors. Crimea. The gift that keeps on giving (NOT!). Is good that nations are on to Russia and Moscow's evil intentions. Very good!

1
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[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/south-china-sea-paracels-spotlight

SOUTH CHINA SEA

South China Sea: Paracels in the spotlight

BY Sam Bateman
30 May 2018
15:00 AEDT

On Sunday, two US Navy warships sailed through and near the Paracel group of islands claimed and occupied by China in the South China Sea. This was Washington’s latest freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) to counter what it claims are Beijing’s efforts to limit freedom of navigation in these waters. In response, China’s Defence Ministry stated that the vessels did not have permission from the Chinese government for passage, and described the action as a serious infringement on China’s sovereignty.

The timing of this operation is significant. It occurred only a few days after the Pentagon disinvited China from participating in this year’s Rim of the Pacific exercise (RIMPAC) in Hawaii. This was a response to what Washington views as Beijing’s continued violation of international norms with its ongoing militarisation of South China Sea islands, including the installation of missile systems on islands in the Spratly group, as well as the landing of heavy bombers on Woody Island in the Paracels.

The choice of the Paracels for the latest American FONOP is also significant. Unlike the ambiguous nature of American FONOPs around the Spratly Islands or Scarborough Shoal, operations in the Paracels send what Washington believes to be a clear legal message. They challenge two claims by China: its straight baselines around the Paracel (Xisha) Islands; and its requirement for prior notification of a warship exercising the right of innocent passage through its territorial sea.

Two ships were used for the operation, one a guided-missile cruiser, while previous American FONOPs in the South China Sea have only involved a single destroyer. This could be interpreted as a stronger message from Washington, and perhaps a greater deterrent to a Chinese challenge.

The Paracels lie across an established shipping route between Guangzhou and Hong Kong in the north, and the Singapore Strait in the south. Despite US implications to the contrary, China has never attempted to restrict navigation through the group.

Vessels transiting through the Paracels pass well within 12 nautical miles of various features in the group. I did so myself several years ago when travelling in a large container ship from Hong Kong to Port Klang in Malaysia. At the time, there were other merchant ships also sailing near the islands. Over the years, warships of various countries, including the US, have also probably done so without being challenged by China.

It becomes more problematic when warships sail around within the group, conducting what a media report of the latest incident referred to as “manoeuvring operations”, rather than simply passing through the islands. Arguably these operations, depending on their nature, may have constituted what the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) refers to as activities “not having a direct bearing on passage”, and thus were contrary to the right of innocent passage.

American operations in and around the Paracels would be welcomed by Vietnam. Vietnam also claims this island group, but independent commentators usually regard the Chinese claim as superior, largely because of North Vietnam’s earlier acceptance of Chinese sovereignty and the principle of state succession.

The Paracels comprise two separate island groups: the Amphitrite group to the east, and the Crescent group in the west. Chinese forces occupied the Amphitrites after the Second World War and then drove South Vietnamese forces off the Crescents by force in 1974. Woody Island in the Amphitrites is relatively large by South China Sea standards and has a major airstrip and extensive military and civil facilities. China is also developing the island’s tourism potential.

While the South China Sea is of great strategic importance to China, the Paracels are particularly significant. They lie about 200 nautical miles to the south-east of Hainan, and provide a useful forward operating base for the projection of power into the South China Sea. Surveillance systems based in the islands would be well-placed to monitor surface and sub-surface naval activity coming from China’s naval bases in Hainan.

The latest incident follows a pattern of increased military activities in the South China Sea in recent months by China and the US. In March and April, both countries undertook extensive naval exercises in the sea. China’s exercises involved its aircraft carrier and more than 40 warships, while the US had three aircraft carrier battle groups exercising at different times.

A worrying trend of “tit for tat” activities continues between the US and China. The current distrust between Beijing and Washington in the South China Sea inhibits bilateral relations more generally, including an ability to deal with situations in North Korea and Taiwan, and more generally across the world.

The South China Sea certainly matters to Beijing, but, in relative terms, rather less so to Washington. Among the Southeast Asian countries, it’s probably only Vietnam that would have welcomed the recent American FONOP in the Paracels. Other Southeast Asian counties would likely be concerned about this escalating militarisation of the South China Sea by both the US and China.

A Chinese speaker at a jointly hosted Chinese–American conference in Beijing last week on Cooperation and Engagement in the Asia-Pacific Region argued that the legal substance and functions of freedom of navigation operations were often “lost in translation” between the US and China. Some dialogue between these powers to reach a common understanding of issues of disagreement would be an important regional confidence-building measure.


Related Content

Deterrence under the dragon’s shadow: Vietnam’s military modernisation

 

[Lilbitsnana]

I saw a tweet earlier that Assad said US must leave Syria or he will remove US mil from Syria by force.

I can't find exact tweet but found a couple linking a Wapo article. I can't post it, my computer won't let me for some reason.

link

https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...ory.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.88ea0a8e1fc1

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/arti...ilitary-doctrine-of-deception-and-deniability

Threat Report 2018: Russia’s Military Doctrine of Deception and Deniability

Bottom Line: Moscow’s increasingly assertive military activity in Eastern Europe and the Middle East seeks to project the power of a resurgent Russia in relation to a retreating United States, while concealing its economic and political fragility at home. In doing so, the Kremlin walks a fine line between escalation with the West and the gradual growth of influence abroad. These realities have required the Kremlin to pursue unconventional and deniable means, sometimes complimented with a small overt military footprint to accomplish its political and military objectives.

Background: Russia’s doctrine of deception – known as Maskirovka, Russian for “masking” or “camouflage” – is a foundational component of Russia’s strategic mindset.

• Using decoys, clandestine actions and disinformation, Russia aims to increase ambiguity and indecision in opposing forces. The tools of Russia’s doctrine of deception broadly include psychological operations; manipulation of media, disinformation and propaganda; electronic and cyber warfare; irregular forces not in uniform; private military contractors; proxies; and physical deception through camouflaged military maneuver. While not necessarily a new doctrine of warfare, its modern iteration takes place at the seams of conventional conflict – the gray zone between peace and war.
  
• A notable development in Russia’s extraterritorial operations and unconventional action is the creation of the Special Operations Command (KSSO) under the General Staff’s command, announced in March 2013. These units are different from the more conventional Spetsnaz units housed under Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). The new units are estimated to total 2,000 combat personnel and have been deployed in Russia’s military operations in Ukraine, Syria and the North Caucasus. Referred to as “little green men” or “polite people” during their annexation of Crimea, these units at times operate without clear Russian military insignia for Kremlin deniability. KSSO operatives have also taken a prominent role in Syria since deploying in September 2015, including the battle against ISIS for Palmyra and during Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s push to retake Aleppo. There are also reports of KSSO deployments to western Egypt to potentially engage in operations across the border in eastern Libya.
  
• The doctrine of Maskirovka goes beyond fostering doubt to present an alternative (– and often false) – narrative. Russia has used this doctrine to pursue geostrategic objectives under the guise of international cooperation. Perhaps the most prominent example is Russia’s positioning itself as a counterterrorism partner to the West in Syria – andLibya to a lesser extent – as it seeks to extend its influence in the Middle East. Russia’s overt air campaign in Syria provides a convenient distraction from its clandestine ground forces in Syria and continuing military operations in Ukraine. It also allows Russia to present itself as a strategic ally to the international community in the war against ISIS. But while Russia may occasionally target ISIS in Syria, its primary objectives in the country have been to bolster the Assad regime and destroy the Western-backed opposition so as to undermine the prospect of a pro-U.S. entity in Syria.

Mark Kelton, former Deputy Director for Counterintelligence, CIA National Clandestine Service

“Russia’s goals are broad acknowledgement by Washington of Moscow’s revitalized role as a key player on the world stage, particularly in the Middle East; recognition that Russia has legitimate policy and security interests in former Soviet territories, the so-called ‘near abroad,’ to include Ukraine and the NATO-member Baltic states; an end to sanctions imposed on Moscow as a result of its carving off a part of Georgia, seizing Crimea and fomenting war in eastern Ukraine; and an end to further NATO expansion to the East. All these goals reflect longstanding Russian grievances and indicate both the authoritarian mindset and the post-Soviet ‘revisionist’ historiography predominant in the minds of Russian President Vladimir Putin and those around him. All are anathema to U.S. interests.”

Robert Dannenberg, former Chief of the Central Eurasia Division, CIA

“Maskirovka is a key element in the current Russian doctrine of ‘hybrid’ warfare as articulated by a number of senior Russian officials and dubbed the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine. This doctrine calls for the integration of information operations, cyber, proxies, overt economic and political influence and clandestine influence agents to support the military objective. Ideally, this leads to the creation of conditions for the achievement of the military objective without the need for overt military action.”

Issue: During its military adventurism, Russia has generated uncertainty and plausible deniability regarding its role in clandestine operations, such as in Crimea, which has helped the Kremlin sidestep the imposition of meaningful repercussions by the West or international community. The growth of Russia’s reliance on private military companies (PMC) – which provide a cheap, politically convenient, controllable and capable avenue to deploy forces in conflict zones around the world – is quickly becoming a prominent feature of this doctrine.

• PMCs are expeditionary, offensively oriented private entities hired by nation-states and private companies to engage in combat, deter opponents and potentially gain territory. Unlike the mercenaries of old, PMCs are structured as multinational corporations, often with a web of subsidiaries and shell companies in various legal jurisdictions around the globe.
  
• While the provision of “mercenary” services is technically illegal under Article 208 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the Russian defense ministry has nonetheless covertly leveraged privatized military outfits in conflicts abroad, with its illegality at home lending a level of deniability to the Kremlin’s actions.
  
• Russian PMCs, known in Russia as Chastnye Voennie Companiy (ChVK), offer the promise of greater Kremlin control and combat effectiveness while sidestepping the potential domestic political backlash for Russian military casualties in far-off wars. They are an effective tool in support of state-sponsored insurgency or unconventional warfare because they are deniable and disposable. They operate with state support and sanction, but in a legal grey area.
  
• An estimated 260 Russian contractors employed by Slavonic Corps were deployed to protect Assad regime assets in 2013 under an agreement brokered by the Hong Kong-registered company Moran. Their supposed mission, blessed by the primary Russian intelligence agency, the FSB, was to guard oil and gas facilities to free up Syrian army resources for an offensive against ISIS. Instead, however, the Russian contractors were tasked with fighting to take control of the facilities from ISIS, leading to ill-fated skirmishes against the terrorist group and the public outing of the company.
  
• The Wagner Group, a Russian PMC, has deployed units to both Ukraine and Syria reportedly under the direction and funding of Russian military intelligence, the GRU, to test the effectiveness of privatized proxies. Wagner seemingly acts as an arm of Russian statecraft and was heavily involved in the fighting in Donbas, Ukraine as well as in Palmyra, Syria, in 2015. Much of the confusion about the scale and nature of Russia’s direct commitment to ground battles in Ukraine and Syria may be linked to the veneer of deniability generated by private military companies.
  
• Moscow may increasingly look to private military companies as an exploratory wing to gauge future involvement in conflicts around the globe. A Russian firm called RSB-Group sent a group of military contractors to eastern Libya in late 2017 to conduct a de-mining mission in support of the controversial Libyan military commander General Khalifa Haftar. The rogue general is vying for a greater leadership role of Libya as his forces employ brutal tactics in the country’s volatile east, independent of the UN-backed government in Tripoli. The use of a private firm in this instance allows the Kremlin to insulate itself from claims that it is supporting a strongman rather than the internationally-recognized government.

Levi Maxey is the author of this portion of the The Cipher Brief Annual Threat Report. This is an abridged version of the full report. You can purchase a copy of the full report here.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.military.com/daily-news...north-korea-may-have-nukes-15-more-years.html

Even if Talks Go Well, North Korea May Have Nukes for 15 More Years

Military.com 30 May 2018 By Richard Sisk
South Korea warned Wednesday against expecting North Korea to agree to get rid of its nuclear weapons quickly in the planned peace summit with President Donald Trump.

"There will be many challenges that need to be overcome" before North Korea's Kim Jong-un would commit to the U.S. demand for "complete, verifiable and irreversible" denuclearization, said Cho Myoung-gyon, Seoul's unification minister.

"I can say that we have just entered the gate of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," said Cho, a top adviser to President Moon Jae-in who has been engaged with North Korean officials in talks at Panmunjom truce village in the Demilitarized Zone.

Cho made the remarks in an address to a visiting European delegation, according to South Korea's Yonhap news agency.

"I can say that the differences in stances between North Korea and the U.S. remain quite significant," Cho said. "It will not be easy to narrow the gap and find common ground but I think it would not be impossible."

As unification minister, Cho has also been involved in talks with the North on the possibility of replacing the armistice that ended the Korean War in 1953 with a peace treaty.

A recent CIA assessment appeared to back up Cho in stating that it was highly unlikely the North would agree to complete denuclearization anytime soon, NBC News reported.

In addition, a top nuclear arms expert predicted that North Korea's extensive nuclear weapons systems and facilities could take as long as 15 years to dismantle.

The analysis by Siegfried Hecker, a former director of the government's Los Alamos laboratory in New Mexico who has toured the North's nuclear facilities four times, was first reported by The New York Times.

The White House is continuing to press ahead on three fronts with preparations for the proposed summit with Kim in Singapore on June 12.

North Korea's Kim Yong-chol, the top intelligence adviser to Kim Jong-un, was headed to the U.S. on Wednesday for meetings in New York with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

In Panmunjom, Sung Kim, the former U.S. ambassador to South Korea, was meeting with North Korean officials on denuclearization terms.

In Singapore, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin was meeting with a North Korean team to work out the logistics of the summit.

The on-again, off-again nature of the talks has increased pressure on the diplomats. Last week, Trump said he was canceling the summit in response to threats from the North, but planning for the summit resumed after conciliatory gestures from the North following a letter from Trump.

In a Tweet on Tuesday, Trump wrote, "We have put a great team together for our talks with North Korea. Meetings are currently taking place concerning Summit, and more. Kim Yong Chol, the Vice Chairman of North Korea, heading now to New York. Solid response to my letter, thank you!"

-- Richard Sisk can be reached at Richard.Sisk@Military.com.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.military.com/daily-news...g-down-small-islands-general-hints-china.html

US Good at 'Taking Down' Small Islands, General Hints to China

Military.com 31 May 2018 By Richard Sisk

If it came down to it, the U.S. military has a track record of "taking down" small islands such as the artificial and fortified ones China has created in the disputed South China Sea, a U.S. general said Thursday.

"The United States military has a lot of experience in the Western Pacific taking down small islands," Marine Lt. Gen. Kenneth McKenzie said in response to an over-the-top hypothetical at a Pentagon news briefing.

McKenzie, the Pentagon's Joint Staff director, said he was not making threats and his audience "shouldn't read anything more into that than a simple statement of historical fact. It's just a fact."

"We have a lot of experience in the Second World War taking down small islands that are isolated. So, that's a core competency of the U.S. military," he said.

McKenzie's statements were in the context of the long-running dispute between the U.S. and China over that country's military buildup and territorial claims on several of the islet chains and atolls in the South China Sea. China's territorial claims conflict with those of Vietnam, the Philippines and other nations in the region.

China has fortified the artificial islands with anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles while building runways capable of handling long-range bombers and barracks for the People's Liberation Army.

In response, the U.S. last week canceled China's invitation to participate in the annual RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) naval exercises off Hawaii. The U.S. also sent the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer Higgins and the Ticonderoga-class cruiser Antietam into the South China Sea, where they sailed within 12 nautical miles of areas claimed by China in the Paracel Islands.

It was the sixth "freedom of navigation" exercise in the South China Sea by the U.S. since President Donald Trump took office, and McKenzie said the U.S. is prepared to continue with such exercises as a form of protest to China's territorial claims. The U.S. has also periodically sent military aircraft over disputed areas in the region.

Before McKenzie made his remarks, China's Foreign Ministry called on the U.S. to stop "hyping up" the South China Sea issue, China's official Xinhua news agency reported.

"Hyping up militarization in the South China Sea by some people in the U.S. is quite preposterous, just like a thief crying 'stop thief,' " Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said.

She appeared to be referring to Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, who said Wednesday in Hawaii that the U.S. would continue to confront the Chinese buildup in the South China Sea. Mattis was en route to Singapore for meetings with regional allies.

Hua said that U.S. forces in the region far exceed those deployed in the South China Sea by China and neighboring countries.

"China is not the first country or the one deploying the largest amount of weapons in the South China Sea, nor is it the most militarily active country in the region," Hua said. "So who is pushing 'militarization' in the South China Sea? The answer is quite clear."

-- Richard Sisk can be reached at Richard.Sisk@Military.com.