WAR 05-15-2021-to-05-21-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
(470) 04-24-2021-to-04-30-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(471) 05-01-2021-to-05-07-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(472) 05-08-2021-to-05-14-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****


---------------

Posted by Jward,
Today at 8:13 AM

-----------------

Posted for fair use.....

UK troops have battled a sandstorm to seize a cache of weapons hidden by terrorists in Mali. (Ministry of Defence/PA)
UK troops have battled a sandstorm to seize a cache of weapons hidden by terrorists in Mali. (Ministry of Defence/PA)
UK
UK Troops Seize Weapons Cache Hidden by Islamic Terrorists in Mali
BY PA

May 15, 2021 Updated: May 15, 2021

UK troops have battled a sandstorm to seize a cache of weapons hidden by terrorists in Mali, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) said on Saturday.

Around 100 soldiers from the Light Dragoons and Royal Anglian Regiment found AK47 rifles, hundreds of rounds of ammunition, camouflage clothing, radios, mobile phones, and hundreds of litres of fuel during the operation.

The mission took place in early May, shortly after suspected fighters of the so-called Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) fled by swimming across the River Niger.......
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....




AUTHORS

MILITARY BALANCE BLOG
14th May 2021
Counting the cost of deterrence: France’s nuclear recapitalisation

Having formally launched the development of its third generation of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, France is embarking on a broad renewal of its nuclear forces. The aim is to ensure that its deterrent remains credible into, and beyond, the middle of this century, explains Timothy Wright and Hugo Decis.

As the 50-year mark approaches since France commissioned its first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN, or SNLE in French), Paris has now formally launched the development of its third generation of SSBNs – a key element in its broader nuclear-forces modernisation programme. The parallel threads of the wider modernisation effort draw together developments to ballistic and air-launched cruise missiles and their respective launch platforms, but will also place a burden on defence expenditure.

The first of the four boats to replace the current second-generation Le Triomphant-class is meant to be commissioned by 2035 – the same year in which the successor to the ASMPA ramjet-power nuclear-armed air-to-surface missile, the ASN4G, is expected to enter service. The Le Triomphant successor, presently known as the SNLE 3G, is also associated with the M51.4 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), which will be a further improvement on the M51 and will likely be required by the early 2040s. The delivery platform for the ASN4G hypersonic cruise missile, the SCAF/Next Generation Fighter (NGF) multi-role combat aircraft, is also planned to enter service at the beginning of the 2040s. Collectively, these projects will renew France’s strategic and sub-strategic nuclear forces but will also be a significant burden on defence expenditure over the next two decades. France’s 2021 draft defence budget earmarked €5 billion (US$6bn) for nuclear-related work, a figure close to 13% of core (excluding pensions) defence funding of €39.2bn (US$47.2bn) for the year.

Submarine size and weapons
The SNLE 3G is expected to be slightly larger than the Le Triomphant-class, with a submerged displacement of approximately 15,000 tonnes and a crew complement of about 100. As was the case with its predecessor, the SNLE 3G will be fitted with 16 launch tubes and armed with the M51 family of SLBM, as well as with torpedoes and anti-ship missiles (AShMs) for self-defence purposes. The SNLE 3G will, however, have a new sonar suite intended to improve detection and help counter likely increased threats to future submarine operations. The yet-to-be-named class of SSBNs will also be fitted with a new and more powerful reactor, developed from the K15 model which is currently used by both the Le Triomphant-class of SSBNs and the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier.

In the interim period before the SNLE 3G enters service, the French Navy will receive an improved version of the M51, the M51.3, which is due to be introduced in 2025. The missile will use the same warhead design, the Tête nucléaire océanique introduced in 2016, but will feature a revised third stage. France’s current SLBM, the M51.2, employs a solid-propellant third stage from the earlier M45 SLBM. The upgraded solid-propellant motor will likely increase the M51.3’s range beyond the reported 6,000 kilometre+ range of the M51.2, although the extent of this increase has not been made public. An M51 missile was tested on 28 April 2021 by the French Directorate of Armaments (DGA), which is responsible for developing and procuring France’s new SLBM. The test launch was conducted from a submerged platform at the DGA’s Essais de missiles site in the Landes region.

As for the further planned SLBM upgrade in the form of the M51.4, while there has been little public mention of this upgrade, part of the rationale for its development may be to try to ensure that the SLBM is capable of beating projected ballistic-missile defences. One option to help achieve this aim could include upgrading the M51’s current post-boost vehicle (PBV), which is derived from the earlier M45 SLBM. PBVs are small liquid-fuelled propulsion systems that can be used by missiles with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle payloads to release the warheads during the terminal phase of flight, allowing them to follow separate trajectories and thus to strike at different targets. An upgraded PBV could complicate an adversary’s missile defences through more dispersed targeting options, while providing the submarine-based nuclear force with greater targeting flexibility.

Dyad elements
The new class of SSBNs will be complemented by the ASN4G from 2035. Initially carried by the air force’s Rafale B and the navy’s Rafale M, the ASN4G missile will also be part of the NGF’s weapons inventory from the 2040s onwards. The NGF is a tri-national effort between France, Germany and Spain to develop a successor to the Rafale and the Eurofighter. France, however, is the only partner to require that the successor be a nuclear-capable aircraft, and that it also be able to operate from an aircraft carrier. Concept work on the ASN4G has been under way since 2014.

France is also one of a small but growing number of countries exploring the potential of hypersonic boost-glide technology. Its V-MaX (véhicule manoeuvrant experimental) project began towards the end of the last decade to explore the potential of very-high-speed glide body designs, with the aim of conducting flight-test experiments from 2021. Whether Paris is interested in the potential application of a hypersonic glide vehicle as an element of its nuclear-deterrent force remains to be seen.

What is clear, however, is that France is embarking on a broad renewal of its nuclear forces with the aim of ensuring that its deterrent remains credible into, and beyond, the middle of this century. The twin objectives of sustaining this impetus and meeting the technical and budgetary demands of the developments now lie ahead.


Related Blogs
undefined
EXPERT COMMENTARY
How COVID-19 has impacted South China Sea defence spending and procurement
By Fenella McGerty, Tom Waldwyn11th May 2021

undefined
RESEARCH PAPER
The evolving nature of China’s military diplomacy: from visits to vaccines
By Meia Nouwens10th May 2021

undefined
RESEARCH PAPER
Missile developments in South Asia: a perspective from Pakistan
By Adil Sultan6th May 2021

undefined
MILITARY BALANCE BLOG
Silo mentality – Iran’s Haji Abad missile base
By Joseph Dempsey4th May 2021

undefined
MILITARY BALANCE BLOG
Aircraft-carrier deployments: manoeuvring for advantage


Military Balance+
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

How China made Canada a global node for narcos and cyber-criminals

Sam Cooper
  • Published
  • :
  • May 15, 2021,
  • 4:06 pm
  • |
  • Updated
  • :
  • May 15, 2021,
  • 5:51 PM

Following is a series of edited extracts from the book, ‘Wilful Blindness: How a Network of Narcos, Tycoons and CCP agents infiltrated the West’ by Canadian journalist Sam Cooper. The book will be released internationally on 20 May and has been made available exclusively to The Sunday Guardian in India. The extracts come from the chapter ‘Compromised Nodes’.
COMPROMISED NODES

Money-laundering was the shared interest in Vancouver. But something else was definitely happening. The Big Circle Boys and Chinese intelligence players had started with casinos. And they moved into real estate and finance, Canada’s soft spots for economic infiltration.

My sources had been telling me some things that I couldn’t believe until I saw the evidence myself. These were people who understood criminal intelligence and geopolitics. They talked about the convergence of organized crime and state-actors in China and Iran and Mexico and Russia. They were saying the impacts of the money-laundering that I was uncovering in Canada went a lot deeper than fentanyl deaths and soaring housing prices in Vancouver and Toronto and Montreal.

They were saying transnational money-laundering endangers democracy. It erodes the rule of law. It’s a national security threat. But you need to look deeper, they said. Look at who is standing behind the transnational criminals. More to the point, who is standing above them holding a protective umbrella. It was a frustrating situation for the people talking to me. Canada has excellent criminal intelligence. But what the RCMP and CSIS know about the Chinese Communist Party’s collusion with the Big Circle Boys and Chi Lop Tse’s super cartel never makes it to trial.

What my sources were describing was essentially a modern version of the map laid out 20 years earlier in the controversial Canadian intelligence report, Sidewinder.

And when the people who wrote Sidewinder saw my reporting on E-Pirate and Paul King Jin, it set off alarm bells. Michel Juneau Katsuya—the former CSIS Asia-Pacific desk chief—recognized the metastasized node he had identified way back in the 1990s. Gangsters, spies and industrialists covertly operating under the Chinese Communist Party.
But there were new convergences.

After 2015, my sources started seeing kingpins of the Chinese underground banking cartel brushing up against state actors from Iranian narco-terrorism networks. For example, E-Pirate surveillance records filed with the Cullen Commission showed a Mideast organized crime suspect was registered to a vehicle used in Paul King Jin’s alleged illegal casino and Water Cube spa operation. And Mideast organized crime suspects served as bodyguards for Jin and his superior, these records showed. And the Sinaloa Cartel was also in the mix. But Chinese state actors definitely ran the show, intelligence experts told me.

Money-laundering was the shared interest in Vancouver. But something else was definitely happening. The Big Circle Boys and Chinese intelligence players had started with casinos. And they moved into real estate and finance, Canada’s soft spots for economic infiltration. But Beijing has a high-tech long-game. And Vancouver was becoming a global technology node for narcos, state actors and cyber-criminals.

This was fascinating stuff, but I approached it with some caution. It sounded like a spy novel.

Part of it was my innate Canadian sense of insulation. Although I had uncovered lots of money-laundering in B.C. casinos and real estate, I had grown up with a sense that my country was a bastion of uprightness and stability. Corruption and wars and spy plots happened in other countries.

So I would nod with interest when I heard these geopolitical crime tips. But inside, I would think, this is Canada. I’ll believe it when I see it. My mind was opening, though. There were major deals happening in Vancouver that made no sense from a national security perspective. In August 2017, I wrote a story with my Postmedia colleague Doug Quan, “How a Murky Company with Ties to the People’s Liberation Army Set Up Shop in B.C.”

We explained how China Poly—a $95-billion arms trading, real estate and industrial behemoth owned by Red Princeling families—was welcomed with open arms in Vancouver. We reported that China Poly had already been accused of numerous corruption and smuggling cases worldwide. They were deeply involved in Xi Jinping’s neo-imperialist Belt and Road infrastructure projects. Their branding depicted the world as a Go board—the ancient Chinese game in which the winner occupies territory to dominate the loser. China Poly often turned up in sketchy dealings with third-world dictators and arms traders. The United States accused them of helping Iran develop its missile program.

In the 1990s, a China Poly agent in California was caught smuggling 2,000 AK-47s into the United States. While that national security probe was underway, one of China Poly’s Princelings visited the White House and got implicated in the so-called Chinagate fundraising scandal. Macau casino barons and Triad associates circled around that political influence case. Some of them were familiar names from my research of Lai Changxing’s networks. I found the Macau barons and China Poly were like hand and glove. Case in point: Stanley Ho spent millions at auction to hand China Poly an object of tremendous propaganda value.

And this bronze pig head was displayed at Poly Culture’s November 2016 “art gallery” opening in Vancouver. Our Vancouver Sun story set the scene like this.

“Under the watchful eye of Vancouver police in tactical gear, attendees admired four rare bronze zodiac heads—a tiger, monkey, ox and pig—that had once adorned the Summer Palace in Beijing.

“It was the first time these cultural relics—looted following the palace’s destruction by British and French forces in 1860—had been displayed outside China since their repatriation.

“The opening of a gallery and North American headquarters here by Poly Culture was the culmination of intense behind-the-scenes courting by local politicians—especially Liberal MLA Teresa Wat, then B.C.’s international trade minister—and was hailed in government documents as a major economic win and ‘significant day for British Columbia in its relationship with China.’”

So I could see the shadowy outlines of state actor activity that my sources were talking about. And my instinct was China chose to display the looted relics in Vancouver for propaganda value. It was like Xi’s regime was planting a flag in the West. In China, the zodiac heads represent the burning national humiliation of defeat in the Opium Wars.

But now B.C. politicians were quietly rolling out the red carpet for Xi’s Belt and Road.

Something else that was hard to believe at first was the connection between China and Mexico that my sources talked about. But I eventually found it was no stretch at all: Chinese actors in fact were merging with the Sinaloa Cartel in North America. And some extremely credible Canadian security intel sources blew my mind with this assessment: the Chinese state seemed to have influence with the Mexican cartels. They had to, one RCMP source told me. Because the Chinese underground bankers were handling almost all of the Latin American narcos’ money.

It was trade-based money-laundering on an industrial scale. Chinese merchants moved the Mexican cartel money worldwide by converting drug cash into factory goods. Merchants shipped the goods wherever the cartels needed their funds. The goods were sold. The proceeds banked. Politicians were bribed, weapons were purchased and more drugs were produced and exported. At the same time, Chinese state controlled factories were shipping mountains of fentanyl precursors into Mexican ports.

As always, it was a textbook case that enabled me to grasp the relationships. I studied U.S. government records on the so-called Chinese-Mexican whale, Zhenli Ye Gon. The Shanghai-born pharmaceutical tycoon—a Chinese national and Mexican citizen—was busted in his Mexico City hacienda in 2007. According to U.S. court records, in a secret room off Ye’s master bedroom, police found a stash of military weapons and a two-tonne pile of cash worth US$207 million. Stop for a minute and visualize that. This was a large room with U.S. dollars, Hong Kong dollars, pesos, euros and Canadian dollars neatly stacked halfway to the ceiling. It was the unlaundered proceeds of Ye’s crystal meth business. And he looked like a very connected figure in China: educated at East China University of Political Science and Law, a school administered by Beijing’s Ministry of Justice.

This was a decade before massive shipments of fentanyl precursors started to land in Vancouver and Manzanillo. But in the early 2000s, Ye was the largest chemical supplier for the Sinaloa Cartel, importing at least 50 tons of meth precursors annually from a Chinese pharmaceutical company. His case had the markers of the Vancouver Model written all over it. He was using Mexican currency exchanges to transfer hundreds of thousands of cash per week into HSBC bank accounts. He was wiring the money into Nevada. In just three years, he gambled at least $125 million in Las Vegas, U.S. court records say, betting $150,000 per hand at baccarat. And Ye was on such good terms with the Venetian Sands—operated by Venetian Macau owner Sheldon Adelson—that the casino comped him a Rolls-Royce, according to the Wall Street Journal.

Meanwhile, I learned the U.S. government had started to pay attention to my reports about China’s growing real estate footprint in Vancouver. I was informed that some in the U.S. State Department worried that Chinese transnational crime was establishing a North American beachhead in Vancouver.

But the RCMP and CSIS appeared to be overmatched. Canada had no real counterpunch to answer China’s sophisticated financial activities in Vancouver. And so, there was a growing FBI and DEA presence in British Columbia. To me, it seemed like Canada’s sovereignty on the west coast was gradually eroding. At least a little bit. And you could see the concern with Xi Jinping’s so-called Belt and Road projects, the type of Chinese infrastructure investment deals warmly accepted by tin-pot dictators in underdeveloped nations. I knew these deals were being pitched to B.C. Liberal premier Christy Clark’s government in 2016, when Clark and Wat met with Chinese Communist Party officials and real estate tycoons in Guangdong and Hong Kong. And B.C.’s government eventually greenlighted a $190-million Belt and Road import-export centre in 2018.The first of its kind in North America.

This despite the fact the U.S. State Department believes Belt and Road projects are a major vector for Chinese espionage and trade-based money-laundering, according to my Canadian intelligence sources.

THE GENERAL
My personal ‘This cannot really be happening in Canada but indisputable evidence says it is’ moment came in late 2017. This was after I started to break E-Pirate stories. Sources I had never heard from started to contact me. One source told me I should look at a compound east of Vancouver and near the U.S. border that was filled with stunning wealth. They said the River Rock Casino whale that owned this hacienda in Chilliwack appeared to be involved in unimaginable money-laundering. In a vast underground bunker, the whale had dozens of high-end luxury and military vehicles stacked on hoists. There were red Ferraris, black Rolls-Royces, white Mercedes, green military jeeps. It was a parking lot of horsepower that would have made El Chapo blush. But what really shocked me was the photos of the high-roller’s industrial collection. There was a red and gold fire truck, a big rig truck, and vintage rocket launchers and ground-mount machine guns.

I was informed the bunker’s owner—a tall, square-jawed and handsome man—was called the General by his followers in Vancouver. And indeed, WeChat videos showed that when Rongxiang “Tiger” Yuan relaxed in his compound’s karaoke lounge to drink fine liquors and sing odes to the Motherland, he wore his military fatigues. Despite my efforts to question Tiger Yuan about his many documented ties to Paul King Jin, I have never been able to reach him directly. So I can’t ask him why RCMP investigators refer to him as “Suspect 2” in confidential documents that name many alleged River Rock VIP gamblers and loan sharks, including Paul King Jin, who is identified as “Suspect 22.”

Through his lawyers, Yuan has denied any involvement in criminality and he sued for defamation after my reports for Global News outlined what my sources and RCMP and B.C. Lottery Corp. investigation records say about him. Yuan says he is a successful businessman who has been an active member of the Chinese-Canadian community for many years, and he meets many individuals.

When you see an elite People’s Liberation Army veteran allegedly involved in massive B.C. casino money-laundering and dealing with the most violent of Mainland China narcos and loan sharks in Canada—and very active in Beijing’s political influence operations in Vancouver—to me it suggests problems worth investigating.

I knew the RCMP and CSIS were watching the General in B.C. But across the country in Ottawa leaders seemed completely oblivious. And I had information that screamed for national attention. Sources told me an Iranian national named “Kousha” was the ‘meatshield’ for Tiger. Canadian deportation records showed this tattooed bodybuilder had a criminal record. In one case, Kousha was convicted for threatening to kill a Vancouver police officer. He had racially abused the officer and his family, and announced he “hated Jews so much that he smiled at their pain, knowing that he could cause fear.” A confidential RCMP link chart indicated Kousha was an employee of “Kenny”—the young Chinese man who shadowed Tiger in public and stored restricted weapons in Tiger’s compound. And photographs from inside Tiger’s compound showed Kousha posing with his finger on the trigger of a German MP40 submachine gun.

So why was Rongxiang Yuan surrounded by gun-toting thugs but also tight with Chinese consular leaders? I had to understand what this convergence of state actors and organized crime suspects meant for Canada’s security. So I consulted international experts like Jonathan Manthorpe, Alex Joske and Clive Hamilton in Australia, and Professor Anne-Marie Brady in New Zealand to understand President Xi Jinping’s so-called magic weapon of espionage and political interference, the United Front Work Department.

By 2020 I had seen enough to eradicate my doubts. My sources were correct. And Canadians had to be informed.

KHANANI AND THE RCMP MOLE
But I also knew that a national money-laundering inquiry was needed. Reporting from Ottawa, I was finding the Vancouver Model was a Canada-wide problem. Transnational drug cartels running underground banking supernodes in China and the Middle East were deeply intertwined with real estate and trade in Toronto and Montreal as well as Vancouver.

And it was a sprawling DEA investigation that ultimately helped me understand how RCMP corruption was enabling organized crime to advance across Canada.

I first learned of the Five Eyes probe of Altaf Khanani and Farzam Mehdizadeh in October 2017. I was waiting to speak to financial professionals about my E-Pirate reporting at a conference in Toronto.

A lawyer for Great Canadian Gaming had emailed, warning me not to deliver my speech. I ignored the baseless libel threat. Canadian bankers wanted to hear me talk about a serious threat to the nation. But I have to admit I was a bit distracted. That was until Doran flicked up a slide showing the mug shots of Khanani, a Pakistani national, and Farzam Mehdizadeh, a 57-year-old Toronto currency exchange owner. When Doran said the men were Five Eyes targets I scrambled to turn on my tape recorder. This meant the powerful Western intelligence alliance viewed these men as serious national security threats.

Doran explained that RCMP units had tailed Mehdizadeh driving from Toronto to Montreal and back 81 times in a single year. The RCMP had been watching Mehdizadeh since at least 2015. Montreal is still superficially dominated by the Italian mafia. But Middle Eastern and Chinese underground bankers increasingly handle the drug money in Montreal, a vital port for narco routes up and down the eastern seaboard.

On March 9, 2016, the RCMP got a warrant to take Mehdizadeh down for international money-laundering. At 10:25 p.m. on April 17, he was speeding back from Montreal on Highway 401 when Ontario Provincial Police pulled him over in Quinte County, near the Sandbanks Provincial Park on Lake Ontario.

He didn’t seem very surprised.

“He voluntarily disclosed he has a large sum of money in his possession…in the amount of $1.3 million,” an RCMP investigation affidavit says. The RCMP said Mehdizadeh had laundered $100 million in Toronto and Montreal in just one year.

But there was so much more to the case.

I found the RCMP only knew about Mehdizadeh because of brilliant work from the DEA and Australian federal police. RCMP’s intelligence directors were briefed in October 2014 at the DEA’s secret headquarters in Chantilly, Virginia. There were dozens of investigators and analysts from the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Since 2008 DEA had been running undercover agents into Hezbollah narco-launderers’ cells in Medellin, Dubai, Panama City. Agents discovered a web of businessmen just like Mehdizadeh collecting drug cash for Iranian state-sponsored criminals in cities worldwide: Toronto, Vancouver, New York, Los Angeles, Sydney, Paris, Melbourne, Miami, London. The DEA broke the case by infiltrating the top of the pyramid. They said Altaf Khanani was the mastermind who washed $16-billion per year for Latin American Cartels, Chinese Triads, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Indian narco-terrorist Dawood Ibrahim, and Hezbollah. It was Khanani’s ties to Iran and Hezbollah that worried the DEA the most. Police called him the Goldman Sachs of underground banking. Not an exaggeration, considering Khanani’s network reportedly handled 40 percent of Pakistan’s foreign currency exchange.

The DEA had no idea at the time but they should have been equally worried about Khanani’s Canadian ties. I would eventually learn that Khanani and Mehdizadeh’s hawala network allegedly had protection from Canada’s most powerful police intelligence official, alleged RCMP mole, Cameron Ortis.

Extracted from:
Book: Wilful Blindness: How a Network of Narcos, Tycoons and CCP agents infiltrated the West
Author: Sam Cooper
Publisher: Optimum Publishing International, Montreal/Toronto
Pages: 472
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

ENDING THE ENDLESS WARS: A STRATEGY FOR SELECTIVE DISENGAGEMENT
MONICA DUFFY TOFT
MAY 13, 2021
COMMENTARY

A majority of U.S. veterans and the public do not believe the efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq were worth the sacrifice. Indeed, after nearly 20 years of overreliance on the U.S. military to fight terrorism and insurgencies worldwide, the Afghanistan intervention has not only been costly in lives and cash, but arguably counterproductive. Indeed, terrorist attacks hit 63 countries in 2019, while terrorist threats to the United States are greater today than they were in 2002. This is in large part as a result of kinetic diplomacy: the habit of responding to terrorist violence with a strategy that overrelies on military violence.

In light of America’s pending drawdown from Afghanistan, all of this raises the question — how can the United States disengage from unpopular, counterproductive military missions in a way that does the least amount of near-term damage to U.S. interests?
In my view, Washington should focus on blocking insurgent access to financial resources; acting in concert with international organizations like the United Nations; including (where possible) representatives from civil society in negotiations; limiting the number of “veto” actors who can block the peace process ending the violence and war; integrating soon-to-be-former insurgents into the political process in exchange for de-escalation; and reintegrating insurgent combatants who wish to remain warriors into the postwar state’s military, while reforming its security sector. None of these objectives — individually or as a whole — is easy. However, these best practices would advance U.S. counter-terrorism interests more effectively than continuing to accept a near permanent U.S. military presence in South Asia and the Middle East.

Admitting Failure in Afghanistan Is Necessary, but Not Easy
While the West won the Cold War, the United States has lost a lot of hot and faux wars since World War II. It lost the Vietnam War, and failed to win the peace after its Iraq intervention of 2003. The United States lost its wars on drugs and poverty, and its “Global War on Terrorism.” And in Afghanistan, Washington has failed to achieve any of its original objectives, including the destruction of terrorist recruitment and training habitat, an end to oppressive Taliban rule, and an end to opium production. Each U.S. defeat has shared the same basic pattern: the application of the wrong mix of tools to achieve a shifting political objective. Moreover, it has created systems of violence and war that have come to define the United States as a nation, a situation that President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned about in his farewell address six decades ago. Above all, since World War II, U.S. losses in hot wars tend to result from an overestimation of the coercive effectiveness of its military capabilities.

In the case of U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) intervention in Afghanistan, the adversary’s center of gravity revolved, as it often does, around understanding what the various component groups that make up that nominal state want and fear. Two problems prevented this critical knowledge from being deployed to protect U.S. interests in Afghanistan. First, why bother getting to know an adversary’s wants and fears if death or serious injury can be relied upon to effect coercion? “Getting to know people” is time consuming, and U.S. publics tend to be promised tangible results now. Moreover, the United States has a significant investment — sunk costs — in armed forces brilliant at killing without being killed. Second, what if those wants and fears end up being offensive to an intervening actor’s core values, such as the status of women, a nondemocratic leadership selection process, or an economy dependent on support for the global trade in heroin?

In Afghanistan, the United States has relied excessively on military force to succeed, and insisted on measuring success in rapid, tangible, physical effects as opposed to, as Sir Robert Thompson famously put it, legitimacy (legitimacy tailored to its indigenous social, cultural, and political context). Obviously, some armed force is indispensable in any coercive strategy, but leading with it is a mistake.

So ISAF cannot win, but as in most military interventions since the end of the Cold War, losing has become politically unacceptable. As this became clear in Vietnam, Henry Kissinger shifted his definition of vital U.S. interest from anything intrinsic to “credibility.” Today credibility is linked with national identity. As Gen. George S. Patton made clear: “That’s why Americans have never lost and will never lose a war; for the very idea of losing is hateful to an American.” Admitting defeat risks admitting that the United States makes mistakes. Its best intentions end in unfortunate consequences perhaps only slightly less often than they do in other nations. A political leader who admits defeat in a war may put not only her own political career into the shade, but alter the balance of partisan power for years to come. This is the main reason admitting failure is so difficult.

The pressure to avoid responsibility for harm to U.S. national identity most often results not in an admission of national failure, but in two very dangerous deflections. The first is what right-wing Germans in the 1920s referred to as Dolchstoßlegende, or the stab-in-the-back myth. Our military couldn’t have been responsible for losing the war in Afghanistan. Instead, it must be the fault of civilian government officials. To be fair, civilians — not servicemembers — are in charge of U.S. defense policymaking. Nevertheless, this sort of deflection never dies. It powered the “who lost China?” debate in the 1950s. It still plagues the scholarship and historical memory of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam’s civil war. When George W. Bush faced a collapse of U.S. public support in 2006 for the second U.S.-led Iraq intervention, he promised that if the American people no longer had the backbone to see it through, his administration would not let the U.S. military down by withdrawing short of “victory.” This same deflection will follow ISAF’s departure from Afghanistan as well, with U.S. chicken hawks — having spent all of the Trump administration decrying ISAF’s presence in Afghanistan — now blaming the administration for spinelessness and betrayal of America’s brave troops for attempting the same withdrawal.

The second deflection is equally dangerous. It asserts that since all rational human beings must fear physical death or serious injury above all else, and America’s killing failed to achieve coercion, it must be that we faced not rational human beings but irrational animals in human form. In World War II in the Pacific, kamikaze attacks and the Battle of Attu convinced Americans and their Western allies that the Japanese were not human adversaries, but beasts who had to be exterminated. In the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, communist battlefield losses as a proportion of prewar population were 2.5 to 3 percent, almost historically unprecedented. The question of how the Vietnamese communists could continue to resist U.S. coercion after sustaining such losses was called the “breaking point” debate. After 9/11 — another suicide attack — this association of an adversary not fearful of death with irrationality became, and remains, a dominant view.

There are real benefits to admitting failure. First, nations — like people — learn when they acknowledge mistakes. Second, after the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, the United States began to accept a broader definition of the costs of war — one that incorporated psychology and emotion as well as physical injury, death, and material opportunity costs. The country began to understand and then acknowledge that the costs of war do not end when the fighting stops and the smoke clears, but can continue for generations afterward as post-traumatic stress disorder and moral injury.

What Is Needed Now: Selective Disengagement
The United States can reduce the long-term damage of ISAF’s failure by returning — as the Biden administration appears to be doing — to an investment in the two key pillars of international peace and prosperity it helped build after World War II: collective security (e.g., NATO and bilateral defense treaties with Japan, South Korea, and Australia), and international institutions such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and International Monetary Fund. That is reengagement, and it needs to happen regardless of whether the United States will end up paying disproportionately more than its allies. Disengagement should take the form of ramping down U.S. military interventions abroad, rebuilding the U.S. State Department, and reestablishing the principle that a resort to arms is not a first but a last resort.

Here I make my case in two parts: first, by establishing that since 9/11 the United States has dramatically departed from traditions that supported its continued security, prosperity, and leadership globally. And second, by highlighting the serious shortcomings of its recent policies in Afghanistan as a way to understand the “how” of disengagement.

A Brief History of Recent U.S. Military Intervention Efforts and Their Outcomes
Since the end of World War II, most U.S. military interventions have not gone as expected, and more importantly, have undermined U.S. interests. Starting with the Korean War in 1950, then moving on to intervention in the Vietnam War, U.S. military interventions began to fit a pattern: Coercing an adversary by threatening to kill a lot of their soldiers, sailors, airmen, and the like seemed to become more difficult. In the Gulf War, by contrast, the United States led a coalition that rapidly and decisively attained its military objective: the ejection of Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait. What the United States learned from this success was summarized in a now well-known essay in Foreign Affairs by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. Now known as the “Powell Doctrine” (an update of 1984’s “Weinberger Doctrine”), it asserted that there were actually two sorts of military intervention the United States might pursue. One sort, an intervention in an internal armed conflict featuring irregular armed forces in vehicle-impassable terrain, was to be avoided at all costs. According to Powell, a veteran of the Vietnam War, these “small wars” were not the sort of wars the U.S. military had been designed to fight and win. The second sort of war — a war against an internationally recognized state fielding regular armed forces — would be the kind of war the U.S. military could be counted on to fight and win both decisively and with relative ease, so long as that state was not a nuclear-armed advanced industrial state such as the Soviet Union.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

Of course, Powell’s effort to dissuade the United States from intervention in future small wars was not successful. Since the end of the Cold War, and in particular since 9/11, the United States has increasingly undertaken the first sort of intervention: deployments to war-prone territories that feature fractured polities and instability, often the conditions that are claimed to necessitate military intervention in the first place. Using data from the Military Intervention Project I direct at the Fletcher School, Tufts University, Figure 1 outlines the number of U.S. coercive engagements across different historical eras (e.g., the Cold War) and the physical intensity — labeled as “level of hostility” — of those interventions: from no use of force, to threat of force, to the use of force below the threshold of outright war, to, finally, interstate war.
mdt-1.png

Source: Graph generated by the author.
Not only has the United States intervened abroad more frequently in the post-Cold War period (note that they are shorter periods, totaling nearly half the number of years of the Cold War period), but it’s done so with more intensity. So, while America’s adversaries have increasingly sought to de-escalate fights, the United States has ramped up its use of force.

While these interventions are often conceived of as short-term military missions, intended to resolve a specific instability, they almost invariably escalate into the never-ending wars and deployments we have seen in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. And as political scientist Ivan Arreguín-Toft has documented, powerful states like the United States have been losing them more often since the 19th century.
MDT-2.png

Source: Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Research spanning over 200 years of asymmetric conflict outcomes makes it clear that the days in which it was possible to succeed in a military intervention of the kind the United States increasingly undertakes have long since passed. In the future, there should be a recognition that military intervention — intervention which presupposes that effective killing equals effective coercion — is unlikely to produce the final outcome sought after, and will, at best, create a true foreign policy dilemma.

So if nonintervention is intolerable, but military victory is impossible, how should the Biden administration approach the tough goal of advancing U.S. national security interests while demobilizing ISAF’s armed intervention in Afghanistan? How can the Biden administration disengage from Afghanistan without tarring the Democratic Party with the inevitable claim from the political right that “the war could have been won, but for the cowardice of politicians Washington” (in other words, the stab-in-the-back claim)?

How to Disengage: Six Tools
Given the current hyperpolarized political climate in the United States, a stab-in-the-back claim against the Biden administration is overdetermined, but these six tools for constructive disengagement are the Biden administration’s best chance to manage Richard Falk’s dilemma in the context of the failed U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan (these would apply in other contexts too, including Yemen and the counter-ISIL efforts in Iraq and Syria). By “constructive,” I mean disengagement that mitigates the costs of ISAF’s defeat in Afghanistan not only to U.S. and allied interests, but to those of the Afghan people going forward. These tools are: (1) blocking insurgent access to cash; (2) acting in concert with international organizations like the United Nations; (3) including (where possible) representatives from civil society in negotiations; (4) limiting the number of veto players; (5) integrating soon-to-be-former insurgents into the political process in exchange for de-escalation; and (6) reintegrating insurgent combatants who wish to remain warriors into the postwar state’s military, while reforming its security sector.

To its credit, the Biden administration has already initiated policies consistent with constraining Taliban financing, including Afghan civil society in negotiations, and reforming the country’s security sector.

Tool 1: Interdict Insurgent Access to Cash
The Taliban have a diverse revenue portfolio. They annually earn an estimated $200 million from “drug processing and taxation,” as well as further revenue from illegal timber and pistachio harvesting. Additionally, the Taliban are supported by Islamic charities.

The traditional issues in targeting Taliban finances do not derive from identifying revenue streams, but rather in locating financiers and building a cooperative system to target the Taliban financial system. Although significant gains have been made in identifying and freezing the assets of illicit charities, these international efforts have not been synchronized and often do not include the Gulf states — the primary source of zakat money redirected toward the Taliban and other Islamic extremists. Other efforts to disrupt Taliban drug processing and taxation have included increasing coalition security force presence in Taliban territory, as well as bombing heroin production facilities. The success of current efforts has been intermittent, however, as the simple Taliban labs can be easily rebuilt.

The first step in curtailing Taliban revenue streams is to eliminate foreign funding sources, especially Islamic charities. The only way to do this is through an international, cooperative effort. The most likely leader of this effort would be the United Nations. European, North American, and Arab states alike need to quickly identify illicit charities and immediately freeze assets. Intelligence sources need to be used to identify and detain terrorism facilitators who operate through the informal, cash-based (hawala) networks in the Middle East.

The second step is long-term rural economic reform to steer the Afghan economy away from heroin production. Studies have shown that airstrikes are unsuccessful because drugs are often removed from the targeted location, and the airstrikes harm rapport between coalition forces and farmers. Further, hoping that the market for heroin in Europe and North America will subside is a folly. Instead, Afghan farmers should be licensed to grow poppies, and the international community needs to support the procurement of these poppies for medical purposes. Similar measures in Turkey and India were successful in significantly reducing, or eradicating, illicit opium trade.

The third and final step is to target and detain Taliban tax officials. Targeting these individuals prevents the Taliban from collecting taxes in rural Afghanistan. This action could be done by Afghan security forces, with intelligence support from foreign allies. Afghan security forces need to be cognizant of local rapport, therefore their presence in rural areas is integral. Outside states, however, are more likely to be viewed as interlopers, therefore outside interveners should focus on intelligence and other support.

Tool 2: Act in Concert with International Organizations
The United Nations currently is not leading the Afghan war settlement process. Instead, Qatar has hosted the U.S.-Taliban peace talks. The United Nations approved the settlement, but this happened after the Feb. 29 deal was already signed. Instead of Qatar and the United States leading the process, the United Nations needs to take ownership over the process (especially given the reputation of the former and the cobelligerent status of the latter). Afghanistan is not a member of any regional organizations, and the various intermediate powers with a Central Asian presence do not have enough rapport among the belligerents to unilaterally lead negotiations. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the United Nations to lead the settlement process.

As part of leading the peace process, the United Nations should also be the primary actor in economic and security actions. Although the original NATO deployment is noble in scope, the United Nations should be leading any military presence under blue flags. Over 90 countries lost citizens in the Sept. 11 attacks. Global jihadism affects all countries. U.N. peacekeeping would redirect Afghan conflict mediation toward multilateralism, instead of the current U.S.-centric interventionism. Of note, U.N. peacekeeping should be framed around a peace settlement, rather than a pure military intervention.

Tool 3: Include Civil Society in Negotiations
Afghan civil society includes a range of professional, religious, and community organizations. However, they have largely been absent from the peace process. Instead, civil society in Afghanistan tends to operate on the margins of the conflict. The peace process — which should ideally be led by the United Nations — needs to actively involve civil society in order to address the grievances that have resulted from the many decades of internal Afghan strife. Further, civil society can be leveraged to lead community reintegration, supporting and carrying out the terms of the peace settlement.

Tools 4 and 5: Limit Actors with Vetoes and Integrate Insurgents into the Political Process in Exchange for Rejecting Violence
The current peace negotiations involve the Taliban, Afghan government, and United States. Although the Islamic State-Khorasan franchise is not represented, it would be quickly defeated by a unified Afghanistan, and therefore should not be given a role. Further, the current involvement of the Taliban in the peace process is a significant progress metric, and the ongoing discussions of Taliban government inclusion needs to be predicated on reducing levels of violence. The international community is following these two lessons through its use of diplomatic tools.

Tool 6: Integrate Non-State Combatants and Reform State Security Sector
Afghanistan is heavily militarized. There are hundreds of thousands of Afghan combatants between the Afghan security forces, Taliban, Islamic State-Khorasan, and other militant groups. As part of any peace process, these combatants need to be disarmed, disbanded, and reintegrated and the security sector reformed. Some of the former Taliban and other jihadi militants will need to be integrated into the Afghan National Army. The Afghan National Army, already too big, needs to refine its structure in order to absorb reformed Taliban.

There are several issues for special attention in a holistic Afghanistan disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process, which should go along with a security sector reform process. First, commanders of both militant organizations and state security forces need to be included in the demobilization and security sector reform processes. These commanders have led decentralized campaigns for years, but if integrated into a reformed state system, these commanders should cooperate with national guidelines. Moreover, the individual combatants need to be provided with livelihoods and hope. For example, a program among Palestinians revealed that cash and brides can help to demobilize terrorist fighters. Second, transitional justice needs to be addressed as part of larger reforms in Afghanistan. Third, the reintegration and reform processes need to include a combination of cultural and economic tools, reforming mindsets and building skill sets. Only in this manner can the ex-combatants fully rejoin society.

Conclusion
While U.S. military intervention remains a critical tool of statecraft in support of U.S. national security and prosperity, its overuse since 9/11 has resulted in grave harm to both U.S. national security and prosperity. The United States needs to be more restrained in its use of force. Here I have introduced the case of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11 as a foil for why even well-resourced military interventions so often go wrong, and how efforts to disengage to achieve stable peace can fail as well. Nevertheless, there are a range of disengagement policies that can advance U.S. and allied interests in Afghanistan. These six approaches would apply equally well (with different details) to disengagement in other theaters as well. The costs of disengagement often seem high (and they are), but they are manageable relative to the costs of continuing to limp forward. Americans also have to think long term (as America’s adversaries very often do).

The war in Afghanistan actually began over four decades ago with the assassination of Muhammed Da’ud Khan in 1978. Its resolution will not follow the departure of American and allied troops and will take decades. Above all, Afghanistan cannot be managed by foreigners, and the country is unlikely to satisfy a Western conception of a legitimate government.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Buhari in Paris: Nigeria President Muhamadu Buhari and France Emmanuel Macron go 'meet' for di African summit
16 May 2021

President Muhammadu Buhari go comot Abuja on Sunday for Paris, France, on a four-day official visit.

Tok-tok pesin to di president Garba Shehu tok inside statement on Saturday say for dia, Buhari go attend di African Summit wey di French President Emmanuel Macron dey host.
According to Shehu statement, di Summit "go focus on reviewing African economy, afta di palava with di Coronavirus pandemic, and getting support, especially from kontries wey dem get 'increased debt burden on"

Di meeting go also get in attendance "major stakeholders for di global finance institutions and some Heads of Government, who go discuss external funding and debt treatment for Africa, and private sector reforms."

During the visit, President Buhari dey expected to meet with President Macron "to discuss growing security threats for di Sahel and Lake Chad region, political relations, economic ties, climate change and partnership to ginger di health sector, especially in stopping di spread of Covid-19, with more research and vaccines.

"Before returning to Nigeria, President Buhari go also receive some key players in di oil and gas sector, engineering and telecommunications, European Council and European Union Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and Commission, and members of di Nigerian community.

Di president go travel togeda with some ministers, di Minister of Foreign Affairs, Geoffrey Onyeama, Minister of Finance, Budget and National Planning, Zainab Shamsuna Ahmed, Minister of Trade and Investment, Otunba Adeniyi Adebayo, and Minister of Health, Dr Osagie Ehanire.

Di National Security Adviser, Maj. Gen. Babagana Mohammed Monguno (rtd) and Director General of National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Amb. Ahmed Rufai Abubakar go also folllow am for dis trip.
 

jward

passin' thru
Hmm. Can't find context, but it feels like a new square for WW bingo card.. included is article on the meeting for background. :: shrug ::

Russian foreign minister warns West that Arctic is 'our land, our waters' ahead of Arctic Council meeting
1621256745053.png1621256761698.png
View: https://twitter.com/AFP/status/1394272521726439434?s=20


Russian, U.S. foreign ministers to meet on sidelines of Arctic Council meeting


4-5 minutes


By Eilís Quinn
The Arctic Council is an international forum made up of the eight northern circumpolar countries, and six Arctic Indigenous groups. The chairmanship of the body rotates through the countries every two years.
On May 20, current chair Iceland hands the gavel over to Russia.
In a phone call on Wednesday, Lavrov and Blinken discussed nuclearization on the Korean peninsula, the renewal of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that put limits on Iran’s nuclear program, in addition to the upcoming Arctic Council meeting, the Russian ministry said.

“Sergey Lavrov and [Antony] Blinken agreed to hold a separate meeting “on the sidelines” of this session to consider key issues of bilateral relations and the international agenda,” the Russian ministry said.
In their news release, the U.S. State Department said they looked forward to collaboration with Russia on the Arctic.
“Secretary Blinken and Minister Lavrov discussed the upcoming Arctic Council Ministerial, where they will meet next week, and the potential to cooperate during Russia’s subsequent Arctic Council Chairmanship,” said U.S. State Department spokesman Ned Price.
ADVERTISEMENT
Price said Blinken had also called for the release of Trevor Reed and Paul Whelan, two Americans imprisoned in Russia.
Whelan, a former U.S. marine, who also has Canadian citizenship, was sentenced to 16 years in prison for spying in 2020. Whelan maintains he is innocent and was set up for political reasons. Reed, also a former marine, was sentenced in 2020 to nine years in prison, for assaulting police in Russia while drunk. Reed also maintains his imprisonment was politically motivated.
“Secretary Blinken reiterated President Biden’s resolve to protect U.S. citizens and act firmly in defense of U.S. interests in response to actions by Russia that harm us or our allies,” Price said. “He called on Russia to release Paul Whelan and Trevor Reed so they can return home to their families.”

Reykjavik ministerial
This year’s ministerial, the biennial meeting is where the leadership of the Arctic Council is officially handed over, and when updates are given on projects from the forum’s six working groups, will be taking place in a hybrid format because of the pandemic.
Foreign ministers and permanent participants will attend the meeting in Reykjavik in person. Working group participants, observer states and organizations, and additional delegates from the Arctic states and Indigenous groups, will attend virtually.

The Arctic Council was set up in 1996 to allow the Arctic countries to work together on environmental protection and sustainable development.
Although security and military issues are specifically excluded from the council’s work and founding document, Russia’s chairmanship comes at a time of increasing tensions between it and the West over the country’s actions in Ukraine, which included sending tens of thousands of troops to Ukraine’s border in April, and concerns in the West about Russia’s investment in military infrastructure in the North.
In April, the Biden administration expelled 10 Russian diplomats and imposed sanctions on Russians and companies in protest of Russia’s interference in the 2020 presidential election as well as hacking campaigns. In response, Russia expelled 10 American diplomats and banned certain officials from entering the country.

Arctic Council - Quick Facts
Year formed: 1996
Arctic Council Members: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia, United States
Permanent Participants: Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Saami Council
Current Chair: Iceland (2019-2021)
Upcoming Chair: Russia (2021-2023)
Posted for fair use
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Decision on Minuteman to shape U.S. nuclear policy for decades
  • By Robert Burns | Associated Press
  • May 17, 2021 Updated 4 hrs ago
  • Comments
WASHINGTON – For 50 years, the Minuteman missile has been armed and ready, day and night, for nuclear war on a moment’s notice. It has never been launched into combat from its underground silo, but this year, it became the prime target in a wider political battle over the condition and cost of the nation’s nuclear arsenal.

Minuteman was not intended to last half a century, so it’s overdue to be replaced or refurbished. Some see this as a moment to push for scrapping it altogether, abandoning one leg of the traditional nuclear “triad” – weapons that can be launched from land, sea and air. Most in Congress favor keeping the land-based leg by replacing Minuteman with a new missile; President Joe Biden’s position is not yet clear.

The outcome of the fight likely will steer nuclear policy and strategy for decades to come. It could influence how U.S. allies in Europe and Asia view the reliability of America’s nuclear “umbrella” – the security net that has allowed most of them to forgo developing nuclear weapons of their own. Some argue that it could make the difference between war and peace in an era of rising Chinese military power.

Navy Adm. Charles Richard, who as head of U.S. Strategic Command is in charge of nuclear warfighting plans, says Minuteman is so old that Air Force technicians – including some stationed at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne – have had to perform magic to keep it fully functional while coping with severely limited spares for components such as missile launch switches.

“I’m afraid there’s a point where they won’t be able to pull the rabbit out of the hat and the system won’t work,” he told a House hearing April 21. Asked later by a reporter if he meant Minuteman had become unreliable, Richard said it’s safe and dependable for now but with “no more margin” for delay in replacing it.

Stephen Schwartz, a nonresident senior fellow at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, says Richard’s statements are reminiscent of alarming claims made during the Cold War about needing new weapons.

“Time and again, officials have warned us ‘the sky is falling,’ and it is never true,” Schwartz said.
“Congress should critically examine the historical record and apply some healthy skepticism to such testimony.”

Richard applauds a bipartisan push in Congress to preserve and modernize the entire nuclear arsenal at a cost, depending on how you define it, of more than $1 trillion. Opponents include a former defense secretary, William Perry, who has become an outspoken critic of Minuteman. The Pentagon’s current leader, Lloyd Austin, has been publicly noncommittal on Minuteman but favors preserving the nuclear triad.

The consensus in Congress is that age is eroding the three main pillars of U.S. nuclear strength – long-range bomber aircraft like the 1960s-era B-52, submarines armed with Trident ballistic missiles, and the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs. Relatively few oppose building new-generation bombers and submarines. The most contentious debate is over whether, when and how to replace Minuteman.

Arguments over Minuteman boil down to this: Given its age and the nuclear challenges posed by Russia and China, should it be phased out in favor of a new-generation ICBM? Or should it be refurbished at lesser cost, to be replaced later? Or should it be phased out, period, with no replacement?

The debate reveals a longstanding American divide.

On one side is the view that ICBMs are indispensable to the strategy for deterring any adversary from attempting a nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies. A key piece of the argument is that ICBMs in their 400 underground silos in five Great Plains states act as a “warhead sink,” or sponge, to absorb the first blow in a nuclear war; the argument is that an attacker would need to expend so many weapons destroying these silos that he would see little chance of winning and thus would be deterred from attacking in the first place.

The opposing view is that ICBMs are overkill, given the large amount of firepower in the more elusive sea- and air-based segments of the nuclear arsenal, and that ICBMs make nuclear conflict more likely because an American president might feel compelled to launch one upon a warning of attack that turned out to be a false alarm. Once it’s launched from its silo, an ICBM cannot be recalled.

These differences are more stark in light of expected stagnant defense budgets.
Among those eager to build a successor to Minuteman, some see political opportunity in its occasional slip-ups. For example, when a routine flight test was aborted shortly before launch last week, Rep. Don Bacon tweeted that the incident was evidence that Minuteman must be modernized “before it’s too late,” although the Air Force has yet to determine what triggered the abort. Bacon is a Republican from Nebraska – home to Strategic Command headquarters and to some Minuteman silos.

Biden has not publicly addressed the issue. In March, the White House released interim national security guidance promising to “take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy,” but offering no details.

As a candidate in 2019, Biden said he believed the nuclear arsenal could be modernized for less than the projected $1 trillion price tag, but was not specific. Some interpreted this as him doubting the need for new ICBMs, but thus far his administration has given no indication of abandoning the plan it inherited to replace Minuteman with a successor dubbed the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, starting in 2029.

Last September, Northrop Grumman won a $13.3 billion contract to develop the successor. The estimated cost of fielding the full system is $95 billion, rising to $264 billion counting sustainment costs over the weapon’s expected lifetime into the 2070s.

Signs of the Biden administration’s nuclear path may emerge in the 2022 budget to be presented to Congress soon. The Pentagon also plans a formal review of its nuclear “posture,” which likely will affirm the need for nuclear modernization but might not decide certain details.

Rep. John Garamendi, a California Democrat, is unconvinced by arguments that Minuteman is just too old to undergo a life extension – a refurbishment to keep it in service for decades to come.

“I need a new one,” Richard, the Strategic Command chief, retorted in a heated exchange with Garamendi last month.

Richard says there is no room for delay. But a new report by the Government Accountability Office suggests delays are almost inevitable. It concluded that every part of nuclear modernization “faces the prospect of delays” due to limitations in the workforce, infrastructure and supply chain.
 

jward

passin' thru
F-15EX To Carry New Oversized Air-To-Air Missile
Thomas Newdick

10-12 minutes



The U.S. Air Force just dropped a big hint that it’s working on a new very long-range air-to-air missile, with the F-15EX Eagle II fighter jet earmarked as the most likely candidate to carry it. The development is the first we’ve heard about a new U.S. air-to-air missile (AAM) in this class since the emergence of the Long Range Engagement Weapon, or LREW, some years ago, followed by that weapon’s apparent disappearance — at least in the public domain.

Details about the new missile were disclosed by Air Force Magazine which recently obtained a series of Air Force talking points for the Fiscal Year 2022 budget. These also talk more generally about the Air Force’s plans to retire over 400 older fighters and replace them with around 300 new aircraft, including the secretive Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program and a ‘clean-sheet’ F-16 replacement, now called the Multi-Role fighter (MR-X).

message-editor%2F1621289123603-aim-120testlaunch.jpg

U.S. Air Force

An F-35A fires an AIM-120 AMRAAM during a live-fire test over the Gulf of Mexico. Once again, the Air Force is now talking about a longer-range missile.


Intriguingly, the talking points also make reference to an unnamed “outsize … air-to-air” weapon, which will be able to be carried by the F-15EX. The fighter is described in the same papers as “an outsized weapons truck.” To date, the largest air-to-air weapon associated with the F-15EX was the standard AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, or AMRAAM. While the Air Force has continued to try and wring out the maximum possible range from the AMRAAM, that weapon is now surely nearing the end of its development potential.

Previously, the ability of the F-15EX to carry outsized weapons was well known but it was always expected that these would be offensive air-to-ground weapons, including hypersonic missiles which are invariably larger than most regular air-launched missiles. In particular, the AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon, or ARRW, has been touted as a possible future armament option for the F-15EX.

message-editor%2F1621288997166-arrw.jpeg

U.S. Air Force

An inert AGM-183A ARRW test round loaded on a B-52H bomber. The F-15EX is also expected to carry this weapon.


Now, it seems, the F-15EX’s weapons carriage capability will likely see it hauling different types of standoff weapons to prosecute targets both on the ground and in the air. In both scenarios, the F-15EX would likely be operating in less-contested airspace, or just outside hostile anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) umbrellas.


Interestingly, while we know the Air Force, together with the Navy, is already working on a new AAM, which is intended to offer greater range than the current AIM-120 AMRAAM, the AIM-260 has long been assumed to be scaled to similar dimensions as the AMRAAM, especially as the F-22 Raptor is slated to be among the first aircraft to receive it. Having the AIM-260 broadly AMRAAM-sized would ensure it is suitable for internal carriage aboard the F-35 Lightning II, too, as well as any forthcoming stealth fighter designs. The AIM-260 is currently in development but details of its design and capabilities remain classified.

Aside from the AIM-260, there has been speculation in the past that the AGM-88G Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range, or AARGM-ER, a radar-killing air-to-ground weapon, would make a suitable candidate to turn into a long-range AAM. Once again, however, that weapon has been sized from the outset to fit inside the weapons bays of the F-35A and the carrier-based F-35C.

message-editor%2F1621288889310-aargm-er.jpeg

U.S. Navy

An F/A-18E with a captive-carry AGM-88G AARGM prototype under its left wing.


Furthermore, by explicitly referring to the “outsize” nature of this new weapon, the Air Force would seem to be pointing to a different weapon altogether, one that Air Force Magazine assesses as a planned counter to China’s PL-15 AAM.
The PL-15 also remains a mysterious weapon. We know that it is intended as the main armament of the J-20 stealth fighter and that it’s broadly analogous to the AIM-120D AMRAAM. However, there has been speculation in the past surrounding exactly how it achieves its presumed very long-range and whether it uses exotic throttleable ramjet propulsion. In fact, it now seems certain that the PL-15 uses a more conventional dual-pulse motor, but that its overall performance and its active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar still offer a serious challenge to the United States and its allies.

message-editor%2F1621289982809-pl-15.jpeg

Chinese Internet

Four dummy PL-15 missiles in the weapons bay of a J-20.


Meanwhile, China has at least been testing another very long-range AAM, photos of which showed it under the wing of a J-16 Flanker multirole fighter jet. This shadowy weapon is thought to be around 18 feet long, compared to 12 feet for the AMRAAM. In the past, The War Zone has speculated about how that weapon may in fact be tailored to destroy airborne early warning and control aircraft, and other high-value targets, at extended ranges.
These Chinese weapons have been under development for some time, as have several Russian counterparts, which pose another threat to the previous dominance of the AMRAAM family. Last year, we saw the first evidence of a test launch of the very long-range R-37M (AA-13 Axehead) from a Su-35S Flanker multirole fighter, while an extended-range version of the R-77 (AA-12 Adder), apparently with ramjet propulsion, also appeared to be under test aboard the Su-57 Felon stealth fighter.

message-editor%2F1621290036910-r-37m.jpeg

RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE SCREENCAP

A Russian Su-35S fires an R-37M missile.


These Chinese and Russian missiles have been known about for some time now — the R-37M was first tested from a MiG-31 Foxhound interceptor as long ago as 2011. This brings us back to the LREW program, which sought to provide the U.S. Air Force with a very long-range AAM to challenge designs like these and to reinstate a capability the Pentagon lost with the Navy’s retirement of the AIM-54 Phoenix in 2004.

message-editor%2F1621293940715-332272main_ed06-0217-37_full.jpg

NASA/Tom Tschida

An inert Phoenix missile under the fuselage of a NASA F-15B during its study as a possible test vehicle to obtain hypersonic data.


Back in late 2017 the National Defense Authorization Act, the Pentagon’s budget, for the following year made reference to the LREW program, which was classed as “emerging capabilities technology development.”
Back then, The War Zone described LREW as follows:
This program has worked as an exploratory initiative used to identify the overall concept, technologies, kill chain structure, and baseline requirements for a new long-range air-to-air missile or family of missiles. Officially the program is aimed at “maintaining America’s air dominance.” Now the classified results of the program are supposedly being funneled down to the services where they are likely to morph into a hardware development program of record.


Concept art provided for LREW showed a two-stage missile design being launched from the weapons bay of an F-22. A two-stage weapon would be a logical solution to developing a very long-range AAM rapidly, but the fact that the missile was apparently scaled for internal carriage by the Raptor raises some questions.

message-editor%2F1621290080369-lrewf-22.jpeg

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE VIA FLIGHTGLOBAL.COM

U.S. Air Force concept art showing an F-22 launching a two-stage LREW missile.


While that concept may have involved some artistic license, the unnamed missile mentioned in the recent Air Force sounds very much as if it would be too large for internal carriage. It is possible, perhaps that LREW eventually yielded a missile that was too big for accommodation in the F-22’s main weapons bay. Taken together, however, it suggests that the new weapon is either separate from the LREW program, or the latter has since morphed into a different kind of weapon and one that is larger than when originally conceived.

Moreover, since LREW was first disclosed, the idea of using the F-15 (in particular) as a ‘weapons truck’ has gained much greater traction, including using the older fighter to launch long-range missiles from a position of relative safety well behind a flight of stealth fighters which could provide targeting for these weapons via datalink. With the missile being launched remotely by the F-15, and then fed targeting updates from low-observable assets via datalink, the value of having the weapon launched by the stealth fighter itself becomes more questionable.

message-editor%2F1621290186327-f-15ex-top.jpeg

VIKING AERO IMAGES

The first F-15EX for the U.S. Air Force.


There are perhaps other clues in the Air Force’s budget talking points as to how the new missile might be utilized. These make reference to “full-spectrum survivability, high speed, advanced weapons, and extended ranges” as well as a concept of operations in which the Air Force seeks to achieve “temporary windows of superiority” in “highly-contested threat environments.” One can quite easily imagine a very long-range AAM launched from distance and cued by various offboard, primarily stealthy platforms, as a way of punching holes in a dense A2/AD environment such as the kind that would be found during a campaign fought over Taiwan, for instance.

Aside from the F-15EX, there is also the possibility that the new missile could also be compatible with the dimensions of the weapons bays of the B-21 Raider stealth bomber. In 2019, Air Force Major General Scott Pleus, the then Director of Air and Cyber Operations for Pacific Air Forces, talked about the possibility of “A B-21 that also has air-to-air capabilities” and can “work with the family of systems to defend itself, utilizing stealth.”
Regardless, with the F-15EX now making rapid progress, we might not have to wait too long to find out more details about the Air Force’s next-generation very long-range AAM. Whatever that weapon turns out to be, it’s been a long time coming and, with Chinese and Russian missile developments continuing apace, it will likely be a much-needed addition to the service’s armory.

Posted for fair use
 

jward

passin' thru
British Carrier Joins U.S. Amphibious Forces In North Atlantic In A Vision Of What’s To Come
For the first time, the flagship of the Royal Navy is working with a full-size Amphibious Ready Group.

By Thomas Newdick May 19, 2021



Some truly impressive photos have emerged documenting recent joint exercises in the North Atlantic involving the British Royal Navy and U.S. Navy, as well as forces from the U.S. Marine Corps. As seen in the image at the top of this story, warships, aircraft, and Landing Craft Air Cushions, or LCACs, deployed from the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group, or IWOARG, teamed up with the Royal Navy’s flagship, the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, as well as vessels from other navies.

Also involved in these maritime drills, which were dubbed Exercise Ragnar Viking, were vessels from the French Navy and the Royal Norwegian Navy — an NH90 naval helicopter from one of those forces is also visible in the image above. The centerpieces of the maneuvers, however, were HMS Queen Elizabeth, which is working up for its first operational deployment within Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG21), and the U.S. Navy’s Wasp class amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima. That amphibious assault ship is the flagship of the IWOARG, which also includes other elements of Amphibious Squadron 4, the Harpers Ferry class dock landing ship USS Carter Hall and the amphibious transport dock ship USS San Antonio, as well as the embarked 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).

message-editor%2F1621435539766-exerciseragnarviking.jpg

U.S. Navy/Lt. Anton Ekman

Participants in Exercise Ragnar Viking underway in the Atlantic Ocean in formation during a photo exercise, May 17, 2021.


The Royal Navy assets for CSG21, meanwhile, are HMS Queen Elizabeth, the Type 45 destroyers HMS Diamond and HMS Defender, the Type 23 frigates HMS Kent and HMS Richmond, the replenishment tanker RFA Tidespring, the stores ship and fleet tanker RFA Fort Victoria, and an undisclosed Royal Navy Astute class nuclear attack submarine.
Other warships involved in Ragnar Viking, some of which are seen in the accompanying photos, included the Virginia class attack submarine USS New Mexico, the Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyers USS Arleigh Burke and USS Ross, the Royal Navy’s Type 23 frigate HMS Lancaster and the amphibious transport dock HMS Albion, the French Navy’s frigate Normandie, and the Royal Norwegian Navy’s frigate HNoMS Otto Sverdrup and corvette HNoMS Skjold.


Embarked aircraft on HMS Queen Elizabeth and attached to other Royal Navy vessels included F-35B stealth fighters from both the Royal Air Force’s No 617 Squadron, the “Dambusters,” and from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 211, the “Wake Island Avengers,” Wildcat HMA2 multirole helicopters from 815 Naval Air Squadron (NAS), anti-submarine warfare and airborne early warning and control Merlin HM2 helicopters from 820 NAS, and Commando Merlin helicopters from 845 NAS.

For its part, the IWOARG provided aircraft from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 162 Reinforced, the aviation combat element of 24th MEU. A typical aviation combat element of this type normally includes 10 MV-22B Osprey tiltrotors, six AV-8B Harrier II attack jets, five RQ-21A Blackjack unmanned aerial vehicles, four CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters, four AH-1Z Cobra helicopters, and three or four UH-1Y Huey helicopters. Also attached is a pair of U.S. Navy MH-60S Seahawk helicopters, in this case from Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 26, the “Chargers,” on hand to provide search and rescue and additional utility capabilities.

The involvement of both F-35Bs and AV-8Bs in the maneuvers is notable, with the former rapidly replacing the iconic jump jet on the decks of U.S. Navy amphibious assault ships. Manwhile, integration of Marine Corps F-35Bs aboard the HMS Queen Elizabeth is now well established and, as we have examined in the past, the American jets are likely to be a regular part of the air wings of the two British carriers for the foreseeable future. As well as boosting the British Joint Strike Fighter force, and lending valuable combat experience, the presence of Marine Corps F-35Bs on Royal Navy carrier decks should also mean that Marine Amphibious Ready Group working with them in the future could have a higher degree of interchangeability. There is also potential for British F-35s cross-decking — operating temporarily from the decks of U.S. Navy assault ships.

Furthermore, with the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps having been experimenting with employing Wasp class ships as ‘Lightning carriers,’ there is the potential for American and British flattops to work together to bring a more considerable number of F-35Bs to bear. The Queen Elizabeth class can potentially carry as many as 36 F-35Bs, although 24 Lightnings are described a “credible complement” for the Carrier Strike role. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps has said it wants to be able to deploy between 16-20 F-35Bs on each assault ship.

CSG21 came into these maneuvers as part of the Royal Navy’s own Exercise Strike Warrior in the North Atlantic, a separate effort involving 15 ships from four NATO countries. The two-week Exercise Strike Warrior, running from May 8-20, is bringing together more than 20 warships, three submarines, and 84 aircraft from 11 nations and is intended as a final test for CSG21 before it heads off on its first operational deployment to the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Asia-Pacific region.

By introducing Ragnar Viking to Exercise Strike Warrior, the aim was to prove that NATO forces can run both Carrier Strike Group and Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit activities simultaneously.
“HMS Queen Elizabeth and the USS Iwo Jima represent a substantial concentration of maritime-based airpower,” said Royal Navy Captain Angus Essenhigh, commanding officer of HMS Queen Elizabeth. “With the involvement of warships from four NATO members, including HMS Albion, our rendezvous in the North Atlantic demonstrates the collective strength of the alliance.”

Without a doubt, Ragnar Viking provided valuable training opportunities for the participants, especially for HMS Queen Elizabeth and its supporting CSG21 vessels, and their aircraft, which have not been to sea together in such significant numbers.
“The fact that the Royal Navy is able to deploy a Littoral Response Group and a Carrier Strike Group simultaneously is also significant,” Captain Essenhigh added. “Very few other navies can do this, and it underscores the United Kingdom's substantial and enduring commitment to the security of Europe and the North Atlantic.”
That last point is of particular relevance at a time in which Russian Navy activities in the North Atlantic are on the increase, especially in regard to long-duration, deeply submerged operations by its increasingly sophisticated submarine force.


According to the U.S. Navy, Ragnar Viking was intended to showcase “high-end NATO cohesion, solidarity, and credibility in the Norwegian, North, and Baltic Seas.” Specific elements of the drills included a demonstration of long-range strike capabilities from the North Atlantic into Lithuania, amphibious landings in Norway, plus anti-submarine warfare and surface action group operations in the North Atlantic.

All those scenarios would seem to be clearly predicated on potential Russian military activity in the wider region, with the Baltic States (including Lithuania) and Norway, which shares a long border with Russia, identified as critical flashpoints of any future possible confrontation between Moscow and NATO. As such, the North Atlantic is also a critical springboard into the Arctic region, the strategic importance of which continues to grow. It is notable, too, that the submarine USS New Mexico, before it joined Ragnar Viking, had made a rare and high-profile port visit to Tromsø in northern Norway, an event described as a signal of deepening U.S. security cooperation with Norway in the Arctic region.


Finally, while the focus of CSG21 has been on the Carrier Strike role, the British carriers are also intended to operate in amphibious warfare scenarios as well, and also with scalable air groups that can cover both those missions, if required. An amphibious assault capability is especially important in the Baltic and North Atlantic, where the Royal Navy would be expected to operate alongside NATO allies, including U.S. Navy assault ships, as in Ragnar Viking, should Russia make a move, for example, on one of the Baltic states or Norway. Increasingly, too, the Arctic is being viewed as a potential theatre for amphibious operations, a fact that both the United States and Russia have noted.

Although the Royal Navy is expecting new warships as part of a modernization drive, it is still clear that most large-scale operations would likely require significant support from NATO, and from the U.S. Navy, and Marine Corps F-35Bs, in particular. With that in mind, Ragnar Viking is likely a pointer to how the British carriers will be expected to operate in the future, whether in wartime or peacetime sceanrios.

There will surely be more photo opportunities once CSG21 begins in earnest later this month — including potential first combat missions over the Middle East. In the meantime, these images provide a dramatic demonstration of NATO cooperation in the alliance’s traditional backyard.
Posted for fair use

Please see source for more photos
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
F-15EX To Carry New Oversized Air-To-Air Missile
Thomas Newdick

10-12 minutes



The U.S. Air Force just dropped a big hint that it’s working on a new very long-range air-to-air missile, with the F-15EX Eagle II fighter jet earmarked as the most likely candidate to carry it. The development is the first we’ve heard about a new U.S. air-to-air missile (AAM) in this class since the emergence of the Long Range Engagement Weapon, or LREW, some years ago, followed by that weapon’s apparent disappearance — at least in the public domain.

Details about the new missile were disclosed by Air Force Magazine which recently obtained a series of Air Force talking points for the Fiscal Year 2022 budget. These also talk more generally about the Air Force’s plans to retire over 400 older fighters and replace them with around 300 new aircraft, including the secretive Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program and a ‘clean-sheet’ F-16 replacement, now called the Multi-Role fighter (MR-X).

message-editor%2F1621289123603-aim-120testlaunch.jpg

U.S. Air Force

An F-35A fires an AIM-120 AMRAAM during a live-fire test over the Gulf of Mexico. Once again, the Air Force is now talking about a longer-range missile.


Intriguingly, the talking points also make reference to an unnamed “outsize … air-to-air” weapon, which will be able to be carried by the F-15EX. The fighter is described in the same papers as “an outsized weapons truck.” To date, the largest air-to-air weapon associated with the F-15EX was the standard AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, or AMRAAM. While the Air Force has continued to try and wring out the maximum possible range from the AMRAAM, that weapon is now surely nearing the end of its development potential.

Previously, the ability of the F-15EX to carry outsized weapons was well known but it was always expected that these would be offensive air-to-ground weapons, including hypersonic missiles which are invariably larger than most regular air-launched missiles. In particular, the AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon, or ARRW, has been touted as a possible future armament option for the F-15EX.

message-editor%2F1621288997166-arrw.jpeg

U.S. Air Force

An inert AGM-183A ARRW test round loaded on a B-52H bomber. The F-15EX is also expected to carry this weapon.


Now, it seems, the F-15EX’s weapons carriage capability will likely see it hauling different types of standoff weapons to prosecute targets both on the ground and in the air. In both scenarios, the F-15EX would likely be operating in less-contested airspace, or just outside hostile anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) umbrellas.


Interestingly, while we know the Air Force, together with the Navy, is already working on a new AAM, which is intended to offer greater range than the current AIM-120 AMRAAM, the AIM-260 has long been assumed to be scaled to similar dimensions as the AMRAAM, especially as the F-22 Raptor is slated to be among the first aircraft to receive it. Having the AIM-260 broadly AMRAAM-sized would ensure it is suitable for internal carriage aboard the F-35 Lightning II, too, as well as any forthcoming stealth fighter designs. The AIM-260 is currently in development but details of its design and capabilities remain classified.

Aside from the AIM-260, there has been speculation in the past that the AGM-88G Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range, or AARGM-ER, a radar-killing air-to-ground weapon, would make a suitable candidate to turn into a long-range AAM. Once again, however, that weapon has been sized from the outset to fit inside the weapons bays of the F-35A and the carrier-based F-35C.

message-editor%2F1621288889310-aargm-er.jpeg

U.S. Navy

An F/A-18E with a captive-carry AGM-88G AARGM prototype under its left wing.


Furthermore, by explicitly referring to the “outsize” nature of this new weapon, the Air Force would seem to be pointing to a different weapon altogether, one that Air Force Magazine assesses as a planned counter to China’s PL-15 AAM.
The PL-15 also remains a mysterious weapon. We know that it is intended as the main armament of the J-20 stealth fighter and that it’s broadly analogous to the AIM-120D AMRAAM. However, there has been speculation in the past surrounding exactly how it achieves its presumed very long-range and whether it uses exotic throttleable ramjet propulsion. In fact, it now seems certain that the PL-15 uses a more conventional dual-pulse motor, but that its overall performance and its active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar still offer a serious challenge to the United States and its allies.

message-editor%2F1621289982809-pl-15.jpeg

Chinese Internet

Four dummy PL-15 missiles in the weapons bay of a J-20.


Meanwhile, China has at least been testing another very long-range AAM, photos of which showed it under the wing of a J-16 Flanker multirole fighter jet. This shadowy weapon is thought to be around 18 feet long, compared to 12 feet for the AMRAAM. In the past, The War Zone has speculated about how that weapon may in fact be tailored to destroy airborne early warning and control aircraft, and other high-value targets, at extended ranges.
These Chinese weapons have been under development for some time, as have several Russian counterparts, which pose another threat to the previous dominance of the AMRAAM family. Last year, we saw the first evidence of a test launch of the very long-range R-37M (AA-13 Axehead) from a Su-35S Flanker multirole fighter, while an extended-range version of the R-77 (AA-12 Adder), apparently with ramjet propulsion, also appeared to be under test aboard the Su-57 Felon stealth fighter.

message-editor%2F1621290036910-r-37m.jpeg

RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE SCREENCAP

A Russian Su-35S fires an R-37M missile.


These Chinese and Russian missiles have been known about for some time now — the R-37M was first tested from a MiG-31 Foxhound interceptor as long ago as 2011. This brings us back to the LREW program, which sought to provide the U.S. Air Force with a very long-range AAM to challenge designs like these and to reinstate a capability the Pentagon lost with the Navy’s retirement of the AIM-54 Phoenix in 2004.

message-editor%2F1621293940715-332272main_ed06-0217-37_full.jpg

NASA/Tom Tschida

An inert Phoenix missile under the fuselage of a NASA F-15B during its study as a possible test vehicle to obtain hypersonic data.


Back in late 2017 the National Defense Authorization Act, the Pentagon’s budget, for the following year made reference to the LREW program, which was classed as “emerging capabilities technology development.”
Back then, The War Zone described LREW as follows:



Concept art provided for LREW showed a two-stage missile design being launched from the weapons bay of an F-22. A two-stage weapon would be a logical solution to developing a very long-range AAM rapidly, but the fact that the missile was apparently scaled for internal carriage by the Raptor raises some questions.

message-editor%2F1621290080369-lrewf-22.jpeg

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE VIA FLIGHTGLOBAL.COM

U.S. Air Force concept art showing an F-22 launching a two-stage LREW missile.


While that concept may have involved some artistic license, the unnamed missile mentioned in the recent Air Force sounds very much as if it would be too large for internal carriage. It is possible, perhaps that LREW eventually yielded a missile that was too big for accommodation in the F-22’s main weapons bay. Taken together, however, it suggests that the new weapon is either separate from the LREW program, or the latter has since morphed into a different kind of weapon and one that is larger than when originally conceived.

Moreover, since LREW was first disclosed, the idea of using the F-15 (in particular) as a ‘weapons truck’ has gained much greater traction, including using the older fighter to launch long-range missiles from a position of relative safety well behind a flight of stealth fighters which could provide targeting for these weapons via datalink. With the missile being launched remotely by the F-15, and then fed targeting updates from low-observable assets via datalink, the value of having the weapon launched by the stealth fighter itself becomes more questionable.

message-editor%2F1621290186327-f-15ex-top.jpeg

VIKING AERO IMAGES

The first F-15EX for the U.S. Air Force.


There are perhaps other clues in the Air Force’s budget talking points as to how the new missile might be utilized. These make reference to “full-spectrum survivability, high speed, advanced weapons, and extended ranges” as well as a concept of operations in which the Air Force seeks to achieve “temporary windows of superiority” in “highly-contested threat environments.” One can quite easily imagine a very long-range AAM launched from distance and cued by various offboard, primarily stealthy platforms, as a way of punching holes in a dense A2/AD environment such as the kind that would be found during a campaign fought over Taiwan, for instance.

Aside from the F-15EX, there is also the possibility that the new missile could also be compatible with the dimensions of the weapons bays of the B-21 Raider stealth bomber. In 2019, Air Force Major General Scott Pleus, the then Director of Air and Cyber Operations for Pacific Air Forces, talked about the possibility of “A B-21 that also has air-to-air capabilities” and can “work with the family of systems to defend itself, utilizing stealth.”
Regardless, with the F-15EX now making rapid progress, we might not have to wait too long to find out more details about the Air Force’s next-generation very long-range AAM. Whatever that weapon turns out to be, it’s been a long time coming and, with Chinese and Russian missile developments continuing apace, it will likely be a much-needed addition to the service’s armory.

Posted for fair use

There were articles back when the F-15EX was first proposed that also proposed equipping them with a version of the PAC-3 to provide both a long range air to air capacity as well as a more flexible BMD capacity.
 

jward

passin' thru
Boko Haram Strongman, Shekau, Dead As ISWAP Fighters Capture Sambisa Forest | HumAngle
Murtala Abdullahi

6-8 minutes


Shekau

Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau is dead, HumAngle has been able to gather from multiple sources.

This incident took place on Wednesday evening following the invasion of the terror group’s stronghold in the Sambisa forest area by a column of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) fighters.
ISWAP, which had broken away from the Shekau-led Boko Haram faction in 2016 after pledging allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS), raided the group’s hideout using multiple gun trucks.

Shekau’s enclave was tracked down by ISWAP using its forces based in the Timbuktu Triangle. His fighters were killed in the process, followed by a long gunfire exchange between the invading group and Shekau’s bodyguards.
HumAngle gathered that after his bodyguards were subdued, Shekau surrendered and engaged in an hours-long meeting with the ISWAP fighters. During the parley, he was asked to voluntarily relinquish power and order his fighters in other areas to declare bai’a (allegiance) to ISWAP’s authority. They had expected Shekau to issue a statement.

Sources within the insurgency, however, said that Shekau who secretly had a suicide vest on eventually blew himself up alongside everyone present during the negotiations.
The identities of the people within ISWAP’s leadership who lost their lives to the explosion remain unclear at this time.
Shekau had been the leader of Boko Haram since 2009 following the death of the group’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf.

He had been rumoured to have been killed at least four times between July 2009 and Aug. 2015. In Aug. 2016, the Nigerian Air Force claimed he had been “fatally wounded” by military bombardments, but the terror group released a video only a month later showing he was alive and in good health.

Shifting dynamics
The Sambisa forest area had been a stronghold of the Shekau-led Boko Haram group, also known as the Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah Wa’l-Jihād (JAS).
Although confrontation and skirmishes between the two rival factions (JAS and ISWAP) are common, the situation recently spiked to new levels.

The clashes, according to the monitoring of the group’s communications, followed attempts to advise Boko Haram about overusing takfir (non-believer) designations or doing so incorrectly.
Seizing Sambisa forest from JAS also holds the promise of offering increased protection to ISWAP fighters from military airstrikes, which its strongholds in the Lake Chad area are prone to.
The recent development comes on the tail of persistent ISWAP attacks on military bases and garrisons as well as events within the group that included the arrival of visitors and reemergence of Abu Musab Al-Barnawi (Habib Yusuf) as an interim leader.

Abu Musab, a son of Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf, previously served as the group’s spokesperson. But he later joined a sub-group of fighters, including top lieutenant Mamman Nur, who broke away due to Shekau’s rigid methods and extreme position on takfir.
The breakaway faction, now known as ISWAP, moved into the Alagarno and Lake Chad Basin, dislodging or taking over Boko Haram assets in the areas and subsequently becoming the dominant terror group in the axis.

Clashes between both groups not uncommon
According to a study published by Brussels-based International Crisis Group, following their split five years ago, dozens of ISWAP fighters were killed in one such battle in July 2016, near Chukungudu, Nigeria, on the shores of Lake Chad. ISWAP survived, defeating several JAS subgroups and absorbing others.

The report added that, since then, fighting between the factions has reduced in intensity and the two groups reportedly reached a ceasefire agreement, which included a deal for JAS to free the families of ISWAP commanders that it had been holding since ISWAP broke away.
“Occasional clashes still occur, particularly when Shekau’s raiders seek to rob and kidnap civilians in ISWAP-controlled areas on the Nigerien and Nigerian shores of Lake Chad, as well as in the Konduga local government area in Nigeria, and ISWAP units try to fend them off,” Crisis Group stated.

In February, Al Thabat, an al-Qaeda affiliated media outfit, revealed that a fierce ISWAP-Boko Haram battle took place in a border area between Nigeria and the Niger Republic, where ISWAP lost some of its fighters.
HumAngle understands that the battle occurred after ISWAP abducted dozens of women linked to Boko Haram. The group subsequently attacked the ISWAP base and rescued the women.

While it was unusual that the clashes were reported by a third-party terror group with no “presence” in the region, HumAngle has learned that another segment that broke off from ISWAP had set up an al-Qaeda position in the Lake Chad region.
ISWAP’s advance into the traditional Boko Haram enclaves is likely to increase security risks on roads and threats to garrison towns like Maiduguri and Konduga.

“Incidentally, if it keeps Sambisa, Alagarno and the Lake under its control, ISWAP can weigh decisively on all major access roads to Maiduguri,” said Crisis Group senior analyst Vincent Foucher in a tweet.
The dislodgement of Boko Haram could further create problems for the civilian population and security forces in the receiving locations, considering ISWAP’s different approach and increased capacities for warfare.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed or transmitted in any form or by any means without proper attribution to HumAngle, generally including the author's name, a link to the publication and a line of acknowledgement.
Photo of Murtala Abdullahi
Abdullahi Murtala is a researcher and reporter. His expertise is in conflict reporting, climate and environmental justice, and charting the security trends in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. He founded the Goro Initiative and contributes to dialogues, publications and think-tanks that report on climate change and human security. He holds a Bachelors of Science in Environmental Education from the University of Abuja.
Photo of Kunle Adebajo
Kunle Adebajo
'Kunle is Investigations Editor and Head of Internal Factcheck at HumAngle. He tweets and monitors trends @KunleAdebajo.
Posted for fair Use
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

Russian Aggression in the Baltics Will Not Look Like Crimea
.
By Sarah White
May 21, 2021

In 2014, Russia invaded and annexed Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in the largest land seizure in Europe since World War II. Since then, experts have made various predictions of what Moscow’s next target for expansion might be.

And there is no shortage of potential next targets in the region. Since Crimea was annexed, Russia has occupied part of eastern Ukraine, engaging in skirmishes with domestic insurgents.

Over the last several months, there was a rapid buildup of Russian troops in the Donbas region of Ukraine, followed by a rapid withdrawal once the alarm raised by NATO and the criticism from the international community became more vocal. (However, about 80,000 Russian troops remain in those areas).

Likewise, Moscow seized on the institutional vacuum left in Belarus after 2020's wave of protest attempting to oust authoritarian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who quickly converted himself into a closer Putin ally than he was before the protests erupted. This “soft takeover” in Minsk has allowed Russia to move tanks and troops to Belarus’ border with Poland.

The Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—have been one of the most commonly identified future hot spots and a particularly disastrous area for conflict to break out. Once Russian satellites like most countries in the area, they are often seen as the next most likely targets for Russian aggression. Because of their NATO membership, unlike with Ukraine and Belarus, military action there would automatically draw in the rest of the alliance.

One of Moscow’s main justifications for annexing Crimea was on the basis of reuniting Russia with Crimea’s ethnic Russian majority. In 2014, that population was about 60 percent. Each of the Baltic states has a Russian-speaking minority population, but that number is 25 percent in Latvia and Estonia. These numbers, combined with the small size of each country and their shared Soviet history, have made the Baltics seemingly vulnerable to becoming the next Crimea. They are also at a geographic disadvantage due to their small sizes and close proximity to the heavily-armed Russian oblast of Kaliningrad.

However, their actual vulnerability compared to Crimea is more nuanced. Unlike the 60 percent Russian-speaking majority in Crimea, it is extremely unlikely that Russian speakers in the Baltics would be inclined to sympathize with Moscow, nor that their national governments would hold a referendum on whether to become part of Russia, like the local government in Crimea did.

As was the case in Belarus before this year, Russian influence in the civil societies of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia is limited. But unlike Belarus, the Baltics have had concrete institutional divisions from Russia for almost two decades; besides being NATO members, all three countries have been members of the European Union since 2004 and are committed liberal democracies. Likewise, Estonians closely identify with their Nordic neighbors, while Latvians and Lithuanians view themselves as Eastern European—but not Russian.

On the one hand, because of the strength of Baltic institutions, using hard power over covert political destabilization is likely Moscow’s path of least resistance there. There is already a heightened level of preparedness for a sudden invasion; as a measure of deterrence, security forces in Estonia and Latvia are already trained to attack Russian troops on sight. Those forces are supported by NATO’s Baltic Air Policing (BAP) mission, where fighters are deployed on a rotating basis by country at Estonia’s Amari Air Base and Lithuania’s Šiauliai Air Base.

On the other hand, it should not be assumed that Russia’s hard-power annexation of Crimea is the new playbook for its future expansion elsewhere. Russian aggression in the Baltics is likely to look different from Crimea because of the risk that comes with attacking NATO members. Russia would have to ensure that their attack is successful and that their forces are prepared to overwhelm the inevitable response from the rest of the alliance.
In any case, it is Moscow’s soft-power strategy that remains more unpredictable. If it fails to influence civil society in the Baltics or undermine its national governments, it is just as likely to deploy other covert methods that have not been observed before.

However, Russian aggression toward the Baltics plays out, if it plays out, the U.S. and NATO should not take the security measures in place there for granted. Potential vulnerability in the Baltics is a good enough reason to fortify NATO defenses, especially on the Polish border, and to increase the support given to deterrence measures by Baltic security forces.

So far, a military response from NATO has been off the table due to both sides’ nuclear arsenals. As a result, NATO has had few options in terms of a response apart from sanctions regimes. Despite how much economic damage might have been done to Russia, they never seem to be successful in deterring Moscow’s future explorations of how far it can expand its sphere of influence.

And while sanctions are the only option, they backfire. Russian President Vladimir Putin has used sanctions imposed by the West as a rhetorical device to bolster his own position and agenda for Russia at home. Sanctions are framed as evidence that the U.S. and Europe are trying to stifle Russia’s recovery from the fall of the Soviet Union, likewise characterized by Putin as a national humiliation from which the West benefitted enormously.

On the military front, sanctions have also not achieved the desired result. Indeed, despite a struggling economy, Russia’s military has only grown stronger and more sophisticated since 2014, as have its attempts to undermine the West and Western-style democracies.
Ultimately, Russia’s increasing military sophistication means that the U.S. and NATO should now be prepared to modernize proportionally to help defend the Baltic states and treat the potential for the eruption of conflict in the Baltics as a threat in the near term. Fortunately, NATO has modernized its defenses in Northern and Eastern Europe, with the F-35 fighter supplementing or replacing older fleets in several countries, including two of the Baltics’ Nordic neighbors, Norway and Denmark, along with Poland. In Poland, one of NATO’s “frontline” states due to its proximity to Russia, the F-35 is in especially urgent demand. The F-35 is especially important in deterring Russian aggression because not only does it collect more intelligence than other tactical aircraft, it is invisible to Russian radar.

Poland has also purchased Patriot missiles from the U.S., which it will be receiving within the next few years, and neighboring Romania has received them as well. Poland is currently in discussions to acquire the M1 Abrams tank, also produced by the United States; if successful, it would be the first European country to do so. The M1 Abrams would both replace Poland’s 500 Soviet-made tanks and eliminate its problem of not being able to join France and Germany’s Main Battle Tank coalition.

Though none of the three Baltic states has acquired the F-35, it was recently deployed there for the first time when four Italian F-35s arrived at Estonia’s Amari Air Base to take over the BAP mission from Germany in April. Despite the readiness of Baltic security forces, BAP is the closest thing that the three countries have to an air defense system, but it has been criticized as insufficiently able to respond to simulated Russian air attacks. Therefore, the development of a domestic air defense system in Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia, if not the outright sale of the F-35 to one of them, would be more reason to make Russia think twice before launching a conventional attack.


Sarah White is a Senior Research Analyst at Arlington’s Lexington Institute. The views expressed are the author’s own.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm....

Posted for fair use.....

Here is the nuclear triad we actually need for deterrence

BY ANDREW C. WEBER, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR — 05/20/21 10:30 AM EDT
126 Comments
THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL

Our nearly $2 trillion nuclear weapons plan to replace every weapon in our Cold War arsenal is bloated and on autopilot. The debate on nuclear modernization should not be reduced to a binary “for” or “against.” We need to modernize our nuclear arsenal but let’s be thoughtful about it and focus on the triad we actually need. Now is the time to make some hard decisions and prioritize our investments.

President Biden has rightly asserted that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons should be to deter their use against the United States and our allies. We can accomplish this with a smart nuclear weapons force posture that is both affordable and formidable, and shaped to prevent it from actually undermining deterrence or raising the risk of nuclear war.

As Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev well understood, smaller nuclear weapons with short flight times make nuclear war more likely. That is why they prioritized such systems for elimination through arms control agreements. Sadly, our current nuclear weapons plan — which emphasizes so-called low-yield, stealthy, “limited” nuclear war-fighting weapons delivered on ambiguous platforms such as cruise missiles — ignores that wisdom and needlessly risks returning us to the dark, dangerous days of the Cold War.

Russia has been modernizing its nuclear forces and is developing some worrisome exotic new systems. China is also improving its modest nuclear force. In today’s uncertain world, we should sustain each leg of our triad of nuclear weapons — submarine and land-based ballistic missiles, and bombers. This combination of three delivery systems provides the foundation of our national defense, at least until future arms control agreements can be negotiated. While serving for five and a half years as President Obama’s Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, we reversed decades of decay in our aging nuclear weapons stockpile and delivery systems, and retired and dismantled needless and destabilizing weapons such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile.

There is an opportunity today for a similar vision to focus resources where they best serve the security of America, its allies and global stability. President Biden should ensure a strong triad of nuclear weapons and a stable deterrent for decades to come, to strengthen our security while leading renewed arms control efforts to reduce the global risks from these weapons.

First, he should continue investing in the new Columbia Class strategic missile submarines, its Trident missiles, and the two refurbished warheads they carry. The submarine leg of our nuclear triad is the strongest and most survivable. Excessive plans for a third submarine missile warhead and a new tactical sea-launched nuclear cruise missile should be scrapped. They won’t improve our security and the new nuclear cruise missile would weaken our deterrent. We don’t want our potential adversaries to think they could use a small nuclear weapon against us and only risk getting a small one in return.

Second, he should sustain our very capable Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), along with the one safe and modern warhead they currently can deliver. The second, older, and less safe warhead should be phased out. The exorbitant plan for a brand new ICBM replacement force, called the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, should be taken off the drawing board. It is wasteful and we don’t need it to maintain an effective ground-leg of our triad over the next few decades.

Third, President Biden should move ahead with the new B-21 Raider stealth bomber and the effective, updated B-61-12 nuclear gravity bomb it will deliver, while eliminating plans to replace our old Air-Launched Cruise Missile with a new Long-Range Strike Option (LRSO). The LRSO is dangerous, destabilizing, and we can have a more effective air leg of the nuclear triad without it. No president wants to be told two hours after launching such a weapon that there is nothing that can be done to recall it, which would be the case with the LRSO if it is not halted.

Today, in accordance with the recently-extended New Start Treaty with Russia, we have 60 nuclear-capable heavy bombers. Once we have fielded our first 40 new B-21s to complement our 20 B-2 stealth bombers, we should retire the ancient and highly vulnerable B-52, or at least remove it from the nuclear mission. Likewise, we do not need our tactical F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to carry nuclear weapons. In about 10 years, a nuclear bomber leg of the triad made up solely of 60 highly capable B-21 Raiders, coupled with the B-61 nuclear gravity bomb, will provide us with a highly effective bomber leg of the triad. Simply, there is no need for yet three additional types of nuclear bombers and a new nuclear cruise missile, which is the Air Force’s current plan.

Most significantly, these changes to the triad remove dual-capable weapon systems — those that could be either conventional or nuclear. Such systems raise the potential for confusion and the destabilizing risks of miscalculation and escalation. Our deterrent will be stronger without them.

This sensible, effective and affordable plan for sustaining our triad of nuclear weapons will likely be attacked loudly from both ends of the pro- and anti-nuclear spectrum. Fortunately, President Biden has more nuclear weapons expertise than any American president since George H.W. Bush. Like the elder President Bush, rather than leave nuclear weapons policy and investment decisions to others, including numerous stakeholders who will fight any change to the status quo, Biden has the knowledge and leadership abilities to direct such decisions from the top. After all, these truly are the president’s weapons.

Andrew C. Weber is a senior fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks. He served from 2009-2014 as President Obama’s Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. Follow him on Twitter
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Well this looks like the opener of a "new phase" of things on the Border......

Posted for fair use.....

Border Patrol Helicopter Had Bizarre Encounter With Mysterious "Highly Modified" Drone (Updated)
The mystery drone flew up to 14,000 feet and was tracked for over an hour. Now the FBI is investigating.

BY BRETT TINGLEY MAY 21, 2021
The FBI has announced the start of an investigation into a strange near-miss incident that occurred on February 9, 2021 in the skies over Tucson. At around 10:30 p.m. on that date, a helicopter operated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, was reportedly buzzed by a “high powered” drone that followed it up to a high altitude. Multiple law enforcement agencies also attempted to follow the drone to the point that they could identify its operator, but were unsuccessful.

As of the time of writing, the exact kind of helicopter involved does not appear to have been identified. CBP operates a number of different helicopter types, with its Airbus AS350s, Airbus EC120s, and Sikorsky UH-60 Blackhawks being among the types that fly regularly in the southwestern United States, including along the border with Mexico.

message-editor%2F1621616951066-helocreditcbpdhs.jpg

CBP
A CBP Airbus AS350 A-Star

Dan Marries of KOLD News, a local CBS affiliate out of Tucson, Arizona, reported the story, as seen in the video in the tweet below. Marries said law enforcement personnel tracked the drone for over an hour at altitudes as high as 14,000 feet. Marries even refers to the drone as "heavily modified," though it's unclear exactly how or where that claim originated. If this drone was indeed flying as high as 14,000 feet, that would rule out much of the off-the-shelf drone technology available on the commercial market and place it into a more advanced category. We are pursuing more information about what exactly was meant by "heavily modified."

View: https://twitter.com/DanMarriesKOLD/status/1395501606448209920


According to The Associated Press, the drone appeared to have taken off from an unknown location five miles south of Tucson before flying north over the city. At some point in its flight, the craft came “dangerously close” to the CBP helicopter. The FBI is now asking for the public’s help for any information related to the incident. A FBI statement, reads in part:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is seeking to identify the person(s) responsible for illegally flying a drone near a U.S. Customs and Border Protection helicopter. On February 9, 2021, at 10:30 p.m., employees of CBP informed the Tucson Police Department that a drone was flying dangerously close to their helicopter. Over the next few hours, multiple law enforcement agencies worked to locate the drone’s operator but were unsuccessful. The drone appeared to launch from an area about 5 miles south of Tucson and flew across Tucson and north over Marana. No one was injured and no other similar incidents have been reported involving this specific drone.

In 2018, The Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act included 18 USC 39B, which federally criminalizes “Unsafe Operation of Unmanned Aircraft.” Specifically, knowing or reckless interference or disruption of a manned aircraft, and the operation of unmanned aircraft in close proximity to airports. While the drone(s) did not come into direct contact with an airplane or cause a pilot to make an evasive maneuver, the actions are illegal and extremely dangerous.

Anyone flying a drone as prohibited by law can face federal criminal charges, fines, and imprisonment. It is possible the drone operator(s) are not aware they are violating the law. We encourage anyone with information to assist in this investigation to contact the FBI at 623-466-1999. Tips can also be reported to tips.fbi.gov.

While the FBI is involved, it's not clear if the US military was involved in any way in the initial incident or in this ongoing investigation given that Davis-Monthan Air Force Base sits on the outskirts of Tucson, some five miles southeast of the city. The base is home to the 355th Fighter Group, which operates 83 A-10 Thunderbolt II close air support aircraft, as well as hosting rescue, mission support, maintenance, and medical groups. The massive AMARG boneyard also sits adjacent to the base. If the reports of the drone's launch site are accurate, that would mean the drone could have taken off close to the base. Tucson International Airport also lies to the south of the city, however. Regardless, this is highly controlled airspace where an unmanned aircraft of this nature should not be freely operating.

message-editor%2F1621611001342-tucsonmapcreditgooglemaps.jpg

GOOGLE MAPS
Davis-Monthan AFB (red marker) occupies a large swath of land southeast of Tucson.
The incident in Tucson is only the latest in a string of events in the region in which unknown drones or otherwise unidentified aircraft have eluded law enforcement. In 2018, a Learjet reported an unidentified craft flying at 40,000 feet above Southern Arizona, an incident The War Zone was the first to report on. An eerily similar incident happened recently over New Mexico. In 2019, drone incursions occurred over Arizona's Palo Verde nuclear power plant, prompting an investigation from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Just south of Arizona, Mexican law enforcement agencies have been struggling to mitigate the threat posed by drug cartels who are increasingly turning to commercial drones to deliver improvised explosives and assassinate their enemies.

message-editor%2F1621611052401-tucsondronescreditdhsoig.jpg

DHS OIG
More broadly speaking, in late 2019 and early 2020, Colorado and Nebraska were the sites of numerous drone sightings which remain unexplained to this day. Military installations have also seen their share of drone incursions in recent years. The THAAD anti-ballistic missile batteries in Guam as well as multiple U.S. Navy vessels have had numerous encounters with what have been reported as unidentified drones. The proliferation of commercially-available drones is presenting a significant issue for the Armed Forces, as air crews are now reporting airborne encounters with drones at an alarming rate.

In an attempt to mitigate the drone threat, the federal government penned an Executive Order earlier this year aimed at limiting the use of foreign-made drones and restricting the use of unmanned vehicles near sensitive sites. A month prior, the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, or CISA, released new guidelines on how critical infrastructure installations can prepare for and defend against drones.

Still, in a June 2020 report, the Office of Inspector General for the Department of Homeland Security, the parent agency of CBP, concluded that "DHS’ capability to counter illicit UAS activity remains limited" and that drones "present an emerging threat to the Nation as their popularity grows." The report specifically mentions "harassment" as a threat category, such as buzzing a government helicopter.

message-editor%2F1621615378829-clipboard.png

DHS
As we have reported over the several years, the threat posed by small, seemingly innocuous commercial drones and their slightly more advanced militarized siblings is rising. America's most robust air defenses weren't designed with small, low-powered, unmanned aerial systems in mind, and in many ways the United States government is playing catch-up to the rapid proliferation and evolution of lower-end drone technology. Our adversaries are well aware of this shortfall, and in some cases are developing low-end swarming drone systems designed to exploit this vulnerability, as well as other potential concepts of operation.

The War Zone is pursuing Freedom of Information Act requests in relation to this incident. We have reached out to the FBI field office in Phoenix but have yet to receive comment. We will update our reporting as the story develops.

UPDATE, 5:06 PM CST:

After publication, Dan Marries of KOLD in Tuscon provided additional information. Marries said the drone was "Modified enough to reach an altitude of 14,000, speeds in excess of 100 mph with a headwind, and range of 70 miles."

Marries also passed along his segment about the drone encounter that aired on Tucson’s KOLD News. In the segment, Marries interviews FBI special agent Nowak (no first name given), who said the drone made “erratic maneuvers” and even strayed into military airspace. According to Nowak, the helicopter had to take evasive action to avoid the drone. A police report filed after the incident stated the drone had a single green light on its underbelly, and the FBI special agent interviewed said the drone was estimated to be between four and six feet in diameter. The FBI is unsure if it was a four- or six-rotor configuration, but the agent interviewed stated the drone had to be “heavily modified” based on its speed, altitude, and endurance.

Contact the author: Brett@TheDrive.com
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

The Interview


Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo: 'Jihadism is an immediate threat for Western Africa'
Issued on: 21/05/2021 - 22:48
 President of Ghana Nana Akufo-Addo speaking to FRANCE 24.

President of Ghana Nana Akufo-Addo speaking to FRANCE 24. © FRANCE 24
By:Marc PerelmanFollow|Christophe BOISBOUVIER
14 min
The President of Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo, granted FRANCE 24 and RFI an interview against the backdrop of the Paris summit on the financing of African economies. He said that he sees the jihadist terrorism that's striking the neighbouring Sahel region as "the most important security challenge" for Ghana and the other 14 ECOWAS countries. He also called the Covid-19 vaccine coverage a "scandal", as less than 2 percent of vaccines administered worldwide have been in Africa.

The president of Ghana called on Western countries to make their vaccine surpluses available to African countries to remedy this "apartheid vaccine", with Ghana having no other option at the moment. Akufo-Addo said that he feels Ghanaians have faith in the vaccine.
He believed that the West African coastal countries are clearly "a target" of jihadist groups based in the Sahel. Despite Ghana not yet being targeted by an attack, the president believed the terrorist threat is the most serious issue facing the 15 ECOWAS countries.
Talking about Chad, Akufo-Addo admitted that the country's stability is a priority. However, he denied any indulgence of the African Union towards the military regime put in place after the death of President Idriss Déby, stressing that, as in the case of Mali, the transition can only be temporary and must lead to a return of democracy.

Click on the player above to watch the full interview.
 
Top