WAR 04-07-2018-to-04-13-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...-bolster-defenses-against-china-idUSKCN1HE069

World News April 6, 2018 / 11:50 PM / Updated 30 minutes ago

Japan activates first marines since WW2 to bolster defenses against China

Nobuhiro Kubo, Tim Kelly
4 Min Read

SASEBO/TOKYO, Japan (Reuters) - Japan on Saturday activated its first marine unit since World War Two trained to counter invaders occupying Japanese islands along the edge of the East China Sea that Tokyo fears are vulnerable to attack by China.

In a ceremony held at a military base near Sasebo on the southwest island of Kyushu, about 1,500 members of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB) wearing camouflage lined up outside amid cold, windy weather.

“Given the increasingly difficult defense and security situation surrounding Japan, defense of our islands has become a critical mandate,” Tomohiro Yamamoto, vice defense minister, said in a speech.

The troops conducted a 20-minute mock public exercise recapturing a remote island from invaders.

The formation of the Japanese marine brigade is controversial because amphibious units can project military force and could, critics warn, be used to threaten Japan’s neighbors. In its post World War Two constitution Japan renounced the right to wage war.

The brigade is the latest component of a growing marine force that includes helicopter carriers, amphibious ships, Osprey tilt-rotor troop carriers and amphibious assault vehicles, meant to deter China as it pushes for easier access to the Western Pacific.

China, which dominates the South China Sea, is outpacing Japan in defense spending. In 2018, Beijing which claims a group of uninhabited islets in the East China Sea controlled by Tokyo, will spend 1.11 trillion yuan ($176.56 billion) on its armed forces, more than three times as much as Japan.

The activation of the 2,100 strong ARDB takes Japan a step closer to creating a force similar to a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) able to plan and execute operations at sea far from its home base.

“They’ve already demonstrated the ability to put together an ad hoc MEU. But to have a solid, standing MEU capability requires concerted effort,” Grant Newsham, a research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies.

“If Japan put its mind to it, within a year or year and a half it could have a reasonable capability.”

Newsham, who helped train Japan’s first amphibious troops as a U.S. Marine Corps colonel liaison officer assigned to the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF), said Japan still needs a joint navy-army amphibious headquarters to coordinate operations as well as more amphibious ships to carry troops and equipment.

Japanese military planners are already mulling some of those additions. Its Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) wants to acquire F-35Bs to operate from its Izumo and Ise helicopter carriers, or from islands along the East China Sea, sources have told Reuters.

The United States last month deployed its F-35Bs for their first at-sea operations aboard the USS Wasp amphibious assault ship, which is based in Sasebo. The Kyushu port is also home to Japan’s Ise and close to the ARDB’s base.

Separately the GSDF may acquire small amphibious ships up to a 100 meters (328.08 ft) long to transport troops and equipment between islands and from ship to shore, two sources familiar with the discussion said. Japanese ground forces have not operated their own ships since World War Two.

“The idea is to bring forces and gear on large ships to the main Okinawa island and then disperse them to other islands on smaller vessels,” said one of the sources, who asked not to be identified because they are not authorized to talk to the media.

Reporting by Tim Kelly; Editing by Michael Perry
 

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https://www.military.com/daily-news...ldiers-first-breaching-exercise-its-kind.html

Robots Replace Soldiers in First Breaching Exercise of its Kind

Stars and Stripes 8 Apr 2018 By Martin Egnash

GRAFENWOEHR, Germany -- Humans took a backseat during a base exercise on Friday, in which robots cleared obstacles for manned tanks and fighting vehicles.

U.S. and British troops participated in the Robotic Complex Breach Concept demonstration, during which several remote-controlled vehicles performed a task usually carried out by soldiers.

"We did a robotic breach today, which has never been done before. This is a historic moment," said 1st Lt. Cody Rothschild, an officer with the 1st Infantry Division's 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, currently on rotation in Europe. "This is a great step forward for the Army, and for robotics."

The rotational armor brigade was the main armor element during the exercise. It provided suppressing fire with M1A2 Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, while remote-controlled U.K. Terrier engineering vehicles cleared a simulated minefield and bridged a tank trench.

Breaching enemy obstacles is one of the most dangerous tasks on a battlefield, said British Warrant Officer Robert Kemp.

"Any breach like this will have enemy weapons trained in on the area," Kemp said. "Roboticizing breach operations takes away the risk of life and makes clearing enemy obstacles much safer."

This is great news for the engineers who would otherwise be on the front lines of an assault.

"It keeps us safe from being out there like sitting ducks," said Pvt. Jonathon Ramirez, an engineer with 2ABCT.

"As an engineer, this means a lot to me," said 1st Lt. Felix Derosin, a platoon leader with the 2ABCT. "The casualty rate for a breach is expected to be 50 percent. Being able to take our guys away from that, and have some robots go in there, is a very positive thing for us. In the future, this can save engineers' lives."

The Terriers were controlled by British soldiers several hundred feet away, inside U.S. Bradley Fighting Vehicles.

Besides the Terriers, the troops used other roboticized systems, such as an unmanned M113 armored personnel carrier, to deliver walls of thick, white smoke to help cloak the breaching operation.

The drill also employed several models of drones, including the Puma Unmanned Aerial System to gather intelligence and the Instant Eye UAS to search for possible chemical weapons.

Although troops have been using unmanned vehicles -- especially drones -- for decades, the use of the robotic systems at the demonstration was new to most of the troops involved.

"When I first came in, I didn't expect to be seeing robots doing (combat operations) like this. Being able to see it, eyes on, shows me what the future is going to be like, and it's pretty good," Derosin said.
 

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/exchanges-gunfire-near-presidents-residence-c-africa-075354368.html

Exchanges of gunfire near president's residence in C.Africa

AFP • April 9, 2018

Bangui (Central African Republic) (AFP) - UN troops and an armed group exchanged gunfire during the night near the president's residence in the Central African Republic, a security source said Monday.

The incident in the capital Bangui came hours after United Nations and Central African forces launched an operation targeting armed groups in a mainly Muslim district of the city. At least two people were killed and dozens wounded during the joint operation, according to UN and medical sources.

The security source said the exchanges late on Sunday took place after an armed group arrived "by the Ndeke Luka radio station by the road that leads to the residence" of President Faustin-Archange Touadera.

"The group was repulsed by UN peacekeepers from Egypt," the source said.

A spokesman for the UN peacekeeping force (Minusca), Herve Verhoosel, said 11 peacekeepers, mostly Egyptian, were among the injured in Sunday's joint operation.

The operation, which had targeted, the "bases of certain criminal groups", would continue "until the goal is achieved", Verhoosel told AFP.

Eight people belonging to the armed groups Force and 50/50 had been detained by Minusca and ammunition had been seized, he added.

The operation follows a resurgence in violence in the flashpoint PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui.

The Central African Republic has been struggling to return to stability since the country exploded into bloodshed after the 2013 overthrow of longtime leader Francois Bozize by the mainly Muslim Seleka rebel alliance.

France intervened militarily to push out the Seleka alliance but the country remains plagued with violence pitting groups competing for control of resources and areas of influence.
 

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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...ld-regret-dropping-nuclear-deal-idUSKBN1HG0U7

World News April 9, 2018 / 12:27 AM / Updated an hour ago

Iran tells Trump he would regret dropping nuclear deal

Reuters Staff
3 Min Read

LONDON (Reuters) - Donald Trump will regret it if he pulls out of the nuclear deal with Iran, President Hassan Rouhani said on Monday, warning the U.S. president that Tehran’s response would be stronger than he thinks.

U.S. sanctions that were lifted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 2015 will resume unless Trump waives them again on May 12. Trump has effectively set that as a deadline for European powers to “fix the terrible flaws” of the deal.

“The new U.S. president - who has big claims and many ups and downs in his words and actions - has been trying for 15 months to break the JCPOA ... but the structure of the JCPOA is so strong that it has not been shaken by such quakes,” Rouhani said in a speech broadcast live on state television.

“Iran will not violate the nuclear deal, but if the United States withdraws from the deal, they will surely regret it. Our response will be stronger than what they imagine and they would see that within a week.”

Iran has warned that it would ramp up its nuclear program if the JCPOA collapses, to achieve a more advanced level than before the deal.

Rouhani was speaking as Tehran marked National Nuclear Technology Day and unveiled what it said were its latest nuclear achievements including a nuclear battery and centrifuges for the oil industry.

Rouhani said Iran has been preparing for every possible scenario, including a JCPOA without the United States - which would still include European signatories, China and Russia - or no deal at all.

France, Britain and Germany are seeking to persuade their EU partners to back new sanctions on Iran, as a way to persuade Trump to stick with the nuclear deal curbed on Iran’s nuclear activities in return for sanctions relief.

Those sanctions would not involve measures that were lifted under the nuclear deal but would target individual Iranians that the EU believes are behind Iran’s ballistic weapons program and its support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Rouhani said on Monday that Iran’s missile capabilities were purely defensive.

“We will produce any weapons necessary to defend our country in such a volatile region. But we will not use our weapons against our neighbors,” Rouhani said.

Iran’s currency hit a new low on Monday on continued concerns over a return of crippling sanctions if Trump carries out his threat.

The U.S. dollar jumped in a day from 54,700 rials to 58,000 rials in the open market in Tehran, local media reported. A dollar was 36,000 rials in mid-September.

Reporting by Bozorgmehr Sharafedin; Editing by Robin Pomeroy
 

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http://www.dw.com/en/the-strengths-and-weaknesses-of-russias-military/a-43293017

EUROPE

The strengths and weaknesses of Russia's military

Russian armed forces provide Moscow with clear military superiority in the post-Soviet region, despite Russia's troops not being able to match the whole of NATO. The Kremlin is busy modernizing its army, experts told DW.

Date 07.04.2018
Author Darko Janjevic

The US, Russia, and China are considered the world's strongest nations when it comes to military power, with the US the undisputed number one. Even so, Russia's still has plenty of arrows in its quiver, most notably the massive nuclear arsenal of some 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads.

Read more: NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg urges calm as Moscow rattles Baltic saber

Leaving the nuclear weapons aside, however, the US has an overwhelming advantage in conventional forces, including a much stronger navy and air force, Russian military analyst Aleksandr Golts told DW.

China, according to Golts, would also have the advantage of numbers in any conventional showdown with Russia. In other areas, however, things are not as clear-cut.

"Russia's air force is much stronger than the Chinese for now," he told DW. "It questionable about the navy, as the Chinese are now undertaking a very ambitious program of ship building and they are much more successful in building a [global] blue Navy fleet than Russia."

Still, while Russia's battleships are old, they are often equipped with very modern cruise missiles, according to Golts.

However, the military expert warns that ranking countries by military power is "more or less useless" as armed forces' effectiveness depends on the goals set by the nation's leaders.

Read more: EU outlines plans for 'military Schengen zone'

'We don't always know where the target is'

This point of view is echoed by Russian journalist and military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer, who warns that real-life conflicts depend on many different variables, including the geography and the people involved.

"It's like predicting a result of a soccer match: Yes, basically, Brazil should beat America in soccer, but I have seen Americans beat Brazil in South Africa, at the Confederations Cup," he told DW. "You never know the result until the game is played."

Felgenhauer notes that Russia is lacking in many areas of modern military technology, including drone design and production, electronic components, as well as radar and satellite reconnaissance. For example, Russia is currently producing surveillance drones under an Israeli license, and it is completely lacking in assault drone capability.

Russia is also working on modernizing its command and control centers, which serve to process information from the battlefield and feed it to the troops.

"That's what the Russian military is talking about: Yes, we have weapons, including long-range weapons, but our reconaissance capabilities are weaker than our attack capabilities," Felgenhauer said. "So we have-long range, sometimes precision guided weapons, but we don't always know where the target is."

No more German and French satellites

These problems were exacerbated by the 2014 Crimean crisis, according to the analyst. In the years leading up to the showdown with the West, Moscow was spending at least $500 Million per year in the US shopping for the so-called double-use merchandize, which can be used for both military and civilian purposes.

"It was electronic components for Russian weapons and satellites, different kinds of special glass and steel," Felgenhauer says.

Similarly, "France and Germany were making double-use satellites, which were basically military satellites, recon satellites, for Russia. And all that kind of stopped."

Good old Soviet weapons

Faced with the West's embargo, Russia is also working to develop its own drones and close the technological gap in other areas. However, the breakdown of the Soviet Union left Moscow not only weaker in terms of territory and the number of troops, but also when it comes to military suppliers, according to the experts.

"The Soviet Union had an idiotic, but at least very logical economy," Aleksandr Golts says. "It had nothing to do with market economy, but the main goal for any enterprise on Soviet territory, whether it was designated as military or civilian, was to be ready to produce military goods and equipment in case of war. After the fall of the Soviet Union, these systems disappeared."

On the other hand, the legacy of the Soviet Union is still very much present in the modern Russian army, as many of its cutting edge systems "are the development of good, old Soviet systems and the modernization of that type of technology," says Golts.

One such weapon is the decades-old Su-25 attack plane, designed to support ground troops. Russia recently announced that the latest version of the aircraft has entered production.

"It is very well known to all the people who participated in the (1980's) Afghan war, such as myself," he told DW. "But, its designers insist it only looks like the old Su-25, that all the avionics are absolutely modern […] and it has shown how good it was during the Syrian war."

20,000 tanks ?

In addition to the nuclear arsenal, there is one area in which Russia is clearly number one. Recently, the Kremlin announced that Russia had more tanks than any other nation in the world, notes Felgenhauer.

"Unofficially, I have seen figures of up to 20,000, which would mean that Russia has more tanks than all the NATO countries put together."

Most of the European powers reduced their tank capabilities after the end of the Cold War, focusing instead on conflicts with terrorist and guerilla groups. This, according to Felgenhauer, puts them at a massive disadvantage in the event of a ground war in Europe.

Read more: German military short on tanks for NATO mission

"Germany has only 300 tanks left right now," he says. "Britain has, I think, 250, and France also something close to that."

In the event of all-European war, Russia also holds a logistical advantage over the West, according to Felgenhauer. Where NATO would need months to mobilize it full strength, Russia would be able to bring in reinforcements on a much tighter schedule.

DW RECOMMENDS

NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg urges calm as Moscow rattles Baltic saber
NATO's chief Jens Stoltenberg has called for a dialogue after member state Latvia closed down part of its airspace due to Russian military tests in the Baltic Sea. Cold War echoes are distant, but getting louder. (05.04.2018)

German military short on tanks for NATO mission
The German military is under-equipped to take on its upcoming role as leader of NATO's anti-Russian defense force, a leaked document shows. Opposition politicians say the defense minister is to blame. (16.02.2018)

EU outlines plans for 'military Schengen zone'
The EU wants to streamline military movements across the bloc and make infrastructure more suitable for military use. The plan has been dubbed a "military Schengen," a reference to Europe's passport-free travel zone. (28.03.2018)

The Soviet Union is dead, but its weapons live on
Cold War armaments still serve as staples of armies across the world, with Eastern bloc designs outlasting the system they were created to protect. DW looks at some of the best-known Soviet-made weapons. (09.09.2017)

Date 07.04.2018
Author Darko Janjevic
 

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https://www.rferl.org/a/western-afghanistan-bomb-attack-six-killed/29154935.html

AFGHANISTAN

Bomb Attack Kills At Least Six In Western Afghanistan

April 09, 2018 17:18 GMT

Reports from Afghanistan say at least six civilians have been killed by a bomb attack near a mosque and a bazaar in western Herat Province.

Jilani Farhad, a spokesman for Herat’s provincial governor, said the dead included four children – two girls and two boys.

Farhad said nine other children were injured by the attack in the town of Shindand at the northern end of the Zerkoh Valley.

He said explosives were placed in an unattended motorbike and detonated by remote control.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility.

The town of Shindand is about 11 kilometers southwest of Shindand air base, a strategic facility used by Afghanistan’s air force and troops from NATO’s training and assistance mission in Afghanistan, Resolute Support.

The town is about 110 kilometers from the border with Iran.

Based on reporting by Reuters and dpa
 

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http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-43707435

Colombian FARC leader arrested on drug trafficking charge

2 hours ago

One of the top leaders of Colombia's former rebel group, the Farc, has been arrested in Bogota following a request from the United States.

Jesus Santrich, a former peace negotiator and a future congressman, is accused of drug trafficking by a court in New York.

Another senior Farc member, Ivan Marquez, said it was one of the worst moments for the peace process.

The Farc rebels signed a peace deal with Colombia's government in 2016.

After the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia disarmed last year, the group announced the formation of a political party.

It kept the acronym Farc but changed what the letters stand for to the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force.

As part of the deal, the Farc were given 10 seats in Congress until 2026, regardless of how many votes they receive in elections.

Mr Santrich, whose real name is Seuxis Hernández Solarte, is to take up his seat in Congress in July.

Correspondents say his alleged offences must have happened after the peace deal was signed in 2016, as under the peace treaty previous drug crimes are no longer punishable by law.
 

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Hummm.....I was wondering if and when this would happen...

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/saudi-de...orism-focused-courts-newspaper-111804500.html

Saudi detainees may face terrorism-focused courts: newspaper

AFP • April 8, 2018

Riyadh (AFP) - Dozens of Saudi detainees caught up in a government anti-graft crackdown could be referred to courts specialised in cases of national security and terrorism, Asharq al-Awsat newspaper reported Sunday.

They include individuals who refused to agree to confidential settlements with the government, and others believed to be guilty of "a greater offence", the pan-Arab daily quoted Saudi Arabia's deputy attorney-general Saud al-Hamad as saying.

"Each of these cases will be dealt with separately. Some will be examined by departments specialised in money laundering, while others will be referred to courts specialised in issues of national security and terrorism," Hamad said.

In November, 381 Saudi royals, ministers and tycoons were detained in an anti-corruption crackdown led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Attorney General Sheikh Saud al-Mojeb said in January that the majority had been released after agreeing to financial settlements totalling over 400 billion riyals ($107 bn) in various forms of assets and cash.

To date, 56 people are known to remain in custody, their whereabouts unknown since the initial holding place -- the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton -- was re-opened on February 11.

Saudi Arabia's prosecutor general has launched fresh investigations and judicial proceedings against those detainees, Asharq al-Awsat said, quoting the deputy attorney-general.

"Depending on the result, the investigation will be referred to the relevant court," Hamad said.

Saudi King Salman in March ordered the creation of specialised anti-corruption units to investigate and prosecute graft cases.

Officials have not made public the charges against suspects detained at the Ritz-Carlton.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the 32-year-old son of the king, is behind the unprecedented crackdown on corruption, as he consolidates his grip on power.

Some critics have labelled Prince Mohammed's campaign a shakedown and power grab, but authorities insist the purge targeted endemic corruption as the country prepares for a post-oil era.

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https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/forecasting-the-future-of-warfare/

FORECASTING THE FUTURE OF WARFARE

ROBERT H. SCALES APRIL 9, 2018
COMMENTARY

“No one in this room can accurately predict the future, least of all me. The nature of war is never gonna change. But the character of war is changing before our eyes — with the introduction of a lot of technology, a lot of societal changes with urbanization and a wide variety of other factors.”

-Gen. Mark Miller at the Association of the U.S. Army Convention, 2017

The Army’s decision to create a “Futures Command” is long overdue, well-intended, and absolutely necessary if the Army is to emerge from the malaise that has held modernization in its vice for all of this new century. But accelerating the pace of modernization without a rigorous understanding of how militaries anticipate the future of war might run the risk of creating an accelerating engine with greater thrust, but no vectors.

I’ve spent almost three decades studying the art and science of future gazing. The high point of my immersion as a futurist began in 1991 when then Army Chief of Staff Gen. Gordon Sullivan, entrusted me with writing the Army’s official history of the Gulf War, Certain Victory. Three years later, in 1995 another chief of staff, Gen. Dennis Reimer, gave me the mission of looking into the deep future of warfare, beyond 2020 to 2025. As head of the Army After Next project, I had access to an enormously talented group of young officers, many of whom are still doing great work today. With the assistance of my deputy, Col. Bob Killebrew, we invented the Army’s first strategic game, which continues today in heavily modified form as Unified Quest.

Army After Next was a magical time. To quote Killebrew:

We never stopped slam-bang arguments over the direction of land warfare that rattled the windows at Fort Monroe. We were secure enough to tolerate and encourage a kind of no-holds-barred intellectual combat that raged inside TRADOC’s doctrine directorate from 1995-97, when rank bowed to ideas and bureaucracy to improvisation, risky experimentation and, very occasionally, success.

As the Army seeks to resume its effort to look into the future it would also be useful to look back 25 years to examine how the Army’s first effort at a disciplined approach to divining the future was created. The target year of the Army After Next study was 2025. That end point is quickly approaching. Perhaps a critical look back might allow today’s futurists to grade our work. If they judge that we got it close to right, then perhaps they will have confidence that borrowing our ideas might help guide them along signposts pointing to war in 2045 and beyond.

Michael Howard, the imminent scholar and military strategist, once observed that the purpose of future gazing in war is not to get it right, but to avoid getting it terribly wrong. He expressed a truism that practical soldiers leaned through experience: war is the most complex and unpredictable of all human enterprises. Unlike law, business, or science, soldiers (thankfully) practice their craft infrequently. Soldiers are reluctant to hypothesize about the future because war is a high stakes game. Getting it wrong costs lives and catastrophic failure threatens survival of the state.

Today, as Gen. Milley suggested above, the art of predicting the course of war is made far more difficult by a quickening of the rate of change among those variables most likely to influence conflict such as technology, domestic politics, and international events. While the pace of influencing events is accelerating the capacity of militaries to build weapons and structures to accommodate change is slowing. Thus soldiers today must cast farther and farther out to stay ahead. The farther out the time horizon, the more indistinct the view becomes, and the more likely soldiers are to get it terribly wrong.

Two decades on I still live with the guilt of having failed to turn Army After Next into a viable operational concept. In the end, success is not measured by the elegance of ideas but by how the Army weaponizes and structures itself to implement the ideas. As my good friend and co-author Wick Murray wrote in his iconic book Innovation in the Interwar Period:

Messiahs are not enough; they need disciples. One way to further the idea of innovations is to institutionalize it in a service’s school systems. This ploy, exploited in every nation, proved inadequate. Another battleground for the hearts and minds of the officer corps has been the writing of doctrinal manuals. Again, the reformers met with considerable success, but these victories of words on paper did not suffice. In the end, the only sign of victory for reformers were real operational units that could perform wartime missions.

In the end, my Army After Next team failed to translate our victory of words on paper into real operational units. But I think wisdom can be found in a failure that should act as a cautionary tale — one that demonstrates how tomorrow’s future gazers can get it right.

Army After Next and Army XXI: A Brief History of Failures

By 1997, our Army After Next team believed they had accumulated enough evidence to begin a visioning process in earnest. Subsequent events would reveal we suffered from one very serious miscalculation that would hamper all the Army’s attempts to get the future right for decades to come. It all came down to timing, what I term “early lock versus late lock.”

Let me explain.

The object of future gazing is not only to predict what organizations, doctrine, and technologies are the right ones, but also to estimate when these three primal warfighting variables will be mature enough to be applied to create combat units. “Lock in” occurs when an Army translates visions, concepts, and ideas into real things, to “operationalize” them to use the common term. Lock too soon and the three variables may not be developed sufficiently to fit into operational units. Lock too late and run the risk of making yesterday perfect.

Sadly, in the 1990s the Army made both mistakes at once and it is still suffering the consequences. I believe (as you will read in a minute) we had our Army After Next concepts right. But we locked too soon. We simply misjudged the rate at which essential technologies would mature. We then made the fatal mistake of trying to apply them too soon: early lock. In a word, the organizational and materiel manifestations of Army After Next — what would eventually become the Future Combat Systems in 2003 were not ready at the time we attempted to turn ideas and concepts into operational units.

In our study, we concluded that strategic speed necessary to arrive quickly could only be achieved by unburdening the operational force. That meant lighter fighting vehicles, a thin if not missing logistical umbilical cord, and the substitution of aerial systems to replace ground systems. In particular, we foresaw that fires, information, and sensors would gravitate into the third dimension. But we locked too early. The technologies essential for the success of Future Combat Systems weren’t ready for prime time in 2000. Sadly, 12 years later most would mature but by then the operationalized spawn of Army After Next — Future Combat Systems — was dead and $18 billion dollars went down the drain.

The Army leadership wisely chose another time horizon closer in for its near-term future gazing experiment, Army XXI. Army XXI was a classic example of late lock. The materiel manifestation was more corrosive than Army After Next because its experimental manifestation, the Army Warfighting Experiments. These were expensive and yielded few insights into where war was actually headed. They failed because their near-term focus only served to revalidate the Army’s bias toward sustaining the heavy force of Desert Storm.

In a strange twist of irony, the Army’s intermediate effort, the Objective Force, turned out to be a comparative success. The Objective Force emerged in 1999 after the Army was embarrassed by its inability to move Task Force Eagle from Germany to Albania. Task Force Eagle consisted of a battalion of AH 64 attack helicopters with its attached security and logistics. The unit was to be stationed at an abandoned Soviet airbase at Tusla, Albania. This strategic repositioning should have taken a week or less. It took over two months.

This public failure of strategic mobility only reinforced the opinion among the Washington elites that the U.S. Army had become a giant beached whale incapable of maneuvering over long distances. This opinion buttressed the air service’s contention that future wars could be won in the air long before the Army could arrive ready to fight. In light of these opinions, the Clinton Administration was contemplating reducing the Army’s conventional force from ten to eight divisions.

Gen. Erick Shinseki, Army chief of staff at the time, decided that the Objective Force would be a gap filler between Army After Next and Army XXI. The concept was simple: Graft an existing eight wheeled fighting vehicle, the Stryker, into a light infantry brigade formation. During the early days of the Iraq War these Stryker brigades proved invaluable as “middle weight” forces sufficiently protected and armed yet capable of moving over great distances. Stryker was, almost accidentally, a perfect “right lock” solution for a warfighting contingency no one predicted in 1999. It remains, arguably, the only materiel success since the “Big Five” (the Abrams, Bradley, Apache, Blackhawk, and Patriot) of the 1970s.

It’s been a decade since the demise of Future Combat Systems. Over the years I’ve tried time and again to reconcile how a legitimate process of future gazing led to such serious and expensive operational failure. One answer is that it did not fail. Perhaps it was only suspended momentarily. In light of current events one could argue that 9/11 caused the course of conventional war to hit the pause button and that it’s now time to hit “resume play.” Spend some time reading our insights from 1999 and make your own judgments.

Army After Next: How it Worked

From the start, the Army After Next team concluded that without some rigor and discipline, the future gazing process would be limited to speculative ruminations of the senior officer present. We began our inquiry by developing a structured methodology to add rigor. Then we created a hypothesis (or a series of hypotheses) that offered the greatest chance of not getting the future terribly wrong. Third, we spent many months gathering evidence, an admittedly ephemeral process for investigating events that had yet to occur. Eventually, we discovered three sources of evidence.

History

To be sure, there is danger in steering a car using only the rear-view mirror, but there is a greater risk in pressing ahead without a look at where we are driving from. But we were comforted with the truism, paraphrased from the eminent strategist, Colin Gray, that “war is war, only the grammar changes.” Clearly, the grammar gets less intelligible the farther time recedes. The utility of historical analogizing also becomes less reliable if the course of backward gazing is discontinuous. Small wrinkles in the fabric are not terribly concerning: The transition from coal to petroleum-fired propulsion caused only minor conceptual revisions in Naval doctrine after the Great War. Relevance becomes a problem when rends in the fabric appear: sail to steam propulsion in the nineteenth century, for example.

During our historical inquiry into the course of industrial age warfare we identified several wrinkles and one serious rend. The final days of World War II tore the contextual fabric of warfare fundamentally. The atomic bomb ended great power conflict. The collapse of European military and economic might ended the European Era of warfare, a five hundred epoch that had seen European armies and navies colonize three quarters of the planet. The collapse ushered in the American Era. We knew America would not fight all post-World War II conflicts but its long shadow would influence all wars to come.

Wrinkles in time would occasionally nudge the course of war. Postcolonial wars would emerge below the nuclear threshold and under the umbrella of the great powers. Airpower would be the premise for American engagement in future wars. Precision guidance, micro circuitry, unmanned vehicles, and stealth would shape the geometry of future battlefields. We completely missed the world after 9/11. Whether it was a rend or a wrinkle remains to be discovered.

The Present

We intentionally violated the old saw that generals should never fight the next war like the last. Our study convinced us that last wars offered brief, often dimly lit glimpses of the key variables that would likely be repeated in the next. The genius is in finding the right ones. After World War I the Great powers knew that internal combustion and wireless telegraphy were the ingredients most likely to alter war-making. The early winners in World War II battles picked the right ones and operationalized and weaponized them most efficiently. Thus, we were compelled to sift through the tea leaves of contemporary wars at the time to include Desert Storm, Panama, the Balkans, and the emerging threat of terrorism.

We were most influenced by Desert Storm, and not in a good way. At the time the Army was under fire for being too slow to the fight. The Army After Next team weighed the dichotomy of arriving quickly but too light versus arriving heavy in combat power but too late. Solving this dichotomy formed the nexus of our investigation into the future. We believed the only means for solving this dilemma was to devise a strategic landpower wargame that tested the comparative merits of light (Army After Next), medium (Objective Force) and heavy (Army XXI) forces.

Wargames

The preponderance of our evidence came from gaming. The gaming methodology we devised in 1995 is still with us in the form of the Unified Quest game conducted yearly at the Army War College. The Army had never done strategic future gazing before, so we were obliged to start by grafting the structure and operational concept borrowed from the Navy’s Global game conducted at the Navy War College on to our game. At the time, Global was the gold standard for all strategic games. We pledged to anchor our version of the game on two pillars: one, to get as close to right as the evidence and gaming methodology allowed and, two, to conduct the game with openness and fidelity.

Eventually, the game evolved into a melding of the Global game’s structures with the proven objectivity imbedded in the Army’s National Training Center methodologies. Most essential was the rule that the game would be “free play” and not scripted. We learned from the National Training Center experience that losing a battle often conveyed more wisdom than winning. But games at the strategic level were very public and closely watched by those who paid our bills. It took long and passionate discussions with the Army’s senior leadership to allow the prospect of losing in a national level game.

Building on the National Training Center motif we worked very hard to create a world-class opposing force. Over time we brought aboard diabolically creative “enemies” like retired Col. Richard Sinnreich and Marine Gen. Paul van Riper. We also borrowed the idea of employing a band of experienced strategic “observer/controllers” to referee the game and enough digitized data collection to capture “ground truth” from the National Training Center. We took the risk of inviting well-known Beltway luminaries to play the roles of administration and service officials and leaders. These people were experienced enough to smell a set up. We knew from the start that any attempt to “cook the books” would compromise the game fatally.

Our greatest initial miscalculation, one we inherited from Global, was our decision to base evidence collection on a single massive, signature game. To be sure, the first game was a hugely successful public relations exercise involving over 600 players and observers. But in the end, we gained very little useful data. In time, we changed our approach to embrace a “constellation” of franchise games scattered across many venues with each game focused on a different variable such as logistics, intelligence, maneuver, and command and control.

Thanks to a quarter century’s leap ahead in information technology, it is now possible to expand a constellation several orders of magnitude. Instead of four or five data points, a well-constructed strategic game might be able to collect hundreds of gaming variations testing thousands of discrete data points. To be sure, the Army’s leadership will still expect a grand event every year. But instead of a single game, perhaps a better idea might be to orchestrate a grand Army After Next, several months after all gaming data has been properly analyzed and parsed.

We can learn a few additional lessons from other failed strategic games that followed Army After Next. First, never restart a game when some “black swan” event rears its ugly head. As we learned painfully from the events of 9/11, black swans are a periodic feature of warfare and any strategic game worth its mettle must be able to accommodate them. Second, keep the game unclassified yet retain as much as possible actual state and non-state players using real geography. Third, don’t build a game around the intent to prove the efficacy of a specific weapon, program or concept. Global lost its credibility because the Navy dedicated every game to proving the need for aircraft carriers (with the added imperative not to loses one).

Be sure to insert a “red handle” to allow any player to stop the game. During our first Army After Next game, we postulated the capability to project ground units from the Continental U.S. directly into the operational area. One very astute DARPA scientist pulled the red handle and stopped the game. He very succinctly reminded us that the laws of physics and our continued reliance on fossil fuels would make direct intervention from the United States impossible. His intercession was important because it made the leadership reformulate the game to add intermediate bases for operational staging. Then we discovered such bases were under the enemy’s WMD umbrella thus forcing us to add air defense and base defense forces, which forced us to radically change our strategic lift requirements — you get the picture.

The Navy’s Global game relied on the creation of “scenarios” most of which were based on extensions of existing national security documents. We found this approach to be a bad idea. One simply cannot credibly extend contemporary strategy beyond a generation. Instead we found it more useful to write a “History of the Future.” We began with general but immutable characteristics of the future: national character, cultural affinities, recurrent behaviors, and personalities of foreign leaders and then added the nuances inherent in the geostrategic positioning of a postulated enemy state. Other facts could be reliably inferred such as economic power or evolving demographics, as well as a country’s technological and intellectual base and it’s relationships with neighboring competitors.

(Continued)
 

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On TB every waking moment
(Continued)

We took a common-sense approach to finding enemies to fight. We eliminated wars of conquest against unconquerable states such as Russia, Iran (we projected they would be nuclear capable in 2025), and China. We eliminated whole continents we then saw as barren of vital interests for the United States: the Americas, Africa, and South Asia. That left us with only a few options: wars on the periphery against great power surrogates or a war against a rouge state such as North Korea. Remember, this was 1996. We completely missed the threat of a global terrorist state. In the end, we chose for our first game a border clash with Russian surrogates in the Balkans. To keep it unclassified, the State Department forced us to march continually northward until our cursor landed on what seemed then to be a non-contentious place: Belarus.

We learned quickly not to use an Army game to solve the problems of the Department of Defense. Never be ashamed to call an Army strategic game what it is: a game focused on landpower. Sure, a whole of government approach is vital for winning wars. Jointness is imperative. No single service fights alone. But the game must view jointness from a land-power perspective.

Yet we must be careful not to be too parochial in crafting the game. The validity of the game will be challenged if it becomes so exclusive to the ground forces that it exercises only in one dimension. This imperative is even more important as we add more dimensions to our calculus such as cyber, space, and interagency involvement.

A lesson we failed to embrace in the 1990’s was to delay the final After Action Review until second and third order insights could be gleaned and consolidated by the game leadership. Sadly, today the perceived need to make a media splash still overrides the imperative for deliberate intellectual introspection. My recommendation would be to first spend several months conducting the franchise games, then convene a strategic senior seminar to socialize the evidence among a group of trusted futurists, in private if possible. Then the insights should be shared with those empowered to translate concepts into doctrine, materiel, and operational units. Then the next year repeat again and again, all while constantly experimenting, questioning, and debating with a willingness to restart whenever rends and wrinkles appear on the temporal horizon.

Lessons Learned about the Art and Science of Future Gazing

The objective of a future gazing exercise must be to feed doctrine first because no program or new structure can survive intellectual scrutiny unless it fits into a credible doctrinal scheme. But doctrine is for today. To develop tomorrow’s doctrine, today’s futurist must march out into the future following an intellectual roadmap that leads a generation beyond today’s doctrinal line of departure. His “locking” point, the temporal final objective is where a vague outline of a “vision” begins to appear. A generation for the objective locking point is just about right. For Army After Next, the objective resided in 2025. In 1999, the Army After Next team believed that it would take at least that long to take a weapon from design to fielding. A generation was needed to train and educate a battalion commander and at least that long was needed to organize and equip a new formation. In Pentagonese, the visionary locking point is well beyond two program objective memoranda (POM).

Once on the objective in 2025, we made an imaginary march back toward the doctrinal line of departure following the signposts in reverse. At about a decade closer to the present, we encountered intermediate objectives where vision becomes a concept. Future gazing gets serious at this conceptual waypoint because the journey enters the realm of the POM. Concepts become programs only through investments in experimentation. It’s at the concept stage that the outline of a doctrine begins to appear. The march from intermediate objective to doctrinal line of departure demands prototyping and modeling to avoid early lock. As we’ve seen with Army After Next, it’s here that mistakes are most often made. Hopefully, if rigor is properly applied and the Gods of War are with us, a properly equipped, trained, and structured formation will meet the enemy sometime along the journey from concepts to the doctrinal line of departure just in time.

The rearward march from vision to concepts to doctrine must be disciplined by an understanding of what might be rather than what just happened. A sure sign that we’ve got it wrong occurs when the journey from vision to concept becomes increasingly complex. We have learned painfully that simplicity is the surest sign of success. Beware of those who add needless layers of detail and cute, captive phrases. Also, the journey from vision to concepts to doctrine must avoid the minefields of intellectual bullying by misinformed seniors amplified by adoring, unthinking disciples.

The end state, a doctrine that drives Murray’s “real operational units that could perform wartime mission(s),” must be sufficiently ahead to allow newly discovered wrinkles and unanticipated breakthroughs to be accommodated yet sufficiently constrained to be affordable. The march backward from vision to doctrine must avoid incrementalism at all costs. If the long march doesn’t result in a leap ahead in capabilities it’s doomed to failure. Incrementalism comes from change neutered by bureaucratic inertia, yesterday’s ideas repackaged as sloganisms, and over-indulgent lawyers, unimaginative doctrine writers, and parsimonious budgeteers.

Minefields Along the March

The long temporal march from vision to concepts to doctrine would be a straightforward process were it not for minefields scattered along the way. These minefields take many shapes and can become deadly though inattention and haste. I tripped over many as director of the Army After Next project. First among them was the impulse within the Army to fixate too quickly on detail. Immediately after the first Army After Next wargame combat developers began to badger us for details. What would a “flying Army” look like? How would a force, as envisioned by Army After Next, be equipped, organized, and trained? How much would it cost? Within a year after the first wargame officers in Training and Doctrine Command were drawing up organization charts and adding tactical detail totally beyond our ability to define much less justify our ideas at the time. The lesson I learned was to be sure that you have the concepts right through gaming and experimentation before you try to build mythical tables of organization and equipment.

Another troublesome minefield is the lure of technology. Just because a new and exciting technology appears doesn’t mean it must fit into an emerging warfighting concept. Another distracting minefield comes from technologists who constantly scan the threat horizon anxious to alert on enemies who they sense are harnessing new technologies to build better weapons. To be sure, we must guard against being surprised by leap-ahead technologies in the hands of an enemy. But recent battlefield experience suggests that we have been surprised and bested on the battlefield, not by new weapons, but by enemies who have employed simple technologies creatively.

We must be careful not to shape the course of change to conform to existing materiel and structures. The French developed their doctrine of the “Methodical Battle” in part to accommodate the mountain of materiel left over from World War I. The Germans on the other hand were stripped of their most modern weapons by the strictures of the Treaty of Versailles and thus were free to develop their concept of maneuver warfare unencumbered by masses of obsolescent materiel.

The lesson for today is obvious. Like the French, we are burdened by the massive investments that gave us the “Big Five.” These machines are now more than a generation old. Let’s accommodate legacy weapons in our doctrine only if they fit. But be aware of the past. A mountain of excess Abrams tanks rusting in the Utah desert should not unduly influence how we prepare to fight tomorrow’s wars.

In a similar fashion, we should never allow the pace of change to conform to outdated thinking. Recent history supports the conclusion that progressive institutional structures facilitate change: The optimum structure can be seen in the development of AirLand battle doctrine during the Cold War. Gen. Donn Starry, then the commander of Training and Doctrine Command, organized his mechanism for change by creating an island of excellence in the form of the “Boat House Gang,” a group of young talented officers imbued with a particularly brilliant creative spirit as they created AirLand Battle doctrine.

Impatience is a character of American strategic thought. Seems like every year or two we witnesses the emergence of some cosmic slogan that morphs into a strategy. You can see it coming when monikers like “Effects Based Operations” or “AirSea Battle” suddenly spawn an office in the Pentagon staffed by action officers scurrying about with furrowed brows. Truth is that history shows us that we can’t afford to get the thinking part over quickly in order to get a budget line started. Imagining the future is like making a fine wine. It needs sufficient time for debate, synthesis, and second-order thought.

The worst institutional approach, as seen in the French Army’s method of divining the future of warfare during the inter-war period, is to rely on a strict hierarchy dominated by seniors who already know the truth. We encountered some of this when, after 9/11, the transition from Army After Next to Future Combat Systems suddenly became threatening to the “heavy” Army establishment

To some degree, Army After Next was torpedoed by first-hand experiences of senior officers who were battalion and brigade commanders in Operation Desert Storm. As my generation learned so painfully after the Vietnam War, nothing ossifies creative thought more than victory and nothing accelerates progress more than losing a war. In a similar fashion the British Army was slow to adapt to a battlefield dominated by the machine gun and artillery because senior British officers had (quite laterally) earned their spurs in glorious wars fighting native peoples rather than fighting a modern army like the Germans. The Germans had no long-term experience in war, so they relied on the study of history rather than the visceral side of warfare learned through glorious but irrelevant experience in battle. We are an Army armed with 17 years of the visceral. So be warned.

Ideas and concepts are porous, particularly in an era of intrusive social media and intellectual property theft wherein the half-life of an idea is measured in days if not hours. To that end, it’s also painful to reveal that visionaries are not the ones who always win. British genius imagined a new era of warfare during the interwar period. Gurus like B.H. Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller were the true architects of machine warfare. But it was the Germans first, and later the Soviets, who gained notoriety for successfully implementing the tenets of blitzkrieg. This example reinforces the truism that no visionary can overcome wrongheaded strategy. And, as the British learned to their chagrin, political leadership often gets it wrong, or right for the wrong reasons

How Did We Do? You Decide.

I gave up command of the Army War College in the summer of 2000. Gen. Rick Shinseki, chief of staff at the time, kindly asked that I stay on active duty another six months to write a monograph on Army After Next. Instead I took the time to write a book on the subject titled Yellow Smoke. The book was on the official reading lists of the Navy and Marine Corps. In 2004, it became the intellectual catalyst that brought Maj. Gen. Jim Mattis and me together and led to our mutual effort to imbed some of my thoughts from Army After Next into Marine doctrine and materiel development between 2004 and 2009.

We are seven years away from 2025, the objective date we established in 1999 for locking in the tenets of Army After Next. Below I’ve listed the ten themes taken from Yellow Smoke. Read them carefully in light of contemporary events and decide for yourselves how close we got it to right.

1. Increase the Speed of Operational Forces as a National Priority

If future wars are to be won at minimum cost, they must be won quickly. The strategic speed of an early-arriving force is best achieved by lightening the force sufficiently to allow it to be projected principally by air.

2. Project and Maneuver Land Forces by Brigades

Land forces will best be able to achieve the necessary balance between strategic speed and sustainable fighting power if all early-arriving, close-combat forces are dispatched and fight as autonomous, self-contained brigades of about 5,000 soldiers each.

3. Maneuver by Air at the Operational and Tactical Levels

Increasing the strategic speed of a force is of little value unless the momentum generated by global projection can be sustained by aerial maneuver at the operational and tactical levels.

4. Establish an “Unblinking Eye” Over the Battlefield

Lighter and smaller early-arriving forces can win against a more numerous and heavier enemy only if they are protected by an “unblinking eye” — a constant, reliable, ubiquitous, and overwhelmingly dominant sphere of information emanating from unmanned aerial platforms.

5. Proliferate Precision and Distribute It Downward

Maneuver forces should be provided with the tools to adequately support an offensive strategy dominated by precision firepower on a distributed battlefield. To do this, ground forces at the lowest tactical level should be given the same relative advantage in precision firepower as that possessed by the air services today.

6. Adopt an Operational Maneuver Doctrine Based on Firepower Dominance and Area Control

The need to accelerate the velocity of maneuver at all levels of war becomes more important when an adaptive enemy begins to level the firepower playing field by acquiring his own precision weapons. Distributed maneuver forced by proliferated precision weapons will change the geometry of ground combat from a linear to an irregular, roughly circular area formation.

7. Supplement Manned with Unmanned Reconnaissance

Information- and precision-age technologies offer considerable promise as a means for producing unmanned aerial and ground vehicles capable of performing effectively as surrogates for manned tactical reconnaissance.

8. Maneuver with All Arms at the Lowest Practical Level

While the “base element of maneuver” might have been a division in World War II and a brigade in Operation Desert Storm, perhaps by 2025 it might be a company of all arms, possessing the power to employ every dimension of ground combat from maneuver to fires, reconnaissance, logistics, and the control of all external amplifiers.

9. Establish a “Band of Brothers” Approach to Selection, Training, and Readiness

The surest way to reduce casualties among close-combat units is to only place in harm’s way soldiers trained through a “band of brothers” approach — those who, over a period of years, have worked collectively to achieve physical fitness, emotional maturity, technical competence, confidence in their leaders, and an intuitive sense of the battlefield.

10. Move Beyond Jointness to True Interdependence of Services

Combat functions such as operational maneuver and precision firepower — functions provided principally by one service yet vital to the warfighting effectiveness of another — should be removed from the constrictive rules of joint warfare and elevated to a new dimension of interdependent command and control.

Gazing into a Different Future

Do you think our concepts were about right? Do you think they would have been sufficiently mature today to guarantee overmatch in 2025? Remember the objective of future gazing is not to get it perfectly right but to avoid getting it perfectly wrong. The Army After Next initiative was cancelled in 2008. What type of Army do you think we might have today had it been allowed to mature?

Sadly, we will never know. We can agree, however, that the Army is now obliged to start over, to march out conceptually, crossing today’s line of departure and continuing to an objective vision place nested in about 2045. I won’t be around to rewrite this piece in 2040. I can only hope that future generations of talented officers will work diligently to get it as close to right as their collective intellects will allow.



Retired Major General Bob Scales is a former Commandant of the Army War College, an artilleryman and author of the book Scales on War: The Future of America’s Military at Risk, published by the Naval Institute Press. The opinions here are those of the authors and do not represent the positions or views of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any organization therein.
 

Housecarl

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https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/revealed-chinas-nuclear-capable-air-launched-ballistic-missile/

Revealed: China's Nuclear-Capable Air-Launched Ballistic Missile

China is developing a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile, likely based off the DF-21.

By Ankit Panda
April 10, 2018

China is developing and has been flight-testing a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) along with a new long-range strategic bomber to deliver it, The Diplomat has learned.

According to U.S. government sources with knowledge of the latest intelligence assessments on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, China has conducted five flight tests of the unnamed missile. The U.S. intelligence community is calling the new missile the CH-AS-X-13.

The missile was first tested in December 2016 and was most recently tested in the last week of January 2018, according to one source. In recent years, the directors of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) have made reference to this nuclear-capable ALBM in their two most recent on-record worldwide threat assessments.

The two most recent tests of the system involved aerial launches off a modified H-6K strategic bomber capable of being refueled while in the air.

The new bomber, dubbed the H6X1/H-6N by the U.S. intelligence community, has been modified from standard variant H-6s for the ALBM delivery mission. The modifications have been made by Xi’an Aircraft Industrial Corporation, the manufacturer of all H-6 bomber variants since the late-1950s. The H6X1/H-6N may have been the subject of speculation in August 2017, when an image of an unidentified H-6 variant appeared on Chinese social media.

The CH-AS-X-13, meanwhile, is a two-stage, solid-fuel ballistic missile with a 3,000 kilometer range; it is likely a variant of the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile. The missile may use lighter weight composite materials in its airframe to reduce the necessary carry weight for the bomber.

The H6X1/H-6N is assessed to have a combat radius of nearly 6,000 kilometers — a significant improvement from older H-6 variants. As a system for nuclear delivery, the CH-AS-X-13 on the H6X1/H-6N, assuming a launch from the edge of the bomber’s combat radius, will be capable of threatening targets in the contiguous United States, Hawaii, and Alaska.

According to a source who spoke with The Diplomat, the U.S. intelligence community assesses that the CH-AS-X-13 will be ready for deployment by 2025.

This is in line with a September 2016 announcement by People’s Liberation Army Air Force General Ma Xiaotan, referenced in the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2017 report on Chinese military power, that China would develop a new generation of long-range strategic bombers to be deployed around the mid-2020s.

Aside from the H6X1/H-6N, China has developed the H-6 into a range of support and attack roles. The H-6K, for instance, is capable of delivering standoff range CJ-20 land-attack cruise missiles with precision guidance. These bombers have conducted missions across the so-called First Island Chain, into the western Pacific.

Additionally, the People’s Liberation Army Navy operates the H-6G, which is designed for anti-ship and maritime support missions.

In recent years, senior U.S. intelligence officials have acknowledged the development of a nuclear-capable ALBM in China.

On March 6, 2018, Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley, in discussing the development of new Chinese long-range, precision-strike systems, said that “These capabilities are being augmented with two new air-launched ballistic missiles, one of which may include a nuclear payload.”

In May 2017, Lt. Gen. Vincent R. Stewart, the former director of the DIA, for the first time, referenced “two, new air-launched ballistic missiles, one of which may include a nuclear payload.”

It’s unclear if the conventional ALBM referenced in these DIA threat assessments is an alternate warhead configuration for the nuclear-capable system. A conventional variant of the CH-AS-X-13 could perform a long-range anti-ship role.

ALBMs are carried horizontally by aircraft and dropped prior to their engines igniting. Following ignition, the missile reorients toward a regular ballistic trajectory like any other ballistic missile.

Why an Air-Launched Ballistic Missile?
Air-launched ballistic missiles are an unusual configuration for ballistic missiles. No country has inducted and deployed an ALBM as part of its strategic forces; the closest would have been the United States, which developed the GAM-87 Skybolt in the 1950s.

The Skybolt program, which also involved the participation of the United Kingdom, was ultimately cancelled in favor of the submarine-based Polaris system. U.S. President John F. Kennedy cancelled the program in the final weeks of 1962, weeks after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The United States conducted subsequent experimentation with ALBMs, including a 1974 flight-test of a Minuteman-I intercontinental-range ballistic missile off a C-5A Galaxy strategic airlifter. Today, the United States uses ALBMs dropped from C-17 Globemasters as target missiles for its tests of missile defense systems.

The Soviet Union, too, is thought to have briefly experimented with modifying its Tu-160 strategic bomber to carry a nuclear-capable ALBM, but the project foundered in the early 1980s and never proceeded to flight-testing.

Until the advent of reliable submarine-launched ballistic missiles and ballistic missile submarines, ALBMs offered an attractive means to improve the survivability of land-based nuclear forces in silos.

As a crisis would escalate, countries could direct their strategic bomber fleets, equipped with ALBMs, to high alert status. Once an ALBM-equipped bomber had taken off — presumably after warning of an incoming launch or the start of an attack — national leadership could be assured of some retaliatory capability.

Given the standoff ranges available to ALBMs, bombers carrying these weapons do not necessarily need to penetrate hostile airspace to be effective.

For China, the pursuit of an ALBM capability may suggest real concern about the survivability of its existing nuclear forces. With an estimated 270 nuclear warheads, China is not a near-peer nuclear adversary of the United States and has a lean force posture built around a longstanding pledge of no first use.

Operational training for the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (formerly the Second Artillery Corps) has long simulated retaliatory launch operations after the country has already absorbed a nuclear strike — presumably against known basing sites for its intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, both in silos and on road-mobile launchers.

In this context, China’s pursuit of an ALBM capability might not be so surprising. Assuming a sufficiently distributed bomber force, the long-range H6X1/H-6N and CH-AS-X-13 could lend important retaliatory flexibility to Chinese nuclear forces.

Moreover, with Chinese concern growing about U.S. missile defenses, a long-range strategic bomber carrying an ALBM could present U.S. homeland missile defense systems with challenging or impossible intercept geometries. (China’s deployed nuclear ballistic missile submarines also have this advantage.)

Finally, in a conventional conflict with the United States, China may plan on its conventional anti-access/area denial capabilities securing air corridors for its bombers to access airspace far into the western Pacific. The ALBM, given its relatively short assessed range of 3,000 kilometers, may ultimately find more use as a theater ballistic missile.

U.S. and allied fighters in Northeast Asia and surface ships in the Pacific could deny the H6X1 the necessary access to make the ALBM useful as a weapon for strategic nuclear retaliation.

Beijing’s growing suite of anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, hypersonic boost-glide warheads, and conventional short-to-intermediate-range systems, however, could neutralize U.S. air defenses and airfields in the East Asian theater.

Given the lack of any authoritative Chinese statements on the burgeoning ALBM program and the lack of an imminent date for deployment, it’s possible too that the program is merely experimental and serves as a technology demonstrator for now.

Whatever the rationale for developing an ALBM, China isn’t the only country bringing back this ballistic missile launch configuration. At his Federal Assembly address on March 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin introduced the Kinzhal, which appears to be an air-launched variant of the short-range Iskander-M ballistic missile. The nuclear-capable Kinzhal is has been shown to be capable of launch from a MiG-31.

Ankit Panda is a senior editor at The Diplomat, where he covers security, politics, and economics in the Asia-Pacific region. He is additionally an adjunct senior fellow at the Federation of American Scientists. He tweets at @nktpnd.
 

Housecarl

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https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/arc...s-approach-to-the-next-india-pakistan-crisis/

A Passive U.S. Approach to the Next India-Pakistan Crisis?

by Michael Krepon | April 10, 2018 | 1 Comment

Quote of the week:
“Escalation is inherent in war both because the desire to win and the need not to lose.” – V.R. Raghavan, “Limited War and Escalation Control,” Nonproliferation Review, 2001.

One common thread among the comings and goings of top national security advisers to President Trump is that none have much experience with South Asia, and none are well suited for the role of crisis manager. This won’t matter if there is no crisis-triggering event, but it could matter greatly if there is another sequence of events with significant escalatory potential.

Before being shown the door, Trump’s second National Security Adviser, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, said the following in an interview with the New York Times:

“The consensus view has been that engagement overseas is an unmitigated good, regardless of the circumstances. But there are problems that are maybe both intractable and of marginal interest to the American people, that do not justify investments of blood and treasure.”

McMaster defined the Trump administration’s foreign policy as “pragmatic realism” rather than isolationism. If his characterization is correct and continues under his successor, John Bolton, the question arises whether “pragmatic realism” also applies to not investing diplomatic capital in “intractable” disputes “of marginal interest to the American people.”

This could be one explanation for the Trump administration’s de-funding of and disinterest in the proper functioning of the State Department, including the practice of not nominating individuals to fill key jobs, including Assistant Secretaries for South Asia and other regions.

The Kashmir dispute certainly qualifies as “intractable.” No administration has seriously considered investing diplomatic capital in reaching a settlement since the 1960s – even after India and Pakistan brought their bombs out of the basement in 1998. Their ritualized friction occasionally boils over when militant groups based in Pakistan send cadres to carry out acts of violence across the Kashmir divide and within Indian cities. When these explosions are either cumulative or spectacular, they can prompt military clashes with escalatory potential. (For an excellent assessment of when and why escalation occurs, see the essay by Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegeland, “Anatomy of a Crisis: Explaining Crisis Onset in India-Pakistan Relations” in Stimson’s new book, Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories.)

In prior nuclear-tinged crises, Washington’s diplomatic intervention was bothersome to some in India, as these moves constrained freedom of action after triggering events. Proactive U.S. diplomacy was, however, widely recognized as serving useful purposes, helping to choreograph climb-downs and letting cooler heads prevail.

Would the Trump White House define an “America First” foreign policy as being passive rather than proactive in the event of another crisis between India and Pakistan? If the Trump administration conveys its disinterest in playing the role of primary crisis manager — unlike the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations — this might induce more cautious behavior by Rawalpindi and New Delhi. By signaling its disinterest to play an active role, Washington could also prompt Indian and Pakistani leaders to take more responsibility not only for avoiding crises but also for crisis management. These outcomes could have positive repercussions.

Alternatively, Washington’s passivity could remove an important buffer against escalatory dynamics while inviting Beijing and Moscow to fill this vacuum.

Moreover, a crisis that spirals into the detonation of a nuclear weapon, whether by command decision, the breakdown of command and control, or by accident would hardly be “of marginal interest to the American people.” Instead, the first appearance of a mushroom cloud on a battlefield since 1945 would be a norm-shattering event, shaking the Nonproliferation Treaty regime to its core.

This line of argumentation — implying western paternalism and the absence of sound leadership judgment on the subcontinent — drives many within the region to distraction. But if it makes colleagues in India and Pakistan feel any less put upon, the same concerns over the absence of sound judgment and escalatory spirals also apply at present to other nuclear-armed states in other regions. No region where nuclear dangers are on the rise deserves a pass.

Critics in India assert that Washington becomes an accomplice to Pakistani brinkmanship by engaging in preventive diplomacy. Actually, the contrary is true: U.S. crisis management has instead served to reject changes in the status quo that acts of violence seek to undermine. After every nuclear tinged crisis that traces back to Pakistan, U.S.-Indian ties have become stronger while Pakistan’s standing has diminished. These dynamics may help explain why there has not been a crisis-triggering event in almost a decade.

No administration’s foreign and national security policies are completely consistent. Trump has decided, for example, that the criteria of pragmatic realism and an “America First” approach to prevent further unwise “investments of blood and treasure” do not apply to Afghanistan. Pragmatic realism also justifies a U.S. readiness to engage in crisis management on the subcontinent – not just as a buffer against escalation, but to clarify penalties to reckless behavior.

The contours of crisis management have changed over the last decade, reflecting the shifting dynamics of U.S. and Chinese ties with India and Pakistan. Success remains possible, however, because no one wants failure.
 

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https://www.themaven.net/warriormav...pons-bound-for-europe-AlONuyci10uDsy92dDiCOA/

Army Triples Abrams Tank RPG-Killing Weapons Bound for Europe

by
Warrior Maven
18 hrs-edited
The Army is sending more Active Protection Systems systems on Abrams tanks to Europe to counter Russia

Photo Credit - US Army
By Kris Osborn - Managing Editor - Warrior Maven

The Army is massively revving up deployment of RPG-killing Active Protection Systems weapons on Abrams battle tanks to Europe as part of a sweeping effort to better arm its Armored Brigade Combat Teams and counter Russian threats in the region.

Active Protection Systems (APS) use sensors and radar, computer processing, fire control technology and interceptors to find, target and knock down or intercept incoming enemy fire such as RPGs and Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, or ATGMs.

The APS system now on Abrams tanks, called Trophy, is engineered to track and destroy approaching enemy fire through 360-degree radar and computer-enabled fire control technology designed to fire out an interceptor projectile to hit and explode attacking RPGs.

“Not only will we be fielding one set of Trophy on Abrams tanks to Europe, but also three other brigades,” Maj. Gen. John Ferrari, Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, G-8, told Warrior Maven in an interview.

The weapons plus-up for Europe-bound APS is woven into the 2019 budget request, he added.

The interceptor consists of a series of small, shaped charges attached to a gimbal on top of the vehicle. The small explosives are sent to a precise point in space to intercept and destroy the approaching round, Army developers explain.

Trophy is the kind of armored vehicle ground-war weapon of particular value in the event of a major land combat engagement against a fortified, well-armed adversary such as Russia.

Systems of this kind have been in development for many years, however the rapid technological progress of enemy tank rounds, missiles and RPGs is leading the Army to more rapidly deploy APS for its fleet of Abrams tanks deploying to Europe.

Trophy involves a collaborative industry team involving General Dynamics, DRS Technologies and Israeli-based Rafael Advanced Defense Systems.

Being engineered as among the most survivable and heavily armored vehicles in existence, the Abrams tank is built to withstand a high degree of enemy fire, such some enemy tank rounds, RPGs, rockets and missiles. Abrams tanks can also carry reactive armor, material used to explode incoming enemy fire in a manner that protects the chassis and crew of the vehicle itself.

However, depending upon the range, speed and impact location of enemy fire, there are some weapons which still pose a substantial threat to Abrams tanks. Therefore, having an APS system which could knock out enemy rounds before they hit the tank, without question, adds an additional layer of protection for the tank and crew. A particular threat area for Abrams tanks is the need the possibility of having enemy rounds hit its ammunition compartment, thereby causing a damaging secondary explosion.

The Army's expedited APS effort has been managed by a coordinated team of Tank Automotive Research, Development & Engineering Center engineers, acquisition professionals, and industry.

An often-discussed challenge with APS technology is to develop the proper protocol or tactics, techniques and procedures such that soldiers walking in proximity to a vehicle are not vulnerable to shrapnel, debris or fragments from the explosion between an interceptor and approaching enemy fire.

APS on Abrams tanks, quite naturally, is the kind of protective technology which could help US Army tanks in tank-on-tank mechanized warfare against near-peer adversary tanks, such as a high-tech Russian T-14 Armata tank.

The 48-ton modern T-14 tank is widely reported to be able to reach speeds of 90-kilometers per hour; it is built with an unmanned turret, without a “fume extractor” and is designed for a 3-man crew surrounded by an armored capsule. -- To Read Warrior Maven's Abrams Tank vs. Russian T-14 Armata Analysis CLICK HERE --

While much has been made of the T-14 Armata’s cutting edge technology, including its active protection, 12-round per minute firing range and 125mm smoothbore cannon in numerous public reports and assessments, it is not at all clear that the T-14 in any way fully outmatches current and future variants of the Abrams tank.

Army Abrams modernization efforts are without question being designed to meet and exceed any dangers posed by rival nation tanks, including the T-14. Concerns about the threat posed by the T-14 Armata are, without question, informing US tank and weapons developers.

Trophy

Trophy's radar scans the entire perimeter of the platform out to a known range. When a threat penetrates that range, the system then detects and classifies that threat and tells the on-board computer which determines the optical kill point in space, Leonardo DRS officials have told Warrior Maven.

Trophy has been deployed in combat in Gaza on Israeli Defense Forces’ Merkava tanks.

While the Trophy system was primarily designed to track and destroy approaching enemy fire, it also provides the additional benefit of locating the position of an enemy shooter.

The Israelis developed Trophy upon realizing that tanks could not simply be given more armor without greatly minimizing their maneuverability and deployability, Leonardo DRS officials said.

More Weapons and Technology - WARRIOR MAVEN (CLICK HERE) --

Kris Osborn can be reached at Krisosborn.ko@gmail.com
 

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https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/04/taliban-overruns-afghan-district-kills-governor.php


Taliban overruns Afghan district, kills governor
BY BILL ROGGIO | April 12, 2018 | admin@longwarjournal.org | @billroggio

The Taliban overran the district of Khwaja Omari and killed at least eight people, including the district governor, earlier today. Seven policemen were also killed in the attack. Khwaja Omari was considered to have been one of the more secure districts in Ghazni province.

The attack and death of Ali Shams Dost, the district governor, and seven policemen was confirmed by the Ghazni provincial police, according to TOLONews. Nine other policemen were wounded during the fighting.

A statement released by the provincial police force said the Taliban launched the raid at 2:00 AM local time. The Taliban routinely launches strikes on district centers and military bases at night. Videos documenting the attacks often show Taliban fighters using night vision devices.

The Taliban torched the governor’s compound before withdrawing its forces. The police claimed that 27 Taliban fighters were killed in retaliatory airstrikes.

The district of Khwaja Omari was previously considered to be one of the more secure areas in Ghazni, which is a hotbed for the Taliban and other foreign jihadist groups such as al Qaeda. Resolute Support listed Khwaja Omari as “Government Influenced,” according to a report issued by the Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. A government influenced district means that the government holds sway and the Taliban presence is minimal.

The fact that the Taliban was able to easily overrun the Khwaja Omari district center indicates that the Taliban presence in the district is far greater than assessed by Resolute Support. FDD’s Long War Journal now assesses the district to be contested.

The security situation in Afghanistan has progressively declined since the US withdrew the bulk of its forces by 2014 and handed over security to Afghan forces. LWJ has assessed that 46 percent of Afghanistan’s 407 districts are controlled (38 districts) or contested (151 districts). [See LWJ report, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan.]

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.
 

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https://www.defensenews.com/land/20...e-in-dod-advanced-munitions-technology-needs/

Navy League

Orbital ATK is expanding to prepare for what they predict will be a surge in DoD buys of more lethal munitions

By: Jen Judson  
1 day ago

NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. — Orbital ATK has hired more people and is expanding facilities as it anticipates a surge in Defense Department advanced missile and munitions technology needs.

In addition to hiring 1,000 more people, “we have invested a decent number of millions, tens of millions, in a number of our facilities to support readiness,” Mike Kahn, Orbital ATK’s defense group president, told Defense News in an April 10 interview at the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space conference.

Orbital will soon be a part of Northrop Grumman, which bought the company late last year in a $9.2 billion deal.

The company recently invested heavily in its Allegany Ballistics Laboratory in Rocket Center, West Virginia, where it builds rocket motors, warheads and fuses because it’s anticipating a “significant increase” stemming specifically from Army programs that are ramping up in the next few years, according to Kahn.

In Mesa, Arizona, Orbital ATK broke ground on a new facility to allow it to double the capacity of its industry-standard Bushmaster cannon line.

And the company is increasing the capacity to handle building two times as many of its Precision Guided Kits that are used to transform 155mm Howitzer rounds. Orbital ATK just celebrated the manufacturing of its 25,000th PGK.

In its Lake City, Missouri, ammunition plant, Orbital has been investing, for a number of years, both in capacity growth and process controls, as well as safety upgrades, Kahn said.

Orbital also opened a new facility a year ago in California to build the extended range version of its Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM).

The military requested in its fiscal year 2019 budget $20.7 billion in missiles and munitions. The Army, specifically plans to buy more critical missiles and rockets and 148,287 155mm artillery projectiles for which Orbital supplies PGKs.

The Army is also planning to plus-up its Hellfire missiles, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) and Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) stock, which means more business for Orbital as well which supplies rocket motors for Hellfire and GMLRS and will also supply the rocket motor for the Hellfire replacement, the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM).

GMLRS and Hellfire rocket motors are produced at the company’s West Virginia facility.

And there’s more DoD money for hypersonic and ramjet development and other technologies to extend ranges out to strategic distances, which Orbital ATK is also investing in heavily.

[Orbital ATK tests partially 3D printed warhead for hypersonic weapons]

Orbital is also setting its site on ways to improve technology within its current systems to meet the needs of the services in the future, according to Kahn.

Orbital’s AARGM is currently only fielded for use on the Navy’s F-18 Super Hornets, but, by the end of the year, the company will be turning on production for the full engineering and manufacturing development phase for the extended-range version, which will allow it to be used in the F-35, Kahn said.

The AARGM-ER is slated for initial fielding either in 2022 or 2023 and following that the Air Force will work on integrating the weapon into a block upgrade for the F-35.

The Navy’s requirements are quite similar to the Army’s in terms of increasing range and lethality of its missiles and munitions, Bart Olson, the company’s defense group vice president, said in the same interview.

In recent years, the company has demonstrated how it can transform the Navy’s 5-inch guns to go farther and hit targets more precisely by providing a PGK variant for the rounds.

“And we are talking to the Navy and Marines about helping them with lethality upgrades centered around the land combat or sea combat areas,” Olson added.

With that in mind, the company is trying to foster interest in the Navy and Marines to move to a 30mm variant of the Bushmaster cannon. Currently the two services have fielded 25mm Bushmaster cannons. The 30mm cannon will get after a desire for more range and more lethality, Olson said.

The Army has already upgunned its Stryker fighting vehicle with a 30mm Bushmaster cannon and has sent the variant to Europe for evaluation with the 2nd Cavalry Regiment there.

Orbital also has a quick way for those using 30mm cannons to switch from 30mm to 40mm if desired, in less an hour, according to Kahn.

The company is also developing a full family of ammunition for the 40mm barrel, to include a practice round, a high-explosive dual purpose round, an armor penetrating round and an airburst round.

And Orbitals M230 chain gun used on Apache helicopters is now cropping up on ground platforms using a remote weapon station.

The company is also investing in advanced ammunition, such as programming 30mm rounds to be airburst rounds, which has great utility in countering unmanned aircraft systems, for example.

Orbital has a deployed a counter-UAS system with ground forces, but has ways to convert it to be used on ships or at sea ports.

And Orbital has also developed a way to guide small ammunition to hit even moving targets, Kahn noted.

The company took a 50-caliber round with precision guidance and hit moving targets in tests through the EXACTO program with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency several years back, Olson said.

Advanced ammunition has great utility for programs like the F-35, Kahn said, because instead of shooting 30 or 40 rounds to hit a target, a guided round can take out a target in one or two shots. An F-35 is limited to carrying roughly 200 rounds.

The company has also used internal research and development dollars to build and qualify its Hatchet precision glide weapon, which is a 6-lb, air deliver munition that can be used from aircraft ranging from UAS, rotary-wing, fixed-wing fighters and bomber aircraft.

The system can be deployed as a single weapon or used as a swarming weapon.

Orbital plans to reach a technology readiness level of 7 by the end of the year through a live, guide-to-hit test.


About Jen Judson
Jen Judson is the land warfare reporter for Defense News. She has covered defense in the Washington area for over six years. She was previously a reporter at Politico Pro Defense and InsideDefense.com.
 

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https://www.usnews.com/news/best-st...d-in-mexico-border-city-apparently-bystanders

6 Killed in Mexico Border City Apparently Bystanders

6 killed in Mexico border city of Reynosa were apparently bystanders.
April 12, 2018, at 10:23 p.m

MEXICO CITY (AP) — Prosecutors are investigating the killing of two women and four men in the northern Mexico border city of Reynosa, apparently as the result of crossfire, officials said Thursday.

The Tamaulipas state prosecutor's office said state police had responded to a report of gunfire between gunmen in the area where the six bodies and a seventh wounded man were found.

The office said in an initial report that none of the six bodies tested positive for having a gun. Three were identified as members of a family passing through the area and three others were thought to have been employed at a nearby factory. All were believed to be bystanders.

It was not clear who killed them or why, but civilians in Tamaulipas have been injured and killed in the crossfire of drug gang battles and shootouts between criminals and law enforcement.

Last week, the Mexican marines accepted responsibility for the deaths of three civilians killed when they drove through a running gun battle between marines and cartel gunmen in the border city of Nuevo Laredo in late March. The family's car was hit by bullets from a helicopter that was battling gunmen nearby.

Also Thursday, gunmen killed a mayor near the colonial city of Puebla in central Mexico.

The Puebla state prosecutors' office said Jose Efrain Garcia was killed when gunmen blocked his vehicle on a road and opened fire.

Garcia was mayor of the town of Tlanepantla, just east of Puebla. The area has been a hotbed of thieves drilling illegal taps into state-owned pipelines to steal fuel.

At least 55 mayors or mayors-elect have been killed in Mexico since 2006, often by criminal gangs or corrupt police.

On Wednesday, Mexico's Green party said a female state assembly candidate was killed in the neighboring state of Michoacan.

In February, two female state assembly candidates were slain in Guerrero.

Violence threatens Mexico's July 1 presidential and local elections.
 

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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...colombian-rebels-confirmed-dead-idUSKBN1HK2L0

WORLD NEWS APRIL 13, 2018 / 10:59 AM / UPDATED AN HOUR AGO

Ecuadorean journalists held by Colombian rebels confirmed dead

Alexandra Valencia
3 MIN READ

QUITO (Reuters) - Two Ecuadorean journalists and their driver, who were kidnapped last month by Colombian insurgents, have been killed, the leaders of both nations said on Friday, vowing justice.

“Regrettably, we have information that confirms the murder of our compatriots,” Ecuadorean President Lenin Moreno said on state television. “It seems these criminals never planned to deliver them back safely.”

On Thursday, Moreno gave the group, former fighters from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) who refused to demobilize under last year’s peace deal with Colombia, 12 hours to prove the hostages were alive or face a military operation.

Moreno returned to Ecuador that day from a regional summit following reports El Comercio reporter Javier Ortega, photographer Paul Rivas and driver Efrain Segarra were killed.

On Wednesday, a statement apparently issued by the Oliver Sinisterra front - a faction of the former FARC guerrillas that refused to adhere to a 2016 peace agreement - reported the Ecuadoreans had died in a failed rescue operation.

Colombia denied any rescue attempt.

The journalists and their driver were on assignment for the Quito-based El Comercio newspaper on the border between Ecuador and Colombia when they were seized on March 26.

A proof-of-life photograph released shortly after their kidnapping showed them chained and padlocked by their necks.

Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos pledged full cooperation with Ecuador and said operations had begun against the rebels on both sides of the border.

“The FARC no longer exist... These are criminals dedicated to drug-trafficking,” he said at the summit in Lima. “They will feel the full force of the law and our armed forces.”

More than a thousand FARC fighters refused to demobilize under the accord with Santos and continued trafficking across the nation. Those operating in Colombia’s southern jungles have attacked Ecuadorean security forces along the border.

The FARC, which battled for more than a half century, attacked military targets and civilian towns but generally allowed journalists to work freely, unless they went against the rebels’ interests.

The media crew was reporting on violence in the Esmeraldas region of the border when they were snatched by a group led by an Ecuadorean man identified as Walter Artizala, alias “Guacho.”

Colombia and Ecuador have both offered $100,000 each for information leading to his capture.

Reporting by Alexandra Valencia; Additional reporting by Silene Ramirez in Santiago, Terea Cespedes in Lima; Writing by Julia Symmes Cobb and Andrew Cawthorne; Editing by Dan Grebler and Bernadette Baum
 

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http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Live-Blog-Gaza-Border-Protests-549717

TIMELINE: HUNDREDS OF PALESTINIANS HURT IN GAZA BORDER CLASHES

All the latest updates as tensions rise on the Israel-Gaza border.

BY JPOST.COM STAFF
APRIL 13, 2018 11:07

Video

19:19 Gaza Health Ministry reports 1 dead, 701 wounded

The most recent numbers reported by the Palestinian Health Ministry in Gaza speak of 701 Gazans who were injured in Friday's border clashes with the IDF. According to the health ministry's spokesman, Ashraf al-Qidra, 28-year-old Islam Hirzallah was killed after being hit by a bullet in the stomach near Gaza City.

The main locations where Friday's clashes on the Gaza border took place.
17:36 Liberman tweets to soldiers at the border

Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman tweeted regarding the Gaza protests:

"From week to week, there are fewer riots on our border with Gaza. Our resolve is well understood on the other side. I thank the soldiers and IDF commanders for professional and ethical work in guarding the border. Thank to you, the citizens of Israel can proceed with the routine, and a small and two-faced minority can even protest against you. Shabbat Shalom!"

17:12 PRCS: 153 wounded in Gaza protests

According to the Palestine Red Crescent Society, 153 people have been injured. These injuries include 63 wounded by live rounds, 59 from tear gas, 24 from a direct hit by tear gas canisters and 7 from shrapnel.

According to the Hamas-run Health Ministry, there are 528 injured, of which 16 are medical staff and/or journalists.

16:36 363 wounded according to Gaza Health Ministry

363 individuals have thus far been wounded during Friday's protests on the Gaza border, the Hamas-run Health Ministry in Gaza stated. This includes injuries sustained from both live fire and tear gas.

16:31 Protesters set off explosive, try to fly kite bomb over border

The IDF spokesperson stated that the violence on the border has continued throughout the past hour. An explosive device was placed and detonated near the Karni crossing, and may have caused Palestinian casualties. A kite bomb with a Molotov cocktail attached was attempted to be sent into Israeli territory, but ended up landing within Gaza.

This is in addition to several attempts by the over 10,000 protesters throughout the last hour to breach the border between Israel and Gaza and sabotage security infrastructure.

The IDF continues to use riot dispersal methods as means to control the uprisings.

15:57 Protestors attempt to damage border security infrastructure

15:29 Israeli forces wound 30 more Palestinians in Gaza-Israel border protests

GAZA BORDER - Israeli troops shot and wounded 30 Palestinians during a large protest on the Gaza-Israel border on Friday in which demonstrators hurled stones and burning tires near the frontier fence, Palestinian medics said.

Some in the Gaza crowd threw firebombs and an explosive device, according to the Israeli military.

Israeli troops have shot dead 30 Gaza Palestinians and wounded hundreds since the protests began, drawing international criticism of the lethal tactics used against them.

An Israeli military spokesman said troops were being confronted by rioters and "responding with riot dispersal means while also firing in accordance with the rules of engagement."

According to the Hamas-run Health Ministry in Gaza 112 individuals have been injured near Khan Younis, including 10 medical personnel.

Reuters and Jpost.com staff contributed to this report.

15:11 PRCS: 27 injured in Gaza protests

The Palestine Red Crescent Society reports 27 injured in Gaza. The report states 14 wounded by live fire and one with a serious head injury.

14:36 Protestors celebrate Hamas's holding of Israeli captives

14:23 IDF releases video of protestors attempting to damage and breach the security fence

14:00 IDF: Palestinians attempt to breach fence with explosives, Molotov cocktails

Palestinians attempted to breach the border fence to Israel by use of explosives and throwing Molotov cocktails, the IDF announced in a statement on Friday.

"In the past hour there have been several attempts to damage the security barrier and cross it. In addition, a number of attempted terrorist attacks were carried out including the throwing of explosives, Molotov cocktails and the destruction of a security barrier.

IDF forces use crowd dispersal and firing methods in accordance with the Open-Fire Regulations," the army said.

"The IDF will not allow damage to the security and fence infrastructures that protect Israeli citizens and will act against violent rioters and terrorists involved," the statement concluded.
 

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http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43759873

Syria crisis: UN chief says Cold War is back

1 hour ago

The UN's secretary general has said the Cold War is "back with a vengeance".

Antonio Guterres also warned about the dangers of escalation over Syria.

The US and its allies are considering launching missile strikes against Syria after a suspected chemical attack, an action which Russia - whose forces are there supporting the government- has said would risk starting a war.

Russia has accused the UK of faking an attack, an allegation Britain dismissed as a "grotesque, blatant lie".

The Cold War, which followed the Allied victory in World War Two, saw the US and its allies facing off for decades with the Soviet Union, of which Russia is the main successor state.

Why is the West considering strikes?
Syria crisis: Your questions answered
Firepower of key countries
Corbyn: PM waiting for Trump on Syria
What exactly did Guterres say?
Mr Guterres delivered his warnings at the opening of a bad-tempered UN Security Council meeting.

"The Cold War is back with a vengeance, but with a difference," he said. "The mechanisms and the safeguards to manage the risks of escalation that existed in the past no longer seem to be present."

He urged countries to "act responsibly in these dangerous circumstances".

During the meeting:

The Russian ambassador to the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, accused the US of using the suspected chemical attack as a pretext to overthrow the Assad government and "contain" Russia
The US ambassador accused Syrian President Bashar al-Assad of using chemical weapons at least 50 times in seven years
France's ambassador said Syria had gone "beyond the point of no return" and France would "shoulder its responsibility to end an intolerable threat to our collective security"
What proof is there of a chemical attack?
The US and France have both said they have proof the Syrian government attacked the Eastern Ghouta town of Douma last Saturday, but neither country has officially given further details.

On Friday, US state department spokeswoman Heather Nauert said: "We know for a fact that it was a chemical weapon."

When she was asked whether the US had proof the Syrian government was behind the attack, she said: "Yes."

The suspected attack, in which dozens of people reportedly died, was denied by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's government.

Rescue workers from the Syria Civil Defence and the Syrian American Medical Society, which supports hospitals in rebel-held areas, said victims were found with foam coming out of their mouths, blue skin and lips, and corneal burns.

On Thursday, unnamed US officials told NBC News they had obtained blood and urine samples from victims which had tested positive for chlorine and a nerve agent.

Syria 'chemical attack': What we know
What can Western military intervention achieve?
Are we heading for a third world war?
The US ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, told the network: "We definitely have enough proof but now we just have to be thoughtful in our action."

Control over the town has since passed from rebels to the Syrian and Russian military authorities.

A UN report last year found the Syrian government responsible for a deadly chemical attack on the rebel-held town of Khan Sheikhoun, in which more than 80 people died. That attack was followed by a US cruise missile attack on a Syrian airbase.

A delegation from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) will arrive in the area of the suspected attack on Saturday.

What are the Russians alleging?
General Igor Konashenkov, a spokesman for Russia's defence ministry, said: "We have... evidence that proves Britain was directly involved in organising this provocation."

In a video produced by the Russian defence ministry two men speaking Arabic say they were working in the casualty ward of Douma's central hospital when they assisted people brought in after the bombing of a multi-storey building.

While they are clearly talking about the suspected chemical attack, both say the bombing occurred on Sunday 8 April when it actually occurred on Saturday 7 April.

The two men say people were suffering from smoke inhalation, not chemical poisoning, but a panic began when one man said they were victims of a chemical attack.

"This is grotesque, it is a blatant lie, it is some of the worst pieces of fake news we've yet seen from the Russia propaganda machine," the UK's UN ambassador, Karen Pierce said.

In a statement, the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office said: "This simply shows (Russia's) desperation to pin the blame on anyone but their client: the Assad regime."

What are Western leaders planning?
In the UK, cabinet ministers agreed it was "highly likely" the Syrian government was responsible for the alleged attack and said the use of chemical weapons must not "go unchallenged".

The US president has said Russian President Vladimir Putin bears responsibility for the alleged attack in Douma because of his support for the Syrian government.

On Wednesday he warned Russia that missiles were "coming" but later tweeted that he had "never said when".

It "could be very soon or not so soon at all", Donald Trump said.

What can Macron and Trump do?
The significance of Eastern Ghouta's fall
Why is there a war in Syria?
What is Russia saying about the risk of war?
Before the Security Council meeting, Mr Nebenzia accused Washington of putting international peace at risk.

"The immediate priority is to avert the danger of war," he said on Thursday.

Senior Russian figures, including the head of the military, have warned that US missiles will be shot down and their launch sites targeted if Russian personnel come under threat.

After six weeks of heavy fighting and an estimated 1,700 civilian deaths in the Eastern Ghouta, rebels are now leaving the area.

Thousands of remaining Islamist fighters and civilians left on Friday.
 
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