WAR 03-18-2022-to-03-24-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

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(284) 02-25-2022-to-03-03-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(285) 03-04-2022-to-03-10-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(286) 03-11-2022-to-03-17-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****


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N. Korea says it conducted 2-day drills simulating tactical nuclear counterattack​

All News 07:03 March 20, 2023

SEOUL, March 20 (Yonhap) -- North Korea said Monday it conducted drills simulating a tactical nuclear counterattack against its enemies over the weekend, as the United States and South Korea are staging their joint annual military exercise.

The North's leader Kim Jong-un "guided" the exercises of its military units operating tactical nuclear weapons Saturday and Sunday, including a ballistic missile launch drill, according to the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). Photos carried by state media showed his daughter Ju-ae also oversaw the drills.

Kim called for fully establishing the country's readiness posture for nuclear attacks against its enemies, as the U.S. and the South have been "frantically" carrying out a "rehearsal of invasion" of the North, involving American military assets.

"We cannot deter the war only with the fact that we are a nuclear state. Only when we completes the country's readiness posture for nuclear attacks that can be operated swiftly and accurately at any time, we can fulfill the important, strategic mission of deterring war," Kim was quoted as saying by the KCNA.

The North said it conducted a drill to review the reliability of its tactical nuclear force Saturday.

On Sunday morning, the country held a ballistic missile launch drill simulating the country carrying out a tactical nuclear attack in a bid to check the operational reliability of its nuclear explosion control devices and detonators, according to the KCNA.

It said the missile, fired from Cholsan County, North Pyongan Province, precisely "exploded in the air" at a height of 800 meters above the East Sea, after flying 800 kilometers.

South Korea's military said Sunday it detected the firing of a short-range ballistic missile from the Tongchang-ri area in the North's western part toward the East Sea. It flew some 800 kilometers before splashing into the sea.

The Freedom Shield military exercise of the allies are under way in and around the peninsula, aimed at bolstering their defense posture against the North's evolving nuclear and missile threats.

sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
 

Housecarl

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Pakistan: Imran Khan’s Party Asks Shehbaz Govt If Giving Up Nuclear Arsenal Is IMF's Bailout Out Rider​

Ishaq Dar said the government must clarify if the IMF has asked the government to give up its missile system amid the ongoing talks between Pakistan and the IMF as a condition to secure an economic bailout.​

By: ABP News Bureau | Updated at : 19 Mar 2023 06:55 PM (IST)

Vice-Chairman of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Shah Mahmood Qureshi on Sunday asked Pakistan's Finance Minister Ishaq Dhar if the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had placed any demand, asking the government to give up nuclear weapons, reported news agency IANS.

Qureshi said the government must clarify if the IMF has asked the government to get rid of its nuclear missile systems amid the ongoing talks between Pakistan and the IMF as a condition to secure an economic bailout from the acute financial crisis that the nation is facing.

ALSO READ: 'Hope Delhi Police Probe Isn't Influenced By My Stand On Adani': Rahul Gandhi Replies To Cops

Earlier this week, Dar had informed the Senate that Pakistan would not compromise on its nuclear programme for reviving the stalled IMF loan facility, reported Geo News, as cited by IANS.


The Finance Minister was replying to Senator Rabbani's concerns that he raised during a senate session. Rabbani had asked whether the IMF programme was being delayed to force the government into taking actions that were against the interest of Pakistan.

Reacting to his concerns, Dar said nobody has any right to dictate to "Pakistan what range of missiles and what nuclear weapons it can have", reported IANS.

IANS quoted him as saying, "We have to have our own deterrence,"

ALSO READ: 'I Am Fine...Please Focus On Your Education': CM Kejriwal Conveys Sisodia's Message For Delhi's Students

Former Foreign Minister Qureshi said, "This statement has created a new crisis in the country.”

He said, "The spokeswoman says that talks about nuclear power are not on the agenda of talks with any country or financial institution. Then why did Ishaq Dar make this statement on the Senate floor," reported IANS.

Qureshi further asked, "Tell us if IMF asked you for a missile system, Ishaq Dar. Why did you make such a big statement on the floor of the House."

He also said that no one has the right to talk to us about our nuclear programme.

"Our nuclear [weapons] are for our defence," said Qureshi.

He also said that Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) Senator Raza Rabbani has also asked Prime Minister (Shehbaz Sharif) to issue a policy clarification on nuclear weapons and missile systems in Pakistan.

Published at : 19 Mar 2023 06:55 PM (IST)
 

Housecarl

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Why Arms Control Will Not Come Back Any Time Soon​

By Robert Peters
March 18, 2023

Vladimir Putin’s announcement on 21 February that Russia was suspending its participation in the New START treaty was unexpected, but unsurprising. As relations between the United States and Russia deteriorate as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the Russian announcement that it would no longer limit its nuclear arsenal shocked no one. Indeed, this was simply the latest in a series of announcements over the past two decades by Moscow or Washington that one of the two sides was withdrawing from arms control treaties.

In 2020, the United States withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty due to Russia repeatedly restricting overflight access to Kaliningrad, Moscow, and the Russian-Georgia border. In 2019, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty due to Russia’s repeated failure to comply with the treaty by fielding the very types of nuclear weapons the treaty prohibited. In 2015, Russia further pulled back from and suspended all participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, calling it anachronistic.

The impending demise of the New START treaty means that (aside from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT))we are entering a world without any nuclear arms control agreements—and that is unlikely to change anytime soon. While there were hopes among the arms control community that a treaty after New START was possible in 2026, that is hard to believe now.

Why such pessimism? There is little trust, great enmity, and a disparity of desires and interests over what to negotiate between the United States and Russia. China’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal also gives the United States particular reason to insist in Chinese inclusion in a future treaty.

After years of both sides claiming the other was cheating on arms control treaties (with the United States consistently making the better case) by blocking inspection and verification efforts or fielding systems that were in violation of both the spirit and the letter of the treaty, there is little trust of the other in Washington or Moscow.

Next, it is hard to overstate the enmity which both sides have, due to a variety of slights over the past two decades, from Putin’s 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference to Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia to concerns over Russia’s meddling in and disinformation campaigns during American elections. This enmity reached a boiling point with the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

All indications are that bad blood exists not just among the political class, but around the country as well. Bumper stickers and yard signs and t-shirts sporting the Ukrainian flag are seen not just on Capitol Hill and northern Virginia, but in towns across the country. When the Russians invaded Ukraine they also crossed a redline in the psyche of the American people. That action solidified their image as “the bad guys” in the American consciousness.

Most importantly, there is a real disparity in interests for a future arms control regime. The United States is concerned about the estimated 2000-plus non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in Russia’s arsenal—a number significantly higher that the approximately 200 American NSNW. It is hard to imagine the United States engaging in yet another nuclear arms control treaty that does not take NSNWs into account—particularly given that many of those weapons are theater range weapons that hold Europe at risk.

Given Russia’s embarrassingly poor showing in Ukraine, Moscow may believe that it must now rely even more heavily on its NSNW arsenal to deter the perceived threat from NATO. If somehow both sides were able to overcome the enmity for one another and trust that the other side will abide by treaty obligations and comply with treaty inspection and verification measures (all of which must happen before negotiations could even begin), what would the United States be willing to put on the table in order to induce Russia to consider giving up its NSNWs?

This is a hard question to answer, but it almost assuredly would include some combination of reduced American force presence in Europe and NATO, deep cuts to the American military’s precision guided munitions, and potentially capabilities in space. These cuts would not only undermine America’s ability to deter further Russian aggression but would undoubtedly hamper the ability to project force globally.

It is hard to believe that any American administration, Republican or Democrat, would agree to a nuclear arms control treaty that made significant cuts to these capabilities in exchange for dubious promises by Moscow to reduce Russian NSNWs, particularly given their penchant for cheating on arms treaties.

Even if an administration were to reach an agreement with the Russians on nuclear arms control, one that may require America to “give up the farm” to get Russia to dismantle the vast majority of its NSNW arsenal, how would that administration find the sixty-seven senators necessary to ratify that treaty? Convincing two out of every three senators to support such a treaty would prove a daunting endeavor.

While some might argue that multilateral arms control is a better venue for a more comprehensive reduction in global arsenals, the Chinese are unambiguous in their rejection of nuclear arms control discussions.

Finally, until there is a new regime in Moscow, one that is truly different and wants to work with the West and is not simply a “Putin2.0” regime, any nuclear arms control agreement is unlikely.

This is not to say that the sky is falling—while arms control can be a useful tool, particularly for strengthening strategic stability—arms control is not a goal in and of itself. Therefore, until there is a change of regime in Moscow, the United States should make a meaningful effort to understand the implications of a world without nuclear arms control.

The United States must consider the implications of a world without arms control for allied assurance. What does such a world mean for American force posture, conventional and nuclear, in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe? What should an American strategic (and non-strategic) nuclear arsenal look like?

Understanding these questions is critical as the United States enters a protracted period of global instability and challenges to the American led international order. In such a world, one must ask the question, is arms control even wise? Perhaps focusing on the building of an effective deterrent, both strategic and theater, is time better spent than trying to lay the groundwork for the treaty after New START.

Indeed, the idea that there is some path where the United States can bring Putin back to the negotiating table to hash out a mutually beneficial nuclear arms treaty is quixotic, at best.

The nation has more pressing issues to attend.


Bob Peters is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He previously spent a career at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, National Defense University, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
 

Housecarl

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Australian startup tapped to provide airborne hypersonic testing platform for Pentagon​

The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) announced that it has awarded contracts for its HyCAT program.
BY JON HARPER
MARCH 17, 2023

Australian startup Hypersonix Launch Systems has been selected by the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit to deliver a test vehicle for the hypersonic and high-cadence airborne testing capabilities (HyCAT) program, DIU announced Thursday.

The company from Down Under won out against heavy competition after more than 60 other companies responded to the solicitation for the project, which was released in September.

HyCAT aims to facilitate exploration of hypersonics technology as the U.S. Department of Defense faces testing infrastructure shortfalls. Current and former Pentagon officials have said the United States is lagging behind China in terms of capacity.

“Currently, testing is limited to land- and sea-based test ranges optimized for low-cadence and operationally-representative tests that replicate the trajectory and velocity of the hypersonic weapon system. However, testing is both costly, slow to iterate and test ranges are limited. The resulting slow pace of hypersonic research and development has significantly impacted the DoD’s ability to mature hypersonics technology and retain a competitive advantage,” DIU said in a release.

To address the problem, the Defense Department is looking for a suite of low-cost, airborne testing platforms that provide “data that accelerates the evaluation of potential systems, concepts, technologies, and mission sets.”

Under the recently awarded contact, Hypersonix Launch Systems will develop a vehicle “capable of operating in a ‘representative environment’ that can maintain speeds above Mach 5 with a maneuverable/non-ballistic flight profile and at least a 3-minute flight duration with near-constant flight conditions,” per the release.

The company is offerings its DART AE vehicle, which leverages 3D-printing technology and is powered by a hydrogen-fueled SPARTAN scramjet engine. The platform, which has a modular payload by of up to 20 pounds, we be able to fly non-ballistic flight patterns at speeds of up to Mach 7 with a range of 1,000 kilometers, according to the company.

The first test flight is slated for early 2024.

“Our longer-term focus is to capture a slice of the emerging multi-billion-dollar commercial market for deployment of small satellites, but clearly Australia’s strategic defence allies see immediate potential in our technology,” Hypersonix Managing Director David Waterhouse said in a statement. “This is our first major contract and a key step in our commercialisation process.”

The agreement permits DIU to issue follow-on production contracts under simplified rules and without having to recompete, according to Hypersonix.

On Thursday, DIU also announced a contract award to California-based Fenix Space, Inc., for its “reusable tow-launch platform.”

The company’s website says its technology provides “a launch pad in the sky” and can offer “on-demand launch” from existing airports and “enable rapid missions across land, sea and space.”

“By initiating tests at high altitudes, the platform bypasses the most fuel-intensive phase of the launch process, reducing costs and offering increased flexibility in operating locations and schedule responsiveness,” the DIU release said.

Both contracts were signed on March 3, a DIU spokesperson told DefenseScoop. The spokesperson declined to disclose the value of the contract awards, saying the organization leaves it up to companies to share that type of information.

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DIU is expecting at least one — and potentially two — additional contract awards for HyCAT 1, according to the spokesperson.

A complementary HyCAT effort — which will leverage the modular payload capability being developed in the first stage of the program to support prototype testing — will be awarded “in the next few months,” per the DIU release.

Testing of these types of hypersonics technologies is slated to take place within 12 to 18 months.

DIU, which is headquartered in Silicon Valley and has outposts in tech hubs across the United States, was stood up during the Obama administration to bring more innovators in the commercial sector into the Pentagon’s acquisition ecosystem.

“Commercial companies are forging ahead towards reusable and low-cost test vehicles,” DIU space portfolio program manager Maj. Ryan Weed said in a statement. “The HyCAT project represents a paradigm shift in viewing the hypersonic realm as a place for aircraft, not just missiles and weapons.”
 

Housecarl

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Turkey’s ANKA-3 Flying Wing Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Emerges​

Turkey’s ANKA-3 is a stealthy unmanned combat air vehicle that aims to fit within a growing locally-developed advanced air combat ecosystem.

BY TYLER ROGOWAY | PUBLISHED MAR 19, 2023 4:45 PM
THE WAR ZONE

growing locally-developed advanced air combat ecosystem.
BYTYLER ROGOWAY|PUBLISHED MAR 19, 2023 4:45 PM
THE WAR ZONE
Turkey’s ANKA-3 Flying Wing Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Emerges

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Just a day after Turkey's home-grown stealthy fighter aircraft was seen in full prior to its official rollout, yet another ambitious Turkish air combat aircraft has officially broken cover.

The Turkish Aircraft Industries (TAI) ANKA-3 MIUS (which stands for National Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle System in Turkish) is a low-observable flying wing unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV). The aircraft is roughly the size of a light fighter and is designed as a survivable, relatively long-endurance, strike, surveillance, and electronic warfare platform. Suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses are also said to be key intended roles for the ANKA-3. It's thought that ANKA-3 is envisioned to work in conjunction with Turkey's manned TF-X stealthy fighter for certain mission applications.

ANKA-3, which follows an increasingly diverse and advanced stable of Turkish drones, including the now famous Bayraktar TB2 family, features external hardpoints for munitions and fuel, as well internal weapons bays. It's powered by a single turbofan engine.

Turkey's Vice President Fuat Oktay stated the following about ANKA-3 in a budget-related speech in December of 2022:
“ANKA-3, with its jet engine and speed, high payload capacity, and tailless structure that is almost invisible on the radar, will open a new page in the field of UAVs. I hope we will continue to share the good news from our ANKA-3 MIUS project with our nation next year.”

View: https://twitter.com/fuatoktay/status/1603817592711413779?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1603817592711413779%7Ctwgr%5E2ef0c06367eccb64dee5730f591c4848cb9d3749%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fturkeys-flying-wing-unmanned-combat-air-vehicle-breaks-cover


It was reported recently that the type could begin test flights as soon as April, but it's unclear exactly what the timetable for its maiden flight is at this time. We should expect taxi tests soon, regardless.
anka-3-part-1.jpg

The only other renderings we have seen of the ANKA-3 previously, shown above and below, surfaced some time ago. There are notable differences between what they show and what TAI has now unveiled, but they appear to show the same general design.
TUSAS-ANKA-3-MIUSun-Ilk-Gorselleri-Paylasildi-1.jpg

The aircraft features a serrated dorsal air intake, as well as an auxiliary intake to its upper rear, near its engine exhaust, which appears to be a conventional, round type. A small aerial and another conformal type antenna are seen on this auxiliary intake. Two large pitot tubes are seen installed along its leading edge, and another is seen extending from its nose. Generally speaking, this is not an uncommon test configuration for flying wing UCAV-type aircraft.

What looks to be a pair of fuel tanks or weapons shapes are seen under its wings. A large conformal rectangle fairing and a round one in front of it appear to be a different skin texture than the rest of the airframe. It's unclear what exactly this is for but one possibility is that these are shrouds to cover antenna arrays. The planform overall is similar to Boeing's X-45C and Dassault's nEURon, although the overall aircraft is less refined.

View: https://youtu.be/FWB-5xVIbw8


We must state that perhaps more than other types of aircraft, stealthy flying wing drones are known to evolve through the testing process significantly. At first, low-observability is not essential to successful flight testing and other primary trials, so things like extra vents, antenna, pitot tubes, airframe surface refinement, and especially exhaust become far more refined in later iterations.

The exhaust, in particular, is among the hardest components of a low-observable aircraft to successfully realize, so a more basic exhaust can be used for initial testing. As predicted, we saw exactly this with Russia's Hunter-B UCAV. A more production-representative configuration emerged after basic flight testing and other trials were complete, which included a low-observable exhaust, among many other refinements.

View: https://youtu.be/w_qCLl5sZxE


The big takeaway here is that Turkey is working on fielding a stealthy flying wing UCAV that puts more of a premium on low observability than high performance. The aircraft is an intriguing counterpart to the recently unveiled fighter-like Bayraktar Kizilelma drone that is already in flight testing.

These two types could provide an intriguing mix of advanced unmanned aerial combat capabilities to the Turkish Air Force, and potentially export customers, if they can prove their intended capabilities in testing. One is more of a high-performance concept with some low-observable features. The other design is less kinematic performance-minded, but its designers have put a premium put on survivability and persistence.

View: https://youtu.be/rwJ7fyvexGc


Currently, China and Russia both have fully disclosed active flying wing UCAV programs — the former has multiple types under development. The United States, on the other hand, has no such program declared as being under development. Instead, the focus has been on collaborative teaming aircraft that are mainly either highly cost-conscious or of higher performance. Industry has pointed to a more traditional UCAV as an option for the U.S. Air Force's future unmanned air combat ecosystem, but there is no indication the service will take this route. Of course, we don't know what is going on in the classified realm, but at this point, a traditional UCAV in that space would be problematic as it would only represent a research and development effort or a very low-density operational capability.

The reality is that the relevance of a flying wing UCAV was proven 20 years ago and looked to be the biggest revolution in aerial combat since stealth technology or even perhaps the jet engine. After it seemed like these aircraft would be a central fixture of the USAF's near-term future, they totally disappeared from view. Even any mention of this class of unmanned aircraft was wiped from pretty much all of the USAF's documentation and talking points. The U.S. Navy proceeded with the X-47B carrier-borne UCAV demonstrator tests, which were highly successful, but it too was puzzlingly abandoned. Instead, the Navy pursued a far less ambitious carrier-based unmanned tanker, the MQ-25 Stingray.

This absolutely bewildering situation — which has had huge impacts on force structure — and what it all really means was the focus of a 2016 War Zone expose you can read in full here. While the USAF may get a traditional UCAV in significant numbers in the future, it is easy to argue this is many years too late and that oversight has done serious damage to Pentagon's air combat supremacy.

Regardless, Turkey clearly isn't waiting around to realize its unmanned aircraft desires as it charges forward with its indigenous air combat aircraft initiatives. Yet another aircraft that was seen out on the tarmac at TAI's plant in Ankara yesterday was the country's new HÜRJET advanced jet trainer that can also provide light fighter capabilities. It is also intended to be Turkey's first self-produced supersonic aircraft.

View: https://twitter.com/Roberto05246129/status/1637153215664799747?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1637153215664799747%7Ctwgr%5E2ef0c06367eccb64dee5730f591c4848cb9d3749%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fturkeys-flying-wing-unmanned-combat-air-vehicle-breaks-cover


View: https://twitter.com/NasserF15QA/status/1637352911888891906?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1637352911888891906%7Ctwgr%5E2ef0c06367eccb64dee5730f591c4848cb9d3749%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fturkeys-flying-wing-unmanned-combat-air-vehicle-breaks-cover


These four aircraft — TF-X, ANKA-3, Bayraktar Kizilelma, and HÜRJET — combined represent a new era of promise for Turkey's aerospace industry and its air arm's tactical capabilities. Fulfilling that promise is an entirely different story, though. All of these projects individually could be riddled with potential pitfalls. Major hurdles exist at every turn and it's not just about the airframe. Software development and subsystem integration are among the biggest challenges. For the stealthy types, everything from low-probability of intercept sensors and advanced communications to radar absorbent coatings and all the processes that go with those factors, just to name a few, must be developed and realized on an operational level. Even reduced signature aircraft, not high-end low-observable ones, will have to overcome some of these issues. Access to engine technology is another potential issue. But if Turkey can turn these aircraft into real and relevant capabilities, it would be a massive accomplishment.

View: https://twitter.com/miguyan2000/status/1637139256077438976?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1637139256077438976%7Ctwgr%5E2ef0c06367eccb64dee5730f591c4848cb9d3749%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fturkeys-flying-wing-unmanned-combat-air-vehicle-breaks-cover


Still, what Turkey needs now is fully capable fighters, and it continues to pursue new F-16s, although Washington's approval hasn't flowed freely. This is due to a number of geopolitical factors, including Turkey's sticking with its S-400 SAM system buy from Russia, a move that got it kicked out of the F-35 program. Getting fighters from Russia is a non-starter now and even if they could, the performance of Russian tactical aircraft in Ukraine has been so poor, it's unlikely Turkey would want them. Making matters worse, the backlog of F-16 orders is substantial and could grow significantly larger in the near term. In the meantime, Turkey is extending the life of its F-16 fleet.

If F-16s can be had as a bridge, Turkey will have time to realize what would be a far more independent high-performance air combat inventory of the future. If that vision comes true it could come with considerable export success, as well.

Contact the author: Tyler@thedrive.com
 

jward

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Donald Trump Jr.
@DonaldJTrumpJr
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What the hell is going on in Mexico? They can’t capture narco terrorists or stop fentanyl trafficking, but they can send the military to seize an American company’s property?


Vulcan Facility Seizure Adds to Tension Between US and Mexico​


Max de Haldevang​


March 19, 2023 at 4:14 PM CDT

The seizure of a US company’s marine terminal in Mexico has drawn criticism from a US senator and risks sparking more tension between the two nations amid spats over energy and security.
US construction firm Vulcan Materials alleges that armed forces, including from the Mexican government, launched a takeover of its facility in the country’s southeast on Tuesday. The company says a federal judge in Mexico has ordered a stay on any government effort to confiscate the property. That order could not be independently verified.
View: https://twitter.com/Cliff_Sims/status/1637599663342727174?s=20



paywall.
 

jward

passin' thru

Air Force Should Double Its B-21 Purchase Plans, Think Tank Says​


Audrey Decker​


The B-21 Raider is unveiled during a ceremony at Northrop Grumman's Air Force Plant 42 in Palmdale, California, on December 2, 2022.

The B-21 Raider is unveiled during a ceremony at Northrop Grumman's Air Force Plant 42 in Palmdale, California, on December 2, 2022. FREDERIC J. BROWN/AFP via Getty Images

A prominent airpower think tank says the U.S. Air Force must more than double its planned purchase of a minimum of 100 B-21 bombers if it is to win a war against China.

A total of more than 300 bombers would be needed, including 225 of the recently unveiled B-21 plus several dozen B-1s and B-52s, said Mark Gunzinger, a retired Air Force colonel who leads future concepts and capability assessments at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, part of the Air & Space Forces Association industry group.
As well, planned production of B-21s should be sped up to 20 per year from the planned eight or nine, Gunzinger told reporters on Thursday ahead of the rollout of a new Mitchell Institute report on the topic.
“More resources can buy back future risk and that's what a more aggressive acquisition rate for the B-21 can do,” Gunzinger said.

The report says the Air Force lacks enough aircraft with the range, payload, and stealth to fight China. It also asserts that declining to double B-21 production will cost more than the planes’ purchase price.
“Throttling B-21 acquisition during this critical period will increase the risk of a conflict with an opportunistic China that would result in costs that exceed any temporary program savings,” it said.
Out of the service’s $185.1 billion 2024 spending request, nearly $3 billion will go to the B-21 program. Service officials said the budget procures “more than one” B-21, but declined to say the exact number.
Buying sufficient B-21s “will require avoiding the same kind of budget-driven decisions that eroded nearly all the service’s advanced combat aircraft purchases since the Cold War, as in the case of the B-2, the F-22, and now the F-35A,” the report said.
The Air Force had intended to buy more than 100 B-2s, but only ended up buying 21 of the $2 billion-a-copy stealth bombers.
The B-21 is part of the Air Force’s current effort to replace most of its nuclear delivery weapons, including its ICBMs.
Unveiled in December, the B-21 is expected to make its first flight later this year. While the schedule has slipped “by a few months,” it remains within the program’s “baseline schedule,” Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said on Wednesday at the annual McAleese and Associates Defense Programs conference.
“I hope we can hold that schedule,” Kendall said.

In this 2020 photo, then-Lt. Gen. Michael Kurilla, now commander of U.S. Central Command, testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee in Washington, D.C.

In this 2020 photo, then-Lt. Gen. Michael Kurilla, now commander of U.S. Central Command, testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee in Washington, D.C. Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post via Getty Images


From Chinese firms grabbing a larger share of regional arms sales to Iran’s nuclear efforts, the Middle East is becoming an increasingly challenging security environment, the U.S. general who oversees operations there said Thursday.
Chinese military exports have increased by 80 percent in a decade, said Gen. Michael Kurilla, who leads U.S. Central Command. In the Middle East, these sales have eaten into U.S. market share, said Kurilla, who put some of the blame on Pentagon red tape. While just five percent of U.S. foreign military sales “don’t go to plan,” Kurilla said, most of those cases are in the Middle East.

Chinese military sales representatives, by contrast, make things easy for buyers. They “open their entire catalog, they give them express shipping. They give them no end user agreement, and they give them financing,” Kurilla said, speaking at a hearing of the Senate Armed Forces Committee. “They’re much faster.”
Still, Kurilla said, U.S. partners would prefer to buy U.S. products for their quality and maintenance, adding that the “vast majority” of Chinese weapons are not fit for purpose a year or more after they’re acquired.

U.S. companies still dominate the Mideast arms market, accounting for 54 percent of imports between 2018 and 2022, according to the most recent global-arms report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. They also dominate the global market, accounting for 40 percent of world exports over the past five years. U.S. arms exports rose 14 percent over the past decade—including a 49 percent rise year-over-year rise in 2022, largely due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Threats from Iran have also increased in the last two years, Kurilla said, citing their progress on enriching uranium, their funding of proxy forces, and drone attacks on neighbors.
Kurilla said Iran proxy groups continue to attack U.S. troops—including a rocket strike by Iranian-backed forces on U.S. troops in Syria less than 60 hours previously. The statement appeared to confirm reports that a March 13 rocket attack on U.S. troops was carried out by Iranian-backed militants.

Kurila also indicated that the capabilities of the ISIS terrorist group had risen.
Discussing ISIS’s Afghanistan branch, ISIS-K, Kurilla said that the group would need less than six months to pull off any attack abroad, although it would need longer for any attack on the United States.
That’s a shorter timeline than Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl gave in October 2021, when he said the group would need at least six months to a year to launch an attack outside of Afghanistan.
U.S. forces have conducted one strike on ISIS-K forces, Kurilla said, and revealed that the U.S. had also conducted two “non-kinetic” operations on ISIS-K.

Access to Afghanistan, though, is a problem. The U.S. is now trying to field high-altitude surveillance assets that can spend weeks observing Afghanistan, with Kurilla saying that U.S. airborne reconnaissance was spending 80 percent of its time just getting to the region.
Kurilla also called out Russia’s increasingly aggressive behavior, where it has maintained a presence since its 2015 intervention in the Syrian civil war. Beginning March 1, Russian ground-attack aircraft began to more frequently buzz U.S. troops, often with weapons attached to their wings, Kurilla said.

News of the buzzing incidents follow a Russian jet’s collision with a U.S. drone over the Black Sea on Tuesday, which resulted in the drone’s destruction. While the U.S. was still determining whether the strike was intentional, the incident fell into a pattern of more aggressive interactions with Russian forces, said Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.......

Posted for fair use.....

LAUNCH UNDER ATTACK: A SWORD OF DAMOCLES​

NATALIE MONTOYA AND R. SCOTT KEMP
MARCH 17, 2023
COMMENTARY

On Jan. 10, 1984, a guidance computer in a U.S. Minuteman-III missile suffered a glitch. As a result, operators in the nearby command center received a message that the missile, aimed at Russia, was entering its launch sequence all on its own. It carried three nuclear warheads. Security forces scrambled to park a truck on top of the silo lid in an attempt to prevent the missile from launching. While the officer in charge later disclaimed that there was a real risk, the truck-parking procedure was in place because the risk of inadvertent launch was understood to be nonzero. This begs the question: Are Russian missiles guaranteed never to launch themselves? Are their missileers perfectly reliable? If the answer is no, then why does the United States maintain a policy that risks starting a nuclear war in the event something goes wrong?

Since the 1960s, the United States has deployed nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles in concrete silos. Barring an almost direct hit, the silo is designed to protect the missile from the crushing overpressure of nuclear explosions so that it can be used for retaliation. In addition to this physical protection, the United States maintains a posture it calls “launch under attack,” a doctrine that permits U.S. missiles to be loosed from their shelters after “multiple, independent sensors” detect an incoming attack from an adversary. The notional purpose of this policy is to provide extra assurance that U.S. silo-based missiles will not be destroyed, silo protections notwithstanding.

Launch under attack proponents argue that this posture improves strategic stability. We argue it does the opposite. A better description of the policy would be “launch on warning.” While multiple sensors are used, those sensors cannot discern whether the warheads on incoming missiles are armed. Because the posture forces a decision before these missiles land, it leaves the president somewhere between zero and 20 minutes to guess at whether the electronic warning messages received constitute an actual attack. This is scant time and an imperfect basis for definitively committing to a civilization-ending nuclear war.

Such a gamble might be deemed necessary if the United States were at risk of losing its weapons from a first strike — a nuclear Pearl Harbor, as the policy’s proponents like to say — but this is not a reality. We argue from published data about missile accuracies and silo hardness that silos will work, and U.S. missiles will survive. In fact, because of a technical twist, the U.S. deterrent force may be stronger after the attack than before it, when measured as weapons available per target. This implies that launch under attack does not provide any additional deterrent against a first strike.

At the same time, there are many historical examples of early-warning systems generating false alarms or computer-generated messages pretending to be actual warnings. When combined with a launch-on-warning posture, these glitches create real risks of accidental war. It is thus not surprising that four-star generals George Lee Butler, Eugene E. Habiger, and James Cartwright — all of whom served as commander of U.S. Strategic Command — have argued forcefully that the United States should abandon its launch under attack policy. Both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama called for severely reducing or eliminating the capacity, stating that it created unacceptable risks. As a candidate, President Bush also argued that the United States should not wait for Russia to reciprocate “because it is in our best interest and the best interest of the world” to act unilaterally. However, U.S. policy remains unchanged.

President Joe Biden’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review released in October maintains the status quo, but it also confesses that the policy is not needed, stating: “…while the United States maintains the capability to launch nuclear forces under conditions of an ongoing nuclear attack, it does not rely on a launch-under-attack policy to ensure a credible response. Rather, U.S. nuclear forces are postured to withstand an initial attack.” Our simulations support this finding. Even under the most pessimistic assumptions, about 100-200 missiles are expected to survive in their silos — more than enough to inflict severe damage on an adversary.

Silo Survivability Simulations

The scenarios investigated in our work were based on the assertion made in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review that “To destroy U.S. ICBMs [silo-based missiles] on the ground, an adversary would need to launch a precisely coordinated attack with hundreds of high-yield and accurate warheads. This is an insurmountable challenge for any potential adversary today, with the exception of Russia.”

Following this view, we developed four attack scenarios in which Russia targets each of the 400 U.S. silos with one warhead, two warheads, three warheads, and finally all of its deployed ballistic missiles (in silos, on road-mobile launchers, and on submarines). We used probabilistic computer simulations of missile accuracy and blast effects to estimate the number of silos that would survive the attack, and ran 10,000 simulations for each attack scenario. (Details of missile accuracy and warhead yields are available in supplemental information). Most Russian ballistic missiles carry multiple warheads on independently targeted reentry vehicles, which imposes constraints on a Russian attack because there is a physical limit to how far apart the individual warheads carried by the same missile can be targeted. Our simulations target the individual warheads to optimize their performance.

The findings for each of the four attack profiles are shown in Figure 1. In each case, we assumed unrealistically high performance for Russia’s weapons. Our findings therefore overestimated the damage Russia could do to U.S. nuclear forces. Specifically, our calculations assumed Russian missiles would suffer no launch failures, duds, navigation errors, flight-control errors, or any other failure that would prevent them from reaching their targets. We also assumed zero fratricide, which is to say Russia’s nuclear detonations would not disrupt other incoming Russian warheads. The smallest attack left the United States with 205 ± 9 missiles, which is just over half of the existing force. The largest attack left 102 ± 9 missiles. In addition to these silo-based missiles, the United States would still retain about 1,000 nuclear warheads deployed on submarine-based missiles, and hundreds more to be delivered by bombers.



Surviving_Silos.jpg


Figure 1: Results of simulated attacks on U.S. missile silos by Russian deployed ballistic missiles 1-, 2- and 3-warheads per silo, as well as all ballistic missiles (214 silos targeted at 3-to-1 and 186 silos targeted 4-to-1). Error bars are 95 percent confidence intervals.
Under the brinkmanship construct, the ability to deter Russia’s first strike rests on its assessment of both the probability that the United States would decide to retaliate as well as the damage inflicted by that retaliation. With respect to a decision to retaliate, adding launch under attack would not change anything. If the attack were genuine, the United States would respond. Launch under attack does make a decision to use weapons more probable, but only for the subset of cases where the early warning system gave a false alarm — exactly those cases where such a decision would be in error.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

That leaves the question of whether the retaliation that the United States could inflict after riding out an attack is comparable to that under launch under attack. Leaving aside U.S. submarines, the number of silo-based missiles remaining would in all cases be sufficient to execute the planned catastrophic damage to Russia’s war-making ability.

First, consider the case where the United States launched all of its silo-based missiles on warning of an incoming, large-scale attack. The Russian arsenal accounts for 138 “counterforce” targets (126 silos, seven mobile missile bases, three nuclear bomber bases, and two nuclear missile submarine bases). To compensate for imperfect accuracy and reliability, each aim point would likely be covered by multiple warheads, as evidenced by declassified Cold War plans. Geographically large targets, like bases, often have multiple aim points. Assuming two warheads per aim point, and that bases have two aim points each while silos have just one, the counterforce targets alone require 300 of the 400 available U.S. silo-based missiles. This would leave 100 weapons for the remaining non-missile counterforce targets, leadership targets, and strategic elements of Russia’s war-making capability such as industry.

Now consider the case after an all-out Russian attack in which the United States did not launch its missile on warning. The 300 counter-missile targets are no longer meaningful targets, since Russia used those weapons in its attack. The other types of targets remain, but now the United States can be expected to have, in the worst case, 102 warheads for these targets where the initial plan designated 100. The situation for the United States is nearly the same regardless of whether the land-based missiles were launched on warning of an incoming attack or not. The remaining U.S. land-based missile force would therefore be adequate to perform its original mission. Moreover, the hundreds of additional submarine- and bomber-based weapons would continue to provide an excellent deterrent against other adversaries or any rebuilt Russian force.

The Counterargument

Given these findings — which we assume are known to military planners — as well as longstanding criticism from former presidents and Strategic Command commanders, the perpetuation of the launch under attack option is curious. The last five Nuclear Posture Reviews have defended the policy using largely identical language:

From the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review: “U.S. forces are not on ‘hair trigger’ alert and rigorous safeguards exist to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapons safety, security, reliability, and command and control. Multiple, stringent procedural and technical safeguards are in place to guard against U.S. accidental and unauthorized launch. ”
20 years later, the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review provides basically the same defense: “U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are not on ‘hair trigger’ alert. These forces are on day-to-day alert, a posture that contributes to strategic stability. Forces on day-to-day alert are subject to multiple layers of control, and the United States maintains rigorous procedural and technical safeguards to prevent misinformed, accidental, or unauthorized launch.”
Unfortunately, these defenses are naive to the kinds of failures that can emerge in complex systems.

The United States uses “dual phenomenology” to assess missile launches prior to launching a retaliatory strike. As the name suggests, it depends on two independent sensor systems to provide warning of incoming ballistic missiles: The Space Based-Infrared System satellites detect missile launches, and the Upgraded Early Warning Radars track incoming missiles. To fulfill the requirements of dual phenomenology, an incoming missile must be detected by both satellite and radar. While this is a useful safeguard, it does not provide any assurance that the incoming missile carries a nuclear weapon or that those weapons are armed. For instance, missile flight tests are conducted unarmed, and Russia has conducted flight tests from Dombarovsky, which also hosts some of Russia’s silo-based missile forces. An accidental launch from that field may be an unarmed missile. There are other scenarios as well.

Once sensor information is received and evaluated, the alert is advanced up the chain of command through multiple “conferences” until it reaches the president. These conferences are intended to avoid mistakes. However, the whole process leaves only a few minutes to make critical decisions. The president would have at most 20 minutes for incoming land-based missiles and as little as zero minutes for Russian submarine-based missiles based near the United States to decide whether to retaliate. Particularly for Russia’s submarine-based missiles, this timeline is extremely tight, which puts immense pressure on all involved — all without knowing the intent, character, or payload of the incoming missiles. Even if these procedures constitute “rigorous procedural and technical safeguards,” the fact remains that sensors provide unacceptably incomplete information on which to base nuclear war.

Perhaps the biggest risk arises from nonrandom errors, like the one that occurred on Nov. 9, 1979, when North American Aerospace Defense Command received sensor warnings of incoming missiles. The early-warning system showed 250 and then 2,200 missiles incoming from the Soviet Union. The problem was not a technical malfunction: Rather, a training tape was accidentally left in place, and it simulated the information needed to confirm that the launches were authentic.

In addition to human error, there may be common-mode technical failures in electronics or software. Depending on where these occur, they may give the appearance of detections confirmed by redundant sensor systems. For example, on June 3, 1980, a circuit chip failure caused North American Aerospace Defense Command screens to display 200 incoming missiles rather than 000. A similar glitch was responsible for triggering the apparent self-launch of a U.S. missile mentioned at the start of this article.

The only way to be confident that the United States is being attacked with a nuclear weapon is to wait until sensors detect an actual detonation. Unpleasant as that may seem, it bears remembering that whether the United States launches its retaliation before or after the detonation does not change the number of detonations over U.S. soil. Launch under attack cannot reduce U.S. causalities, but it could increase them by unintentionally initiating a nuclear war that didn’t exist. With the stakes so high and missile survivability already adequate, it would be prudent to wait until detonations are confirmed.

A Technical Imperative?

Prior to his becoming Secretary of Defense in 2017, Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis argued that the silo-based missiles were not needed because U.S. submarines were undetectable and would therefore always be capable of retaliation. Proponents of launch under attack now argue that advances in technology could make the submarines at sea vulnerable to attack. While it is true that vulnerable submarines could undermine America’s retaliatory capability, we have shown here that retaliation does not need to hinge on the availability of submarines: Plenty of silo-based missiles will survive. Moreover, there is no evidence that submarines are becoming vulnerable, but if they did, and if Russian forces improved to such a point that enough U.S. silo-based missiles were genuinely at risk, then the Lunch Under Attack policy could always be reinstated.

By contrast, the technical landscape that is actually emerging today suggests it might be time to look beyond Launch Under Attack, because it provides insufficient protection. Increasingly, U.S. adversaries are fielding delivery vehicles that are undetectable by the current suite of sensors, namely cruise missiles and hypersonic vehicles. Without the ability to detect and track all possible delivery vehicles, assured retaliation will require the use of other sources of intelligence beyond the sensors used for dual phenomenology. Thus, the logic of launch on warning, and the technical systems propping up that policy, provides a veil of strong protection but actually falls short of what is now needed.

Similarly, over-reliance on this system leaves the United States under-prepared for detection failures. For example, anti-satellite weapons, including simple ground-based lasers, could disable early-warning satellites. Without satellite detection, the requirements of dual phenomenology could not be fulfilled. It is unclear what would happen at this point. Would the launch under attack policy degenerate to a one-phenomenon launch policy? In that situation, it would take longer for incoming missiles to come within range of the radars, so decision makers would have even less time to evaluate missile threats, on top of needing to assess whether the blinded sensors were caused by a technical malfunction, a hostile act by the attacker, or a third party aiming to introduce confusion. Instead of holding fast to the idea of immediate launch, it is far sounder to build a nuclear capability that can survive a first strike and for which decision-makers are not pressed to make decisions with incomplete information. Fortunately, that condition already exists today, and such a launch policy should be implemented now.

Bottom Line

The United States currently maintains the option to launch under attack so that in the event of first strike by Russia, U.S. silo-based missiles could be launched before they are be destroyed. However, our simulations find that 100-200 silo-based missiles would survive, which would likely leave the United States with more warheads per retaliatory target than before the Russian strike. As such, the United States would suffer no meaningful loss of capability and should update its policy to eliminate the Launch Under Attack option in order to reduce risks of accidental nuclear war caused by technical glitches, human error, or cyber-attack. Revising this policy does not lock the United States into any particular posture: If technologies change, the policy could be reinstated. In the meantime, the United States should strive to deploy a more robust, less provocative, and less dangerous system that is better tuned to emerging threats. There has not yet been a false alarm that prompted an actual nuclear launch, but there’s no need to bet the entire world on the hope it will never happen.



BECOME A MEMBER


Natalie Montoya is a technical associate at the Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy in the Department of Nuclear Science & Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Previously, Natalie was the 2021–2022 James C. Gaither Junior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

R. Scott Kemp is associate professor of nuclear science and engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and director of the Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.......(In light of Xi's visit with Putin in Moscow...And as always consider the article source. HC.)

Posted for fair use......

Russia Helping China Speed Up Its Nuclear Buildup. U.S. Unprepared to Counter It.​

Mar 20, 2023 4 min read

Commentary By

Patty-Jane Geller@pj_geller
Senior Policy Analyst, Center for National Defense
russia-helping-china-speed-its-nuclear-buildup-us-unprepared-counter-it

Jack Kraemer
Spring 2023 Member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation

KEY TAKEAWAYS​

Policymakers are increasingly concerned about evidence of increasing cooperation between the United States’ two greatest adversaries, Russia and China.

The more fuel Russia provides, the more plutonium China can produce. And the more plutonium China can produce, the more nuclear weapons it can build.

The United States will need to compete in the nuclear arena to prevent China from surging ahead and gaining nuclear advantages.

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Policymakers are increasingly concerned about evidence of increasing cooperation between the United States’ two greatest adversaries, Russia and China.

While recent discussion has focused on China providing Russia with lethal aid to support its aggression in Ukraine, a potentially more dangerous element to this budding relationship has just come into public view: Russian support for China’s nuclear buildup.

China is pursuing a significant nuclear expansion as part of its strategy to supplant the U.S. as the leading global power. It recently surpassed the United States in its number of long-range missile launchers, it has tested new and novel nuclear technologies, and it is now projected to possess at least as many nuclear weapons as the U.S. does by 2035, if not sooner.

Central to this nuclear buildup is China’s need for nuclear material; namely, plutonium.

Historically, China operated two nuclear power plants capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. The two plants were shut down in 1984 and 1989, respectively, leaving China with only a limited stockpile of plutonium. But at that time, China still maintained its historic posture of “minimum deterrence,” possessing just a very limited arsenal of nuclear weapons.

With its newfound nuclear ambitions, China must remedy its limited access to plutonium. As part of the effort, China has been constructing new fast-breeder reactors called the CFR-600. While China claims these reactors serve civilian purposes, they are also equally capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium.

Compared with a typical nuclear reactor that utilizes the energy from nuclear fission to power a generator or create electricity, a fast-breeder reactor can be designed to maximize the output of plutonium from the fission reactions. For that reason, these reactors are useful for nuclear weapons programs.

That’s where Russia enters the picture.

Recent reports reveal that Russia, through its state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, has been providing fuel for China’s new fast-breeder reactors. China is thought to have already purchased more than 25,000 kilograms (55,000 pounds) of fuel for a price of $384 million since shipments from Russia began arriving in September.

Nuclear collaboration between Russia and China is not entirely new. It dates back to the 1950s, when the Soviet Union provided materials and technical assistance to China’s fledging nuclear program. While tensions developed between the two states for much of the rest of the Cold War, causing nuclear aid to stop, they resumed cooperation in the 21st century.

This time, the implications of Russia’s aid to China’s plutonium reactors are quite significant. For starters, it proves that when Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping declared a “no limits” partnership in February 2022, they really meant it.

Perhaps worse, this development means that the more fuel Russia provides, the more plutonium China can produce. And the more plutonium China can produce, the more nuclear weapons it can build.

China is already on track to multiply the size of its stockpile over the next several years, and it’s moving faster than the U.S. had expected. In 2020, the Pentagon predicted China would double its stockpile by the end of the decade, but by the end of 2022, it had already done so. With Russian help, China might be able to accelerate this buildup even further.

Given the state of geopolitics, any advancing relationship between Russia, a country with significant nuclear experience and an abundance of nuclear material, and China, an aspiring nuclear superpower with money to spend, comes with great risk.

Meanwhile, as Russia supports China’s efforts to crank out more nuclear weapons, the United States has no similar capability to produce the cores of weapons-grade plutonium needed for new nuclear weapons, called plutonium pits.
In fact, the U.S. is the only nuclear weapons state without this capability.

The U.S. Energy Department is pursuing a project to ultimately be able to produce 80 of these plutonium pits per year, but it has been delayed, and will not be complete until after 2030. And even then, at first it will produce enough pits only to replace current aging warheads, rather than expand the inventory.

To avoid falling behind China, the U.S. needs to significantly progress on this program.

Whether the United States is prepared to admit it or not, it’s becoming increasingly clear that it will need to compete in the nuclear arena to prevent China from surging ahead and gaining nuclear advantages.

Combined with the threats posed by a recalcitrant Russia, the U.S. needs to strengthen its nuclear deterrent to ensure it retains a strategic edge against these increasingly hostile adversaries.

This piece originally appeared in The Daily Signal
 

jward

passin' thru

Marine littoral regiment fends off traditional regiment in exercise​


Irene Loewenson​


The 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment — the first unit of its kind — isn’t set to reach initial operational capability until the fall. But a recent exercise, in which the 3rd MLR helped prevent a more traditional force from claiming terrain, demonstrated that it’s already an effective unit, a Marine two-star said.

“It’s not capable of everything we set out and designed, but it is a capable operational unit [that] can sense and target and operate under the stand-in force concept,” Maj. Gen. Jay Bargeron, commanding general of 3rd Marine Division, told Marine Corps Times. “We have capability today. We will have more next month, we’ll have more next year, but we have capability today.”

The Hawaii-based 3rd MLR is the first unit testing out the Marine Corps’ concept of the stand-in force — a unit positioned within a contested area that works to sense an adversary, and sometimes fire at it, while avoiding being sensed itself.
It was conceived with the potential for conflict with China clearly in mind. The littoral Marines could quietly move onto an island in a Pacific archipelago, surveil enemy forces and pass information on to U.S. aircraft, ships or submarines. They also have new capabilities to take out enemy assets themselves.
Previously called the 3rd Marine Regiment, it was redesignated as the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment, under 3rd MARDIV in March 2022 to reflect the unit’s focus on close-to-shore operations. The Marine Corps has already announced plans for another littoral regiment to be based on Okinawa, Japan.

This was the 3rd MLR’s eighth exercise, according to a Marine news release from January. During the Rim of the Pacific exercise in summer 2022, the regiment showed off its ability to protect ships attempting to move through a strait.,
But Marine Littoral Regiment Training Exercise, as February’s exercise was called, was the first time the regiment conducted a training exercise integrated into a larger Marine air-ground task force.
The exercise was broken up into three phases.
First, units within the 3rd MLR — the combat team, the anti-air battalion and the logistics battalion — practiced technical skills as individual components.

Next, small teams of Marines spread out across bases southern California, including San Clemente Island, to practice command and control. Expeditionary advanced base operations, as these kinds of distributed, forward-positioned missions are called, comprise one of the key concepts of Force Design 2030, the Marine Corps’ modernization effort.
In the final phase, a 3rd MARDIV-led stand-in force, which included the 3rd MLR, engaged in simulated battle with enemy forces aboard Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms. Gen. David Berger, the Marine commandant, attended that portion of the exercise, as The New York Times reported.

The stand-in force’s job was to defend key terrain from the so-called assault force, the rival Marine air-ground task force that included the Twentynine Palms-based 7th Marine Regiment.
The assault force was tasked with seizing three objectives. It seized none of them.
But the attacking force was operating with a critical vulnerability, Bargeron acknowledged. “They gotta come to us.”
It’s tough terrain in the desert, Bargeron said of 29 Palms, who knows the area well after previously serving as the commanding officer of 7th Marines.

“There’s some distances there that had to be covered — logistically supporting a unit like that while they’re trying to cover those distances is tough,” he said. “And every time they move, we’re looking for them. And we have ways of seeing them when they move,” namely through unmanned aerial systems.
The 3rd MLR’s long-range precision fires and short-range air defense were key parts of the effort to fend off the assault force, Bargeron added. And it helped that the stand-in force had a Marine special operations platoon that lurked near the enemy to provide data to the 3rd MLR and headquarters.
Perhaps more important than 3rd MLR’s successes, however, was how the exercise showed which areas are most in need of improvement.

The regiment needs to work on logistics, according to Bargeron, especially its ability to pull resupplies from sister services. It needs to get better at airspace command and control, he added. And it needs to link up its sensors with each other and with the joint force.

Bargeron stressed that the stand-in force has to improve its ability to communicate with the intermediate headquarters, which performs command and control for the force and integrates with the fleet headquarters.
“So, basically, how to work together,” Bargeron said. “We haven’t done that in this way in a while at this scale.”
Next up for the 3rd MLR is Balikatan 2023, a joint exercise between the U.S. and Philippine militaries in April.
Irene Loewenson is a staff reporter for Marine Corps Times. She joined Military Times as an editorial fellow in August 2022. She is a graduate of Williams College, where she was the editor-in-chief of the student newspaper.
 

jward

passin' thru

It’s Time to Take Women’s Role in Armed Conflict Seriously​


Hilary Matfess, Meredith Loken​

rather silly/woke topic in the main, but an interesting tidbit or two in there re: what lvl o' female participation exists in various groups. . .

Many popular accounts of women’s experiences during war exoticize and decontextualize female fighters, while underscoring women’s vulnerability and victimhood at the expense of their agency. Though academics have long pointed to the shortcomings of these narratives, they have persisted in much of the popular media coverage of women in conflict.

For instance, reporting on women who joined ISIS in Iraq and Syria still often refers to them as “jihadi brides,” as though they are harmless groupies following “real” jihadists, rather than acknowledging the possibility that they are active and ideologically driven participants in a violent movement. Many women fighters in Sierra Leone and Angola were similarly labeled and treated by government officials and international NGOs as “dependents.”

Narratives depicting women who have participated in armed insurgencies as less political—and less important—than men can have high costs. For example, women are often ignored or forgotten during post-conflict demobilization and reintegration programs, in part, perhaps, because these narratives affect how international, nongovernmental and local organizations view them. In the cases of Sierra Leone and Angola, the “dependent” classification meant that many women did not receive benefits—such as cash, support for education and help procuring work—provided to combatants. Without reintegration assistance, some of these women end up relying on illicit work, including sex work, and living in poverty. This is particularly true of women who may not have weapons to surrender, despite the fact that many women take on a mix of armed and unarmed roles during conflict.

A more holistic understanding of women’s contributions to armed groups is therefore necessary for those interested in providing support to women in conflict-affected contexts as well as those seeking to understand the capabilities and strategies of armed actors. This is what we set out to provide with our new project, the Women’s Activities in Armed Rebellion Project, or WAAR, which gathered information on women’s combat, noncombat and leadership roles in more than 370 nonstate armed groups. This novel dataset and its accompanying qualitative handbook sheds light on under-appreciated dynamics of women’s wartime activities in armed groups. It offers compelling evidence that women’s participation in armed rebellion is fairly common, and that this participation takes myriad forms beyond the combatant/victim typologies usually used to portray it.

To create the dataset, we collected information on whether rebels included women in combat, noncombat and leadership roles, and whether female leaders participated as military or noncombat leaders. We also drilled down into women’s noncombat roles, examining whether they contributed to logistics, clandestine activities or outreach to civilians. In addition, we collected information on how women organized within the insurgency, such as whether rebels formed all-female units or organizations. In addition to the dataset, our project includes a qualitative handbook detailing what we know about women’s participation in each group, offering nuance and description that cannot be quantified.

Overall, we found that nearly two-thirds of the rebel groups we examined include women within the ranks.
The most common form of participation that we identified was in noncombat roles. Nearly 60 percent of the rebel groups in our sample included women in noncombat roles. In more than half of the groups in our sample, women contributed to logistical noncombat tasks, assuming the roles of “nurses, medics, cooks, couriers, planners, administrators, radio or weapons operators and guards.”

A more holistic understanding of women’s contributions to armed groups is necessary for those interested in providing support to women in conflict zones.


In 46 percent of the armed groups, women engaged in noncombat outreach activities, which include things like “recruiters, involvement in service provision, fundraising, serving as representatives of the rebels to the international or domestic community, and mobilization of community members.” For example, the Kurdish Women’s Union—the women’s wing of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which fought an armed insurgency against the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq—provided support to the families of fallen peshmerga soldiers, provided health care and social services to civilians, went on diplomatic missions abroad and helped create jobs for women.

We found that 30 percent of organizations incorporated women into clandestine noncombat operations, which include activities like “intelligence operators, spies, smuggling, and decoys.” For example, in Nicaragua’s civil war, women reportedly comprised approximately 50 percent of the Contra insurgency’s correos, or courier networks. According to Timothy Brown, they were often preferred over men “because they tended to attract less attention, could move more freely, and were not subject to conscription.”

In more than half of rebel groups, we found evidence of women participating in combat or undergoing military training. In some cases, women’s participation in armed combat was the result of female members themselves demanding armed training. For example, in the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, or ABSDF, in Myanmar, women in auxiliary roles had to pressure ABSDF leaders to include them in military training.In other cases, women’s combat roles were controversial, waxing and waning over time. In Uganda, the Front for National Salvation, or Fronasa, briefly recruited women fighters, but a Fronasa leader reported that “women soldiers in FRONASA were rejected by our partners and we agreed to disband the women units.”

Of the armed groups in our sample, 45 percent included women in leadership roles, with roughly a quarter of the groups including them in military leadership positions and almost 40 percent incorporating them into political or auxiliary leadership. Our work corroborated previous research suggesting that women often rose to leadership roles in which they exercised authority over other women, rather than over men or mixed-gender groups, which can perpetuate separate spheres for men and women.

Moreover, more than one-third of the groups we looked at operated at least one women’s wing, with almost a third organizing a noncombat wing and 15 percent operating a women’s military unit. Some groups organized multiple women’s wings and different types of them. For example, the Maoists in Nepal organized women’s groups in the villages in which they were active, while also creating the All Nepal Women’s Association (Revolutionary) and women’s military units. All of these different approaches harnessed women’s activities to bolster the various organizations’ capabilities and expand their influence.
While there are many possible applications of the WAAR dataset, the project’s qualitative handbook also makes an important contribution to understanding the role women play in armed groups. The 350-page handbook contains entries for each of the rebel groups listed in our dataset, describing the scope of women’s participation in the insurgency, details about how their contributions shifted over time and the intra-group gender dynamics women faced, among other issues.

The handbook and data highlight the need for more nuanced narratives about women’s contributions to armed groups. For example, while ideology is often offered as an explanation for why rebels do or do not include women in certain roles, our data suggests that this is not a deterministic factor. For example, while many left-wing groups organize women’s wings, not all have done so. Furthermore, groups with seemingly conservative gender ideologies have organized women’s wings. For example, the Islamic State created all-women policing units in territories under its control.
Furthermore, as the qualitative handbook underscores, women can have different experiences within the same rebellion as a result of their activities and rank within the organization. Whereas some women rise to leadership positions, including all the way up to the organization’s highest echelons, others remain in the rank and file, with limited autonomy over their activities and the tactics of the organization. Additionally, the WAAR dataset sheds light on the wide range of women’s activities, both traditional and unconventional, in armed insurgencies.

Overall, the dataset provides the opportunity for both scholars and practitioners to take a more nuanced approach to the questions of what roles women have played in armed conflict, what the wartime and post-conflict significance of their participation is, and what features facilitate women’s involvement in insurgencies. In so doing, it offers a corrective to the simplified and sensationalistic narratives that often characterize popular coverage of women’s participation in armed groups. More nuanced narratives like these are urgently necessary to better understand armed groups’ capabilities and to provide more effective demobilization assistance after war.

Hilary Matfess is an assistant professor at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver.
Meredith Loken is an assistant professor at the University of Amsterdam.


 

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Soldiers Can Now Steer Robot Dogs With Brain Signals​


A small sensor tucked neatly behind the ear allowed soldiers to mentally guide robotic quadrupeds.​


By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor, Defense One
March 22, 2023 06:14 PM ET
Drones
Artificial Intelligence


A breakthrough that enables a human to guide a robot merely by thinking could help troops on a future battlefield to communicate with a wide array of sensors, vehicles, and robots—all while the enemy is looking to intercept radio communications.
A new paper, published this month in Applied Nano Materials by Australian researchers working with the country’s Defence Department, documents how a test subject directed a ground robot to waypoints simply by visualizing them through a Microsoft HoloLens.

The U.S. military has achieved some remarkable success with brain-computer interfaces. In 2015, a paralyzed woman with a brain chip developed through the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency, or DARPA, was able to pilot a virtual F-35 using only brain signals. But such chips must be surgically implanted. And sensors that can be worn over the skin typically require gels for better electrical conduction. That just doesn’t work well for soldiers in helmets.

“The use of the gel contributes to skin irritation, risk of infection, hair fouling, allergic reaction, instability upon motion of the individual, and unsuitability for long-term operation due to the gradual drying of the gel,” notes the paper.
“Until now [the brain-computer interface or BCI] systems have only functioned effectively in laboratory settings, requiring [the user] to wear invasive or cumbersome wet sensors and remaining stationary to minimize signal noise. In comparison, our dry sensors are easy to wear in combination with the BCI. They work in real-world environments and users can move around while using the system,” Chin-Teng Lin, a professor at the University of Technology Sydney and one of the paper’s authors, explained to Defense One in an email.

The graphene-based sensor that the researchers developed works well inside a helmet. The researchers coupled that with a Microsoft HoloLens. As the wearer looked around using the HoloLens his brain would send out a signal via the occipital lobe. These signals were collected through the sensor and run through a small Raspberry Pi 4B computer, which translated the signals (via steady-state visually evoked potential, a formula for translating occipital lobe activity into clear computer signals) into instructions about a specific way point corresponding to a spot. Those instructions went to a Q-UGVs robot from Ghost Robotics, which proceeded to the point.

The Australian military is also working with the researchers and tested the system before they published the paper. In a video posted to the Australian Army’s YouTube page a month ago, they describe the successful experiment. In a second demonstration, a commander issued instructions both to robots and fire-team members to do a security sweep of an area. The soldiers monitored the robot’s video feed via the HoloLens headset.
“This is very much an idea of what might be possible in the future,” Australian Army Lt. Col. Kate Tollenaar says in the video. “We’re really excited to see where the technology might go and to work with our stakeholders on…use cases”

 

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theepochtimes.com



Myocarditis Diagnoses Spiked in Military in 2021, New Data Show​


Zachary Stieber​



The rate of myocarditis spiked in the military in 2021, newly disclosed data show.
Diagnoses of myocarditis, a form of heart inflammation, jumped 130.5 percent in 2021 when compared to the average from the years 2016 to 2020, according to data from the Defense Medical Epidemiology Database (DMED).
The data was downloaded by a whistleblower and presented to Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.).
Myocarditis is a serious condition that can lead to death.

All four of the COVID-19 vaccines authorized in the United States can cause myocarditis, according to U.S. officials. They added a warning for Johnson & Johnson’s shot this month.
COVID-19 can also cause myocarditis, though some experts say the data on that front is weaker.
The whistleblower downloaded the data from DMED in 2023, about a year after the Pentagon said it fixed a data corruption issue with the military health system.

The data also showed spikes in diagnoses of pulmonary embolism (41.2 percent), ovarian dysfunction (38.2 percent), and “complications and ill-defined descriptions of heart disease” (37.7 percent).
Johnson called the spike in diagnoses “concerning.”
The Pentagon and the Defense Health Agency, which manages the DMED, did not respond to requests for comment.

Difference in Percentages​

The newly disclosed data also showed higher increases than the Pentagon previously reported.
The military, for instance, had claimed that the rate of pulmonary embolism had increased just 25.4 percent in 2021.
Both rates were much lower than 468 percent.
That was among the shocking spikes in disease diagnoses identified by whistleblowers in 2022.
After the spikes were made public, military officials claimed the increases were not correct because some diagnoses in the years 2016 to 2020 had not been counted.

The undercounts stemmed from “corrupt” data, the military told Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) in a 2022 letter. The problem was fixed in early 2022, officials said. They gave Johnson a list of percentage increases of 15 diagnoses on Feb. 15, 2022.
The newly disclosed data, though, showed higher increases than were reported on that list.
Diseases of the nervous system increased 9.5 percent in 2021, compared to the 5.7 percent the Pentagon had said, according to the whistleblower data. Hypertension increased 12.6 percent, not 1.9 percent. Testicular cancer increased 16.3 percent, not 3 percent.

Other rates were lower than the Pentagon reported. Female infertility, for example, was reported by officials as increasing in 2021 by 13.2 percent. But the new data shows an increase of 4.3 percent.
“The most recent DoD whistleblower provided my office with DMED data that showed different percent changes compared to what DoD provided last year,” Johnson, the top Republican on the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, wrote in a March 21 letter to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

“It remains unclear how DoD calculated the percent changes for these specific registered diagnoses after the DMED data issue was allegedly fixed. Further, the recent whistleblower data highlighted above raises additional questions as to why the whistleblowers percent changes differ from DoD’s percent changes if the data source for both calculations was DMED,” he added.

Johnson asked Austin to provide answers by April 4.
Myocarditis Diagnoses Spiked in Military in 2021, New Data Show
 

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Air Force ‘mobility teams’ are rapidly moving cargo to remote Indo-Pacific sites​


Seth Robson​




Maj. Gen. John Klein, commander of the Air Force Expeditionary Center, speaks to airmen at Yokota Air Base, Japan, Tuesday, March 21, 2023. (Akifumi Ishikawa/Stars and Stripes)

YOKOTA AIR BASE, Japan — The risk of war with China is spurring the U.S. Air Force to create “air mobility teams” charged with dispersing quickly to deliver cargo to far-flung spots across the Indo-Pacific.

Airmen at the home of U.S. Forces Japan in western Tokyo explained how the teams work during a Monday visit by Maj. Gen. John Klein, commander of the Air Force Expeditionary Center at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, N.J.

“The U.S. Air Force is absolutely reorienting toward our pacing challenge of the People’s Republic of China,” Klein told Stars and Stripes before departing Yokota on Tuesday.

The installation — along with Kadena Air Base, Okinawa; Osan Air Base, South Korea; Andersen Air Force Base, Guam; and Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii — serves as an air mobility hub that allows the United States to project power across the Indo-Pacific, he said.

Air mobility teams can disperse to other facilities —civilian airports, for example — to provide some of the same services available at the major hubs, Klein aid.

“The pacing challenge is going to drive a very rapid pace of conflict if we ever get to that stage,” he said.

The goal of an air mobility team is to provide cargo and passenger services in concert with aircraft and aircrew as fast and efficiently as possible, Klein said.

Four members of Yokota’s 730th Air Mobility Squadron formed a small team, including maintainers and cargo handlers, to support the deployment of MQ-9 Reaper drones to Kanoya Air Base in southern Japan late last year, the team’s leader, Master Sgt. Steven Bazar, told Klein on Monday.

Eight Reapers and more than 150 airmen in the newly formed 319th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron began a yearlong deployment to Kanoya in October. The facility is a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force base near the southern tip of Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan’s four main islands.

The air mobility team, along with a loading vehicle, flew from Yokota to Kanoya in a C-130J Super Hercules airlifter in late September, Bazar said.

Their first task involved working with Japanese sailors to measure taxiways to prepare for the arrival of C-17 Globemaster III aircraft transporting the drones from Creech Air Force Base, Nev., he said.

A C-17 landed at Kanoya two decades ago, but the aircraft didn’t return until they delivered the drones, he said.

The airmen came up with a plan to steer the C-17s away from a sinkhole detected by the Japanese near the runway, he said.

“Believe it or not, they have wild hogs out there.” Bazar said, adding that landing lights had to be protected from the pigs.

The team’s work included welcoming an advance party from Pacific Air Forces and receiving government vehicles brought to the base by road and air, he said.

Over the course of 40 days, the air mobility team helped unload 319 tons of cargo and 130 personnel from 11 C-17s, 11 C-130Js and five C-12J Huron passenger planes, Bazar said.

 

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NORTHCOM: Russia Close to Persistent Nuclear Cruise Missile Attack Sub Presence off U.S. Coasts - USNI News​


View all posts by Sam LaGrone →​




Russia could have its most powerful and quiet nuclear attack submarines on persistent patrols off either U.S. Coast in the next two years, the head of U.S. Northern Command told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday.

In response to questions from Sen. Joni Ernst (R-Iowa) on the threat of Chinese and Russian cruise missile submarines operating close to the U.S., NORTHCOM commander Gen. Glen VanHerck said that the deployments of the Russian Yasen-class nuclear cruise missile attack boats have been deploying more frequently.
“[The risk is] absolutely increasing. Within the last year, Russia has also placed their [Yasens] in the Pacific,” he said.
“Now not only the Atlantic, but we also have them in the Pacific and it’s just a matter of time – probably a year or two – before that’s a persistent threat, 24 hours a day. … That impact has reduced decision space for a national senior leader in a time of crisis.”

Also known by their NATO reporting name Severodvinsk class, the 13,800-ton Yasen-class attack boats are among the most capable submarines in the world. In particular, the three current boats in the class are capable of a special quiet operations mode that make them difficult to detect in the open ocean. In 2018, the lead boat in the class, Severodvinsk, evaded U.S. efforts to find it for weeks, according to press reports.
Navy officials have told USNI News that the service has become increasingly concerned with the efficacy of the Russian submarine force.

The growing ability of Russian submarines to operate undetected in the Atlantic pushed the Navy to reactivate U.S. 2nd Fleet and create a command for anti-submarine warfare across the Atlantic in 2018.
The Russian Navy has planned to build ten Yasen-class attack boats, with the fourth to commission later this year, according to Russian press reports.

The Russians have also recently delivered two new strategic nuclear submarines.
In January, the Russian Navy commissioned the 24,000-ton Borey-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine Generalissimus Suvorov. In July, the Russian Navy delivered Belgorod – a strategic weapons platform fitted with school bus sized nuclear torpedoes that can be fitted with a 100-megaton nuclear warhead.

VanHerck also emphasized the need for the U.S. to expand its operations in the Arctic, as Russia has modernized its assets in the region and China continues to push farther north.
“Russia has modernized their fleet of icebreakers. They’ve modernized their strategic defense along with their submarine forces. China is sailing into the Arctic under the guise of research [missions] and we know they’re doing military operations, surveying the seabed.”

VanHerck said the U.S. is short of assets in the Arctic as Russia and China continue to expand operations.
“We’re not organized, trained and equipped to operate and respond in the Arctic. Infrastructure is a big concern for me, whether that be runway links, whether that be buildings, whether that be weapons storage, whether that be fuel storage,” he said.

“We need persistence that requires icebreakers. We as a nation are in bad shape regarding icebreakers, and I fully support the Coast Guard’s plan. We need to go faster.”
NORTHCOM: Russia Close to Persistent Nuclear Cruise Missile Attack Sub Presence off U.S. Coasts - USNI News
 

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On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Navy seeks $3.6 billion over 5 years for 64 hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike rounds

A senior Navy officer recently said the budget is an "endorsement of the capability."​

By JUSTIN KATZ on March 22, 2023 at 2:23 PM

WASHINGTON — The Navy for the first time has outlined the initial production schedule for its hypersonic missile program, a $3.6 billion dollar buy for 64 rounds over the next five years.

Conventional Prompt Strike is the Pentagon’s upcoming hypersonic weapon being jointly developed by the Navy and Army. The Navy will employ it on Zumwalt-class destroyers and Virginia-class submarines, while the Army will operate a land-based variant.

The details of the Navy’s schedule to produce the all up rounds for the program are outlined in the service’s newly released budget justification documents. The request for fiscal 2024 includes $341 million for the first eight rounds.


The service’s projected schedule for future years, which are subject to change when those budget requests are submitted, include 10 rounds for $440 million in FY25; 11 rounds for $663 million in FY26; 16 rounds for $988 million in FY27; and 19 rounds for $1.1 billion in FY28.

It is not clear as of press time whether the Army will also seek funding in its new budget request for all-up rounds — meaning the round contains the warhead, missile body, container and other necessary components for launch — because the associated justification documents have not yet been made public. An Army spokesperson did not immediately respond to questions from Breaking Defense.


The Navy plans to integrate CPS onto the Zumwalt destroyers in FY25 and onto its submarines around FY29. Despite achieving a variety of “Joint Flight Campaigns” last year, the Pentagon’s top weapons tester recently reported it is too early in the program’s life cycle to assess its overall effectiveness.

Breaking Defense has previously reported the low number of Zumwalt-class destroyers may also pose issues for the Navy during integration due to the ship’s limited availability for testing.

One of the most senior Navy officers overseeing the weapon’s development earlier this month acknowledged to lawmakers the Pentagon had to cancel a recently planned test due to a “battery failure,” USNI News reported.

When asked during a press conference at the Pentagon why the service was proceeding with production despite the testing mishaps, Rear Adm. John Gumbleton, the service’s officer charged with crafting the annual budget request, said the request is “an endorsement of the capability.”

“The point of testing is to learn things. But we have confidence that we’re going to be able to field the system as required and we’ll work with our industrial partners to make sure we stay on track for that — for that production,” he said March 13.

On the Air Force’s end, that service intends to finish its research and development spending on one of its key hypersonic weapons, the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, in FY24, Breaking Defense reported. The Air Force’s other major program, the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile, will continue research and development through FY28.

The service previously scrapped one of its hypersonic weapons programs, the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon, due to budget pressures in 2020.
 

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Amid Pentagon Focus On China, Indo-Pacific Command Says It Has $3.5B Budget Shortfall​


Marcus Weisgerber



Soldiers with the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division escort four HIMARS vehicles of the 17th Field Artillery Brigade to their firing positions at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Sept. 26, 2022. Maj. Jonathon Daniell

The U.S. military has made no secret in recent years that countering China in the Pacific is top priority. Despite that, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command submitted to Congress a list of 30 important projects totaling $3.5 billion that did not make it into the Pentagon’s $842 billion fiscal 2024 budget request.
The list includes funding for high-profile projects, including defending Guam from Chinese or North Korean ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles. It also includes upgrades to missile interceptors, long-range artillery, space sensor, and offensive cyber effects.

These requests come on top of the $9.1 billion the Pentagon asked Congress to approve for “Pacific deterrence” in its week-old spending proposal. Those funds would go toward “critical investments including resilient and distributed air basing, new missile warning and tracking architecture, construction to enable enhanced posture, funding for defense of Guam and Hawaii, and multinational information sharing, training, and experimentation.”
But items listed on the unfunded priority list go beyond weapons and technology; they also include military exercises to “better familiarize our forces with the challenges associated with” operating in the Pacific.
“This is not new golf courses in Hawaii…but this is hardcore, combat. warfighting networking stuff,” said Bradley Bowman, senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a hawkish Washington think tank.

“It's defending Guam from missile attack, it's hardening cyber network defenses, it's missile warning and tracking, it's space sensors, it's undersea targeting, it's resilient warfighting architecture, it's a joint fires network, it's missiles,” Bowman said. “These are exactly the things we need to make defense planners in Beijing think twice before they launch unprovoked aggression against Taiwan.”

Bowman questioned why the money for such important projects was not included in the Pentagon’s budget request. “What explains a $3.5-billion unfunded priority list that consists of such fundamental combat capabilities?” he said.
The unfunded list includes $147 million to helpdefend Guam from missiles. The list does not specify exactly how that money would be spent. Last week, the Missile Defense Agency asked Congress to approve $801 million to boost missile defense on the wester-Pacific U.S. territory.

“Current forces are capable of defending Guam against today's North Korean ballistic missile threats,” Michele Atkinson, Missile Defense Agency operations director, told reporters during a briefing last week. “However, the regional threat to Guam, including those from [China], continues to rapidly evolve.”
Other items on the list:
  • $493 million to accelerate “development of precision strike stand-off weapons for attacking long range, medium range, and tactical targets.”
  • $357 million for the SM-6 Block 1B interceptor to increase “capability for ground-based and naval long-range weapons for extended range to target enemy anti-surface warfare capability. This capability is foundational to provide combat formations with precision-strike capabilities that are operationally decentralized and geographically distributed in theater.”
  • $275 million for “the next generation of national defense space architecture to enable U.S. military operations and responses to emerging multi-domain threats and adversaries.”
  • $151 million for the Precision Strike Missile.
It also includes $511 million for transportation and support “to quickly mass forces multiple times a year as part of a persistent, synchronized set of operations, activities, and investments in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans.”
There’s an additional $70 million for joint training.
“You can have the best weapons in the world, you can have the best networks in the world, but if you don't have the training [and] exercises and the know how, among the people operating those weapons and systems, knitting it all together, it's not going to be as effective as it could be,” Bowman said. “And that's where the exercises and the training ranges come into play.”

Overseas exercises and training tend to get the short straw in the budget requests because there is no Congressional constituency for them.
“A lot of this stuff is essential to deterring aggression and defeating aggression if it happens,” Bowman said. “But because it's happening over there, and it's not necessarily stationed in a district or state, or it's not necessarily being built in a district or state, because it's something not necessarily related to a piece of equipment, then there's less of a political incentive for people to advocate for it.”

Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., has led a bipartisan effort to stop the practice of commanders and the heads of each service from submitting these lists, arguing they are de facto addendums to the budget requests. The lawmakers have argued that if the projects are of such priority, they should be part of the budget submissions. Military officials, particularly those in charge of regional commands, say the lists are valuable because it allows them to respond to urgent threats.

“I would call in the Pentagon and say: ‘I want to go through every item on this list and I want to hear your argument, why you did not put this in the fiscal 2024 budget requests,’” Bowman said. “If the Pentagon cannot provide a persuasive answer, then it seems to me among the highest priorities in Congress for this session should be fixing those shortcomings, authorizing and appropriating the items on the unfunded list.”

 

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U.S. Military, Spy Agencies Differ on Threat From Afghanistan Militants​


Gordon Lubold in Washington and Saeed Shah in Pakistan


Top general sees danger from ISIS-K within six months as others recognize only intent​

March 24, 2023 10:00 am ET
WASHINGTON—A top U.S. military commander says Islamic State groups operating inside Afghanistan could pose a threat to the West within six months, but U.S. intelligence agencies don’t see the danger with the same urgency.
A classified intelligence assessment in December concluded that the threat from Islamic State’s affiliate in Afghanistan, known as Islamic State-Khorasan, was growing, according to U.S. officials, nearly 18 months after President Biden ordered the complete withdrawal of all American troops from the country in August 2021.

Gen. Erik Kurilla, the head of U.S. Central Command, which oversees U.S. troops in the region, says the Islamic State-Khorasan could pose a threat to American interests. The group seeks to expand its ranks and develop the capability to attack the West, and could act in concert with remnants of al Qaeda, he said.
“It is my commander’s estimate that they can do an external operation against U.S. or Western interests abroad in under six months, with little or no warning,” Gen. Kurilla said in a hearing last week.

Gen. Kurilla added that he believed an attack on the U.S. homeland would be much harder to do but remained an ultimate goal of the group. He named the particular strain of the group, the al-Sadiqi office, as the primary concern.
Gen. Kurilla estimates about 2,000 ISIS-K fighters operate inside Afghanistan. In his March 16 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he said the U.S. had limited intelligence on Afghanistan. Most of that is gleaned through drones and limited networks of informants on the ground, other officials have said.
U.S. military officials see a range of threats from ISIS-K, which could simply inspire attacks or fund and actively direct them.
When U.S. troops left Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said publicly that terrorist groups inside Afghanistan could pose a threat within two years, so Gen. Kurilla’s assessment, based in part on the new intelligence, appears to be in keeping with the assessment at the time.

According to an analysis by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ISIS-K is expected to maintain its campaign against the Taliban while eyeing other targets.
“ISIS-Khorasan almost certainly retains the intent to conduct operations in the West and will continue efforts to attack outside Afghanistan,” ODNI said in its annual global threat assessment, released in early March.
But other U.S. officials say no consensus has emerged within the intelligence and military communities about the urgency of the threat emanating from Afghanistan.

“We assess that there’s not a credible threat to the homeland that’s imminent,” Army Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told reporters Wednesday. “There’s probably intent there, but no credible threat that we can put our finger on that would be executable here in the near term.”
Gen. Berrier said the threat was more to Europe than to the U.S. He didn’t speak to whether there was a lack of consensus within the intelligence community or not.
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A senior defense official said this week that ISIS-K “has its hands full with the Taliban,” distracting it from mounting a significant attack in the West.

“They could potentially generate capacity, maybe working with other ISIS affiliates to carry out limited attacks further afield,” the official said. “But I do not think that ISIS has the capacity to carry out a large-scale attack against the United States and that they are not likely to have that capacity anytime soon.”
The Taliban control Afghanistan and is the sworn enemy of ISIS-K. But U.S. military officials said the Taliban lack the ability to conduct strikes against ISIS-K leaders or other operatives with any precision, which has enabled the group to grow in strength.

The Taliban carries out frequent operations to find and eliminate ISIS-K cells, keeping the group on the run. This week, the Taliban said its fighters had killed three ISIS-K operatives in a raid in Kabul, saying the men had planned to carry out attacks during the holy month of Ramadan. The Taliban has killed hundreds of suspected ISIS-K operatives, many in and around Kabul and the east of the country since taking over in August 2021.

When the U.S. military pulled out of Afghanistan, some Biden administration officials expressed hope the U.S. could establish a drone base near Afghanistan, perhaps in Central Asia. Gen. Kurilla toured the region last year to strengthen relationships with Central Asian nations, but a base, for now, appears to be out of the question. At present, U.S. drones spend 80% of their flying time in transit between their bases and Afghanistan, Gen. Kurilla said. That leaves about 20% of the drone’s flying time spent surveilling terrorist networks.

The U.S. hasn’t launched any known strikes inside Afghanistan since the attack that killed al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in August 2022, officials said.
Write to Gordon Lubold at gordon.lubold@wsj.com and Saeed Shah at saeed.shah@wsj.com
 

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US Air Force conducts hypersonic test, but full results are unclear​


Stephen Losey​




QTWVUSI72JAGJJH6ADVF7C33LA.jpg
A B-52H Stratofortress assigned to the 419th Flight Test Squadron is prepared to conduct a flight test of the hypersonic AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., on Aug. 8, 2020. (Giancarlo Casem/U.S. Air Force)

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force has revealed it conducted a test launch of its hypersonic AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon, or ARRW, earlier this month, but it remains unclear whether the event was a success.
The service said in a statement Friday that a B-52H Stratofortress bomber released the fully operational prototype ARRW, which is made by Lockheed Martin, off the coast of southern California. The March 13 test represented the second launch of an ARRW operational prototype and focused on the weapon’s end-to-end performance, the Air Force said.
The Air Force added that “the test met several of the objectives,” without providing further details. The wording differs from a service statement released in December following the first launch of an operational ARRW prototype, which said “all objectives were met” in that Dec. 9 test.

The Air Force’s December statement also said the B-52 “successfully released” the ARRW. The most recent release on the March test did not use the word successful, simply noting that a “B-52H Stratofortress released” the second ARRW prototype.
The statement about the December test specified that the ARRW reached hypersonic speeds greater than Mach 5, completed its planned flight path and detonated. The March statement did not include such statements.
Engineers and testers from the ARRW team “are collecting data for further analysis,” the Air Force said. The test was conducted by the 412th Test Wing at Edwards Air Force Base in California.

Asked whether the March 13 test was successful, the Air Force told Defense News it would not provide further information beyond what was in the release.
“We expect less information to be available on this topic in the future for operational security reasons,” a Defense Department official told Defense News.
Stephen Losey is the air warfare reporter for Defense News. He previously covered leadership and personnel issues at Air Force Times, and the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare at Military.com. He has traveled to the Middle East to cover U.S. Air Force operations.
 

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US-Australia gun for hypersonic aircraft edge on China​


Gabriel Honrada​



The US and Australia have announced plans to develop a hypersonic aircraft, the latest development in the AUKUS allies’ high-tech defense partnership that is fast-transforming the region’s security dynamics.
This week, Defense News reported that the US Department of Defense (DOD) has selected Australia-based aerospace company Hypersonix to develop a high-speed aircraft to test hypersonic technologies.
The report says that the aircraft will support America’s Hypersonic and High-Cadence Airborne Testing Capabilities (HyCAT) program, which aims to enlist the private sector and military users to alleviate strain on government testing facilities.

Defense News mentions commercial companies are forging toward reusable and low-cost launch vehicles, with the HyCAT representing a paradigm shift in hypersonics from weapons to aircraft.
It also says that testing has been a significant roadblock in hypersonic weapons development and that the US plans to increase the pace of weapons tests with one HyCAT test a year as part of the strategy.
Hypersonix’s DART AE aircraft is powered by a hydrogen-powered scramjet that can reach Mach 7 and test high-speed platforms, components, sensors, communications and control systems. It is slated for its first flight in 2024, according to Defense News.

Data from DART AE tests may be used to develop a hypersonic spy plane. In December 2022, Asia Times reported on US plans to develop Project Mayhem, which may be the successor to the vaunted SR-71 spy plane.
Concept art of the DART AE UAV. Photo: University of Southern Queensland
The US awarded Virginia-based aerospace firm Leidos a US$334 million price ceiling to develop a “larger class air-breathing hypersonic system capable of executing multiple missions with a standardized payload interface, providing a significant technological advancement and future capability.”
Leidos will work at the Wright-Patterson Air Base in Ohio and other testing sites, with the project expected to be completed by October 2028.

The aircraft, dubbed the SR-72, is envisioned to perform multiple missions including delivering area-effect or unitary payloads or intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.
It is planned to be powered by a turbine-based combined cycle (TBCC) powerplant scheme. In TBCC, jet engines would provide the initial boost to get the aircraft to optimal speed for its scramjet engines to kick in for hypersonic flight.
The SR-72 and US hypersonic weapons may use Australian engines. Asia Times reported in April 2022 that Hypersonix presented its hypersonic engine technology to US defense officials in March that year in a bid to jumpstart the US’ laggard hypersonic weapons program, which is perceived to be trailing China.

Hypersonix claims it can 3D-print a hypersonic engine made of special alloys resistant to corrosion, oxidation, high pressure and high temperature in three weeks. Hypersonix also envisions using more exotic coatings for hypersonic flight control surfaces, which are subjected to extreme temperatures during hypersonic flight.
However, the raw materials needed for the high-temperature-resistant composites are not readily available in Australia, and there is an urgency to produce them domestically.

Co-development of high-end military technology may be one of the defining points of AUKUS. In an April 2022 article for Trends Research and Advisory, Brendon Cannon notes that the pooling of technology from the North Atlantic to the South Pacific is AUKUS’ most defining feature, as it contributes to accumulating military power within the bloc.
Cannon also mentions that the sharing of highly-sensitive technology, such as hypersonic engines and nuclear propulsion, happens only in the tightest of alliances, with the ingrained trust, common culture and deep institutionalization of defense ties between AUKUS’ Anglosphere members giving an advantage over other security arrangements in the Pacific where these factors are lacking.

In the case of the Quad, India’s reliance on Russian oil and reluctance to take a harder stance on China have been handicapping its participation in that bloc, much to the frustration of other Quad members.
Among US treaty allies, Japan’s reluctance to embrace nuclear technology for military purposes, South Korea’s limited projection capabilities beyond the Korean Peninsula and the Philippines’ military weakness and political instability limit what these alliances can accomplish.
Despite official pronouncements, AUKUS may not be about preserving a rules-based liberal international order in the Pacific but rather aims to continue Anglo-Saxon hegemony.

In a September 2021 article for E-International Relations, Jeffrey Geiger writes that AUKUS draws on the legacy of Anglo-American imperialism to contain China at the expense of regional states in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
AUKUS nuclear submarine deal is already making ripples across the Indo-Pacific. Image: US Embassy in China
Geiger notes that AUKUS marks the post-Brexit next step in the US-UK “special relationship,” effectively promoting the UK’s “Global Britain” strategy. It also seeks to cement Australia’s central position in the US Indo-Pacific geostrategic vision, linking it to Western powers while pushing out China and other regional states from that framework.

Melissa Conley Tyler, in a September 2022 article for the Lowy Institute, writes that for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), AUKUS brings to the fore nuclear proliferation concerns and the loss of ASEAN centrality.
Tyler says there is no thinking about nuclear submarines without entertaining the idea of loading them with nuclear weapons. She also says AUKUS erodes ASEAN’s already precarious position as the foundation of regional order in the Pacific.
Similarly, there is no talking about hypersonic weapons without entertaining the idea of tipping them with nuclear warheads. For example, in a September 2020 article for War on the Rocks, Allan Cummings notes that the US Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) is a prime candidate for becoming a dual-use weapon with conventional and low-yield nuclear versions.

He also mentions that the Virginia-class submarines Australia aims to acquire under AUKUS and Zumwalt-class destroyers are both ideal launch platforms for these weapons, which can provide theater-level deterrence, improve the air-defense penetration capabilities of US sea-based nuclear weapons and avoid the outright escalation entailed by strategic nuclear weapons.

Tyler also notes that ASEAN leaders and academics have described AUKUS as a sign that the bloc is being “sidelined”, “made redundant” and “pushed into strategic irrelevance” by AUKUS. They say that’s a result of ASEAN’s dithering and indecision, which distracted the organization from being a regional conductor capable of harmonizing the interests of regional powers to prevent great power conflict in the Pacific.

US-Australia gun for hypersonic aircraft edge on China
 

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Popular Resistance Committees Attempts To Establish a Foothold in the West Bank

BY JOE TRUZMAN | March 21, 2023 | Jtruzman@fdd.org | @JoeTruzman

On Tue., the Shin Bet said that in recent weeks it arrested four West Bank Palestinians attempting to carry out attacks against Israeli targets. The Shin Bet alleges that the Gaza-based Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) recruited and directed the suspects.

FDD’s Long War Journal has tracked the PRC’s movements in the West Bank since March 3, and reported the group’s attempt to establish a foothold in Jenin.

The Shin Bet alleges Iman Zakot and Mohammed Aram – both residents of Rafah and members of the PRC – recruited Palestinians living in the West Bank. The pair provided recruits with training and instructions on carrying out operations against Israeli targets, including smuggling weapons into the West Bank.

During the investigation of the two Palestinian suspects, it was uncovered that they had received a firearm and direction from the PRC to carry out a shooting attack in Jerusalem, according to the Shin Bet.

Last month, the Shin Bet arrested two additional Palestinian suspects. The Shin Bet alleges the pair were planning to carry out a bomb assault on behalf of the PRC.

It’s unclear to what extent the PRC has established itself in the West Bank. Open-source evidence shows the group appears to be active in Jenin where fighters have participated in meetings with established militant organizations such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.

The PRC’s official media channels have yet to claim they have established a formation in the West Bank. For now, online channels claiming affiliation with the PRC’s Jenin branch publish evidence of the group’s activity. Despite official channels not mentioning its alleged activities in the West Bank, evidence is mounting that they are active.

On December 26, 2022, the Shin Bet alleged it foiled a bomb strike directed by the PRC and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. On March 4, a video claiming to be published by the group’s fighters in Jenin showed an IED exploding at an unidentified location in the West Bank.

The PRC is the third largest militant organization behind Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, respectively. Despite other Gaza-based militant groups’ activity, the PRC has not demonstrated interest in destabilizing the West Bank until recently. The PRC has proven ties to Hezbollah and Iran. Additionally, the PRC has an extensive history of bombing and rocket attacks against Israelis and Americans.

The U.S. government has not enacted sanctions on the PRC despite attacks against civilians.

Joe Truzman is a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.
 
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