ALERT The Winds of War Blow in Korea and The Far East

jward

passin' thru
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal

CHINA JUST BLINKED ON FENTANYL AFTER A TARIFF SLAP FROM THE U.S.

After getting hit with tariffs, China finally agreed to crack down on chemicals used to make fentanyl, the drug killing thousands in the U.S.

They just banned two key ingredients starting July 20, which might help get those tariffs lifted.

Beijing still says it’s acting “independently” and called U.S. pressure straight-up blackmail.

Meanwhile, they’re arresting smugglers, seizing drugs by the ton, and just gave a former drug official a suspended death sentence for taking $17 million in bribes.

No mention of the U.S. in China’s press releases, but yeah... we know why this is happening.

Source: Reuters
 

jward

passin' thru


asiatimes.com

Japan’s new hypersonic missile aims at China’s navy, NoKo nukes​





Japan has unveiled a mobile hypersonic missile system designed to outmaneuver China’s layered carrier defenses and threaten North Korea’s survivable nuclear arsenal, marking a decisive shift from a purely defensive posture to a counterstrike capability.

This month, Asian Military Review reported that at Fuji Firepower 2025, the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) unveiled the ground-launched Hyper Velocity Guided Projectile (HVGP), a mobile hypersonic strike missile system developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries under contract from Japan’s Advanced Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA).

The HVGP program, launched in 2018, marked its first successful test firing in early 2024 at a US range. Its operational deployment has been advanced to 2026. The Block 1 HVGP, mounted on an 8×8 tactical truck with two containerized, solid-fuel boost-glide missiles, has a range of 500–900 km and reaches Mach 5.
Upgraded variants, Block 2A and 2B, are planned for 2027 and 2030, with their ranges extended to 2,000 kilometers and 3,000 kilometers, respectively. The HVGP employs satellite and inertial navigation, with a naval-targeting variant using RF imaging derived from Doppler shift and a land-attack version deploying explosively formed projectiles. Both are designed for high-speed maneuvering post-boost.

Planned deployments in Kyushu and Hokkaido underscore its strategic intent to counter regional threats. Concurrently, Japan is also developing the scramjet-powered Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCV) to extend strike capabilities further. These systems are at the core of Japan’s revised defense strategy, which aims to safeguard its territorial integrity amid increasing regional security pressures.
Previously, Asia Times reported that Japan announced four hypersonic missile tests conducted in California between August 2024 and January 2025. These systems are envisioned for strategic interdiction, counterforce, and even counter-leadership operations.
In line with developing strategic interdiction capabilities, Japan has recently conducted the first domestic test firing of its short-range Type 88 anti-ship missile and plans to develop the long-range Type 12.

However, James Conway and Jerry McAbee mention in a March 2024 RealClearDefense article that by 2030, subsonic cruise missiles and supersonic ballistic missiles may become obsolete against the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
Japan’s current arsenal of subsonic cruise and ballistic missiles faces significant limitations: subsonic cruise missiles allow a longer intercept window despite their maneuverability, while ballistic missiles, though fast, follow predictable arcs that are easier to track. These constraints justify Japan’s shift toward maneuverable hypersonic systems, such as the HVGP.
Underscoring this point, Daniel Rice’s December 2024 report for the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) highlights that the PLAN carrier strategy is built around a three-layer defense system, enabling increasingly autonomous and far-reaching blue-water operations.

Rice explains that the carrier battlegroup’s defenses are arranged in concentric zones: the “Outer Defense Zone” (185–400 kilometers), maintained by submarines and J-15 fighters for long-range strikes and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); the “Middle Defense Zone” (45–185 kilometers), secured by destroyers and frigates equipped with radar, vertical launch systems (VLS), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities; and the “Inner Defense Zone” (100 meters–45 kilometers), protected by close-in weapons and point-defense systems.
Aside from strategic interdiction, Japan’s hypersonic weapons may be poised to play a critical role in its counterstrike capabilities against North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.

In a March 2024 article for the United States Studies Center (USSC), Masashi Murano notes that Japan’s counterstrike capability focuses on long-range, conventional counterforce strikes against military assets, such as missile bases, rather than leadership or cities. To that end, Murano mentions that Japan is acquiring Tomahawk cruise missiles, improved Type 12 missiles, and hypersonic missiles.
However, Murano cautions that Japan still faces deficiencies in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to hit time-sensitive targets such as transporter erector launchers (TEL), its counterstrike doctrine is still a work in progress, and the risks of escalation remain major issues it should tackle in building its counterstrike capabilities.
In addition, North Korea has taken several measures to harden its nuclear arsenal against a pre-emptive counterforce strike.

Hans Kristensen and other writers mention in a July 2024 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that North Korea is actively pursuing solid-fuel rocket intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), sea-based platforms such as nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), and tactical nuclear weapons, which together enhance survivability by making its arsenal more mobile, concealable, and less reliant on vulnerable fixed launch sites.
Kristensen and others note that North Korea’s deeply buried enrichment sites, continued fissile production, and development of tactical warheads all point to a doctrine that embraces redundancy and dispersion, hallmarks of a survivable deterrent.

Given that sanctions and threats of military action have failed to dissuade the North Korean regime from continuing its nuclear program and stopping its belligerent behavior, some strategists argue that targeting the regime itself might compel behavioral change.
In an April 2023 NK News commentary, Bruce Bennett notes that the Kim regime’s prioritization of military buildup over basic human needs, along with exhortations to the North Korean public to sacrifice for the country’s defense, reflects deep anxiety over regime survival and control.

Bennett observes that deployments like MQ-9 Reaper drones in Japan, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) from B-52s flying over the Korean Peninsula, and Japan’s new hypersonic systems may concern the Kim regime over its survival.
Yet, as Lauren Sukin points out in a February 2024 article for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), North Korea’s nuclear policy calls for automatic nuclear retaliation should its command and control system, including Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, be attacked.

Sukin adds that the US, and by extension, its allies, forcing regime change on North Korea could end, at best, in an even more anti-US regime than that headed by Kim Jong Un. At worst, she says such attempts could result in regional instability or North Korea using chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
Japan’s rollout of hypersonic strike weapons marks a significant moment in Northeast Asian security. While they offer a powerful conventional deterrent against China’s carrier strike groups and North Korea’s dispersed nuclear forces, they also heighten the risk of arms racing, strategic miscalculation, and regional instability.

Japan’s new hypersonic missile aims at China's navy, NoKo nukes - Asia Times
 

jward

passin' thru
WORLD AT WAR
@World_At_War_6
Jun 28

"PENTAGON RAISES ALARM OVER CHINA’S ABILITY TO STRIKE TAIWAN"

Leaders in the US Air Force have expressed worries regarding the missile capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and its development of a "kill web.

China has successfully launched more than 470 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites, which provide data to an advanced sensor-to-shooter kill web.

This kind of "kill web" links sensors directly to strike forces, accelerating the execution of attacks through data sharing and automation, enabling strikes to be conducted within seconds.

This indicates that the US will encounter significant challenges in protecting Taiwan should a potential conflict arise.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use......

Military

North Korea overtakes Iran as Russia’s partner of choice​

As Iran falters and China looms, N Korea arming Russia’s war, fortifying its frontier and tilting regional balance on Moscow’s terms

by Gabriel Honrada
June 23, 2025

North Korea is no longer just supplying Russia with manpower and missiles. It is embedding itself deep within Russia’s war economy, sending thousands of workers to the heart of its drone industry and reshaping the balance of power in Eurasia.

This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that 25,000 North Korean workers are being sent to Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan to assist with the manufacturing of Shahed drones, part of a deal reportedly brokered during Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu’s visit to Pyongyang.

Satellite imagery reveals new dormitory construction at the Alabuga site, indicating Russia’s intention to increase drone production from 2,000 to 5,000 units per month.

Ukrainian intelligence chief Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov confirmed this development, citing the growing cooperation between Russia and North Korea and warning of the strategic implications for both Ukraine and South Korea. He added that some North Korean workers may be contracted into the Russian defense service.

The Alabuga plant, repeatedly targeted by Ukrainian strikes, remains a critical node in Russia’s standoff strike capability, particularly amid high attrition from its war in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Russia is reportedly assisting North Korea in enhancing the accuracy of KN-23 missiles, long-range air-to-air munitions, and submarine-launched systems. The transfer of labor and technology underscores tightening bilateral military ties as both regimes confront isolation and intensifying global scrutiny.

Russia may be shifting its partnership of convenience from Iran to North Korea. As Iran falters under Israeli and US airstrikes and unfulfilled Russian arms deals, North Korea pulls ahead, embedding itself in Russia’s war machine and Far Eastern strategy.

While Russia and Iran have a long history of distrust and conflict, their mutual disdain for the Western-dominated international order, autocratic governments and heavily sanctioned economies in the aftermath of the former’s invasion of Ukraine has placed them in the same boat.

Iran has sought to make itself indispensable to Russia’s war effort by supplying Shahed drones, tactical gear, and artillery in exchange for revenue and to avoid diplomatic isolation. It may have also sought Russian investment in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

Yet as Russia transitioned to a war economy and began producing Shahed drones locally, Iran’s leverage may have declined, undercutting the latter’s efforts to extract security guarantees or financial backing from the former.

Furthermore, while Iran has consistently requested advanced Russian equipment, such as Su-35 fighter jets, these deliveries have not yet materialized, as Russia may need those fighters more urgently in its conflict with Ukraine.

In October 2024, Israel destroyed Iran’s prized S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers, leaving the latter exposed to current air attacks. While Iran has downplayed the need to purchase the more advanced S-400 from Russia, citing the superior capabilities of its domestic systems, this could be a cover-up for Russia’s refusal to provide such systems for the same reason it has withheld Su-35 fighters.

However, Israeli strikes on Iran present mixed implications for Russia. For one, while such strikes may have undermined Russia as a credible partner, strikes on Iranian oil and gas infrastructure may have eliminated Iran as a competitor to Russian energy exports.

Yet, these gains may be short-lived. Israel admits that its strikes are not sufficient to destroy Iran’s nuclear program and that the goal is to pressure Iran back into negotiations.

Furthermore, it is unknown how Iran would respond in the aftermath. A nuclear-armed Iran may ultimately undermine Russia’s influence. Russia may have less leverage over a nuclear-armed Iran, potentially triggering a Middle East nuclear arms race, with Saudi Arabia stressing that it will develop nuclear weapons if Iran gets the bomb.

Despite that possible long-term setback, Israeli strikes may distract the US from Ukraine, drawing attention and resources away from confronting Russia. It also allows Russia to point out US “double standards,” with the US distancing itself from Israeli combat operations in Gaza while supporting Israeli strikes on Iran that have caused civilian casualties.

As Iran buckles under sustained Israeli and now US strikes, North Korea is stepping into the breach, presenting an entirely different set of nuances.

North Korea and Russia share deep ties dating back to the Korean War, and the former’s nuclear arsenal arguably makes it a safer long-term investment for the latter. North Korea has deepened its role in Russia’s war effort, providing matériel and manpower while reaping combat insights, hard currency, and access to advanced systems.

North Korea’s interest in supporting Russia in Ukraine may be to reduce its overdependence on China, its main political and economic lifeline, to maintain strategic autonomy and regime survival.

These aims may clash with China’s goal of maintaining stability in the Korean Peninsula. Arguably, North Korean missile tests pose a threat to China just as much as they are to Japan and South Korea, prompting China to threaten to scale down political and economic ties with North Korea.

To those ends, North Korea is actively developing nuclear delivery systems with possible Russian assistance, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that could reach the US mainland and nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) that ensure a second-strike capability.

While a belligerent North Korea serves China and Russia’s mutual interest of undermining the Western-dominated international order, it remains uncertain whether this wartime alignment will evolve into a lasting partnership once the guns fall silent in Ukraine.

Despite Russia being heavily sanctioned, it still seeks to resume trade with the US, raising doubts about the long-term growth of Russia-North Korea relations.

However, beyond the Russia-Ukraine War, Russia may use North Korea as leverage against China’s growing presence, economic influence, and territorial ambitions in the Russian Far East, strengthening economic, political, and military ties to form a buffer state.

In turn, North Korea maintains its autonomy by balancing ties between Russia and China, with its nuclear arsenal providing a strategic backstop against regime change.

With Iran sidelined and China’s shadow growing, North Korea is fast becoming Russia’s most dangerous and dependable ally, fueling its war machine, fortifying its eastern flank, and tilting Eurasia’s strategic balance in Russia’s favor.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use......

Australian destroyer conducts South China Sea Freedom of Navigation activity

Following the port visit to Singapore, the ship will link up with the UK-led carrier strike group centered on the aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales, where the Australians will integrate and train with the multinational carrier strike group.​

By Mike Yeo on June 30, 2025 at 2:25 PM

SINGAPORE — Australia and the United Kingdom have conducted a Freedom of Navigation activity with their warships around disputed islands in the South China Sea with the Australia destroyer involved subsequently linking up with the UK’s carrier strike group currently in the Indo-Pacific.

The activity around the disputed Spratly islands involved the Royal Navy River-class Offshore Patrol Vessel HMS Spey and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Hobart-class destroyer HMAS Sydney, according to a June 24 X post from the UK’s Permanent Joint Force Headquarters.

Australia has been very cautious in the past to disclose that it was operating close to the disputed islands, so the fact the UK made this public — presumably with Australia’s knowledge — is a notable change of posture.

Speaking to Breaking Defense during a port visit in Singapore on June 27, Commander Ben Weller, commanding officer of the Sydney, confirmed that the ship conducted a transit of the Spratly islands as part of Australia’s routine presence in the South China Sea.

“We routinely operate in all areas of this part of the world, and we always ensure that we do so in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” he said.

Weller said that the Sydney encountered the Chinese military during its transit in the South China Sea, although he added that his interactions with them were “safe and professional” when asked if there were any attempts to challenge his presence in the area or interfere with his voyage.

He noted, however, that Australian P-8A Poseidon anti-submarine aircraft had reported unsafe encounters with Chinese planes and warships. Australia had previously reported in February that a Chinese fighter jet had dropped chaff and flares in front of an Australian P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft in the South China Sea, while a Chinese warship had shone a laser at another Australian P-8A in the Arafura Sea.

Joining UK-led Carrier Strike Group​

The Sydney departed Australia in April for its current deployment, which Weller said was an opportunity to work with and enhance Australia’s relationships and interoperability with its allies and partners throughout the region on a regular basis.

The ship has conducted a multinational exercise with Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the UK, taken part in monitoring sanctions against North Korea, trained with the Japanese, South Korean and US navies and made port visits in Japan and South Korea prior to its June port visit to Singapore.

Following the port visit to Singapore — its second during this deployment following an earlier visit in April — the ship will link up with the UK-led carrier strike group centered on the aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales, where the Australians will integrate and train with the multinational carrier strike group which includes ships from countries such as Canada, Spain and Norway.

The group will then head to Australia to take part in the multinational Talisman Sabre military exercise in July, before the Sydney will detach from the carrier group and head back to its homeport in its namesake city, concluding its deployment.

The Sydney is one of three Hobart-class destroyers of the RAN. Based on the Álvaro de Bazán-class hullform from Spain’s Navantoa, the ships are Australia’s most advanced warships and are equipped with the Lockheed-Martin Aegis combat system, integrated air and missile defense capability and Kongsberg Naval Strike Missiles.

Australia is currently carrying out an upgrade to the ships, which Weller says will bring their Aegis system from Baseline 8 to the latest Baseline 9. It will also introduce Saab’s Australian Interface for the ship’s combat system and add Tomahawk cruise missile capability for the destroyers.
 

jward

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GeoInsider
@InsiderGeo
1h

North Korea has informed the U.S.-led U.N. Command of plans to resume building fortifications inside the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), Seoul’s defense ministry confirmed.

This marks the first such notification in over six months. Since last year, Pyongyang has fortified the border with mines and barriers, reflecting tense inter-Korean relations. The latest notice may signal a willingness to communicate under South Korea’s new administration, though officials remain cautious about its implications.
 

jward

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Railgun Installed On Japanese Warship Seen In New Photos


The TWZ Newsletter

Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.

New pictures have emerged showing work being done on the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ prototype electromagnetic railgun currently installed on the test warship JS Asuka. An at-sea test of the weapon in this configuration is expected to come before the end of the month, if it has not occurred already. Japan’s continued developments in this realm stand in notable contrast to the U.S. Navy’s shelving of its promising pursuit of this category of weapons in the early 2020s after major technical hurdles emerged.

The images of Asuka and its railgun in port in Yokosuka, seen at the top of this story and below, come from @HNlEHupY4Nr6hRM on X who originally posted online. All of the images were taken on June 30. Additional photos of the ship taken recently are also circulating online. Asuka, a 6,200-ton-displacement dedicated testbed with a warship-like design, first emerged with the turreted railgun on its stern flight deck in April.
A broad view of JS Asuka in port in Yokosuka with the turret railgun (seen here covered) installed on its stern flight deck. @HNlEHupY4Nr6hRM

The pictures show the shroud around the railgun removed so that work can be performed on the weapon inside. This confirms that the railgun installed in the turret on Asuka is extremely similar, if not identical, to a prototype that the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) has been testing on land and sea for a number of years now. TWZ had posited that this was likely the case based on what was visible in previous available imagery. How exactly the design may have evolved over the years is unclear.
A close-up look at the front end of the railgun with the shroud removed. @HNlEHupY4Nr6hRM
A look at the turret with the shroud around the railgun still fitted. @HNlEHupY4Nr6hRM
A composite image showing, at top, close-ups of the muzzle end and rear of the railgun now installed on JS Asuka as seen in previously released images, and of a prototype railgun that ALTA has shown in the past, at bottom. ATLA/JMSDF

Also visible are what look to be several containerized generators and/or capacitors, as well as other shipping containers that could contain additional systems or workspaces. Railguns, which use electromagnets instead of chemical propellants to fire projectiles at very high velocities, have historically had significant power generation and cooling requirements. These demands mean that complete railgun weapon systems are typically physically very bulky.

With all this in mind, TWZ previously noted that installing the railgun turret Asuka‘s flight deck made good sense from a testing perspective, given the ample open space it offered. Integrating the weapon onto an operational warship in a traditional manner would require meeting the power and cooling demands, as well as finding sufficient space below deck for the various components, in addition to the time and resources for those more extensive modifications.
A picture of the railgun turret on JS Asuka that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) released in April. JMSDF

Railguns present additional challenges when it comes to the wear and tear of sustained firing of projectiles at very high speeds. As barrels quickly wear out from extreme friction, the weapon’s range and accuracy are degraded, and the potential risk of a catastrophic failure can emerge.

In past testing, ATLA has reportedly demonstrated the ability to fire rounds at a velocity of around 4,988 miles per hour (2,230 meters per second; Mach 6.5) while using five megajoules (MJ), or 5 million joules (J), of charge energy. As of April, prior testing goals had included a muzzle velocity of at least 4,473 miles-per-hour (2,000 meters-per-second) and a barrel life of 120 rounds, according to Naval News. Reports say that ATLA has also been working to reduce the weapon’s power requirements.
A Japanese prototype railgun is fired during at-sea testing in 2023. ATLA

In May, Aviation Week reported that at least one at-sea test of Asuka‘s railgun installation was set to occur sometime in June. Yahoo Japan subsequently published a story saying that the testing window would span from June 9 to July 25. That same piece said that the test ship had been observed departing Yokosuka on June 9, but it is unclear whether or not any live-fire testing has yet taken place.

Speaking through an interpreter at a panel discussion at DSEI Japan 2025, Kazumi Ito, principal director of the equipment policy division at ATLA, said Japan’s railgun efforts were “progressing,” but acknowledged “various challenges,” according to National Defense Magazine.

Despite the challenges, Japanese authorities have made clear they are looking toward an operational naval railgun capability in the future. Starting at the DSEI Japan 2025 exposition earlier this year, the Japanese Ministry of Defense has been publicly showing a model of a railgun in a turret with a much more streamlined design than the one currently on Asuka.

In a public presentation in 2024, JMSDF Vice Adm. Imayoshi Shinichi, ATLA’s director general of Naval Systems, had also highlighted plans to integrate a railgun on future 13DDX destroyers, which are expected to begin entering service in 2024. ATLA has previously shown an artist’s conception of a Maya class destroyer, also known as the 27DDG class, armed with a railgun, as well.
A graphic depicting a railgun installed on a Maya or 27DDG class destroyer. Japan MoD

The video below, which ATLA put out last year, also depicts ground-based railguns mounted on trucks.

As terms of potential operational applications of either naval or ground-based railguns, these weapons hold the promise of being potent anti-air assets, in addition to being able to engage targets at sea and on land. As TWZ has previously written:

“In principle, a practical electromagnetic railgun would offer a highly capable and flexible weapon system that can rapidly engage a wide array of targets at sea, on land, and even in the air, and at considerable ranges. Japan has previously expressed interest in this capability explicitly to help protect against incoming hypersonic threats. Such a weapon would also offer benefits in terms of magazine depth and cost compared to traditional surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles, given the small size and lower unit price of the individual rounds.”

“When it comes to warships, in particular, where physical space is at a premium and where options for reloading missiles at sea can be at best extremely limited, having a weapon system firing lower-cost munitions from a large magazine and that can engage a broad swath of target sets would be a clear boon.”

Japan is certainly not alone in trying to turn the capabilities that a railgun could offer into a reality. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army have experimented with railgun designs in the past two decades or so. The Navy was particularly active on this front from 2005 to 2022, but ultimately shelved that work in the face of persistent technical issues. Planned at-sea testing was never conducted after being repeatedly set back. Interestingly, ATLA has reportedly met with U.S. Navy representatives about potentially leveraging the service’s past railgun work.

“In getting closer to the deployment, I believe the scope of collaboration [with the United States] will be expanded,” ATLA’s Ito had also said during the DSEI Japan 2025 panel discussion, per National Defense Magazine.

In the meantime, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army have already continued to leverage hypervelocity projectiles previously developed for the railgun for use in conventional naval and ground-based guns. Using the fast-flying projectiles for air defense applications, including knocking down incoming cruise missiles and drones, remains a particular area of interest.
US Navy briefing slide from the service’s abortive railgun program showing how ships armed with the weapons (as well as conventional guns firing the same ammunition) could potentially engage a wide variety of aerial threats, including cruise missiles, as well as surface targets. USN A briefing slide related to the Navy’s past railgun and HVP programs. It shows how ships could potentially engage a wide variety of aerial threats, including cruise missiles, as well as surface targets, with HVPs fired by conventional 5-inch naval guns. HGWS/MDAC could have similarly multi-purpose capabilities. USN

China, a major competitor for Japan on both regional and global levels, has been notably active in developing naval railguns, as well. A turreted railgun first emerged on a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ship back in 2018. How that development of that design or other Chinese railguns has progressed since then is unclear.
The Chinese naval railgun that emerged in 2018. Chinese internet

Other countries, most notably Turkey, are also now actively pursuing railguns, including for naval use. In 2024, Japanese authorities themselves signed a deal to cooperate on future railgun developments with their counterparts in France and Germany.

New details about Japan’s progress toward fielding an operational naval railgun may begin to emerge soon based on the results of the testing of the prototype installed on Asuka.

Special thanks again to @HNlEHupY4Nr6hRM for sharing the pictures of Asuka with its railgun with us.

Howard Altman contributed to this story.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com
check out the source for the actual photos and images:
 

jward

passin' thru
Special Kherson Cat
@bayraktar_1love
1h

Russia has supplied North Korea with Pantsir-S1 air defense systems, which are now being used to protect the capital city of Pyongyang. This was reported by the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Russian-made Pantsir air defense systems are already on combat duty, actively shielding key areas of the North Korean capital.

In exchange, Russia is reportedly seeking to bolster its own military ranks with North Korean citizens. These individuals are expected to sign contracts with the Russian armed forces, posing as volunteers. Росія активізує своїх глибоко законспірованих агентів - СБУ
 

onetimer

Has No Life - Lives on TB
A July 4th DPRK ICBM launch wouldn't surprise me.


Heo TaeJin
@AIYeyENGDdJkjTr
·
21m
July 3, 2025
#USNS Howard O. Lorenzen #South Korea #West Sea

The missile tracking ship USNS Howard O. Lorenzen (T-AGM-25), which docked at Sasebo Base in Japan, has departed and is currently operating in the West Sea of Korea.

The location of #AE6257 USN MQ-4C Triton, posted below, is believed to be close to Howard O. Lorenzen.

The deployment of the T-AGM-25 in the West Sea is quite unusual and I would assume it is intended to track North Korea's long-range missiles or projectiles.
 

Plain Jane

Just Plain Jane

Fiji Says Chinese Military Base, Missiles Not Welcome In Pacific​

by Tyler Durden
Wednesday, Jul 02, 2025 - 06:00 PM
The tiny South Pacific archipelago country of Fiji has come out firmly against China establishing a military base in the Pacific Islands, according to a statement of Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka issued Wednesday.

He emphasized that China has no need for such a provocatively located base to demonstrate its military strength, citing its recent intercontinental ballistic missile test as evidence.
Via cntraveller
Rabuka provided clear acknowledgement that Pacific nations are grappling with how to respond to China’s growing efforts to expand its influence, in remarks given to the National Press Club in Canberra.

"Pacific leaders have consistently aimed for a diplomatic stance of being friendly with all and enemies to none — a challenging path, but one we believe is achievable," Rabuka said.

The problem is that Pacific Islands have become a key area of geopolitical competition between US and Chinese naval power for regional security influence, especially over the last decade, and as tensions over Taiwan independence continue to boil.

Reuters reported the comments as follows:

Fiji opposes establishment of a military base by China, he said, in response to queries on Beijing’s security ambitions in a region where it already has a security pact with the Solomon Islands and a police presence in several nations.
“If they want to come, who would welcome them?” he said. “Not Fiji.”
Rabuka is proposing an "Ocean of Peace" treaty that would bind the region to unity, allow for common solutions to regional issues that arise, and which would reject coercion as a tool for for political dominance. But as Germany's DW reviews:

Beijing has spent hundreds of millions of dollars constructing sports stadiums, government offices, hospitals and roads in Pacific countries such as Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.
The charm offensive has already borne fruit with Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Nauru severing longstanding diplomatic links with Taiwan in favor of China.




"We do not want superpower rivalries or big power rivalries to be played out in the Pacific," Rabuka explained in his comments. He added, "China's participation in our development should not affect how we interact with Australia, New Zealand and America."

But these referenced countries have no only long been part of the 'Five Eyes' - English speaking nations which cooperate at the highest levels on intelligence - but there's also the 'AUKUS' defense pact involving the US, Australia, and the UK. Beijing views that it is only legitimately reacting to this rising 'Western threat' in regional waters. China sees that Pacific as its own backyard.
 

Plain Jane

Just Plain Jane

CCP Leaders Propose Regulations To Rein In Xi's Superagencies​

by Tyler Durden
Thursday, Jul 03, 2025 - 10:25 PM
Authored by Dorothy Li via The Epoch Times (emphasis ours),
China’s top leaders are proposing new rules to regulate a set of powerful commissions and groups established nearly a decade ago by communist Party chief Xi Jinping to centralize his power.
A Chinese paramilitary policeman stands guard in Tiananmen Square before the introduction of the Communist Party of China's Politburo Standing Committee, the nation's top decision-making body, on a polluted day in Beijing on Oct. 25, 2017. Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images
The proposed regulation was reviewed on June 30 during a closed-door meeting of the Politburo, the Party’s second-highest decision-making body, Chinese state media reported.

Details of the new measures are scarce. A summary of the meeting published by state mouthpiece Xinhua News Agency stated that the aim is to regulate these commissions’ “establishment, responsibilities, and operations.”

The changes target agencies called “decision-making, deliberative and coordinating institutions,” the report read, referring to more than a dozen Party groups that steer policies across various sectors, including financial services, foreign affairs, technological development, and education.

Many of these Party committees were established or gained more power in 2018 when Xi introduced a series of directives aimed at consolidating the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) dominance over state agencies in decision-making.

Officials at the June 30 meeting ordered to limit the reach of these groups, stating that they “must avoid taking over others’ functions or overstepping boundaries,” according to Xinhua.

The directive has raised eyebrows among outside observers, who consider it a rare signal that Party elites speak up against the direction Xi has taken the CCP.

The Politburo essentially delivered a fierce denunciation of these groups: they are prone to focus on trivial issues and overstep,” Li Linyi, a Chinese current affairs commentator, told The Epoch Times.

Since the agendas of these groups’ meetings are determined by the Party’s general secretary, according to the CCP’s regulations, “such criticisms can be seen as directed at Xi Jinping himself,” Li said.

He linked this development to the power struggles within the Party’s top brass.

It is highly likely that Xi’s power could face further limitations in the future,” Li said.

Echoing his comments, Shen Ming-shih, a China expert at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a think tank funded by the Taiwanese government, told The Epoch Times that the new rules were likely intended to set the stage for Party elders to return to the inner circle.

Speculations have been growing in recent weeks that the 72-year-old Xi’s health, whether political or physical, has taken a turn for the worse, following a series of unexplained disappearances and the downfall of his protégé and old associate.

The latest figure to be ousted is Adm. Miao Hua, whose ties with Xi go back more than two decades to the coastal province of Fujian. Miao, who had overseen the military’s political loyalty since 2017, was abruptly suspended from office and placed under investigation for alleged graft in November 2024. On June 27, the CCP expelled the admiral from the military’s top leadership body without explanation.

The move comes as the CCP is dealing with questions about the fate of another Xi ally, Gen. He Weidong, who hasn’t been seen in public view since mid-March. The general has missed at least three major political events that he was expected to attend, but Beijing has remained tight-lipped about his whereabouts.

China’s defense ministry initially said that it was “not aware” of reports that He was under scrutiny. During a monthly news briefing on April 24, the ministry again dodged a question about the general’s status. He is one of the two vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, which commands the country’s armed forces.

According to some well-connected analysts who previously spoke to The Epoch Times, Xi’s political control was significantly weakened due to the power struggle with Party elders.

Amid the uncertainty surrounding the Party’s leadership, the Politburo’s meetings have been closely watched for signals of power transfer.

The Politburo’s June 30 meeting didn’t provide any information about when they will convene senior party officials for a closed-door conclave called the fourth plenum, which is expected to decide personnel changes.
 

jward

passin' thru
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
22m

NORTH KOREAN ESCAPES TO SOUTH KOREA: DODGES GUARDS AND LANDMINES

A North Korean dude just pulled off the real-life version of “The Floor Is Lava,” except the lava is landmines and angry border guards.

It took South Korea’s military 20 hours of stealth-mode tracking through jungle-level greenery to guide him to safety, and when the troops found him, he literally asked, “Who are you?” Like, bro... You just crossed into South Korea.

Congrats to this guy for surviving one of the most dangerous zones on Earth with nothing but hope and some serious guts.

Source: Japan Times
 

jward

passin' thru

China’s Mysterious Ekranoplan Seen In Full For First Time​






The TWZ Newsletter​


Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.

We are getting our first full look at China’s wing-in-ground effect (WIG) craft. It was first identified last week by our friend and submarine warfare analyst HI Sutton. You can read his initial post at Naval News here. It was originally spotted in an image with its nose section obscured. In that image, the flying-boat-hulled aircraft was pictured sitting on a pier situated on the Bohai Sea, which sits at the northwestern reach of the South China Sea.
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The craft seen on a pier along the Bohai Sea in China. (Via X)
As we have discussed many times before, the Soviet Union was famed for its experimentation and semi-operational use of large WIG craft known as Ekranoplans. The capability and tactical concepts surrounding it never really caught on en-masse, but we are currently experiencing a renaissance of sorts for large WIG aircraft that aim to race above the thick air above the water with relative efficiency and speed (most can fly less efficiently at higher altitudes too). The U.S. is developing just such an aircraft, the Liberty Lifer, in hopes that it could be used to deliver heavy cargo, personnel and materiel to far-flung locales across the great expanses of the Pacific. In doing so it would help reduce some of the Pentagon’s looming logistic woes were it to fight across such a large theater.

In the case of this mysterious aircraft being tested by China, it is loosely similar in scale to what we have seen of their new amphibious flying boat, the AG600, which is intended to perform resupply, search and rescue, and other missions, especially over the South China Sea. This WIG aircraft appears ideally suited for similar applications in the littorals.
jdkajd2-copy.jpg
China’s AG600 amphibious aircraft.
Flying low utilizing the thick cushion of air above the water to increase lift and decrease drag, the aircraft also stays under the surface/land-based radar horizon. Considering it is an aircraft, not a boat, it isn’t vulnerable to mines, submarines, and other dangers that can lurk even in seemingly lower-threat waters. Still, it is not a survivable asset in a highly contested combat arena, but if a war were to erupt between the U.S. and China, China would be fighting in their own backyard, unlike the United States. Vast areas extending from its shores will remain readily accessible for periods of time. This is where such an aircraft would be useful even in a high-end fight — providing logistical support to remote areas and especially in recovering downed aircrew and other personnel. Even sea control and anti-submarine warfare applications are real possibilities.

The biggest claim surrounding this aircraft is that it’s jet powered. The image of its rear seems to point to that, but at the time we thought this remained very inconclusive as it looked like propellers may have been intended for it but not yet fitted. Still the exhausts looked large for a turboprop. This new pictures from the front is also inconclusive and there may be spindles or at least some sort of spike at the front of the engine nacelles, which would point to propellers. There are also upper inlets as well, which would mean two large inlets per nacelle if it was jet powered, which seems odd. It’s also quite possible that this uses a new hybrid-electric propulsion system, which may make a lot of sense for this kind of aircraft. Regardless, these are low-resolution images that are sparse in details, and the aircraft could end up being jet powered, but it remains a significant question mark for us.

As for the rest of the aircraft, it has a large joined v-tail, which is not uncommon for WIG craft. The wings have large outrigger wing-float sponsons on their tips and the hull appears to have smaller sponsons amidships. The nose is perhaps the most exotic element and it looks blended for efficiency, at least in a modern sense. The aircraft very likely leverages heavy use of composite structures allowing for weight savings, aerodynamic enhancement, and limited signature control as a byproduct. We also see a common flying boat stepped hull and a larger door open on its side, which would be useful for hauling cargo and recovering personnel.
It’s also worth noting that this aircraft could very well be a technology demonstrator that is meant to test a variety of design elements. It could even be a subscale one, or it could be meant to at least inform larger designs. On that note, it has clear similarities to the Pentagon’s Liberty Lifter very large WIG craft that is in the works.
GuuXBW3XIAABczx.jpg
Liberty Lifter. (Aurora Flight Sciences capture)
So there you have it, our first full view of the “Bohai Sea Monster,” as Sutton calls it. As with any new aircraft ‘leaks’ out of China, we should see a steady stream of higher-resolution imagery of this craft in the weeks to come.
Contact the author: Tyler@twz.com
more images at source
 

jward

passin' thru
Tyler Rogoway
@Aviation_Intel
2h

South Korea Canceling AH-64 Apache Buy A Sign Of What’s To Come

While claims the attack helicopter is irrelevant are hyperbolic, their survivability, employability, and return on investment are definitely in question.




twz.com

South Korea Canceling AH-64 Apache Order A Sign Of What’s To Come​




The TWZ Newsletter​


Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
News has emerged out of South Korea that the country’s plans for a follow-on buy of 36 AH-64E Apache Guardian attack helicopters have been aborted. These aircraft would have joined 36 AH-64s already procured for Republic of Korea (ROK) service.

The Korea Times reports that the $2.2B deal was cancelled after the funding was nearly zeroed out in a supplemental budget that was approved last Friday. The outlet also noted the 66% increase in cost of the aircraft compared to the first order around a decade ago. Talk that South Korea could cancel its follow-on Apache order had been present for some time now.

Yu Yong-weon, a member of South Korea’s National Assembly belonging to the People Power Party, told The Korea Times that the vulnerability of helicopters to proliferated air defenses and loitering munitions/drones that have been showcased to the world in Ukraine spurred the decision. Yu stated: “Drones and smart systems are redefining modern battlefields… Rather than clinging to expensive legacy platforms, we must invest in capabilities that reflect the future of warfare.”
POCHEON, SOUTH KOREA - SEPTEMBER 30: An AH64 Apachi helicopter hovers during the South Korea and U.S. joint military exercise to commemorate the 63th Korea Armed Forces Day at the Seungjin firing drill ground on September 30, 2011 in Pocheon, South Korea. The exercise is intended to prepare the South Korean defence force for any potential action from North Korea. (Photo by Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images)
An Apache operates over the firing range in Pocheon, South Korea. (Photo by Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images) Chung Sung-Jun
As TWZ has noted for years now, well before Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine, the attack helicopter’s utility has to be questioned. This doesn’t mean it’s irrelevant, it means the rationale behind how many resources are poured into this class of aircraft has to be reevaluated based on the glaring realities of today’s battlespace, let alone what we can predict for that of tomorrow.

Survivability is certainly at the top of the list here. How can a low and slow-flying helicopter operate close enough to its objective to be useful in a traditional direct attack sense without being put at extreme risk? New tactics and combined arms concepts can certainly go a long way here, but pop-up threats — such as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), road-mobile SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery — that are very hard to predict and thus harder to plan for, remain a glaring issue.
Footage of a Russian Mi-24/35 attack helicopter getting shot down this morning by Ukrainian forces near Kyiv using MANPADS (man-portable air-defense systems). #Ukraine️ pic.twitter.com/Lb2nXbzVYh
— (@combatpix1) March 5, 2022
Then there is the advent of cheap loitering munitions that can take down helicopters as targets of opportunity or be launched and chase them down on demand. These weapons pose a growing and highly dynamic threat, too.
The proliferation of look-down radar capabilities and advanced long-range air defense systems also pose huge threats to attack helicopters. This is especially so as sensor fidelity and advanced networking capabilities continue to expand, along with a range of counter-air missile technology. The exploitation of the radar horizon and terrain masking will be less effective at providing some protection from these threats with each passing year.

New longer-range weapons, including missiles and air-launched effects (ALEs), the latter of which can act to attack, decoy, and jam air defenses, offer another survivability cushion, but only against some threats. Enhanced situational awareness and electronic warfare systems can also help. Suffice it to say that the growing risks to attack helicopters put their future in a murkier place.

An AH-64 Apache Longbow helicopter hovers during a military drill on July 28, 2003, in Yeounchun, South Korea. (Photo by Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images) Chung Sung-Jun

Then there is the range issue. Attack helicopters have notoriously short range, especially when laden for combat. In a modern era of anti-access capabilities, how attack helicopters would even get within launch range of their target area, let alone survive once they are there, at least in many combat scenarios, is also a huge question mark. Speed also buys some degree of survivability, which traditional helicopters don’t have. These factors are especially magnified in the Pacific, which, in part, drove the U.S. Army to further develop and procure the tiltrotor V-280 Valor over the compound helicopter Sikorsky-Boeing SB-1 Defiant. You can read all about that here.

When it comes to the Korean Peninsula, the range problem is far less pronounced, but the survivability one is arguably more so. If North Korea continues to acquire technological help from Russia to enhance its already rapidly expanding drone portfolio and its air defenses, this will only become more pronounced. So, it’s not too surprising that the billions of dollars that were supposed to be spent on additional Apaches will be realigned to other programs, specifically drones and new capabilities. Among them will surely be one-way attack munitions, something South Korea is already an adopter of, that soon will be able to operate without a man-in-the-loop, with basic AI capabilities used to allow them to choose their own targets. You can read all about this looming revolution in warfare here. For a fight across the DMZ, there really isn’t a more relevant weapon at this time, minus maybe artillery.
In addition, South Korea has its own, albeit less capable attack-capable helicopters, including its Marine Attack Helicopter (MAH) and its Light Attack Helicopter (LAH), which could augment the existing AH-64 force.
Marine Attack Helicopter in testing.

A final note here is that often times pundits and the media will portray something as totally irrelevant or relevant. This binary, ‘black and white’ positioning makes for a good headline, but it usually isn’t anywhere near representative of the nuanced reality we live in. The AH-64 and other attack helicopters still have their uses and are an important component of combined arms strategy today, but that does not mean expanding their fleet size or even maintaining the current fleet size is logical. A reduced force balanced against new capabilities can be a prudent solution and this can be realized over time as the existing force needs deep upgrades and overhaul. On the other hand, if the force is too small it won’t be operationally relevant and it will be very costly to maintain for its size. So a balance is needed here, as well.

And it’s also worth highlighting that demand for the Apache remains solid, with continued interest abroad.
Regardless, it’s possible, if not outright probable, that we will see similar changes to the U.S. Army’s rotary wing inventory in the years to come. The service has roughly 825 Apaches in operation today. As the force adapts (at this time, far too slowly) to a new era of warfare, that number could change dramatically.
We will be exploring this topic more in-depth in the future.
Contact the author: Tyler@twz.com
South Korea Canceling AH-64 Apache Order A Sign Of What's To Come
 

jward

passin' thru
OMG I must be in a really bad mood, coz I kinda love the proof o' concept and am more interested in how I can get one than bugged by China havin a stable full already..


Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal

CHINA UNLEASHES ROBOCOP HAMSTER BALLS ON ITS CITIZENS

Beijing's latest dystopian toy: a 21mph armored sphere that hunts protestors.

This mechanical death ball packs net guns, tear gas, and smoke bombs.

It rolls through water, bounces off walls, and never gets tired of chasing dissidents.

In other words, China watched every sci-fi movie about oppressive governments and said "hold my beer."

Your move, Boston Dynamics.

Nothing says "harmonious society" like robot hamster balls armed to the teeth.

Source: TheIndianHunts
rt 30s
View: https://twitter.com/MarioNawfal/status/1942420878031045025
 

OldArcher

Has No Life - Lives on TB
Tyler Rogoway
@Aviation_Intel
2h

South Korea Canceling AH-64 Apache Buy A Sign Of What’s To Come

While claims the attack helicopter is irrelevant are hyperbolic, their survivability, employability, and return on investment are definitely in question.




twz.com

South Korea Canceling AH-64 Apache Order A Sign Of What’s To Come​






The TWZ Newsletter​



Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
News has emerged out of South Korea that the country’s plans for a follow-on buy of 36 AH-64E Apache Guardian attack helicopters have been aborted. These aircraft would have joined 36 AH-64s already procured for Republic of Korea (ROK) service.

The Korea Times reports that the $2.2B deal was cancelled after the funding was nearly zeroed out in a supplemental budget that was approved last Friday. The outlet also noted the 66% increase in cost of the aircraft compared to the first order around a decade ago. Talk that South Korea could cancel its follow-on Apache order had been present for some time now.

Yu Yong-weon, a member of South Korea’s National Assembly belonging to the People Power Party, told The Korea Times that the vulnerability of helicopters to proliferated air defenses and loitering munitions/drones that have been showcased to the world in Ukraine spurred the decision. Yu stated: “Drones and smart systems are redefining modern battlefields… Rather than clinging to expensive legacy platforms, we must invest in capabilities that reflect the future of warfare.”
POCHEON, SOUTH KOREA - SEPTEMBER 30: An AH64 Apachi helicopter hovers during the South Korea and U.S. joint military exercise to commemorate the 63th Korea Armed Forces Day at the Seungjin firing drill ground on September 30, 2011 in Pocheon, South Korea. The exercise is intended to prepare the South Korean defence force for any potential action from North Korea. (Photo by Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images)
An Apache operates over the firing range in Pocheon, South Korea. (Photo by Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images) Chung Sung-Jun
As TWZ has noted for years now, well before Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine, the attack helicopter’s utility has to be questioned. This doesn’t mean it’s irrelevant, it means the rationale behind how many resources are poured into this class of aircraft has to be reevaluated based on the glaring realities of today’s battlespace, let alone what we can predict for that of tomorrow.

Survivability is certainly at the top of the list here. How can a low and slow-flying helicopter operate close enough to its objective to be useful in a traditional direct attack sense without being put at extreme risk? New tactics and combined arms concepts can certainly go a long way here, but pop-up threats — such as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), road-mobile SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery — that are very hard to predict and thus harder to plan for, remain a glaring issue.

Then there is the advent of cheap loitering munitions that can take down helicopters as targets of opportunity or be launched and chase them down on demand. These weapons pose a growing and highly dynamic threat, too.
The proliferation of look-down radar capabilities and advanced long-range air defense systems also pose huge threats to attack helicopters. This is especially so as sensor fidelity and advanced networking capabilities continue to expand, along with a range of counter-air missile technology. The exploitation of the radar horizon and terrain masking will be less effective at providing some protection from these threats with each passing year.

New longer-range weapons, including missiles and air-launched effects (ALEs), the latter of which can act to attack, decoy, and jam air defenses, offer another survivability cushion, but only against some threats. Enhanced situational awareness and electronic warfare systems can also help. Suffice it to say that the growing risks to attack helicopters put their future in a murkier place.

An AH-64 Apache Longbow helicopter hovers during a military drill on July 28, 2003, in Yeounchun, South Korea. (Photo by Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images) Chung Sung-Jun

Then there is the range issue. Attack helicopters have notoriously short range, especially when laden for combat. In a modern era of anti-access capabilities, how attack helicopters would even get within launch range of their target area, let alone survive once they are there, at least in many combat scenarios, is also a huge question mark. Speed also buys some degree of survivability, which traditional helicopters don’t have. These factors are especially magnified in the Pacific, which, in part, drove the U.S. Army to further develop and procure the tiltrotor V-280 Valor over the compound helicopter Sikorsky-Boeing SB-1 Defiant. You can read all about that here.

When it comes to the Korean Peninsula, the range problem is far less pronounced, but the survivability one is arguably more so. If North Korea continues to acquire technological help from Russia to enhance its already rapidly expanding drone portfolio and its air defenses, this will only become more pronounced. So, it’s not too surprising that the billions of dollars that were supposed to be spent on additional Apaches will be realigned to other programs, specifically drones and new capabilities. Among them will surely be one-way attack munitions, something South Korea is already an adopter of, that soon will be able to operate without a man-in-the-loop, with basic AI capabilities used to allow them to choose their own targets. You can read all about this looming revolution in warfare here. For a fight across the DMZ, there really isn’t a more relevant weapon at this time, minus maybe artillery.
In addition, South Korea has its own, albeit less capable attack-capable helicopters, including its Marine Attack Helicopter (MAH) and its Light Attack Helicopter (LAH), which could augment the existing AH-64 force.
Marine Attack Helicopter in testing.

A final note here is that often times pundits and the media will portray something as totally irrelevant or relevant. This binary, ‘black and white’ positioning makes for a good headline, but it usually isn’t anywhere near representative of the nuanced reality we live in. The AH-64 and other attack helicopters still have their uses and are an important component of combined arms strategy today, but that does not mean expanding their fleet size or even maintaining the current fleet size is logical. A reduced force balanced against new capabilities can be a prudent solution and this can be realized over time as the existing force needs deep upgrades and overhaul. On the other hand, if the force is too small it won’t be operationally relevant and it will be very costly to maintain for its size. So a balance is needed here, as well.

And it’s also worth highlighting that demand for the Apache remains solid, with continued interest abroad.
Regardless, it’s possible, if not outright probable, that we will see similar changes to the U.S. Army’s rotary wing inventory in the years to come. The service has roughly 825 Apaches in operation today. As the force adapts (at this time, far too slowly) to a new era of warfare, that number could change dramatically.
We will be exploring this topic more in-depth in the future.
Contact the author: Tyler@twz.com
South Korea Canceling AH-64 Apache Order A Sign Of What's To Come
Smart decision.

OA
 
Top