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Franco-Russian Naval Sale is a Challenge to NATO
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 29
February 11, 2010 09:48 PM Age: 3 days
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vlad’s Corner, Military/Security, Europe, Russia
By: Vladimir Socor
NATO is being tested, with “its future at stake,” not so much in Afghanistan as the line recently went, but rather in Brussels itself and in the Alliance’s most influential capitals. The latest among these tests –one that the Alliance seems only determined to side-step– is over the proposed French naval modernization program for Russia. The program envisages selling one French Mistral-class warship –a state-of-the art, offensive power-projection capability– to Russia and licensing the construction of three or four ships of the same class in Russia, potentially usable in the Baltic and Black Sea.
The Mistral would be the first-ever military and production-licensing sale by a NATO country to Russia; and the deal’s value could set a billion-Euro benchmark or even higher. Moscow has also expressed interest in purchasing the “soldier of the future” integrated kit Felin from France’s Sagem company, as part of modernizing the Russian ground troops’ offensive potential. Again, Russia’s “near abroad” would be the likely arena for using such forces
Certain other West European countries could well use a French “precedent” and start selling their own military production to Russia, with similar disregard for the security of Russia’s neighbors, who are NATO allies and partners. Ideally, from Moscow’s standpoint, European countries would ultimately even compete with each other in arms offers to Russia. Moscow is trying to induce such competition already by hinting at talks with other European countries for Mistral-class analogues, if France bargains too hard on the terms of its sale.
Beyond crass commerce, France is also justifying the Mistral sale to Russia as an anti-crisis stimulus program and employment-generating measure, in addition to its grand political rationalization (EDM, January 7, 26). Thus, France is creating a myriad excuses that other NATO countries can emulate in future arms deals with Russia, if this Mistral sale goes ahead, with corrosive effects on the Alliance’s solidarity and its policies.
If NATO tolerates the Mistral deal, then other allied countries and companies may scramble for bilateral arms deals with Russia, outside any NATO consultation processes, and without objection from an alliance self-consigned to irrelevancy on this account. NATO needs to deal with the Mistral case pro-actively, before any fait accompli and precedent will have been set. If NATO fails on this issue now, then the entire issue of arms sales to Russia will spin out of the Alliance’s ability to control.
Meanwhile, NATO looks reluctant to face the implications of the proposed sale for the Alliance itself. The office of NATO’s Secretary-General seems to give the Mistral deal a green light without any qualms, thus distancing itself from the US position. According to NATO’s chief spokesman James Appathurai, “NATO has no formal role at all in this sale. We are quite confident that the sale would be (when it takes place) perfectly legal, within all the relevant frameworks. But of course some allies have expressed concern about the sale, and we are aware of it” (Radio Free Europe, February 9).
This statement’s first part sounds like a resigned admission of NATO irrelevance to the issues at hand. The second element implicitly disavows US Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ objections to the Mistral sale and the Pentagon spokesman’s statement of receptiveness to regional concerns (La France D’Abord: Paris First to Capitalize on Russian Military Modernization, EDM, February 11).
The Secretary-General’s office backtracked somewhat the following day, with the same spokesman conceding that “the anxieties of some Allies are of course real and are understandable for historical and for geographical reasons” (NATO press release, February 10).
This interpretation, however, avoids the issue of Russian intentions and capabilities in the context of the Mistral deal. It reduces the debate to history and geography, without taking the recent experience with Russian conduct into account. And while mentioning Allies, it overlooks NATO Partners, although Georgia and Ukraine would be directly affected by the possible Mistral deployment in the Black Sea.
Georgia remains a prime target of opportunity for Russia in the Black Sea basin at present. A Mistral-class ship would enable Russia to threaten amphibious and helicopter landings on Georgia’s sea coast, with far greater speed and effectiveness than those of Russia’s existing capabilities. Russia’s naval command publicly alluded to the Mistral’s potential use against Georgia when starting the talks with France for the sale. Paris has ignored Georgian officials’ appeals (EDM, September 18, November 2, December 2, 2009). Meanwhile, Georgia is an all-but disarmed country and (as a thwarted NATO aspirant) is not covered by any external security guarantees.
Russia could also use this type of ship to intimidate Ukraine in the run-up to 2017, when the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s lease in the Crimea runs out. Moscow has indicated in multiple statements that it is prepared to keep the Sevastopol naval base (eastern Crimea) regardless of legal issues. The Mistral’s helicopters and armored vehicles would give Russia the threat option of a quick landing on the Crimean peninsula’s western side.
Meanwhile, immersed in electoral confrontations, and with a moribund presidency, Ukraine failed to join Georgia in raising the Mistral issue at the international level, although Ukraine might equally be affected in due course.
Defense ministers and other officials in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania continue expressing concern about the possible impact on Baltic security, if Russia stations a Mistral-class warship there. According to Latvian Defense Minister Imants Liegis, this would change the security situation in the Baltic Sea, necessitating adjustments in defense planning (BNS, February 9). Lithuanian Defense Minister Rasa Jukneviciene will raise this issue within NATO: “Such a sale is quite astonishing to us, this will become a precedent. It is an important issue for NATO and we will bring it up” (BNS, February 9). According to Estonian Foreign Ministry senior official (and previously ambassador to NATO) Harri Tiido, the Mistral sale to Russia could undermine the Baltic States’ security; and “Baltic nations may in that case have to consider changes to their defense planning (Radio Free Europe, February 9).
Thus far, Baltic and Black Sea countries have not been effective in raising their concerns on this matter within NATO. They have not yet spoken in a concerted fashion; since they are worried about irritating France (even about possible French retaliation on other matters); and they seem at times to hope that the Mistral issue would just go away.
NATO’s internal politics are also partly responsible for inhibiting debate on this issue. Debate was discouraged at the political level, and the United States hesitated for four months before Gates raised the issue, privately and publicly, with Paris on February 8. Apparently, the quest for Russian “help” on Afghanistan and Iran, all its frustrations notwithstanding, took precedence over longer-term considerations.
However, serious examination of the proposed Mistral sale in NATO need not be construed as jeopardizing NATO-Russia relations, or primarily as a Baltic and Black Sea issue. Ultimately, the most relevant issue is that of integrity of NATO’s internal consultation processes and procedures. The Mistral affair should bring the wider issue of arms sales to Russia onto NATO’s agenda. The new NATO Strategic Concept, currently being drafted, provides a compelling first opportunity in this regard.
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La France D’Abord: Paris First to Capitalize on Russian Military Modernization
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 29
February 11, 2010 09:46 PM Age: 3 days
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vlad’s Corner, Military/Security, Europe, Russia
By: Vladimir Socor
French President Nicolas Sarkozy has approved the sale of one Mistral-class warship to Russia; and France is now considering Moscow’s request for three more of that class of helicopter-carrier and amphibious-assault ship.
The Russian Navy’s First Deputy Chief of Staff, Vice-Admiral Oleg Burtsev, broke the news on February 5 in Moscow about Sarkozy’s approval of the first warship procurement (Interfax, February 5). The French defense ministry confirmed this on February 8 and announced the Russian navy’s request for three additional ships (Le Monde, February 9). The announcements seemed timed by Moscow and Paris to undercut US Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ intention to raise this issue during his Paris visit.
Jacques de Lajugie, the international director of the French Defense Ministry’s General Directorate for Armaments, told a February 8 news conference that Sarkozy has cleared the first warship’s sale to Russia, while Paris is examining Moscow’s additional request “at the technical level.” Where those three additional ships would be built is an unresolved issue, De Lajugie said (Agence France Presse, February 8).
It is public knowledge that Moscow wants to buy the license for building the three additional ships in Russia; whereas Paris wants the construction of those additional ships to be shared between Russian and French shipyards. France is handling this strategic matter to a large extent as a business and job-creating proposition. Paris, moreover, is worried (according to De Lajugie in the news conference) about Moscow’s contacts with other European naval shipbuilders for acquiring helicopter carriers from them. Given this possibility (or perhaps this excuse) Paris has now rushed through the approval of the first warship sale to Russia.
Meanwhile, French arms exports soared to almost 8 billion Euros during the recession year 2009, up by 21 percent from 2008, according to the same French official (Financial Times Deutschland, February 9).
Defense Secretary Gates did object to the Mistral sale during his February 8 meetings with Sarkozy and with French Defense Minister Herve Morin. According to an Elysee Palace official’s account, Sarkozy replied that the warship sale would not pose security problems to Russia’s neighboring countries. Gates told the concluding news conference that he held “an in-depth exchange of views about this” with Morin,” hinting that the French side was not persuaded by the objections. Elaborating, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell noted that “US friends and allies in Eastern Europe are clearly nervous about it, with good reason.” In the Black Sea, “these new warships would give Russia additional capabilities to threaten Georgia;” and Gates “made our concerns clear” (Agence France Presse, Radio Free Europe, February 8; Le Monde, February 9).
Sarkozy and other French officials claim to be harmonizing their policy on military exports with the broader quest for a security partnership with Russia. They argue that the refusal to sell the warships would contradict Western statements about cooperating with Russia on perceived common challenges (EDM, January 7, 26). Defending the warship sale decision, Sarkozy and Morin now argue that a reversal would amount to ignoring Russia’s post-1991 transformation. And “one cannot expect Russia to behave as a partner if we do not treat it as one,” Sarkozy told Gates with reference to the warship sale (Agence France Presse, February 8).
By this logic, practice should be adjusted to follow theoretical postulates, regardless of any actual experience with Russia’s conduct. Furthermore, by this logic, Russia might have behaved as a partner and respected instead of breaking, the Sarkozy-brokered armistice in Georgia, if only France had started its military sales to Russia sooner.
French leaders practice a double discourse on the warship sale, alternately presenting it as a political imperative and an ordinary commercial transaction (two lines usually included within the same conversation).
Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner told journalists in the same context (though without mentioning the warship sale directly) that his hope for a Franco-Russian partnership rests on Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s “will for change,” and his “entirely different vision. There is something very promising about Medvedev” (Agence France Presse, February 10). However, the driving force behind the Mistral deal in Russia is Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the military, not Medvedev. And according to French Prime Minister Francois Fillon after a meeting with Putin, “Russia is a democracy today” (Le Monde, January 30) –an echo of German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s characterization of then-president Putin as an “impeccable democrat.”
French political rationalization of military sales to Russia need not be taken any more literally than the German theory of a “modernization partnership” with the Kremlin. Meanwhile, German business and the government are far ahead of France in developing a special partnership with Russia. Paris is now embarking on an effort to build its own special relationship with Moscow. They cannot match Germany’s role vis-à-vis Russia overall, but they hope to make inroads in some specialized sectors where France has competitive advantages.
One sector that remains closed to Germany for political reasons is that of military sales to Russia. The French are stepping into that potentially large niche, as the first Western power to capitalize on Russia’s military modernization program. Once this process starts, a floodgate may open for military sales to Russia from some West European countries, bypassing and undermining NATO, and enhancing Russia’s capacity to pressure NATO allies and partners in Europe’s East.
