INTL 8/5/09|U.S. Could Pull Back Europe-Based Nukes, State Dept./Speed up START talks

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U.S. Could Pull Back Europe-Based Nukes, State Department Official Says
Wednesday, Aug. 5, 2009

By Martin Matishak

Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON -- The United States could remove some or all of its tactical nuclear weapons from Europe to encourage Russia to consolidate its own arsenal of nonstrategic bombs, a key U.S. State Department official said last week (see GSN, July 27).

Such a move would lessen the possibility of a Russian weapon falling into terrorist hands, according to Robert Einhorn, the agency's special adviser for nonproliferation and arms control.

The United States is believed to have between 150 and 240 weapons deployed across the continent, according to the Federation of American Scientists. A majority of them were installed during the Cold War as a hedge against Moscow's nuclear arsenal.

At one time there were as many as 480 short-range B-61 bombs -- which can be dropped by F-16 fighter aircraft or their European equivalent the Tornado -- kept under U.S. control at bases in Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, Turkey and the Netherlands, according to a 2005 report by the Natural Resources Defense Council.

Prior administrations have removed some of the weapons, most recently from Germany between 2005 and 2007 and the United Kingdom last year (see GSN, July 10, 2007 and June 26, 2008). The rest remain in Europe under control of the U.S. Air Force.

Russia, meanwhile, is estimated to have more than 2,000 deployed tactical nuclear weapons that could be carried by cruise missiles, torpedoes or other means, according to the federation.

Those tactical weapons are clustered around the Kola Peninsula, where a majority of the country's naval fleet is docked, and Vladivostok, Russia's largest port city, according to Hans Kristensen, director of the FAS Nuclear Information Project. The bombs are also thought to be west of the Ural Mountains, as well as around the Russian border with China.

Tactical, or nonstrategic nuclear weapons, typically refer to short-range weapons, including land-based missiles with a range of less than 300 miles and air- and sea-launched weapons with a range of less than 400 miles.

In a commentary last year former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Defense Secretary William Perry and former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn called for eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed.

When considering future formal and informal arms control agreements, the United States should determine not only how they might serve "traditional" goals such as reducing incentives for a nuclear first strike, but also how they would affect "the likelihood of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons or fissile materials," Einhorn said Thursday during a U.S. Strategic Command symposium on nuclear deterrence in Omaha, Neb.

Addressing the "large U.S.-Russian asymmetry" in nonstrategic nuclear weapons would not only reduce the threats perceived by a number of European states, it would also reduce the risk of Moscow's tactical weapons from falling into terrorist hands, Einhorn told the audience.

Such a move in regards to tactical nuclear weapons would differ from Cold War thinking, when the central U.S. goal of arms control was reducing the risk of a massive nuclear war by limiting and reducing Soviet strategic forces that posed the "greatest risk" to U.S. retaliatory capabilities, Einhorn said.

"Removing such tactical nuclear weapons from forward-deployed locations and consolidating them in secure storage facilities deep within Russia could be just as worthwhile, and perhaps more feasible, than classic arms control solutions," he said.

"This poses a question of whether the U.S., as an inducement to Russia to limit or consolidate its tactical weapons, should be prepared to reduce or eliminate the relatively small number of U.S. nuclear weapons that remain in Europe," according to Einhorn.

U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev last month signed a "joint understanding" on reductions to their nations' respective strategic nuclear arsenals (see GSN, July 6). The agreement does not address tactical warheads.

The military value of the Europe-based tactical weapons has "dropped precipitously since the days of the Cold War," Einhorn said. However, they continue play a role in the "cohesion" of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, he added without elaborating.

In addition, "at least one" ally country believes the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on it soil reduces the incentive for it to acquire its own nuclear weapons capability, Einhorn told the audience. Kristensen told Global Security Newswire yesterday in a telephone interview that Einhorn was referring to Turkey.

In its final report to lawmakers in May the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States said that the requirements of "extended deterrence in Europe are evolving, given the changing relationship with Russia" and the perception of some allies that they are "keenly vulnerable to Russian military coercion."

Nations located near Russia believe that U.S. nonstrategic forces in Europe remain necessary to prevent the Kremlin from using its nuclear arsenal as a means of coercion against them, according to the report.

It warns that the United States should not abandon "strategic equivalency with Russia" and should not cede to Moscow "a posture of superiority in the name of de-emphasizing nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy."

Balance "does not exist in nonstrategic nuclear forces, where Russia enjoys a sizable numerical advantage," the report states, adding "the current imbalance is stark and worrisome to some U.S. allies in Central Europe."

Einhorn cautioned that any changes to the United States' nuclear deployments in Europe "should only be considered after extensive consultations and consensus-building within" NATO.

His comments "means he's preparing the soil for the next phase" of U.S.-Russian arms control talks after the START follow-on treaty is finalized, according to Kristensen, who attended the symposium.

He predicted that administration officials would become more specific "within the next year or two."

The idea of reducing or eliminating the European-based weapons "was always something that was dismissed and the stock statement was, 'Well, the Europeans want them there,'" Kristensen said.

He dismissed the argument made by some experts that if the United States shrinks its extended deterrent, or "nuclear umbrella," that ally countries would seek their own nuclear-weapon capability.

"We have an interest in the Russian weapons being consolidated or taken back into the country," Kristensen told GSN. "The real question is how do we play it and get them to engage on it?"

Until now Moscow has refused to discuss relocating its tactical nuclear weapons, citing NATO deployments along its border, according to Kristensen.

"It's more of a Cold War assessment of the need for national prestige, more than anything," he said. "The bottom line is they haven't been interested so far."

[EDITOR'S NOTE: Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. NTI is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by the National Journal Group.]

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Medvedev, Obama Pledge to Expedite START Talks
Wednesday, Aug. 5, 2009

U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev pledged yesterday to redouble efforts to replace a key strategic arms control treaty set to expire in December, the Xinhua News Agency reported (see GSN, Aug. 4).

The leaders last month resolved to cut their nations' respective deployed strategic nuclear arsenals to between 1,500 and 1,675 warheads under a successor to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The two countries are now required under a 2002 pact to hold no more than 2,200 operationally fielded warheads by 2012.

Speaking by telephone, Medvedev and Obama said they would provide their negotiators with additional directions on reaching a deal to replace the START pact.

The leaders "exchanged views on the implementation of the outcome of the Moscow summit, in particular the need for an early start of the practical work of [the] Russian-American Presidential Commission," a body that would address arms control matters and other bilateral issues, a Kremlin statement says (Xinhua News Agency, Aug. 4).

They "agreed to give additional instructions to experts on intensifying work, to reach a constructive decision by December," RIA Novosti quoted the release as saying.

Obama and Medvedev also decided to "continue a trusting and honest exchange of opinions and assessments on all problems of interest to both sides," the release states (RIA Novosti, Aug. 4).

Under the 1991 agreement, the United States has conducted nearly 100 more inspections than Russia to verify weapon reductions in its former Cold War rival, Interfax reported yesterday.

"Since the treaty took effect, 464 inspections of American strategic arms facilities have been carried out. The U.S. has held 559 similar inspections in Russia," said Sergei Ryzhkov, first deputy head of the Russian National Nuclear Threat Reduction Center.

Russia "carries out over 40 inspections each year under the START I Treaty, performs over 50 observation flights under the Open Skies Treaty, over 80 inspections under the 1999 Vienna Document and four inspections under agreements with China," Ryzhkov said.

"An analysis of the inspections conducted suggests that the signatory states mostly abide by the agreements reached," he said (Interfax I, Aug. 4).

"The United States currently has 1,195 [nuclear-weapon] carriers and 5,573 warheads, and Russia 811 carriers and 3,906 warheads," according to Ryzhkov. Before signing the START agreement, the United States possessed 2,246 delivery vehicles and 10,563 warheads while Soviet states held 2,288 delivery systems and 8,757 warheads, he said (Interfax II, Aug. 4).

Elsewhere, Russia's military today confirmed sending two nuclear-powered, conventionally armed attack submarines on a patrol mission off the eastern United States, the Associated Press reported (Associated Press/Google News, Aug. 5).

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UN special non-proliferation meeting leaves out countries of "concern"
www.chinaview.cn
2009-08-06 06:16:21

UNITED NATIONS, Aug. 5 (Xinhua) -- The special meeting of the UN Security Council on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament to be chaired by U.S. President Barack Obama next month will focus on a range of issues without dealing with specific countries, said the United States top envoy to the UN here on Wednesday.

"There are many, many issues out there that are important and relevant that go beyond individual countries," Susan Rice told reporters. "We want to secure loose nuclear material within four years. We want to start a follow-on agreement. We want to ratify CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). We want to have a fissile material cut-off."

The special session, to take place on Sept. 24 during the annual general debate of the UN General Assembly, will host the heads of state of the other 14 Security Council members, according to a statement made by Rice on Tuesday.

Rice said it was too early to say who would come but she added that the UN session will be "one of the rare occasions in which the Security Council has met at the heads of state level."

"It is a topic this council has been focused on and seized with and which I think all of our colleagues agree merits the highest level attention," said Rice, who made the comments after addressing the Security Council on peacekeeping operations.

In Prague in April, Obama pledged his commitment to working towards a world free of nuclear weapons and voiced his support for the CTBT, which bans all nuclear explosions for military or civilian purposes and which the U.S. has yet to ratify.

Meanwhile, members of the Security Council -- Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States -- reaffirmed their support in May for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a convention to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, and urged all NPT signatories to ensure "a successful and balanced review" at the conference in 2010.

"The NPT review conference is an important milestone and we are very much committed to working to making it a success," said Rice. "And to the extent that this session in the Security Council can lend a positive impetus to that, we would find that very valuable."

Only four recognized sovereign states are not parties to the treaty: India, Israel, Pakistan, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The DPRK acceded to the treaty and withdrew it in 2003.

Even though Iran has signed the NPT, the United States has vowed to curb Tehran's nuclear program over fears that it could be months away from enriching enough uranium for a warhead. Iran has repeatedly said its nuclear program is for legitimate energy needs.

"We are dealing with the individual countries every day in the Security Council, as we just have, I think quite effectively, with North Korea and as we continue to review and to deal with the situation of Iran," Rice said.

The special session, on the other hand, is an opportunity for the council "to continue its thinking and to concert its action" in nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, she said.

Editor: Mu Xuequan

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Pentagon Says Nuclear Review Will Address Disarmament, Deterrence
Tuesday, Aug. 4, 2009

By Martin Matishak

Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON -- The Obama administration's review of the nation's nuclear-weapon policy will address both the desire for global nuclear disarmament and the need to maintain an effective deterrent, a senior Defense Department official said last week (see GSN, July 28).

President Barack Obama's speech in April on nuclear nonproliferation sketched out "twin imperatives in the nuclear realm," Brad Roberts, deputy assistant defense secretary for nuclear and missile defense policy, said Wednesday at a U.S. Strategic Command symposium on deterrence in Omaha, Neb.

The first imperative is to "explore the possibility of creating conditions that might ultimately allows the nuclear weapons states to feel safer in relinquishing their nuclear weapons," according to Roberts. The five recognized nuclear powers are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States

The second imperative is to "not to disarm unilaterally and to maintain an effective deterrence so long as nuclear weapons remain," he told the audience.

The "business" of the congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review is to "figure out how to balance these two objectives," he said.

That review, which Roberts is helping to lead, will establish policies and strategies for the U.S. nuclear deterrent over the next five to 10 years. It is scheduled to be released this fall.

That dual approach makes sense, according to national security analyst Lawrence Korb, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress.

While Obama has talked about creating a world free of nuclear weapons, "you have to have enough of a deterrent to maintain security, especially if others don't follow you on the path to zero," Korb, who also attended the symposium, said today in a telephone interview with Global Security Newswire.

Roberts said last week there are "three main expectations" on nuclear weapons as the administration prepares a new national security strategy.

The first is a "continued focus on practical steps to reduce nuclear weapons roles, numbers and emphasis," according to Roberts.

He said the administration would not take "any and every step" to address the three aspects, but rather those that "preserve and indeed enhance strategic capability, if we can do so at lower numbers."

The second expectation is that there will be a continued focus on stability in Washington's relationship with the other nuclear powers, according to Roberts. Russia and China "continue to perceive rising instability in the strategic military relationship with the United States," he noted.

He said the White House is taking a new tack in the U.S. relationship with Russia, "seeking to revitalize the arms control foundation on the hope that this will renew the political relationship and strategic cooperation more generally."

Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev last month signed a "joint understanding" for new limits on deployed nuclear warheads and delivery systems in a replacement for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (see GSN, July 6). The 1991 agreement is scheduled to expire in December.

Observers should "expect more continuity than change out of this administration on overall strategic political objectives with China," Roberts said. No fewer than six administrations have tried to engage the communist country as a "responsible stakeholder in the international system ... and trying to engage China in a dialogue about non-zero-sum approaches to our shared and sometimes competitive interests," he said.

Lastly, there will be an increased emphasis on extended deterrence and the assurance of allies, according to Roberts. Extended deterrence refers to the "nuclear umbrella" the United States provides to allies such as South Korea and Japan.

"The concern about tipping points is rising," Roberts said, noting that the anxieties of partner nations in East Asia have "sharpened" as a result of North Korea's two nuclear tests and the modernization of the Chinese military's nuclear capabilities.

There is an "active process" within the administration to consult with ally countries on the Nuclear Posture Review and how the United States will address the challenges in their security environments.

The imperatives and expectations Roberts laid out shows that the White House wants to de-emphasize nuclear weapons, Korb told GSN today. He said the key drivers for that approach are the cost of maintaining the country's nuclear stockpile and concerns about proliferation.

When asked last week what effect a dramatic reduction in the U.S. nuclear stockpile would have on proliferation or convincing other nuclear weapons states to reduce or forswear the possession of warheads, Roberts responded "it depends and it's mixed."

The administration "can imagine reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal that would generate anxiety among our partners and opportunism by others," he said. "It's difficult to imagine any single action by the United States that would have a single international response."

Roberts said the "shorthand" of the debate within the arms control community is that further reductions are essential in order to underscore the strength of the commitment by the United States and Russia to the nonproliferation regime.

"I think that accords with our thoughts that further steps are necessary and useful in demonstrating that commitment," he told the audience.

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Nuclear Weapon's Refurbishing Woes Draw Congressional Attention to Treaty

By Walter Pincus
Tuesday, August 4, 2009

Concern over the U.S. strategic nuclear stockpile, illustrated by problems with a classified material called "Fogbank," has triggered quiet maneuverings on Capitol Hill related to negotiations to extend the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

That treaty expires at year's end.

"Fogbank" plays a key part in the W-76, the nuclear warhead on the Navy's Trident II sub-launched intercontinental ballistic missile and the country's most numerous and important strategic nuclear weapons. Initially deployed in 1978, about 3,000 were produced with a planned 30-year life. In 2000, planning began for refurbishing about 2,000 W-78 warheads under the ongoing life-extension program being used to upgrade existing U.S. nuclear systems.

Initial delivery of the reconditioned W-76 warheads was to begin in 2007 and take nine years. But according to a March 2009 Government Accountability Report, the program ran into a problem -- "Fogbank." It turned out that there initially was no replacement for this key element of the W-76, and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) "had lost knowledge of how to manufacture the material because it had kept few records of the process when the material was made in the 1980s and almost all staff with expertise on production had retired or left the agency," according to the GAO.

In 2000, NNSA considered a cheaper material but dropped that idea because, in part, the Los Alamos National Laboratory's "computer models and simulations were not sophisticated enough to provide conclusive evidence that the alternate material would function exactly the same as Fogbank," the GAO said.

Then followed a series of apparent blunders. Though remanufacturing Fogbank was recognized as a high-risk program, a determination was made to build a new Fogbank production facility while, at the same time, using an existing pilot plant to test the manufacturing process. There were safety issues with the new facility, the pilot plant was minimally utilized, and when production began a year behind schedule, the Fogbank produced was unusable. In 2007, NNSA decided to reverse itself, and with a $23 million initiative, try to produce an alternative material while pushing ahead with making new Fogbank.

The current plan is to get the alternative product certified by the end of this year and use it if additional problems develop as the Fogbank facility goes into full-scale production.

The Fogbank experience showed all the weaknesses in the U.S. nuclear program that critics have harped on for years -- potential failures within refurbishing systems, lack of a trained nuclear workforce and lack of modernized facilities.

With that background in mind, on July 23, a bipartisan group of six senior senators wrote President Obama. The group, which included John F. Kerry (D-Mass.) and Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.) -- chairmen of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees, respectively -- and Richard G. Lugar (Ind.) and John McCain (Ariz.) -- the two ranking Republicans -- said that when the new START treaty is submitted for ratification, it should be accompanied by a 10-year funding estimate to support enhancement of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. They also want it to include cost figures, beginning with the fiscal 2011 budget, that show how much will be available to modernize the aging nuclear weapons manufacturing complex and to maintain a competent workforce able to create new weapons, if necessary.

Finally, they want numbers to prove that the administration is prepared to maintain the nuclear weapon delivery systems -- strategic submarines, sub- and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and long-range bombers, all of which need replacements.

Triggering the letter were competing amendments passed in the House and Senate versions of the fiscal 2010 Defense Authorization Bill. The House language, written by Rep. Michael R. Turner (R-Ohio), would prohibit use of funds to reduce strategic nuclear weapons under a new treaty with Russia -- unless the president certified there were sufficient verification measures and that neither U.S. missile defense systems nor conventional offensive weapons were under limits. It would also have to be determined that the U.S. nuclear weapons programs were adequately funded.

The Senate amendment, originated by Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) but modified by colleagues, is much less harsh. It calls for Obama to provide a report to Congress that includes the information contained in the July 23 letter.

In a floor statement last Wednesday, Kerry said, "I would encourage the administration to see that requirement not as a burden, but as an opportunity." He applauded Senate colleagues for not adopting the House approach, which he described as "trying to bar U.S. compliance with a treaty before the treaty has even been negotiated."

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August 6, 2009
My Plan For Nuclear Disarmament
By Ban Ki-moon

The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 marked an end and a beginning. The close of World War II ushered in a Cold War, with a precarious peace based on the threat of mutually assured destruction.

Today the world is at another turning point. The assumption that nuclear weapons are indispensable to keeping the peace is crumbling. Disarmament is back on the global agenda - and not a moment too soon. A groundswell of new international initiatives will soon emerge to move this agenda forward.

The Cold War's end, 20 years ago this autumn, was supposed to provide a peace dividend. Instead, we find ourselves still facing serious nuclear threats. Some stem from the persistence of more than 20,000 nuclear weapons and the contagious doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Others relate to nuclear tests - more than a dozen in the post-Cold War era, aggravated by the constant testing of long-range missiles. Still others arise from concerns that more countries or even terrorists might be seeking the bomb.

For decades, we believed that the terrible effects of nuclear weapons would be sufficient to prevent their use. The superpowers were likened to a pair of scorpions in a bottle, each knowing a first strike would be suicidal. Today's expanding nest of scorpions, however, means that no one is safe. The presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States - holders of the largest nuclear arsenals - recognize this. They have endorsed the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, most recently at their Moscow summit, and are seeking new reductions.

Many efforts are under way worldwide to achieve this goal. Earlier this year, the 65-member Conference on Disarmament - the forum that produces multilateral disarmament treaties - broke a deadlock and agreed to negotiations on a fissile material treaty. Other issues it will discuss include nuclear disarmament and security assurances for nonnuclear weapon states. In addition, Australia and Japan have launched a major international commission on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.

My own multimedia "WMD - We Must Disarm!" campaign, which will culminate on the International Day of Peace (Sept. 21), will reinforce growing calls for disarmament by former statesmen and grassroots campaigns, such as "Global Zero." These calls will get a further boost in September when civil society groups gather in Mexico City for a U.N.-sponsored conference on disarmament and development.

Though the United Nations has been working on disarmament since 1946, two treaties negotiated under U.N. auspices are now commanding the world's attention. Also in September, countries that have signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will meet at the U.N. to consider ways to promote its early entry into force. North Korea's nuclear tests, its missile launches and its threats of further provocation lend new urgency to this cause.

Next May, the U.N. will also host a major five-year review conference involving the parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which will examine the state of the treaty's "grand bargain" of disarmament, nonproliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If the CTBT can enter into force, and if the NPT review conference makes progress, the world would be off to a good start on its journey to a world free of nuclear weapons.

My own five-point plan to achieve this goal begins with a call for the NPT parties to pursue negotiations in good faith - as required by the treaty - on nuclear disarmament, either through a new convention or through a series of mutually reinforcing instruments backed by a credible system of verification. Disarmament must be reliably verified.

Second, I urged the U.N. Security Council to consider other ways to strengthen security in the disarmament process, and to assure nonnuclear weapons states against nuclear weapons threats. I proposed to the council that it convene a summit on nuclear disarmament, and I urged non-NPT states to freeze their own weapon capabilities and make their own disarmament commitments. Disarmament must enhance security.

My third proposal relates to the rule of law. Universal membership in multilateral treaties is key, as are regional nuclear-weapon-free zones and a new treaty on fissile materials. President Barack Obama's support for U.S. ratification of the CTBT is welcome - the treaty only needs a few more ratifications to enter into force. Disarmament must be rooted in legal obligations.

My fourth point addresses accountability and transparency. Countries with nuclear weapons should publish more information about what they are doing to fulfill their disarmament commitments. While most of these countries have revealed some details about their weapons programs, we still do not know how many nuclear weapons exist worldwide. The U.N. secretariat could serve as a repository for such data. Disarmament must be visible to the public.

Finally, I am urging progress in eliminating other weapons of mass destruction and limiting missiles, space weapons and conventional arms - all of which are needed for a nuclear weapons- free world. Disarmament must anticipate emerging dangers from other weapons.

This, then, is my plan to drop the bomb. Global security challenges are serious enough without the risks from nuclear weapons or their acquisition by additional states or non-state actors. Of course, strategic stability, trust among nations, and the settlement of regional conflicts would all help to advance the process of disarmament. Yet disarmament has its own contributions to make in serving these goals and should not be postponed.

It will restore hope for a more peaceful, secure and prosperous future. It deserves everybody's support.


Ban Ki-moon is U.N. secretary general.

© 2009 Project Syndicate.