HEALTH 7/2/08- 7/9/08 Weekly Bird Flu Thread:New DNA weapon against avian flu

Link to last weeks thread:

6/24/08- 7/1/08 Weekly Bird Flu Thread:WHO: Pakistan confirms new bird flu outbreak

http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?t=292358


Johns Hopkins on influenza:

http://www.iom.edu/Object.File/Master/33/450/Rashid Chotani.pdf

National Avian Influenza Surveillance Information:

http://wildlifedisease.nbii.gov/ai/

CDC

http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/index.htm

WHO

http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/en/index.html

CIDRAP

http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/

Official U.S. Government Web site

http://www.pandemicflu.gov/

FAO

http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/subjects/en/health/diseases-cards/special_avian.html

Public Health Agency of Canada

http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/influenza/avian_qa_e.html

European Union

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/dyna/influenza/country_en.htm

The World Bank

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXT...68427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:1793593,00.html

U.S. researchers identify new DNA weapon against avian flu ​

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/02/content_8471705.htm

WASHINGTON, July 1 (Xinhua) -- By delivering vaccine via DNA constructed to build antigens against flu, along with a minute electric pulse, U.S. researchers have immunized experimental animals against various strains of the virus.

Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania reported that this is a potential new way to vaccinate against avian flu. The study was published in the latest edition of online journal PLoS ONE.

"This is the first study to show that a single DNA vaccine can induce protection against strains of pandemic flu in many animal models, including primates," says lead researcher David Weiner. "With this type of vaccine, we can generate a single construct of a pandemic flu vaccine that will give much broader protection."

Traditional vaccines expose a formulation of a specific strain of flu to the body so it can create immune responses against that specific strain. Conversely, a DNA vaccine becomes part of the cell, giving it the blueprint it needs to build antigens that can induce responses that target diverse strains of pandemic flu.

Avian flu mutates quickly, generating different strains that escape an immune response targeted against one single strain. "We are always behind in creating a vaccine that can effectively protect against that specific strain," notes Weiner.

Instead of injecting a live or killed virus, the research team injected three different species of animal models with synthetic DNA vaccines that are not taken from the flu microbe, but trick the immune system into mounting a broad response against pandemic flu, including strains to which the immune system was never exposed. Antibodies induced by the vaccine rapidly reached protective levels in all three animal species.

To ensure increased DNA delivery, the researchers administered the vaccine in combination with electroporation, a small, harmless electric charge that opens up cell pores facilitating increased entry of the DNA vaccine into cells.

If proven in humans, this research could lead the way to preparing against an outbreak of avian flu. Because these synthetic DNA vaccines are effective against multiple cross strains, vaccines could be created, stockpiled, prior to a pandemic, and thus be delivered quickly in the event of an outbreak, surmise the researchers.

Migration of H5N1 to the European Union​

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/07010801/H5N1_Migration_EU.html

Recombinomics Commentary 18:08
July 1, 2008

Phylogenetic analyses of strains from EU Member States indicated that all H5N1 viruses detected in the EU in poultry and wild birds since 2006 were closely related and belong to clades 2.2 and 2.3. The use of phylogeny can advise on the source of infection, but it is not possible in all circumstances to be definitive about the likely source of an introduction.

All H5N1 viruses detected in the EU in poultry and wild birds since 2006 belong to clade 2.2, the lineage that was first identified during the 2005 Qinghai lake outbreak in China, except for an import case in quarantaine facilities in the UK (clade 2.3). Phylogenetic analyses of strains from EU MSs indicate multiple independent virus introductions, presumably from countries in Eastern Europe or the Middle East, where similar clade 2.2 strains are circulating in poultry and/or wild birds. The use of phylogeny can advise on the source of infection, but it is not possible in all circumstances to be definitive about the likely source of an introduction.

The above comments are from a recent European Food Safety Organization report entitled “Animal health and welfare aspects of avian influenza and the risk of its introduction into the EU poultry holdings”. This first paragraph is from the executive summary, while the second paragraph is the text which was summarized. Although both acknowledge two clades (2.2 and 2.3) in the EU since 2006, the executive summary fails to note that clade 2.3 was in a single import case, which is the exception that proves the rule. Although clade 2.3 (Fujian strain) was detected when quarantined exotic birds died, clade 2.3 has never been reported in EU poultry or wild birds as misrepresented in the executive summary.

Moreover, clade 2.3 has never been reported in poultry, wild birds, or humans outside of eastern Asia. This exception is similar to the H5N1 detected in crested owls being smuggled into Europe from Thailand in 2004. The two birds were detected on a passenger plane and as expected, the H5N1 was clade 1 from Thailand. However, like the clade 2.3 described above, clade 1 has never been detected outside of southeast Asia. Thus, although both clade 1 and clade 2.3 have been detected in birds involved in smuggling or trade, the two exceptions, or undetected related cases, have never produced a reported infection in poultry or wild birds in the EU or any other country not in eastern Asia.

In contrast, all Asian H5N1 in the EU has been clade 2.2, which is transported and transmitted by migratory birds. The role of these birds in the movement of H5N1 over long distances extends to all other countries west of China. None of these countries have reported cases of Asian H5N1 in poultry, wild birds, or people prior to the outbreak at Qinghai Lake in the spring of 2005. This outbreak was followed by the rapid expansion of H5N1 into more than 50 countries west of China, and all infections were clade 2.2.

This type of migration was repeated a year after the Qinghai expansion. In the summer of 2006 a Qinghai subclade (clade 2.2.3) was modified during a massive wild bird outbreak at Uvs Lake in Mongolia. This sub-clade was easily distinguished from other Qinghai sub-clades, including clade 2.2.3 in circulation in early 2006. This Uvs Lake strain migrated to South Korea and Japan in late 2006 / early 2007. It also migrated to the west and was reported in Kuwait in early 2007. Although there were no reported of the Uvs Lake strain in Europe in late 2006 or early 2007, in the summer of 2007 it appeared in wild birds at multiple locations in the Czech Republic, Germany, and France. This was followed by outbreaks throughout Europe in late 2007 / early 2008 and all reported outbreaks in the EU were the Uvs Lake strain.

Similarly, in recent weeks long range migratory birds in northern Japan were linked to clade 2.3 infections and similar sequences were found in chickens in Russia infected with entrails from a wild birds, as well as poultry infected in South Korea. The detection of clade 2.3 in long range migratory birds in northern Japan raises the possibility of expansion of the Fujian strain (clade 2.3) out of eastern Asia.

Thus, the executive summary displayed above is in error, and this type of error continues to confuse a very straightforward geographic expansion of H5N1. The role of trade and smuggling in the long distance spread of H5N1 is minimal. Virtually all of the long range spread of H5N1 in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa is due to migratory birds, which has been confirmed year after year as new waves of H5N1 migrate into the regions.

Live chicken sales resume in Hong Kong after bird flu ban​

http://www.monstersandcritics.com/n..._sales_resume_in_Hong_Kong_after_bird_flu_ban

Hong Kong - Live chicken sales resumed in markets across Hong Kong Wednesday after a 21-day ban on poultry imports and sales following a bird flu outbreak.

However, many chicken stalls remained closed because of tough new restrictions which prohibit the keeping of live poultry in markets overnight to lower the risk of a new bird flu outbreak.

Thousands of chickens were slaughtered when bird flu was discovered in samples taken from four markets in Hong Kong last month. The source of the infection was never traced.

The government tightened restrictions and announced a compensation package for poultry farmers and traders which has been the subject of weeks of wrangling.

Traders' groups estimated only around 100 of licensed 469 poultry stalls across the city of 6.9 million would reopen for business Wednesday while the government said it expected 180 to open.

Traders insisted the move was not a boycott but said they wanted to test market conditions before reopening, fearing they could be left with unsold chickens at the end of each day's business.

Up to 30,000 chickens from local farms and from farms across the border in mainland China were expected to be available for sale in markets Wednesday.

Hong Kong's health secretary York Chow appealed to traders to concentrate on getting business back to normal under the new restrictions rather than fight for higher compensation.

'It is important the trade should be more pragmatic and realistic rather than try to ask for anything more,' he told reporters.

Hong Kong was the scene of the first outbreak of bird flu to jump the species barrier in modern times in 1997 when six people died and 12 others were infected.

Tough new hygiene and monitoring controls have since been introduced and Hong Kong has been spared further human infections in the recent bird flu cases across the Asia region.

Toward a Unified Nomenclature System for Highly Pathogenic
Avian Influenza Virus (H5N1)​

http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/14/7/e1.htm

WHO/OIE/FAO H5N1 Evolution Working Group1

Suggested citation for this article

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus (H5N1) has appeared in >60 countries and continues to evolve and diversify at a concerning rate. Because different names have been used to describe emerging lineages of the virus, this study describes a unified nomenclature system to facilitate discussion and comparison of subtype H5N1 lineages.

The continuing geographic expansion and rapid evolution of HPAI subtype H5N1 virus across 3 continents is hindering control and eradication efforts in affected countries and raising public health concerns about a potential influenza pandemic. Since 1997, when the virus was discovered to cause disease and death in humans in Hong Kong, researchers have monitored the movement of the virus from region to region. Its molecular evolution has been characterized to better understand the spread of the virus and thus help prevent its perpetuation in poultry populations. Specific mutations and reassortment events that may enhance the virus's ability to infect and be transmitted to humans (1–7) have also been scrutinized. Therefore, much effort has been spent to delineate the emerging lineages of the HPAI viruses (H5N1) from their earliest known progenitor, A/goose/Guangdong/96 (Gs/GD). From this ancestral virus, numerous lineages have evolved and because of rapid transcontinental spread, numerous publications have used different names to classify similar (if not identical) groups of viruses within the Gs/GD-like lineage (1–6). As a result, discussion and comparison of virus isolates have been hindered by a lack of uniformity in nomenclature, often leading to confusion in the interpretation of research results. The now routine practice of genome sequencing has also dramatically increased the sequence information available for analyses, adding to the complexity of examining the evolutionary relationships among HPAI virus (H5N1) isolates.

To address these issues, an international group of scientists and collaborators, referred to as the H5N1 Evolution Working Group, was convened at the Options for the Control of Influenza VI Conference in June 2007 in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Their goal was to develop a unified nomenclature system for the classification of HPAI viruses (H5N1) belonging to the Gs/GD-like virus lineage. The initiative, which was encouraged and approved by 3 international agencies (the World Health Organization [WHO]), the World Organisation for Animal Health [OIE], and the Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO]), set out to unify the nomenclature system to simplify interpretation of sequence and surveillance data from different laboratories and to remove stigmatizing labeling of HPAI virus (H5N1) clades by geographic reference. Although most genes of the HPAI virus (H5N1) genome have undergone reassortment leading to their replacement by genes from lineages distinct from Gs/GD, the hemagglutinin (HA) protein gene has not been replaced since its emergence in 1996 (1). Therefore, monitoring the evolution of the Gs/GD HA lineage provides an initial constant by which H5N1 strains may be effectively compared. Taking these factors into account, we performed phylogenetic analyses on all of the publicly available subtype H5N1 HA sequences that have evolved in the Gs/GD lineage and designed a classification system. The results support the concept that the HPAI viruses (H5N1) currently circulating can be effectively grouped into multiple clades, herein designated by a hierarchical numbering system. Global adoption of the proposed H5 clade nomenclature and its expansion to other influenza lineages and genes, including other animal influenza virus subtypes, will benefit human and animal influenza research and public health.
The Study
Figure 1
Figure 1.

Figure 1. Neighbor-joining tree of 859 H5N1 isolates constructed by using PAUP* version 4.0b10 (9) with 1,000 bootstrap replicates...

Figure 2
Figure 2.

Figure 2. Neighbor-joining tree of 158 H5N1 isolates constructed by using PAUP* version 4.0b10...

Nucleotide sequences of the HA gene of HPAI viruses (H5N1) were collected from publicly available databases: GenBank National Center for Biotechnology (NCBI) and the Influenza Sequence Database of Los Alamos National Laboratories (LANL). The analysis only included nearly full-length HA sequences (i.e., at least 1,600 nt in length) to ensure robust statistical support (Table 1). Multiple sequence alignment of 871 HA sequences was performed with ClustalW (www.ebi.ac.uk/Tools/clustalw2). The final alignment length was 1,707 nt. Isolates with 100% sequence similarity (i.e., redundant sequences) were identified and removed, giving a final alignment of 859 sequences. The appropriate DNA substitution model and γ-rate heterogeneity were determined with MrModeltest v2.2 (8) and used in all subsequent analyses. The neighbor-joining (NJ), maximum-likelihood (ML), and Bayesian methods used to construct trees for comparison are detailed in the legend of Figure 1. For ease of display, and also to ensure that the clade topology would be maintained if fewer isolates were used, a smaller dataset of 158 subtype H5N1 HA sequences was analyzed that included representative vaccine strains, reference serum strains, many human isolates, pathogenesis study strains, and geographically diverse isolates (Figure 2). Phylogenetic analyses were conducted on this dataset as described for Figure 1.

To quantify the nucleotide distances between and within groups identified on the phylogenetic tree, the average pairwise distances (between and within clades) were calculated by using MEGA version 3.1 (www.flu.org.cn/en/download-51.html) (13) by the NJ method with the Kimura 2-parameter model. Each distinct clade was determined to have an average distance >1.5% from other clades and an average distance <1.5% within the clade. Certain clades that comprise highly evolved HA genes depart slightly from these criteria; higher average intraclade distances were observed (i.e., Ck/Shanxi/2/2006 in clade 7).

Clade assignments were made by following several criteria used collectively to rationally name groups by a clade number. The criteria used to define clades are described in Table 1. Using these specific criteria, we identified and numbered 10 unique clades from the consensus topology of the large trees generated (Figure 1). The clade designations were then confirmed by the consensus topology of the smaller trees generated (Figures 1, 2). The topology of each clade was almost identical, and major clades were identified with consistency by using any of the 3 phylogenetic tree reconstruction methods (NJ, ML, and Bayesian). Also, the identified clades were consistent between the large and small datasets. Although the overall topologic organization between the large and small tree varied slightly (i.e., the positions of clades 7 and 8 are changed), the monophyletic grouping and bootstrap support for each clade remained predominately unchanged. However, trees derived from small datasets often yielded minor discrepancies; e.g., 4 isolates that were designated as clade 9 in the large tree were grouped with clade 8 in the smaller tree. The discrepancies in grouping between the large and small trees indicate the importance of using the largest datasets possible when classifying viral sublineages by phylogenetic analyses. Several of the identified clades were found to have distinct amino acid residues shared by members of that clade. To identify clade-specific amino acid residues, amino acid alignments were constructed for each clade, and residues shared by all members of that clade were compared with the Gs/GD/1/96 virus. Distinct shared amino acid residues are shown for each clade at the clade-defining node in Figure 2.
Conclusions

Using the clade designation criteria proposed in Table 1, this study has identified 10 unique first-order numbered clades of the HPAI viruses (H5N1) in the Gs/GD-like lineage (clades 0–9). The group of HA genes previously designated as clade 2 showed a level of diversity that far exceeds the current definition of a clade; therefore, this group was also separated into 5 additional second-order clades (clades 2.1–2.5). Clades 2.1 (avian/human isolates from Indonesia) and 2.3 (avian/human isolates from the People's Republic of China; Hong Kong; Vietnam; Thailand; Lao People's Democratic Republic; and Malaysia) were also further delineated into third-order groups (clades 2.1.1–2.1.3 and 2.3.1–2.3.4), respectively. The origins of isolates belonging to each clade are described in Table 2. For each clade identified, a representative prototype virus is listed to facilitate interpretation of the proposed numbering system (Table 2). As other studies have shown, the primary clade defining factor appears to be spatio-temporal because most distinct clades consist of isolates within close geographic proximity to one another or from specific time periods (perhaps as a result of heightened transmission during outbreak periods) (2–7). Notably, clade 2.2 comprises isolates from more widespread geographic areas (3 continents), which is likely to reflect movement of the virus through long-distance spread as a result of poultry trade or wild bird migration (2,3,6,7).

The evolution of the H5 HA in avian hosts shows a notable difference from the typical evolution of HA genes from human influenza viruses. The evolution of the H3 HA since 1968 is characterized by a limited diversity among circulating strains. This lack of diversity is clearly the consequence of rapid extinction after the emergence of new clades and lineages. As expected, the evolutionary tree of human influenza HA genes has extended trunks and extremely short branches (14,15). In contrast, multiple avian influenza A HA clades continue to evolve and co-circulate in different regions and species; hence, the unprecedented need for a nomenclature system that has been unnecessary for human influenza genes.

The results from this study indicate that the HPAI H5N1 viruses can be grouped into several clades designated by a numbering system that can continue to be expanded as these viruses continue to evolve. By establishing this nomenclature system and guidelines for naming clades, this information can be used in the future as criteria for assigning new clades as new lineages of HPAI H5N1 variants emerge.
Acknowledgments

We gratefully acknowledge the WHO, OIE, and the FAO for encouragement and support for this project. We also thank the research institutes, Ministries of Health, and Ministries of Agriculture from all of the countries that have contributed viral isolates or sequence data used in this study and for making this information publicly available in GenBank and LANL. Large and small trees containing publicly available sequences will be posted on the WHO GIP website (www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/en) and the joint OIE-FAO network (OFFLU) website (www.offlu.net) and maintained as up-to-date ("evergreen") evolutionary trees of the H5 HA to keep an open forum for following subtype H5N1 evolution.

References

1. Duan L, Campitelli L, Fan XH, Leung YH, Vijaykrishna D, Zhang JX, et al. Characterization of low-pathogenic H5 subtype influenza viruses from Eurasia: implications for the origin of highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses. J Virol. 2007;81:7529–39. PubMed DOI
2. Ducatez MF, Olinger CM, Owoade AA, Tarnagda Z, Tahita MC, Sow A, et al. Molecular and antigenic evolution and geographical spread of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in western Africa. J Gen Virol. 2007;88:2297–306. PubMed DOI
3. Chen H, Smith GJD, Li KS, Wang J, Fan XH, Rayner JM, et al. Establishment of multiple sublineages of H5N1 influenza virus in Asia: Implications for pandemic control. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2006;103:2845–50. PubMed DOI
4. Salzberg SL, Kingsford C, Cattoli G, Spiro DJ, Janies DA, Aly MM, et al. Genome analysis linking recent European and African influenza (H5N1) viruses. Emerg Infect Dis. 2007;13:713–8.
5. Smith GJD, Fan XH, Wang J, Li KS, Qin K, Zhang JX, et al. Emergence and predominance of an H5N1 influenza variant in China. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2006;103:16936–41. PubMed DOI
6. Smith GJD, Naipospos TSP, Nguyen TD, de Jong MD, Vijaykrishna D, Usman TB, et al. Evolution and adaptation of H5N1 influenza virus in avian and human hosts in Indonesia and Vietnam. Virology. 2006;350:258–68. PubMed DOI
7. Wallace RG, Hodac H, Lathrop RH, Fitch WM. A statistical phylogeography of influenza A H5N1. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2007;104:4473–8. PubMed DOI
8. Nylander JAA. MRMODELTEST 2. Evolutionary Biology Centre, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden; 2004 [cited 2007 Mar 12]. Available from http://www.abc.se/~nylander
9. Swofford DL. PAUP: phylogenetic analysis using parsimony, version 4. Sunderland (MA): Sinauer Academic Publishers; 2001.
10. Wood GW, Banks J, McCauley JW, Alexander DJ. Deduced amino acid sequences of the haemagglutinin of H5N1 avian influenza virus isolates from an outbreak in turkeys in Norfolk, England. Arch Virol. 1994;134:185–94. PubMed DOI
11. Zwickl D. Genetic algorithm approaches for the phylogenetic analysis of large biological sequence datasets under the maximum likelihood criterion. PhD thesis, University of Texas at Austin; 2006 [cited 2008 Jun 5]. Available from http://www.bio.utexas.edu/faculty/antisense/garli/Garli.html
12. Huelsenbeck JP, Ronquist FR. MRBAYES: Bayesian inference of phylogenetic trees. Bioinformatics. 2001;17:754–5. PubMed DOI
13. Kumar S, Tamura K, Nei M. MEGA3: an integrated software for Molecular Evolutionary Genetics Analysis and sequence alignment. Brief Bioinform. 2004;5:150–63. PubMed DOI
14. Fitch WM, Leiter JM, Li XQ, Palese P. Positive Darwinian evolution in human influenza A viruses. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 1991;88:4270–4. PubMed DOI
15. Wolf YI, Viboud C, Holmes EC, Koonin EV, Lipman DJ. Long intervals of stasis punctuated by bursts of positive selection in the seasonal evolution of influenza A virus. Biol Direct. 2006;1:34. PubMed DOI

New drug candidates identified to combat ''bird flu''​

http://www.mathaba.net/rss/?x=597278


LOS ANGELES, July 2 (Xinhua) -- More than two dozen promising and novel compounds have been isolated from which new "designer drugs" might be developed to combat "bird flu," according to a new study.

In some cases, the compounds appeared to be equal or stronger inhibitors than currently available anti-flu remedies, said the study conducted by a team of scientists with the University of California, San Diego (UCSD).

As the specter of a worldwide outbreak of avian or "bird flu" lingers, health officials recognize that new drugs are desperatelyneeded since some strains of the virus already have developed resistance to the current roster of anti-flu remedies, the study said.

"If those resistant strains begin to propagate, then that's when we're going to be in trouble, because we don't have any anti-virals active against them," said Rommie Amaro, a postdoctoral fellow in chemistry at UCSD. "So, we should have something as a backup, and that's exactly why we're working on this."

"In light of the urgency to find drugs to combat this virus, we're hopeful that our results will assist in that effort," said J. Andrew McCammon, holder of the Joseph Mayer Chair of Theoretical Chemistry at UCSD and a Howard Hughes Medical Institute Investigator.

The study, published in the Journal of Medicinal Chemistry, builds on prior work that captured the nanosecond-by-nanosecond movements of a protein called neuraminidase 1 (or N1), needed by the avian flu virus to spread infection to new cells.

To help reveal the often-spasmodic motion of proteins, scientists work with molecular dynamics codes that simulate their movements as they obey the fundamental laws of physics.

In their latest work, the scientists conducted a "virtual screen " of an ensemble of 1,883 compounds selected from the National Cancer Institute Diversity Set, using a computational tool called AutoDock that predicts how small molecules, such as drug candidates, bind to a receptor of a known three-dimensional structure.

The goal was to try to determine which compounds fit best into the "hot pocket" region of N1. Generally, compounds that most easily bound to the site are considered to be top hits for validation and further optimization as drug candidates.

Five other compounds known to experimentally bind to avian influenza N1 were also screened, including drugs now available or in clinical trials.

The results were intriguing. About 27 compounds showed significant promise, all having potentially the same or stronger bonding affinity than current anti-flu drugs now available, including Tamiflu and Relenza.

Several looked like particularly good candidates, Amaro said, since they bound to both the regular active site and an additional side pocket that opened during the computer simulation.

"The general idea is that we will be able to make a better drug through the strategic targeting of multiple active site pockets," said Amaro.

The research now moves into the lab, where the compounds will undergo testing against the virus. Researchers at the Scripps Research Institute in La Jolla, California will lead this phase of the research.

Homeless people die after bird flu vaccine trial in Poland​

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wor...e-after-bird-flu-vaccine-trial-in-Poland.html

Three Polish doctors and six nurses are facing criminal prosecution after a number of homeless people died following medical trials for a vaccine to the H5N1 bird-flu virus.

The medical staff, from the northern town of Grudziadz, are being investigated over medical trials on as many as 350 homeless and poor people last year, which prosecutors say involved an untried vaccine to the highly-contagious virus.

Authorities claim that the alleged victims received £1-2 to be tested with what they thought was a conventional flu vaccine but, according to investigators, was actually an anti bird-flu drug.

The director of a Grudziadz homeless centre, Mieczyslaw Waclawski, told a Polish newspaper that last year, 21 people from his centre died, a figure well above the average of about eight.

Although authorities have yet to prove a direct link between the deaths and the activities of the medical staff, Poland's health minister, Ewa Kopacz, has said that the doctors and nurses involved should not return to their profession.

"It is in the interests of all doctors that those who are responsible for this are punished," the minister added.

Investigators are also probing the possibility that the medical staff may have also have deceived the pharmaceutical companies that commissioned the trials.

The suspects said that the all those involved knew that the trial involved an anti-H5N1 drug and willingly participated.

The news of the investigation will come as another blow to the reputation of Poland's beleaguered and poverty-stricken national health service. In 2002, a number of ambulance medics were found guilty of killing their patients for commissions from funeral companies.

Legal threat in live-chicken battle​

http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=30&art_id=68030&sid=19617869&con_type=1

Carol Chung

Thursday, July 03, 2008

More taxpayers' money could be spent on taking the government to court to fight new hygiene regulations.

Hong Kong Poultry Wholesalers Association chairman Tsui Ming-tuen said he will apply today for legal aid to launch a judicial review against the government's ban on traders keeping live chickens overnight.

"The government's decision makes it very difficult for our business to continue," he said. It was hurting the interests of people in the business and depriving Hong Kong people of the taste of fresh chicken.

Tsui issued the threat yesterday after talks with the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department officials to broker an improved buyout offer for people dealing in live poultry fell apart.

The transport sector of the poultry trade also failed to reach a deal with the AFCD on a buyout offer. The government is only willing to improve the deal to HK$180,000 each.

About 20 poultry trucks drove slowly outside Cheung Sha Wan government offices to protest against the ban on keeping live poultry overnight.

But Secretary for Food and Health York Chow Yat-ngok believed the ban on retailers from keeping chickens overnight will work out.

"We believe retailers and farmers will take the experience from today and make appropriate business decisions for the future," he said.

People who violate the ban may be prosecuted and have their licenses revoked, he said.

According to the amended Food Business Regulation, retailers who keep live poultry after 8pm can be subject to a fine of HK$50,000 and six months' imprisonment.

Chow also urged the industry to be "pragmatic" and "realistic" about compensation because there is little room to improve the buyout offer.

The overnight ban, the latest measure against H5N1, came into effect yesterday as the sale of live chicken resumed after a three-week halt. And wholesalers representative Tsui described as "unexpectedly satisfactory" the first day of operating under the overnight ban system. "So many chickens could be sold despite so few stalls being open," he said. More than 25,000 chickens were sold yesterday.

Tsui expects the supply of live chickens to return to a situation whereby about 20,000-23,000 come from the mainland and 10,000 from local farms.

Transportation and Pandemics​

http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch9en/appl9en/ch9a4en.html

Authors : Dr. Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Dr. Thomas Luke and Dr. Michael Osterholm

Dr. Luke: Department of Virology, Naval Medical Research Center. Dr. Osterholm: Director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP), University of Minnesota.

UNDER CONSTRUCTION

1. Pandemics

There are approximately 1,500 microbes that are known to be a source of disease among the human population. Influenza is the most virulent among them because of its lethality and how easy it is to be transmitted. Under normal circumstances, influenza's impacts are relatively benign since populations have developed a level of immunity to its debilitating effects. Yet, it is estimated that between 1 to 1.5 million people per year die of influenza or related complications. Influenza pandemics are thus considered to be among the most significant threats to the global population.

Pandemic. An epidemic of infectious disease that spreads through human populations across a large area, even worldwide.

Over the last 300 years, ten major influenza pandemics have occurred. The 1918 influenza pandemic (Spanish Flu) is considered to be yet the most severe. 30% of the world’s population became ill and between 50 and 100 million died. One important factor why the Spanish Flu spread so quickly and so extensively was through modern transportation, which at the beginning of the 20th century offered a global coverage. The virus was spread around the world by infected crews and passengers of ships and trains and severe epidemics occurred in shipyards and railway personnel.

Concerns about the emergence of a new pandemic are salient, particularly in light of recent outbreaks such as SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in 2002-2003, which quickly spread because of the convenience of air travel. The next influenza pandemic could be equally severe and widespread illness or absenteeism in freight transportation sectors can cause cascading disruptions of social and economic systems.

The relationships between transportation and pandemics involves two major sequential dimensions:

*

Transportation as a vector. With ubiquitous and fast transportation comes a quick and extensive diffusion of a communicable disease. From an epidemiological perspective, transportation can thus be considered as a vector, particularly for passengers transportation systems. This issue concerns the early phases of a pandemic where transportation systems are likely to spread any outbreak at the global level.
* Continuity of freight distribution. Once a pandemic takes place or immediately thereafter, the major concerns shift to freight distribution. Modern economic activities cannot be sustained without continuous deliveries of food, fuel, electricity and other resources. However, few events are can be more disruptive than a pandemic as critical supply chains can essentially shut down. Disruptions in the continuity of distribution are potentially much more damaging than the pandemic itself.

2. Vectors and Velocities

The more efficient transportation, the more efficient the vector that can transmit an infectious disease. International and long distance transport such as air and rail, modes and terminals alike, concentrates passengers and increase the risk of exposure. In the past, this could be an advantage as a ship could be quarantined, since there were ample time during the voyage for an infection to carry its course and the symptoms to become apparent. Today, it is a different matter as the velocity conferred by transportation systems for long distance travel is superior to incubation time of many flu variants (the period after the infection before symptoms are revealed). Since the incubation time for the average influenza virus is between 1 and 4 days, there is ample time for someone being infected to travel to the other side of the world before noticing symptoms. Once symptoms have developed, there is also a "denial phase" where an infected individual will continue traveling, particularly if going back to his place of origin. An infected individual beginning to show symptoms is likely to cancel an outbound travel, but will do the utmost, even breaking quarantine (or warnings), to go back home. Thus, in a window of a few days before an outbreak could become apparent to global health authorities, a virus could have easily been transposed in many different locations around the world. At this point, the vector and velocity of modern transport system would insure that an epidemic becomes an pandemic. In some cases, the velocity of global transportation systems is higher than at the regional level, which paradoxically implies that a virus can spread faster at the global level - between major gateways - than at the regional level.

Once an outbreak becomes apparent, the global passengers transportation system, such as air travel and passenger rail, can quickly be shut down in whole or in part, either voluntarily (more likely if the outbreak is judged to be serious) or by the unwillingness of passengers to be exposed to risks. The later is what happened during the SARS outbreak in 2003. For instance, while the public transportation systems of several large Chinese cities were still operated, the number of users precipitously dropped because of risk avoidance. The SARS outbreak also had a substantial impact on the global airline industry. After the disease hit, flights in Pacific Asia decreased by 45% from the year before. During the outbreak, the number of flights between Hong Kong and the United States fell 69%. It is quite clear that this impact would pale in comparison to that of a 12 to 36 month worldwide influenza pandemic. However dramatic the impacts of modern transportation as a high velocity vector for a pandemic, a potential greater risk resides in the geographical and functional structure of supply chains because the continuity of freight distribution could be compromised.

3. Continuity of Freight Distribution

Up to the mid 20th century, the scale of production, transport and retail was dominantly local (food) or regional (durable goods such as cars). Since then, a process of globalization expanded substantially the scale at which a wide array of goods are distributed. Thus, the interconnectedness of the global economy, while being a net advantage from a supply chain standpoint, could make the next influenza pandemic more devastating than the ones before it. Even the slightest disruption in the availability of parts, finished goods, workers, electricity, water, and petroleum could bring many aspects of contemporary life to a halt. The global economy has been favored by the exploitation of comparative advantages and a more tight management of supply chains. Inventories are kept to a minimum. Virtually no production surge capacity exists. As a consequence, most markets depends on the the timely delivery of many critical products (such as pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, food, and equipment parts) and services (such as communications support).

The transportation industry has also consolidated into a small number of global and national mega-players to achieve massive economies of scale. Since the frequency, speed and reliability of shipments are high under normal circumstances, manufacturers have relocated their facilities to lower cost locations. Because transportation costs are lower than inventory management costs, retailers and secondary manufacturers employ “just-in-time” inventory systems - their “stockpile” is flowing in the transportation stream as inventory in transit. Most supply chains are re-stocked on a continuous basis, on par with the demand. The typical efficiency, and potential non-resiliency, of critical supply chains as a function of transportation would be placed under stress during a pandemic. The most important include:

* Food. Modern food production and distribution relies on low levels of inventory, particularly to avoid wastes of perishable products on store shelves. On average, supermarkets have between 2 to 5 days of inventory of perishable goods (dairy, produce, meat) and about 1 to 2 weeks for other goods (pasta, canned goods, etc.). It is worth underlining that these figures are for a normal and stable demand. In the case of a pandemic, available food supplies could quickly be exhausted through hoarding behavior. Food security is therefore defined by the ability of the transportation workers to move food from producers, to the bulk-storage facilities, to the processor and lastly to the grocer.
* Energy. The provision and distribution of energy is critical to the functioning of a modern economy and society. For instance, about 40% of the world's supply of electricity is generated by burning coal (50% for the United States). Coal power plants maintain a fairly low stockpile, about 30 days, and rely on a constant supply from major coal mining regions, which tend to be far away. While a pandemic would not directly damage energy systems, many energy distribution systems could be threatened through the removal of essential personnel from the workplace for weeks or months and impaired transportation capabilities to supply power plants.
* Medical supplies. A pandemic is obviously associated with a surge in the use of medical facilities, equipment and pharmaceutical products. Global drug production is controlled by a few large conglomerates that maintain a limited number of facilities at selected locations. Commonly, a single drug is produced at a single plant. If global distribution systems were impaired during a pandemic, many essential drugs would have difficulties to reach patients while limited stockpiles maintained at medical facilities would quickly run out. For instance, over 95% of all generic drugs used in the United States are made off shore, primarily in China and India. A similar pattern applies to critical medical equipment such as ventilators. Even simple respiratory masks could quickly run out. All these shortages are likely to result in additional deaths.

It is very likely that a pandemic would quickly exhaust available food, energy and medical resources, replacements will not be forthcoming and it could be many months before they could be replenished. Thus, supply chain issues are expected to seriously compound the impacts of an influenza pandemic.

4. Possible Mitigation Strategies

Many pandemic preparation plans fail to account the full importance and ramifications of global supply chains. They are essentially designed with the assumption that national economies, namely the United States, are mostly self reliant. The geographic and functional realities of the global economy are quite different from this assumption. Cascading disruptions in vulnerable freight transportation systems and strategic supply chains can compound the difficulties of maintaining social cohesion and critical infrastructures during a pandemic. Transportation workers must therefore receive a high priority for support – including vaccine, prophylactic antivirals, public health interventions and access to health care. Pandemic planners must cooperatively develop plans and obtain the agreements and resources necessary to conduct health assurance campaigns at major transportation chokepoints and corridors.

The basic strategy to protect the transportation system is to provide the workers with vaccine, prophylactic medications, protective equipment and physical security under the umbrella of transmission shielding operations as they move from and into transportation chokepoints and at suitable points along major corridors (i.e., weigh stations, etc). Transportation workers must also have a well-enunciated priority for healthcare services if they become ill during their work travels. This will require that some national, state and local pandemic resources and response activities are reprioritized from traditional influenza priority groups (elderly, etc) to insure that all citizens have a reliably adequate supply of essential supplies and services. Using modern communication systems, national, state and local licensing and regulatory authorities, industry and unions can identify, locate, educate and train the transportation workforce. Governments and transportation stakeholders (industry, unions, and workers) must create a cooperative plan that identifies roles, resources and responsibilities.

Because transportation workers must cross international and local borders, national and local entities, industry and unions, health agencies and other stakeholders must provide this support without regard to their nationality or state of origin. The international maritime domain presents unique challenges as it plays a fundamental role in supporting the global distribution of essential commodities (food and energy), parts and finished goods. The naval services of nations should prepare to establish task forces in international waters to quickly provide vaccine/antivirals and other health assistance to the multinational mariners of commercial vessels as they transit into or out of maritime chokepoints and sea lanes. International entities such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the International Maritime Organization, or the Global Maritime Partnership initiative, can provide the organizational framework to protect global maritime commerce.

Burundi: Untreatable Disease Kills 1000 Chicken​

BURUNDI - Food security in Burundi's Kayanza province is under threat because of an untreatable disease that has killed more than 1,000 chickens in one commune, according to a senior official.

"The disease has also been reported in other parts of the country but total numbers of dead chickens are not [yet] available," the director of the Animal Health Department in the Ministry of Agriculture and Stockbreeding, Pierre Bukuru, told IRIN.
*
"With the pandemic among the chickens, the population will face a significant lack of animal proteins and many people will suffer from the shortage, as chicken is widely raised and consumed in Burundi," he added.

Bukuru said the illness, which has similar symptoms to Newcastle Disease, was affecting the economic lives of people raising chickens or trading in meat and eggs.

"Egg production has dropped by 80 percent," he said.

He added that the meat of infected chickens did not pose a threat to human health as long as it was well-cooked.

And although the disease itself can be passed on to humans, the only effects are mild conjunctivitis.

Laboratory tests were being carried out to determine the precise identity of the disease, although he ruled out the possibility of it being avian influenza.

"Bird flu has not yet reached Burundi up to now," Bukuru said.

No treatment is available for the disease, and although chicks can be vaccinated, doing so would be impractical in a country where most poultry is kept by individual households.

The Black Death, by John Hatcher​

http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-e...s/the-black-death-by-john-hatcher-859389.html

Reviewed by Jeremy Laurance
Friday, 4 July 2008

What can it be like to face the end of the world? The closest I came was in 2003 when I interviewed a doctor outside the Prince of Wales hospital, Hong Kong. Almost all the patients had fled and the doctor insisted we sat outside, six feet apart, wearing surgical masks. It was the height of the Sars outbreak and there was no knowing then how far or how long it would run.

On that occasion we escaped. Almost 700 years earlier, the world was not so lucky. The Black Death, the greatest disaster to befall humanity, killed half the population. It was spread by fleas that lived on rats and, once they died, turned their attention to humans. It originated in the Russian steppes and was carried via trade routes through the Middle East, Europe and eventually to the village of Walsham in Suffolk, where this book is set.

Why Walsham? Because an exceptional number of documents survive. This has enabled Hatcher, professor of history at Cambridge, to recreate the events through the eyes of the residents with scrupulous attention to detail. The result is a gripping read - part historical inquiry, part novel.

The story is centred round Master John, the parish priest, whom Hatcher has invested with an exceptional sense of vocation and a crippling conscience, questioning his faith as the plague advances. There was only one defence against the pestilence - to beg God for forgiveness. In the church's eyes, it was a punishment visited on a sinful world. Yet as the disease advanced it cut down the innocent and guilty, young and old. It was its failure to discriminate that taxed his belief. It also undermined the faith of his parishioners, who reacted with uncontrolled excitement to the arrival of every itinerant quack.

Some devised their own remedies, such as Edmund de Welles, owner of High Hall, who bent over a chamber pot and breathed in. He survived. Others lost their faith and abandoned themselves to their fate, eating, drinking and fornicating, while still others shunned worldly things and flagellated their flesh. In two months, half the village's 1,500 population were dead, their corpses piling up. By June, the plague had started to wane, only to be replaced by a new scourge.

With the population halved there was a desperate shortage of labour. Wages soared, plunging the country into economic crisis and changing the relationship between landlord and tenant for ever. It is impossible to read this book without wondering how the modern world would cope with a plague. Bird flu is waiting to strike and while we have a much-improved medical arsenal, the potential for devastation remains. Sars wreaked havoc in a few weeks. When the next plague strikes we must hope we are better prepared.

Indonesia seeks to shut Navy lab researching avian flu​

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-virus5-2008jul05,0,2146766.story?track=rss

Politicians say the U.S. facility doesn't benefit Indonesia and could be a cover for spying. The move may undermine the hunt for mutating viruses that could set off a pandemic, scientists warn.
By Paul Watson, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
July 5, 2008
JAKARTA, INDONESIA -- Threats to shut down a U.S. Navy medical research lab here may undermine the hunt for mutating viruses that could set off the next flu pandemic, Western scientists warn.

Indonesia suspended negotiations with the United States over the fate of Naval Medical Research Unit No. 2 last month after senior politicians said it didn't benefit Indonesia and could be a cover for spying.

The U.S. Embassy firmly denied that the facility is used to gather intelligence, and said most of the lab's staff members are Indonesians helping with research carried out in cooperation with local health officials.

The biomedical research lab opened in Jakarta in 1970 and is used to study tropical diseases, including malaria, dengue fever and avian flu, according to an embassy fact sheet.

It has a staff of about 175 scientists, doctors, veterinarians and technologists; only 19 are Americans and the rest are Indonesians. The Navy also has research labs in Egypt, Kenya, Peru and Thailand.

Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono said last month that his ministry recommended that the lab be closed because its operations were too secretive and were incompatible with Indonesia's security interests. Health Minister Siti Fadilah Supari also said she had recommended to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono that it be closed.

"I've told the president the lab's useless, the cooperation degrades our sovereignty and it should be shut down," Supari told members of parliament last month. "He told me to shut it if I think it's [of] no use."

Negotiations on the lab would resume as early as this month, the Foreign Ministry said, once the country had a "unified stand" on the issue. But U.S. Embassy spokesman Tristram Perry said he was not aware of any date for talks to resume.

U.S. officials say privately that the dispute is part of a bigger argument over sharing virus samples, including strains of the avian flu, which the World Health Organization warns could set off a pandemic.

Before Indonesia announced in January 2007 that it would no longer share samples with other countries, the U.S. naval lab did research on normal flu viruses from seasonal outbreaks as well as bird flu cases treated in Indonesian hospitals.

"Sometimes you test a virus and you don't know if it's avian influenza, or normal flu or something completely different," said a Western scientist who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the negotiations.

Now those viruses appear not to be going anywhere for testing, the scientist said, adding that Indonesian labs cannot do the sophisticated research the Americans can do.

"Nobody knows what they are," she added. "Maybe there could be a pandemic from a different, new strain."

In its current form, the avian flu spreads from birds, usually poultry, to humans, but the infection rate is low. Indonesia leads the world in bird flu deaths with at least 110 confirmed since 2005, according to WHO. The virus kills 81% of its victims in Indonesia, the agency's figures show.

A second Western scientist said that Indonesia has many strains of the avian flu virus, and that without constant research, a different strain more easily transmitted to humans could catch scientists off guard, and spread rapidly before a vaccine is ready.

"Many groups have tried to bring in scientists to work in the [Indonesian] labs, and there's been resistance to that," the second scientist said. "There's a very nationalist spirit here."

After announcing the ban on virus-sharing, the health minister, who is a cardiologist, published a book in which she warned that any viruses shared with other countries could be turned into biological weapons.

She also recounted a meeting in Geneva with John E. Lange, the U.S. special representative for pandemic flu, in which she told him, "It is not impossible that there will be a group of people in developed countries insane enough to reengineer the viruses to create an outbreak in the Third World."

Her book, widely sold in English and Bahasa Indonesia editions, also said the pressure to share viruses was an example of exploitation of developing countries' natural resources.

"They also exploited part of the human body from the people of the powerless countries," the health minister wrote. "They took our blood. They took our cells. They took our antibodies.

"And perhaps it would be more dangerous when, in the end they would take our brain cells as well, to be reengineered to create a new generation of slaves."

Early this year, she insisted that the move to stop virus-sharing was necessary to protect poor nations from profiteering drug companies. Indonesia says it fears that vaccines developed from local viruses will go to foreigners first, leaving Indonesians without protection or profit.

In March, Supari pledged to resume sharing, but only with WHO researchers. Supari said she won assurances that no vaccine would be developed from the Indonesian samples without the country's consent. The organization said it would work out details of an agreement in negotiations.

Since virus-sharing was stopped, Indonesia has confirmed that 52 more people have come down with bird flu. The Health Ministry gave foreign researchers virus samples from only six of those cases, the first Western scientist said.

Indonesia's hard line against cooperation also affects research on regular flu strains, which kill 250,000 to 500,000 people worldwide annually.

Most of those outbreaks start in Southeast Asia, British scientists Derek Smith and Colin Russell reported in a study published this year. That makes it crucial for U.S. researchers to keep working here, the Western scientists said.

Migration of H5N1 Clade 9 Into Indonesia​

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/07040801/H5N1_Indo_Clade_9.html

Recombinomics Commentary 18:01
July 4, 2008

The difference of the protein composition caused the bird flu vaccine that until now was used in Indonesia to become ineffective.

Despite this, Musny guaranteed the bird flu virus of H5N1 strain Purwakarta not turn off like strain other bird flu.

The difference that was specific in the protein composition in strain Purwakarta, according to Musny, happened resulting from the mutation in the virus body personally.

The above translation describes a new Indonesian strain of avian influenza that is not covered well by current vaccines. Although there are public H5N1 sequences from Purwakarta, the public sequences are from 2004 and are clade 2.1, which is the clade found throughout Indonesia (see phylogram). The number of public 2007 sequences from Indonesia is limited, and there are no public 2008 sequences, so the relationship between the strain described in the local media, and recent isolates cannot be independently confirmed.

However, there is a small number of 2006 isolates from west Java that are clearly not clade 2.1. This new clade represents an independent introduction, and the public sequences (see list below) are limited to waterfowl and are most closely related to clade 9 sequences in China.

The location of the clade 9 sequences suggest that the Indonesian sequences were due to migratory birds flying along the Australia / East Asia Flyway and raise concerns that the current public sequences from Indonesia seriously under-represents the H5N1 diversity in Indonesia.

More testing of waterfowl, and release of 2007 and 2008 sequences from Indonesia, would be useful.

A/heron/Cicurug/IPB25-RS/2006
A/duck/Leuwiliang/IPB3-RS/2006
A/muscovy duck/Klapanunggal/IPB1-RS/2006
A/goose/Leuwiliang/IPB4-RS/2006
A/muscovy duck/Cileungsi/IPB5-RS/2006
A/goose/Bojonggenteng/IPB2-RS/2006

Tanzanian Intensifies Campaign Against Avian Flu (Part 5/5)​

http://www.voanews.com/english/africa/2008-07-04-voa42.cfm?rss=africa

By Douglas Mpuga
Washington, DC
04 July 2008

listen to interview on bird flu - Download (MP3) audio clip
listen to interview on bird flu - Listen (MP3) audio clip

A senior official of the Tanzanian ministry of health says the country will remain vigilant in the fight against avian influenza, especially because it lies on a migratory bird route.

Dr. Mohamed Ali Mohamed is an epidemiologist at Tanzania’s ministry of health in Dar es Salaam. He told VOA English to Africa reporter Douglas Mpuga that Tanzania and other countries in the region are at risk for avian flu because they lie on a route taken by migratory birds from Europe and Asia every year.

He said the government is careful about importing poultry products from other countries, but the risk cannot be eliminated.

“But we are prepared in case of any (avian flu) threat or outbreak. We work as a team with other ministries in this effort to combat the avian flu threat,” he said.

Dr. Mohamed noted that Tanzania is trying hard to sensitize the people about this threat. “We have an avian flu awareness plan. We work with other agencies like the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). In fact, UNICEF is the lead agency in this (awareness) campaign. We even have conducted local traditional plays in different regions of the country to make sure people understand the risk of avian influenza.”

He is not concerned that local poultry farmers might not report avian flu cases for fear of losing their birds. “In our response plans we are discussing compensation plans to poultry farmers in case of an outbreak. This will encourage people to report any cases (of avian flu).”

Dr. Mohamed said the government is now in the process of asking for help from different organizations to create the fund. “ We have got some assistance from the AU (African Union) Avian Influenza Preparedness Fund. He mentioned the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and Prevention and the World Health organization (WHO) as the other organizations that have promised help in case of an outbreak.

He said Tanzania was the first east African country to receive training in the detection and prevention of avian influenza. “We have the personnel, protective gear and WHO has promised drugs.”

Medline Receives Force Majeure Notice
From Hong Ray Enterprises​

http://www.tradingmarkets.com/.site/news/Stock News/1733914/

MUNDELEIN, Ill., July 3, 2008 /PRNewswire via COMTEX/ -- MLNI | Quote | Chart | News | PowerRating -- Hong Ray Enterprises of Shijiazhuang, China, the world's largest manufacturer of vinyl exam gloves and a major manufacturer of nitrile gloves, has notified Medline Industries, Inc., and other U.S. customers that they are facing "force majeure conditions" and that they will be unable to meet their normal agreements to customers. Hong Ray is Medline's largest exam glove supplier.

"This disruption to supply will have a cost impact on the entire industry," said Tripp Amdur, president of Medline's glove division. "We are moving quickly to secure adequate supply for our customers through alternative factories, at ultimately a much higher cost. It is crucial that we act fast for exam gloves, however, because it's a high demand item that can spike in times of crisis situations such as SARS and the pandemic flu."

In its letter to Medline and its other U.S. customers, Hong Ray cited a long list of events and government actions that have led to its inability to fulfill its contracts. These include a fire at a major raw material manufacturer, dramatic changes in government policy impacting labor, taxes and credit and pollution-control measures associated with the Beijing Olympics.

According to Amdur, Hong Ray's situation is by no means unique.

"All of our suppliers are facing enormous and unexpected obstacles in fulfilling their contract obligations," said Amdur. "While Hong Ray is the first factory to formally declare 'force majeure,' other factories, including those that manufacture latex gloves, face similar circumstances. In Malaysia, for example, the government recently declared a change in pricing for natural gas, almost tripling the price overnight."

Scientists warn against closing Navy lab​

http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2008/07/07/scientists_warn_against_closing_navy_lab/

JAKARTA, Indonesia -Threats to shut down a US Navy medical research lab here might undermine the hunt for mutating viruses that could set off the next global flu pandemic, Western scientists warn.

Indonesia suspended negotiations with the United States over the fate of Naval Medical Research Unit No. 2 last month after senior politicians said it didn't benefit Indonesia and could be a cover for spying.

The US Embassy denied the facility is used to gather intelligence, and said most of the lab's staff are Indonesians helping with research carried out in cooperation with local health officials.

The biomedical research lab opened in Jakarta in 1970 and studies tropical diseases including malaria, dengue fever, and avian flu, according to an embassy fact sheet.

It has a staff of about 175 scientists, doctors, veterinarians, and technologists, but only 19 are American. The rest are Indonesians.

Navy research labs also are in Egypt, Kenya, Peru, and Thailand.

Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono said last month that his ministry recommended the lab be closed because its operations were too secretive, and were incompatible with Indonesia's security interests.

Dr. Siti Fadilah Supari, the health minister, also said she had recommended to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono that it be closed.

"I've told the president the lab's useless, the cooperation degrades our sovereignty, and it should be shut down," Supari told members of Parliament last month. "He told me to shut it if I think it's no use."

Negotiations on the lab would resume as early as this month, the Foreign Ministry said, once the country had a "unified stand" on the issue.

But US Embassy spokesman Tristram Perry said he was not aware of any date for talks to resume.

US officials say privately that the dispute is part of a bigger argument over sharing virus samples, including strains of the Avian flu, which the World Health Organization warns could set off a global pandemic.

Before Indonesia announced in January 2007 that it no longer would share samples with other countries, the naval lab did research on normal flu viruses from seasonal outbreaks as well bird flu cases treated in Indonesian hospitals.

"Sometimes you test a virus and you don't know if it's Avian influenza, or normal flu, or something completely different," said a Western scientist who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of negotiations with Indonesia.

Now those viruses appear not to be going anywhere for testing, the scientist said, adding that Indonesian labs cannot do the sophisticated research the Americans can do.

"Nobody knows what they are," she added. "Maybe there could be a pandemic from a different, new strain."

In its current form, the avian flu spreads from birds, usually infected poultry, to humans, but the infection rate is low.

Indonesia leads the world in bird flu deaths with at least 110 confirmed since 2005, according to WHO.

The virus kills 81 percent of its victims in Indonesia, according to the agency's figures.

A second Western scientist said that Indonesia has many strains of the avian flu virus, and that without constant research, a different strain more easily transmitted to humans could catch scientists off guard, and spread rapidly before a vaccine is ready.

"Many groups have tried to bring in scientists to work in the [Indonesian] labs and there's been resistance to that," added the second scientist. "There's a very nationalist spirit here."

After announcing the ban on virus-sharing, the health minister, who is a cardiologist, published a book in which she warned that any viruses shared with other countries could be turned into biological weapons.

She also recounted a meeting in Geneva with John E. Lange, the US special representative for pandemic flu, in which she told him: "It is not impossible that there will be a group of people in developed countries insane enough to reengineer the viruses to create an outbreak in the Third World.' "

Her book, widely sold in English and Bahasa editions, also said the pressure to share viruses was an example of exploitation of developing countries' natural resources.

"They also exploited part of the human body from the people of the powerless countries," the health minister wrote. "They took our blood. They took our cells. They took our antibodies.

"And perhaps it would be more dangerous when, in the end they would take our brain cells as well, to be re-engineered to create a new generation of slaves."

In January, she insisted the move to stop virus-sharing was necessary to protect poor nations from profiteering drug companies. Indonesia says it fears vaccines developed from local viruses will go to foreigners first, leaving Indonesians without protection or profit.

Bird Flu Concerns Lead to Partial Ban on Chickens in Zanzibar​

http://www.voanews.com/english/Africa/2008-07-04-voa39.cfm

A Zanzibari official says the island’s dependence on imported poultry products could affect its tourism industry. Dr. Kassim Gharib Juma is Zanzibar’s director of veterinary services. He told VOA English to Africa reporter Douglas Mpuga that in 2005 the fear of an outbreak of avian influenza led to a ban of importation of poultry products.

The ban has since been partially lifted for poultry from selected countries, but the fear of an outbreak remains. Dr. Kassim said there is no avian influenza in Zanzibar but its presence “in other countries has affected our import of poultry because most of the tourist hotels here depend on imported poultry. That has drastically affected the menu of the hotels as far as poultry products are concerned.”

Some people keep chickens and other domestic birds in their backyards, a practice Dr. Kassim said could be a problem. He said it could be “a source of infection to humans because 80 percent of the households here keep ‘backyard chickens.’ [The chickens] are so close to people that if they get infected you might expect that the infection could come to the household as well.”

He said the threat of avian flu in Zanzibar is made worse by people smuggling poultry products into the country. “But also,” he added, “Zanzibar lies on the path of migratory birds from East Asia. So we are at risk because of that. Then there is the other risk of getting it because our neighbors Sudan and Djibouti have had bird flu cases, and we are very close.”

But Dr. Kassim is optimistic that an outbreak of avian flu can be averted because of the vigorous awareness campaign on the island. “People are very much aware (of the avian flu threat). We have conducted a campaign, giving seminars to people in the poultry industry, farmers, our veterinary and medical staff, local authorities and the general public.”

Since Zanzibar partially removed the restriction on the importation of poultry products, demand for them has been increasing, especially from the tourism industry.

Can "Bird Flu" Be Eradicated Forever? ​

http://www.topnews.in/usa/can-bird-flu-be-eradicated-forever-2680

Avian Influenza or ‘Bird flu’, which has become a great threat to the mankind in the existing era, may be eradicated forever, if the efforts of scientists prove to be successful.

Recently, scientists at the University of California, San Diego with the help of the resources at the San Diego Supercomputer Center (SDSC), claimed to have isolated more than two dozen novel compounds which may prove promising in developing new “designer drugs” to cure Avian Flu. The compounds isolated seemed to be equal or stronger inhibitors than currently available anti-flu remedies in certain cases.

Rommie Amaro, a postdoctoral fellow in chemistry at UC San Diego, said, “If those resistant strains begin to propagate, then that’s when we’re going to be in trouble, because we don’t have any anti-virals active against them. So, we should have something as a backup, and that’s exactly why we’re working on this.”

The study which was written by the researchers in the Journal of Medicinal Chemistry, also revealed that their work builds on prior work that captured the nanosecond-by-nanosecond movements of a protein called neuraminidase 1 (or N1), needed by the avian flu virus to spread infection to new cells.

The researchers conducted a “virtual screen” of an ensemble of 1,883 compounds during the study, which were selected from h National Cancer Institute Diversity Set. They got the compounds by using a computational tool called AutoDock that predicts how small molecules bind to a receptor of a known three-dimensional structure.

The group basically wanted to determine which compounds fit best into the “hot pocket” region of N1, as compounds that most easily bind to the site are considered to be top hits for validation and further optimization as drug candidates.

Other than this, the researchers also screened five other compounds known to experimentally bind to avian influenza N1, including drugs now available or in clinical trials.

Their efforts revealed that about 27 compounds had potentially the same or stronger bonding affinity than current anti-flu drugs now available, including Tamiflu and Relenza.

The researchers now have plans to test these compounds in their laboratory to determine their efficacy against the virus, and experts at The Scripps Research Institute in La Jolla will lead the study.

DEFRA lifts remaining avian flu restrictions​

http://www.fwi.co.uk/Articles/2008/07/08/111123/defra-lifts-remaining-avian-flu-restrictions.html

DEFRA has today lifted the Surveillance Zone and remaining disease control area restrictions put in place following the outbreak of H7N7 avian flu on a free range layer unit near Banbury.

Surveillance has shown that infection appears to have been contained to the single premises and 30 days have now elapsed since preliminary cleansing and disinfection was completed on that premises.
Click Here

Deputy chief Vet officer Alick Simmons said: "This incident has demonstrated again the potential for avian flu to be introduced into domestic poultry in the UK.

"The risk of further incidents, while low, remains, and I urge poultry keepers to maintain the highest standards of biosecurity and to report suspicion of disease promptly," he said.

Hong Kong expert warns flu vaccine for chickens losing efficacy​

http://www.monstersandcritics.com/n...arns_flu_vaccine_for_chickens_losing_efficacy

Hong Kong - A vaccine used to stop outbreaks of the deadly bird flu virus in chickens in Hong Kong for the last seven years is losing its effectiveness, a leading microbiologist warned Tuesday.

Professor Yuen Kwok-yung said the vaccine, which protects chicken from the H5 strain of the virus, is becoming less effective and the city risks further outbreaks because total failure is inevitable.

The head of microbiology at the University of Hong Kong told the South China Morning Post the virus was mutating and shifting away from the Fujian strain of H5N2 that it was developed for.

His warning follows an outbreak of H5N1 virus in four wet markets in Hong Kong in June, the first in years in the former British colony.

Yuen, who is part of a team investigating the outbreak, said the city must get rid of all live chickens in markets before the vaccine becomes completely ineffective.

He said tests showed that in 2005 vaccine was producing only a quarter of the antibodies to protect against the virus compared to the level produced by the same vaccine in 2001.

He said some chickens showed an antibodies level at the 'alarm stage' which meant the protection was minimal.

'It is only a matter of time before it will lose its protection,' said Yuen, who is urging the government to ban all live chicken markets in Hong Kong before the vaccine, developed in the Netherlands, becomes ineffective.

'It takes time for the manufacturers to produce new vaccines,' he said. 'Hong Kong is taking its own risk if it still has live chickens in the markets.'

The government has yet to identify the source of the latest outbreak which resulted in the culling of thousands of chickens and led to tighter restrictions on imports and a ban on overnight stocking of live chickens in markets.

Live chicken sales resumed July 2 after a 21-day ban on import and sales following the outbreak.

Hong Kong was the scene of the first outbreak of bird flu to jump the species barrier in modern times when six people died and 12 others were infected in 1997.

Tough new hygiene and monitoring controls were introduced and Hong Kong has been spared further human infections from the recent bird flu cases across the Asia region.

H5N1 Persistence in Southern Vietnam​

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/07080801/H5N1_Vietnam_Persistence.html

Recombinomics Commentary 00:12
July 8, 2008

The department said that ducks died in Phuong Thach commune, Cang Long district, Tra Vinh province, from June 24.

By July 4, around 1,000 unvaccinated ducks had died. Their samples were tested positive to H5N1 virus.

The above comments describe the continued presence of H5N1 in southern Vietnam. Although Vietnam has been culling and vaccinating poultry for several years, H5N1 remains endemic in the area and is continuously reported in unvaccinated birds.

However, recent reports from Hong Kong and Egypt raise concerns that the current vaccination approaches have limited utility, and the continuing reports of H5N1 in Vietnam may reflect these shortcomings.

H5N1 Endemic in Egypt​

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/07070802/H5N1_Egypt_Endemic.html

Recombinomics Commentary 22:19
July 7, 2008

The event is unlikely to be contained and is now considered to be endemic. No more follow-up reports will be made, but instead, information about this disease will be included in the future six-monthly reports.

The above comments from the OIE final report from Egypt declare H5N1 endemic. Consequently, updates will be submitted at six month intervals. The declaration is not a surprise. At the end of 2007 and beginning of 2008, Egypt reported widespread outbreaks in spite of an extensive vaccine campaign. Many of the H5N1 outbreaks were in vaccinated flocks, and the H5N1 recovered in Egypt as well as Israel had a large number of non-synonymous changes.

The latest final report describes 19 new outbreaks between February 7 and June 14, which were H5N1 positive based on testing by the Central Laboratory for Veterinary Quality Control on Poultry Production (NLQP) using the real-time PCR. These outbreaks included vaccinated birds, backyard holdings, commercial farms, and wet markets.

Other countries, such as Indonesia have also declared H5N1 endemic. However, Indonesia has not filed an OIE report on H5N1 since September 26, 2006, when H5N1 was characterized as endemic.

Migration of H5N1 Into Bangladesh​

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/07070801/H5N1_Bangladesh_Migration.html

Recombinomics Commentary 12:57
July 7, 2008

Migratory birds are mainly responsible for the outbreak of avian influenza (AI) or bird flu in the country, according to a study report.

The report said that migratory birds might be responsible for initial introduction of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh Livestock Research Institute (BLRI), Bangladesh Agriculture University, Chittagong Veterinary University, Department of Livestock Service and Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) jointly conducted the study from February to June this year.

The study involved phylogenetic, epidemiological and socio-economic analysis.

The above comments on H5N1 in Bangladesh are not a surprise. Although no H5N1 sequences from Bangladesh have been made public, media reports indicated the H5N1 in Bangladesh was similar to H5N1 in West Bengal. Sequences from West Bengal have also not been made published, but earlier outbreaks in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran were the Qinghai sub-clade 2.2.3.

The Qinghai strain was first reported at Qinghai Lake in the spring of 2005. Qinghai Lake is due north of Bangladesh, and migratory birds that winter in south Asia migrate to the Qinghai Lake in the spring, and summer in areas to the north in Siberia and Mongolia. The Ganges Delta in Bangladesh and West Bengal attract a variety of waterfowl, which would facilitate movement of H5N1 into both countries.

The involvement of waterfowl in the recent outbreaks provoked the standard disclaimers by conservation groups, which rely on negative data linked to minimal testing of waterfowl, or surveillance programs which target fecal samples or cloacal swabs, which have low or undetectable levels of clade 2.2.

In the recent outbreak in Bangladesh, dead crows tested positive for H5N1 as did one child. Crows also died in West Bengal in association with poultry outbreaks, but there are no reports of wild bird H5N1 in India. Testing in India is minimal, and only poultry has tested positive, even though resident and migratory wild birds have died in association with H5N1 positive poultry deaths. The reporting failures in India are common.

The migratory bird linkage to outbreaks in Bangladesh and India were expected. Release of sequence data by both countries would be useful.

JPD, thanks again for your efforts on keeping us informed.

Bernard Matthews outlines blueprint
for tackling H5N1 avian flu​

http://www.fwi.co.uk/Articles/2008/...tlines-blueprint-for-tackling-h5n1-avian.html

This year's Temperton Fellow has called on the UK government and the poultry industry to work together to establish an early-warning system for migratory birds that can carry H5N1 avian flu.

Then armed with this knowledge, free-range turkey producers would be able to take measures to avoid contact between wild birds and poultry, such as temporarily housing flocks during the high-risk period.
Click Here

Delivering his Temperton Fellowship Report, Bernard Matthews Foods technical director Jeremy Hall highlighted the trend towards free-range Christmas turkeys. "TV chefs are encouraging consumers to go free range, which has led to a 15% growth in Christmas turkey volume. But outdoor farming brings risk and the sector needs to find how to manage this during the higher-risk autumn migration season. So the challenge is to rear turkeys through the highest risk months without any outbreaks."

One big limitation highlighted by Mr Hall, undermining the industry's preparedness, is the lack of information on movement of the virus. He said that while there was good EU information on routine wild-bird testing, the approach was disjointed.

"The EC's way of reporting the previous quarter's results means data are available only when it is about five months out of date. However, the European picture on virus movement is critical and we need a faster web-based reporting system."

Mr Hall added: "I remember having meetings with the British Trust for Ornithology (BTO) and I was amazed by the sophistication of its records and mapping. Using those data with satellite tracking, we could track bird movement and know precisely when birds start their journey back to the UK.

"But the government needs to put more support into wild-bird testing and monitoring. At the moment, we are depending on the goodwill of the RSPB and BTO for bird spotting. DEFRA is inadequately supporting this and we need to halt the decline in bird collections for avian flu testing."

Mr Hall believed the common pochard was the most likely candidate for carrying and harbouring the H5N1 avian flu virus in Europe.
Click Here

"Looking at wild birds testing positive, there were mainly swans and pochards. But as swans either migrate short distances or don't migrate at all, they are picking up infection from other species."

In contrast, the common pochard travels huge distances to its breeding grounds in eastern Russia and China, so spends the summer in contact with wildfowl in areas known to have a high presence of infection. And about 84,000 of these return to the UK each autumn.

Better information and an early detection system would enable producers to take action during high-risk weeks. But there was still the issue of flocks losing free-range status when temporarily housed. "We are in talks with Animal Health Teams in DEFRA to secure a UK concession on risk-reduction grounds and for an option to house free-range birds during the high-risk weeks in late October and November."

Demanding challenge

According to DEFRA's analysis, turkeys are 37 times more susceptible to avian flu than chickens. So given the rise in the number of turkeys being reared outdoors to comply with free-range standards and birds that are being reared under major bird migration routes, the sector faces the challenge of meeting consumer demand and mitigating the avian flu risk.

The turkey industry, including Bernard Matthews, together with the British Poultry Council, NFU, the Traditional Free-range Turkey Association, Quality British Turkey and Red Tractor has drawn up some best practice guidelines to help minimise risk.

Study shows H5N1 virus is adapting each time it infects a human​

http://www.news-medical.net/?id=39855

Scientists have discovered how bird flu adapts in patients, offering a new way to monitor the disease and prevent a pandemic, according to research published in the August issue of the Journal of General Virology.

Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus has spread through at least 45 countries in 3 continents. Despite its ability to spread, it cannot be transmitted efficiently from human to human. This indicates it is not fully adapted to its new host species, the human. However, this new research reveals mutations in the virus that may result in a pandemic.

"The mutations needed for the emergence of a potential pandemic virus are likely to originate and be selected within infected human tissues," said Professor Dr Prasert Auewarakul from Mahidol University, Thailand. "We analyzed specific molecules called haemagglutinin on viruses derived from fatal human cases. Our results suggest new candidate mutations that may allow bird flu to adapt to humans."

Viruses with a high mutation rate such as influenza virus usually exist as a swarm of variants, each slightly different from the others. These are called H5N1 bird flu quasispecies. Professor Dr Auewarakul and his colleagues found that some mutations in the quasispecies were more frequent than others, which indicates they may be adaptive changes that make the virus more efficient at infecting humans. Most of these mutations were found in the area required for the virus to bind to the host cell.

"This study shows that the H5N1 virus is adapting each time it infects a human," said Professor Dr Auewarakul. "Such adaptations may lead to the emergence of a virus that can cause a pandemic. Our research highlights the need to control infection and transmission to humans to prevent further adaptations."

The research has provided genetic markers to help scientists monitor bird flu viruses with pandemic potential. This means they will be able to detect potentially dangerous strains and prevent a pandemic. The research also gives new insights into the mechanism of the genesis of a pandemic strain.

"Our approach could be used to screen for mutations with significant functional impact," said Professor Dr Auewarakul. "It is a new method of searching for changes in H5N1 viruses that are required for the emergence of a pandemic virus. We hope it will help us to prevent a pandemic in the future."

Link to next weeks thread:

7/10/08- 7/17/08 Weekly Bird Flu Thread:Genes identified for bird flu replication

http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?t=294072