04/07: "The Winds of War" - military action or a nuclear Iran

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04/06: "The Winds of War" - Deaths Fuel Iran Row
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?t=236603



<B><center>A Difficult Choice

April 06, 2007
Guardian Weekly
Ian Bremmer
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/ian_bremmer/2007/04/the_ultimate_sanction.html

Tehran is not Pyongyang. In all likelihood the decision for the west is this:

<font size=+0 color=red> military action or a nuclear Iran. </font></center>

Despite his bellicose rhetoric, George Bush would very much like to avoid a choice between air strikes on Iranian nuclear sites and accepting a nuclear Iran. For the moment, administration officials are hoping that "targeted" sanctions aimed directly at Iran's leadership will compel a compromise. The UN security council's recent decision to tighten existing sanctions on Iran by prohibiting dealings with 15 individuals and 13 organizations aims at precisely that. But, while some within the US government argue that similar sanctions induced North Korea to compromise on its nuclear programme, there are several reasons why the same strategy is unlikely to work with Iran. </b>

First and foremost, targeted sanctions did not, in fact, really work with North Korea. The freeze on $25m of the leadership's assets held at Banco Delta Asia in Macau has certainly irritated the North Koreans. But the asset freeze did not prevent Kim Jong-il from ordering a ballistic missile test last July or an underground nuclear test in October.

Instead, North Korea's willingness to resume negotiations partly reflects the Americans' decision to stop insisting on the "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" of North Korea's nuclear program as a pre-condition for talks on normalizing relations. The Bush administration has accepted that North Korea is a nuclear power and that outsiders can do little about it, so the United States has shifted its diplomatic stance from the hard-line Japanese approach to the more flexible and stability-oriented Chinese position.

That shift is understandable. Given its simultaneous military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, together with North Korea's demonstrated nuclear capability, the Bush administration can't credibly threaten Kim with force. Sanctions have rattled the North Korean leadership, but not nearly enough to compel them to surrender fully the nuclear program, which is their ultimate guarantee of security.

At the same time, the North Koreans' willingness to make a deal also reflects China's decision to put its foot down. China remains the only foreign power with any real leverage over Kim's government. Exasperated by Kim's refusal to ease international tensions, Chinese officials have made clear their refusal to protect and subsidize North Korea's elite if it continues to push the US toward confrontation. The Chinese can't force Kim to disarm fully, but they can persuade him to negotiate with a now more flexible US.

As a result, the US and North Korea have agreed a deal that differs from the Clinton-era "Agreed Framework," mainly because North Korea now has a track record as both a deal breaker and a nuclear weapons state. Having returned to the bargaining table in a position of strength, North Korea now hopes to secure a compromise that frees up the leadership's assets and brings new benefits that help buttress the regime a little longer. As long as the Chinese talk tough and the US remains willing to negotiate, the agreement may hold. But neither diplomatic stance is likely to continue indefinitely.

In any case, none of this will help the Bush administration with Iran. No outside actor has the leverage with Iran that China has with North Korea, and even if the US offered Iran a more conciliatory approach, the Democratic-led Congress isn't likely to follow suit. Buffeted by criticism that their position on the war in Iraq is incoherent and that they are soft on security threats, the Democrats appear determined to ratchet up pressure on Iran, favoring much broader sanctions than the Bush administration has proposed.

For example, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Tom Lantos has introduced legislation that would extend the extra-territorial reach of US law to foreign governments' export credit agencies, financial institutions, insurers, underwriters, and guarantors. It would bar foreign subsidiaries of US companies from investing more than $20m in Iran's energy sector, and would eliminate the president's authority to waive these penalties. It would also designate Iran's Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist group and impose further limits on exports to the country's civil aviation industry.

Moreover, Republicans are getting in on the act. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen has introduced legislation that would require US government pension funds, private pension funds, and mutual funds sold or distributed in the US to divest from companies that invest more than $20m in Iran.

Finally, just as Iran faces no China - an outside player with considerable domestic influence - North Korea faces no Israel, a neighbor that believes its security could depend on an act of military pre-emption. Israel does not want to take on Iran without US support and will maintain pressure on both Congress and the president to threaten Iran with every means at its disposal.

The appeal of targeted sanctions against Iran is obvious: they are meant to help the administration avoid military action, which could create more problems than it solves. They allow the White House to argue that it means to undermine Iran's leadership, not its people. They are also much more likely to win international support than sanctions that would remove Iran's oil and gas supplies from the international marketplace.

But the chances are slim that sanctions, whether targeted or otherwise, can undermine the consensus within Iran in favor of the nuclear programme. As in North Korea, a nuclear capability constitutes a powerful symbol of the country's sovereignty and international clout - and would be the ultimate guarantee that America could never do there what it has done in Iraq.

Sanctions give lawmakers and diplomats plenty to talk about. But unless a sea change occurs in Iranian domestic politics, they will merely postpone the difficult (and increasingly likely) choice between military action and accepting a nuclear Iran.

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<B><font size=+1 color=brown><center>Trying to Stay Out of Iran </font>

April 06, 2007
The Nation
David Corn
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070423/corn </center>
When House Democratic leaders were designing legislation that attached a withdrawal deadline to 100 billion dollars in supplemental funding for the Iraq War, they initially included a provision stating that President Bush couldn't use military force against Iran without obtaining a Congressional OK. </b>

For many Democrats, this was a no-brainer. At an issues retreat in early February, <b>retired Gen. John Hoar had told House Democrats there was a high probability of military confrontation.</b> Some Democratic legislators were looking to cut Bush off at the pass. "Once burned, shame on you; twice burned, shame on me," says liberal Representative Jim McDermott. But as John Larson, vice chair of the House Democratic caucus and co-sponsor of a similar Iran measure, recalls, <b>"A funny thing happened on the way to the forum." The Iran provision was pulled out of the Iraq bill. </b>

Appropriations Committee chair David Obey, who had drafted the Iran provision, had an explanation for disappointed fellow Democrats: He had concluded that it was poorly written and Bush could easily circumvent it. But several conservative Blue Dog Democrats had complained about limiting Bush's options regarding Iran, and Speaker Nancy Pelosi, looking for votes to pass the Iraq War spending bill, decided to appease them. (Her calculation paid off: The bill passed on a 218-to-212 vote.) Days after the Iran measure was yanked, an upset McDermott spoke at a meeting of House Democrats. "We have to make a decision," he recalls saying, "whether to leave this guy [Bush] with a blank check." Pelosi promised they'd have the chance to vote on the issue.

But politics and policy are in the details. Pelosi could green-light a stand-alone bill compelling Bush to seek Congressional authority before initiating military action, or she could attach such language to a piece of must-pass legislation, such as the defense authorization bill. House Democrats may not have enough votes to pass separate legislation. Last June Representative Maurice Hinchey proposed an amendment that would have prohibited military action against Iran unless Congress first declared war.

It was soundly defeated, with forty-seven Democrats voting nay. (A year earlier Peter DeFazio won only 136 votes for a similar measure.) Although the Democrats have since gained the majority, House aides estimate that there are still dozens of Democrats who would not vote for such a measure. And only five Republicans have supported legislation proposed by Republican Walter Jones that would allow the President to use military force against Iran only after receiving "specific authorization" from Congress (unless Iran attacks the United States or is about to do so).

Moreover, Democrat Tom Lantos, chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, is pushing legislation to intensify sanctions against Iran; and some Democrats would prefer to see get-tough action define their party's Iran policy, not legislation limiting Bush's power.

House Democratic aides note the possibility of combining sanctions with restrictions on Bush. But that would not be to the liking of AIPAC, the powerhouse pro-Israel lobby, which has declared the Lantos bill a top priority. In a recent speech AIPAC executive director Howard Kohr said that legislation restricting Bush's options would be "a sign of weakness." Asked if he can point to a political fight lost by AIPAC recently, Representative Larson replied, "Not to my recollection." But if Pelosi tucks an Iran provision into a compulsory bill, it will have a better chance.

In the Senate, freshman Democrat James Webb has introduced legislation to prohibit Bush from striking Iran without Congressional authority unless it's to counter actual or imminent attack. After taking office Webb reviewed Bush's signing statement for the bill granting him permission to use force against Iraq and saw that Bush insisted he had "constitutional authority to use force" to "respond to aggression or other threats to U.S. interests."

This claim was "so broad," Webb thought, that Congress had to prevent Bush from applying it to Iran. Webb had hoped to include his bill in the Senate's Iraq-funding legislation, but the legislation was passed without it. Majority leader Harry Reid supports the idea underlying Webb's proposal. But some Democrats fear that such initiatives imply that Bush has the authority to attack Iran unless Congress declares otherwise, and that if a bill like Webb's were defeated, Bush's hand would be strengthened. "I understand the concern," says Webb, "and I'm not taking any options off the table, just trying to rein in a trigger-happy President."

But before Iran comes Iraq. House and Senate Democrats must still work out a compromise that resolves the differences in each body's Iraq measure. Then they may find themselves in a constitutional showdown with a veto-wielding President. This won't leave much time for a debate over Iran. Given rising tensions between the Administration and Tehran, DeFazio says, "we may not even get to send the President a message before something happens."

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<B><font size=+1 color=green><center>Admedinejad's "Plan B" - The Circus Continues</font>

April 06, 2007
RealclearPolitics.com
Walid Phares
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/04/admedinejads_plan_b_the_circus.html </center>
With the decision to release the 15 British sailors, the Ahmedinejad three-ring circus and the mullah's propaganda machine have produced a better end to the hostage crisis: Release them quickly and invest heavily in their merciful "liberation." Hence the new debate worldwide is about the mullahs and President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad "freeing" the British personnel, and not anymore about their abduction -- and certainly not about the UN sanctions on the nuclear standoff, the Iranian operatives arrested in Iraq, or the domestic opposition to Ahmedinejad. The propaganda war continues, still powerful, and still in the hands of Tehran, or rather in the sophisticated PR machine at the service of the regime. </b>

The abrupt change in direction by the mullahs from enduring crisis to sudden solution is the product of their PR machine realizing how furthering the hostage crisis would have been catastrophic. Ahmedinejad needed more time, but his advisors realized that the operation was close to being utterly exposed in the court of world opinion. But why did the "advisors" (mostly Western-hired) ask the mullahs to release the British at once? And how were they able to exploit that change of course? Here are the reasons:

1.) The basis behind this punctual operation was systematically eroded in one week: Analysis exposing the role of the Iranian intelligence in Iraq, the defection of Iranian military officials, and the rise of protests inside the country helped expose what the regime was trying to dodge with this orchestrated hostage crisis. The surfacing of this charade both in Western and Arab media stripped the Iranian PR machine of its subterfuge. More around the world were growing increasingly incredulous of the mullahs' professed concern about the breach of Iranian sovereign waters. Hence the "Psy-ops" architects quickly ordered a change in direction.

2) In addition, the Iranian management of the hostage operation was starting to unravel in the eyes of their professional publicists. Showing the detainees on TV, parading them, forcing the female soldier to wear a scarf, and then forcing the captured sailors to write letters and deliver televised speeches were the worse possible actions the captors could have done. The direction taken by the managers of the hostage crisis was becoming untenable to the regime. They were losing international sympathies for the Iranian story of sovereignty. Instead, the international community was growing frustrated with Ahmedinijad's coordinated propaganda operation.

3) Once the real objectives of the operation began to circulate widely, the margin for Iranian maneuvering shrunk dramatically. When the reality of what the mullahs wanted to do with the hostages over time was understood, the regime's ability to surprise the public with circus-like actions collapsed. Since most of the potential future acts were exposed in advance, Khomeinists lost the ability to be creative: options such as having more pro-regime students staging demonstrations, releasing more videos, and inviting Western "mediators" to Tehran to blast London and Washington became obsolete. While it is true that Tehran won the first round of the match by shifting international focus to the hostage crisis instead of its nuclear program, because of his speedy recourse to circus stunts, Ahmedinijad was about to lose the entire propaganda war with his enemies. Thus, the PR advisors behind Tehran's propaganda stunt sounded the alarm: Stop the operation and revert to Plan B.

4) And what urged the change of direction as well was that the Iranians were made to understand that any action taken against the British sailors, especially since the latter were operating under UN mandate, would be considered a breach of international law. Any mistreatment, blatant abuse of rights, or even kangaroo court procedures would be considered as cause for action against the regime. Iran's PR advisors know that such a development would be very dangerous for business.

5) And in the larger picture, as I argued in my previous assessment of this crisis, playing brinkmanship with the U.K., U.S., and regional forces opposed to the Tehran elite, was highly risky. The price for detaining 15 sailors, with all the additional circus tricks Tehran had been preparing, wasn't worth any international extension of support to the four major ethnicities inside Iran and to various democratic movements opposed to the regime. The situation had to be modified to fit the changing circumstances and chart a new direction.

So what is the new direction?

First, Ahmedinijad had to detach the regime from the sailors, but in the most sumptuous way: Hold a major press conference, during which the regime extends awards to the captors while embracing the captives. The sailors apologize again, greet the regime, smile to the cameras and are shipped back to their country. That is what the international media wanted and that is what it would get.

Second, the "liberation" of hostages would allow Ahmedinijad to use the closing statements prepared for the long captivity immediately. Instead of a gift to the British people for Christmas, it was revamped as an "Easter Gift." Theologically, Ahmedinejad was clumsy here: Christians don't usually give "gifts" for Easter, and Christians believe Christ "ascended" into heaven not "passed," as Ahmedinjad termed it. But that is a just little religious detail. Probably Ahmedinejad's advisors weren't ready to release the hostages on a theologically complicated Easter but on an easily understood concept like Christmas.

Iran's risky adventure was smartly designed but poorly executed. There seems to be a gap between the architects of the plan (both inside and outside Iran) and the poor way Ahmedinejad executed it. For at first, Iran was successful in steering the debate away from the UN sanctions. But then, by executing a grotesque masquerade, Tehran was on the verge of disaster.

This is when the advisors quickly suggested a remedy: Move to Plan B as quickly as possible. The abrupt twist had the added bonus of shielding Iran from any repercussions from the international community. If the mullahs were a bit smarter and bit less ideological, they may have been able to execute the plan as designed and gain valuable time to distract the world from its real goals: regional hegemony, nuclear capability, etc. But as we saw, while the advisors can work miracles, the stultified thinking of the mullahs can mess up even the best-laid plans.

Now that Tehran has ended the first act of its international circus, it's time for the Act II.

Professor Walid Phares is the author of the recently released book, The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracies. He is a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy.

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<B><font size=+1 color=blue><center>An International Failure</font>

April 06, 2007
The Washington Post
Charles Krauthammer
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MGJmZTdlODIxZGQzMWJlYzQyMTAzYWE1NzAyM2UxNWE= </center>
Iran has pulled off a tidy little success with its seizure and subsequent release of those 15 British sailors and marines: a pointed humiliation of Britain, with a bonus demonstration of Iran’s intention to push back against coalition challenges to its assets in Iraq. All with total impunity. Further, it exposed the utter futility of all those transnational institutions—most prominently the European Union and the U.N.—that pretend to maintain international order. </b>

You would think maintaining international order means, at a minimum, challenging acts of piracy. No challenge here. Instead, a quiet capitulation.

The quid pro quos were not terribly subtle. An Iranian “diplomat” who had been held for two months in Iraq is suddenly released. Equally suddenly, Iran is granted access to the five Iranian “consular officials”—Revolutionary Guards who had been training Shiite militias to kill Americans and others—whom the U.S. had arrested in Irbil in January. There may have been other concessions we will never hear about. But the salient point is that what got this unstuck was American action.

Where then was the EU? These 15 hostages, after all, are not just British citizens, but under the laws of Europe, citizens of Europe. Yet the EU lifted not a finger on their behalf.

Europeans talk all the time about their preference for “soft power” over the brute military force those Neanderthal Americans resort to all the time. What was the soft power available here? Iran’s shaky economy is highly dependent on European credits, trade, and technology. Britain asked the EU to threaten to freeze exports, $18 billion a year of commerce. Iran would have lost its No. 1 trading partner. The EU refused.

Why was nothing done? The reason is simple. Europe functions quite well as a free trade zone. But as a political entity, it is a farce. It remains a collection of sovereign countries with divergent interests. A freeze of economic relations with Europe would have shaken the Iranian economy to the core. Yet nothing was done. “The Dutch,” reports the Times of London, “said it was important not to risk a breakdown in dialogue.” So much for European solidarity.

Like other vaunted transnational institutions, the EU is useless as a player in the international arena. Not because its members are venal but because they are sovereign. Their interests are simply not identical.

The problem is most striking at the U.N., the quintessential transnational institution with a mandate to maintain international peace and order. There was a commonality of interest at its origin—defeating Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The war ended, but the wartime alliance of Britain, France, the U.S., China, and Russia proclaimed itself nonetheless the guardian of postwar “collective security” as the Security Council.

Small problem: Their interests are not collective. They are individual. Take the Iranian nuclear program. Russia and China make it impossible to impose any serious sanctions. China has an interest in maintaining strong relations with a major energy supplier, and is not about to jeopardize that over Iranian nukes which are no threat to it whatsoever. Russia sees Iran as a useful proxy in resisting Western attempts to dominate the Persian Gulf.

Ironically, the existence of transnational institutions like the U.N. makes it harder for collective action against bad actors. In the past, interested parties would simply get together in temporary coalitions to do what they had to do. That is much harder now because they feel such action is illegitimate without the blessing of the Security Council.

The result is utterly predictable. Nothing has been done about the Iranian bomb. In fact, the only effective sanctions are those coming unilaterally out of the U.S. Treasury.

Remember the great return to multilateralism—the new emphasis on diplomacy and “working with the allies”—so widely heralded at the beginning of the second Bush administration? To general acclaim, the cowboys had been banished and the grown-ups brought back to town.

What exactly has the new multilateralism brought us? North Korea tested a nuclear device. Iran has accelerated its march to developing the bomb. The pro-Western government in Beirut hangs by a thread. The Darfur genocide continues unabated.

The capture and release of the 15 British hostages illustrate once again the fatuousness of the “international community” and its great institutions. You want your people back? Go to the EU and get stiffed. Go to the Security Council and get a statement that refuses even to “deplore” this act of piracy. (You settle for a humiliating expression of “grave concern”). Then turn to the despised Americans. They’ll deal some cards and bail you out.

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<B><center>April 7, 2007

<font size=+1 color=purple>Iran calls for British goodwill after releases</font>

http://thestar.com.my/news/story.as...01_NOOTR_RTRJONC_0_-293392-1&sec=Worldupdates </center>
LONDON (Reuters) - Iran called on Britain on Saturday to respond to the release of 15 British military personnel with goodwill, signalling it would welcome this over Iranians held by U.S. forces in Iraq and its nuclear programme.

"We played our part and we showed our goodwill. Now it is up to the British government to proceed in a positive way," Iran's ambassador to Britain, Rasoul Movahedian, told the Financial Times in an interview. </b>

U.S. forces in Iraq have arrested a number of Iranians, including diplomats, in the past and are still holding five. Washington accuses Tehran of aiding militants fighting U.S. forces in Iraq. Iran denies the charge.


Iran's ambassador Rasoul Movahedian leaves the Foreign Office in London in this March 23, 2007 file photo. Iran called on Britain on Saturday to respond to the release of 15 British military personnel with goodwill, signalling it would welcome this over Iranians held by U.S. forces in Iraq and its nuclear programme. (REUTERS/Stephen Hird)
Movahedian said the release of the Britons was not linked to any other case, but added: "If (the British) want to be helpful and use their influence we will welcome that ... We will welcome in general any steps that could defuse tensions in the region."

Some media reports during the two-week standoff over Tehran's seizure of the Britons that ended on Thursday said Iran wanted the five Iranians freed in return for releasing the 15.

Movahedian said it was a "mutual task" for Iran and the world's major powers to "glean the fruits" of Tehran's decision to release the Britons.

He said he would welcome recognition by the U.N. Security Council's five permanent members -- the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China -- of what Iran says is its right to enrich uranium in its nuclear programme for peaceful purposes.

"That's the prime issue for Iran and I think that could help set a new basis for our future relations with Western countries," he said.

"We share in the British people's happiness (over the release of the 15) and we believe it is the right time for the British government to affirm its willingness to establish sensible lines of communication with Iran."

The West suspects Iran has a secret programme to build nuclear weapons. Tehran says its programme is solely for power.

Britain says no deal was struck with Iran to end the standoff over Tehran's seizure of the 15 sailors and marines.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on Wednesday he had decided to forgive and free the 15 even though Britain was not "brave enough" to admit they strayed into Iran's territory.

The standoff, which began when Tehran seized the 15 in the Shatt al-Arab waterway between Iraq and Iran on March 23, raised international tension and rattled financial markets.

The dispute centred on where the Britons were when they were seized. Britain says they were in Iraqi waters on a routine U.N. mission. Tehran says they strayed into its territorial waters.




Copyright © 2007 Reuters

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<i>Could be... This is why ole Amjen-dabutthead decided to let the Brits go? Not worth the wear and tear on Iranian realstate; to keep them for propganda purposes ~ Dutch</i>




<B><font size=+2 color=red><center>Americans offered 'aggressive patrols' in Iranian airspace</font>

Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, Michael Howard and John Hooper
Saturday April 7, 2007
The Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,,2051971,00.html </center>
The US offered to take military action on behalf of the 15 British sailors and marines held by Iran, including buzzing Iranian Revolutionary Guard positions with warplanes, the Guardian has learned.</b>

In the first few days after the captives were seized and British diplomats were getting no news from Tehran on their whereabouts, Pentagon officials asked their British counterparts: what do you want us to do? They offered a series of military options, a list which remains top secret given the mounting risk of war between the US and Iran. But one of the options was for US combat aircraft to mount aggressive patrols over Iranian Revolutionary Guard bases in Iran, to underline the seriousness of the situation.

The British declined the offer and said the US could calm the situation by staying out of it. London also asked the US to tone down military exercises that were already under way in the Gulf. Three days before the capture of the 15 Britons , a second carrier group arrived having been ordered there by president George Bush in January. The aim was to add to pressure on Iran over its nuclear programme and alleged operations inside Iraq against coalition forces.
At the request of the British, the two US carrier groups, totalling 40 ships plus aircraft, modified their exercises to make them less confrontational.

The British government also asked the US administration from Mr Bush down to be cautious in its use of rhetoric, which was relatively restrained throughout.

The incident was a reminder of how inflammatory the situation in the Gulf is. According to some US and British officers, there is already a proxy war under way between their forces and elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

Meanwhile, the Iranians are convinced that separatist guerrilla attacks in Khuzestan and Baluchistan provinces are the work of British and US intelligence respectively. Earlier this week, ABC television news reported that a Baluchi group, Jundullah, based in Pakistan and carrying out raids inside Iran, had been receiving advice and encouragement from American officials since 2005.

A senior Iranian source with close ties to the Revolutionary Guard, told the Guardian: "If this had been between Iranian and American soldiers it could have been the beginning of an accidental war."

With the crisis now over, a remarkable degree of consensus is emerging among British, Iranian and Iraqi officials about what happened over 13 nervous days - namely that the decision to seize the Britons was taken locally, and was not part of a grander scheme cooked up in Tehran.

"My best guess is that this was a local incident which became an international incident," said one British source closely involved in the crisis.

Both sides had been watching each other closely for years across the disputed line separating the Iranian and Iraqi sides of the Shatt al-Arab waterway and the northern Gulf beyond and British officials say that Iranian boats regularly infringe on foreign waters.

The senior Iranian source meanwhile, claimed there had been three British incursions into Iranian waters in the three months leading up to the capture and that the decision to detain the British naval crew on March 23 was taken by a regional Revolutionary Guard commander, responsible for the waterway.

Once the 15 captives were brought back to Iran, their stay was guaranteed to be unpleasant. The Pasdaran (as the Revolutionary Guards are universally known in Farsi) are a law unto themselves, feared within Iran for their thuggish methods.

There is also general agreement in London and Tehran that once the crisis had been triggered it took nearly two weeks to untangle, because their release had to be agreed by all the key players in the perpetual poker game that passes for government in Tehran. But those players could not be reached because they were scattered around the country for the No Rouz (new year) holiday.

"Nobody who counted was answering the phone," said one senior British official. "By the time the Iranian leaders got back from the holiday [on Tuesday] the phone was ringing off the hook, including from people they didn't expect, calling on them to release the captives quickly."

Among those unexpected callers were their closest allies, the Syrians, as well as leaders from far-flung states with no direct stake in the Gulf. Even the Colombian government issued a protest.

Another surprise intervention came from the Vatican. Hours before Wednesday's release, a letter from Pope Benedict was handed to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It said the Pope was confident that men of goodwill could find a solution. He asked the supreme leader to do what he could to ensure that the British sailors and marines were reunited with their families in time for Easter. It would, he said, be a significant religious gesture of goodwill from the Iranian people.

What impact the Pope's message had is impossible to assess. But some of its language was reflected at the press conference at which the release of the 15 Britons was announced. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said the decision to "forgive" the sailors and marines had been taken "on the occasion of the birthday of the great prophet [Muhammad] ... and for the occasion of the passing of Christ".

The Iraqi government also played a critical role, pushing for consular access to five Iranians who had been arrested by US forces in Irbil and had been in custody since January, and helping organise the mysterious release of an Iranian diplomat who had been in captivity since February.

In the first days of the crisis, Iraqi officials also helped the British to identify the exact boundaries of Iraqi waters, the Guardian has learned, suggesting the British were not as certain of their case as they had publicly claimed.

But it was the unexpected release of Jalal Sharifa, the second secretary at the Iranian embassy, that raised most eyebrows, fuelling speculation that some kind of bargaining was going on. The diplomat had been missing since he was plucked from the streets of Baghdad on February 4. Iran blamed US forces in Iraq for ordering the diplomat's abduction, but US military officials denied the claims. Baghdad's foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, however, has insisted that negotiations over Mr Sharafi had been under way long before March 23.

Some credit for the abrupt release of the British naval crew has also been given to Tony Blair's top foreign policy adviser, Sir Nigel Sheinwald, who got through to his Iranian counterpart, Ari Larijani for the first time the night before Mr Ahmadinejad made his surprise announcement. The opening of a Sheinwald-Larijani channel of communication is being hailed as one of the few pluses to emerge from the affair.

The crucial decision for release was taken on Tuesday by the supreme national security council. It includes representatives of the presidency, the armed forces and the Revolutionary Guard, and Tuesday was the first day they could all be brought together following the No Rouz holiday.

"I think they realised pretty quickly the game was not worth the candle," a senior British government source said.

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<B><font size=+1 color=brown><center>Someone said, 'Lads, I think we're going to be executed'</font></b>


<i>· Sailors tell of 'psychological torture'
· US offered military action to free 15</i>

<b>Steven Morris and Ewen MacAskill
Saturday April 7, 2007
The Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/military/story/0,,2051926,00.html?gusrc=rss&feed=11 </center>
The British hostages held captive in Iran for a fortnight yesterday told of the moments they thought they were about to be executed by their captors as the first full account of their ordeal was made public.

The most frightening time was when the 14 men and one woman, Faye Turney, were lined up against a wall, handcuffed and blindfolded. They heard weapons being cocked and some of them thought they were about to be shot.</b>

Royal Marine Joe Tindall said: "They [the Iranians] changed from the military dress to all black, their faces covered. There were weapons cocking. Someone, I'm not sure who, someone said: 'Lads, lads, I think we're going to get executed.' After that comment someone was sick and as far as I was concerned he had just had his throat cut." Lieutenant Felix Carman added: "Some of us feared the worst."
As the sailors and marines told their stories, the Guardian learned that the US had offered to buzz Iran with fighter jets during the impasse. Diplomatic sources said that, Pentagon officials offered a series of military options, including for US combat aircraft to mount aggressive patrols over Iranian Revolutionary Guard bases. Britain told the Pentagon to calm the situation by staying out of it and tone down military exercises in the Gulf.

Speaking in detail for the first time, six of the 15 sailors and marines - who returned to the UK on Thursday after being freed by Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad - defended themselves against accusations that they had been captured too easily. They were paraded on television apparently admitting they had trespassed into Iranian waters. It emerged that Acting Leading Seaman Turney, a mother from Plymouth, had been separated from the men soon after capture and was under the impression for days that they had been sent back and she was the only one remaining in Iran.

The crew insisted they had been in Iraqi waters when they were seized. They said they were surrounded by eight Iranian boats and, although they had made their weapons ready, they had no chance of overpowering the Iranians.

Captain Chris Air of the Royal Marines said: "The Iranians are not our enemies. We are not at war with them. By the time the true intent of the Iranians had become apparent and we could legitimately have fought back it was too late for action.

"We were completely surrounded and, in addition to any loss of life, any attempted fightback would have caused a major international incident and an escalation of tension within the region. Our team had seconds to make a decision and we believe we made the right decision."

In captivity, they were kept in isolation and deprived of sleep. They were told they had been abandoned by their government and could admit they had trespassed and go home, or stay in prison for seven years. At least one of the servicemen was hit.

The group denied cooperating with the Iranians, but said they had made a "conscious decision" to "make a controlled release of non-operational information". They have been given two weeks' compassionate leave.

Downing Street and the Ministry of Defence did not comment on the press conference at Royal Marines Barracks Chivenor, north Devon. The Foreign Office was considering its response.

Last night Iranian television claimed the hostages statements had been "dictated" by the MoD.

Meanwhile, the names of four British soldiers killed in Iraq on Thursday were released yesterday. Clarence House said one of them, Second Lieutenant Joanna Dyer, was a close friend of Prince William from their time together at Sandhurst.

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<B><font size=+1 color=green><center>U.N. May Probe Syria - Lebanon Smuggling </font>

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: April 6, 2007
Filed at 9:01 p.m. ET
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-UN-Lebanon.html?_r=1&oref=slogin </center>
UNITED NATIONS (AP) -- France circulated a draft Security Council statement that expresses ''serious concern'' at mounting reports of illegal arms transfers from Syria to Lebanon and authorizes an independent mission to assess how their border is being monitored.</b>

The proposed presidential statement, sent to council members late Thursday and obtained Friday, welcomes the Lebanese government's ''determination'' to prevent arms transfer, which are banned under a U.N. resolution that ended last summer's war between the Islamic militant group Hezbollah and Israel.

It reiterates the council's call on the Syrian government ''to take further measures to reinforce controls at the border,'' and it urges all countries, especially Syria and Iran, to enforce the arms embargo.

The council is expected to discuss the draft statement, probably next week.

The draft welcomes Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's intention to evaluate the situation along the border in cooperation with the Lebanese government ''and invites him to dispatch at the earliest an independent mission to fully assess the monitoring of the border.''

Last Saturday, Ban warned during a visit to Lebanon that arms smuggling from Syria could threaten the cease-fire in Lebanon and urged full compliance with U.N. resolution 1701 that ended the 34-day Israeli-Hezbollah war.

''There are intelligence reports that arms are smuggled. I am concerned by that kind of arms smuggling, which will destabilize the situation in Lebanon,'' he said.

The leading Lebanese daily An-Nahar reported that Ban told Lebanese security chiefs Israel had provided him with ''evidence and pictures'' of trucks crossing from Syria to Lebanon and unloading weapons.

Ban expressed the need for ''an enhanced monitoring capacity of the Lebanese armed forces to ensure that there will be no such smuggling activity.''

Asked again Thursday about the arms smuggling allegations, Ban said, they ''should independently be assessed.''

In the French draft, the Security Council would express ''its serious concern at mounting reports of illegal movements of arms across the Lebanese-Syrian border in violation of resolution 1701.''

When the council receives recommendations from the secretary-general, the draft says it will take further steps to achieve the goals of banning the sale or transfer of arms or technical assistance to any entity or individual not authorized by the Lebanese government.

The council would also reiterate ''its deep concern at the continuing Israeli violations of Lebanese air space'' and appeal to all parties to respect the cease-fire and the U.N.-drawn boundary between Israel and Lebanon known as the Blue Line, and ''refrain from any provocation.''

Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Saniora, who is opposed to Hezbollah and Syrian influence, said at a news conference with Ban that the government was trying to improve its monitoring capabilities but stressed that ''not one single case of arms smuggling across the border'' with Syria has been recorded.

Hezbollah, however, has boasted that it replenished its stockpile of rockets after the war.

In February, Hezbollah acknowledged that a truckload of ammunition seized by the government belonged to the guerrilla group and demanded its release. It urged the government to abide by its own policy, proclaimed in 2005, to support the ''resistance'' in the south -- which is Lebanese shorthand for Hezbollah -- but the government refused.

The French draft expresses ''deep concern'' at statements by Hezbollah's secretary general, notably about the February arms shipment, which ''are an open admission of activities which would constitute a violation of resolution 1701.''

It again urges Israel to provide the U.N. with detailed data on its use of cluster bombs in southern Lebanon.

The proposed statement notes ''with profound concern'' that there has been no progress on the issue of returning two Israeli soldiers abducted by Hezbollah, which triggered the war, and encourages efforts to urgently settle the issue of Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel.

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<center>

It would appear that daily
threads are not much of
interest - shr:

Bump - </center>

I'm interested. Thanks Dutch!

Bump

Read em' daily. Thanks.

Intermingled with the miscellaneous hogwash which is also available in the mainstream media I look here on TB2K and invariably find the postings of the Flying Dutchman. When I awoke today I made the coffee and thought that I had better soon look to see what is happening in the mid east and other related hot spots. Dutch provides those daily updates with great personal sacrifice of time and talent. I think that I have been remiss in not automatically bumping his efforts as I read about what could very well be harbingers of the last days. My apologies Dutch.

Everything we take for granted could change in hours if (when) TSHTF in one of those arenas about which Dutch posts. Here is another boot. There is real news happening out there and it damned well isn’t this:

http://stb.msn.com/i/C6/1E45371186E1857243BCE4154994BE.jpg

I read them, Dutch! It is nice to have it all in one place!

I read them everyday. Thanks for all your hard work. It is appreciated.

I read them too! Many thanks for pulling all this informantion together into one thread that can be read quickly.

Bump

All my thanks Dutch and HAPPY EASTER ALL