10/28-11/03/06 | Weekly Bird Flu Thread:Preparations for a Flu Pandemic

JPD

Inactive
Preparations for a Flu Pandemic

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/28/opinion/28sat4.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=login

Published: October 28, 2006

The World Health Organization’s new plan for ramping up the production of flu vaccine is a measure of how unprepared the world is to cope with an onslaught of pandemic influenza. The plan, conceived by a group of more than 120 experts, lays out a sensible path toward vaccine sufficiency— but it will take years to complete and cost up to $10 billion.

There are no signs yet that the influenza strain causing the greatest concern — a virulent form of avian flu — is ready to sweep through human populations. So far it has infected only 256 people in 10 countries — mostly people in close contact with chickens in Asia — but the highly lethal pathogen has killed some 60 percent of those.

Fortunately, it has not yet developed the ability to spread easily from one person to another, the critical transition for unleashing a pandemic. But if this strain or another does, it will move so rapidly there will be little chance of containing it — unless we start preparing now.

This week, the W.H.O. warned that if a flu pandemic were to occur, the global vaccine supply would fall several billion doses short. It recommended three overlapping responses: increasing the use of vaccines in the normal flu season so that manufacturers are encouraged to expand capacity; new techniques to raise production yields; and development of more potent vaccines that could provide broad and long-lasting immunity.

The price tag would be $3 billion to $10 billion for a global effort that might yield results in three to five years, provided action started now. The Bush administration’s pledge of $10 million to W.H.O. to help other countries develop vaccines and manufacturing capacity is prompt but woefully short.

The administration has also invested substantially in vaccine research, including $1 billion to develop new cell-based technologies that would allow rapid expansion of production in an emergency. Although those investments are primarily for our own benefit, the knowledge generated is likely to help others around the world.

Still, both the American and global efforts ought to be intensified. The administration’s goal of being able to make enough vaccine quickly to protect all Americans is also probably four to five years away. Neither America nor the rest of the world is yet ready to handle a worst-case pandemic.
 

JPD

Inactive
H5N1 Suspect Cases in Egypt Continue to Grow

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/10270601/H5N1_Egypt_Grow_2.html

Recombinomics Commentary
October 26, 2006

There is a state of panic among citizens enough after the seizure of the child Basma Essam seven months yesterday on suspicion Bismnod بانفلونزا infected birds. The bodies of the Ministry of Health had seized two cases in the last few hours and another case a few days ago have been transferred to the Abbasiya Hospital of the gravity of their situation.

The above translation describes additional suspect H5N1 bird flu cases in Egypt. The status of cases hospitalized last week have not been reported.

The HA sequence of case confirmed earlier this month has been published. It has a M230I change near the receptor binding domain, which could affect transmissibility. A change two positions upstream, S227N, was associated with large fatal clusters in Turkey earlier this year.

More information on these new and earlier admissions in Egypt would be useful
 

JPD

Inactive
More H5N1 Bird Flu in Michigan

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/10270603/H5N1_Michigan_Again.html

Recombinomics Commentary
October 26, 2006

The USDA has reported detection of H5N1 in Michigan for the third time. The most recent report is in Mallard ducks in St Claire County. Like the sample reported for Tuscola County in Green-winged teals, viral isolation tests are ongoing. In August, H5N1 was isolated from Mute swans in Monroe County. Similarly, H5N1 has been isolated from resident wild mallards in Queen Anne’s County, MD as well as Mallard ducks in Crawford County, PA.

More recently, H5N1 isolation attempts have failed. H5N3 was isolated from Northern pintail ducks in Cascade County, MT and H6N2 was isolated from Green-winged teal in Fulton County, IL. No virus was isolated from H5N1 positive samples from Northern pintail ducks from Ottawa County, OH. In all reported incidents, sequence data indicated low path American strains in the H5N1 positive samples.

All detections listed in the table are from samples that are positive for both H5 and N1. Media reports have indicated H5 has also been detected in live markets in New Jersey as well as wild birds in northern California and Washington State.

The failure to isolate H5N1 from positive samples is cause for concern. The USDA site suggests the isolation failures were due to a lack of viable H5N1, but viability is dependent on isolation procedures and each test has a detection limit, and results indicate the sensitivity of the isolation procedure is lower than the PCR test. This detection limit may also be impacted by handling, shipping, and pooling of samples.

Dual infections may also limit isolation and dual infections are common in wild birds as indicated by the isolation of H5N3 and H6N2 from H5N1 positive samples.

An alternative approach for detecting high path H5N1 involves sequence analysis. Recombination is common between H5N1 and low path serotypes, including H5. Therefore release of the H5N1 from the earlier isolates would be useful.
 

JPD

Inactive
Survey: In flu pandemic, staying home raises paycheck, care questions

http://www.cnn.com/2006/HEALTH/10/25/flu.pandemic.ap/index.html

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Ask Americans if they would hole up at home to keep from spreading a super-strain of flu, and at first they pledge to cooperate.

But probe deeper, and here come the doubts. One in four adults says there is no one to care for them at home if they got sick, raising the specter of Grandma gasping alone in bed or a single mom passed out while her children wail.

Another one in four could not afford to miss work for even a week. Would they heed doctors' calls to stay home or go sneeze on co-workers?

And one in five fears the boss would insist they come to work even if they were sick and contagious.

So concludes a survey by Harvard researchers that will bring the concerns of average people into government deliberations on how to fight the next worldwide outbreak of a super-flu.

"If you want to contain the flu, you have to make it livable for people" to comply with infection-control steps, said Robert Blendon, a health policy specialist at the Harvard School of Public Health. He presented the survey this week at a meeting of public health officials.

"This is really a Catch-22 here. If you can't help the people make it at home, then the epidemic's going to get much more severe."

Pandemics can strike when the easy-to-mutate flu virus shifts to a strain that people have never experienced. This has happened three times in the past century. Concern is rising that the Asian bird flu might trigger a pandemic if it starts spreading easily from person to person.

Old-fashioned infection control is one strategy to try slow a pandemic's spread until vaccines become available: staying home if you are sick or may have been exposed; closing schools; avoiding crowded gatherings such as church services, sports events and shopping malls.

It is far from clear how well such measures would work, or if some could cause more harm than good. So the government asked the Institute of Medicine to bring together health specialists, state and local officials and industry this week to debate that issue.

Harvard's Blendon was pleasantly surprised that his survey of 1,697 adults suggests people are paying attention to pandemic discussions and are open to public health advice.

Some 94 percent said they would stay home, away from other people, for seven days to 10 days if they had pandemic flu and 85 percent would do so if a household member were sick. Equally high numbers said they would heed calls not to leave their community while pandemic flu circulated.

People were mostly confident they could care for sick family members at home, and find a relative or friend to help out with child care if schools closed for months at a time.

But as the survey probed more consequences of containment measures, people began to realize what hardships could await them.

Millions of people live with no other adult who could care for them if they fall ill, Blendon noted. Communities need to plan how to provide emergency in-home help, perhaps through properly trained charity groups.

Then there were practical survival issues. More than 40 percent of those surveyed said they would run out of diapers, baby formula or medications if they had to stay home for even a week.

Blendon said workplace worries were a major problem, too. Many people live paycheck-to-paycheck, and more than one-quarter of respondents said they would lose a job or business if they had to stay home for seven days to 10 days. Only one-third thought they still would get paid if they missed work.

The Harvard poll was conducted by telephone between Sept. 28 and Oct. 5 by ICR of Media, Pa. It has a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 2.5 percentage points.
 

JPD

Inactive
Fujian H5N1 Sequences in China

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/10280601/H5N1_Fujian_404.html

Recombinomics Commentary
October 27, 2006

Hong Kong University has released H5N1 sequences from 404 isolates in China. The isolates are from a number of provinces and locations in southern China, including Hong Kong, Shantou, and Fujian, Yunnan, Hunan, Guiyang, Guangxi province. Most isolates are from ducks and geese, but many wild birds from Hong Kong (common magpie, crow, large-billed crow, white-backed munia, munia, Japanese white-eye, little egret, crested myna, and robin).

Although many of the 404 HA sequences (see list here) are partial sequences, the vast majority include the HA cleavage site, and the vast majority also have the novel Fujian cleavage site of PLRERRRK_R. Some of the isolates have the more common cleavage site of PQRERRRKKR.

The Fujian HA cleavages site was first reported in 2005 in A/duck/Fujian/1734/05(H5N1). As noted previously, all human sequences from China in 2005 and 2006 were the Fujian strain, as were the wild bird sequences in Hong Kong as well as sequences from Laos and Malaysia. Thus, the current sequences confirm that the Fujian strain has become widespread in China.

The relase of 404 H5N1 sequences from isolates collected over a short time period (2005 and 2006) isa without precedent and provides insight into the evolution of H5N1 in China. The analysis is supported by 156 PB2 sequences (see list here), which are largely full sequences and point to a wild bird origin of the sequences, modified by the acquisition of mammalian polymorphisms via recombination (see shared polymorphisms here).

Although the vast majority of the sequences are the Fujian strain, there is considerable heterogeneity, increasing pandemic concerns. Analysis is somewhat hampered by a lack of full sequences in the database. Initial analysis indicates the PB2 gene from A/goose/Shantou/239/2006(H5N1) and other Shantou isolates is distinct from most of the other newly released PB2 sequences. The 5’ end of the gene is related to A/duck/Yokohama/aq10/2003(H5N1), but is modified by the acquisition of human polymorphism. The 3’ end of the gene is related to previously sequenced heron isolates (A/grey heron/Hong Kong/18/2005(H5N1) and A/grey heron/Hong Kong/837/2005(H5N1)) , but the earlier sequences only include the 3’ portion of the PB2 gene.

The current sequences significantly advance the understanding of H5N1 evolution in China, which enhances the full sequences from northern China, released earlier this month. Those sequences also had clear-cut evidence of recombination, which was confirmed with full sequences of all eight gene segments.

Full sequences of all genes from the 404 H5N1 isolates from southern China would be useful, as would full sequences from earlier H5N1 isolates. These data indicate H5N1 is evolving in a predictable manner via recombination. A robust database of full sequences improves such analysis and increase the accuracy of predicting emerging sequences based on recombination between previously described parent sequences.
 

PCViking

Lutefisk Survivor
Whatever happened to bird flu?

Alok Jha
Monday October 23, 2006
The Guardian

It's still around, infecting people in Asia and set to cause another bout of worry-inducing headlines in Europe this winter. There are several strains of avian influenza, but the one that had everyone reaching for their drug stockpiles earlier this year was H5N1. You'd be forgiven for thinking this strain had appeared out of the ether; but it has been around since 1996, when 18 poultry workers were infected in Hong Kong.

The authorities cracked down by slaughtering Hong Kong's entire poultry flock, a tactic that seemed to stop the virus in its tracks. But China had problems with H5N1 in 2003 and, since then, it has been spreading through south-east Asia. This year it arrived in Turkey, killing several people, and eventually turned up in a dead swan in Britain in April. Cue weeks of paranoia.

But the terrifying pandemic never happened, and there are three reasons why. First, H5N1 hasn't shown any signs of mutating so that it can transmit between humans. Second, we emerged from the flu season, at least in Europe. Third, birds are not migrating at the moment. "It has bubbled away all summer in Indonesia," says Mike Skinner, a virologist at Imperial College London. "Their total mortality is the highest of all the countries."

According to the World Health Organisation, 293 people worldwide have been infected by H5N1 so far, leading to 148 deaths. Around 50 cases have been reported in the past few months.

Scientists have been racing to develop better flu treatments. The Medical Research Council put up £10m last December for researchers to look at how H5N1 might mutate and how we could fight it. Drug companies have also been busy creating antiviral drugs and working out how to make vaccines. GlaxoSmithKline announced in June that it could stimulate immunity to flu using smaller amounts of vaccine, which could make stocks go further. Merck is looking at faster ways of creating vaccines - at the moment, they are made using hens' eggs.

But there's little doubt among experts that H5N1 will return this winter. "We'll see more outbreaks - it's almost inevitable," says Skinner.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/story/0,,1929339,00.html

:vik:
 

JPD

Inactive
The next flu pandemic: Not if but when

http://www.independentmail.com/and/news/article/0,1886,AND_8203_5102455,00.html

By RAY CHANDLER
Independent-Mail
October 28, 2006

CLEMSON - An obituary he saw in 2005 haunts Dr. George Fabian.

The short biography of a 93-year-old deceased woman included that she was preceded in death by three sisters, ages 4 years, 2 years and 4 months. All three had died within a week. All during the influenza pandemic that began in 1918.

The story the obituary told haunts Dr. Fabian, the medical director of the Division of Acute Diseases and Epidemiology of the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, because he knows that, sometime, another such pandemic is inevitable.

"With pandemic flu," Dr. Fabian recently told a joint meeting of the Anderson, Oconee and Pickens county medical associations, "it’s not a question of if, it’s a question of when."

Dr. Fabian’s stop at the meeting at Clemson University’s Madren Center was one of a series of presentations he is giving to government officials and health professionals across the state, briefing them on the details of the eventual crisis as well as methods and plans for dealing with the outbreak.

History shows that influenza outbreaks have occurred an average of 24 years apart over the past three centuries, with the range varying from 10 to 49 years. But what makes the 1918 outbreak critical to current planning, Dr. Fabian told the meeting of tri-county physicians, is that recent research indicates the 1918 outbreak likely originated as an avian influenza virus, which once again threatens.

The avian influenza that has ravaged poultry in Asia has claimed 148 human victims out of 252 confirmed cases since 2003.

But health officials say it has yet to show any signs of being capable of sustained direct human-to-human passage.

The 1918 pandemic, which researchers say probably originated in the American Midwest, infected nearly one-third of the U.S. population, leading to an estimated 675,000 deaths. Worldwide, the pandemic claimed victims numbered in excess of 55 million, and possibly as high as 100 million.

In an average year, according to the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, the U.S. has 200,000 cases of influenza, leading to 36,000 deaths.

The avian virus seldom makes the jump to human populations, Dr. Fabian explained, but the constant mutation of viruses — essentially protein-encapsulated blobs of genetic material — as they move through populations, highjacking cellular processes to reproduce themselves, makes avian viruses a ticking time bomb.

"They’re like Rubik’s Cube," he said. "They’re constantly sitting out there changing all the time and eventually they hit on the right structure that enables them to make the jump."

The result is an entirely new virus facing the collective human immunological system, one for which there is no real resistance, leading to the high infection rates such as for the 1918 pandemic and resulting mortality rates of about 50 percent.

Such an outbreak would last an estimated six to eight weeks, and would consist of a number of waves of infection that would sweep through the population.

A migratory bird, a smuggled bird and an incubating traveler are the three main ways health officials say an avian virus capable of jumping to humans might arrive in the United States, but of the three a smuggled bird is the most likely route.

Given current technology, it would take from four to seven months to produce vaccine to deal with the pandemic, Dr.
Fabian said, and until vaccine became available health officials would need to use antivirals, which can also fight viruses but lack the specificity of vaccines.

South Carolina is stockpiling about 275,000 doses of antivirals as part of its preparedness plans.

But planning for the pandemic’s opening infections also focuses on containment, Dr. Fabian explained, and that centers on social isolation of the population.

"The safest thing would be for people just to stay home," he said, adding that planners foresaw levels of absenteeism among the population approaching 40 percent at the pandemic’s peak. Plans called for the closing of schools, the cancellation of public events and perhaps enforced quarantine in particular circumstances.

The impact of such measures is still under close study.

This month the CDC awarded $5.2 million in grants to the Harvard School of Public Health to study the workability of what on the surface seem simple measures.

"We can’t afford to neglect some of the traditional approaches to contagion control because we very well may find ourselves in a situation where that’s all we’ve got for a period of time," said the CDC’s quarantine chief, Dr. Marty Cetron.

However successful efforts to contain the outbreak might be, Dr. Fabian said, the health care community will face its own crisis in dealing with the sheer numbers of patients and the degrees of illness. Plans for that will need to continue to be developed and fine tuned until the moment they must be put into action.

"The clock is ticking," he said, quoting another health official’s assessment of the coming crisis. "We just don’t know what time it is."
 

JPD

Inactive
Alaska villagers drawn into the fight against bird flu

http://www.boston.com/news/nation/a...lagers_drawn_into_the_fight_against_bird_flu/

By Jia-Rui Chong, Los Angeles Times | October 29, 2006

KIPNUK, Alaska -- The 800 Yup'ik Eskimos in this wet and lonely village knew the situation was serious when government scientists began swooping in on bush planes.

Except for a few doctors that fly in each year to give villagers checkups, outsiders rarely visited this outpost of scattered gray plywood homes and prefab structures in the middle of the tundra.

Soon, latex gloves appeared on store shelves and Wild West-style posters started popping up around town: "Wanted: Birds of the Delta." Researchers camped out in the town's tribal council offices, preparing for trips to nearby Kwigluk Island with vials, swabs, nets, and needles.

They came bearing a warning: The wild birds that the Yup'ik have hunted for millennia may be carrying the first traces of the deadly bird flu virus from Asia into North America.

"It's kind of scary, you know," said resident Ronnie Peter, 39. "That's like, our food, you know."

The H5N1 avian influenza emerged in China 10 years ago and has spread into Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. While the virus mainly infects fowl, since 2003 it has sickened 256 people and killed 151 around the world.

Kipnuk lies at the crossroads of an invisible freeway system linking migratory birds that journey along the East Asia-Australia flyway with those from the Pacific Americas flyway.

Tens of millions of birds flock every year to this seemingly endless expanse of soggy land in the Yukon Delta National Wildlife Refuge to feast on insects, grasses, worms, and mussels before heading back south in the winter to Asia, Australia, and other parts of the Americas.

"If it's going to show up in wild birds, Alaska is the most likely place where it's going to happen," said Brian McCaffery, a federal wildlife biologist who was camped a few miles down the coast from Kipnuk, collecting bar-tailed godwit droppings for testing.

Federal officials have identified 29 bird species that are likeliest to carry the deadly virus from Asia, and they have enlisted local hunters to help provide birds for testing.

In the old days, the Yup'ik Eskimos felled the uqsuqaq, metraq, and kanguq with bows and throw sticks tipped with sharpened walrus ivory. Now, the men use 12-gauge shotguns and reach remote hunting spots in motorboats.

Little else has changed . . . until now.

"Oh Lord, what are we going to eat? Store-bought food?" thought Steven Mann, who oversees tribal operations in town, when he first started receiving faxes on bird flu safety in the spring.

The nervousness has waned through the summer, said the 58-year-old former Army sergeant. "We don't joke about what we eat here."

Mann's son, Danny, a lanky 27-year-old who used to work as a bilingual parent liaison for the school, took on the job of bird flu testing manager in Kipnuk for the tribal health agency, the Yukon-Kuskokwim Health Corp. He gets $15 for every bird he samples.

The residents of Kipnuk, which means "bend in the river" in Yup'ik, are a little bewildered that their speck of a village has been drawn into the battle against the bird flu virus.

No roads lead here. The closest Wal-Mart is nearly 500 miles away. The flatland that spreads out between the Yukon and Kuskokwim rivers is riddled with lakes and creeks.
 

JPD

Inactive
Bird flu likely to re-emerge in cold, wet

http://www.bangkokpost.com/News/29Oct2006_news11.php

Fowls in weak state, cooler days coming

By Kultida SamabuddhI & Apiradee Treerutkuarkul

A re-emergence of the avian influenza outbreak is likely as the country is entering the cold season while fowls are in poor health due to widespread floods, Livestock Development Department chief Yukol Limlamthong has warned. ''The poultry population is in a weak condition as a result of the flood disaster, which could make them contract the virus easily,'' said Dr Yukol.

The department's bird flu prevention units have started to spray disinfectant in poultry farms across the country, focusing on flood-hit provinces, he added.

The agency normally stepped up bird flu prevention operations around year-end because the deadly virus is found to spread well in cold weather.

However, this year's operation has to be more stringent than previous years due to the weak condition of the fowls.

Nirundorn Aungtragoolsuk, chief of the department's animal disease control bureau, said authorities working on bird flu prevention were preparing to seek cabinet approval to revive the National Committee on Avian Influenza, dissolved in the aftermath of the coup d'etat.

The committee is in charge of drafting and supervising the national policy on bird flu outbreak control and prevention.

Comprising experts and officials from various agencies, it was chaired by the ousted deputy prime minister Suriya Jungrungreangkit.

A virologist yesterday urged agencies to again consider poultry vaccination following the Public Health Ministry's proposal to use the method to combat bird flu.

Use of bird flu vaccine in fowls is currently banned.

Prasert Auewarakul, a virologist at Siriraj Hospital's faculty of medicine, said strict safety procedures were needed if the government decided to carry out vaccinations.

''The government should follow safety procedures when conducting the vaccine programme,'' he said. It should also consider the vaccine use guidelines developed by the National Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology.

The Livestock Development Department opposes vaccinating poultry against the avian flu virus, saying vaccination would make it more difficult to control bird flu outbreaks because vaccinated and infected fowls could not be kept apart easily.

However, Disease Control Department chief Thawat Sundarajarn, who backs lifting the ban, said the programme would be effective in combating bird flu.

In the first stage, it would be limited to only rare fowl species, birds raised for their plumage and backyard chickens. Vaccinated fowl would be contained.
 

JPD

Inactive
The Public Engagement Project on Community Control
Measures for Pandemic Influenza

http://www.keystone.org/Public_Policy/pandemic_control.html

Public forum on flu in Syracuse, NY, Atlanta, GA,
Seattle,WA and Lincoln, NE

This important initiative is being sponsored by The Keystone Center and Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO).

Syracuse, NY has been chosen as one of four sites in the nation for a public forum on responding to wide-scale flu outbreaks like the ones feared as the result of bird flu.

The Public Engagement Project on Community Control Measures for Pandemic Influenza will visit Syracuse at 9 a.m. Nov. 18 at the Oncenter. Information gathered at the forum will help shape plans by agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

To sign up for the forum, call 448-8732. For more information, visit www.keystone.org/Public_Policy/pandemic_control.html.

The other three locations are:

Atlanta, Georgia
Saturday, October 28, 2006
Centuryl Ballroom, Marriot Atlanta Century Center, 2000 Century Boulevard NE, Atlanta, Georgia 30345. Located just off I-85 at Century Center.

Seattle, Washington
Saturday, November 4, 2006
Northgate Community Center, 10510 5th Avenue NE, Seattle, Washington 98125. Across from Macy's at Northgate Mall.

Lincoln, Nebraska
Saturday, November 18, 2006 Nebraska Room, Country Inn & Suites, 5353 North 27th Street, Lincoln, Nebraska 68521. 3 blocks North of Superior.
 

JPD

Inactive
Qinghai H5N1 in Shantou China

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/10290601/H5N1_Qinghai_Shantou.html

Recombinomics Commentary
October 29, 2006

Recent H5N1 sequences released at Genbank included 404 H5N1 isolates from China deposited by Hong Kong University and collaborators. Although many of the HA sequences were partial sequences, most included the HA cleavage site and the vast majority have the novel HA cleavage site, PLRERRRK_R found in the recently reported Fujian strain. However, a Guinea fowl isolate from Shantou, A/Guinea fowl/Shantou/1341/2006(H5N1), had the characteristic Qinghai cleavage site, PQGERRRKKR. Although this strain was initially isolated from waterfowl at Qinghai Lake in Qinghai Province, subsequent Qinghai isolates have been limited to regions to the north and west of Qinghai Lake including Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, India, Afghanistan, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa,

The Shantou is the first Qinghai isolate which have a number of defining polymorphisms, including PB2 E627K. The HA and PB2 sequences from the Shantou isolate were made public, and the characteristic polymorphisms were present in both sequences, including E627K.

The number of Qinghai sequences outside of China continues to increase and these sequences have a number of polymorphisms shared with a subset of Qinghai isolate. In HA, the Shantou isolate had C1261T (see list here), but several additional polymorphisms were not found in other Qinghai isolates, but were in H5N1 isolates from eastern China and Vietnam. Similar polymorphism sharing was in PB2 also.

H5N1 evolves via acquisitions of polymorphisms by homologous recombination in dually infected hosts. The profile of newly acquire polymorphisms in the Shantou isolate indicate the Qinghai strain is evolving via dual infections in eastern and southeastern China.

The limited detection in China may be related to vaccination efforts or natural immunity which may have suppressed levels of the Qinghai strain, but increased levels of the Fujian strain. Alternatively, current surveillance methods may select against detection of the Qinghai strain
 

JPD

Inactive
Flu viruses evolve in fits and starts pattern, study suggests

http://bodyandhealth.canada.com/cha...1&news_channel_id=1020&channel_id=1020&rot=11

Provided by: Canadian Press
Written by: HELEN BRANSWELL
Oct. 29, 2006

TORONTO (CP) - The accepted notion that influenza viruses are constantly changing in a bid to outsmart the human immune system may not be entirely accurate, a new study says.

The work, by U.S. scientists, suggests flu viruses evolve in a pattern of fits and starts, perhaps spurred by a competition between the two circulating types of influenza A that infect people, H3N2 and H1N1.

The finding, if confirmed by other researchers, could offer clues on how best to select the influenza strains that go into the annual flu shot, in particular in the years when H3N2 is undergoing the major changes that precede a bad flu season.

"Our hope is one, we could do a better job of being ready for those big changes, which is important because a lot of people get sick those years," said David Lipman, senior author of the paper, which was published in the online journal Biology Direct.

It might also help scientists predict if the avian influenza strain H5N1 is evolving in a way that should set off alarm bells, said Lipman, director of the U.S. National Center for Biotechnology Information, one of the National Institutes of Health.

The authors suggest the dominant human subtype, H3N2, occasionally goes into brief periods of evolutionary suspension or stasis, lasting months and even a year or so. Spotting an opening, H1N1 surges forward to become the main circulating subtype for a flu season, an occurrence that snaps H3N2 viruses back into action, they say.

"When H1N1 wins, that's basically a sign that H3N2 is in a stasis period," said Lipman, who wrote the paper with colleagues from the National Institutes of Health and the Pennsylvania State University.

Their work, which may raise eyebrows among flu scientists, is one of the first to draw on the Influenza Genome Sequencing Project - an ambitious U.S. program aimed at cataloguing the genetic blueprints of as many garden-variety flu viruses as possible from different parts of the world.

The project is a bit like a genetic census of influenza. The growing database gives scientists the chance to study the genetic codes of a large number of flu viruses and look for patterns that may provide insights into everything from how flu evolves to how best to design new flu drugs and vaccines.

Joshua Plotkin, a researcher who specializes in molecular evolution at Harvard, called the work "an awesome use of these data."

Plotkin is also looking for ways to predict the evolution of influenza viruses. While he didn't challenge the findings, he suggested this paper doesn't turn flu dogma on its ear, but rather fine-tunes it.

"It's been known for a long time that . . . it sometimes takes two or in rare circumstances even three years" for a sufficiently new strain of H3N2 to emerge and cause a serious epidemic, he said, adding the study conclusions "really fill in the detail of that story."

But one of the reviewers of the paper remained skeptical Lipman and his co-authors had captured a real pattern, suggesting the collection of 1,000 or so viruses they studied might not have been representative of what was going on around the world. The viruses studied for this paper were from New York state and New Zealand.

"I am not convinced that the view of long periods of stasis . . . described here is not primarily due to the use of a biased (incomplete) dataset," Ron Fouchier, a virologist from Erasmus University in Rotterdam, wrote in his assessment of the study. (Biology Direct posts the comments of its academic reviewers along with the articles.)

In the paper, Lipman and his colleagues charted the evolution of H3N2 and H1N1 viruses between 1995 and 2005.

They saw a pattern in which H3N2 viruses would evolve to the point where they were sufficiently different that they could cause a serious annual epidemic. That's because the changes made the viruses unrecognizable to the immune systems of many people worldwide.

Those big influenza years occurred in 1997, with a flu strain named A/Sydney and in 2003 with a strain named A/Fujian.

But because those strains made so many people sick, the H3N2 viruses would have had to acquire significant new changes in successive flu seasons to again infect lots of people. They did not and in the year or two after, the flu seasons were milder.

Eventually, the evolutionary progress of those strains of H3N2 appeared to stall, allowing H1N1 to come to the fore. Being overtaken by the rival strain seemed to push H3N2 back into action.

Lipman said a mild H3N2 season followed by an H1N1 season - H1N1 typically causes even milder disease than H3N2 - could be a signal a bad flu season is on the way.

"We don't know if it's going to take off next season. Or the season after. What this . . . tells us though, is that we need to come up with a better way to analyze the sequence data, to do the (strain) surveillance, to see when it's going to explode on us," Lipman said.
 

JPD

Inactive
Bird flu: the front line

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,7-2425837,00.html

Winter flu season has begun — and that means a greater risk of bird flu infecting humans. Anjana Ahuja reports on the fight against a killer
If you have the stomach for it, go to www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/en/ and click on “frequently asked questions”. Here, courtesy of the World Health Organisation (WHO), you will find everything you ever wanted to know about H5N1, the avian influenza virus — and plenty that you wished you didn’t. That the potential for H5N1 to fuel a human influenza pandemic “is serious and has increased” ; that once a pandemic is under way it is “considered unstoppable”; that the best way to prevent one is to eliminate H5N1 in birds but that this is seen as “increasingly doubtful”.

There have been more deaths from bird flu — 73 — in 2006 than in any previous year of the current outbreak, which kicked off in 2003. The virus is creeping closer to Europe, with several countries — Azerbaijan, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq and Turkey — reporting human cases for the first time this year. And now winter lies around the corner. Cold weather brings a sharp rise in human influenza, heightening the possibility that bird flu could infect a person already infected with human flu. The resulting viral brew may permit H5N1 to snatch from human flu the ability to jump from person to person (at present, infection requires close contact with an infected bird). In WHO parlance, the emergence of a transmissible virus takes us from phase 3 to phase 4, just two phases away from showtime.

But if you want to get a real feel for how the influenza community perceives the threat, you have to join doctors and researchers on the front line of the war against H5N1. For the past ten years Professor Jeremy Farrar has been director of the Oxford University Clinical Research Unit at the Hospital for Tropical Diseases in Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) in Vietnam. Many of the country’s 93 confirmed H5N1 cases have spent their final, suffocating hours here in the hospital, built in the 19th century. Along with a Vietnamese medical team headed by Dr Tran Tinh Hien, Farrar has cared for many victims and is tracking the survivors.

“I don’t necessarily share all the doom and gloom of the global community,” he says, as we sit down to green tea in his large office. “But I do think influenza is probably the only infectious disease we know about that has the potential to cause a global nightmare.

“There are very few infectious diseases that can affect everybody, whether you’re rich or poor, whether you live in San Francisco, London, or Ho Chi Minh City, that can potentially kill a lot of people, and that in reality you can’t do much about.” For the moment, H5N1 — or, to give its full name, HPAI A(H5N1): highly pathogenic avian influenza virus of type A of subtype H5N1 — remains very much a local nightmare, plaguing few people but tormenting them terribly. The virus ravages the lungs — X-rays show the black of the lungs replaced by a ghostly white cloud — to cause pneumonia. The virus can also spread elsewhere in the body, even to the brain, to cause multiple organ failure.

The pathogen appears to latch on to receptors in the lower lung. This part of the body is relatively inaccessible — which may explain why, even though the virus is endemic in poultry, human infection is so rare. Human flu, in contrast, hooks on to receptors in the upper respiratory tract, meaning that coughs and sneezes disperse the virus easily. Scientists have warned that H5N1 could mutate and begin to favour receptors in the upper tract, which would raise the threat level.

“Avian influenza is a horrible disease, and people can deteriorate incredibly quickly,” says Farrar, 45. “I remember one patient having breakfast and talking and by the next morning she was dead. Seeing fit healthy young people, and especially children, go from being very well to very sick and then dying in a short space of time, is always traumatic.” But to see Hn (a bird flu survivor, see opposite) coming in every six months — she always remembers you and has got that gorgeous smile — makes life worthwhile. She should have died.”

Each person that the virus infects — 256 worldwide since 2003, of whom 151 have died — acts as a reservoir in which H5N1 can replicate and mutate. What scientists fear most is that the virus maintains its lethality — it kills around 60 per cent of people it infects — while acquiring the capability to jump from person to person. Were this to happen, the resulting pandemic could relegate the Spanish flu outbreak of 1918 to the footnotes of history. The 1918 virus, H1N1, killed only 1 per cent of those it infected. This is why clusters of H5N1 victims within families or neighbourhoods cause palpitations among scientists — fortunately, outbreaks within families have been due to common exposure rather than to transmission between relatives.

Reassuringly, it is predicted that a rise in transmissibility will go hand-in-hand with a decrease in virulence — as happened with later milder pandemics, such as the 1957 episode of H2N2 that killed two million people, and the 1968 outbreak of H3N2 that killed one million. The logic is that a virus that wipes out its host also wipes out its main vehicle for replication and transmission, so for a virus to be “successful” — such as HIV, which is still with us 25 years after emerging — it cannot be too virulent.

Farrar, though, sees no reason to smile: “The fear factor has gone a little bit but my guess is that if a pandemic were to happen it would happen explosively anyway. The virus would gain this transmissibility, and if the climate was right, say in urban Manila, or Shanghai, or Jakarta, then I think it would take off explosively.”

His unit has produced a wealth of research about H5N1, much of which has earned global headlines. One of the most promising projects, a collaboration between the unit and the National Institutes of Health in Maryland, involves isolating antibodies to H5N1 in the blood of bird-flu survivors. Mice that are first immunised with these antibodies and then infected with the virus survive the ordeal, raising the prospect that the antibodies could form the basis of a future vaccine. The Wellcome Trust, which is fast-tracking influenza research and has funded much of the unit’s work, has awarded the project £385,000.

“We believe that part of surviving H5N1 involves individuals making antibodies capable of killing the virus,” explains Dr Cameron Simmons, who is leading the unit’s involvement with the project.

But, Simmons says, antibodies are not the only key to survival: “It’s partly how soon you get medical care and Tamiflu, how much virus you got initially, how old you are, and what your flu infection history is. Although H5N1 is very different from human flu, parts of it are very similar. So adults who have a long history of flu exposure could potentially have an immune response that helps them to fight H5N1.”

The idea of mining survivors’ blood for lifesaving chemicals dates back to 1918, when doctors transfused the blood of flu survivors into new patients. This roughly doubled the chances that the recipient would survive. The technique was also employed on a smaller scale during the Sars outbreak, although success rates are hard to pin down. Latterly, however, the threat from blood-borne diseases such as HIV and hepatitis B dampened enthusiasm for serum therapy. Some British academics are arguing for British laws governing blood products — tightened in the wake of “mad cow” disease — to be relaxed ahead of any flu pandemic.

Simmons has isolated the H5N1-killing antibodies from the blood of four survivors. He says: “We’ve shown that if you give these antibodies to mice before they’re infected,you can protect the animal from what is rapidly lethal.”

The antibodies can quash the strain of H5N1 circulating in Vietnam (this strain is also circulating in Thailand and Cambodia)but are only partially effective against the other major strain of H5N1, which has cornered China, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea. Any mass-produced vaccine using this method would need to contain antibodies to both strains.

The mice are also protected if the antibodies are given 24 hours after infection. The researchers are now trying to gauge how long the delay between infection and immu-nisation can be. The atmosphere in the unit, Simmons says, is one of measured optimism: “It’s difficult to extrapolate from a mouse to a human, so there’s doubt as to what our experiments will mean for people.

“But it’s exciting because although influenza has been a significant disease for decades and the risk of a pandemic is a real one, we have only one or two existing drugs. Our antibodies are another treatment option for H5N1 that can be made on an industrial scale and potentially very cheaply.”

Another of Farrar’s colleagues, Dr Menno de Jong, has been studying the impact of H5N1 on the immune system of patients. He recently reported, in Nature Medicine, that the patients who died displayed a particularly fierce immune response. Flu experts are now wondering whether this ability to provoke an “immune storm” in the lungs accounts for the virus’ deadliness. Immunosuppressants might be another therapeutic prospect.

De Jong, who helped to define the WHO’s diagnostic criteria for H5N1, is now trying to discover whether some individuals are immune to it. Together with health officials in Ho Chi Minh City, he has collected the blood of hundreds of poultry workers and individuals involved with culling infected birds. It has been noted, anecdotally, that no poultry workers or cullers have ever come down with H5N1. The plan is to test the blood for H5N1 antibodies, to see whether these workers actually encounter the virus but don’t succumb to it.

Bleakly, De Jong believes that a human flu pandemic is inevitable, although the culprit may not be H5N1: “If you look at history, every now and then we do get a pandemic. My fear is that there is already a pandemic under way in poultry.” Unlike chickens, ducks and geese can carry H5N1 without ill effect; they are often described as Trojan horses. Influenza researchers would like to see long-term strategic planning for a human pandemic, plus basic research into the H5N1, as a matter of urgency. A vaccine cannot be produced until a pandemic strain emerges (to ensure the best match) but then, production capacity is limited by the fact that the vaccine would need to be cultured in chick eggs (and is thus dependent on egg supply). All the while, H5N1 remains a moving target: it has already diverged into two clades (families), with each family further split into various subtypes.

Farrar says: “I’m not saying we will or won’t have a pandemic, but if we do, then we have to recognise that we don’t have great vaccines, we don’t have the global capacity to produce them, and we have only two drugs (Tamiflu and Relenza), neither of which is brilliant, because you can’t get them directly into the bloodstream. From a public health perspective, that’s not a great position to be in.”

He also points out that while an international effort is called for, “pontificating in Washington or Geneva (the site of WHO’s HQ) or Oxford will get you only so far. It’s local doctors who’ll be seeing patients, who will need to identify what’s going on. If we rely on people flying in from Geneva, we’re stuffed.” The 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (Sars) outbreak, which killed 774 people, was popularly viewed as a dress rehearsal for a flu pandemic; alas, it wasn’t a realistic one. Sars sickened people immediately, making victims easily identifiable, and containable, while they were infectious. This allowed a prospective pandemic to be reined in with relative ease (although not before losing the Asian economy an estimated £22 billion; the World Bank reckons a flu pandemic could cost 20 times that).

Human influenza is a stealthier foe, taking around three days to make people ill, thus giving them ample time to infect others. Should H5N1 mutate into a transmissible form, this time lag between infection and the appearance of symptoms may persist. In this case, the likelihood of an H5N1 pandemic depends on how infectious the disease becomes.

Very roughly, if a person carrying H5N1 went on to infect two or more people, it would be virtually impossible to contain a pandemic. Mathematical simulations by Professor Neil Ferguson, at Imperial College, London, shows that if each flu case infects an average of 1.8 people or fewer, a combination of containment strategies and pre-vaccination offers hope. Ferguson has predicted that a pandemic could cost up to 200 million lives.

Farrar, though, believes that such simulations depict an unreal world; how likely is it, he asks, that people will overcome the natural urge to flee a disaster zone and obey quarantine orders: “What do you do then? Do you shoot them? Put them in prisons?”

The death from Sars in 2003 of one of Farrar’s friends, Dr Carlo Urbani, has also brought home the risks of serving on the pandemic frontline. Dr Urbani, the WHO’s representative in Hanoi, was one of the first specialists to raise the alarm on Sars. Tragically, Urbani, who had been treating Sars-infected patients, fell ill on a flight to Bangkok, and died in the city.

Farrar, who is married to Dr Christiane Dolocek, a researcher at the unit specialising in typhoid and malaria, recalls: “Carlo persuaded the hospital in Bangkok to close and he stayed in it and died. He had three little kids and was a lovely guy. So when Dr Hien, a brilliant doctor here, identified an H5N1 case in December 2003, it was terrifying. I’ve got three little kids as well.

“When you’re dealing with an unknown agent and you don’t know whether it’s going to be like Sars, where a high proportion of healthcare workers came down with it, and you don’t know if you’ve got a treatment for it, it’s very scary. But how different is it from Londoners living with terrorism? Here in Ho Chi Minh City, that seems quite frightening to me. Things are always worse when you’re not used to dealing with them.

“Doctors here and elsewhere are treating people with far more infectious diseases with bigger risks to themselves, like multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis. Yes, people are frightened, but they don’t lose sleep over it.”

In the influenza community, it seems, there is neither hysteria nor complacency — just a chilling acceptance that the risk of a pandemic is a game of chance.

‘I BOUGHT THE DUCKLING AS A PET’ — A SURVIVOR’S STORY

Hn Diem Hong Nguyen, 11, puts one hand on her hip, thrusts her chin out and sashays barefoot across her parents’ living room. Then, all charm and poise in her white ruched blouse and pink combat trousers, she swivels round and sashays back. She does this under the eyes of her proud parents — mother Chau, 38, and taxi-driver father, Drung Ngoc, — and the watchful gaze of numerous Jesus figurines. As well as her passions for drawing and painting, she explains through an interpreter, she wants to become a model.

Hn and her 14-year-old brother Druong Suan live, like so many Vietnamese city-dwellers, in a two-bedroom apartment in a narrow, crowded alley with their parents and extended family. The living room, which contains depictions of the Last Supper and photos of Pope Benedict, opens on to the alley and provides welcome shelter from the hammering downpours of southern Vietnam’s rainy season. The living room doubles up as a bedroom for Hn’s aunt.

In December 2003 this pretty, slightly built schoolgirl was fighting for her life in the city’s Hospital for Tropical Diseases (HTD). She caught H5N1 from a duckling that she bought outside her school. It seemed an innocuous addition to the family’s domestic menagerie: a monkey, a dog, birds and fish. Hn says: “I bought the duckling as a pet. It was so small and cute and I loved it. I fed it rice and vegetables three times a day, just as my mother feeds me, and when I came home from school, I played with it and hugged it. After a week it got sick and died. I decided to bury it at the end of the alley outside my house and went off alone with a dinner spoon. I felt sad but I didn’t cry. About three days later a neighbour asked me to dig it up because it smelt. So I dug it up and went with two friends to bury it in a nearby cemetery. I had wrapped the duck’s legs in paper, so that I didn’t have to touch it. After burying it, I came home and washed my hands without soap.”

The next day, Hn developed a fever. Her mother Chau recalls: “After two days, the fever hadn’t come down, so we took her to a paediatric hospital. The doctor admitted her immediately. Within five days her fever had worsened and she needed oxygen to breathe. I cried a lot. I was so afraid that she would die. Doctors isolated her and told me that her lungs were getting worse every day. They sent a blood sample to the Pasteur Institute (in Ho Chi Minh City).

“One morning they told me that it was bird flu and that afternoon she was transferred to the HTD. I was scared because I’d read in a newspaper of bird flu in the north and the person died. The doctors told me that my daughter was the first bird flu case in the south, and that I should pray. I prayed every day before bed and we went to church every day. I think God heard my prayers — that’s why my daughter survived.” Hn’s father recalls seeing around 15 other cases of bird flu during his daughter’s recuperation; most died within three days of arrival.

He remembers that his daughter was given Tamiflu an hour after reaching the HTD. By this time she was unconscious, only one third of one lung was functioning, and her immune system had almost shut down (recent research suggests that this shutdown may have saved her life as H5N1 appears to trigger a potentially lethal “immune storm”).

Her father adds: “We had to wait 24 hours to see if Tamiflu worked. I stayed with her the whole time and stopped working. Then we saw her fever had come down — we were so happy that it was working. She had half a Tamiflu pill a day and was fed intravenously. She stayed in hospital for a month and three days. Ten days before she came home the doctors said that there was no virus in her body and that she’d survive. We just thanked God. I hugged the doctors. We thought we were luckiest people alive.”

One of Hn’s most vivid memories was that her father bought her a pair of pink slippers to help her to walk again — she’d been bedridden for so long. “I couldn’t walk because I was so weak. When I came home, I couldn’t wait to go to school. My friends had collected money to send toys to the hospital.” The family will never keep pets again (the city has banned the keeping of domestic poultry). “We wouldn’t dare,” says Chau. “It is too scary.”

Hn’s recovery has come at a financial cost in a country where healthcare is not free (except for children under 6) and the average income is £320. Her parents estimate their medical costs at about $4,000 (£2,140), half of which covered drugs and hospital care. The other half went on medical transportation plus other expenses, such as a large donation to the local church which held a special ceremony to pray for Hn, and gifts to doctors. Hn’s illness coincided with the Tet, or Vietnamese New Year, during which it is customary to give to others.

As our meeting draws to a close, Hn smiles serenely and reaches for her mother’s hand — and pledges to pay her parents back with proceeds from the catwalk.

MY FAMILY CAME TO SAY GOODBYE

Oanh Duong Thi Kieu Duong, 27, is tall and slim, dressed in dark jeans and a pink T-shirt, and her black hair is in a ponytail. She sits nervously in a room at the Hospital for Tropical Diseases (HTD), a place that she once feared she would never leave alive.

A tailor — she sews coats in a clothing factory for export to Taiwan — Oanh rents a single room in Ho Chi Minh City, returning once a month to her husband and eight-year-old daughter, who live in a one-room hut in a province 170km (105 miles) away. Oanh’s husband is a poor farmer. She describes her ordeal: “It was December 2004 and we had about 50 chickens in the house. I saw that some of them were ill and dying. I buried the small ones and kept the biggest one to cook and eat. I cleaned and plucked it but, because I had a headache, I left it for my husband to cook when he came from work.

“That afternoon I started feeling dizzy. The next morning I felt so bad that I went to the local health centre. I felt as if my head would explode. They gave me tablets. I wrapped myself in a blanket and went to my sister’s house so she could perform a treatment, ‘rubbing wind’, on me, which involves taking a coin and rubbing it on the head, to get the poisoned wind, or bad chi, out of my body. It didn’t make me better so my brother came over and took me to a provincial hospital on the back of his motorbike. I could barely hold on for the hour-long journey. A doctor diagnosed a respiratory infection and I told my brother to buy all the medicines he prescribed. I took them all in one go.

“I still didn’t feel better so I contacted my cousin, who works as a doctor there. She admitted me and X-rayed my chest. They asked if I’d eaten chicken. I said yes, even though I hadn’t. I lied because I was scared, the pain was so horrible. All the doctors went to get masks. As soon as I saw the masks, I thought that I was dying. I asked the doctor if I was going to be OK and she said that she didn’t know. I heard the doctors tell my husband it was bird flu — it was first time I’d heard of it.”

Oanh was transferred to the HTD in Ho Chi Minh City, where she stayed for ten days. “All I remember is that I didn’t know the faces of the doctors who treated me, and that when I had a high fever I was unconscious. I remember thinking that, because I was isolated and wearing a mask, if I died, nobody would hear my last words. I didn’t know if I would be around to be a mother to my daughter. I prayed every day. My family came to say goodbye to me. My poor daughter could not eat — someone gave her money to buy breakfast and instead she saved it for me.”

The memories make Oanh cry. But the drama did not end after going home. She discovered she had been pregnant throughout her illness. Six months into the pregnancy, a scan showed the foetus had an abnormally swollen belly. She was advised to abort to avoid the foetus dying inside her and causing a fatal infection. She agreed. She believes that the many medicines she took — which saved her life — cost her the baby. Sadly, Oanh suffered another miscarriage earlier this year.

Professor Jeremy Farrar says that the effects of an aggressive course of anti-flu medication on developing foetuses remains unknown but, given the deadliness of bird flu, the mother must be the priority.

Oanh is grateful to be alive: “If it wasn’t for my cousin, I’d be dead. I saw so many people come here and die of bird flu. And I survived because of my faith and because I am the youngest in my family (she has 11 siblings). I needed to survive so that I could mourn my parents when they die.”

She no longer eats poultry or eggs or keeps chickens. She has run up 4 million dong (£132) in debts, and has sold a piece of farmland to pay her medical bills. Her hopes for the future? “I hope that I can pay all my debts and have a second child.”
 

JPD

Inactive
Impact of a bird flu pandemic hits home

http://www.agoravox.com/article.php3?id_article=5279

It is clear that current vaccines, antiviral drug supplies and government preparation will not be enough in the event of a pandemic. Issues with availability, distribution and funding have had a negative impact on the current worldwide preparedness level. Individuals will need to do their part to prepare, as it is clear in many instances they will be on their own.

If the avian flu virus mutates so that the disease can be transmitted from one human to another, we will face a pandemic with the potential to kill a billion people worldwide. It is important for people to educate themselves, their family and their neighbors about bird flu and the concrete steps they can take now can to lessen the spread of the disease.

Waiting to prepare for a pandemic is like waiting for a category five hurricane to come ashore before racing to the lumber yard for plywood. A pandemic is even more dangerous than a localized natural disaster because a virus can be transported by airplane to virtually anywhere in the world within a matter of days.

Pandemic preparation has two integral components. First, you should have a basic 3 day emergency kit, just as you would for an earthquake, storm, hurricane, or other disaster. The only difference in preparing for a pandemic is that you should extend the level of preparation to last much longer. The flu lasts approximately two weeks, but it can conservatively take 6-8 weeks for it to go through a population. During this time you will need to be prepared for disruption of services just as with other large scale emergencies.

Second, is the preparation for “infection control,” it involves hygiene and barriers to contamination. Hygiene includes hand washing, covering sneezes and coughs, and daily disinfection of surfaces such as doorknobs, keyboards, and faucets. The “barrier method” of infection control requires that sick individuals be isolated and that others wear protective clothing. Only by wearing the appropriate quality masks, gloves, and goggles can the flu virus be prevented from entering through the mucosal membranes of the eyes, nose, and mouth.

Dr. Fenstersheib, the Public Health Officer for Santa Clara County, California, predicted that in the event of a pandemic, 25-35% of the population would become ill. He said, "With the burden this will place on the healthcare system and the government infrastructure, it is clear that each individual and family in our community must take on the responsibility to be prepared to care for sick family members during a pandemic. With proper supplies and instruction, home preparedness will go a long way to lessen illness and save lives.”
 

JPD

Inactive
Seventh Egyptian dies of bird flu - agency

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L3068642.htm

30 Oct 2006 16:01:17 GMT
Source: Reuters

CAIRO, Oct 30 (Reuters) - An Egyptian woman died of bird flu on Monday, bringing the total number of human deaths in Egypt to seven, the state news agency MENA said.

The victim was a woman from the Nile Delta town of Samanoud who had slaughtered and handled domestic poultry, it said. It was the first human death in Egypt from the virus since May.

The agency had earlier identified the woman as 39-year-old Hanan Aboul Magd, who was admitted to hospital with a high temperature and respiratory trouble on Oct. 4.

She moved to a specialist hospital in Cairo on Oct. 12 and was receiving Tamiflu, the standard treatment for the deadly virus, MENA said.

It said people with whom she was in contact have tested negative for the H5N1 virus, which first appeared in Egypt in February and caused great damage to the poultry industry.

With 15 infections, Egypt has had the largest cluster of human bird flu cases outside Asia, and the latest case came a month after authorities found a cluster of new cases in birds following a two-month lull in detected poultry cases.

The initial bird flu outbreak caused panic in Egypt, where poultry is a major source of protein and where poor families frequently breed chicken domestically in cities and rural areas to supplement their diet and income.

MENA said Aboul Magd had raised a flock of 11 ducks from her home north of the Egyptian capital. Two became sick and died, and she then slaughtered the rest before she was hospitalised.

Egypt's commercial poultry industry has started to recover from the disease and the vast majority of commercial flocks have been vaccinated, but only about 20 percent of domestic birds had received vaccines, officials say.
 

JPD

Inactive
Flu Pandemic: Protecting Yourself

http://www.torontodailynews.com/index.php/HealthNews/2006103001flu-pandemic

A pandemic, a worldwide influenza epidemic, is inevitable, say health experts.

It’s only a matter of time. A pandemic, a worldwide influenza epidemic, is inevitable, say health experts.

Pandemics tend to occur when disease-causing organisms that typically affect only animals adapt and can infect humans -- then further adapt to pass easily from human to human. People have little or no immunity so the virus can spread rapidly.

Although experts are concerned about H5N1 virus, a strain of bird flu garnering much attention, no one knows what may occur with this or any other influenza virus.

Mayo Clinic Health Letter recommends how to minimize risk in the event of a pandemic, whether mild or severe.

1) Be knowledgeable. Look to reliable sources for information such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease, the World Health Organization and Mayo Clinic.

2) Get the standard flu vaccine. It won’t protect you from a pandemic flu virus, but it’s a precaution against simultaneous infections.

3) See your doctor within two days after flu symptoms begin. If you have a cough, sore throat, muscle aches or fever of 101 degrees or more, your doctor may be able to prescribe an antiviral drug.

4) Frequently wash hands or use alcohol-based hand sanitizers. Either helps prevent the spread of infections.

5) Stay healthy. A healthy body means a strong immune system. Eat a healthy diet, get adequate sleep and exercise.

6) Consider wearing a face mask in public. It may prevent you from inhaling airborne particles from an infected person’s coughs or sneezes.

7) Be cautious with social contact. If you are sick, avoid public places where you are likely to infect others. If you’re not sick, avoid handshakes or close contact with those who are.

8) Think carefully about travel. Influenza viruses spread easily when people are confined to small spaces such as an airplane, train or bus.

9) Use good respiratory etiquette. Cough or sneeze into a facial tissue and wash your hands often.
 

JPD

Inactive
Suspect H5N1 Patients in Egypt Continue to Increase

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/10300601/H5N1_Egypt_Increase.html

Recombinomics Commentary
October 30, 2006

A suspected case of human bird flu has been reported in the northern Egyptian governorate of Gharbiyah, raising the number of possible infected humans in the area to five, al-Ghomhuria reported, citing a local
hospital.

A 23-year-old woman in the city of Tanta was suspected of having symptoms of avian flu and was transported to a local hospital

The above translation indicates that the number of suspect bird flu cases in the Gharbiyah governorate continue to rise. The only confirmed case (39F) from Samanoud has died today, one month after developing symptoms. The H5N1 HA sequence from this patient has been released, and it has a polymorphisim, M230I, which is adjacent to the receptor binding domain.

Although reports on the latest fatality cite negative tests on relatives, the increasing number of hospitalized patients in the area is cause concern.
 

JPD

Inactive
New H5N1 strain could start wave
of bird flu outbreaks

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SP303161.htm

0 Oct 2006 21:01:57 GMT

By Tan Ee Lyn

HONG KONG, Oct 31 (Reuters) - Scientists in Hong Kong and the United States have detected a new strain of H5N1 bird flu virus in China and warned it might have started another wave of outbreaks in poultry in Southeast Asia and move deeper into Eurasia.

The strain, called the "Fujian-like virus" because it was first isolated in China's southern Fujian province in March 2005, has increasingly been detected since Oct. 2005 in poultry in six provinces in China, displacing other H5N1 strains.

The strain might also have become resistant to vaccines, which China began using on a large scale from Sept. 2005 to protect poultry from H5N1, said the scientists.

The researchers are from the University of Hong Kong, including virologists Guan Yi and Malik Peiris, and Rob Webster of St Jude Children's Research Hospital in the United States.

"The predominance of this Fujian-like virus appears to be responsible for the increased prevalence of H5N1 in poultry since Oct. 2005 and recent human infection cases in China," they said in an article published in the U.S.-based Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (www.pnas.org).

"It has already caused poultry outbreaks in Laos, Malaysia and Thailand, and human disease in Thailand. It is likely that this variant has already initiated a third wave of transmission throughout Southeast Asia and may spread further in Eurasia."

The first wave of H5N1 outbreaks occurred in late 2003 and 2004 in many parts of Asia. The second wave started in China's Qinghai Lake in May 2005 and that strain has since been found in parts of Europe, Africa and the Middle East.

The virus has killed more than 150 people since late 2003 and remains largely a disease among birds. But experts fear it could trigger a flu pandemic and kill millions of people if it mutates into a strain that can pass from human to human.

SUPER STRAIN

The researchers collected 53,220 fecal samples from chickens, geese and ducks in poultry markets in six Chinese provinces between July 2005 and June 2006. Of these, 1,294 tested positive for H5N1.

But genetic sequencing of viruses collected from Oct. 2005 onwards showed the Fujian strain was clearly becoming predominant over other H5N1 strains. Between April and June this year, 103 out of 108 H5N1-positive samples were of the Fujian type.

"That's pretty conclusive proof that this new variant is predominant," said Gavin Smith, one of the researchers in the Hong Kong team.

To test how well vaccinated poultry could stand up to various strains of H5N1, the researchers collected 1,113 blood samples from chickens from Nov. 2005 to April 2006.

Only 180 samples, or 16 percent, tested positive for H5N1 antibodies. They were exposed to 3 strains of H5N1 -- namely the Yunnan, Guiyang and Fujian-like strains.

The antibodies managed to neutralise the Yunnan and Guiyang strains, but had little or no effect on the Fujian virus.

"The market poultry, many of them don't have antibodies against H5 virus and those that do are not well protected against the Fujian virus, which is why we think the Fujian-like virus has been able to grow because other (strains) have been suppressed," Smith told Reuters in an interview.

"What happens with vaccines is that you basically introduce something that kills off most of the viruses, but there are always going to be some viruses that can escape from it."
 

Bill P

Inactive
New Strain of Bird Flu Takes Over


http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?chanID=sa003&articleID=9B6897E7-E7F2-99DF-389770E045273992

FLU IN FLUX: Samples taken from poultry in southern China indicate that the H5N1 bird flu virus continues to evolve, keeping alive the threat of a global pandemic.

Despite mass vaccinations of poultry in China, the bird flu virus continues to evolve. Samples collected from poultry markets in southern China over the last year show that a variant of the virus has spread outward from a single province and supplanted strains in the rest of the region, researchers report. The result calls into question the steps taken so far to contain the virus, which public health officials fear could give rise to a deadly worldwide flu pandemic.
In early 2004 the H5N1 bird flu virus spread from poultry in China to southern Asia and has since been identified in birds as far away as Europe and north Africa. In principle, vaccination of domestic chickens and other birds could limit the virus's transmission and thereby its ability to evolve into a more transmissible form. With that goal in mind, China announced last November that it would begin vaccinating 14 billion domestic chickens against H5N1.

Since that time, however, the virus seems to have become even more entrenched in domestic poultry, report Chinese and American researchers in a paper published online October 30 by Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA. The team collected samples from over 50,000 seemingly healthy birds between July 2005 and June 2006 at live poultry markets in six provinces of southern China. They identified H5N1 in 2.4 percent of birds, primarily domestic ducks and geese, up from 0.9 percent the year before.
To identify the source of the ongoing transmission, the researchers selected 390 virus samples from infected birds, determined their genetic sequence and compared these sequences with known variants of the virus. One strain, hailing from the province of Fujian, appeared in only 3 percent of birds collected up to September 2005. Between April and June of 2006, however, Fujian-like viruses were responsible for 95 percent of infections. "It means that the virus is still evolving," says co-author Robert Webster of St. Jude Children's Research Hospital in Memphis. "It means that the problem is not under control." Offshoots of the Fujian variant were isolated in the 22 human cases of bird flu reported in China since last November, and the strain has sickened birds in Laos, Malaysia and Thailand, where it also infected people, the group notes.


A weakness in China's vaccine may have allowed the previously local variant to become widespread, the researchers surmise. They analyzed serum samples from 76 chickens for signs of antibodies against three H5N1 variants, including the Fujian-like strain. The presence of antibodies is a sign that a vaccine has taken effect. Almost all of the samples displayed two to four times more antibodies to the other two variants than to the Fujian virus, suggesting that the vaccine given to the chickens was less effective against that strain, the researchers point out. The result highlights the need to supplement vaccination with other measures, says veterinary researcher Richard Slemons of Ohio State University. The former can be effective if part of a broader program of monitoring vaccinated chickens with surveillance afterward, agrees Webster. Vietnam has vaccinated its poultry and saw no new human cases of bird flu this year. --JR Minkel
 

JPD

Inactive
Control Measures Fail To Stop Spread Of New H5N1 Virus

http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=55431

Article Date: 31 Oct 2006 - 0:00am (PST)

A new variant of the bird flu virus H5N1 emerged in late 2005 and replaced most of the previous variants across a large part of southern China, despite an ongoing program to vaccinate poultry, according to researchers at the University of Hong Kong in collaboration with scientists at St. Jude Children's Research Hospital.

The new virus, called Fujian-like (FL), appears to be responsible for the increased occurrence of H5N1 poultry infections since October 2005, as well as recent human cases in China, the researchers said. FL has now also been transmitted to Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand, resulting in a new bird flu outbreak wave in Southeast Asia that has caused human infections as well, according to the Hong Kong/St. Jude team.

The investigators also warned that it is possible that this new H5N1 variant will spread further through Asia and into Europe, as it evolves to form other sublineages that vary from place to place. This evolution into different sublineages also occurred during the previous two waves of H5N1 transmission that occurred during the past several years, according to the investigators. A report on these findings appears in the November online edition of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS).

The findings are significant because experts believe that H5N1 is the most likely virus to trigger a human influenza pandemic (worldwide epidemic). Moreover, the increasing number of transmissions from birds to humans in the past year supports this opinion, said Robert G. Webster, Ph.D., a co-author of the PNAS paper. Webster is a member of the Infectious Diseases department and holder of the Rose Marie Thomas Chair at St. Jude.

Based on their study of vaccinated poultry the Hong Kong/St. Jude team suggested that the vaccination itself might have facilitated emergence of this new variant.

This emergence and rapid distribution of FL, despite the vaccination program that was started in September 2005, also suggests that the current H5N1 control measures are still inadequate, Webster said.

Moreover, since November 2005, some of the 22 H5N1 human infections reported from 14 provinces in China were from infected residents of metropolitan areas such as Shangai, Wuhan and Guangzhou, which are remote from poultry farms.

"We don't know yet whether the people in those metropolitan areas were infected locally by contact with poultry or by contact with other humans," Webster said, "but we suspect from the studies they are being infected by contact with poultry."

The researchers found the virus in samples taken from infected chickens in 11 of the last 12 months of the present study, compared with only four months during 2004-05. This indicates an increase in the incidence of H5N1 infection in 2005-2006 compared with previous years, which suggests that H5N1 viruses have not been effectively contained.

The investigators also conducted genetic studies of 390 H5N1 viruses isolated from poultry in the current study (30 percent of the total found in southern China) and found that 68 percent were of the FL sublineage.

The emergence of FL-like viruses and their success in replacing other H5N1 variants in such a short time demonstrates how difficult it is to control H5N1 in China, Webster said.

The other authors of this paper are Gavin Smith, X. H. Fan, J. Wang, K. S. Li, K. Qin, J.X. Zhang, D. Vijaykrishna, C.L. Cheung, K. Huang, Marik Peiris, Honglin Chen and Yi Guan (University of Hong Kong), and J.M. Rayner (formerly of St. Jude).

This work was supported in part by the Li Ka Shing Foundation, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and ALSAC.
 

JPD

Inactive
New bird flu variant doesn't seem to pose greater human health risk: WHO

http://www.cbc.ca/health/story/2006/10/31/bird-flu.html

Last Updated: Tuesday, October 31, 2006 | 5:16 PM ET
The Canadian Press

The emergence of new variants of the H5N1 avian flu virus doesn't appear to raise or lower the risk the virus poses to humans, officials of the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization said Tuesday.

Representatives of the UN agencies charged with animal and human health issues held a teleconference Tuesday to discuss the discovery of the new subgroup of viruses. The new variant, called a Fujian-like virus, was reported Monday in the scientific journal The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

The newly described subgroup of viruses could pose challenges for containing H5N1 in poultry because vaccines being used in China — where it emerged — may not protect domestic birds against this variant.

But the pattern of human cases with these viruses is similar to that seen with viruses spreading in Indonesia, or those that caused human infections in Vietnam in 2004 and 2005, said Michael Perdue of the WHO. The variant is responsible for recent human cases in China and Thailand.

"If you look at the mortality rate and the disease, the Fujian-strain infections are no different," said Perdue, a senior scientist with the WHO's global influenza program.

"So there's no reason to lead us to believe that this sublineage is acting any differently than any of the other sublineages in terms of affecting humans."

Dr. Juan Lubroth, head of infectious diseases for the FAO's animal health service, said the variant bears watching, but doesn't raise the level of alarm.

"The virus isn't necessarily more pathogenic, more virulent. The fact that you have a virus that has mutated or has changed somewhat and that humans have become infected with the more dominant virus when it has occurred is logical, because that's the virus that is circulating," he said.

The study shows the importance of conducting regular surveillance to look at what viruses are infecting poultry, as well as the need to update poultry vaccines so that they protect against the viruses in circulation.

He said, however, that the FAO is not certain Chinese manufacturers are taking this important step.

"We don't have enough data from China to say that this is what is happening."

The researchers, from Hong Kong University and St. Jude Children's Research Hospital in Memphis, Tenn., discovered the new variant as part of an ongoing surveillance program looking for H5N1 infection in the live poultry markets of southern China.

The authors say the new variant appears to have emerged in Fujian province in 2005 and has since become the dominant virus type in southern China. It has spread to Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia and Thailand.
 

JPD

Inactive
WHO blasts Chinese government for
not sharing samples of new bird flu strain

http://www.cbc.ca/cp/health/061101/x110104.html

05:13:30 EST Nov 1, 2006
Canadian Press: AUDRA ANG

BEIJING (AP) - The World Health Organization criticized China's Agriculture Ministry on Wednesday for not sharing samples of a newly discovered strain of bird flu, complicating the health watchdog's efforts to track the virus' spread.

Scientific research released this week said that the new strain - called H5N1 Fujian-like - had spread widely over the past year, being found in almost all poultry outbreaks and some human cases in China and now becoming prevalent in Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand.

Despite that prevalence, the Agriculture Ministry has not given the WHO any samples of the new strain, said Julie Hall, an infectious disease expert at the WHO's Beijing office.

"There's a stark contrast between what we're hearing from the researchers and what the Ministry of Agriculture says," Hall said in a telephone interview. "Unless the ministry tell us what's going on and shares viruses on a regular basis, we will be doing diagnostics on strains that are old."

While new strains of viruses emerge regularly, health experts need to know when one becomes dominant in order to develop methods to detect and fight the disease, said Hall.

The ministry's reluctance has been an ongoing source of aggravation at the WHO. International health experts have repeatedly complained about Chinese foot-dragging in co-operating on investigating emerging diseases like bird flu and the SARS pneumonia.

Telephones at the Agriculture Ministry were not answered on Wednesday and it did not immediately respond to faxed questions.

Some countries are slow to share genetic information or samples of viruses because they fear they will be pushed aside in the global race to produce a lucrative vaccine.

"This is a new disease. Nobody knows how to tackle it, nobody in the world has all the answers," Hall said. "But if they share . . . then we will all gain from that."

She said the ministry has not shared bird flu virus samples from poultry since 2004 - a key step in developing diagnostic tools and vaccines.

The study by Chinese and American scientists released this week found that one out of every 30 geese and one out of every 30 ducks in live markets tested positive for H5N1 in six southern Chinese provinces during yearlong surveillance, which began in June 2005.

In that same period, however, the ministry reported only three outbreaks in those same provinces, Hall said.

The study was conducted in Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan and Hunan, densely populated provinces where people live in close proximity to ducks, pigs and other farm animals, making the area a common breeding ground for flu viruses.

Out of 108 virus samples taken from infected poultry between April and June of this year, 103 - or 95 per cent - had the Fujian-like strain, according to the results of the study reported in Tuesday's issue of Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

"The ministry needs to tell us just how many substrains are circulating in China and whether some strains are dominant or becoming more dominant," Hall said.

The H5N1 flu has devastated poultry in China and several other southeast Asian countries and also has claimed more than 150 human lives. Most of the people affected lived close to flocks of chickens or other poultry.

Public health authorities fear that the virus will mutate into a form that can spread easily among people, raising the potential for a worldwide pandemic that could kill millions. That worry has spurred efforts to develop vaccines for the virus as well as to test migrating wildfowl in an effort to detect movement of the disease.

In September, the Agriculture Ministry accused the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for causing a delay in its attempt to share bird flu virus samples, saying that the agency had not yet completed import procedures.

Hall questioned the assertion then, saying that China's Health Ministry has so far shared six samples with the CDC lab designated by the WHO using the same import procedures without any problems.
 

JPD

Inactive
Poultry Indonesia Printing Edition,
2006 Nopembre

http://www.poultryindonesia.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1143

www.poultryindonesia.com. DAY-Old-Chick (DOC) production for broilers in the third quarter of 2006 is estimated at approximately 17 million head/week, declined from around 24 million chicks per week during the first quarter and about 20 million chicks per week within the second quarter of this year, according to some leading broiler farmers in Jakarta and surrounded area. However, a source from Poultry Breeders Association stated that the number is around 20 million chicks per week.


Indonesia poultry sector will still be operating at well below full capacity. However, Avian Influenza (AI) and rising input costs hinder any expectations for more rapid growth. While the number of reported cases has declined significantly since the beginning of the outbreak in August 2003, the disease is proving almost impossible to eradicate from back-yard flocks.

Indonesia is still adopting the same approach as before. Basically, it is needed integrated surveillance to enable attack the virus at the source and execute the three programs of vaccination, culling compensation and biosecurity in poultry centers.

However if we look at the higher number of imported feed raw material in 2006, it is estimated that feed consumption for poultry production (broiler and layer only) in 2006 is estimated to be around 5.5 million tons, a nearly 5% increased from the figure in 2005. It accounts 50 percent of the 11 million ton feed millers capacity. Feed accounts for sixty to sixty-five percent of poultry production costs, and a high percentage of that is imported, particularly the protein needs.

WEST Java province has dropped out of a special commission to educate the public about bird flu and will improve its existing working team instead, an official says. Provincial health office head Yudi Prayudha said the decision was taken after the province was declared the country’s worst affected by the H5N1 virus.

Health Ministry data shows that out of the country’s 52 deaths from bird flu, 19 came from West Java.

Yudi said he had done his best to disseminate information about the dangers of bird flu but the results had not been positive. Even doctors and nurses were not taking the problem seriously and were not immediately treating patients showing bird flu symptoms, he said.

Yudi said the local administration had not yet allocated any special fund for handling bird flu infections in the province.

Meanwhile in Semarang, Central Java, the virus is believed to be rife in poultry in Lebdosari hamlet. Totok Sutanto, the head of the Semarang Agriculture Office’s animal unit, said the birds infected with the virus would be culled to prevent it from spreading. “We will soon cull the infected chickens while waiting for laboratory tests from the chicken blood we took,” Totok said. The likely infection was discovered following the deaths of dozens of chickens belonging to a villager, he said. Officials arrived at the site a day after the disease was reported, Totok said.

Despite the find, work went on as normal at Rejomulyo, Semarang’s biggest chicken market.

“Every day, up to 500 chickens are slaughtered here,” a worker, Gito, said.


A major bird flu outbreak took place in Central Java in 2004 when nearly 8.7 million chickens died from the disease or were culled, local data said.

According to Kurmaningsih, the head of the Central Java Livestock Husbandry Office, her office had asked for 10 million more doses of H5N1 vaccine from the central government.

“We currently have 12 million doses of the vaccine, but we want more in order to be ready for a much bigger outbreak,” she said.

Kurmaningsih explained that despite the massive poultry vaccination drive launched earlier this year through a program called the National Movement against Avian Influenza, the infections which started hitting the province in 2003 have continued to spread.


Kurmaningsih said under the program, her office distributed 50 million doses of vaccine to poultry owners in the province in 2004, 14 million doses in 2005 and another 22 million doses this year.

“We culled chickens in Boyolali in 2004. But now we have no plans to do so because the social impacts (of culling) are so widespread. Besides that we still don’t know whether there will be compensation for the culled chickens,” she explained.


THE H5N1 bird flu virus has infected pigs on the Indonesian resort island of Bali, a senior agriculture ministry official said. “There were two pigs that were infected by bird flu in Bali. These were old cases that happened last July,” Musni Suatmodjo, agriculture ministry director of animal health, said.

It was reported that a team from the veterinary faculty at Udayana University had discovered avian influenza infected two pigs in the regencies of Gianyar and Tabanan in Bali. It was not clear if the pigs died.

Pigs are a concern because they are susceptible to many of the viruses that infect humans. Swines can act as mixing vessels in which genetic material from avian flu viruses can mix with human influenza viruses, potentially producing new and deadly strains for which humans have no immunity.


I Gusti Putu Suwandi, head of the Tabanan agriculture office, said there have not been new cases of avian influenza in the area since July. “As for the pigs’ cases, we haven’t received a formal report of the finding from the university,” Suwandi said.

The agriculture ministry’s Suatmodjo said bird flu had been detected in 30 out of 33 provinces in the country, with the latest cases in North Sulawesi province. He said that although that was an increase from 29 provinces last year, the percentage of deaths in poultry was lower thanks to better vaccination and other control measures. “The number of death cases in poultry due to bird flu was relatively small as commercial farms have done proper vaccination and biosecurity, but the main problems remain on the backyard farms,” Suatmodjo said, referring to the many Indonesians who keep a handful of chickens at their homes.

Indonesia has become one of the frontlines in the battle against the disease. So far, 52 people have died of bird flu, the highest of any country, with the majority of deaths occurring since the beginning of this year.

Although the human death toll has climbed, the Indonesian government has resisted mass culling of birds, citing the expense and impracticality in a huge, populous country where keeping a few chickens or ducks in backyards is common. Culling at selective farms and their immediate surroundings has been the preferred method.
 

JPD

Inactive
British scientists create new bird flu map

http://www.daelnet.co.uk/countrynews/country_news_01112006.cfm

AS THE late autumn migrations of millions of birds to Europe begins to gather pace, bringing with it new fears about the spread of deadly avian 'flu, British scientists announced today (November 1) that they have created a new map of migration patterns which could act as an early warning system should the disease threaten Britain.

We can now provide much better information to Defra to help them target their surveillance

Dr Phil Atkinson - BTO

Migrating birds from South East Asia and the southern steppes were last year accused to bringing the deadly strain of H5N1 strain which has killed humans in Asia to Europe, but there were no reported cases of the infection spreading to people here.

However, warning bells rang because epidemiologists fear that the H5N1 strain to crossbreed with human flu strains and produce a killer strain against which there are no effective vaccines.

Scientists from the rural affairs department Defra turned for help to the British Trust for Ornithology (BTO), which has some 650,000 movements on its data base of birds ringed by hundreds of volunteers. And working together for the past year, they have now come up with an early warning computer model which, the experts hope, will allow them to predict the arrival of infected birds in Britain.

Announcing the creation of the new technology today, Dr Phil Atkinson, who took the lead in the research, commented: "We were pleased that Defra recognised that we have excellent data about the movements of birds due to the huge efforts of bird ringers, working as part of the BTO's ringing scheme.

"We have used this information to develop a 'migration mapping tool' to give an easy to understand picture of the timing of migration and the areas from which migratory waterfowl that visit Britain and Ireland originate, or through which they travel.

"We can now provide much better information to Defra to help them target their surveillance for a potential avian flu incursion, given an outbreak of the disease in another country."
 

JPD

Inactive
Italy

BIRD FLU: VIRUS NEAR GROSSETO,
HUNDREDS OF WILD DUCKS CULLED

http://www.agi.it/english/news.pl?d...-CRO-0-NF11&page=0&id=agionline-eng.oggitalia

AGI) - Grosseto, Nov. 1 - After the discovery of avian influenza yesterday in the Grosseto area, hundreds of animals will be put down. Late yesterday evening, the Health Ministry asked the National Avian Influenza Centre for its advice concerning the whether the ministerial decree DM 22/9/2000 should be urgently applied regarding the wild duck breeding grounds on which bird flu has been found, with the H5 strain and of the N type, still a phase of definition, but having ruled out that it is the "N1", the most contagious.

The ministerial decree referred to provides for the culling of all the animals on the farm. The Health Ministry made the decision along with the Tuscany regional government and the healthcare body of Grosseto on the way to go about the matter in this specific case, and supplied instructions for the culling itself.

In addition to the putting down of the wild ducks, the ministerial orders provide for other measures to limit the likelihood of the spread of the virus, which consist mostly in the establishing of a surveillance zone with a kilometre radius around the farm in question, surveillance which will begin immediately after the ordinance by the mayor of Grosseto and which will last for three weeks after the culling. In the zone the entire bird population will once again be checked, even birds intended for use by single families, as was done previously, since the entire area is inside or very close to a humid zone used by migratory birds.

For the period in question, all the animals checked are to be considered under seizure and will have to be kept on the farms, prohibited from coming in or going out, including both the birds themselves and their products, meaning eggs and chicks. All farms in rural zones will be kept under constant surveillance by the veterinary service of the local healthcare authority.

The culling of the farm-bred wild ducks will be carried out within a few days by a specialized firm, and the bodies will be destroyed and buried on the land where they are found after having their bodies disinfected. The owners of the animals culled will be reimbursed for the market value of the animals, established by an ad hoc committee provided for by law in the case of forced culling. (AGI) .
 

JPD

Inactive
Human Bird Flu Deaths in 2006 Match Previous Two Years Combined

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=a9_6USUUxfjs&refer=europe

By Jason Gale

Nov. 1 (Bloomberg) -- Bird flu killed a 39-year-old woman in Egypt, pushing the number of fatalities worldwide this year to 74, as many as reported in the previous two years combined.

Egypt's Health Ministry confirmed the country's seventh death from the H5N1 strain of avian influenza, the World Health Organization said in a statement yesterday. The woman's infection was diagnosed 18 days before she died on Oct. 30 and was linked to diseased poultry she helped slaughter at her home on the Nile Delta in September.

Diseased birds increase the opportunities for human infection and provide chances for H5N1 to change into a form more dangerous to people. The virus is reported to have killed a person about every four days this year, more than double the 2005 rate. Millions could die if H5N1 becomes easily transmissible between people, sparking a lethal pandemic.

``As the distribution among poultry populations increases, more humans are getting exposed and these increased human cases and fatalities are a sign that this is an ever-developing situation,'' David Nabarro, the senior United Nations system coordinator for avian and pandemic influenza, said in a telephone interview from Bangkok last month.

The H5N1 virus is known to have infected 256 people in 10 countries in the past three years, killing 152 of them, the WHO said yesterday. Last year, 42 fatalities were confirmed, after 32 in 2004 and four in 2003.

Almost all human H5N1 cases have been linked to close contact with sick or dead birds, such as children playing with them or adults butchering them or plucking feathers, according to the United Nations health agency. While the virus doesn't spread easily between people, some human-to-human transmission may have occurred.

Rapid Spread

The virus is reported to have spread in wild birds and domestic poultry to at least 38 countries this year. More than 209 million poultry have died or been culled worldwide since January 2004 because of H5N1, the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization said in a June 19 report.

``The virus in birds continues to move at a rapid rate, causing major damage to the poultry industry,'' Nabarro said.

``The work that has been done by many countries to stamp out avian influenza has meant that the human cases and fatalities are unfortunately confined to a few nations,'' he said. ``We have to further increase our efforts to stamp out the virus in poultry and other bird populations and at the same time do more to reduce the contact between humans and sick birds.''
 

JPD

Inactive
Indonesia

Possibility of avian influenza epidemic a worry

http://www.thejakartapost.com/detailfeatures.asp?fileid=20061102.T01&irec=0

I Wayan Juniartha, The Jakarta Post, Denpasar

It seems that Bali is not only a paradise for vacationers, but also for H5N1, the dangerous virus known as avian influenza, or bird flu.

While visitors seek a memorable experience, the virus is struggling simply to ensure the survival of its kind.

It may not be appropriate to bracket the leisure of the tourism industry with the menace of the avian influenza epidemic. It certainly is not a pretty comparison.

"Pretty or not, it is a fact that we are all have to deal with right now," Ngurah Mahardika stated.

Mahardika is the team leader of the Avian Influenza Detection and Identification Program, an ongoing, government-funded project carried out by the school of veterinary medicine at Udayana University.

Since late 2005, Mahardika and his team have conducted extensive surveys in Bali, West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara, searching for the dangerous virus.

The results are scary: The virus has infected poultry populations in 37 of the total 55 subdistricts in Bali. "We took samples in 152 villages and we found infected poultry population in 53 villages," he said.

The bad news didn't stop there. Recently, following a series of tests on 800 pigs across the island, his team has identified over 20 pigs infected by the virus. Back in 2005, when they tested 400 pigs, no infection was found.

Being a virus expert -- he holds a PhD in molecular virology from Germany's Justus-Leibig University -- Mahardika knows perfectly well the dangerous implications of that recent development.

"It means that the virus has succeed in inching closer to the human population," he said.

So far, there hasn't been any reported case of the virus infecting the human population of the island. Yet, it is a grave, tragic error to think that it will forever ignore an opportunity to infect a new host.

"Honestly speaking, I'm now very worried about such a possibility," he confessed.

Unfortunately, the majority of the island's human population still does not view avian influenza as an immediate, growing threat.

The island is not properly prepared to tackle a possible avian influenza epidemic.

"The problem is the prevailing atmosphere of indifference. Many people have mistakenly assumed that avian influenza does not pose a grave threat to the island," he said.

Sadly, such indifference has also persisted among the majority of the island's media outlets, public institutions and government agencies.

Their levels of apathy are not similar, but the end result is the same.

The general public's lack of awareness of avian influenza, the lack of effective, standardized and island-wide detection and prevention measures, and the lack of an emergency response management are some of the results of such apathy.

"We don't have any kind of scenario, let alone a worst-case one. We don't know which parts of the island are the most vulnerable, the speed of the viral transmission or how many people will have been infected before we will be able to effectively contain the epidemic," said a doctor, who declined to be named.

Being the only health service provider in a rural village in northern Badung, he was quite afraid that the village didn't stand a chance against the epidemic.

"There are a large number of chicken farms in the village. The human population is quite dense. It's not rocket science to realize that this village is vulnerable to the epidemic," he said.

"At the same time, we don't have enough manpower, facilities and medical supplies to carry out an emergency operation if there is an outbreak of avian influenza," he explained.

To a large extent, the village is a miniature version of the island. The poultry population on the island totals over 12 million while the pig population is around 900,000.

The island is also populated by 3.4 million people.

"Bali is densely populated by poultry, pigs and humans: All have been positively identified as possible hosts for H5N1," Mahardika said.

"Bali bears disturbing similarities to various dense areas in China. Such density provides the virus with a paradise, where they could duplicate as many times as they wish," he added.

The density factor is further aggravated by two particular practices commonly employed by poultry and pig farmers in Bali.

One practice -- letting ducks search for food in newly harvested paddy fields -- exposes the ducks to probable transmission from migratory wild birds.

"Paddy fields are the primary source of food for migratory wild birds. The World Health Organization (WHO) has identified such creatures as the primary agent of transmission of the avian influenza among poultry populations," Mahardika stated.

Moreoever, Tumpang Sari, a practice of keeping pigs and poultry in the same spot, has increased the possibility of the virus "jumping" from one species to another -- poultry to pig.

"The danger of having the virus in pigs is that the pig could serve as a host for various subtypes of the virus," he said.

"In pigs, the subtypes could also get involved in a 'reassortment' process to adapt themselves with the new non-poultry host," he said.

Moreover, it has been known that pigs could also be infected by the human influenza virus. If avian and human viruses are mixed and reassorted inside the pig, the results could be devastating.

They will either produce a more powerful version of the old viruses or new viruses with a lethal ability to penetrate the barriers.

"The mixing and reassortment process will make it easier for the virus to get into the next available host -- human beings," he pointed out.

The only hope, Mahardika believed, lies in community-based prevention and detection programs. In the absence of an island-wide, government-initiated prevention measure, the powerful traditional institutions, such as desa pekraman (traditional villages) and banjar (neighborhood organizations), are the only institutions that could mobilize the Balinese to act in unison.

"The key to dealing with an epidemic is detection and prevention. We must educate and empower the traditional institutions to perform those actions," he said.

Moreover, pecalang (traditional security guards) could be assigned with another responsibility: supervising the poultry and pig farms and keeping a close tab on poultry trade and transport.

The role of pecalang will be particularly significant since the government's much-publicized measure of prohibiting the transportation of live poultry into the island ended in failure.

Through bribery and ingenuity, the poultry traders managed to send poultry from Java and Lombok into Bali on a regular basis. "Every day they unload live poultry from Java in a street in west Denpasar," said Putu Tapa, a resident of that area.

Mahardika believes that the education and empowerment of the traditional institutions will play a critical role in warding off the threat.

"With support from those institutions there is a huge possibility that we will be able to prevent the occurrence of an outbreak or confine the outbreak to a limited geographical area," he said.

Education and empowerment are effective ways to wipe out the general public's indifference toward the threat of avian influenza.

After all, public indifference is borne out of a lack of knowledge.

Mahardika, however, still has to deal with another kind of indifference; that which has been borne out of fear and greed.

Many, including government officials, have accused him of tainting the island's image as a prime tourist destination. They argue that Mahardika has made a lot of fuss over an empty threat and, by doing so, had damaged the island's tourism industry.

"They are afraid that tourists will not visit the island if they know about the possibility of an avian influenza outbreak," Mahardika said.

Mahardika doesn't see it that way. As a responsible host for tourists, he argued, the Balinese should make sure that their guests are well-protected from any harm.

"If we can show the world that we have taken any necessary precaution to protect the island and its human population -- the foreigners as well as the natives -- I believe that it will boost, instead of degrade, the image of our tourism industry," he said.

Denials and cover-ups, on the other hand, are simply fruitless.

"History has taught us that viral epidemics move swiftly, mercilessly and indiscriminately. If such an epidemic takes place in Bali, even the mightiest of the tourism industry's public relation agency will not be able to salvage the island's image," he warned.
 

JPD

Inactive
Sharp end in Bali's war against possible bird flu outbreak

http://www.thejakartapost.com/detailfeatures.asp?fileid=20061102.T02&irec=1

Inside a dilapidated two-story building in a dusty corner of Udayana University campus in Denpasar, lies the Veterinary Medicine Department's molecular biology laboratory, the sharp end of the island's fight against avian influenza, or bird flu.

Prior to December 2005, a sample from a suspected infected animal had to be sent to Jakarta or Hong Kong for positive viral identification, a process that could take up to a week.

Currently, this lab can complete the process in a day or less. Moreover, it can process up to 300 samples at a time.

"Give us a sample in the morning and by the afternoon we will give you the result, which includes the specific subtype of the avian influenza virus," the lab's head Ngurah Mahardika said. From the perspective of prevention, the reduction from one week to one day is very significant.

"Imagine what the epidemic could do in six days to a tiny, densely populated island like Bali; and, what we can do in six days," Mahardika said.

"Those six days are the line that separates life-saving measures from life-threatening epidemic," he stressed.

The laboratory contains a three meter by five meter glass chamber, where most of the dangerous work of preparing the virus for identification takes place.

Two centrifuges, an ELISA reader and a thermocycler stand on a table at the chamber's north section. Facing the table is a Laminar flow cabinet and a laboratory-grade oven.

Currently, several additional chambers are being constructed to upgrade the laboratory's capability and increase its bio-security level.

Pointing at the newly arrived Liquid Nitrogen Container right outside the glass chamber, Mahardika stated that the lab received generous contributions and assistance from several concerned individuals.

"That is one of the personal donations we have received. Help comes from many places, such as from my colleagues in the University of Hong Kong and Iowa State University," he said.

Worth around Rp 40 million (US$4,400), the container can maintain a steady internal temperature of -196ø Celsius, which is ideal for storing virus samples.

So far, Mahardika and his dedicated staff of around 20 students and lecturers from the veterinary medicine department have collected and tested more than 8,000 samples.

Using the complicated yet accurate method of PCR (polymerase chain reaction), the students carefully render the virus powerless with a mixture of fenol, chloroform and alcohol.

They then isolate and extract the virus from the sample using the centrifuge machine, which rotates the sample at a speed of up to 11,300 revs per minute.

The RNA (Ribonucleic acid) thus extracted is then mixed with a buffer solution, several enzymes and genetic primers before being placed inside a thermocycler instrument, which repeatedly manipulates the temperature surrounding the mixture.

This process transforms the RNA into DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) and also multiplies the amount of the DNA.

The final step, an electroforesis procedure conducted on the resulting DNA, will reveal the type and subtype of the virus.

"A more complete result, which includes the virus' genotype, could be achieved if we took another step, placing the DNA in the sequencing machine.

Unfortunately, we don't have the necessary machine yet. We must send the DNA sample to Jakarta for that step," he said.

Having his lab fitted with a Rp 2.5 billion (US$275,000) sequencing machine is Mahardika's current aim.

(I Wayan Juniartha)
 

JPD

Inactive
China says no evidence of new bird flu strain

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/PEK282865.htm

By Lindsay Beck

BEIJING, Nov 2 (Reuters) - China has found no evidence of a new strain of H5N1 bird flu in its southern provinces and said on Thursday there was no need to share virus samples with the World Health Organisation (WHO).

Scientists in Hong Kong and the United States said in a report released this week they had detected a new strain of bird flu, first isolated in the southern Chinese province of Fujian last year, that may have started outbreaks in Southeast Asia.

But China rejected the report, published in the U.S.-based Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (www.pnas.org), saying there was no evidence of major changes to the virus since 2004.

"Up to now, the bird flu viruses selected from the south share a high uniformity," Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao told a regular news conference.

"There has no marked change in the biological characteristics of the organisms."

China, home to the world's biggest poultry population, has been at the centre of the fight against bird flu, which scientists fear could mutate into a form that can pass easily between people, potentially leading to a pandemic.

It has battled dozens of outbreaks in birds, and seen at least 21 human cases, including 14 deaths.

But the World Health Organisation says its understanding of the virus and how it might be changing is being hampered by the fact China has not shared animal virus samples since 2004.

"It's our understanding that there have been certainly changes in the virus and continual evolution in the virus since 2004 and the viruses that we requested from 2005 have still not been shared with WHO," said Julie Hall, the WHO's bird flu coordinator in Beijing.

The point was not whether there were major differences in virus strains, she said: it was about being able to keep abreast of changes, however minute, to better understand how the virus is developing.

"Whether it be dramatic or significant, it's about that regular understanding so that we can see that we're keeping on top of this," Hall said.

China was criticised for its initial cover-up of the SARS virus, which first emerged in its southern province of Guangdong in 2003, but the government has defended its handling of bird flu, saying it has been promptly reporting outbreaks.

Liu said China was maintaining "close cooperative relations" with the WHO and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organisation in dealing with H5N1.
 

JPD

Inactive
H5N1 Qinghai Fujian Recombination in China

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/11010601/H5N1_Fujian_Qinghai.html

Recombinomics Commentary

November 1, 2006

The recent paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences describes the widespread detection of the Fujian strain of H5N1 in China. The spread in China was clear from earlier sequences from fatal human infections in late 2005 and early 2006 as well as isolates from Laos and Malaysia followed by sequences made public from wild birds in Hong Kong. The paper indicated that birds positive for the Fujian strain had low antibody titers and the new strain may have evolved away from the vaccine being used for the birds. Moreover, the detection rate of the Fujian strain continued to rise, indicating the strain was becoming dominant.

Sequences from 404 isolates were made available which include full or partial HA sequences as from all 404 isolates, as well as 152 PB2 sequence. Included in these sequences was one Qinghai strain from Shantou, A/Gunea fowl/Shantou/1341/2006. However, analysis of the other sequences indicate widespread acquisition of regions of identity with the Qinghai strain (see identities here), indicating the H5N1 was evolving via recombination, and the Qinghai strain was one of the contributing parents, in the vast majority of the Fujian isolates.

Origins could be traced using probes of various regions of the new isolates and this analysis indicated many contained regions that traced back to wild bird isolates in Hong Kong in 2003, or isolates from northern China in 2003. These data indicate wild birds are responsible for the transport and transmission of the evolving H5N1. Qinghai matches were also found in Indonesia isolates. These matches had been noted previously, and include the Qinghai cleavage site in on Indonesia isolate.

The latest sequences allow for tracing of the evolution of H5N1. This could be done with regions of HA and PB2. The PB2 tracing was somewhat limited, because the more extensive changes were in the 5’ end of the gene and in many instances this region was missing from the deposited sequences.

The widespread recombination and exchange of portions of genes highlight the need for a robust database, including both high and low path H5N1 from wild birds. Although the current sequence database has grown dramatically in recent weeks because of complete sequences from Indonesia, Qinghai sequences from the Capua lab via the NIAID influenza sequencing project, and China sequences from the Beijing Genome Institute, many holes in the database remain. The recent sequences from China significantly increased the number of H5 sequences in the database. However, many were partial sequences and there should be eight complete sequences per isolate, or 3232 sequences. Thus far, 556 of the 3232 have been made public. Similarly, most of the H5N1 sequences of the larger genes (PB2, PB1, PA, NP) are only partial sequences. Those isolates, which data back to 2000 should be completed, which can be done at no charge by the NIAID sequencing program.

In addition, the vast majority of the Qinghai sequences from Europe have not been released. Although Weybridge presented phylogenetic trees on approximately 80 isolates, only 6 have been made public even though some samples were collected over a year ago.

Similarly, only 4 of the 8 genes from H5 isolates in Canada have been released from the samples collected in August 2005. No sequences from this year isolated by the United State or Canada have been released.

In addition, 2005 and 2006 bird isolates collected in China have also been withheld including a large series from Qinghai Lake in the summer of 2005 as well as the many outbreaks in Chain reported in 2005 and 2006. A description of these isolates indicates many are also the Fujian strain, but additional strains, which likely include the Qinghai strain have also been described.

The latest data show that H5N1 continues to rapidly evolve and a full dataset is required to address both the evolution of H5N1 as well as match failures in Indonesia. An increased surveillance and release of hoarded sequences is long overdue.
 

JPD

Inactive
Bird Flu-Infected Dog Suggests Human Risk From Pets

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080&sid=at4gjkrsnPNI&refer=asia

(Update3)

By Jason Gale

Nov. 2 (Bloomberg) -- Bird flu killed a dog in Thailand after infecting its lungs, liver and kidneys, highlighting the potential for pets to contract the lethal virus and spread it to humans, researchers in the country said.

The dog probably picked up the H5N1 avian influenza strain from infected duck carcasses in the central Thai province of Suphanburi two years ago, the researchers said in a study published in this month's Emerging Infectious Diseases journal. Five days after feeding on the carcasses, the dog developed high fever, panting and lethargy, and died a day later.

The dog's systemic H5N1 infection provides more evidence of the virus's ability to kill mammals. Disease trackers are monitoring for signs the virus is changing into a form more dangerous to people after it killed at least 74 people this year, as many as reported in the previous two years combined.

``Despite the low probability of H5N1 infection in domestic animals, the possibility of humans acquiring H5N1 infection from direct contact with infected cats and dogs warrants concern and highlights the need for monitoring domestic animals during H5N1 outbreaks in the future,'' said the authors, including Thaweesak Songserm from Kasetsart University and Alongkorn Amonsin from Chulalongkorn University.

Emerging Infectious Diseases is published monthly on the Internet by the National Center for Infectious Diseases in Atlanta.

Human Cases

The H5N1 virus is known to have infected 256 people in 10 countries in the past three years, killing 152 of them, the World Health Organization said on Oct. 31. Last year, 42 fatalities were confirmed, after 32 in 2004 and four in 2003. Millions could die if H5N1 becomes easily transmissible between people, sparking a lethal pandemic.

The H5N1 virus is reported to have spread in wild birds and domestic poultry to at least 38 countries in Africa, Asia and Europe this year.

Thailand recorded its first outbreak of H5N1 in poultry in January 2004, with human infections reported the following month. The last of the country's 25 human cases was reported in August. Seventeen Thais are known to have died of the disease.

Felines, including domestic cats, are at risk of infection from H5N1 if they prey on birds, studies published in March by researchers at two Thai universities and a government research center showed. A 2005 study showed H5N1 was probably transmitted between tigers in Thailand and German officials in March confirmed an infection in a stone marten, a type of weasel.

No Adaptation

Tests on the infected dog in Thailand showed it had a variant of H5N1 consistent with the strain circulating in the country at that time. Virus particles collected from the dog showed no sign of adaptation, the study in Emerging Infectious Diseases said.

The study is the first report of H5N1-related systemic disease in a domestic dog infected during the second wave of outbreaks in Thailand that occurred during October 2004, the authors said.

Two domestic cats in Iraq were infected with the same variant of H5N1 that was found in geese in China's Qinghai Lake last year, U.S. scientists said in a letter appearing in the August edition of Emerging Infectious Diseases.

The finding supported the notion that cats may be broadly susceptible to circulating H5N1 viruses and thus may play a role in re-assortment, antigenic drift, and transmission, said Samuel Yingst, Magdi Saad and Stephen Felt, researchers at the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit No. 3 in Cairo, Egypt.

1918 Pandemic

Experts believe that a pandemic in 1918, which may have killed as many as 50 million people, began when an avian flu virus jumped to people from birds.

In uncomplicated human cases of seasonal influenza, disease is limited to infection in the nose, throat and lungs. In contrast, H5N1 was observed to have caused encephalitis, or swelling of the brain, in one patient in Vietnam, said virologist Menno de Jong, whose team observed 18 cases there.

Virus particles collected from numerous sites of infected patients could be cultured, including from the throat, rectum, blood and cerebral spinal fluid, said De Jong, who is head of the virology department at the Oxford University Clinical Research Unit in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.
 

JPD

Inactive
Continued Hoarding Of H5N1 Sequences

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/11020601/H5N1_Hoarding_More.html

Recombinomics Commentary

November 2, 2006

"There has no marked change in the biological characteristics of the organisms."

China, home to the world's biggest poultry population, has been at the centre of the fight against bird flu, which scientists fear could mutate into a form that can pass easily between people, potentially leading to a pandemic.

It has battled dozens of outbreaks in birds, and seen at least 21 human cases, including 14 deaths.

But the World Health Organisation says its understanding of the virus and how it might be changing is being hampered by the fact China has not shared animal virus samples since 2004.

"It's our understanding that there have been certainly changes in the virus and continual evolution in the virus since 2004 and the viruses that we requested from 2005 have still not been shared with WHO," said Julie Hall, the WHO's bird flu coordinator in Beijing.

The point was not whether there were major differences in virus strains, she said: it was about being able to keep abreast of changes, however minute, to better understand how the virus is developing.

"Whether it be dramatic or significant, it's about that regular understanding so that we can see that we're keeping on top of this," Hall said.

The above acknowledgment by WHO of the potential importance of minute changes in H5N1 is a welcome change. In the past, WHO updates have focused on the lack of major changes, such as the acquisition of human genes via reassortment. However, there has been no data to support such an acquisition by H5N1 and the H1N1 1918 pandemic also did not involve reassortment. Although the basic tenets of influenza genetics cite reassortment as the source of genetic shift and random mutations as the source of genetic drift, the H5N1 clearly demonstrates evolution by recombination.

Researchers in China have acknowledged the recombination in H5N1 in their earlier submissions to Genbank entitled, “A cohort of AIV H5N1 subtypes isolated from wild aquatic birds and domestic poultry revealed rapid transmission, frequent reassortment, and identifiable recombination events”. Sequences released last month confirmed the recombination, but researchers from St Jude and Hong Kong University have failed to acknowledge such changes, even though recombination was obvious in sequences from Hong Kong in 2002 in PB2, PB1, PA, and NP. The sequences released this week also had evidence of recombination with the Qinghai strain, as well as obvious recombination in genes that were closely related to sequences released by researchers at the Beijing Genome Institute.

The recombination provides a roadmap of prior and future interactions resulting from dual infections and the exchange of genetic information, which is the main driving force behind H5N1 evolution. Thus, a full and current database is essential for monitoring the evolution of H5N1 as well as the development of vaccines against emerging genomes.

The complaints against China are justified. Although the full sequences released last month provide a detailed history of H5N1 evolution between 1997 and 2004, the recent releases do not contain any Fujian sequences or any sequences from 2005 or 2006. Human sequences from fatal cases in 2005 and 2006 have been released, but most only contain the HA sequence and there have been more releases for the more recent cases, although a Ministry of Health report from the beginning of this year describes additional cases in 2006, which are clearly also due to infections by the Fujian strain.

In addition, presentations on H5N1 in Qinghai Province indicate many additional Qinghai isolates have been sequenced, but not released. The MOH report also suggests additional Qinghai isolates have been obtained for eastern China.

The PNAS report published this week also had the sequences of a Qinghai isolate from Shantou. This is the first public sequence of the Qinghai strain from eastern China. The sequence had the characteristic Qinghai HA cleavage site as well as PB2 E627K and was closely related to Qinghai isolates from China, Russia, Mongolia, India, Afghanistan, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, but unlike the isolates from outside of China, the unique polymorphisms were found in H5N1 isolates in China, again highlighting the role of recombination in H5N1 evolution via acquisition of single nucleotide polymorphisms.

The PNAS report included HA sequences from 404 H5N1 isolates from China, which greatly expanded the HA database, which included 1032 sequences at Los Alamos prior to the PNAS report. Moreover, several hundred of the 1032 sequences were added in the preceding weeks from sequences released by Indonesia, Qinghai isolates sequenced under the NIAID flu blueprint program, and the sequence released by the Beijing Genome Institute. However, many of the 404 HA sequences were partial sequences, and only 156 PB2 sequences were released. Moreover, no sequences from the other 6 gene segments were released, even though the MP gene sequences were discussed in the paper. In addition, a high proportion of earlier H5N1 sequences, are only partial sequences, including the larger PB2, PB1, PA, and NP genes, which have obvious examples of recombination, which was present in the 156 sequence that were released.

The other major hoarder of sequences is the WHO affiliated Weybridge labs. Phylogenetic trees of approximately 80 Qinghai sequences from Europe were presented months ago from samples collected in late 2005 / 2006. These sequences have also been withheld, in spite of comments indicating that the sequences will be released. Thus far only one bird sequence (the 8 gene segments from a turkey in Turkey collected over a year ago) and five human sequences (four from Turkey and one from Azerbaijan) have been released.

Moreover, only 4 gene segments of one H5N2 isolate in Canada has been released, although H5 was found throughout Canada over a year ago in August 2005 isolates and no 2006 sequences from H5N1 in Canada or the United States has been released.

The hoarding of these sequences by the major sequencers worldwide is cause for concern. The sequences provide critical information on the interactions and transport of H5N1 as well as the genetic diversity, which drives the evolution. The release of full sequences from current and past H5N1 isolates, which can be done at no charge via the NIAID sequencing project, is long overdue.
 

JPD

Inactive
Genetic disposition suspected for human bird flu: WHO

http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/art...02289688_RTRUKOC_0_US-BIRDFLU-WHO.xml&src=rss

By Stephanie Nebehay

GENEVA (Reuters) - Scientists suspect some people have a "genetic disposition" for infection with bird flu, which may explain why some get it and others don't, and why it remains relatively rare, the World Health Organization said on Thursday.

Evidence, mainly from a family cluster of cases last May in North Sumatra, Indonesia -- when seven people in an extended family died -- showed genetic factors might influence human susceptibility to the H5N1 virus, it said.

Only blood relatives were infected in the Karo district of North Sumatra, the largest cluster known to date worldwide, "despite multiple opportunities for the virus to spread to spouses or into the general community," it added.

The theory -- which it said merited further study -- was contained in WHO's report issued on Thursday, on a closed-door meeting of 35 scientific experts held in late September.

"A genetic predisposition for infection is suspected based on data from rare instances of human-to-human transmission in genetically-related persons," the WHO said.

"This possibility, if more fully explored, might help explain why human cases are comparatively rare and why the virus is not spreading easily from animals to humans or from human to human," it added.

Bird flu remains mainly an animal disease, but has infected 256 people since late 2003, killing 152 of them, according to the United Nations agency. Experts fear the virus could mutate and spark a human influenza pandemic, which could kill millions.

Overall, the H5N1 virus continues to show "inefficient spread", both from animals to humans and among humans, it said.

Much about the disease remains poorly understood, but the present situation is serious and "the risk that a pandemic virus might emerge is not likely to diminish in the near future".

Results from clinical trials of candidate pandemic vaccines had "not been promising" and it may be premature for countries to choose one to stockpile so as to protect their populations.

"CHAMPION VECTORS"

Mallard ducks have been identified as the "champion" spreaders of bird flu, and appear to shed the virus increasingly from the respiratory tract rather than via feces, the WHO said.

This finding will require modifying disease surveillance strategies so that samples are also taken from birds' pharynx, as well as feces, it said.

"In terms of geographical spread of the virus, mallard ducks are now regarded as the 'champion' vectors; mute swans are highly susceptible birds that are thought to serve as sentinels, but probably not as vectors of virus transmission," it said in the report, posted on its website www.who.int.

Recent studies had shown that the virus is now moving both ways in "relay transmission", from poultry to migratory birds and back again, it added.

Culling birds remains the control strategy of first choice, and had proven successful in Japan and South Korea, if costly.

High-quality vaccination of poultry was recommended in resource-strapped countries, yet ducks react differently to poultry vaccines which are designed for chickens, it said.
 

JPD

Inactive
If bird flu virus becomes pandemic, high death rates possible:
WHO report

http://bodyandhealth.canada.com/cha...9&news_channel_id=1020&channel_id=1020&rot=11

Provided by: Canadian Press
Written by: HELEN BRANSWELL

Nov. 2, 2006

(CP) - There's no guarantee the H5N1 avian flu virus would become less deadly to people if it triggers a pandemic, a new report from the World Health Organization warns.

A group of eminent influenza scientists gathered by the WHO last month concluded there is no reason to believe that the virus, which kills roughly 60 per cent of people who become infected, would become any milder if it evolves to become a pandemic strain.

The report, based on that meeting, cautions governments against spending a lot of money to stockpile existing H5N1 vaccines. It also reveals that a low level of H5N1 viruses found in wild and domestic birds appear to be naturally resistant to oseltamivir, the main flu drug being stockpiled against a future pandemic.

The WHO scientist who convened the meeting cautioned, however, that the question of how lethal an H5N1 pandemic might be is the scientific equivalent of a black hole.

Modern science has never seen a flu virus as nasty as H5N1, and there is no way of knowing if the virus can become easily transmissible among people or what an H5N1 pandemic would look like.

"It's one of those things that you hate to conjecture," said Michael Perdue, an avian influenza expert and scientist with the WHO's global influenza program.

"We just don't know enough about this virus, a whole new subtype for humans. . . . If a new H5 enters, it could be more lethal than anything we've ever seen in history. (But) who knows?"

"I think it's anybody's opinion because it's just so completely unknown."

The report noted some modelling studies suggest a highly lethal virus could not spark a pandemic, because people who fall gravely ill aren't walking about transmitting flu to others. "All such matters remain difficult to predict," the report concludes.

It also questions the wisdom of stockpiling current versions of H5N1 vaccine for later use, saying there is little evidence that a vaccine against one variant of the virus will induce a good immune response against even other currently circulating H5N1 viruses, let alone future ones.

"We still don't have the data that would say that a pre-pandemic vaccine based on one H5N1 strain would completely protect against another," Perdue said from Geneva.

"Although one would hope it would mitigate the effects some, we don't have the data to show it."

The United States and Switzerland are stockpiling current H5N1 vaccines. And several other countries - Singapore and Britain among them - are reported to be in negotiations with vaccine maker GlaxoSmithKline to buy bulk lots of its H5N1 vaccine for stockpiling purposes.
 

JPD

Inactive
East China province reinstates bird flu monitoring

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/02/content_5282313.htm

www.chinaview.cn 2006-11-02 18:10:57

JINAN, Nov. 2 (Xinhua) -- Shandong Province, east China, has reinstated round-the-clock bird flu monitoring to prevent possible outbreaks as more and more migratory birds fly over the province on their way further south.

Li Zhanpeng, head of the provincial wildlife protection center, said that all 153 monitoring stations in the province were ordered to report on a daily basis.

Local people were also called on to report deaths of wild birds to the provincial wildlife protection center. Its telephone hot line number is 0531-88557707, Li said.

Wild birds migrate through eight routes around the world, three of which traverse China. Migratory birds flying from East Asia to Australia pass Shandong Province.

China has reported nine outbreaks of bird flu in poultry this year, in northwestern Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, north China's Shanxi Province and Inner Mongolia, east China's Anhui Province, southwestern Guizhou and Sichuan provinces and the central province of Hunan.

Since 2003 China has reported 21 human infections of bird flu which have caused 14 deaths. Globally, the World Health Organization (WHO) has recorded 256 human infections including 151 deaths as of Oct. 16.
 

JPD

Inactive
Study fingers migrating ducks in bird flu spread

http://www.antara.co.id/en/seenws/?id=22672

Washington, (ANTARA News) - Migrating ducks, geese, and swans spread the H5N1 bird flu virus from Russia to Romania, Turkey and Ukraine, researchers said on Thursday.

A careful analysis of the spread of the virus from central Asia into eastern Europe in the autumn of 2005 shows that wild birds, especially mallard ducks, were the chief spreaders of the virus.

"We conclude that the spread of (highly pathogenic avian influenza) H5N1 virus from Russia and Kazakhstan to the Black Sea basin is consistent in space and time with the hypothesis that birds in the Anatidae family have seeded the virus along their autumn migration routes," the researchers wrote in the journal Emerging Infectious Diseases.

Anatidae include geese, ducks and swans, some of which are killed by H5N1, and other species of which often show no ill effects from the virus but which can spread it. Mallard ducks are the main suspect.

Bird flu remains mainly an animal disease, but has infected 256 people since late 2003, killing 152 of them, according to the World Health Organization.

Experts fear the virus could mutate and spark a human influenza pandemic, which could kill millions.

Domestic ducks and chickens can spread the virus to people, and the poultry trade is held responsible for some spread, but experts have also long believed that wild birds also can carry the virus over long distances.

Marius Gilbert of the Free University of Brussels and colleagues used satellite data to figure out the start of the autumn migration, and plotted known seasonal migration pathways against the actual outbreaks of H5N1.

They noted that adult birds can transmit the virus easily to juveniles during the molting season, when they cannot fly, and also noted that the virus can survive in cold standing water -- where many species of birds congregate while molting.

"The initial outbreaks of (highly pathogenic) H5N1 virus in Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine occurred close to wetlands frequented by overwintering migratory waterfowl," they wrote.

"These locations were clearly far from any known location where ... H5N1 virus had been recorded, while the timing and location match the autumn wildfowl migration ahead of the approaching wave of frost."

Bird experts around the world are testing many different species to see which ones carry and transmit the virus.

The researchers said that their study "by no means excludes the role of the poultry trade as an important, complementary transmission pathway."

U.S. and Canadian officials say they expect highly pathogenic strains of H5N1 to eventually arrive in the Americas, saying it is only a matter of time, Reuters reported.(*)
 

JPD

Inactive
WHO issues bird flu warning, warns on Tamiflu research

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/11/03/bird_flu_warning/

Virulence and resistance discussed
By Lucy Sherriff → More by this author

Published Friday 3rd November 2006 11:36 GMT


The World Health Organisation has warned that there is no guarantee that a pandemic strain of the H5N1 virus will be less deadly to people. The report, published this week, contains the findings of a meeting of flu experts held last month.

The method of change will determine how deadly the virus is, the report says. If the virus changes by exchanging genes with a human flu virus, a process called reassortment, a pandemic might not be too deadly. However, straightforward adaptive mutation would leave the virulence of the disease unchanged, the scientists warned.

It also cautioned against regarding the anti-viral drug Tamiflu as a magic bullet, highlighting that some H5N1 viruses seem to already be naturally resistant to the effects of the drug.

The report comes less than two weeks after the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology (CEH) in the UK issued a warning about the possible environmental effects of large scale use of Tamiflu.

Dr Andrew Singer of the CEH said: "An antiviral drug has never been widely used before, so we need to determine what might happen. During a flu pandemic, millions of people will all take Tamiflu at the same time. Over just eight or nine weeks, massive amounts of the drug will be expelled in sewage and find its way into the rivers. It could have huge effects on the fish and other wildlife."

A build up of the drug in rivers could cause the avian version of the virus to become resistant to it, which could lead to a new, resistant strain emerging in humans, Singer argues.

He is calling for research into ways to safely break the anti-viral down once it is in the sewage system but before it reaches the public waterways.
 

JPD

Inactive
CDC places order for H5N1 vaccine

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/11/03/2003334581

STAFF WRITER, WITH CNA
Friday, Nov 03, 2006, Page 2

The Center for Disease Control (CDC) has ordered 190,000 doses of avian influenza vaccine to enhance the nation's flu-fighting capability amid renewed pandemic warnings, a senior official said yesterday.

According to CDC Deputy Director Chou Chih-hao (周志浩), the government decided to procure the vaccine from two foreign suppliers after a new resistant strain of the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus deadly to humans and poultry was found to have spread through Asia.

Chou quoted a report by scientists in Hong Kong and the US as saying that the new virus -- dubbed the "Fujian-like" strain -- may have mutated in response to vaccination programs designed to halt the disease in farm flocks.

Noting that the strain emerged last year and has already spread throughout China as well as to Hong Kong, Thailand, Laos and Malaysia, the report said that the spread of this virus over such a large geographical region within a short period of time directly challenges current disease control measures.

Against this backdrop, Chou said the CDC has spent nearly NT$60 million (US$1.81 million) purchasing 190,000 doses of the vaccine against the H5N1 virus from two foreign companies.

The vaccine is 70 percent to 80 percent effective and has a shelf life of between six months and two years, Chou said.

Nevertheless, Chou added that although the vaccine has been proven safe and effective in preventing avian influenza in humans in initial clinical tests, it has not yet been approved for commercial sale.

Therefore, Chou said, the vaccine will be stockpiled for emergency epidemic control use or domestic clinical testing.

"Basically, only frontline medical and epidemic control personnel will get vaccinated," Chou said, adding that the vaccine will not be available to members of the public.

According to the procurement contracts, Chou said, the vaccine will be delivered by the end of this year.

"The vaccine will be ready for use if an avian flu outbreak occurs this winter," he said.

If each medical professional gets two doses of the vaccine, Chou said, the stockpile will be enough to cover 90,000 individuals, or one-third of the country's health care personnel.

Moreover, Chou said, the CDC has also kept in stock enough doses of Tamiflu -- an oral anti-viral drug for treatment of influenza -- for 2.3 million people, or 10 percent of the nation's population in accordance with the recommendation of the WHO.
 
Top