GOV/MIL China Has Begun Limited Fielding of New Antiship Ballistic Missile

http://www.nti.rsvp1.com/gsn/articl...issile-pentagon/?mgh=http://www.nti.org&mgf=1


WASHINGTON -- China has begun initial deployment of a new ballistic missile capable of attacking U.S. aircraft carriers, according to a Pentagon assessment released on Monday.

The Dongfeng-21D is a precision-guided antiship weapon that the Defense Department sees as aimed at undercutting the U.S. ability to project naval power in the Asia-Pacific region.

“China is fielding a limited but growing number of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-21D,” reads the congressionally mandated annual report on China’s military capabilities. The missile gives the People’s Liberation Army “the capability to attack large ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean.”

The Defense Department report places the missile’s range at greater than 930 miles, though Chinese state media have said the missile can strike moving ships as far away as 1,700 miles.

David Helvey, deputy assistant secretary of Defense, told reporters that the missile fielding “implies a limited operational capability.”

It is not publicly known if a supporting network of Chinese satellites that would provide mid-course and terminal targeting guidance to the DF-21D in a possible attack is also in place. “I don’t have details on whether or not they have the entire architecture in place,” Helvey said. “It’s something that we’re watching very, very carefully.”

Helvey said he did not have publicly available information on how many of the missiles the U.S. military estimates are currently deployed or where they might be fielded.

“We’re concerned about … the ability of China to develop missiles that can project its military power with precision at great distances from China,” he said. “Obviously, something that can hold at risk large surface ships, including aircraft carriers, is something we pay attention to, but we put it in the context of a number of China’s military developments … that we characterize as anti-access and area-denial.”

The Pentagon report also noted that in the last year, the Chinese military “continued to improve capabilities in nuclear deterrence and long-range conventional strike.”

The PLA Second Artillery Corps, which oversees the nation's strategic nuclear force, “continues to modernize its nuclear forces by enhancing its silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and adding more survivable mobile delivery systems.”

The Asian power might be working on a new road-mobile ICBM with the capability of carrying more than one independently targeted re-entry vehicle, according to the DOD report.

China is also growing its sea-based nuclear deterrent with three Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarines presently operational, according to the assessment.

Helvey noted the Chinese government’s announcement earlier this year that it would increase defense spending by 10.7 percent, which would bring its declared military budget to $114 billion. He added, however, that discerning the actual amount China spends on defense remains difficult, as Beijing does not include all defense expenditures in its declared military budget.

Last year, the United States and China made headway in their efforts to improve military-to-military contacts, with a number of high-profile visits by each side including trips by each country’s defense chief, according to Helvey.

The aircraft carrier may just be todays version of the Battleship. Just as in WWII the Battleship was found to be obsolete maybe the Aircraft carrier might be today.

Hognutz said:

The aircraft carrier may just be todays version of the Battleship. Just as in WWII the Battleship was found to be obsolete maybe the Aircraft carrier might be today.

Click to expand...

and so would go our 'projection of power' ...

The aircraft carrier may just be todays version of the Battleship. Just as in WWII the Battleship was found to be obsolete maybe the Aircraft carrier might be today.
and so would go our 'projection of power' ...

Yup, I have been saying this for some time.
The carrier battle group is only good for one thing--beating up on lesser countries and forcing them to bend to our will.

The aircraft carrier is now obsolete.
One such missle possess enough kinetic energy to literally split a large ship in two--forget the explosive warhead, which BTW will be a small nuclear weapon as well.

This notion of aircraft carriers is a hold over from WWII.
These things should be put into a reserve status and tied up in harbors.
Reserve crews should man them, and only in case of a "real war" should they be utilized as sea.

They now only serve as political play toys for a president--roaming around intimidating whomever is out of favor.
They are also a complete waste of money, and a tremendous burden.

Tie them up in harbor--and hook up their reactors to the power-grids where they will do some good.

Red China Power
China expanding submarine, missile forces with advanced systems, Pentagon annual report says

http://freebeacon.com/red-china-power/

China is building two new classes of missile submarines in addition to the eight nuclear missile submarines and six attack submarines being deployed as part of an arms buildup that analysts say appears to put Beijing on a war footing.

“In terms of China’s submarines, they’re investing heavily in a robust program for undersea warfare, developing submarines that are both conventional, diesel-electric powered, air- independent propulsion and nuclear-powered attack submarines,” David Helvey, deputy assistant defense secretary for East Asia, told reporters at a briefing on release of the Pentagon’s annual assessment of Chinese military power.

China has yet to conduct an underwater test firing of its submarine-launched missiles but is deploying new missile submarines and planning advanced versions.

“We see China investing considerably in capabilities for operations in this area,” he said.

The Pentagon’s latest annual report to Congress also includes new details of China’s deployment of an aircraft carrier-killing ballistic missile, two new stealth jet fighters, and a new road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile in addition to three other new ICBMs.

The Chinese military is also developing cyber warfare capabilities that can be used in preemptive attacks, the 92-page report states.

Chinese missile forces, known as the Second Artillery Corps, are “developing and testing several new classes and variants of offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, upgrading older missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses,” the report said.

Of particular concern to the Pentagon is the deployment near Taiwan of a precision-guided DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, according to the report.

“We’re concerned about the ability of China to develop missiles that can project its military power with precision at great distances from China—obviously something that can hold at risk large surface ships, including aircraft carriers, is something that we pay attention to, but we put it in the context of a number of China’s military developments, again, that we characterize as anti-access and area denial,” Helvey said.

However, Helvey noted that no single weapons system is the problem. Instead, he said, “it’s the integration and overlapping nature of these weapons system into a regime that can potentially impede or restrict free military operations in the Western Pacific.”

“So that’s something that we monitor and are concerned about.”

“The DF-21D is based on a variant of the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile and gives the PLA the capability to attack large ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean,” the report said, noting that its range is greater than 932 miles and that it is armed with a high-technology maneuvering warhead.

Additionally, the report confirms, China is building a new road-mobile ICBM that is likely capable of being armed with a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV).

The Free Beacon first reported Aug. 15 that the new missile, described by defense officials as the DF-41, was flight-tested and is expected to be equipped with MIRVs.

“The Second Artillery continues to modernize its nuclear forces by enhancing its silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and adding more survivable mobile delivery systems,” the report said.

New road mobile missiles deployed in recent years include DF-31 and DF-31A mobile ICBMs and the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile. The DF-31A has a range of about 7,000 miles.

“This administration is reluctant to just come out and say it, but this report makes clear that China is preparing for small-scale and then large-scale wars against the United States and its friends and allies,” said Richard Fisher, a China miltiary analyst with the International Assessment and Strategy Center.

“It is time to start signalling to China’s leadership the broader economic, political, as well as military costs of its current course before it believes it can confidently embark on surprise military campaigns.”

Beijing is also rapidly building new radar-evading stealth fighter-bombers known as the J-20 and J-31.

“Within two years of the January 2011 flight test of China’s first stealth fighter, which we call the J-20, China tested a second prototype, which is referred to as the J-31,” Helvey said. “The first J-31 flight test, in October 2012, highlights China’s continued ambition to produce advanced fifth-generation fighter aircraft.”

Helvey said the Pentagon does not expect either the J-20 or the J-31 “to achieve an effective operational capability before 2018.”

U.S. intelligence assessments from five years ago said China would not field a jet comparable to the U.S. Air Force F-22 stealth fighter before 2018. As a result, the Pentagon canceled production of the F-22 at 187 jets.

The first test flight of the J-20 took place two years ago and surprised the U.S. military. It was tested during the visit of then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who was criticized for canceling F-22 production.

China’s surface naval forces are also expanding rapidly with deployment of several new types of warships, including the first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning.

Helvey said the carrier conducted its first aircraft launch and recovery operations in November with J-15 fighters.

“We anticipate that China will spend the next three to four years on training and integration before achieving an operationally effective aircraft carrier capability,” he said. “China will likely build several indigenous aircraft carriers over the next 15 years.”

Chinese cyber and space weapons capabilities continued to be developed. Helvey said those warfare capabilities are being closely watched.

For the first time, the report linked large-scale cyber attacks and intrusions of computer networks to the Chinese government and military.

“In addition, in 2012, numerous computer systems around the world, including those owned by the United States government, continued to be targeted for intrusions, some of which appear to be attributable directly to [People’s Republic of China] government and military organizations,” Helvey said.

Asked about Chinese economic espionage, Helvey declined to provide details but said, “We’re always mindful of the potential threats to the security of our defense technology and defense systems.”

The report also discusses China’s assertions of territorial and maritime claims that are upsetting stability in the region.

“In this report, we do highlight China’s increased assertiveness with respect to its maritime territorial claim,” Helvey said.

China is claiming most of the South China Sea as its territory and is disputing Japan’s claims to the Senkaku Islands. Both areas are said to have large deposits of undersea gas and oil to which energy-hungry states in the region seek access.

China’s government routinely protests the annual report, claiming it is part of a Pentagon campaign to hype the threat from China.

Helvey said the Chinese are aware of the report and were not consulted prior to its release on Monday.

“China’s leaders continue to see the modernization of its military as a central component of their strategy to advance China’s national development goals in the first two decades of the 21st century,” he said.

Fisher, the IASC military analyst, said the latest report is far more useful than the truncated 43-page report from 2012.

“The first ever report disclosure of development of the Type 096 SSBN raises the prospect of a new submarine launched missile that also may be multiple warhead capable,” Fisher said. “As the Administration presses for additional reductions in U.S. nuclear warhead levels and shows reluctance to fund U.S. nuclear arsenal modernization, it is doubly important that Congress be informed about the size and growth of China’s nuclear forces.”

Fisher said the report failed to address China’s transfer of strategic missile technology to North Korea, specifically the transporter-erector launchers for Pyongyang’s new KN-08 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile disclosed for the first time during a military parade in April 2012.

“A failure to chastise and sanction China’s action will only serve to undermine confidence in American security guarantees and increase interest by our allies in their own nuclear deterrents,” he said.

Former State Department intelligence official John Tkacik said the report’s most important revelations are on the Chinese navy and especially its submarine forces.

“Last year’s report disclosed that two Jin-class ballistic missile submarines were already operational, and now the 2013 report counts three, so I take the DIA bean-counters’ word for it, China is launching one new boomer each year,” Tkacik said.

Each of the missile submarines will be equipped with 12 JL-2 missile that likely will have multiple warheads. The new submarines mean the Chinese are adding at least 180 new nuclear warheads to their arsenal, a sharp increase from the U.S. intelligence estimate of 240 warheads, Tkacik said.

In addition to the new missile submarine planned as a following on to the Jin submarines, China is planning at least one more advanced Typ 096 missile submarine a year indefiniately, Tkacik added.

“The real news is the construction of a new special-purpose class of guided-missile submarine, the Type-095 SSGN,” he said. “A Chinese SSGN [cruise missile-firing submarine] is not only a new threat for the U.S. Navy to worry about, but it will deeply unsettle China’s neighbors in East and Southeast Asia.”

Pentagon: Espionage Fuels China’s Fast-Paced Military Buildup

http://freebeacon.com/pentagon-espionage-fuels-chinas-fast-paced-military-buildup/

China is using state-sponsored industrial and economic espionage to acquire technology fueling its fast-paced military modernization program and cut its reliance on foreign arms makers, the Pentagon said on Monday.

In its 83-page annual report to Congress on Chinese military developments, the U.S. Defense Department also highlighted Beijing’s efforts to develop advanced-technology stealth aircraft and to build an aircraft carrier fleet to project power further offshore.

“What concerns me is the extent to which China’s military modernization occurs in the absence of the type of openness and transparency that others are certainly asking of China,” David Helvey, deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia, told a Pentagon briefing on the report.

Helvey welcomed Chinese moves toward greater openness but said there were still many unanswered questions and warned of the “potential implications and consequences of that lack of transparency on the security calculations of others in the region.”

The annual China report, which Congress began requesting in 2000, comes amid tensions in the region due to China’s military assertiveness and expansive claims of sovereignty over disputed islands and shoals.

Beijing’s publicly announced defense spending has grown at an inflation-adjusted pace of nearly 10 percent annually over the past decade, but Helvey acknowledged that China’s actual outlays could be much higher.

China announced a 10.7 percent increase in military spending to $114 billion in March, the Pentagon report said. It said publicly announced defense spending for 2012 was $106 billion, but actual pending for 2012 could range between $135 billion and $215 billion. U.S. defense spending is more than double that, at more than $500 billion.

The report highlighted China’s continuing efforts to gain access to sophisticated military technology to fuel its modernization program. It cited a laundry list of methods, including “state-sponsored industrial and technical espionage to increase the level of technologies and expertise available to support military research, development and acquisition.”

“China continues to engage in activities designed to support military procurement and modernization,” the report said. “These include economic espionage, theft of trade secrets, export control violations, and technology transfer.”

China also relies on acquisitions of key dual-use components, the report said, citing a network of government-affiliated companies and research groups that help it gain access to sensitive technology.

The report referred to two people from Taiwan, for example, who were charged in the United States with trying to pass sensitive defense technology to China by photographing the technology, deleting the images, then taking them to China where the images could be recovered.

China rejects U.S. Pentagon charges of military espionage


http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/05/07/usa-defense-china-espionage-idINDEE9450DD20130507





China is using espionage to acquire technology to fuel its military modernization, the Pentagon said on Monday, for the first time accusing the Chinese of trying to break into U.S. defense computer networks and prompting a firm denial from Beijing.

In its 83-page annual report to Congress on Chinese military developments, the Pentagon also cited progress in Beijing's effort to develop advanced-technology stealth aircraft and build an aircraft carrier fleet to project power further offshore.

The report said China's cyber snooping was a "serious concern" that pointed to an even greater threat because the "skills required for these intrusions are similar to those necessary to conduct computer network attacks."

"The U.S. government continued to be targeted for (cyber) intrusions, some of which appear to be attributable directly to the Chinese government and military," it said, adding the main purpose of the hacking was to gain information to benefit defense industries, military planners and government leaders.

A spokeswoman said it was the first time the annual Pentagon report had cited Beijing for targeting U.S. defense networks, but China dismissed the report as groundless.

The U.S. Defense Department had repeatedly "made irresponsible comments about China's normal and justified defense build-up and hyped up the so-called China military threat," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said.

"This is not beneficial to U.S.-China mutual trust and cooperation," Hua told reporters. "We are firmly opposed to this and have already made representations to the U.S. side."

China's defense build-up was geared towards protecting its "national independence and sovereignty," Hua said.

On the accusations of hacking, Hua said: "We firmly oppose any groundless criticism and hype, because groundless hype and criticism will only harm bilateral efforts at cooperation and dialogue."

Despite concerns over the intrusions, a senior U.S. defense official said his main worry was the lack of transparency.

"What concerns me is the extent to which China's military modernization occurs in the absence of the type of openness and transparency that others are certainly asking of China," David Helvey, deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia, told a Pentagon briefing on the report.

He warned of the "potential implications and consequences of that lack of transparency on the security calculations of others in the region."

The annual China report, which Congress began requesting in 2000, comes amid ongoing tensions in the region due to China's military assertiveness and expansive claims of sovereignty over disputed islands and shoals. Beijing has ongoing territorial disputes with the Philippines, Japan and other neighbors.

Beijing's publicly announced defense spending has grown at an inflation-adjusted pace of nearly 10 percent annually over the past decade, but Helvey said China's actual outlays were thought to be higher.

China announced a 10.7 percent increase in military spending to $114 billion in March, the Pentagon report said. Publicly announced defense spending for 2012 was $106 billion, but actual spending for 2012 could range between $135 billion and $215 billion, it said. U.S. defense spending is more than double that, at more than $500 billion.

The report highlighted China's continuing efforts to gain access to sophisticated military technology to fuel its modernization program. It cited a laundry list of methods, including "state-sponsored industrial and technical espionage to increase the level of technologies and expertise available to support military research, development and acquisition."

Dean Cheng, an analyst at the conservative Heritage Foundation think tank, said he was surprised by the number of cases of human espionage cited in the report.

"This is a PLA (People's Liberation Army) that is extensively, comprehensively modernizing," Cheng said. "...China is also comprehensively engaging in espionage."

China tested its second advanced stealth fighter in as many years in October 2012, highlighting its "continued ambition to produce advanced fifth-generation fighter aircraft," the report said. Neither aircraft of its stealth aircraft was expected to achieve effective operational capability before 2018, it said.

Last year also saw China commission its first domestically produced aircraft carrier. China currently has one aircraft carrier bought abroad and conducted its first takeoff and landing from the ship in November.

If aircraft carriers are obsolete, why is China working like mad to get the one they bought from Russia operational and busting their butts and spending their money to build several more in China?
Quick someone call them and tell them to stop. After all TB2K members know more about naval strategy than the naval war college strategists in the US and the equivalent in China.

Nothing made by man is indestructible. That doesn't mean you throw them away. Everything has it's uses.

Offensive and defensive weapons are constantly evolving and their missions changing.
I do believe that carriers will be around longer than anyone currently posting on this forum.

Well all jokes aside I think man will kill himself from soil destruction along with the destruction of water supplies suitable for drinking and agriculture before he can kill himself off from wars.


With what Shinmen Takezo said
"The aircraft carrier is now obsolete.
One such missle possess enough kinetic energy to literally split a large ship in two--forget the explosive warhead, which BTW will be a small nuclear weapon as well."


During the Falklands War the Argentinians sunk one or more British warships with Exocet missiles.


Weapons of the Falklands War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weapons_of_the_Falklands_War

These are some of the key weapons of the Falklands War used by both sides. ... The Exocet is probably the most famous weapon of the war, sinking two British ... The Sea Skua was a British light anti-ship missile, fired from Lynx helicopters, ... to the mainland short after but in the subsequent reinforcement of the islands ...

China Connection said:

Well all jokes aside I think man will kill himself from soil destruction along with the destruction of water supplies suitable for drinking and agriculture before he can kill himself off from wars.


With what Shinmen Takezo said
"The aircraft carrier is now obsolete.
One such missle possess enough kinetic energy to literally split a large ship in two--forget the explosive warhead, which BTW will be a small nuclear weapon as well."


During the Falklands War the Argentinians sunk one or more British warships with Exocet missiles.


Weapons of the Falklands War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weapons_of_the_Falklands_War

These are some of the key weapons of the Falklands War used by both sides. ... The Exocet is probably the most famous weapon of the war, sinking two British ... The Sea Skua was a British light anti-ship missile, fired from Lynx helicopters, ... to the mainland short after but in the subsequent reinforcement of the islands ...

Click to expand...

A Pentagon released a paper quite some time ago, postulating that the "next" two wars after the WOT, will be over water and food... Good call, as usual, CC...

My prayers are with you, my friend...

OA, out...

"...Yup, I have been saying this for some time.
The carrier battle group is only good for one thing--beating up on lesser countries and forcing them to bend to our will...."

Sounds good to me. I see no reason to set up a military so constituted that the only war it can fight is Armageddon.

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1701&MainCatID=17&id=20130510000007


Calculating Taiwan's response to China's anti-ship missiles

Editorial
2013-05-10
09:13 (GMT+8)

US intelligence agencies have advised that China has deployed 21D anti-ship missiles to deter American intervention in a contingency involving Taiwan.

The missiles, with a range of 1,500 to 3,000 kilometers, have been dubbed "carrier killers" as they can hit moving targets at sea guided by the country's newly deployed Beidou satellite navigation system.

A research institute in Zurich notes that the missiles can be knocked off course by an electronic beam, suggesting the US can eliminate the threat by strengthening its abilities in electronic warfare.

Furthermore, the X-47B drones carried aboard US aircraft carriers can strike the bases from which the missiles are launched, and the drones' SM-3 anti-missile systems are also capable of destroying incoming missiles.

Washington is therefore confident in its ability to counter the new threat.

China, under its new leaders Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, still believes that the West led by the US has not foresworn its attempts to contain China, and the boycott of arms sales to China followed by the US, Europe and Japan, has deepened its distrust.

China's national strength is growing. The country might not become a global power before 2020, but it can undoubtedly tip the military balance in the region. This prompts US strategists to suggest that Washington should help China become a peacemaker rather than a bully, while keeping a close eye on the country's military buildup, especially in terms of space and cyberspace warfare.

Against this background, Taiwan should shed its longtime mindset of seeing China as its sole enemy, and instead strengthen its capability in handling threats against its exclusive economic zone and its cyberspace security. It should also balance its ties with China against its ties with Japan and the US.

With regards to Taiwan's armaments procurement policy, it should adhere to the principle of buying only the much-needed and most effective weapon systems, for the lowest possible prices.

For links see article source....
Posted for fair use....
http://www.defensereview.com/chinas...grumman-x-47b-ucas-and-dassault-neuron-ucasu/


China’s Lijian (also written “Li Jian”, meaning “Dark Sword or “Sharp Sword”) Stealth Drone/UAS/UAV Test Flight-Ready: Chinese Response to Northrop Grumman X-47B UCAS and Dassault nEUROn UCAS/UCAV Makes its Public Debut
Published by David Crane in Aircraft Systems, Featured, In The News on May 10th, 2013

by David Crane
defrev (at) gmail (dot) com

Photo(s) Credit: Want China Times

May 10, 2013

Well, we knew this was coming, at some point. Looks like the Chinese military's (PLA) got themselves a copy of the Northrop Grumman X-47B UCAS and Dassault nEUROn UCAS/UCAV (Unmanned Combat Air System/Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle) thanks to the Hongdu Aviation Industry Group (HAIG) and Shenyang Aviation Corporation (SAC). It's called "Li Jian", which reportedly translates to either "Dark Sword" or "Sharp Sword", depending on who's article you're reading. No matter, the new "stealth drone", or, more accurately, low-observable UCAS, represents a potentially major step in stealth UAS/UAV technology, assuming it's well-designed, built and viable.

DefenseReview (DR) is curious about how much of a combat load Lijian can handle if its weaponized, and its performance capabilities versus the X-47B and nEUROn. It's interesting that China was able to beat Russia to punch on a "stealth drone" of this type, at least publicly.

China's definitely keeping our military on its toes.

Editor's Note: The accompanying photos appear to be of two different aircraft, so there may be two versions of Lijian, or the Chinese have developed two different drone aircraft.

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/16/china-launch-idUSL2N0DW3LQ20130516

UPDATE 2-U.S. sees China launch as test of anti-satellite muscle -source
Thu May 16, 2013 4:01am EDT

(Adds Chinese Foreign Ministry comment)

By Andrea Shalal-Esa

May 15 (Reuters) - The U.S. government believes a Chinese missile launch this week was the first test of a new interceptor that could be used to destroy a satellite in orbit, a U.S. defense official told Reuters on Wednesday.

China launched a rocket into space on Monday, but no objects were placed into orbit, the Pentagon said on Wednesday. The object re-entered Earth's atmosphere above the Indian Ocean.

"We tracked several objects during the flight but did not observe the insertion of any objects into orbit and no objects associated with this launch remain in space," said Lieutenant Colonel Monica Matoush, a Pentagon spokeswoman.

The rocket reached 10,000 km (6,250 miles) above Earth, the highest suborbital launch seen worldwide since 1976, according to Jonathan McDowell at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics.

China has said the rocket, launched from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in western China, carried a science payload to study the earth's magnetosphere.

"I want to emphasize that China has consistently advocated for the peaceful use of outer space and opposes the weaponisztion of outer space as well as an arms race in outer space," Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei told reporters in Beijing.

POSSIBLE ANTI-SATELLITE PAYLOAD

However, a U.S. defense official said U.S. intelligence showed that the rocket could be used in the future to carry an anti-satellite payload on a similar trajectory. Neither the U.S. official nor the Pentagon released details of what the Chinese rocket carried into space.

"It was a ground-based missile that we believe would be their first test of an interceptor that would be designed to go after a satellite that's actually on orbit," said the official, who was not authorized to speak on the record.

Representative Mike Rogers, chairman of the U.S. House Intelligence Committee, declined to comment specifically on the rocket launch, but said China was clearly taking a more aggressive posture in space.

"Any time you have a nation-state looking to have a more aggressive posture in space, it's very concerning," Rogers said at a Reuters Cybersecurity Summit.

The United States remains concerned about China's development of anti-satellite capabilities after Beijing shot a missile at one of its own defunct satellites in orbit in 2007, creating an enormous amount of debris in space.

Monday's rocket launch was similar to launches using the Blue Scout Junior rocket that were conducted by the U.S. Air Force in the 1960s for research on Earth's magnetosphere, McDowell said in an emailed response to questions.

He said all the previous suborbital launches above 10,000 km had been conducted by the United States. All China's previous missile tests went to less than 2,000 km, although Beijing had launched orbital vehicles higher, including to the moon, he said.

Most scientific suborbital launches are at most 1,500 km or so, McDowell added. The 1976 launch was Gravity Probe A, when NASA and McDowell's institute worked together to launch an atomic clock to 10,280 km.

Monday's launch came less than a week after U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter unveiled what he called a "long overdue" effort to safeguard U.S. national security satellites and develop ways to counter the space capabilities of potential adversaries.

U.S. military space officials are taking steps to improve the resilience of national security satellites in orbit, the defense official said. These include using new wave forms to make it more difficult for adversaries to jam signals from space, putting U.S. sensors on commercial satellites and using terrestrial high-frequency communications.

Last week, the Pentagon released an 83-page report on Chinese military developments that highlighted China's increasing space capabilities and said Beijing was pursuing a variety of activities aimed at preventing its adversaries from using space-based assets during a crisis. (Additional reporting by Megha Rajagopalan in BEIJING; Editing by David Brunnstrom, Cynthia Osterman and Ron Popeski)

Related News

U.S. sees China launch as test of anti-satellite muscle - source
Wed, May 15 2013
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Tue, May 14 2013
UPDATE 3-Starman falls to Earth after five-month space odyssey
Tue, May 14 2013
Top U.S. admiral puts cyber security on the Navy's radar
Mon, May 13 2013
China calls U.S. the "real hacking empire" after Pentagon report
Wed, May 8 2013

Analysis & Opinion

The case for sea-based drones
China denies military espionage accusations

China Connection said:

During the Falklands War the Argentinians sunk one or more British warships with Exocet missiles.

Click to expand...

I read here on TB2K iirc, that after that happened, Thatcher threatened them with a nuclear exchange if they did it again.

TerryK said:

If aircraft carriers are obsolete, why is China working like mad to get the one they bought from Russia operational and busting their butts and spending their money to build several more in China?
Quick someone call them and tell them to stop. After all TB2K members know more about naval strategy than the naval war college strategists in the US and the equivalent in China.

Nothing made by man is indestructible. That doesn't mean you throw them away. Everything has it's uses.

Offensive and defensive weapons are constantly evolving and their missions changing.
I do believe that carriers will be around longer than anyone currently posting on this forum.

Click to expand...

So the Chicoms can put the screws to it's neighbors and eventually expand its search for fuel and seafoods for the PLA and to venture south and west to see how far they can go before they hit.

I feel we have about 5-8 years before the PLA has a true blue water fleet with 4-5 CVN's and the associated shipping needed for support and protection in order to leave their home waters.

IIRC the Chicoms have at least 4 hulls laid possibly 5 that are currently under construction, I read last week here in the WOW pot that they are having catapolt problems and these new Chiness aircraft carriers may be of the jump jet type of carrier if they cant figure out the problems.

The 3 Soviet aircraft carriers the chicoms purchased over the past 20 years are in the process of being rebuilt from the hull up so in 5-8 years the chicoms may have 8 operationial aircraft carriers.

SIRR1

SIRR1 said:

So the Chicoms can put the screws to it's neighbors and eventually expand its search for fuel and seafoods for the PLA and to venture south and west to see how far they can go before they hit.

I feel we have about 5-8 years before the PLA has a true blue water fleet with 4-5 CVN's and the associated shipping needed for support and protection in order to leave their home waters.

IIRC the Chicoms have at least 4 hulls laid possibly 5 that are currently under construction, I read last week here in the WOW pot that they are having catapolt problems and these new Chiness aircraft carriers may be of the jump jet type of carrier if they cant figure out the problems.

The 3 Soviet aircraft carriers the chicoms purchased over the past 20 years are in the process of being rebuilt from the hull up so in 5-8 years the chicoms may have 8 operationial aircraft carriers.

SIRR1

Click to expand...

Yes, and that is also an important purpose of a Navy. As Troke said earlier, any military that is only ready to fight Armageddon and nothing else isn't much use 99.9% of the time.
Force continuum has always been a policy of the modern Navy. Putting all your money and research in one area or the other would be foolish.

People who make the argument that it only takes one nuclear tipped cruise missile to take out an aircraft carrier therefore we shouldn't build them should also realize the argument applies to just about anything including a city!
It reminds me of DGI who insist we will all die and nobody will survive a nuclear war so why prep. An even better analogy is the government can drone you from 40,000 feet so why own an AR.

All weapon systems have their uses.
Having a squadrons of advanced fighter bombers that can be most anywhere in the world in a matter of a few days is a very valuable thing.
Being able to launch almost 500 long range cruise missiles from 3 old converted trident subs is also valuable.
Being able to end the existence of any country in the world by one SSBN is well.... priceless.
Having all of the above options plus many more is the domain of only one Navy in the world.

For links see article source....
Posted for fair use....
http://thediplomat.com/the-naval-diplomat/2013/05/23/airsea-battle-with-chinese-characteristics/

Airsea Battle With Chinese Characteristics
By James R. Holmes
May 23, 2013

So the U.S. Navy and Air Force chiefs of staff penned a good piece over at Foreign Policy last week, explaining the sister services’ AirSea Battle doctrine. Have a look.

Something struck me while reading it, namely that China is pursuing its own AirSea strategy under the guise of “counter-intervention” operations or, in Western parlance, anti-access and area denial. You might even call it AirSeaLand, since part of Chinese sea power resides in the Second Artillery Corps, the army’s missile force. But joint sea power is nothing new. History abounds with examples when coastal states alloyed land, sea, and eventually air into an implement of sea combat.

Nor do we have to look to exotic climes for examples. Here’s one from U.S. history that sounds strikingly modern. I’ve been reviewing my Spanish-American War history while piecing together some remarks for a Memorial Day speech next week in Newport. Hat tip to my colleague Professor George Baer, whose masterwork One Hundred Years of Sea Power (1994) reveals how eminent fin de siecle Americans thought about maritime defense and offense. Popular opinion deformed the U.S. war effort to a certain extent, in large measure because ordinary Americans entertained outsized fears of the Spanish fleet’s prowess. Citizens of seaports like Newport and New York clamored for protection from naval bombardment. Their pleas siphoned assets away from the main fights in the Caribbean Sea and Philippine Islands.

To appease public sentiment, the U.S. Navy formed a flying squadron for Atlantic waters. It also stationed long-in-the-tooth monitors — think of USS Monitor dueling CSS Virginia at Hampton Roads in the 1860s — in East Coast seaports. Alfred Thayer Mahan reports that the monitors boasted little military potential, but they did create a placebo effect. They were tokens of Washington’s commitment to the national defense, and they looked forbidding. How ships look determines their political impact on various audiences — especially when no gunfire is exchanged that could debunk the comforting image they project. The monitors were there. No Spanish fleet appeared off American shores to test their mettle. So these engines of war did their job despite their decrepitude.

That insight furnished Mahan with the opening discussion for his book Lessons of the War with Spain. We often berate Mahan for indifference to what transpires on land, and there’s some justice to such charges. In this case, however, he proposed harnessing land power for nautical purposes. Emplacing long-range coastal artillery at select ports would provide real defensive power. After all, a ship’s a fool to fight a fort. Army gunners would spare the navy from supplying warships — in effect mobile guard towers — for harbor defense.

Thus liberated from coastal defense, the fleet could roam the seven seas, executing such offensive functions as national leaders deemed fit. Call it LandSea Battle. The U.S. Army hoisted a protective aegis over Atlantic seaports while the fleet acted as the long arm of U.S. foreign policy. Or, as President Theodore Roosevelt put it, land power rendered the navy “footloose.” (Cue crappy old Kenny Loggins tune.)

That sounds remarkably like Beijing’s approach to sea power, but with a twist. Land-based PLA weaponry and short-range naval platforms hold off adversaries while the main PLA Navy fleet, like the U.S. Navy in the age of Mahan and Roosevelt, is footloose and fancy free. Here’s the twist, though: the reach of land-based sea power is now so great that the PLA Navy surface fleet can shelter within striking range of Fortress China while still remaining largely footloose. That reduces the urgency of China’s naval buildup, allows leisure time for fleet experimentation, and opens up manifold deterrent and coercive options for Beijing.

It’s rather as though Mahan’s coastal artillery boasted an effective firing range measured in hundreds of miles, as opposed to the few miles of offshore waterspace big guns actually could sweep. Such alt-history armaments would’ve granted commanders singular freedom to act beyond American waters. Or, Washington could have elected to remain on the strategic defensive, maintaining a small navy for constabulary duty and quelling local challengers. It appears you can accomplish a lot at sea with forces based ashore — and open up new strategic vistas for your navy in the process.

Maritime history: it’s the gift that keeps on giving.

_____

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/16/breaking_the_kill_chain_air_sea_battle


Foreign Policy
National Security

Breaking the Kill Chain
How to keep America in the game when our enemies are trying to shut us out.
BY ADM. JONATHAN GREENERT, GEN. MARK WELSH | MAY 16, 2013
Comments 50

Our military services and national security leaders are consumed right now with reductions to defense budgets. Whether from years of continuing resolutions, sequestration, or just less funding in general, our military will have to adjust to getting fewer dollars to protect our nation's security interests. At the same time, the world continues to present challenges to U.S. interests, including instability in North Africa and the Middle East, regular provocations from Iran and North Korea, and territorial disputes between China and its neighbors. Our military will need an affordable and effective approach to counter coercion and assure access to places where conflict is most likely and consequential.

The caps established in 2011 by the Budget Control Act place defense spending at the same level as the early 2000s. This level of funding was sufficient to organize, train, and equip a force able to defeat Saddam Hussein's military, deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan, and occupy Iraq and Afghanistan. But our fiscal situation is different today. Personnel and infrastructure maintenance costs have risen by double-digit percentages since 2003 as our services took on new missions, such as defending allies from ballistic missiles and countering piracy and illicit trafficking. Meanwhile, our competitors are more capable than a decade ago thanks to proliferation of weapons and other military technology. Less funding will compel us to reprioritize our efforts and make some hard choices with respect to the size and shape of our forces. This does not mean we will be unable to address our nation's security needs, but we will need to focus our investments and operations on our most important interests.

The Defense Strategic Guidance issued in January 2012 assessed our security environment and fiscal circumstances following the first set of BCA-imposed budget reductions. Although we are reevaluating that strategy in light of potential additional cuts imposed by sequestration, one of the most significant challenges the strategy identified remains a concern: the dedicated effort by some nations and groups to prevent access to parts of the "global commons" -- those areas of the air, sea, cyberspace, and space that no one "owns," but upon which we all depend. These "anti-access" strategies employ military capabilities, geography, diplomatic pressure, and international law to impede the free use of ungoverned spaces. The Air-Sea Battle concept -- which disrupts the so-called "kill chains" of our potential adversaries -- is our services' approach to negate these efforts.

A new form of coercion

Nations seeking to intimidate their neighbors are turning to anti-access strategies because they are cost-effective. Merely threatening to close key maritime crossroads such as the Strait of Hormuz or demonstrating the ability to cut off a country from cyberspace or international airspace can be an effective tool for regional and international coercion. Similarly, these capabilities can be applied to prevent or slow U.S. or allied assistance from arriving in time to stop or repel an attack -- providing an aggressor much greater leverage over neighbors who depend on allies for security.

Three well-known developments made this shift in our competitors' strategy possible. One, the world economy has become more interconnected, so impediments at air or maritime chokepoints have a much faster global impact. Two, technological advances in sensing and precision have spurred the development of more lethal air defenses and anti-ship cruise missiles; cheaper, more integrated surveillance systems; and new weapons, such as anti-ship ballistic missiles. Improvements in automation have made these systems easier to use while proliferation has put them in the hands of a range of potential new adversaries. And three, the American way of projecting force changed from placing bases and garrisons close to potential battlefields to a more expeditionary strategy whereby a smaller overseas presence is supported by forces that can surge into the area from hundreds or thousands of miles away.

In history there are numerous examples of anti-access capabilities and strategies. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the "Desert Fox," used aircraft, gun emplacements, and mines during World War II to disrupt access to France during the D-Day landings at Normandy. Mines were used in the Arabian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq "tanker war" of the 1980s to hinder the passage of both countries' oil. Serbian forces and Saddam Hussein each employed Cold War-era air defenses in an attempt to deter intervention by NATO and a U.S.-led coalition respectively. Anti-access strategies have always been employed to increase the cost of intervention beyond an acceptable level and show potential victims of aggression that help is not likely to come. Today, however, anti-access capabilities have much greater range and lethality. And they are typically employed as part of an overall strategy in peacetime alongside legal, diplomatic, and geographic means to deny access even before a conflict occurs.

Anti-access strategies also undermine our ability to stabilize crises. Suppose an aggressor threatens to attack a country within range of its anti-access military capabilities. If we cannot reliably defeat the aggressor's array of cruise and ballistic missiles, submarines, aircraft, etc. and project power, U.S. forces will be less able to move into the area to interdict attacks, reassure our allies, and defuse potential hostilities.

The Air-Sea Battle concept

The Air-Sea Battle concept, approved by the secretary of defense in 2011, is designed to assure access, defeat anti-access capabilities, and provide more options to national leaders and military commanders. Air-Sea Battle is one of the operational concepts nested within the overarching Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) -- the Joint Force's approach to defeating threats to access. Air-Sea Battle is not focused on one specific adversary, since the anti-access capabilities it is intended to defeat are proliferating and, with automation, becoming easier to use. U.S. forces need a credible means to assure access when needed to help deter aggression by a range of potential adversaries, to assure allies, and to provide escalation control and crisis stability.

Some examples of where Air-Sea Battle may apply include the Arabian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, where a favorable location provides Iran the ability to threaten the production and passage of almost 20 percent of the world's oil. If Iran can demonstrate or credibly assert that it can prevent or slow a U.S. response to its aggression, it is more able to coerce its neighbors or the international community. In the eastern Mediterranean, the government of Syria has deployed an array of modern anti-air missile systems to raise the costs of outside intervention in its ongoing civil war. And in the Pacific, North Korea has already demonstrated its willingness to employ anti-access capabilities with the sinking in 2010 of the South Korean ship, Cheonan.

Air-Sea Battle is not a military strategy; it isn't about countering an invasion; it isn't a plan for U.S. forces to conduct an assault. Air-Sea Battle is a concept for defeating threats to access and enabling follow-on operations, which could include military activities as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster response. For example, in the last several years, improved integration between naval and air forces helped us respond to floods in Pakistan and to the earthquake and tsunami in Japan.

Normally, operational concepts are developed by commanders to carry out a specific set of actions in their area of responsibility. In contrast, the military services are using JOAC and Air-Sea Battle to guide their efforts to organize, train, and equip forces provided to operational commanders. Further, we are integrating these concepts into the tactics and procedures we develop to operate with our allies. This is similar to the effort in the 1980s to implement the "Air-Land" Battle concept and associated NATO concepts to defeat Soviet aggression in Central Europe. That effort resulted in programs such as the JSTARS radar aircraft that we still use to track targets on land. And while Air-Land Battle was focused on a singular threat and region, the idea of using a specific operational concept to guide investment is the same approach we are taking with Air-Sea Battle.

Breaking the "kill chain"

Air-Sea Battle defeats threats to access by, first, disrupting an adversary's command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; second, destroying adversary weapons launchers (including aircraft, ships, and missile sites); and finally, defeating the weapons an adversary launches.

This approach exploits the fact that, to attack our forces, an adversary must complete a sequence of actions, commonly referred to as a "kill chain." For example, surveillance systems locate U.S. forces, communications networks relay targeting information to weapons launchers, weapons are launched, and then they must hone in on U.S. forces. Each of these steps is vulnerable to interdiction or disruption, and because each step must work, our forces can focus on the weakest links in the chain, not each and every one. For example, strikes against installations deep inland are not necessarily required in Air-Sea Battle because adversary C4ISR may be vulnerable to disruption, weapons can be deceived or interdicted, and adversary ships and aircraft can be destroyed.

U.S. forces need not employ "symmetrical" approaches to counter each threat -- shooting missiles down with missiles, sinking submarines with other submarines, etc. Instead, as described in the JOAC and Air-Sea Battle, we will operate across domains. For example, we will defeat missiles with electronic warfare, disrupt surveillance systems with electromagnetic or cyberattacks, and defeat air threats with submarines. This is "networked, integrated attack" and it will require a force that is designed for -- and that regularly practices -- these kinds of operations.

Building a truly "joint" force

Conducting operations across domains requires rapid and tight coordination between air, ground, and naval forces -- a level of integration well beyond today's efforts to merely pre-plan and deconflict actions between services. This integration can't be achieved effectively and efficiently on an ad hoc basis. Forces must be "pre-integrated" -- before the fight begins. This compels us to work more closely as we develop and prepare our forces.

Today, for example, instructors from the Navy's "Top Gun" school routinely train with their counterparts at the Air Force Weapons School. As part of Air-Sea Battle we are pursuing this type of inter-service cooperation between all the services, as well as within each branch of each service. Just as in tactical aviation, we are expanding our doctrine integration to include additional areas of collaboration -- such as Army air-defense forces and Marine reconnaissance units. With the doctrine, procedures, investment, and training included in Air-Sea Battle's initiatives, we are moving from cooperation toward integration across domains. To foster integration we are directing an intensified approach to building common procedures, complementary budgets, combined exercises, and joint war games.

An essential prerequisite for cross-domain operations is communication and data links that connect sensors, decision-makers, and shooters armed with kinetic, electromagnetic, and cyber weapons. Our investments, guided by the Air-Sea Battle concept, are building increasingly robust networks able to communicate between each service's platforms, even in a contested electromagnetic environment. Part of this effort is focused on the systems and procedures for Joint Tactical Networking to connect today's aircraft and ships with new 5th generation aircraft, such as the F-35 and F-22.

Two recent tests advanced our efforts to promote Joint Tactical Networking. In the first, an Air Force F-22 provided updated targeting information to a Navy submarine-launched Tomahawk missile. Similarly, in September 2012 an Army Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) ashore successfully guided a U.S. Navy SM-6 surface-to-air missile to intercept an incoming cruise missile, demonstrating the ability to extend the range of an Aegis-equipped ship to well beyond the horizon and over land. These examples show how integrating capabilities from multiple services and domains combine to provide greater range and more options for commanders.

We cannot forget, however, that the enemy gets a vote. Electromagnetic jammers and decoys are becoming less expensive and easier to obtain, and they can emit more complex signals. Our communication networks will need to be resilient and redundant. We are investing together in new waveforms that are resistant to jamming while also building systems that can back up traditional satellite communications. Through the FY 2013 Air-Sea Battle Implementation Master Plan, our services will continue to pursue communication network improvements through technology development, war games, and the operational alignment of our Air and Maritime Operations Centers around the world.

By improving our integration, we improve our combined capability to assure access without expensive new investments. A more efficient and effective force will provide a starting point for evaluating how and where we should address potential reductions in future defense budgets.

Keeping up the momentum

We continue to implement the Air-Sea Battle concept in three main ways: compelling institutional change, fostering conceptual alignment, and promoting programmatic collaboration.

Compelling institutional change. The Air-Sea Battle concept establishes a "new normal" for integration between services so they are able to conduct successful cross-domain operations. This approach will require breaking down traditional service and community paradigms. Each of our services and each of the communities (e.g., fighters, bombers, submarines, surface ships, satellites, cyber operators, patrol aircraft, etc.) within our services have decades of established tactics, procedures, and traditions that may not align with each other. We will have to eliminate some of these differences to become a more integrated force able to operate across domains. For example, fighter aircraft may be used as surveillance platforms to support submarines attacking air defenses, or submarines may operate remotely-piloted aircraft to support Marine special forces attacking a radar.

This change will take sustained effort. We established a joint Air-Sea Battle Office (ASBO) with representatives from each service to lead day-to-day implementation of the concept. The ASBO sponsors war games and simulations, assists with service-level doctrinal changes, and advises on budget decisions. Most recently, in December, the ASBO hosted 150 personnel from all four services for the 2012 Air-Sea Battle Implementation Working Group. Representatives from U.S. Central and Pacific Commands, as well as their supporting components, played prominent roles during the discussions. The working group made significant progress in solidifying the habitual relationships Air-Sea Battle will require between the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

Fostering conceptual alignment. The ASBO promotes incorporation of Air-Sea Battle concept elements in service concepts and assures the Air-Sea Battle effort stays consistent with and supports the overarching Joint Operational Access Concept. For example, Air-Sea Battle was incorporated into each of the services' war games during 2012. The Marine Corps' Expeditionary Warrior (March), Army's Unified Quest (June), Navy's Global (August), and Air Force's Unified Engagement (December) included objectives that explored Air-Sea Battle as a way to meet anti-access challenges. The Air-Sea Battle focus increased with each successive game, culminating with Unified Engagement 12, a "table-top" wargame including about 300 participants from a dozen nations. This was the first Air-Sea Battle war game to include participation by our treaty allies. Allied participation will remain a priority going forward, with the intent of influencing multinational military concepts, tactics, and doctrine.

Promoting programmatic collaboration. The ASBO assesses service programs and budgets and recommends specific solutions to address Joint Force shortfalls against anti-access challenges. To most efficiently deliver solutions, the ASBO's specific programmatic recommendations are coordinated between the services. Starting with the FY 2010 budget, application of the Air-Sea Battle concept has resulted in tangible investments to deliver the integrated, cross-domain capabilities required to defeat modern threats to access. Over the past two years these investments included the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile; Navy electronic warfare systems, such as Ship Signals Exploitation Equipment; and new data links for our fighters.

As part of its assessments, the ASBO is identifying redundancies across the services that can be eliminated. These efforts will be important as our resources become more constrained. For example, in the FY 2013 budget our services proposed reductions in Global Hawk unmanned vehicles, Air Force strike fighters, and Navy surface combatants. We will use the Air-Sea Battle concept to help integrate our force further and maintain our capability in the face of smaller budgets.

A challenge we can't ignore

Some will argue the United States can afford to retrench and "reset" following more than a decade of war, with decreasing resources and without an existential threat such as the Soviet Union. We don't have that luxury. Anti-access threats erode confidence in the freedom of the global commons that underpins our global economy. Nations are fielding and directly threatening their neighbors with anti-access systems. And potential aggressors are using these capabilities to assert that they can slow or prevent a U.S. response in order to undermine confidence in U.S. security guarantees.

The United States must sustain its capability to assure access when needed to counter these trends. Our services will continue to increase the integration of our training and improve our coordination in developing doctrine, operating concepts, new capabilities, and investment plans. We will need, however, the support of our partners in Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to ensure this integration is implemented in our budgets and strategies. Through our combined efforts, Air-Sea Battle will assure continued U.S. freedom of action and with it our ability to deter aggression, maintain regional stability, dampen crisis, and assure our allies and partners.
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MARWAN NAAMANI/AFP/Getty Images


Admiral Jonathan Greenert is the chief of naval operations, and General Mark Welsh is the chief of staff of the Air Force.
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JtheDeuce
JtheDeuce

The Chief of naval Operations and Chief of Staff of the Air Force have penned an article for Foreign Policy Magazine on the importance of ASB and how it will "Break the Kill Chain". My first thought was, "Why Foreign Policy magazine?" I understand the wide readership within domestic policy and defense and large external readership. Perhaps it is one step in assuaging fears that the Air Force and Navy will use it as a reason to dominate defense dollars in the future, build alliances behind the idea of ASB within the Government and other international prominent defense thinkers/allies?



I would have to ponder more on that point to come to a good conclusion. However, one sentence in this article gives me pause: "Air-Sea Battle is not a military strategy; it isn't about countering an invasion; it isn't a plan for U.S. forces to conduct an assault. Air-Sea Battle is a concept for defeating threats to access and enabling follow-on operations, which could include military activities as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster response."



1. Are there sever access challenges to HA/DR missions other than natural obstacles, which prevent the US from rendering assistance? Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, and so many other nations have allowed us to assist to some extent, will that actually change in the future? If it does, will ASB do anything to insure a sovereign nation allows the US to conduct HA/DR on its soil?



2. ASB seems very vague according to what the authors say it is not. If it is not definitive in any of the above named areas, why do we need it? Furthermore, it seems like we have volumes of current doctrine telling us how to "defeat access threats and enable follow-on operations."



In the subsequent paragraph the authors state quite explicitly that ASB "...defeats threats to access by, first, disrupting an adversary's command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; second, destroying adversary weapons launchers (including aircraft, ships, and missile sites); and finally, defeating the weapons an adversary launches."



Pardon me but is that not simply just a systems approach to targeting with a healthy dose of COG Analysis (Tactical-Operational level COG analysis principally speaking.)?



Finally the last page and paragraphs deliver up some seemingly token systems identified by the ASB office which the Navy and Air Force have identified they could be cut..I know how the Air Force feels about the Global Hawk and how several communities have been trying to get rid of it for years...almost since inception. It never discusses the specific ships in the Surface fleet to be mothballed. And I am puzzled by the statement that the air force will take less F-35s? Will that be to the Air National Guard? Because 5 F-35s have been identified as possibly being cut for ANG units as part of the Air Force's sequestration bill. (I don't have the link to the article where I read that.)
2 days agoReplyLike
j_kies
j_kies

All respect to the CNO and the CSAF; however, the ASB problem is far harder than they indicate and it is not clear that the US is actually taking the problem seriously.



The references to Cyber and Electromagnetic 'Weapons' appear unsophisticated, how pray tell do you know that your 'weapon' was effective, who gets killed to establish that your 'weapon effectiveness surrogate' sucked?



ASB has a historic example where a numerically superior and technically superior attacking airforce (with combat experienced pilots) were set to establish air superiority against a land-based airforce with manual coordination of an 'integrated air defense'. Since ASB proposes to accomplish this same task of 'fighting in' only now with inferior numbers and with enemy threats to the airfields (especially the mobile ones) please define how ASB is different to the offensive side of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/battle_of_Britain.
3 days agoReplyLike
arvay
arvay

Just one point among many possible



" the dedicated effort by some nations and groups to prevent access to parts of the "global commons" -- those areas of the air, sea, cyberspace, and space that no one "owns," but upon which we all depend. "



The "commons" is not a "commons" when the US uses it as a staging ground for attacking or intimidating other nations. So, for example, sending numerous hostile vessels and aircraft into and around the Straits of Hormuz is not a boating vacation, or trade routes with Africa, it's part and parcel of hostile actions against Iran -- a policy which also includes acts of war such as cyber attacks and assassinations.

The authors placidly endorse the right to "coerce" others. Would they extend the same right to, say, China -- if it maintained a large aggressively armed strike force in the Gulf of Mexico "commons?" Oh, we're just exercising our rights of free passage!

I don't know if these guys think the rest of us are dumb, or are just so encased in their organizational bubble that they actually think this stuff makes sense -- except as a means of maintaining their well-funded battle groups.
4 days agoReplyLike
BobKoski
BobKoski

Excellent article Gentlemen. I appreciate the long term view of where we need to be going, but this all depends on the Nation's political leadership to have the sense and guts to actually do it.



Two points I think are worth mentioning. First, I will be fascinated to watch how the USS Ford class aircraft carriers are used as they begin to join the fleet. They are such a radical departure from the Nimitz class that it is difficult to predict how they will be used in the future along the lines this article predicts, but it will be very interesting to watch.



Second I would point out the Navy's recent success carrier launching the X-47B stealth drone aircraft. The Ford class EMALS (Electromagnetic Aircraft launching System) is tailor made for launching these kinds of aircraft much more effectively than steam catapults do. I will also be fascinated to watch how Naval Air incorporates these drones into regular air operations. The US Navy has been working with automatic carrier landing systems for decades and now they have an aircraft that is tailor made to go to sea and support many of the missions discussed here.



Thanks again for a well written and thought provoking article.
5 days agoReplyLike
BrianScott
BrianScott

This essay seems to mostly be about the South China Sea, without saying so.



The "Straits of Hormuz" reference is a red herring; the Iraninans can sink our carriers there at will. The US Navy figured that out in 2002, though that information may still be TOP SECRET.



You don't come right out and say it, Admiral, but you seem to understand that the Supercarrier is obsolete for dealing with all but a handful of third-world threats. That would be a tough thing for a tailhook guy to admit; lucky you are from the undersea warfare community. But if you understand that, aren't you obliged to reduce the squandering of critical funds on this legacy artifact of a different era ?

And General Welsh, you come dangerously close to acknowledging that the F-35 is an overpriced, underperforming piece of gold-plated junk, and continuing to fund it actually makes it impossible to fund what's needed to implement the Air-Sea Battle concept.

Doesn't that oblige you to recommend canceling it ?



Sounds like ASBO is a replacement for Joint Forces Command. That's one lesson unlearned.



"... in the FY 2013 budget our services proposed reductions in Global Hawk unmanned vehicles, Air Force strike fighters, and Navy surface combatants." That's a good start. Should be expanded to the Ford Class and the F-35 immediately.



ps: missiles don't "hone in;" they "home in." if you doubt this, use the Google.
5 days agoReplyLike
Jim Hasik
Jim Hasik

BrianScott I would very much like to know the source of your opinion that "the Iraninans can sink our carriers [in the Strait of Hormuz] at will". That is not my reading of the military balance in the Persian Gulf.
4 days agoReplyLike
JPWREL
JPWREL

Jim Hasik The Iranians don't have to sink a carrier but with mining or high speed short-range anti-shipping missiles can damage it enough to discourage placing it in the Straits. In case you haven't noticed all modern naval vessels especially the top heavy US versions that have good left-right offensive combo are still handicapped with having glass jaws.
4 days agoReplyLike
Jim Hasik
Jim Hasik

JPWREL Jim Hasik I think that most American admirals would agree that the Strait itself is an unwise place to loiter. Destroying Iran's ships and aircraft is accomplished rather better from farther away. That's what jet aircraft are for.



Quite separately, I agree that "modern" naval vessels can only withstand so much punishment, but as I believe that Wayne Hughes of the Naval Postgraduate School has aptly shown, that has been the case for over a century.
3 days agoReplyLike
FranzLiebkind
FranzLiebkind

Jim Hasik JPWREL

A bit off-topic, but any hesitancy the admirals have over loitering in the Strait of Hormuz must be must held in spades for the Taiwan Strait. This opens quite a can of worms for the coming East Asia pivot.
3 days agoReplyLike
BrianScott
BrianScott

ADM Greenert,

you wanna help make USA more secure ?

Fire the clowns at JTF-GTMO who are still inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on prisoners we have already declared to be functionally innocent.
5 days agoReplyLike
BrianScott
BrianScott

just started this article, but it looks like you've summarized the problem as:

"Personnel and infrastructure maintenance costs have risen by double-digit percentages since 2003 as our services took on new missions, such as defending allies from ballistic missiles and countering piracy and illicit trafficking."



In case you don't have anyone on staff willing to speak truth to power, which is almost always the case anywhere you go in the military, here's the simple solution:

*** presonnel costs too high - reduce the number of personnel.

*** infrastructure costs too high - get rid of unneeded bases.

*** new mission, European missile defense against Iran - shut it down (Iran doesn't have missiles that threaten Western Europe.

*** new mission, Somali piracy - instead of countering 200 barefoot teenagers armed mostly with spears with a carrier task force that costs $ 6 billion a year, give the Puntland government $ 200 million a year to take care of it. They are actually far more capable than the US Navy in dealing with this.

*** new mission, illicit trafficking - huh ? DoD is supposed to stop prostitution now ?



You two should be embarrassed.
5 days agoReplyLike
schneibster
schneibster

You speak of "eliminating" some doctrines. I would be more comfortable with integrating them. I foresee interservice jealousies and the kinds of cartoons that spring up on bulletin boards questioning brainless policies if this is allowed to go too far, or for that matter very far at all.

Each different organization will need to be able to predict what other organizations they are to integrate with will do. This prevents friendly fire incidents. In addition clear expectations help avoid confusion, another source of these incidents. This of course presents an avenue of attack, by misidentification using cybernetic or electromagnetic attacks.



These comments aside this seems like a credible integration of tactics, logistics, and politics.
5 days agoReplyLike
WalosoMaloso
WalosoMaloso

I think this proposal is sound and honest. Im glad to see that the military is coming clean about the electrmagnetic weapons. 20 years ago i read a book by T.E. Bearden about pulsing gigawatts of power on a radar wave using a techique known as phase conjugation... I digress... I live outside the US. And yes there is a lot of sentiment that the US should "mind its own business". Without fail, the people that express these views are woefully ignorant of the "global dynamic". They tell me about the evil of US imperialism... and then show me their new smartphone!!

Does the US need to be the the worlds policeman...No. But as far as I know, US foregin policy is dedicated promoting peace and freedom . How can you argue against that?
6 days agoReplyLike
goldeneye
goldeneye

"...less like a global superpower bully..."



All America is doing is trying to guarantee un-fettered passage of the world's major sea-lanes. They have to do this; they only survive as a trading nation world-wide, it's that basic for them. If ships don't cross the world's largest oceans, to get to the Americans, they will be un-able to sustain any sort of economy...Which underlies everything else...
6 days agoReplyLike
ArenHaich
ArenHaich

America can try to be more modest and less like a global superpower bully to adjust its military expenditure and ambitions.

How about the US taking the sensible path of honing its own anti-access capabilities to protect the homeland against likely aggressors?

America can then concentrate on providing anti-access technologies to its key allies so that they too can protect themselves against other encroaching powers or neighbors.

The global trend is that fewer and fewer countries want the US as the world’s policeman. Get used to it and make life easier for Americans and the military strategists.
6 days agoReplyLike
AdinB
AdinB

I'll believe that AirSea Battle means something once they fully develop interoperable Datalinks and platform metadata sharing. Air Battle Managers can't get full data from flying fighters and F22s can't fully share data with F35s. With nonstandard datalinks on different platforms I'll be shocked if we get something that actually gets useful data in digital form fast enough to be useful.
6 days agoReplyLike
johnboy4546
johnboy4546

"Nations seeking to intimidate their neighbors are turning to anti-access strategies because they are cost-effective."



Gosh! And....



.....nations that are seeking to AVOID being intimidated by the overwhelming military might of the Good Ol' USofA are also turning to anti-access strategies.



So who is to decide which is which?



That is, who decides whether that strategy is being followed by

a) no-good-nations with black hats and evil in their heart, or by

b) put-upon-nations who are sick of seeing The Mighty Six Fleet (or the 3rd fleet, or the 7th fleet...) trailing their coat just offshore and daring anyone to do anything about it?



Apparently it is the Good Ol' USofA who has the right to make that call, which is a kinda' obvious conflict of interest when you think about it....
6 days agoReplyLike
schneibster
schneibster

johnboy4546 You could always watch and see if they threaten people with nuclear holocausts.



Just sayin'.
5 days agoReplyLike
johnboy4546
johnboy4546

schneibster

"You could always watch and see if they threaten people with nuclear holocausts."



And that would be.... who, exactly?



"Just sayin'."



Yeah, you are. You appear to be good at that.



But, apparently, you are the only one who is sayin' that.
5 days agoReplyLike
BrianScott
BrianScott

johnboy4546

actually, there is an entire chorus of neocons in DC who proclaim that Iran has threatened to wipe Israel off the face of the map. They also warn that Iran wants to have nuclear weapons. I think that's what schniebster is hinting at.



So, presumably in 20 or 30 years, whatever state exists in that part of the world where Iran sits today may have nuclear weapons, the means to deliver them, and the desire to start a war that will result in their annhiliation.



Rational people may disagree, but it is a fact that a lot of people allege exactly that.
5 days agoReplyLike
schneibster
schneibster

johnboy4546 "And that would be.... who, exactly?"



The DPRK, on Earth.
4 days agoReplyLike
schneibster
schneibster

BrianScott johnboy4546 I suppose I could wave my hands at Iran, but I don't actually believe they're making nuclear weapons, just brinking like adolescents.
4 days agoReplyLike
schneibster
schneibster

johnboy4546 Shall I quote Kim Jong Un threatening a nuclear attack against Seoul?



Are you really that ignorant?
4 days agoReplyLike
schneibster
schneibster

johnboy4546 Or just that much of a liar?
4 days agoReplyLike
johnboy4546
johnboy4546

schneibster johnboy4546

"Shall I quote Kim Jong Un threatening a nuclear attack against Seoul?"



Oh, please do.



Then we can compare that quote against the authors original claim, which was this:

"Nations seeking to intimidate their neighbors are turning to anti-access strategies because they are cost-effective."



Which will then allow us to evaluate this statement:

"You could always watch and see if they threaten people with nuclear holocausts."

to see whether that last statement really is effective at separating out

a) the "nations seeking to intimidate their neighbors" from

b) the "nations feeling intimidated by the US military".



So, please, go right ahead....


4 days agoReplyLike
johnboy4546
johnboy4546

schneibster

Owwww, look, maybe I should spell this out since you *do* appear to be utterly incapable of holding to a coherent line of thinking:

1) I was pointing out that the authors appear to be claiming that nations only adopt "anti-access strategies" when they are "seeking to intimidate their neighbours".

2) I made the (not particularly radical) point that there is another reason why nations may seek "anti-access strategies" i.e. they feel threatened BY the United States military might

3) I made the further point that it is possible to confuse (1) with (2).



At about which moment you jumped up 'n' down in a masterly demonstration of the truth of point (3), which you did by spouting this nonsense:

"You could always watch and see if they threaten people with nuclear holocausts."



Nooooo, actually, that doesn't tell you anything about the distinction between (1) and (2).



After all, nukes are the ultimate "anti-access" weapons, and therefore it is just as likely that someone will start making noises about using them when

a) they feel threatened

as when

b) they seek to threaten others.



Pretty obvious, I would have thought.



But, then again, that requires "thinking", rather than "just sayin'"
4 days agoReplyLike
schneibster
schneibster

johnboy4546 You should try touching base with reality occasionally: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/w...alls-hawaii-and-us-mainland-targets.html?_r=0
3 days agoReplyLike
schneibster
schneibster

johnboy4546 Good luck with your psychosis.
3 days agoReplyLike
johnboy4546
johnboy4546

schneibster

**Yawn**



Back to the very beginning, a very good place to start....



That North Korea has threatened both the USA and the South Koreans with their nuclear arsenal is not something that I dispute.



What I am disputing is **YOUR** claim that such threats allow us to distinguish between:

a) Countries that adopt "anti-access" policies so that they can "intimidate their neighbors"

from

b) Countries that adopt "anti-access" policies because they are being intimidated BY the threat of force by an overwhelmingly powerful and demonstrably trigger-happy USofA



http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/w...alls-hawaii-and-us-mainland-targets.html?_r=0



Yeah, annnnnnnnnnd???????



Are the North Koreans issuing threats because of (a) or because of (b)?



I would suggest that they are issuing those threats because the USofA has, indeed, been flying nuclear-bomb-capable B2 bombers up 'n' down the Korean Peninsula, as well as sailing nuclear-missile-equipped warships up 'n' down the Yellow Sea i.e. North Korea has been making those threats because it has just been Scared Shitless By The USA.


3 days agoReplyLike
johnboy4546
johnboy4546

schneibster

"Good luck with your psychosis."



*Yawn* again.



You do appear to be very quick at losing the thread of, well, everything.



As in: you keep forgetting what you are arguing about, to the point at which you cease to "debate" and thus you do little more than hop around like a frog on a hotplate.



It is, indeed, your singular talent.....
3 days agoReplyLike
schneibster
schneibster

johnboy4546 No, not the beginning.



The point where you started lying.
3 days agoReplyLike
schneibster
schneibster

johnboy4546 I don't see a great deal of point in arguing with delusional psychotics.



Sorry.
3 days agoReplyLike
johnboy4546
johnboy4546

schneibster

"No, not the beginning."



How can anyone seek to understand unless they are willing to start at the beginning and work their way forward from there?



"The point where you started lying."



And THAT sentence is Exhibit A, if it pleases the court.



At no stage have I "lied" about anything and, I will point out, Schneibster can not demonstrate anything to the contrary.
3 days agoReplyLike
johnboy4546
johnboy4546

schneibster

"I don't see a great deal of point in arguing with delusional psychotics."



And that, ladies and gentlemen, is the schneibster running away following his dreadful realization that his (supposed) slam dunk had missed the ring by A Country Mile.



And it missed because (did I already mention this? I think I did) scheibster can not keep track of what it is that he is arguing about.



"Sorry"



Oh, I have no doubt about that.



Indeed, that is apparently the only thing you have nailed throughout this very disagreeable conversation.
3 days agoReplyLike
schneibster
schneibster

johnboy4546

The DPRK threatened the ROK with nuclear holocaust.



You can lie all you like but that's what really happened.



The US had nothing to do with it other than being threatened, and having our ally threatened. We responded with sufficient force to forestall the DPRK's threat, and sufficient force to ensure nobody would try to attack the anti-missile cruisers that nullified the DPRK's threat.



You representing this as some kind of "hegemonistic" move is lying, plain and simple. You're just farting in the bathtub.
2 days agoReplyLike
johnboy4546
johnboy4546

schneibster

"The DPRK threatened the ROK with nuclear holocaust."



*yawn*



I'll repeat this again, coz' it never gets old: a nuclear power can threaten to use its nuclear weapons because:

a) It seeks to intimidate it's neighbour

or

b) because it feels intimidated BY another power.



Ergo, simply pointing to those threats tells you nothing about who is intimidating whom.....



"You can lie all you like but that's what really happened."



Oh, dear, *yawn* again.



I'll point out again (how many times is this now?) that the original sentence from the authors was this:

"Nations seeking to intimidate their neighbors are turning to anti-access strategies because they are cost-effective."



The key word is "intimidate". It most definitely is not "threaten".



Ergo, the central issue (and how many times do I need to point this out?) is "who is being intimidated?", not "who is issuing the threats?"



They are, indeed, two very different things, and From The Very First you have shown your complete and utter inability to understand that distinction.



Honestly, do you know a.n.y.t.h.i.n.g?
2 days agoReplyLike
schneibster
schneibster

johnboy4546

"'The DPRK threatened the ROK with nuclear holocaust.'



*yawn*"



OK, well if you're bored with foreign affairs why don't you leave?
1 day agoReplyLike
schneibster
schneibster

johnboy4546 You appear to have mistaken me for someone who cares why the DPRK does what it does.



I don't.



They did it.



There are consequences.



Wusses like you always argue against consequences because you're afraid of them.
1 day agoReplyLike
johnboy4546
johnboy4546

schneibster johnboy4546

"You appear to have mistaken me for someone who cares why the DPRK does what it does."



*yawn*



Schneibster is doing what he always does; shifting the goalposts.



To recap:

1) AdmiralGeneral claimed that the only reason for a country to establish "anti-area access" is so that it can then "intimidate the neighbors"

2) I pointed out, correctly, that there is ANOTHER reason i.e. because that country is intimidated BY the military might of the United States.

3) Schneibster then claimed to have a method of distinguishing (1) from (2).

4) I pointed out, correctly, that his foolproof method is but the method of a fool.



Leading up to this.......

"You appear to have mistaken me for someone who cares why the DPRK does what it does."



Proof positive, ladies and gentlemen", that Schneibster lacks the intellect to comprehend what is actually being argued about.



"I don't."



That's because Schneibster is holding an argument with himself, after which he congratulates himself on his own cleverness.



"They did it."



They did.... what, exactly?



Q: Did they provide Schneibster with the "proof" that he had a foolproof method of distinguishing between "intimitading the neighbors" and "being intimidated by the USA"?

A: Well, no, that would require an understanding of the reasons WHY the North Koreans are issuing those threats.



Q: Does Schneibster give any consideration to that?

A: No, he explicitly says that he does not care.



Q: Meaning.....?

A: He has already lost the argument.
1 day agoReplyLike
schneibster
schneibster

johnboy4546 Doesn't matter why.



Apologists for people who kill millions are shitbags.
1 day agoReplyLike
johnboy4546
johnboy4546

schneibster



Schneibster: "Doesn't matter why."



Then why did you butt in at the beginning?



Because (and why do I have to remind you of this?) my post was all about an unwarranted assumption (the only reason for "anti-area access" is TO INTIMIDATE THE NEIGHBORS) when it should be obvious that there is another reason (to avoid BEING INTIMIDATED BY the US military).



It was at that precise point that you attempted to claim that you knew how to distinguish the former from the latter: "You could always watch and see if they threaten people with nuclear holocausts."



Noooooooo, you can't use THAT rule of thumb to distinguish the former from the latter, and that remains true no matter how many times you attempt this non-answer:

Schneibster: "Doesn't matter why."



Dude, it matters a great deal to the issue at hand, which is whether - or not - "watch and see if they threaten people with nuclear holocausts" as a valid diagnostic tool for distinguishing

a) "Nations seeking to intimidate their neighbors"

from

b) "nations that are seeking to AVOID being intimidated by the overwhelming military might of the Good Ol' USofA"



Any idiot should be able to understand that point, so what's your excuse?
1 day agoReplyLike
schneibster
schneibster

johnboy4546 Gotten a bit far afield from Kim Jong Il threatening to nuke Seoul, haven't we?



That was your design, of course.
6 hours agoReplyLike
LordHalston
LordHalston

"The dedicated effort by some nations and groups to prevent access to parts of the "global commons" -- those areas of the air, sea, cyberspace, and space that no one "owns," but upon which we all depend. These "anti-access" strategies employ military capabilities, geography, diplomatic pressure, and international law to impede the free use of ungoverned spaces."



-We have chosen the role of fighting this fight...and I, as an American am proud of that fact.



Call it jingoism...but if not America than who? If not now...then when?
6 days agoReplyLike
jamsb3
jamsb3

LordHalston

Call it imperialism, it fits.



How about the obvious, if the Iranian Navy buzzed the Gulf of Mexico every day the Lord God America would have a fit.
6 days agoReplyLike
urbantip
urbantip

LordHalstonAh, this reminds me of the old good "White Man's Burden". And we know how that turned out to be in practice.

6 days agoReplyLike
epsilon7428
epsilon7428

LordHalston

Thank you lord halston for the truth
4 days agoReplyLike
jamsb3
jamsb3

Wow cool. What's not to not like about PT boats, fog, and .50 cal guns? The Gulf of Tonkin is one place the Persian Gulf is another.



"Air-Sea Battle will assure continued U.S. freedom of action and with it our ability to deter aggression, maintain regional stability, dampen crisis, and assure our allies and partners." Golly, Sergeant Pyle that sure sounds fine.
6 days agoReplyLike
pi for dinner
pi for dinner

Oh, what to believe. Sounds like expanded talking points derived from a pointless powerpoint presentation that was kludged together by a contractor on their way out the door. As the cliche goes, 'The admiral and general believe their own press releases.'
7 days agoReplyLike
John Newcomb
John Newcomb

Not sure that the Admiral and General have hit the mark with this article, or maybe its because the only exitential threat that they can clearly name as provocateurs are Iran and North Korea. Could be that the Putinist Russian theory of "multi-polar" world means that countries like Russia will be working on low-threat, low-cost ways to reduce American access to some places - while increasing Russian access.



Examples might include the Black Sea especially:



1. Russia Today video of Russian complaints of USS Monterey entrance to Black Sea with Ukrainian invite: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3qnmueWfeo



2. Geriatric Sevastopol Ukrainian Communist Party "welcoming party": http://video.mail.ru/mail/pdv69/21/766.html



Contrast to the traditional cooked pig welcoming given to Russian Navy returning to Sevastopol:

http://inotv.rt.com/2013-04-01/Korabli-CHF-Rossii-vernulis-v



- Now, what about the Russian Navy moving into the Mediterranean Sea?
7 days agoReplyLike
Sam the man
Sam the man

Jeesh. I though corporate management techno-babble was unreadable.



Good luck with the force deployment upgrade joint task force for intermediate risk assessment and interdiction....on a biannual basis.
7 days agoReplyLike

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For links see article source....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40915&tx_ttnews[backPid]=13&cHash=f19a1bfe952ecb21e3a167e2180c1cfc

Missile Defense with Chinese Characteristics
Publication: China Brief Volume: 13 Issue: 11
May 23, 2013 04:16 PM Age: 22 hrs
By: Michael S. Chase

Could the HQ-9 be Precursor for Chinese Missile Defense?

On January 27, 2013, China conducted its second mid-course missile defense interceptor test, leading to considerable speculation among Chinese and Western analysts about Beijing’s motives and intentions as well as its plans for further development of mid-course intercept technology and possible deployment of its own missile defense system. Given Beijing’s longstanding and vehement opposition to U.S. missile defense programs—which it charges damages strategic stability and undermines China’s security by raising doubts about the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent—it would seem logical that China would refrain from pursuing similar capabilities (“China Steps Up Rhetoric Against U.S. Missile Defense,” China Brief, October 19, 2012). Somewhat ironically, however, even as Chinese officials have continued to criticize the United States for conducting research on and activities related to missile defense, China has been developing its own missile defense technology. Indeed, over the past three years, Beijing has conducted two missile defense interception tests—both of which were accompanied by brief official statements—and Chinese analysts have suggested a number of potential directions for China’s missile defense program.

China’s Missile Defense Interception Tests

China conducted the first of its two missile defense interception tests on January 11, 2010. China’s official Xinhua News Service released a brief statement that provided only very limited information on the test. The statement read “On January 11, 2010, China conducted a test on ground-based midcourse missile interception technology within its territory. The test has achieved the expected objective. The test is defensive in nature and is not targeted at any country” (Xinhua, January 11, 2010). At a Foreign Ministry press conference the next day, a spokeswoman repeated the themes contained in the brief official statement that followed the test. In an attempt to distinguish it from China’s January 2007 ASAT test, the spokeswoman added that the missile defense test did not leave any debris in space or pose a threat to the safety of any orbiting spacecraft (Xinhua, January 12, 2010). Beijing’s strategic communication plan following the January 2010 missile defense interceptor test clearly represented a major improvement compared to the confusion and awkward silence that followed China’s January 2007 ASAT test, but Chinese official and unofficial statements still left many key questions unanswered [1].

Following China’s second missile defense interception test, which was conducted in January 2013, Chinese official media carried a brief report confirming that it had taken place, but the statement provided only limited information on the results and almost no insight into China’s rationale for the development of its own missile defense technology. The report stated that China “again carried out a land-based mid-course missile interception test within its territory.” It quoted a Ministry of National Defense spokesman, who stated the test was “defensive in nature” and not targeted at any other country, and indicated the test “reached the preset goal” (Xinhua, January 28). The report also described the test as similar to the one that China successfully carried out in January 2010, but offered no further details. Other official media reports echoed the theme that the test was defensive and was not targeted at any specific country.

Another theme highlighted by some official media reports was the technical complexity of China’s missile defense tests. One Xinhua report stated that such tests demonstrate “highly complicated technologies in detecting, tracking and destroying a ballistic missile flying in the [sic] outer space.” The report described the successful anti-missile test, “together with a string of other military equipment progress,” including the sea trials of China's first aircraft carrier and the test flight of a developmental large transport aircraft, as a reflection of China’s growing military power. Specifically, it stated these developments “demonstrated the country's fast-growing ability to defend its own national security and deter any possible threats" (Xinhua, January 28). In addition, separate media reports lauded Beijing’s disclosure of the test as a sign of China’s “increasing transparency in military affairs” (Xinhua, January 28). Yet the official reports provided no insight into the strategic rationale for China’s investment in missile defense technology, the PLA’s plans for future tests or Beijing’s thinking about the potential operational deployment of missile defense systems.

Motives and Implications

Although China publicly announced both of its missile defense tests, it has not provided any official explanation of its motives for the development of missile defense technology or its plans for the deployment of missile defense capabilities. Chinese official statements thus have raised more questions than they have answered. Nonetheless, knowledgeable Chinese observers suggest there are at least three paths Beijing could follow in the future: (1) continue to refine its missile defense technology while refraining from deploying an operational system; (2) deploy a national missile defense system intended to protect the entire country, at least from a small-scale ballistic missile attack (like the current U.S. national missile defense system); or (3) deploy a small number of missile defense interceptors in a point defense role, to provide some level of protection for key strategic targets such as its ICBMs or strategic command and control facilities [2].

As for the first potential way forward, following China’s second missile defense test, Li Bin, a well-known Chinese scholar who specializes in nuclear strategy and arms control issues, suggested that Beijing was likely focusing on technology development in an attempt to “assess capabilities” rather than planning to deploy a national missile defense system. Furthermore, in Li’s words, “China’s 2010 and 2013 missile intercept tests demonstrated that the country had acquired [hit-to-kill] technology, but that does not mean China has a conceptual missile defense system that can target incoming missiles from any specific country.”

Perhaps the least likely outcome would be deployment of a full-scale national missile defense system. As Li Bin puts it, “In the U.S.-Chinese context, it would be very inefficient for China to deploy a national missile defense system to counter U.S. offensive nuclear forces. If the Chinese want to use a national missile defense system to limit the damage caused by U.S. strategic missiles, they will need many more interceptors than the United States would need for the same purpose. China would have to pay much more money than United States to build up its capability. Moreover, such a missile defense system, if it contained enough interceptors, would have broader costs as well—the same negative impact as the U.S. national missile defense system currently does on U.S.-Chinese strategic stability.” Even one modeled after that of the United States and capable only of intercepting a small number of incoming warheads would seem to be a poor fit for China’s strategic circumstances.

If Chinese leaders intend to deploy an operational missile defense system, a point defense system designed to defend a handful of small areas against ballistic missile attack would seem a more logical and affordable approach. According to Li Bin, a point defense system would represent “a much more reasonable choice than a national missile defense system for China if it decides to develop its hit-to-kill technology into a missile defense system.” Li suggests that a point defense system could be used to protect Chinese command and control centers, and thus to ensure that “Chinese political and military leaders would survive a surprise preemptive nuclear strike so that they could direct a retaliatory nuclear strike.” According to Li, such a system “could also be used to protect some of China’s strategic nuclear weapons and increase their survivability.” Indeed, Li’s earlier work has highlighted the possibility that point defense systems could enhance the survivability of China’s silo-based ICBMs.

In contrast to the potentially destabilizing effects of a broader national missile defense system, Li writes, “a point defense system would make China’s nuclear deterrent more credible and ensure its strategic stability with other nuclear-armed countries.” This assessment appears to track closely with the post-test comments of military officers who suggested that defensive capabilities would improve the survivability of China’s strategic nuclear forces. Although none of these comments specified an exact role for China’s mid-course missile defense interceptors, they would appear to be consistent with their employment in a point defense role, probably protecting Chinese ICBMs. China’s approximately 20 silo-based ICBMs would seem to be the best candidates for this purpose, given that China presumably sees them as much more vulnerable to a first-strike than its road-mobile ICBMs. In addition, employing missile defense in this role could be less difficult—and less expensive—than trying to deploy even a limited national missile defense system. Indeed, Li Bin suggests that compared to a national system, a point defense system would have more modest technical requirements and a much lower cost.

If China pursues the deployment of a missile defense system, it will need more than ground-based interceptors. As Chinese analysts have noted, Beijing also will need complementary capabilities, such as ballistic missile early warning satellites (Hubei Daily, January 28). China currently lacks early warning satellites like the U.S. Defense Support Program (DSP) and Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites.

As for the broader implications of China’s missile defense program, Chinese analysts suggest it will strengthen, rather than undermine strategic deterrence. Beijing continues to object to missile defense systems it sees as strategically destabilizing (most notably, those of the United States), but it apparently does not see its own missile defense system as problematic from this perspective. Indeed, Chinese analysts do not appear to be concerned that China’s development of missile defense will trigger an arms race. So long as China limits its missile defense deployments to a point defense role, continues to adhere to its longstanding “No First Use” (NFU) policy and maintains a nuclear force posture clearly oriented toward retaliatory missions, this thinking does not contradict China’s broader position on missile defense. Thus, Beijing can make the case that its own missile defense program is not inconsistent with its argument that missile defense systems potentially capable of negating an adversary's strategic deterrent are destabilizing, especially when coupled with first strike doctrines and capabilities.

Underscoring the extent to which Beijing’s development of missile defense technology is linked to China’s other strategic weapons programs, some Chinese analysts have characterized China’s missile defense program as an emerging element of China’s overall strategic deterrence posture. For example, after the January 2013 missile defense test, Senior Colonel Shao Yongling of the PLA Second Artillery Force Command College told the official Communist Party newspaper People’s Daily that China’s development of mid-course missile intercept technology shows “the country’s strategic deterrence system is shifting from relying merely on offensive weapons to integrating offensive and defensive weapons.” Shao suggested that missile defense would allow China to continue to “maintain a relatively small number of nuclear weapons given its increasing defensive capabilities.” Specifically, in Shao’s words, “as long as enough nuclear weapons survive first-strike attacks, China can carry out nuclear retaliation against the attacker. Therefore, strong defensive capabilities are of great significance to the country's national security” (People’s Daily, January 30).

China’s development of missile defense technology has received less attention from scholars who follow Chinese military modernization than Beijing’s modernization of its nuclear force and its development of offensive counter-space capabilities [3]. China’s two missile defense intercept tests—and the comments of Chinese analysts linking them to Beijing’s ongoing attempts to strengthen its strategic deterrence capabilities—however, suggest that U.S. analysts should pay very close attention to Chinese missile defense developments.

Notes:

James Mulvenon, “Evidence of Learning? Chinese Strategic Messaging Following the Missile Defense Intercept Test,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 31, available online <http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM31JCM.pdf>.
Li Bin, “What China’s Missile Intercept Test Means,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 4, 2013, available online <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/04/what-china-s-missile-intercept-test-means/fa45>.
For one notable exception, see Kevin Pollpeter, “China’s Second Ballistic Missile Defense Test: A Search for Strategic Stability,” SITC Bulletin Analysis, February 2013, available online <http://igcc.ucsd.edu/assets/001/504391.pdf>.

Hummm....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/artic...and-austin-strange/china-has-drones-now-what?

China Has Drones. Now What?
When Beijing Will—and Won't—Use Its UAVs
Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange
May 23, 2013

Drones, able to dispatch death remotely, without human eyes on their targets or a pilot’s life at stake, make people uncomfortable -- even when they belong to democratic governments that presumably have some limits on using them for ill. (On May 23, in a major speech, U.S. President Barack Obama laid out what some of those limits are.) An even more alarming prospect is that unmanned aircraft will be acquired and deployed by authoritarian regimes, with fewer checks on their use of lethal force.

Those worried about exactly that tend to point their fingers at China. In March, after details emerged that China had considered taking out a drug trafficker in Myanmar (also known as Burma) with a drone strike, a CNN blog post warned, “Today, it’s Myanmar. Tomorrow, it could very well be some other place in Asia or beyond.” Around the same time, a National Journal article entitled “When the Whole World Has Drones” teased out some of the consequences of Beijing’s drone program, asking, “What happens if China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the South China Sea?”

Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle -- and its behavior will continue to be constrained by politics.

China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing’s opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the program, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, by 2011 China’s air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States’; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian (“sharp sword” in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.

This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Burmese drug trafficker, Naw Kham, made clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a nonstate actor. Meanwhile, as China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines, and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese Major General Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.

Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China’s rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China’s Defense Ministry.

What about using drones outside of Chinese-claimed areas? That China did not, in fact, launch a drone strike on the Burmese drug criminal underscores its caution. According to Liu Yuejin, the director of the antidrug bureau in China’s Ministry of Public Security, Beijing considered using a drone carrying a 20-kilogram TNT payload to bomb Kham’s mountain redoubt in northeast Myanmar. Kham had already evaded capture three times, so a drone strike may have seemed to be the best option. The authorities apparently had at least two plans for capturing Kham. The method they ultimately chose was to send Chinese police forces to lead a transnational investigation that ended in April 2012 with Kham’s capture near the Myanmar-Laos border. The ultimate decision to refrain from the strike may reflect both a fear of political reproach and a lack of confidence in untested drones, systems, and operators.

The restrictive position that Beijing takes on sovereignty in international forums will further constrain its use of drones. China is not likely to publicly deploy drones for precision strikes or in other military assignments without first having been granted a credible mandate to do so. The gold standard of such an authorization is a resolution passed by the UN Security Council, the stamp of approval that has permitted Chinese humanitarian interventions in Africa and antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. China might consider using drones abroad with some sort of regional authorization, such as a country giving Beijing explicit permission to launch a drone strike within its territory. But even with the endorsement of the international community or specific states, China would have to weigh any benefits of a drone strike abroad against the potential for mishaps and perceptions that it was infringing on other countries’ sovereignty -- something Beijing regularly decries when others do it.

The limitations on China’s drone use are reflected in the country’s academic literature on the topic. The bulk of Chinese drone research is dedicated to scientific and technological topics related to design and performance. The articles that do discuss potential applications primarily point to major combat scenarios -- such as a conflagration with Taiwan or the need to attack a U.S. aircraft carrier -- which would presumably involve far more than just drones. Chinese researchers have thought a great deal about the utility of drones for domestic surveillance and law enforcement, as well as for non-combat-related tasks near China’s contentious borders. Few scholars, however, have publicly considered the use of drone strikes overseas.

Yet there is a reason why the United States has employed drones extensively despite domestic and international criticism: it is much easier and cheaper to kill terrorists from above than to try to root them out through long and expensive counterinsurgency campaigns. Some similar challenges loom on China’s horizon. Within China, Beijing often considers protests and violence in the restive border regions, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, to constitute terrorism. It would presumably consider ordering precision strikes to suppress any future violence there. Even if such strikes are operationally prudent, China’s leaders understand that they would damage the country’s image abroad, but they prioritize internal stability above all else. Domestic surveillance by drones is a different issue; there should be few barriers to its application in what is already one of the world’s most heavily policed societies. China might also be willing to use stealth drones in foreign airspace without authorization if the risk of detection were low enough; it already deploys intelligence-gathering ships in the exclusive economic zones of Japan and the United States, as well as in the Indian Ocean.

Still, although China enjoys a rapidly expanding and cutting-edge drone fleet, it is bound by the same rules of the game as the rest of the military’s tools. Beyond surveillance, the other non-lethal military actions that China can take with its drones are to facilitate communications within the Chinese military, support electronic warfare by intercepting electronic communications and jamming enemy systems, and help identify targets for Chinese precision strike weapons, such as missiles. Beijing’s overarching approach remains one of caution -- something Washington must bear in mind with its own drone program.

The navies are used for proxy wars. Consider what happened in Korea (1950s) and VietNam (1960s). One small nation is set against another while the super powers back opposite sides. Afghanistan is a good example. These are training and proving grounds for the technologies while the banksters and corporate military hardware suppliers pocket the coin.

If there is ever a direct war among super powers, it will go nuclear quickly and satellites will be among the first casualties.

China is aggressively expanding its "ownership" of seas and resources. They need a navy to reach these places. Not only are they pushing on the asian island countries (including VietNam), but Africa and Australia hold desired resources always in their sights.