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Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialization

Monday, February 08, 2010
By Janusz Bugajski for CRIA

While it is understandable in the current global turmoil that policymakers and analysts in both Europe and North America wish to see Russia transformed from a strategic adversary into a strategic partner, it is important to base such an approach on a realistic appraisal of Moscow’s geopolitical objectives. Strategic partners not only share particular policies, but they are also bound by common interests and joint goals. While Russia can be a partner with the trans-Atlantic alliance in dealing with specific threats such as nuclear proliferation, climate change, or counter-terrorism, the current government in Moscow does not share the long-term strategic targets of either NATO or the EU.

Despite periodic trans-Atlantic disagreements, NATO and EU partners are committed to respecting the decision of sovereign states to accede to the multinational institutions of their choice. They also favor the expansion of democratic systems and legitimate governments that combine stability with respect for human and civil rights and that do not threaten the sovereignty of neighbors. The same foreign policy principles do not apply for the Russian authorities. Contrary to Western interests, the Kremlin’s goals and strategies revolve around a form of “pragmatic reimperialization” in which zero-sum calculations prevail. Russia’s administration seeks to be a global player, but in order to achieve this goal it remains intent on rolling back American influence, neutralizing the EU by focusing on bilateral ties with selected states, re-establishing zones of “privileged influence” around its long borders, and curtailing the expansion of Western institutions, particularly the NATO alliance.

Russia’s neo-imperial project no longer relies on Soviet-era instruments, such as ideological allegiance, military force, or the installation of proxy governments. Instead, the primary goal is to exert a predominant influence over the foreign and security policies of disparate states that will either remain neutral or support Russia’s reimperialization. Moscow has not embarked on a new bipolar Cold War, but pursues alliances with an assortment of states to undercut U.S. and NATO interests.

While its goals are imperial, the Kremlin’s strategies are pragmatic. It employs elastic and eclectic methods involving a mixture of enticements, threats, incentives, and pressures where Russia’s national interests are seen as predominating over those of its neighbors and individual European capitals. The Russian administration aims to discredit Western institutional enlargement, postures as the defender of the international legal order, seeks to neutralize democracy promoting institutions such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), pursues dependency relations with neighboring governments, manufactures security disputes with NATO to gain advantages in other arenas, and promotes its diplomatic indispensability in resolving conflicts that it has contributed to creating.

Russia’s brewing domestic problems, precipitated by the global financial crisis and deepened by the drop in crude oil and natural gas prices, have not aborted its expansionist ambitions. On the contrary, Moscow uses the opportunities presented by the economic turmoil among its weaker neighbors to further impose its interests. It may seek to deflect attention from mounting social and regional disquiet inside the Russian Federation to cultivate the sense of besiegement by pressuring various neighbors in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia to abide by its foreign and security decisions. It is therefore important for the NATO allies to work more closely with a range of countries along Russia’s borders – from Ukraine to Kazakhstan – to ensure their independence and stability during a time of uncertainty and economic crisis.
While President Barack Obama has symbolically pushed the “reset” button in relations with Moscow, some of Russia’s neighbors fear that instead of a “soft reset,” in which avenues of cooperation are pursued where there are genuine common interests, Washington may push a “hard reset” in which Russia’s imperial impulses are overlooked or accommodated. Indeed, the Putin-Medvedev tandem views reset buttons as the U.S.’s obligations to make compromises and as opportunities to expand and consolidate Russia’s influences. Moscow will therefore drive hard bargains to gain far-reaching advantages from Washington.

Expansive National Interests

Russia’s leaders believe that the world should be organized around a new global version of the 19th century “Concert of Europe” in which the great powers balance their interests, and smaller countries orbit around them as satellites and dependencies. From their point of view, in addition to having enduring interests, Russia also has enduring adversaries, particularly NATO and the U.S., in a competition to win over satellite states. For the Kremlin leadership there are only a handful of truly independent nations which must act as “poles of power” in a multipolar world order. Unipolarism, where the U.S. dominates world politics, must be replaced in order to establish checks and balances between the most important power centers. According to President Medvedev, the “continuing crisis of Euro-Atlantic policy is brought about by the “unipolar syndrome.”1
Russia’s regime does not favor working within multilateral institutions where its sovereignty and decision-making may be constrained, aside from privileged clubs such as G8 or the UN Security Council (UNSC).2 Hence, Moscow prefers multipolarity to multilateralism, where its power is enhanced rather than its involvement in cumbersome bodies where its power is diminished by the presence of several smaller countries. Russia is also more interested in regional organizations than global bodies, especially where it can play a leading role within them or act as a counterweight to Western leadership. Russia also favors participation in inter-institutional frameworks, in which it can assume an equal position to that of the EU, the U.S., or NATO, such as within the “Quartet” which deals with the Middle East peace process.

Despite initial expectations that a prosperous Russia will evolve into a democracy with a more benign foreign policy, the exact opposite occurred. With Putin as president from 1999 and the subsequent decade-long oil bonanza, Russia became more authoritarian in its domestic politics and increasingly imperialistic toward its neighbors. This trend has been largely supported by the Russian public, as the state media inculcated the myth that during the 1990s, Russia was in a chaotic state of affairs precipitated by international meddling, and that a strong centralized state was the most effective alternative.

Western analysts often assume that Russia is acting in accordance with its national interests rather than its state ambitions. It is useful to distinguish between the two rather than simply accepting official Russian assertions at face value. For instance, is it in Russia’s legitimate interest to prevent the accession of neighboring states into NATO or to oppose the positioning of NATO infrastructure among new Alliance members? Accepting such positions would indicate that NATO is a threat to Russia’s security and territorial integrity rather than being primarily a pretext used by Moscow to deny the sovereignty of neighboring countries.3

Russia’s ambitions are to fundamentally alter the existing European security structure, to marginalize or sideline NATO, and to diminish the U.S. role in European security. In all these areas, Russia’s national interests fundamentally diverge from those of the U.S.; or, more precisely, the Russian leadership does not share Western interests or threat perceptions.4 To affirm its national interests, the Medvedev administration has released three major policy documents: the Foreign Policy Concept in July 2008, the Foreign and Security Policy Principles in August 2008, and the National Security Strategy in May 2009.5

The Foreign Policy Concept claims that Russia is a resurgent great power, exerting substantial influence over international affairs and determined to defend the interests of Russian citizens wherever they reside. According to the Foreign and Security Policy Principles, Moscow follows five key principles: the primacy of international law, multipolarity to replace U.S.-dominated unipolarity, the avoidance of Russian isolationism, the protection of Russians wherever they reside, and Russia’s privileged interests in regions adjacent to Russia.

Russia’s National Security Strategy, which replaced the previous National Security Concepts, repeats some of the formulations in the other two documents and depicts NATO expansion and its expanded global role as a major threat to Russia’s national interests and to international security. The document asserts that Russia seeks to overcome its domestic problems and emerge as an economic powerhouse. Much attention was also devoted to the potential risk of future energy wars over regions such as the Arctic, where Russia would obviously defend its access to hydrocarbon resources. The document also envisages mounting competition over energy sources escalating into armed conflicts near Russia’s borders.

Among the customary list of threats to Russia’s security, the National Security Strategy includes alleged falsifications of Russian history.6 The Kremlin is engaged in an extensive historical revisionist campaign in which it seeks to depict Russia’s Tsarist and Soviet empires as benevolent and civilizing missions pursued in neighboring countries. Systematized state-sponsored historical distortions have profound contemporary repercussions. Interpretations of the past are important for legitimizing the current government, which is committed to demonstrating Russia’s alleged greatness and re-establishing its privileged interests over former satellites.

Pragmatic Reimperialization

The word “pragmatic” has been loosely applied in describing Russia’s foreign policy by implying partnership, moderation, and cooperation, as well as by counterposing it to an ideologized and expansive imperial policy characteristic of the Cold War. Paradoxically, pragmatic imperialism is a useful way to describe Putinist Russia’s foreign policy, which has been continued under the Medvedev presidency, particularly in the strategies employed to realize specific national ambitions.7

The primary goal of Putinism is to restore Russia as a neo-imperial state – if not as a global superpower then as a regional superpower. Moscow’s overarching goal toward the West is to reverse the global predominance of the United States by transforming the current unipolarity into multipolarity in which Russia exerts increasing international leverage. To achieve these long-range objectives, the Kremlin is intent on expanding the “Eurasian space” in which Russia is the dominant political player, and thus the Western, or Euro-Atlantic, zone of security would become increasingly fractured and neutralized. In this strategic struggle, “Eurasianism” for Moscow involves two interconnected approaches: transforming Europe into an appendage of the Russian sphere of influence and debilitating Euro-Atlanticism by undercutting Europe’s connections with the United States.

The two strategic objectives were succinctly highlighted by Russia’s newly installed president Dmitry Medvedev during his visit to Berlin in June 2008 when he proposed the creation of a pan-European security pact that would sideline or absorb NATO and steadily enfeeble U.S. influence. In Medvedev’s words: “Atlanticism as a sole historical principle has already had its day. NATO has failed to give new purpose to its existence.”8 Medvedev followed up his initial proposal for a new European security framework during the World Policy Conference in Evian, France, on October 8, 2008.9 In elaborating on the initial plan, he posited the notion of “equal security” in which Russia would maintain a veto on any further NATO enlargement and where no state or international organization would possess “exclusive rights” in providing peace and stability in Europe. In effect, Moscow would be in a position to block any moves by the Central-East European (CEE) countries to enhance their own security and obstruct any changes in NATO’s military infrastructure in Europe.

Moreover, the European states would need to negotiate with Russia on any proposals for missile defense, weapons modernization, or peacekeeping deployments. Meanwhile, the U.S. would be expected to take a back seat in a process intended to weaken transatlantic ties. In sum, under Moscow’s security plan an authoritarian and expansive Russia would become an “equal partner” in determining European security. Some Western analysts initially acquiesced to the Kremlin’s strategic objectives by contending that the West needs to be cognizant and even sympathize with Russia’s “national humiliation” because of the recent loss of its empire.10 This is tantamount to compensating Russia for its past imperial failures and serves to gloss over or even justify imperialism, colonialism, enforced Russification, and the panoply of Soviet communist crimes as understandable “national interests.” Such an accommodating stance can also act a cover for tolerating the recreation of a new Russian-dominated zone in Eurasia in which anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism play an important political role.

Russia under Putin’s guidance has evolved into an imperial project for two core reasons. First, it has clearly articulated ambitions to restore its global status, primarily in competition with the United States, and to undermine international institutions that hinder these aspirations. Second, Moscow's drive to dominate its former satellites, curtail the expansion of Western structures, and neutralize Europe as a security player is accomplished through a mixture of threat, subterfuge, disinformation, pressure, and economic incentives. Russia's national interests are viewed as predominating over those of its smaller neighbors and European partners.

However, Russia's neo-imperialism no longer relies primarily on traditional instruments such as military might, the implanting of political proxies in subject states, or the control of territory. Instead, Moscow employs an assortment of diplomatic, political, informational, economic, and security tools to encourage the evolution of pliant governments that either remain neutral or actively promote Moscow’s strategic agenda. Nonetheless, military force may also be employed to destabilize a neighboring government and fracture its territory as the invasion of Georgia in August 2008 poignantly illustrated. In contrast with the Cold War, Russia has deployed novel tools for subversion, disinformation, and domination. In particular, Moscow’s growing monopolization of energy supplies from within Russia and the Caspian Basin to Europe buttresses its power projection. Europe’s growing energy dependence and Russia's accumulative purchases of energy infrastructure and other assets in targeted states reinforce the latter’s political influence.

The statist and neo-imperialist essence of the Kremlin’s policy challenges the West – primarily as an alternative center or fulcrum of independent statehood, international security, and economic development. It specifically confronts the concept of American pre-eminence, or “Atlantic-centrism,” in which the world is allegedly welded to a single-axis controlled from Washington. In building a new “global order,” Moscow strives to renew itself as a major pole of power by recreating its dominant role in a revamped empire, beginning with the post-Soviet space, which has become a euphemism for Russia’s “imperial space.”

Russia’s internal and external developments are closely interlinked. The Putinist system has interwoven centralism and statism with imperial restoration and great power ambitions. In this equation, the Kremlin’s often-cited pragmatism is not a policy agenda but a means to an end. Pragmatism in foreign policy signals variable approaches and elastic tactics for achieving specific long-range goals. However, the objectives – and not the means – are what ultimately define state policy. Putinism is an eclectic and goal-oriented assemblage of precepts and philosophies that blends communist and Tsarist, nationalist and internationalist symbols together with disparate events and personalities from Russian history to demonstrate and develop Moscow’s enduring dominance. Russia’s neo-imperialist ideology (or system of precepts and justifications) involves a patriotic synthesis of all previous Muscovite empires in which the priority is to restore the strength and stature of the Russian state.

Russia’s rulers are not simply “pragmatists” or “realists” devoid of ideology and pursuing their objective national interests. Autocratic regimes also possess a set of precepts regarding the role of government while specific national ambitions guide their domestic and foreign policies. Contemporary Russia forges strategic links with other autocracies that value strong government to ensure national unity and a political status quo rather than experimenting with unpredictable democracies that can grievously weaken state structures. Without declaring any ideologically motivated global mission and by claiming that it is pursuing pragmatic national interests, the Kremlin engages in asymmetrical offensives by interjecting itself in its neighbor’s affairs, capturing important sectors of local economies, subverting vulnerable political systems, corrupting or discrediting national leaders, and systematically undermining Western unity.

Moscow’s stealth tactics have persuaded some analysts to believe that Moscow’s geoeconomic goals prevail over geostrategic imperial objectives and that power holders in the Kremlin are focused on profit rather than politics.11 The contention that private interests motivate Moscow’s policy decisions is highly contentious. Such suppositions fail to answer important questions about the Kremlin’s policy: in particular, how are the private interests of state officials separated from state interests? Russia has traditionally been governed by arbitrary rulers who controlled the economy and whose private interests overlapped with their ideological predispositions and imperial ambitions. Moreover, the expansion of Russia’s power and influence actually serves the “private interests” of Kremlin leaders: getting rich and making Russia strong are now largely synonymous. Centralized control over growing energy revenues enabled the Kremlin to accelerate the pursuit of both objectives.

Russia’s Pragmatic Strategies

Observers debate the degree to which the Kremlin pursues a “grand strategy” to achieve its stated or disguised objectives. Under Putinism decision-making has been centralized in all sectors of government and a narrow clique of former KGB officers have established a “Chekistocracy” by capturing the state apparatus and the economy to serve specific policy objectives. Foreign and security policy are tightly coordinated by the Kremlin’s inner circle, and there has been little indication of dissension among Russia’s leaders concerning state interests or national ambitions. In pursuit of its long-term trans-continental objectives, the Kremlin employs several interlinked strategies which amount to an agenda of insidious and pragmatic reimperialization.

1. Discrediting the West

Moscow charges the West in general and the United States in particular with “democratic messianism,” in which Western values and political systems are evidently forced upon defenseless states. Washington is accused of a multitude of imperialist designs, including political unilateralism, aggressive militarism, disregarding international institutions, undermining state sovereignty, overthrowing governments, and breaking up independent states. Russian leaders thereby seek to promulgate anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism while depicting Russia as the stalwart bastion against Washington’s neo-imperialist encroachments. Russian leaders, however, do not seek international isolation but continue their interaction with the U.S. to gain strategic advantages while highlighting the alleged NATO threat to Russia.

2. International posturing

The Russian state poses as a defender of the international system and of international law, in contradistinction to the West. It selectively highlights evidence of its multilateralism and determination to work through international institutions such as the United Nations. Moscow postures as the spokesperson for the national independence, political stability, and territorial integrity of all sovereign states regardless of their political structures. Moreover, Russia’s self-defined “sovereign democracy” is depicted as a valid independent model that should be emulated more widely.

At the same time, Moscow disguises its unilateral and aggressive record toward Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and other neighboring states that it seeks to dominate. Moscow’s position remains contradictory as it has broken the international rules that it vehemently upholds in the UN, especially on the question of non-intervention in neighboring states. Russian exceptionalism has therefore been stressed by Moscow, which claims the right to protect its passport holders in neighboring countries, such as Georgia, and intervene militarily on their behalf.12 To justify the de facto partition of Georgia and the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, Russian officials allege that they had no choice, as the international system of law had allegedly broken down and Russia was merely acting to defend its interests. This has given added impetus to the Kremlin’s claims that a new security architecture is needed for Europe.

3. Expanding spheres of influence and interest

The Russian regime defines its national interests at the expense of its neighbors, whose statehood is considered secondary or subsidiary and whose borders may not be permanent. Putinist foreign policy focuses on establishing several zones of expanding influence among former satellites where Western influence needs to be curtailed or comprehensively eliminated. This can be described as an essentially zero-sum calculation. In the Kremlin’s approach, smaller European countries are not accorded full sovereignty but must have their security interests dictated either by Moscow or Washington or remain neutral by remaining outside of NATO. Hence Russia pursues political dominance over the post-Soviet republics and political preeminence among former Central and East European satellites. In the latter it seeks to neutralize, isolate, and marginalize new NATO and EU member states.

Moscow employs a broad range of tools to achieve these strategic ambitions, ranging from diplomatic offensives and informational warfare to energy blackmail, military threats, and the purchase of political influence. It benefits from political uncertainty and territorial conflicts within and between neighboring countries and often encourages them in order to pose as a mediator and a leading regional power. The August 2008 war transformed the conflict in Georgia from a dispute over sovereignty, inter-ethnic relations, and central control to an overt inter-state confrontation over borders and territorial control.13 As one Russian analyst and Putin critic points out:

Russia’s war with Georgia in August 2008 was a watershed in Russia’s development, demonstrating the ruling team’s return to imperial ambitions and attempts to rebuild Russia’s spheres of influence. The war proved premature the conclusion that the Russian elite had switched to post-imperial moods. In August 2008, the Russian political regime turned to a neo-imperialist strategy of survival.14


4. Dividing and dominating

Moscow sparks conflicts with specific states to test the reaction of the larger powers and multinational organizations, including the EU and NATO. It thereby seeks to foster international divisions and disrupt the emergence of a unified policy toward Russia. By periodically acting in an aggressive manner toward countries such as Georgia, Estonia, or Poland, Moscow probes and gauges Western reactions. It is encouraged by a weak and divided Western response to expand its assertive foreign policy posture. Provoking a fractured and ineffective Western reaction is also designed to demonstrate the limitations of Western security guarantees and the vulnerability of individual states to Moscow’s pressures. In the Kremlin’s estimations, this can contribute to making NATO an increasingly irrelevant defense alliance and a weakened strategic player.

5. Promoting strategic indispensability

Rather than posing as a superior ideological, political, or economic alternative to the West, as during the Cold War, the Kremlin now depicts Russia as an essential and emergent player in global affairs. In this schema, the Europeans and Americans need to be convinced that Moscow's cooperation is necessary to resolve problems that Russia has in fact contributed to creating. Moscow poses as an indispensable partner on issues ranging from Iran’s nuclear program to the spread of jihadist terrorism and the proliferation of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction). To underscore their indispensability, Russian officials also engage in strategic blackmail by asserting that they can terminate their assistance to the West in its negotiations with Iran or in allowing supplies across Russian territory to NATO troops in Afghanistan. Moscow calculates that increasing dependence on Russia’s diplomacy will undercut an assertive Western response to its expansionist agenda.

6. Neutralizing through dependence

Moscow pursues several projects to enhance Europe's dependence on Russia, keep the EU divided, and undercut a more activist Western policy. This includes growing hydrocarbon energy supplies and increasing trade and business interconnections. Energy dependence is most obviously manipulated as a means of political pressure, whether through pricing policies, supply disruptions, or infrastructure ownership. For instance, Russia’s periodic “gas wars” with Ukraine have contributed to furthering political division and economic uncertainty in Ukraine. Russia’s “gas diplomacy” also serves to bribe, corrupt, and potentially blackmail local officials through lucrative payoffs from unregulated energy contracts.15

Energy deals can be a reward or an incentive for political agreement or unwillingness to challenge Russia’s foreign policy. Lucrative investment deals are offered by Russian officials to those states, companies, and politicians that are perceived as Russia-friendly, particularly when political disputes with other Western governments are sharpened, as was the case following Moscow’s military intervention in Georgia in August 2008. In some cases, as in Bulgaria, the impact of pending energy contracts limited government criticisms of Russia’s intervention in Georgia.16 Meanwhile, countries that do not qualify for EU or NATO membership because of insufficient reform or internal divisions, including Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, become prime targets for Russia’s economic and political overtures.

Another element of Moscow’s dependency strategy is punitive: the imposition of periodic trade embargos and other economic sanctions against its near neighbors in order to promote Russian dominance over the patterns and terms of trade in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Where economies are dependent on Russian energy supplies or market access, such measures can be a strong source of political pressure.

7. Playing security chess

The Kremlin purposively manufactures security disputes with the U.S., NATO, or the EU in order to gain advantages for its positions vis-à-vis other security questions. Its negotiating strategy is to engineer a crisis and exploit the ensuing attention to secure beneficial concessions from its adversaries. Examples of this process of artificial crisis creation include NATO’s incorporation of the Central-East European countries, the planned U.S. Missile Defense system in Central Europe, and Kosova’s independent status. All three have been presented as threats to Russia’s national interests, and the West was pressured to make concessions.

President Obama’s abandonment of the Bush administration’s missile defense system in Central Europe in September 2009 was depicted by Russian officials as a vindication of Moscow’s opposition. The Kremlin has also reserved the right to challenge and oppose Washington’s plans to construct an alternative sea-and-land-based interceptor system to counter short- and medium-range Iranian missiles. Some Russian officials claimed that President Obama’s new anti-missile plans could still pose a threat to Russia’s security and specifically its ability to effectively use strategic nuclear weapons.17

8. Two steps forward, one step back

Russia’s leaders seek strategic advantages by partially stepping back from an initially aggressive stance and pushing the West to make concessions by accepting some of its gains. Several Western leaders then herald their evident success in averting a larger international crisis. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008 can be seen in the light of such calculations, whereby the focus of the EU’s attention was on dispatching monitors to the “buffer zones” that were created by Russian forces deeper inside Georgian territory rather than to the disputed regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which Moscow recognized as independent states and where it has since stationed troops evidently on a permanent basis.

9. Mixing messages and threats

Russia’s regime periodically sends mixed messages through purposeful ambiguity with regard to its foreign policy intentions in order to confuse and disarm Western capitals. For instance, while it claims to be working toward a peaceful resolution of the bilateral disputes in the frozen conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, it simultaneously prepares political pressures and military responses to gain clearer advantages. A positive message may be intended to lull the West into a false sense of security while a veiled threat is subsequently issued regarding potentially harmful actions by Moscow. The latter can include withdrawal from an arms treaty, the cancellation of an energy agreement, or a direct challenge to develop or deploy nuclear weapons against NATO territory. Initial combative statements serve to warn Western capitals of adverse consequences if compromises are not secured. Such threats can be retracted when gaining a concession from its adversary.

10. Liberals vs. hardliners

Moscow engages in disinformation campaigns about the presidential succession by depicting President Dmitry Medvedev as a liberal and democrat and a person with whom the world can work pragmatically. A similar campaign was initiated when Vladimir Putin took over the Russian presidency in 2000 when the new president was presented as a legal scholar and reformer despite the fact that he was intent on establishing a “power vertical” and a “managed democracy.”18 The depiction of Medvedev as a reformer and occasional statements by the President supporting such contentions entices Western governments to downplay Russia’s domestic human rights abuses and foreign policy assertiveness while offering various incentives and concessions to the Kremlin. This “good cop–bad cop” routine depicts Prime Minister Putin as the hardliner whose policies may be somewhat muted if the West engages with the Kremlin and overlooks its authoritarian and expansionist policies.

Russia’s Vulnerabilities

While Russia pursues a neo-imperial foreign agenda its domestic conditions continue to deteriorate, thus making the country vulnerable as a potentially failed state.19 Some of Russia’s deep-rooted problems were highlighted by President Medvedev in a revealing report released in September 2009 in which he depicts Russia as having a “primitive economy based on raw materials and endemic corruption.”20 According to Medvedev, Russia suffers from “an inefficient economy, a semi-Soviet social sphere, a fragile democracy, negative demographic trends, and an unstable Caucasus.” There are several interpretations regarding the release of the Medvedev report. It could indicate either a brewing internal power struggle with Prime Minister Putin or a choreographed tandem routine to create confusion in Western policy circles; alternatively, it may be a harbinger of major domestic upheaval.

One cannot assume that Putinism has ensured a stable and durable authoritarian system. Russia confronts several looming crises: demographic (with a declining population of productive age and serious health problems, including high death rates and declining birth rates); ethnic and religious (especially in the North Caucasus); economic (with overreliance on the price of primary energy resources); social (as the stifling of democracy restricts flexibility, adaptability, and modernization); and political (as power struggles may become manifest between Kremlin oligarchs and security chiefs who gained control over large sectors of the economy).

Russia’s economy is significantly more dependent on hydrocarbon exports than ever before. In 1998 oil and gas sales accounted for 44 percent of export revenue; by 2009 this figure had exceeded 67 percent, with many manufacturing and service industries linked to the resource sector.21 As a result of its over-dependence on primary resources and other structural weaknesses, the Russian economy was projected to contract by 8 percent in 2009 and to remain stagnant during 2010. In terms of demography, conservative estimates indicate that Russia’s population is expected to decline from about 141 million in 2007 to fewer than 135 million by 2017, and to fewer than 127 million in 2027. Even more tellingly, Russia has a shrinking labor force, a growing pool of pensioners, and an expanding Muslim population that may increasingly resent Slavic dominance and Moscow’s centralism.

Nonetheless, economic weakness does not automatically signal a Russian withdrawal from its neo-imperial agenda.22 Indeed, long-term economic and demographic weaknesses may engender short-term assertiveness to consolidate spheres of interest that Russia’s leaders will seek to maintain under Moscow’s long-term dominance. The Kremlin may also be calculating that its economic problems are only temporary as the market price of oil has steadily increased since the spring of 2009 and the Russian stock exchange rebounded as foreign investment began to return to the country. Regardless of these trends, Russia remains a highly volatile and vulnerable economy that is over-dependent on oil revenues and commodity price cycles. This boom-and-bust system could actually stimulate a more expansive appetite during the boom cycle to compensate for potentially more restricted foreign policy capabilities during economically leaner periods.

Some Russian analysts believe that there are divisions within the ruling elite, partly based on policy prescriptions but mostly rooted in interest groups and their control over key resources. Piontkovsky concludes that there is a distinction between the “globalist kleptocrats” and the “nationalist kleptocrats.”23 Although both are anti-Western and seek to restore Russia’s power and global reach, the nationalist kleptocrats favor more isolation from Western influences and include the country’s military chiefs. The globalist kleptocrats, on the other hand, invariably possess property and bank accounts in foreign countries and even while they berate the West, they staunchly oppose national isolation.

Russia may also become increasingly susceptible to ethnic nationalism, especially as the Muslim population continues to grow, economic uncertainties continue, and the influx of workers from Central Asia, and from China to Siberia and the Far Eastern provinces, accelerates ethnic tensions. Russia’s nationalist backlash could be supported by various interest groups or used by the Kremlin to mobilize public support. As a declining power, Russia may become even more threatening – or even desperate – during its potential devolution, as it will seek to prevent and disguise its deterioration by projecting strength, extracting maximum advantages from the weakness of neighbors, and promoting the commensurate decline of other major powers, competitors, and adversaries.

The August 2008 invasion and partition of Georgia indicates that the disintegration of the Soviet Union may actually be continuing as “the end of the USSR’s existence as a formal and legal entity is not the same thing as the historical disintegration of the ‘Kremlin empire.’”24 Moscow has established a new precedent in former Soviet territories by recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states as this can be used to justify and legitimize the gradual partition of other former Soviet republics, as well as of certain republics within Russia itself.

There is a rising danger of separatism and territorial partition within the Russian Federation, especially in the North Caucasus but also in the Volga republics and several eastern territories.25 In the Caucasus, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan remain the most important flashpoints, as insurgent groups are spreading and launching violent attacks against local leaders appointed by Moscow. Inter-ethnic and clan conflicts are growing amidst local nationalisms and pan-regional religious radicalism where republican borders are not recognized. The region is also racked by corrupt and abusive governance, high rates of unemployment, widespread poverty, and the breakdown of the social infrastructure. In the midst of a spreading economic crisis, this is a heady mix of problems that federal authorities may not be able to contain. The addition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which are fully dependent on Russia economically and militarily, will further deplete federal resources and contribute to instability inside Russia.

When its energy earnings were high, Moscow was confident that it could extinguish unrest in the North Caucasus with financial assistance. However, as the federal government's ability to finance corrupt local despots has diminished, its room for maneuver has shrunk. Meanwhile, the arbitrary brutality of the local security forces against civilians has fuelled vendettas and increased the number of recruits for the rebel movements. The Kremlin could decide to employ greater force against rebels and thereby provoke a broader insurgency, or it may manipulate inter-ethnic grievances to keep local political forces in check. Alternatively, local leaders who fear losing their power and resources could exploit ethnic or religious conflicts or even support territorial separatism to their advantage.

Paradoxically, the Russo-Georgian war and Moscow’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on August 26, 2008, could presage a new phase in the disintegration of the contemporary Russian empire and also involve the breakup of other post-Soviet states. Several national groups in the North Caucasus may insist that the principle of self-determination and independence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia should now apply to them, and this could create conflicts with neighbors, minorities, and the federal government. A plethora of territorial and political disputes pepper the North Caucasus.26 Since coming to power in 2000, Putin has sought to curtail or altogether eliminate the autonomy of the ethnic republics and regions but has met with significant resistance. In several parts of the Russian Federation, the indigenous or titular populations are pushing for independence; in other areas the Russian majority supports sovereignty, and in a few cases both the titular and the Russian populations back separation.27

Conclusions and Western Approaches

Some Western officials and security analysts contend that Russia’s neo-imperialism and strategic expansionism remain illusory, as Moscow does not possess the capabilities to effectively challenge the West – either in military or in economic terms – and is increasingly interconnected with the West through energy, trade, finance, and business. These arguments underestimate the damage that Western interests can sustain from an aggressive and opportunistic Russia, even one that may be in terminal decay. Irrespective of Russia’s structural weaknesses, with over-dependence on hydrocarbon revenues and facing serious domestic economic and demographic problems, in the immediate future Russia remains a serious threat to its weaker neighbors whether through political subversion, energy entrapment, military pressure, or other forms of purposeful destabilization. Such persistent threats, even toward new NATO and EU members, are compounded by a disunited and unfocused West that remains preoccupied with numerous other global and regional challenges.

Moscow continues to exploit and deepen Western disunity to undermine the effectiveness of multinational institutions and neutralize the West’s reactions to its destabilizing policies. Furthermore, a serious internal crisis inside the Russian Federation may have even more damaging consequences along the country’s long borders. Moscow is likely to manipulate perceptions of besiegement and external threat to deflect attention from its mounting domestic challenges and apply additional pressures – if not engaging in outright aggression – against its near neighbors.

President Barack Obama’s election was perceived by the Kremlin as an opportunity to undermine the U.S.’s global reach, and the Russian authorities are likely to purposively test the new president’s resolve. President Medvedev challenged Obama to make strategic compromises by withdrawing from the planned Missile Defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic and acquiescing to Moscow’s goal of establishing demarcated “spheres of interest” in Eastern Europe and a “balance of power” in Eurasia encapsulated in a new European or Eurasian security treaty.

Nevertheless, behind the Kremlin’s rhetoric lurks a lingering fear that the Obama administration may be a potentially grave threat to Russia's ambitions. President Obama could raise the U.S.’s global stature, reduce anti-Americanism, and provide an impetus for a renewed Western strategy that could undercut Russia's expansive ambitions. If handled adroitly by a united and determined West, the ultimate failure of Russia’s Orwellian “sovereign democracy” and Moscow’s inability to construct durable zones of dominance or even ensure the coherence of the Russian state could provide an important boost for the reanimation of democratic and pro-Western development along Russia’s over-extended borders.

Although Washington and Brussels have few direct tools available to influence or accelerate Russia’s internal developments, they can deploy their substantial economic, diplomatic, and security resources to prevent and contain any instabilities emanating from Russian territory that challenge the security and sovereignty of various European countries, whether they are EU and NATO members or aspirants, or of Central Asian states seeking to contain Russia’s subversive influences. The first step in curtailing Moscow’s drive to dominate Eurasia and to disarm the West is a realistic appraisal of Russia’s imperial pragmatism and a thorough assessment of Moscow’s diverse capabilities.

Janusz Bugajski is holder of the Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair and director of the New European Democracies program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C. His most recent book is entitled Dismantling the West: Russia’s Atlantic Agenda, (Potomac Books, 2009). This article first appeared in the Winter 2010 edition of the Caucasian Review of International Affairs, a Germany-based, quarterly peer-reviewed free, not-for-profit and online academic journal. The is reprinted with permission.

NOTES:

1 President Dmitry Medvedev’s Speech at the World Policy Conference, Evian, France, October 8, 2008, http://natomission.ru/en/society/article/society/artnews/21/

2 Charles Grant, “Can Russia Contribute to Global Governance?” Insight, Centre for European Reform (CER), June 17, 2009, http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/2009/06/can-russia-contribute-to-global.html

3 Among policy reports that fail to distinguish between objective national interests (state security, territorial integrity) and subjective national interests (regional dominance, curtailing sovereignty of neighboring states), see (i) “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy Toward Russia,” A Report from the Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Russia, March 2009, Washington D.C., The Nixon Center; (ii) Steven Pifer, “Reversing the Decline: An Agenda for U.S.-Russian Relations in 2009,” Policy Paper, No.10, January 2009, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.; and (iii) Anders Aslund and Andrew Kuchins, “Pressing the ‘Reset Button’ on U.S.-Russia Relations,” Policy Brief, Number PB09-6, March 2009, Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C.

4 David J. Kramer, “The Russia Challenge: Prospects for U.S.-Russian Relations,” Policy Brief, June 9, 2009, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington D.C., 2.

5 Consult Marcel de Haas, “Medvedev’s Security Policy: A Provisional Assessment,” Russian Analytical Digest, No.62, June 18, 2009, www.res.ethz.ch and www.laender-analysen.de, 3.

6 On August 28, 2009, Kremlin chief of staff Sergei Naryshkin chaired the first session of the presidential commission “for counteracting attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russia’s interests.” The commission’s first task was to “correct textbooks.” The Education and Science Ministry started this process by approving “The History of Russia from 1945 to 2008 for 11th Graders” whose aim is to “ideologically prepare an entire generation of young people to loyally and complaisantly serve the Russian ruling class.” See Vladimir Ryzhkov, “An Enlightened Way to Distort Soviet History,” The Moscow Times, September 1, 2009, http://www.moscowtimes.ru/opinion/article/381661/.
7 For details on Russia’s policies toward individual states see Janusz Bugajski, Dismantling the West: Russia’s Atlantic Agenda, Potomac Books, 2009, and Expanding Eurasia: Russia’s European Ambitions, CSIS Press, 2008.
8 Dmitry Medvedev’s speech at a meeting with German political, parliamentary and civic leaders, June 5, 2008, Berlin, Germany,
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type82914type84779_202153.shtml

9 A valuable analysis can be found in Marcin Kaczmarski, “The Russian Proposal For a New European Security System,” CES Commentary, Issue 11, October 16, 2008, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, Poland.

10 For instance, see Thomas Graham, “U.S.-Russia Relations: Facing Reality Pragmatically,” in Europe, Russia and the United States: Finding a New Balance, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., July 2008, 1. One wonders whether the same principle should apply to Germany’s loss of the Third Reich or the dissolution of the British Empire.

11 For example, see Dmitri Trenin, “Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with The West,” The Washington Quarterly, vol.30:2 (Spring 2007): 95-105.

12Alexander Artemev, “War As An Exception,” Gazeta.ru, July 29, 2009, http://www.gazeta.ru.politics/2009/0229_a_3228830.shtml

13 See Vicken Cheterian, “The August 2008 War in Georgia: From Ethnic Conflict to Border Wars,” Central Asian Survey, vol. 28:2 (June 2009): 155-170.

14 Lilia Shevtsova, “The Medvedev Presidency: Russia’s Direction and the Implications for Foreign Policy,” James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, May 6, 2009, 11.

15 Some Western analysts believe that Russia has gained little from its energy pressures against neighboring states but, they do not conduct a thorough political impact assessment. For example, see Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Catherine Yusupov, “Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications,” Rand Project Air Force, April 2009, 95-96, http://www.rand.org. This Rand analysis is also flawed by a focus on more nebulous Russian government goals of achieving respect and prestige rather than the concrete and observable objectives of power, influence, and dominance.

16 See “Bulgaria in the Middle,” August 15, 2008, http://sofiaecho.com/2008/08/15/662901_bulgaria-in-the-middle. Sofia was evidently concerned about its inclusion in the Russian-sponsored South Stream gas pipeline and the Bourgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline.

17 Conor Sweeney, “Russia Still Cool On New US Anti-Missile Scheme,” Reuters, September 29, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE58S2YY20090929
18 For a valuable analysis of the non-democratic nature of Russia’s political system, see Lilia Shevtsova, “The Medvedev Presidency: Russia’s Direction and the Implications for Foreign Policy,” James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, May 6, 2009, 1-40.

19 For a useful outline of Russia’s internal problems see Steven Pifer, “Russia and Eurasia,” Neyla Arnas (Ed.), Fighting Chance: Global Trends and Shocks in the National Security Environment, Washington D.C., National Defense University, 2009, 207-223.

20 Dmitry Medvedev, “Go Russia!” Official Web Portal, President of Russia, September 10, 2009. http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2009/09/10/1534_type104017_221527.shtml
21 Katinka Barysch, “Russia: A Tale of Two Crises,” Center for European Reform, July 13, 2009, http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/2009/07/russia-tale-of-two-crises.html

22 Russia’s history demonstrates that “economic dysfunction was accepted as the inevitable price of strategic power” and what has traditionally made an economically weak Russia into a military power and expansionist state was political power and centralized control over society and the economy. See George Friedman, “The Russian Economy and Russian Power,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, July 27, 2009.

23 Andrei A. Piontkovsky, “Moscow’s Power Divide,” Transitions Online, Czech Republic, August 18, 2008.

24 Sergei Markedonov, “The ‘Five-Day War:’ Preliminary Results and Consequences,” Russian Politics and Law, vol. 47:3 (May-June 2009): 72.

25 See Alexey Malashenko, “The Kremlin’s Violent Underbelly,” The Moscow Times, Moscow, Russia, July 29, 2009, http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/1016/42/379916.htm

26 Nona Mikhelidze, “After the 2008 Russia-Georgia War: Implications for the Wider Caucasus and Prospects for Western Involvement in Conflict Resolution,” Background paper of the conference on “The Caucasus and the Black Sea Region: European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and Beyond,” Rome February 6-7, 2009, 13, Instituto Affari Internazionali, http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai0901.pdf.

27 For an insightful analysis of separatist sentiments in Russia, see Louk Hagendoorn, Edwin Poppe, and Anca Minescu, “Support for Separatism in Ethnic Republics of the Russian Federation,” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 60:3 (May 2008): 353-373, Department of Central and East European Studies, University of Glasgow, www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713414944.
 

willdo

Veteran Member
good read

Russia will never join the EU, it wants the EU to join it.

In contrast with the Cold War, Russia has deployed novel tools for subversion, disinformation, and domination. In particular, Moscow’s growing monopolization of energy supplies from within Russia and the Caspian Basin to Europe buttresses its power projection. Europe’s growing energy dependence and Russia's accumulative purchases of energy infrastructure and other assets in targeted states reinforce the latter’s political influence.

China is doing this, too...except it's for themselves.

Rather than posing as a superior ideological, political, or economic alternative to the West, as during the Cold War, the Kremlin now depicts Russia as an essential and emergent player in global affairs. In this schema, the Europeans and Americans need to be convinced that Moscow's cooperation is necessary to resolve problems that Russia has in fact contributed to creating. Moscow poses as an indispensable partner on issues ranging from Iran’s nuclear program to the spread of jihadist terrorism and the proliferation of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction).

very clever of them and how stupid of us.

President Obama’s abandonment of the Bush administration’s missile defense system in Central Europe in September 2009 was depicted by Russian officials as a vindication of Moscow’s opposition. The Kremlin has also reserved the right to challenge and oppose Washington’s plans to construct an alternative sea-and-land-based interceptor system to counter short- and medium-range Iranian missiles. Some Russian officials claimed that President Obama’s new anti-missile plans could still pose a threat to Russia’s security and specifically its ability to effectively use strategic nuclear weapons.17

How does a sea-land interceptor system to counter missiles from Iran pose a threat to Russia's security and effective use of strategic nuclear weapons? The "use of strategic nuclear weapons" bothers me...does this mean Russia is using Iran as a base from which Russia anticipates using nuclear weapons and who do they see as the enemy they need to protect/attack from in that location that they don't already have reach to? Am I missing something in the geography? Strategically speaking, because Israel means more to many in the US than just a strategic piece of property, that Iran is to Russia what Israel is to the US in the Middle East. I expect that the stunning announcement on the 11th will showcase Russia's nuclear gifting to Iran, who will claim to have produced it by its little ole self.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
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Military Doctrine Consolidates Xenophobia of the Russian Elites

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 28
February 10, 2010 05:22 AM Age: 4 days
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Military/Security, Russia
By: Pavel Felgenhauer

The constitution of the new democratic Russia adopted in 1993 contains a special clause that the nation must have a public military doctrine to mark the end of the time of communist tyranny. A provisional military doctrine was adopted in 1993 and in this document Russia rejected the use of military force to solve international disputes, a notion that is today scorned by the pro-Kremlin press (Izvestiya, February 8).

In 2000, the then President Vladimir Putin signed Russia’s first permanent military doctrine, but in fact the text was prepared during the rule of his predecessor Boris Yeltsin. The 2000 military doctrine was an ambiguous document, created during a time of transition from a shaky democracy to an authoritarian dictatorship. Moscow had already openly clashed with the West over the eastward expansion of NATO and the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. The 2000 doctrine singled out as a serious external threat “the expansion of alliances that threaten Russia and its allies,” but it avoided mentioning NATO directly. The military doctrine President Dmitry Medvedev signed into law last week identifies NATO expansion as the prime external threat together with the deployment of foreign soldiers and naval forces close to the territory of Russia and its allies (www.kremlin.ru, February 5).

The Secretary of the Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, who was in charge of preparing the doctrine, told a press conference in Moscow, “It is a consensus opinion of all who worked on the military doctrine that NATO threatens us and seriously.” Patrushev demanded that NATO must stop “pulling” Ukraine and Georgia into its ranks and “arming Georgia” (RIA Novosti, February 10).

It takes significant bureaucratic effort to reach an inter-departmental consensus to assemble the text of the public military doctrine, and then no one really knows what to do with it next. The new military doctrine, as well as its predecessors is essentially a collection of empty bureaucratic declarations without any mention of means to achieve the stated goals. Similarly, it is a good reflection of the opinions that dominate the political, security and military elite in Moscow.

Last October, Patrushev announced that the new military doctrine would be approved soon and allow the first-use of nuclear weapons, including “preventive nuclear strikes,” to defend against “conventional aggression” not only in possible large-scale, but also in regional and “even local wars” (Izvestiya, October 14). The final text, though markedly anti-Western and anti-American, does not contain anything about “preventive nuclear strikes.” This omission has been interpreted as an important goodwill gesture aimed at the West (Izvestiya, www.russiatoday.com, February 8). The reality might not be so pleasant. Last August, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, who was the head of the defense ministry task force working on the military doctrine told reporters: “The new doctrine unlike the present one will consist of two parts –one public and the other secret.” According to Nogovitsyn, the public part will deal mostly with military-political issues, while the secret one “will specifically depict the plans of usage of the armed forces including nuclear weapons as an instrument of strategic deterrence” (Interfax, August 11, 2009).

The Kremlin announced that Medvedev had authorized the new doctrine and also endorsed another document: “The Principles of the State Policy of Nuclear Deterrence until 2020.” The latter document is absolutely secret; there were no official or unofficial comments about its content. It is quite possible that the “principles” are in fact the more important of the two –the real doctrine that may contain among other things the provisions of possible “preventive nuclear strikes” to defend against “conventional aggression.”

Of course, the leaders of Russia are not suicide bombers eager to bring the world down in a nuclear holocaust –they are pragmatic and corrupt bureaucrats that have assumed unlimited authoritarian power over a nuclear state. In some aspects, the Russian elite have achieved what the rulers of Iran are aspiring to do: securing unlimited power and oil revenue, coupled with a capable nuclear deterrent that guarantees security from external pressure or attack.

NATO’s Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen did not like the new Russian military doctrine: “I have to say that this new doctrine does not reflect the real world ... NATO is not an enemy of Russia.” This statement reflects a common delusion in the West –that the rulers of Russia are still absorbed by old Cold War attitudes. Rasmussen added, “It [the doctrine] does not reflect realities and it is in clear contradiction with all our endeavors to improve the relationship between NATO and Russia” (Reuters, February 6).

In reality, the Russian elite is well connected with reality and its present aggressive xenophobia has little to do with the Cold War when Communist Russia was planning a grandiose strategic operation to defeat “NATO aggression” by sending its tanks to the English Channel and occupying Western Europe. Today, Moscow’s strategic objectives are entirely different –it is resolved to be a regional superpower– the strong man in its neighborhood (as Iran aspires to be in the Middle East). The new doctrine actually contains a clause that Russia is ready to cooperate with NATO –if the Alliance plays ball. The offer is genuine –if the West agrees to strike a deal similar in nature to the one Moscow obtained at the Yalta conference in February 1945, when World War II was nearing its end– to have a free hand in Eastern Europe. Western (NATO) expansion into what the Russian elite sees as its domain is considered as threatening its core vital interests –a casus belli, as demonstrated by the invasion of Georgia in August 2008.

Russia’s rulers are ready to fight, not for some Cold War dream but for their political and physical survival and the new military doctrine shows that, if need be, it includes nuclear weapons.
 

willdo

Veteran Member
I guess he needs to bring their buddies in Iran up to speed on their "new" doctrine!

Last October, Patrushev announced that the new military doctrine would be approved soon and allow the first-use of nuclear weapons, including “preventive nuclear strikes,” to defend against “conventional aggression” not only in possible large-scale, but also in regional and “even local wars” (Izvestiya, October 14). The final text, though markedly anti-Western and anti-American, does not contain anything about “preventive nuclear strikes.” This omission has been interpreted as an important goodwill gesture aimed at the West (Izvestiya, www.russiatoday.com, February 8). The reality might not be so pleasant. Last August, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, who was the head of the defense ministry task force working on the military doctrine told reporters: “The new doctrine unlike the present one will consist of two parts –one public and the other secret.” According to Nogovitsyn, the public part will deal mostly with military-political issues, while the secret one “will specifically depict the plans of usage of the armed forces including nuclear weapons as an instrument of strategic deterrence” (Interfax, August 11, 2009).

The Kremlin announced that Medvedev had authorized the new doctrine and also endorsed another document: “The Principles of the State Policy of Nuclear Deterrence until 2020.” The latter document is absolutely secret; there were no official or unofficial comments about its content. It is quite possible that the “principles” are in fact the more important of the two –the real doctrine that may contain among other things the provisions of possible “preventive nuclear strikes” to defend against “conventional aggression.”
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Though a couple of these could be placed in the earlier thread specific on the Russian new nuclear doctrine, the factors are such that I felt that these should be posted here for consideration....HC
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Moscow Finds US Non-Strategic BMD Plans Threatening
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 38
February 25, 2010 04:14 PM Age: 3 days
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Military/Security, Russia, Featured
By: Pavel Felgenhauer

Russian officials – the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and the Chief of the General Staff, First Deputy Defense Minister Army-General Nikolai Makarov – have told journalists that a nuclear arms control agreement to replace the 1991 START treaty that expired on December 5, 2009, “is almost 100 percent ready” (Interfax, February 17). Makarov insists that the new draft treaty is balanced and “will not undermine Russian defenses.” However, Makarov added that the final negotiations are not easy, since US Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) plans are causing concern (RIA Novosti, February 24).

This month, Romania announced that it is ready to agree to a US request to deploy so called theater BMD interceptors on its territory after 2015. Moscow intimated that it is “concerned by Romania’s decision” and demanded clarification (RIA Novosti, February 5). Later, Bulgaria announced it is considering possibly deploying US theater BMD interceptors on its territory. Lavrov demanded explanations from Washington and expressed bewilderment: “How must we understand this, first a Romanian surprise, then a Bulgarian one?” According to Lavrov, Washington replied by stating that the potential BMD deployments in Romania and Bulgaria are part of the modified US plan to defend Europe against missile attack, announced by President Barack Obama last September, when he scrapped previous arrangements to deploy Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI’s) in Poland and a BMD radar in the Czech Republic (RIA Novosti, February 14).

Unlike the strategic GBI’s, the missiles intended for possible deployment in Romania and Bulgaria will either be Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) interceptors developed for the US Navy with the Aegis system, or land-based Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors. SM-3 and THAAD missiles have been developed to neutralize medium-range ballistic missiles and cannot intercept Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM’s). Iran, North Korea, China and other nations have medium-range ballistic missiles, but Russia does not. Under the 1987 treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) both Russia and the US eliminated all land-based missiles with a range of 500 kilometers (km) to 5,000 km. It would seem that the deployment of non-strategic BMD in Romania and Bulgaria does not threaten Russia.

Initially, Moscow expressed “concern.” Sergei Rogov, a government nuclear arms control expert and the director of the government-controlled Institute of USA and Canada Studies in Moscow, while denouncing “American unilateralism” in declaring its new BMD deployment plans, also called for calm. According to Rogov, there is “no need to panic,” since the deployment of theater BMD in Romania and Bulgaria does not pose an immediate threat and Russia has previously endorsed the idea of deploying non-strategic BMD in Europe, while opposing strategic BMD (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 19). Nevertheless, Rogov’s argument did not carry weight in Moscow. Former President George W. Bush’s plans for a limited strategic BMD deployment in the Czech Republic and Poland did not actually threaten Russia, but Russian political and military leaders deliberately created a standoff. The same process appears to be unfolding with the potential Romanian and Bulgarian BMD deployment plans.

The US Ambassador to Russia, John Beyrle, told Interfax that the Russian government “knows well” Washington’s plans to deploy BMD and that they were discussed “on numerous occasions.” According to Beyrle, US BMD will not interfere with the START follow-on treaty (Interfax, Febrauary 18). The Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Andrei Nestorenko, in turn announced, “There are no ballistic missile threats to Europe, so we do not understand why they need to deploy any BMD” (www.mid.ru, February 19). Of course, Moscow is implying that any BMD in Romania or Bulgaria is aimed at Russia.

Alexander Pikayev, a former fellow at the Carnegie Endowment Center in Moscow and now a government employed expert, announced that Russia may respond to a launch of a BMD interceptor with a nuclear attack on Romania, believing it is not an interceptor, but a ballistic missile aimed at Russian territory. According to Pikayev, debris from a successful US BMD intercept could contaminate the territory of Moldova or any other country. “The US is probably planning to deploy hundreds of BMD interceptors in Europe and this may reverse any nuclear disarmament agreement between Moscow and Washington,” stated Pikayev. If a follow-on START is signed, the Russian parliament will add amendments to the treaty that will link its implementation to US BMD deployment (Interfax, February 19).

Moscow’s main complaint is that Russia was “not consulted” about the potential BMD deployment in Romania and Bulgaria (RIA Novosti, February 24). Moscow has for some time insisted that the West must first secure Russian approval before deploying any weapons in former Russian-dependent nations like Romania, Bulgaria, or Poland, no matter whether it is BMD or any other system (EDM, January 21). The recently announced bilateral agreement between Washington and Warsaw to deploy a US military base with a battery of Patriot missiles less than 55 km from the border of the Kaliningrad region has enraged Moscow. Makarov declared that the Patriot deployment in Poland will not be involved in BMD, “but will threaten Russia, since this complex is aimed to defend against air force attacks they expect most probably from Russia, though we never announced such intent.” Makarov added that Russia will be forced to take “adequate measures” (RIA Novosti, February 24). Russia itself has reinforced its air defenses in Kaliningrad by deploying additional S-300 missiles, with two S-300 divisions deployed only 5 km and 17 km from the Polish border (Kommersant, January 25). Lavrov last week summed up the present state of US-Russian relations: “I will not say we are enemies, and I will not say we are friends” (Ekho Moskvy, February 19).

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Russian Military Doctrine Looks East
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 36
February 23, 2010 03:43 PM Age: 5 days
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Military/Security, Russia, China and the Asia-Pacific
By: Roger McDermott

Statements by senior Russian defense officials raise many questions concerning Moscow’s defense posture. The Chief of the General Staff Army-General Nikolai Makarov and the First Deputy Defense Minister Army-General Nikolai Pankov recently chaired a roundtable with Russian journalists in Moscow, devoted to military reform. Noting that public interest in the reform has continued since the “new look” was first announced in October 2008, Makarov referred to an opinion poll that suggested 63 percent of ordinary Russians support the reforms and believe it will lead to the “expected result.” Predictably, both Makarov and Pankov highlighted the administrative achievements to date, ranging from abolishing the division-based structure of the armed forces and successfully completing the transition to permanent-readiness brigades with a three tiered command-and-control system. He also confirmed that the Sozvezdiye tactical-level command-and-control system, tested during military exercises in 2009, will be rapidly introduced as the military adopts network-centric capabilities (Krasnaya Zvezda, February 21). It was also implied during the roundtable that further additional, as yet unannounced, aspects of the reform are currently under consideration.

However, one source of puzzlement was his reference to the new military doctrine, signed by President Dmitry Medvedev on February 5, providing clear and unambiguous guidance on the future development of the military. Yet, it is unclear which elements of the doctrine he referred to. Indeed, the doctrine does not formulate such clear direction on these issues. One source within the defense ministry clarified this, saying that the doctrine confirms that such clarity exists in presidential statements and “strategic planning documents” (Krasnaya Zvezda, February 21; Vedomosti, February 15; www.kremlin.ru, February 5).

Indeed, since the new doctrine was signed, following almost five years of drafting, much Western attention has focused on its more nuanced approach toward NATO. This stems from the distinction made in its content between a “danger” or “threat.” NATO enlargement, which is axiomatically opposed by the Russian military-security elite, is thus downgraded to a danger, allowing continued opposition toward its implementation without implying any shift in defense posture [EDM, February 9; www.foi.se/upload/projekt/RUFS/RUFS_Briefing_feb_10.pdf].

Recognizing this distinction, compared with the previous military doctrine in 2000, a number of obvious novelties are evident. These include: “attempts to destabilize the situation in individual states and regions and to undermine strategic stability;” the “creation and deployment of strategic missile defense systems undermining global stability and violating the established correlation of forces in the nuclear-missile sphere, and also the militarization of outer space and the deployment of strategic non-nuclear precision weapon systems.” Despite these dangers being “new,” they are unsurprising. Other innovations involve the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology and the growth in the number of nuclear states, as well as the violation of international agreements and non-compliance with previously existing treaties. The former seems linked to Iran and North Korea, while the latter reflects the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and the difficulty in concluding a revised Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. The doctrine also notes the danger posed by centers of inter-ethnic tension, international armed groupings close to the Russian border, which may indicate its authors had Afghanistan in mind (www.kremlin.ru, February 5).

Nonetheless, a military “threat,” according to the doctrine, may lead to a “real possibility of military conflict.” It then notes a deterioration in inter-state relations, which was not mentioned in the previous doctrine. The fourth and fifth threats, in contrast to other themes contained in the doctrine, are rooted in the observation of worrying trends close to the Russian border. These involve a “show of military force with provocative objectives in the course of exercises on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation or its allies;” and “stepping up of the activity of the armed forces of individual states (groups of states) involving partial or complete mobilization and the transitioning of these states’ organs of state and military command and control to wartime operating conditions.” The underlying security thinking is less clear, yet there was evidently a weighty issue on the minds of the authors of the doctrine (www.kremlin.ru, February 5).

Alexander Khramchikhin, the Deputy Director of the Moscow-based Institute for Political and Military Analysis, who has written extensively within the Russian military press on such issues, suggested that the formulators of the new military doctrine had in mind the growing threat posed by China. Khramchikhin pointed out that during military exercises conducted by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), they have rehearsed large-scale aggression against Russia. Other Russian military Sinologists have similarly observed a trend in the PLA’s exercises away from Taiwan or Tibet, toward rehearsing military intervention within Central Asia and Russia (Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, February 18). Thus, while many analysts and commentators focused on the western dimension of the new doctrine, the threat perception in relation to China has increased, and this is firmly rooted in following the demonstration of military force displayed by China’s combat training exercises. As Khramchikhin concluded: “In recent years, only one country has conducted training exercises of such a nature. That country is the People’s Republic of China.”

To date, Russian military-security thinking on China has been based on downplaying this potential flashpoint, predicated on letting sleeping dogs lie. At a geopolitical level, Moscow has endeavored to foster a Sino-Russian strategic partnership and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as mechanisms through which both sides can defuse any tension, while playing their own zero-sum game. Faced with the overwhelming conventional superiority of the PLA, the only realistic option is nuclear deterrence. However, while not daring to overtly specify China in its military doctrine, this perception is influencing Russian defense planning. The author has identified the movement of Russian military experts into think-tanks devoted to examining Far Eastern issues. Moreover, all the indications are that the forthcoming combined-arms operational-strategic exercise Vostok 2010 with units of the Siberian and the Far Eastern military districts, the air force, airborne troops and the Pacific Fleet may also include a strong underlying signal to the Chinese leadership. While Russian silence on China as a future threat has been longstanding, the message displayed during this exercise may prove more revealing than any formulation of words.

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Russia’s Military Doctrine: New Dangers Appear
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 35
February 22, 2010 03:46 PM Age: 6 days
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Military/Security, Russia, Featured
By: Jacob W. Kipp

In the immediate aftermath of President Dmitry Medvedev signing the new Russian military doctrine most attention focused on the fact that a first preemptive nuclear strike was not mentioned in the document and on the attention given to NATO as the chief source of “danger” to the security of the Russian Federation. Comments by NATO’s leadership that the doctrine was not a realistic portrayal of NATO were reported by the press, but there was no strong criticism of that aspect of the doctrine. Instead, Russian authors drew attention to the gap between Russia's conventional military capabilities vis-a-vis NATO and its reliance on nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict.

Oleg Nikiforov, however, addressed the issue of NATO-Russian relations and explored Western assessments of Russia’s military power in a review of a recent article by Margarete Klein for the German Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Klein had opined that Russia’s great power pretensions are not based on real military capabilities and that economic and demographic problems mean that it is unlikely to achieve military modernization. Nikiforov notes the prominence of the think tank and its close relationship to Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government. For Nikiforov, the article asked whether Russia is a “paper tiger or a real threat,” and answered with a qualified both. Russia’s military modernization will not pose a direct threat to NATO members, but its increased capabilities might permit it to more effectively intervene in its periphery, where it will be a real threat to successor states and with it the possibility of NATO intervention. In this regard, the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008 appears to be a sign of the willingness of the Russian government to act even at the risk of creating an international crisis. He also notes her negative prognosis on the likelihood of success for the “new look” of the Russian armed forces, based upon the inability of their defense industry to produce modern weapons in a timely fashion, which leaves the prospect of conflict high and the ability to manage it at a conventional level low (Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February 5).

Olga Bozheva noted that the doctrine appeared on the eve of the Munich Conference on Global and European Security and created quite a stir. There, Russia raised concerns about US plans to deploy elements of an Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) system in Romania, while the West expressed concern over the role of nuclear weapons in the Russian military doctrine. Citing reduced capabilities of early warning in the event of a nuclear attack and declining offensive nuclear capabilities, Bozheva depicted the doctrine’s nuclear pronouncements as a de facto admission of Russian military weakness. The doctrine offers nothing but fine words about the “new look” of the armed forces promised by Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov, and Western leaders are likely to read the Russian defense posture as nothing more than a bluff seeking to conceal real weakness. The bluff will not work for long. Similarly, the new doctrine proclaimed NATO expansion to be the primary danger to Russian security, and the president approved the decision to purchase one helicopter amphibious assault ship of the Mistral class from France. This contradiction revealed the deeper problem of Russian defense, the absence of a “machine-building complex” to support domestic military requirements. Bozheva labeled the new military doctrine as an “anti-military doctrine” (Moskovsky Komsomolets, February 8).

Aleksandr Khramchikhin, the Deputy Director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis, highlighted the potential for conflict on the Russian border, which had nothing to do with NATO, but was likely, if unleashed, to lead to a much wider war. Khramchikhin pointed to increased tensions between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. He warned that neither Seoul nor Pyongyang, and neither Beijing nor Washington wanted to start a conflict, but the large arsenals and the heightened tension might lead to an uncontrolled escalation bringing in other powers. Khramchikhin, who has written extensively over the last few years on China’s emergence as a regional superpower and modern military power, notes a basic asymmetry between the armed forces of the North and South, with the latter enjoying technological superiority but the North prepared to conduct a dogged defense. US intervention on the side of South Korea would not fundamentally change that military balance, or bring the war to a rapid conclusion. US forces are currently overcommitted in other theaters and lack the strategic reserve to occupy the North. Khramchikhin characterized such a conflict as a catastrophe for everyone. Moreover, North Korea could make use of it nuclear arms delivered by short-range missiles and aircraft or as nuclear mines. Such an escalation would demand that China acted (Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February 4).

Only one week after Khramchikhin’s article, a group of “NATO Elders,” tasked with developing NATO’s new strategic concept visited Moscow. The group headed by the former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, stated that they were there to listen. They showed considerable interest in Russia’s new military doctrine and took several opportunities to remind Russian audiences of the challenge that China posed for international stability. The elders pointed out that the new military doctrine did not even mention China, while naming NATO’s expansion into post-Soviet space as the primary danger for Russian security interests. Russian specialists explained these remarks as a result of the increased tension between Washington and Beijing after the United States announced the sale of F-16’s to Taiwan, and characterized the new relationship as a “cold war” (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 12).

The silence about the rise of China and its implications for Moscow has been deafening. Sino-Russian cooperation to counter-balance a US-dominated unipolar order made some strategic sense when tensions between the United States and China did not look like they carried any risk of conflict. However, Russian observers now see the new tensions as the emergence of a “duel” between China and the United States for leadership. Thus far, there is no significant risk that the two powers will come to blows, it is clear that they are heading towards cooler relations with Beijing responding to the announced arms sale by cutting military-to-military contacts and threatening sanctions against the American firms involved in such sales to Taiwan. Vladimir Kuzar presented these tensions as marking the end of the mutually advantageous economic partnership between Washington and China, as Beijing asserts its regional power and seeks its own solutions to global issues like Iran and North Korea. He concludes his article by warning that the Sino-American duel “can create new and dangerous tension in world politics.” Yet, he does not address the implications of those dangers for Russia’s own security (Krasnaya Zvezda, February 10).

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European Proposal on Tactical Nuclear Weapons Highlights Russian Nuclear Dilemmas
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 33
February 18, 2010 03:46 PM Age: 10 days
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Military/Security, Russia, Europe
By: Stephen Blank

As the negotiations on a bilateral arms control treaty lumber towards conclusion, the issue of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Europe has regained prominence. Recently Germany, Norway, Poland, and Sweden have individually proposed that both Russia and the US eliminate their TNW from Europe or pull them out of areas bordering on the European Union, particularly Kaliningrad and Kola Peninsula (ITAR-TASS February 2; Interfax, February 3; www.gazeta.ru, February 4). While there is no doubt that Russia has numerically reduced those weapons and it is unclear what their mission would be, it is also clear that this proposal has triggered conflicting reactions from Russian leaders, reflecting an unresolved ambivalence and struggle over the role of nuclear weapons in Russian defense policy. The US has already stated its intention to place this issue on the next round of arms control talks with Russia after the conclusion and ratification of the treaty now being negotiated (www.gazeta.ru, February 4). However, Moscow’s reaction is more complicated.

Predictably right-wing hawks such as Retired Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov and Konstantin Kosachev, the Chairman of the Duma Committee on International Affairs, slammed this proposal as one-sided and illogical, insisting that NATO and the US should first remove their TNW and adopt President Dmitry Medvedev’s proposals on European security rather than supposedly dividing Europe by insisting on such anti-Russian schemes (Interfax, February 2; Interfax, February 2). Indeed, one commentator, Mikhail Rastopchin, renewed calls to abrogate the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and build new TNW to deter and compete with NATO (Vremya Novostei, February 3). It is also well known that the navy strongly defends the continuation of the use and retention of TNW, though it is not clear what mission it has in mind for them (Pomper, Sokov, Potter, Survival, No. 1, 2010). On the other hand, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his ministry’s spokesman, Andrei Nesterenko, stated that they welcomed this call, and were ready to negotiate over TNW’s with both the US and the EU. Indeed, they claimed, quite falsely, that for years Moscow has been trying to persuade its partners to listen to its offer to negotiate the TNW issue, without any response (ITAR-TASS, February 3; Interfax, October 8, 2009; Interfax, February 3). Lavrov even tied his remarks to Moscow’s demand, which is a non-starter for the US and NATO that all TNW be returned to their host countries’ territory, a clearly one-sided proposal (Interfax, February 3).

These statements embody what some might call the ambivalence of Russian policy on nuclear weapons, while others might describe it as disingenuous. On the one hand, both President Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have stated their aspiration for a situation of zero nuclear weapons, if Russia’s security could be guaranteed (Saradzhyan, Belfer Center), a position reiterated by the Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov at the recent Munich Security conference (www.sicherheitkonferenz.de). Yet, both Putin and Medvedev announced in December 2009 that Russia will build new offensive nuclear weapons, a position that the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council, Retired Chief of the General Staff, Army-General Yuri Baluyevskiy again confirmed (Interfax, December 29, 2009; Interfax, February 5). Ivanov also denied that Russian generals want to use nuclear weapons (ITAR-TASS, February 6).

However, the facts disprove Ivanov. Indeed, he admitted in 2006 that Russian multipurpose submarines carried nuclear weapons, in violation of existing treaties (Interfax, September 10, 2006). Similarly, the Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt stated in 2007 that, “According to the information to which we have access, there are already tactical nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad area. They are located both at and in the vicinity of units belonging to the Russian fleet” (The Local, August 18, 2008). Similarly, Vice-Admiral Oleg Burtsev, the Navy’s Deputy Chief of Staff, told RIA Novosti that, “Probably, tactical nuclear weapons will play a key role in the future,” and that the navy may fit new, less powerful nuclear warheads to the existing types of cruise missiles because these missiles’ range and quality were expanding. “There is no longer any need to equip missiles with powerful nuclear warheads,” Burtsev said, adding “We can install low-yield warheads on existing cruise missiles” (RIA Novosti, March 23, 2009).

Although the new Russian military doctrine retained the preexisting official position on nuclear use and refrained from discussing preventive or preemptive nuclear use as Nikolai Patrushev, the Chairman of the Security Council had called for in October 2009, this does not validate Ivanov’s claim above (www.kremlin.ru, February 5; Izvestiya, October 14, 2009). As Ivanov admitted in 2006, Russian submarines equipped with Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM’s) or other nuclear weapons were already practicing launches against the US (Interfax, September 10, 2006). More recently, during the Russian exercises in the summer and fall of 2009 Ladoga and especially Zapad 2009, the Russian air force launched simulated nuclear strikes against Poland in a purely conventional exercise on a first-strike basis, clearly aiming to intimidate Poland (www.telegraph.co.uk, November 2, 2009). Moreover, Stabilnost 2008 rehearsed, among other contingencies, a global nuclear war against the US (EDM, October 3, 2008). Clearly, it will be impossible to secure meaningful reductions to its TNW as long as the navy and its supporters like Patrushev, who argues that Russia cannot go to zero as long as anyone has nuclear weapons and still seeks a preemption and preventive option, are making the decisions (Interfax, February 5). Moreover, as Russia’s exercises since 2006 conclusively show, Moscow sees nuclear weapons as war fighting weapons to be used offensively, hence its opposition, as stated in the doctrine, to US missile defenses (www.kremlin.ru, February 5). Whether the Russian government fully controls its generals as Ivanov claims, or is ambivalent or disingenuous is a question for each person to decide. But the existing evidence is hardly reassuring either with regard to TNW or to questions of nuclear weapon use in general.
 

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Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Eurasian Security
March 07, 2010

Jacob W. Kipp

Presidents Barrack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev have pledged to accelerate the negotiation of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The new agreement would replace the treaty that lapsed on December 5, 2009.

Progress in the US-Russian negotiations has been significant with the working numbers for reduced offensive arsenals in the range of 1500-1675 for warheads and 500-1100 for strategic delivery systems. These numbers are much lower than those contained in the expired START regime. Both Presidents Obama and Medvedev have spoken of this measure as a means to increase strategic security and stability and strengthen the existing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The issues that remain to be resolved before the Obama-Medvedev summit are not seen as precluding the signing of the treaty. Current discussions suggest it may be signed in late March or April, with the ceremony held possibly in Prague. The Chief of the General Staff Army-General Nikolai Makarov, confirmed the Russian military’s support for the treaty, saying “The talks on the treaty are very difficult, but we have reached an understanding that the parties should take in to account each other’s interests and should not infringe upon each other’s defense capabilities in any way,” adding: “The treaty will be ready soon, and it will not infringe upon Russia’s interests.” Unlike the May 2002 US-Russia Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, signed by Presidents Bush and Putin, the new agreement will include verification measures based on earlier START agreements (ITAR-TASS, February 24).

The choice of Prague as a possible venue represents Washington’s desire to link this agreement with President Obama’s proclaimed goal of eliminating nuclear weapons in the twenty first century, which he delivered there in April 2009. Obama referred to nuclear weapons in general and presented the problem of nuclear proliferation as a global issue. Progress on START has made the global connections of the various nuclear arsenals more apparent and the problems associated with them much more immediate. This was apparent in the prominence given to reducing nuclear weapons at the 46th annual International Conference on Security recently held in Munich. The US and Russian delegations agreed that reducing global nuclear arsenals to zero was possible, but it would take time. Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Ivanov, the senior Russian delegate in Munich, addressed the issue as imperative: “Although nuclear armament remains the backbone of the strategic deterrence system, it cannot be viewed as a panacea against all threats and challenges. It can and should be liquidated.” Ivanov raised Moscow’s concern over the recently announced US decision to deploy missile defense systems in Romania. Ivanov stated that the signing of the START agreement would in all probability lead to pressure to reduce US and Russian tactical nuclear arsenals. Ivanov pointed to the decision of Russia in the early 1990's to withdraw such systems from combat units and to place them in central repositories, and noted that the US had not reciprocated (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 8).

As Ivanov predicted, calls for reductions in tactical nuclear arsenals in Europe were quickly forthcoming. The Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Poland, Karl Bildt and Radek Sikorski, appealed to Moscow and Washington to quickly and radically reduce tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Their proposal had a Baltic-Scandinavian focus, regarding Russian tactical weapons in Kaliningrad Oblast and the Kola Peninsula. The Russian response was to express surprise at the uneven treatment of the US and Russian arsenals. Russia has already withdrawn its tactical nuclear weapons to central repositories and deploys no such weapons in Kaliningrad Oblast. Unnamed Russian generals were cited as stating that Russia in recent years has removed tactical nuclear weapons from the ground forces, reduced the tactical nuclear arsenal for the air force and air defense forces by 60 percent, and on submarines by 30 percent. As far as the Kola Peninsula is concerned, Russian commentators noted that it was the base of the Northern Fleet, which included naval units involved in Russia's strategic triad. They stated that tactical nuclear systems there were kept in secure facilities and that Russia had no intention of withdrawing them. However, Moscow has not excluded the possibility of negotiating a reduction in tactical nuclear arsenals. According to Colonel-General Vladimir Verkhovtsev, Chief of the 12th Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, which has oversight of Russia's nuclear arsenal, it will seek to have the negotiations broadened to include British and French arsenals, and take into account Russia’s distinct situation in Eurasia (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 5).

Verkhovtsev’s point about tactical nuclear weapons being part of Russia’s deterrent is an explicit part of the new military doctrine. While that document did not embrace the long-discussed notion of “preventive nuclear strike,” it did endorse first use under certain conditions, including deterrence of nuclear strikes and attacks by other means of mass destruction against Russia and its allies and in the case of conventional aggression, which would pose a threat to the existence of the Russian state. Dmitry Litovkin addressed the issue of Russia's claim to the right of a nuclear first strike in the context of the 2000 version of Russia's military doctrine which claimed a similar right against Russia's declared primary threat, i.e., the US and NATO. But the context today is different, Litovkin points to Russian declaratory policy on nuclear weapons to be a direct manifestation of the weakness of its conventional military power and questions whether the new military doctrine actually supports to the efforts to give the armed forces a “new look” (Izvestiya, February 8).

While the US and NATO expansion is once again declared to be the primary concerns in the new military doctrine, they are identified as opasnosti (dangers) and not ugrozy (threats). Moreover, a new concern has appeared among the top four: “territorial claims against the Russian Federation and its allies, intervention in their internal affairs” (Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, February 17). These are direct threats to Russia and its allies and can directly result in military aggression against the Russian state, as opposed to moves which might marginally affect the balance of forces. The Russian elite avoid speaking about a threat or danger from China, but there are analysts who see the People’s Republic of China as a possible threat to which Russia could respond only with nuclear weapons. For the last two decades Russia has treated China as a strategic partner, engaging in large-scale weapons sales. Yet, now Russian arms producers warn that in the area of aviation technology China acts like a pirate state, counterfeiting Russian designs like the MiG-29 and the Sukhoi-27 and selling these copies (Izvestiya, February 17). Other Russian authors have noted the deteriorating relations between the United States and China and are concerned that Russia might be drawn into a conflict which would not be in its interests. Aleksandr Khramchikhin recently presented to his readers a scenario for a “Second Korean War,” resulting from tensions between North and South Korea and leading to the intervention of the United States and China, in which Beijing would be the only possible winner. Khramchikhin avoided discussing explicitly the implications of such a conflict for Russia, but it is not difficult to imagine its consequences, where China would expect and demand that Russia provide logistical and other support as a result of Russia’s strategic weakness in the Far East (Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February 4). Valentina Maltseva addressed the new military doctrine’s treatment of nuclear weapons and called the statement on the use of nuclear weapons against large-scale conventional aggression as a sign that Russia will defend itself with the weapons that it has. “This thesis many consider to be a manifestation of aggression by Russia “rising from its knees.” The author does not state who the “many” might be, but the locale suggests an eastern focus (Sovetskaia Sibir, February 11).

As NATO members debate among themselves the issue of reducing tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, Russia's Eurasian landscape may demand a broader focus for such discussions on this part of the nuclear equation because of the emerging explicit connections. The Almaty-based Eurasian Media Forum reported on February 25 that “Russia is ready to protect other participants of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), including with application of nuclear weapons.” The CSTO Secretary-General, Nikolai Bordyuzha, made these remarks in a television interview. Moscow has been calling for closer ties between NATO and the CSTO, but there has been little interest in this in Brussels or Washington. Both see the CSTO as a manifestation of a Russian “sphere of privileged influence.” One cannot construe a nuclear response to terrorism or to NATO as being at the heart of Bordyuzha’s declaration, its source lies further east. Moreover, by explicitly invoking the nuclear arsenal as part of Moscow's commitment to other CSTO members, Bordyuzha has made the issue of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons explicitly into a Eurasian security problem (Eurasian Media Forum, February 25).

Source: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/
 

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Russia Looks East and Sees Storm Clouds: Part One
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 53
March 18, 2010 05:52 PM Age: 4 days
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Military/Security, Russia, China and the Asia-Pacific
By: Jacob W. Kipp

As Roger McDermott has already noted (EDM, March 16), Army-General Makhmut Gareev, the President of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, recently addressed what he called the “eastern vector” of Russian national security in an interview with Krasnaya Zvezda (Krasnaya Zvezda, March 5). He noted the increasing importance of the Asia-Pacific region to the global economy, the flow of capital to the region, and its emergence as a geopolitical center of gravity. While recounting the US and NATO involvement in Afghanistan after 9/11, and critically assessing the performance of NATO forces there, Gareev turned his attention to what he sees as the single most important shift: the transformation of NATO into a global presence with significant military influence in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region.

This shift in the country’s center of attention from Europe to the east has implications for Russia and China. Gareev admits that the NATO presence in Afghanistan does serve Russian interests. With regard to NATO, he points to other threats by non-military means to undermine Russia’s position by subversion and information warfare in the form of the so-called “color revolutions.” He noted that Russia’s national security strategy states that the government will give priority to non-military means, and then highlights that the state lacks the ability to adequately coordinate it. Gareev sees NATO’s expanded military presence as an emerging threat to China. Given the timing of the article, coming only a few days after NATO emissaries had raised the challenge of China in discussions with senior officials in Moscow, one could conclude that Gareev is predicting greater tension between NATO and Beijing. Such a shift of attention also means that Moscow can assume NATO is not seeking conflict with Russia in Europe, which he calls NATO’s rear. The problem of NATO-China tension is that it affects a region where Russia is itself weak. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has been able to assume a benign security environment in the Far East at a time of its own internal weakness in the same region. The globalization of NATO means increased tension in a region where Russia has limited military capabilities. The deployment of naval, air, and ground forces to the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Asia-Pacific region in the context of increased economic rivalry with China and rising regional tensions, would fundamentally alter Russia’s security environment, as Gareev explained.

Tensions between Washington and Beijing are followed closely in Moscow. The recent visit of senior US officials to Beijing was presented as an effort to reduce tension after the flare-up over the sale of aircraft to Taiwan. Beijing has not supported new sanctions against Iran and is concerned about deteriorating economic relations with Washington. It has also responded coolly to the demarche by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s demands regarding internet censorship and Google’s problems in China. Russian commentators believe that the Chinese government wants more than atmospherics and expects real changes in US policy toward China (Kommersant, March 3). Russian media noted in the announcement by the Chinese government that it would increase its defense budget by only 7.5 percent, as opposed to the recent rate of 10 percent annually. However, commentators see the published Chinese defense budget as hardly reflecting the real level of expenditure, and suggest that the current reduction in the rate of growth is both a response to the global economic crisis, where the military will have to tighten its belt along with everyone else, and a signal to the rest of the world that China is engaged in an arms race (www.gazeta.ru, March 5).

Aleksandr Khramchikhin provided a much more in-depth analysis of the Chinese defense budget, and sees China continuing to make gains against the United States because of the great asymmetries in Chinese military procurement. Moreover, he sees US military sales to Taiwan as more symbolic than real in their contribution to that country’s defense capabilities. The Obama administration does not want a confrontation with China. He categorizes the current tension between Washington and Beijing as not serious, because the Obama administration, in fact, fears such a confrontation. The new defense budget in this context, even with a lower rate of increase, is a “budgetary warning” to Washington and elsewhere about the shifting strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region (Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, March 9).

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula continue to receive extensive coverage in the Russian military press. The current “Key Resolve/Foal Eagle” exercises being conducted by US and South Korean forces triggered predictable protests from Pyongyang, which characterized the exercise as a “serious provocation.” However, Russian commentators see the current situation as an exchange of threats between the two sides. Viktor Ruchkin states that the core activities of the exercise involve the use of US and South Korean Special Forces for the location, seizure and destruction of WMD systems. The North Korean response at this time of leadership transition, harvest failure and currency crisis has been particularly strident even for Pyongyang. The People’s Army not only raised its alert level, but also instructed its forces to be ready to answer any preventive strike. It announced the creation of a new command for its medium range missile forces, which include weapons with a range of 3,000 kilmeters, capable of striking targets in Japan and American bases in Guam. Ruchkin did not speculate on whether North Korea has achieved the capability of arming such missiles with nuclear warheads, which would give added weight to the seriousness of the current level of tension. The North Korean government did warn that in the face of military provocations and sanctions it would end its participation in the Six-Party Talks and seek to strengthen its nuclear deterrent (Krasnaya Zvezda, March 13).

During the same period, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Chirkin, the recently appointed commander of the Siberian Military District, announced the deployment of two brigades to the Chinese border near Chita. Chirkin stated that the brigades were deployed there to counter the presence of 5 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) combined arms armies across the border. From 2003 to 2007 Chirkin commanded an army in the Siberian military district. On the rationale for the deployment, Chirkin stated: “We are obligated to keep troops there, because on the other side of the border are five Chinese armies and we cannot ignore that operational direction.” He added that the defense ministry intended to develop an army headquarters for command and control of the brigades (Voenno Promyshlennyi Kuryer, March 3).

In a related report, Chirkin described the PLA forces across the border as composed of three divisions and 10 tank, mechanized, and infantry brigades, which he said were not small, but also “not a strike force.” As to the role of the new brigades, Chirkin characterized them as part of a deterrent force aimed as a friendly reminder to Beijing: “. . . despite friendly relations with China, our army command understands that friendship is possible only with strong countries, which can quiet a friend down with a conventional or nuclear club” (Argumenty Nedeli, March 4-10). The Siberian Military District is actively preparing for this summer’s Vostok-2010, which will test the combat capabilities and combat-readiness of Russia's “new look” forces. In preparation for that major exercise, the Siberian Military District will conduct exercises to ensure that rear services will effectively support the combat units (Buriatiia, February 20).

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Russia Looks East and Sees Storm Clouds: Part Two

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 54
March 19, 2010 03:34 PM Age: 3 days
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Military/Security, Russia, China and the Asia-Pacific
By: Jacob W. Kipp

Attention to both combat capabilities and combat-readiness by senior officers in Russian military forces echoes comments made by retired Army-General Makhmut Gareev in early March during a conference organized by the Academy of Military Sciences on the lessons of the Great Patriotic War and their relevance to current defense and security issues. Gareev delivered the main report in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff, Army-General Nikolai Makarov, and other senior military leaders. Gareev speaks with great authority on this issue, having served as a young officer when the war began. Speaking to officers born after that war, Gareev faced the daunting task of convincing them of the relevance of that war’s lessons for contemporary defense and security problems. He began by referring to Prime Minister Putin’s admonition to not forget Russian military traditions, because the experience of many generations of officers can assist in solving contemporary military tasks.

In the context of the creation of the “new look” army, the transition to brigade-based formations and the development of network-centric warfare, Gareev focused on the relationship between the military and civilian leadership at critical times, specifically during the immediate pre-war period. Gareev criticized Stalin's leadership prior to the German assault. On the one hand, he wanted to avoid war at all costs that summer. On the other hand, every indication suggested that war was imminent. Stalin chose to accept the covert mobilization of Soviet forces in some military districts, and kept the frontier districts in a peacetime regime of summer training. Soviet mass media continued to stress the peaceful relations between Moscow and Berlin in the days before the attack. Regarding his famous press release, in which the Soviet government declared that it had no intention to attack Germany and was not engaged in any mobilization activities, and asked Berlin to clarify the intent of its deployments along the Soviet border, Gareev said that diplomats might have seen the statement as a ploy to force Germany to reveal its hand, but he warned that a critical aspect was missing. The foreign ministry and the General Staff never had any classified discussions about this issue and so the military districts and the navy were not warned about the imminence of war until after the first blow was struck. This is relevant in any situation when war is imminent, but it addresses the larger issues of civil-military relations. Gareev understands that Stalin would not have tolerated any such discussions between a foreign minister and the General Staff. Stalin controlled all channels of communication, which ran through his party-state apparatus. His basic point, however, is that the General Staff has every right to expect precise political guidance in order to make sound strategic decisions. This requires the political leadership understanding the impact of the tasks assigned upon operational military decisions.

Gareev highlighted two other war-imminent situations. He stated that Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the Chief of the General Staff, opposed military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 at a session of the Politburo. In response, Yuri Andropov, the then-head of the KGB and a member of the Politburo, told the Marshal: “We here make policy. Your job is to accomplish the military tasks assigned.” Political direction was no better at the start of the first Chechen War, when the government set the task for deploying forces to disarm bandit formations. What transpired was the bloody first battle for Grozny, where hastily-assembled composite units were surrounded and suffered heavy casualties. In both Afghanistan and Chechnya, the governments blundered into wars that they did not want, because they failed to understand the implied tasks that followed from the initial order, and failed in their political guidance to take into account the real situation on the ground.

Turning to the current Russian National Security Strategy, Gareev noted that it addresses the primacy of non-military means in resolving Russia's national security problems, but points out that there is really no effective central control of these means and the result is uncoordinated policy. This might leave the military with the task of salvaging a bad situation. In this context Gareev considered the issue of combat capability and combat readiness. The current military reform program is intended to achieve greater combat-capability (boesposobnost'). However, scant attention has been paid to combat-readiness (boegotovnost'). The first relates to arming, organizing, and training the forces for combat. The second concerns their readiness for actual combat, which means the capacity to respond to attack and go directly into combat. In 1941, the Soviet armed forces were undertaking measures to increase their combat capabilities, but they were not ready for the immediate conduct of combat operations, and forward deployed forces paid for that oversight. A similar situation existed in 1994 during the initial military intervention in Chechnya. Competent intelligence can provide some warning of possible attack, and in that context the investment in combat readiness pays its highest dividends in the initial period of war.

He also commented on the nature of future war. Admitting the difficulties associated with this task, he made a number of observations relevant to the current direction of the reforms associated with the “new look” armed forces. First, Gareev took to task those who depicted future conflicts as being “non-contact warfare,” a term used by the late Major-General, Vladimir Slipchenko, to describe sixth generation warfare dominated by precision-strikes, electronic warfare, and information technology. To those who criticized Russian operations during the Russia-Georgia War in August 2008 for not being a “non-contact war,” he states that the means used complemented the political and military context of the war and suggested this was based on achieving military and political goals without triggering foreign intervention. Reflecting on Soviet military theory in the 1930’s, Gareev noted the positive development of both the deep operations concept and the creation of the industrial base to provide the means to arm such forces. “If we speak about the operational strategic dimension, then we have to admit that our theory and practice has a completely confused understanding of the initial period of war and how troops should act in the case of surprise attack by the enemy” (Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, March 9).

Gareev noted the progressive nature of the development of the concept and capabilities associated with network-centric warfare, but warned that Russia does not yet have the means to conduct such operations. He also warns against seeing network-centric operations as a substitute for the conduct of ground combat. Russia fought the war that it did in Georgia, because it matched both the strategic circumstances and its political goals. New concepts do not negate that necessity.

Moreover, he said that the new Russian military doctrine refers to the use of forces in local wars, armed conflict, and anti-terrorist operations, but he warns that such conflicts will not be limited. They can evolve into large-scale regional wars in terms of forces deployed, and the areas involved in such conflicts. He warns that a serious gap exists in how we think about future war in theory and the actual technical basis to conduct such warfare. In part, this is a consequence of the lessons derived from looking at operations in Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as models for future conflicts. These were one-sided conflicts, where only one combatant possessed modern means. Future wars are more likely to involve both sides deploying such means. That places before the Russian state and its military key tasks, which Gareev describes in the following manner:

“In our view, the most important task for the Russian armed forces is to create its own precision-strike weapons and the necessary technological base to support the conduct of network-centric warfare. Similarly, we must work out and implement more active and decisive methods of strategic and operational-tactical action to impose upon the enemy those actions, including contact warfare, which he most seeks to avoid” (Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, March 9).

While this appears to describe a conflict with the United States, and its NATO allies, Chinese military modernization makes it also relevant for defense in the east. On March 5, addressing the defense ministry collegium, President Dmitry Medvedev, set the training focus for 2010. He spoke of increasing the combat readiness of the conventional forces in their new organizational structure, which will require the creation of multi-service groupings. He also said that he will personally observe Vostok 2010, conducted this summer by the Siberian and Far Eastern Military Districts (Vedomosti, March 9).

Taken together, this focus on the eastern strategic direction and the attention to combat readiness suggests both progress in military reform, and increasing concern over the possibility of hostilities from that direction.
 
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