WAR 05/01 to 05/07 ***The***Winds***of***WAR***

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(7)03/30 to 04/06 ***The***Winds***of***WAR***
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showt...***of***WAR***

(8)04/07 to 04/14 ***The***Winds***of***WAR***
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showt...***of***WAR***

(9)04/15 to 04/22 ***The***Winds***of***WAR***
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showt...***of***WAR***

(10)04/23 to 04/30 ***The***Winds***of***WAR***
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?403500-04-23-to-04-30-***The***Winds***of***WAR***

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USA and Japan warn North Korea on nuclear test

1 May 2012, 02:23 (GMT+05:00)
http://en.trend.az/regions/world/usa/2020658.html​

US President Barack Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda stressed Monday that they stand united in opposition to provocations by North Korea, following a failed rocket launch this month, DPA reported.

Obama said North Korea's actions, seen as part of a move to develop a missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, were "a sign of weakness and not strength, and only serve to deepen Pyongyang's isolation."

"Pyongyang is very clear that the United States, Japan, South Korea, other countries in the region are unified in insisting that it abide by its responsibilities, abide by international norms, and that they will not be able to purchase anything from further provocative acts," he said during a White House press conference following meetings with Noda.

The Japanese leader noted that in the past North Korea had followed tests of missile technology with nuclear tests, and there was a "great possibility" they could do so again.

Noda said he believed the international community "all together will need to call for restraint" by North Korea.







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US warns North Korea against 'provocations'

Last Updated: 15 hours 34 minutes ago
http://www.radioaustralianews.net.au/stories/201205/3492701.htm?=​

The United States and Japan have warned North Korea not to carry out a new nuclear test, during the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to Washington.

US President Barack Obama says North Korea's "old pattern of provocation" will not be tolerated.

Mr Obama says the communist north's recent actions, including a failed rocket launch, would "only serve to deepen Pyongyang's isolation".

Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda is the first Japanese leader to visit Washington in three years.

Mr Noda says there is a great possibility that Pyongyang will carry out its first nuclear test since 2009.

The visit comes as the two countries agreed to relocate 9,000 US marines from Okinawa to Guam.

More than 20,000 US troops are stationed in Japan, leading to local resentment.

The leaders say they will continue to work towards an early resolution on this issue and have pledged to strengthen defence ties.





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Israeli Defense Minister Keeps
All Options Open on Iran

"Israel cannot afford to be duped," Defense Minister Ehud Barak said Monday
while discussing international tensions involving Iran's nuclear program.

By JODI RUDOREN
Published: April 30, 2012
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/w...raeli-options-remain-open-on-iran.html?_r=1&=​

JERUSALEM — The Israeli defense minister, Ehud Barak, said Monday night that the international talks on the Iranian nuclear program do “not fill me with confidence,” reiterating his hard-line position about all options — including an independent Israeli attack — remaining on the table, despite mounting criticism from the security establishment here and a growing sense abroad that a diplomatic solution may be possible.

“They say in the Middle East a pessimist is simply an optimist with experience,” Mr. Barak said in a speech to about 100 members of the Foreign Press Association at the King David Hotel. Acknowledging that a military strike was “not simple” and would be “complicated by certain risks,” he said that a “radical Islamic Republic of Iran with nuclear weapons would be far more dangerous both for the region and, indeed, the whole world.”

“Israel cannot afford to be duped,” he added. “The No. 1 responsibility is to ensure that our fate will remain firmly in our own hands.”

Mr. Barak spoke days after his former internal security chief issued a blistering attack of him and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, part of a growing chorus of criticism of their hawkish stance that the defense minister dismissed as “politically motivated” and coming from people who “prefer to bury their heads in the sand.” Though many here, as in Washington, are increasingly confident that Israel will not strike Iran this year, Mr. Barak and Mr. Netanyahu seem reluctant to abandon their hawkish narrative.

And one reason is they believe their tough words are working.

“In a way, it is paying off: they achieved the awakening of the international community and the involvement of the United States,” explained Yossi Melman, whose history of the Israeli intelligence community, “Spies Against Armageddon,” is scheduled for publication in two months. “It’s difficult to sense whether it’s manipulation, or part of it is psychological warfare,” Mr. Melman added. “I think he really genuinely believes in what he says.”

The tough talk makes Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Barak seem increasingly isolated in the international arena, where predictions of war in the near future have all but disappeared amid a focus on the negotiations scheduled to continue in Baghdad this month. American officials believe the looming threat of tighter sanctions July 1 has made the Iranians take the talks more seriously, and that the government has begun to prepare the people for a deal.

In Israel, the dissent that burst into public view in recent days has been simmering here for some time, so it may actually have less of an effect.

A poll conducted last week by Smith Research for The Jerusalem Post showed that fewer than half of Israelis back an independent strike on Iran. But about half disagreed with the harsh critique of Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Barak by Yuval Diskin, who retired last May as head of Shin Bet, Israel’s equivalent of the F.B.I., according to a poll conducted by Dahaf Institute.

Other recent surveys show that about three-quarters consider a nuclear Iran an existential threat, and almost as many support a strike with American backing. Mr. Netanyahu’s popularity is strong, with polls showing his Likud Party would pick up seats in the next election, which is now expected in late summer or early fall.

“Israelis like the hawkish rhetoric,” said Mina Zemach, director of the Dahaf Polling Institute. “Netanyahu is very strong now. What the public hopes is that Netanyahu prepares us just in case, if no one will stop Iran, then we have to attack.”

Several political and security experts said that they did not expect to see a change in policy or tone from Mr. Netanyahu or Mr. Barak, but that the move to elections indicates that they do not believe a strike is imminent. And campaign season is likely to push the issue aside in favor of domestic concerns.

“The minute we have a date set for elections, you have to assume that Bibi and Barak are not going to risk their electoral chances by taking some dramatic military initiative which could go wrong,” said Yossi Alpher, a strategic analyst who is an editor of BitterLemons.net, a Web site about the Middle East. “The Palestinian issue and Iran are not the first issues. This is not what preoccupies the public.”

Iran insists that its nuclear program is for civilian purposes, but Israel says that Tehran must be prevented from developing the capacity to build a nuclear weapon.

Despite the move toward early elections, and what many here believe is a commitment Mr. Netanyahu made to President Obama in March not to attack before the American elections, a senior intelligence official said the military option remains very much a live possibility. “It is affecting the regime,” he said of the international pressure. “We don’t think it will bring the regime to change the strategy.”

In his speech, Mr. Barak said that sanctions had “forced the Iranians to take note, sit down and talk,” but that “actions speak louder than words.” He repeated his view that Iran is “approaching what I have termed the immunity zone,” in which the enrichment of uranium to weapons grade could not easily be stopped.

“Just imagine the most unstable elements in the hands of the most unstable regime in one of the most unstable regions of the world,” he warned. “It is well understood in Washington, D.C., as well as in Jerusalem that as long as there is a future existential threat to our people, that all options to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons should stay on the table, and they will.”

Yehuda Ben Meir, one of the directors of the national security and public opinion project at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, said that there was some discomfort among Israelis with Mr. Netanyahu’s comparing the Iranian threat to the Holocaust, but that “there’s a consensus about the severity of the threat and there’s a consensus that Israel should do whatever it can.”

David Horovitz, a veteran journalist here who runs the new Web site The Times of Israel, said many Israelis view the strident tone as a “successful effort to create the sense in the international community that there needs to be more dramatic action in a nonmilitary sense.”

“I don’t think what’s unfolding is deemed by Netanyahu and Barak to justify, ‘O.K., we can tone down the process,’ ” Mr. Horovitz said of the international pressure. “Quite the reverse.”





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The madness of our ‘plan’ for Syria

While we wait, civilians die

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
Monday, April 30, 2012, 8:00 PM.
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/madness-plan-syria-article-1.1069996​

The United States seems to have two plans to deal with what is fast becoming a civil war in Syria. Plan A calls for the full implementation of the UN ceasefire and the complete cooperation of Bashar Assad, a dictator who would, at the risk of his very life, give up some power to the opposition.

Plan B, on the other hand, envisions a military response through air power. For that to be implemented, Plan A must fail and more Syrians must die.

Just how many more Syrians must die no one can say. But it seems pretty clear that the toll — now in excess of 9,000 — must mount before the U.S., NATO and maybe the Turks and the Saudis will move to bring the slaughter to a halt. Bloomberg News reports that “more than 500 people” have been killed since the start of the ceasefire on April 12. This ceasefire is more fire than cease.

Few people in Washington have much faith in the UN plan, advanced by former Secretary General Kofi Annan. He has been doing what he has been trained to do — go through the motions of peacemaking.

Time is not on the side of moderation or accommodation. The longer the killing goes on, the more radical and extreme the anti-Assad forces become.

The intelligentsia that initially supported the movement will be marginalized by Islamic extremists — volunteers from nearby Arab countries who can’t abide Assad and his secularism. (Already, bombings have been reported.)

As with Saddam Hussein, his late neighbor, Assad and his family have long been at odds with the Muslim Brotherhood and similar organizations. In 1982, Assad’s father killed perhaps 20,000 in the Brotherhood stronghold of Hama. It is now payback time.

Those of us who have long advocated that the U.S. put some muscle into its diplomacy — even bomb Syrian military installations and impose a no-fly zone — have to concede the difficulties entailed.

The Syrian air-defense system is thick, designed by the Russians to deter an Israeli attack. The composition of the Syrian opposition is largely unknown. More worrisome, Syria has a vast stockpile of chemical and biological weapons.

Still, none of this is insurmountable. Israel was able to bomb a suspected Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007, apparently without losing a single airplane — and whatever Israel can do, the U.S. can do as well. What’s missing at the moment is not the wherewithal to deal militarily with the Assad regime but the will to do so — and to do so expeditiously. This is a matter of leadership and, so far, President Obama has provided precious little.

In “Prague Winter,” her compelling new memoir, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright emphasizes the importance of leadership — or its lack — in world affairs. As a woman, she is the Czechoslovakian-born daughter of Josef Korbel and Anna Spiegelova. As a diplomat, she is a daughter of Munich, the infamous agreement that turned part of her country over to Nazi Germany.

The Munich analogy can be overdone. (Saddam was no Hitler.) But the analogy to the supposed antidote to Munich, Vietnam, can also be overdone. Not every military action is a quagmire. The military interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya did not require boots on the ground.

The Syrian revolution is going to spiral into something awful. The longer it lasts, the more people die and the greater the chance of it spilling across borders. The plan, as it is now, is to wait for the inevitable — the failure of Kofi Annan and, after that, the predictable failure of an arms embargo that will weaken the opposition much more than it will Assad.

Somehow, multiple failures are supposed to lead to success. That’s worse than Munich. It’s madness.


Read more: http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/madness-plan-syria-article-1.1069996#ixzz1tZh7PQOp



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How long must Syrians wait?

By Richard Cohen,
Monday, April 30, 6:57 PM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opini...ait-for-help/2012/04/30/gIQANhYdsT_story.html​

The United States seems to have two plans to deal with what is fast becoming a civil war in Syria. Plan A calls for the full implementation of the U.N. cease-fire and the complete cooperation of Bashar al-Assad, a dictator who would, at the risk of his very life, give up some power to the opposition. Plan B, on the other hand, envisions a military response through air power. For that to be implemented, Plan A must fail and more Syrians must die.

Just how many more Syrians must die no one can say. But it seems pretty clear that the toll — now in excess of 9,000 — must mount before the United States, NATO and maybe the Turks and the Saudis will move to bring the slaughter to a halt. Bloomberg News reports that “more than 500 people” have been killed since the start of the cease-fire on April 12. This cease-fire is more fire than cease.

Few people in Washington have much faith in the U.N. plan, advanced by former secretary-general Kofi Annan. He has been doing what he has been trained to do — go through the motions of peacemaking. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t, but there is a protocol to these things that has to be honored. Yet as each ticket is punched, more people die.

Time is not on the side of moderation or accommodation. The longer the killing goes on, the more radical and extreme the anti-Assad forces become. The intelligentsia that initially supported the movement will be marginalized by Islamic extremists — volunteers from nearby Arab countries who can’t abide Assad and his secularism. (Already, bombings have been reported.) As with Saddam Hussein, his late neighbor, Assad and his family have long been at odds with the Muslim Brotherhood and similar organizations. In 1982, Assad’s father killed perhaps 20,000 in the Brotherhood stronghold of Hama. It is now payback time.

Those of us who have long advocated that the United States put some muscle into its diplomacy — even bomb Syrian military installations and impose a no-fly zone — have to concede the difficulties entailed. The Syrian air-defense system is thick, designed by the Russians to deter an Israeli attack. The composition of the Syrian opposition is largely unknown (to quote Butch Cassidy: “Who are those guys?”). More worrisome, Syria has a vast stockpile of chemical and biological weapons. The weapons have not been used — they’re hard to control — but a regime fighting for its life may well use everything at its disposal. Saddam did against the Kurds.

Still, none of this is insurmountable. Israel was able to bomb a suspected Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007 apparently without losing a single airplane — and whatever Israel can do, the United States can do as well. What’s missing at the moment is not the wherewithal to deal militarily with the Assad regime but the will to do so — and to do so expeditiously. This is a matter of leadership and, so far, Barack Obama has provided precious little.

In “Prague Winter,” her compelling new memoir, former secretary of state Madeleine Albright emphasizes the importance of leadership — or its lack — in world affairs. As a woman, she is the Czechoslovakian-born daughter of Josef Korbel and Anna Spiegelova. As a diplomat, she is a daughter of Munich, the infamous agreement that turned part of her country over to Nazi Germany. She rebuts Tolstoy, “who argued that scholars routinely exaggerate the ability of the great and powerful to control events,” by citing the weak and vacillating leaders who failed to recognize evil and stand up to Hitler. They were accessories before the fact, changing history by inaction.

The Munich analogy can be overdone. (Saddam was no Hitler.) But the supposed antidote to Munich, Vietnam, can also be overdone. Not every military action is a quagmire — and, anyway, quagmires can be avoided by using air power. The military interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya did not require boots on the ground. They ended when they were finished — a brilliant exit strategy.

The Syrian revolution is going to spiral into something awful. The longer it lasts, the more people die and the greater the chance of it spilling across borders. The plan, as it is now, is to wait for the inevitable — the failure of Kofi Annan and, after that, the predictable failure of an arms embargo that will weaken the opposition much more than it will Assad. Somehow, multiple failures are supposed to lead to success. That’s worse than Munich. It’s madness.





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Hummm....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/p..._official_no_nato_planning_underway_for_syria

Obama official: No NATO planning underway for Syria
Posted By Josh Rogin Monday, April 30, 2012 - 5:11 PM Share
Comments 1

There is no formal planning going on inside NATO to prepare for defending Turkey from the violence spilling over from Syria, even though Turkey is considering whether to formally invoke NATO's chapters on collective defense, a top Obama administration official said Monday.

"Our Supreme Allied Commander [Adm. James Stavridis] can do a certain amount of planning... but there has been no formal tasking and there has been no formal request by the Turks for consultations in an Article 4 or Article 5 scenario," said Liz Sherwood-Randall, the National Security Council's senior director for Europe, in remarks Monday at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davotoglu briefed his foreign minister and defense minister counterparts on Syria at a high level meeting in Brussels this month, and reports said that Davotoglu discussed at length a cross border attack by Syrian forces on a refugee camp inside Turkey that killed two. Davotoglu is also reported to have said the Syrian regime has "abused a chance offered by the Annan plan."

The Obama administration also believes that the Annan plan "is failing," is currently searching for a "plan B" in Syria, and is preparing military related options in case they are diplomacy breaks down. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned that NATO might have to get involved earlier this month, during a ministerial meeting of the "Friends of Syria" group in Paris.

"Turkey already has discussed with NATO, during our ministerial meetings over the last two days, the burden of Syrian refugees on Turkey, the outrageous shelling across the border from Syria into Turkey a week ago, and that Turkey is considering formally invoking Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty," Clinton said.

Sherwood-Randall was speaking to preview the upcoming May NATO Summit in Chicago, which she said would focus on three dimensions: NATO's mission in Afghanistan, NATO's defensive capabilities, and the effort to get NATO countries to increase their contributions to the alliance.

On Afghanistan, she said NATO "will shape the next phase of the transition" to Afghan control ahead of the full handover to the Afghan government in 2014.

"Setting forth the next phase of the transition in Chicago is an important step that will ensure we complete our work on time," she said. "In order to ensure a responsible transition of security, we need to development milestones along the way, and it's our intention to do that in Chicago."

She did not say whether those milestones would be the same milestones that Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced accidentally by reading internal talking points to reporters on the plane to Brussels in February, which amount to the goal of handing over the lead combat control to Afghan forces in 2013 while maintaining combat participation by allied forces.

Sherwood-Randall said that there will be no NATO-Russia Council meeting in Chicago as there was in Lisbon in 2010 and she said that was because the Russian government declined to participate.

She also said that the United States would have to shoulder the burden of defense spending in NATO for a long time to come and that European countries were not expected to increase their spending on defense until their economic troubles subside.

"We can anticipate growth in European defense spending when Europe has recovered from its economic crisis and obviously there is a lot of work to be done on that front," she said. "We are so interdependent economically that it effects our growth as well. That said, we have got to find a way to maintain our alliance capabilities in this time of fiscal constraint and that's what we intend to do."

For links see article source....
Posted for fair use.....
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/04/30/jordans_prime_ministerial_shuffle

Jordan's prime ministerial shuffle
Posted By Mohammad Abu Rumman Monday, April 30, 2012 - 2:38 PM
Comments 3

Prime Minister Awn Shawkat al-Khasawneh shocked Jordan on Thursday by suddenly resigning. Jordanian prime ministers typically come and go at the discretion of the king. They are often the last to know of their fate, and passively accept their dismissals until the next time their services might be needed. Khasawneh violated political tradition by submitting his resignation while abroad in Turkey, through one of his ministers, with a language devoid of the traditional praise and reverence. Jordanian monarchs are not accustomed to being curtly dismissed by their hand-chosen government officials.

The King's discomfort with this perceived disrespect, and concern that it might become a rallying point for the opposition, was palpable. He responded with an aggrieved letter that blamed the premier for slowing down the process of reform. The palace hinted that Khasawneh was the obstacle to holding early parliamentary elections because he preferred postponing the elections to 2013. A massive media campaign denouncing the former prime minister has likely been inspired by the palace, which clearly hopes to prevent the opposition from exploiting Khasawneh's resignation to blame the king for the absence of meaningful reform. It will now fall on the government of the conservative new Prime Minister Fayez Tarawnah to deliver on these reforms... or, more likely, to oversee their continuing failure.

The disagreement between the prime minister and the king had been an open secret among Jordan's political circles and media for some time. The king's defenders felt that Khasawneh was delaying the adoption of important laws, such as: one for a new independent body to oversee elections in a way that would ensure fairness and avoid the lapses that made a catastrophe of the previous elections and a consensual electoral law for conducting the elections to produce a more qualified and representative parliament with a better image, leading to a "parliamentary government" or quasi-parliamentary government that would emerge from the political powers of the parliament.

Khasawneh took office widely seen as a reformist and a liberal politician. He entered government sharply critical of how the country was being managed. He denounced the corruption, and expressed his intention to bring an end to the intervention of the intelligence department into public affairs. He defended the principle of the constitutional "guardianship of the state," and sticking to its mandate. He began a dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition, and introduced advanced positions, both intellectually and politically, to the public landscape.

But this impressive rhetoric did not reflect itself on the ground in a tangible way. Reformists felt very disappointed by the PM in the recent days, as he seemed unable to prevent the arrest of a number of political activists, and reports continued to appear exposing abuse and torture in prisons. These were seen as punitive behaviors conducted by various bodies in the state against the activists of the popular movement for what the officials consider an alarming crossing of the traditional red lines, as the protests' slogans mounted up to include explicit and implicit criticism of the Jordanian monarch and his family.

The greatest disappointment was the new election law that the prime minister presented to parliament. The proposed law retains the states' traditional method of designing laws under the pressure of traditional scarecrows, such as the conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood and dwarfing the opposition. Thus the draft was turned down immediately by the opposition parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the National Front for Reform, dozens of institutions of civil society, and most of the political forces, all of whom saw it falling short of the least political ambitions, and not likely to fulfill the promise of a parliamentary government after elections. Many were shocked by the prime minister's refusal to withdraw the law from parliament for amendment, in spite of the negative reactions it provoked. Instead, he seemed to be hoping that the controversy would drive the king to the parliament and call for new elections as soon as the law is approved.

Khasawneh's resignation was sparked by the king's decision to extend the current parliamentary session, made while he was on a visit to Turkey. The decision was meant to facilitate the rapid passage of the election law, leading to the dissolution of the parliament and early parliamentary elections. Khasawneh preferred to continue the regular session of parliament until its natural end, which would have delayed the elections until next year. He believed that the new independent commission to oversee voting would need a full year to be able to manage the elections, or at a minimum six months, to ensure that the electoral process would be clean. Perhaps his legal background predisposed him to focus on the UN's standards for such commissions rather than the urgency of the political dynamic, to the dismay of many reformists hoping for speedier change.

What will happen now that Khasawneh has left the stage? Reformists were unpleasantly surprised by the selection of a conservative prime minister, Fayez Tarawneh, to succeed Khasawneh. But some justify this choice by saying that the new PM's tenure will be very short, since his key mission will be the withdrawal of the election law and conducting speedy negotiations about it with the opposition, before sending it again to parliament for approval within a few months. After this, the PM will recommend dissolving the parliament and holding early parliamentary elections, which will require him, according to the new constitutional amendments, to submit his resignation. The second government will hold the elections and resign in turn to leave the stage for another government after the elections. Thus, we are likely to see two governments until the end of the year or the presumed date of the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Although the task seems clear, it still requires reaching an agreement with the opposition and the various political forces on the required law. This requires the PM to have a great deal of political power and flexibility in order to persuade the opposition to participate. He will have also to include in the deal package -- for the first time -- the nomination of the anticipated president of the independent commission that will run the next elections. The character of the president of the commission will be an important indicator of the credibility of the reform process.

This political confusion in Jordan is particularly dangerous given the mounting signs of a serious economic crisis. Jordanian ministers who were recently engaged in talks with the World Bank warn that this will be the toughest on the country since 1989, when the upheaval of the south erupted as a result of social protest against corruption and bad economic conditions. There has been growing dissent and unrest across Jordan's south for the past year, with no signs of letting up. The 1989 events led to reviving the Jordanian democratic life and ended with holding the best elections in the history of the country. Will it take another explosion of popular anger like that of 1989 to convince the decision-making circles in Jordan that political reform is the only reliable guarantee for political stability?

Mohammad Abu Rumman is a political analyst at the University of Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies.

For links see article source....
Posted for fair use.....
http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/04/29/khamenei-preparing-for-a-deal/

Khamenei Preparing for a Deal?
By Zachary Keck
April 29, 2012

There are unmistakable signs coming out of Iran that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei is laying the groundwork for a possible deal with the United States. This shift began in February, when Khamenei reaffirmed his opposition to nuclear weapons on both religious and strategic grounds. The following month, Khamenei praised President Barack Obama’s “good and wise statement” at AIPAC that time for diplomacy still existed, conveniently ignoring that the U.S. leader had also indicated his willingness to undertake military action if necessary. As negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 got underway, Khamenei’s appointees in the clergy, judiciary, and media all sounded a note of optimism. It’s now being reported that Iran is willing to limit the scope of its uranium enrichment.

Most have speculated that Khamenei’s sudden willingness to compromise is the result of his desire to avoid the looming sanctions against Iran’s oil exports. Although there may be some truth to this, at least as important is surely Khamenei’s recent consolidation of power at home. By purging his political competitors, the Supreme Leader has eliminated a significant source of his past opposition to a deal – his fear that his internal opponents would most benefit from it.

When the Islamic Republic’s Constitution was amended in 1989, it simultaneously invested executive power in the Supreme Leader and the president, creating a fierce rivalry that has persisted to this day. Although the Office of the Supreme Leader was by far the more powerful of the two, its current occupant, Ali Khamenei, lacks the religious stature and charisma to be sure of his position. One consequence of this, as Iran scholar Said Amir Arjomand has noted, is that the leader and presidents’ policy preferences have become “increasingly determined by the constitutionally defined vested interest of the office they each held, rather than their personal will.”

Indeed, although Khamenei had been a pragmatist during his presidency, after becoming Supreme Leader he immediately went about refashioning himself as a staunch conservative. The reasoning isn’t hard to discern; the hardliner clerics on the right have the greatest interest in the preservation of the Velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist) system, with a Supreme Leader at its helm. Additionally, the Supreme Leader began strengthening the organizations that were directly answerable to him, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Judiciary, and Bonyads [economic foundations]. Notably, these groups are among the greatest benefactors of Iran’s isolation from the West.

In the same vein, all three post-Khomeini Presidents – Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-2007), Mohammad Khatami, (1997-2005) and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-present) – have sought to overcome their constitutional inferiority by achieving a rapprochement with the U.S. The thinking went that if they could be seen as presiding over such a deal, their popularity at home would allow them to undercut the Supreme Leader.

Thus, whereas Rafsanjani cooperated with the U.S.-led coalition during the first Gulf War and steered a lucrative oil contract to the U.S. company Conoco, Khatami appealed directly to the American people on CNN and got Khamenei to sign off on the 2003 grand bargain proposal. Most telling of all is Ahmadinejad who, despite his ideological aversion to the West, emerged as a supporter of a nuclear deal.

While at times political and strategic realities have forced Khamenei to acquiesce in these efforts, he has remained opposed to a deal and has tried to stymie one whenever possible. In 2009, for instance, Obama reportedly secretly sent two letters to Khamenei pledging negotiations in good faith. Neither were answered. Later that same year, Khamenei rejected the fuel swap agreement Ahmadinejad negotiated with the P5+1, mainly because it was the president’s initiative and would have strengthened him at home.

Since that time, however, Khamenei has steadily eliminated all political competitors. This began with the purge of the Reformists, followed by the stripping of Rafsanjani’s position as the Chairman of the Assembly of Experts. Although initially content to allow Ahmadinejad to finish out his final term unmolested, the president’s continued intransigence finally led Khamenei to publically censure him. When it became clear Ahmadinejad’s most powerful backers in the clergy and military would side with the Supreme Leader, Khamenei began touting the elimination of the Office of the President altogether. Nonetheless, Ahmadinejad’s marginalization wasn’t completely secure until the crushing defeat his allies suffered in March’s parliamentary elections.

Notably, Khamenei’s speech reiterating his opposition to nuclear weapons came on the eve of these elections. Shortly thereafter, as if to demonstrate his newfound confidence, Khamenei surprised everyone by reappointing Rafsanjani to his one remaining governmental post. Rafsanjani quicklymadeheadlinesby declaring his longstanding support for direct talks with the United States. Some in the West misinterpreted this as Khamenei seeking to use Rafsanjani as an interlocutor to Washington. But the Supreme Leader would never confer such a privilege on his rival and, sure enough, Khamenei’s allies soon began disparaging Rafsanjani for allegedly trying to usurp the Leader.

While this signaled to domestic audiences that Khamenei was the driving force behind the upcoming negotiations, Khamenei ensured the P5+1 powers received the same message by conferring Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, with the title of special representative to the Supreme Leader. By contrast, none of Ahmadinejad’s officials were present when negotiations with the P5+1 powers resumed last month, and the president himself once again became an opponent of compromising with the West.

Besides getting the sanctions lifted, a rapprochement works in Khamenei’s favor in two ways. First, it would weaken the persons and organizations Khamenei aligned himself to consolidate his powers, particularly the IRGC. With their common enemies now marginalized, Khamenei has to consider the possibility that the IRGC might turn its sights on him someday. Absent the threat of the “Great Satan,” Khamenei could reduce the size of the IRGC’s bloated peacetime force. More importantly, the influx of international companies that would follow the lifting of sanctions would severely undercut the IRGC’s enormous economic largesse.

The aging Khamenei is also likely thinking of his legacy. Whereas Imam Khomeini is revered for toppling the Shah, creating the Islamic Republic system, and repelling Saddam Hussein’s invasion in 1980, Khamenei’s tenure as Supreme Leader has been rather forgettable. While curbing some of the excesses of the Khomeini era, social and political rights remain restricted, the economy underperforms, and Iran is viewed with suspicion if not hostility abroad. As it stands today, Khamenei’s tenure as Supreme Leader is easily forgotten. By achieving a rapprochement with the United States, Khamenei would ensure himself an eternal spot in Iranian history.

Zachary Keck is an editorial assistant with The Diplomat.

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http://the-diplomat.com/2012/04/29/tackling-north-korea-missile-quest/

Tackling North Korea’s Missile Quest
April 29, 2012
By Michael Raska

There’s much we don’t know about North Korea’s missile program. But it’s abundantly clear a new defense strategy is called for.

While North Korea’s latest launch of the Unha-3 (Taepodong 2) space launch vehicle intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) failed in its third attempt to place a satellite into orbit, the test doesn’t end Pyongyang's ongoing efforts to develop its catalogue of short, medium, and long-range ballistic missile systems.

On April 15, Pyongyang unveiled what appeared to be a new road-mobile long-range ballistic missile system, code-named KN-08, which hints that North Korea aims to develop a mobile ICBM that can be launched directly, without the lengthy preparation time required by the Taepodong 2. The new system also signals ambitious objectives, more missile tests, and ultimately, it raises questions about the covert external, technical and financial assistance that underlines North Korea’s ballistic missile programs.

During the April 15 military parade in Pyongyang, marking the 100-year anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-Sung, North Korea’s new leader Kim Jong-un declared that superiority in military technology was “was no longer monopolized by imperialists.” Following his first public speech, North Korea displayed one of its largest military parades, featuring at least six new road-mobile long-range missiles that were transported on top of a large 16-wheel TEL vehicle based on Chinese design.

The new missile’s appearance has stirred significant debate among arms control experts, intelligence and defense analysts on the viability, character, capability, and future deployment of North Korea’s new missile program.

On the one hand, there are skeptical suggestions that the new missiles, painted in a three-tone camouflage with serial numbers and stage-separation bands in clear white paint, are nothing but plywood mockups. In particular, selected design features of the new missile seem odd and raise considerable suspicions. Moreover, the uncertainty of its operational readiness is marked by the absence of any flight tests.

Others, however, see North Korea’s new missile development as a significant shift toward an actual ICBM missile force.

Indeed, there have been a series of less-noticed public statements by high-ranking U.S. officials that point toward North Korea’s emerging ICBM development trajectory. For example, during the 10th IISS Asia Security Summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue, held in June 2011 in Singapore, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that “with the continued development of long-range missiles and potentially a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile and their continued development of nuclear weapons, North Korea is in the process of becoming a direct threat to the United States.”

More recently, on March 7, 2012, Adm. Robert Willard, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, testified before the House Armed Service Committee, noting that “there is a development within North Korea of a road-mobile ICBM system that we’ve observed…We have not observed it being tested yet, to my knowledge. We are watching the development very closely.”

For more than three decades, North Korea has been developing and deploying a variety of ballistic missile technologies as force multipliers vis-à-vis qualitatively more advanced U.S.-South Korea conventional military capabilities.

Its programs date back to the early-1980s, when North Korea reverse-engineered Soviet-made 300 kilometer-range Scud B short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) acquired from Egypt. Subsequently, it used the Scud technology and progressively extended the range and payload capabilities of its follow-on systems, including Scud B (Hwasong 5), Scud C (Hwasong 6), No Dong medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), Taepodong 1 (TD-1) and TD-2 long-range systems. The TD-1, for example, combined technologies of the Nodong’s first stage and Scud-variant as the second stage.

From the early 1990s onwards, North Korea has successfully exported or transferred its missile technologies to selected countries in the Middle East and South Asia. With the saturation of the Scud market in the 2000s, however, North Korea has shifted its missile development priorities to completely new systems. These include solid-propellant SRBM, code-named KN-02 Tochka – a derivative of the Soviet SS-21 missile; the liquid-propelled intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), code-named Musudan – a derivative of the SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM); and the Taepodong 2 ICBM. The latest exposure of the KN-08 is another addition to the catalogue of North Korea’s ballistic missiles in development.

In this context, North Korea has currently three potential pathways to develop an operational ICBM: 1) It can continue to enhance the Taepodong 2 variant, disguising it as a space launch vehicle; 2) It can use the experience to modify technologies of the Musudan IRBM and extend the range and payload capabilities in a similar way it has used the No Dong to develop the Taepodong; and 3) It can introduce and test a new larger type of missile with more advanced design, engines, and accurate guidance systems based on external covert operational, technical, and financial assistance. In doing so, it can use the newly constructed space launch facility located at Tongchang-ri.

Since the mid-1990s, strategic realities on the Korean Peninsula have become more “fluid” and multi-faceted with the emergence of “hybrid” security threats that combine conventional, asymmetrical, low-intensity, and non-linear threat dimensions. These include two extreme threats on a threat scale – on one end is North Korea’s continuously advancing ballistic missile program coupled with its WMD

(nuclear, chemical, and biological) development. At the other end of the threat spectrum, however, is North Korea’s specter of a failed state – its progressively worsening economic situation, gradual strategic decay accompanied by internal structural erosion and prolonged international diplomatic isolation, which have broadened the risks of potential instability and volatility, for example, in scenarios ranging “from implosion to explosion.”

In the increasingly “hybrid conflict” spectrum, South Korea’s traditional security template based on three mutually-reinforcing strategic pillars: defensive deterrence; the U.S-South Korea alliance; and forward active defense may no longer be relevant. This means that U.S-South Korean defense planners must search for a new defense strategy with relevant operational concepts that would allow greater flexibility, adaptability, and autonomy under conditions of strategic uncertainty. At the same time, the international community must work toward sharpening proliferation restrictions of missile technologies and components in order to curtail North Korea’s WMD programs and ambitions.

Michael Raska is Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, based at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

Related Features

* Plugging U.S. Missile Defense Gaps
* Debating Missile Defence
* China’s Alarming, Puzzling, Missile Test
* Behind the China Missile Hype
* And You Think North Korea’s Crazy?

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http://the-diplomat.com/indian-decade/2012/04/30/indias-spy-satellite-launch/

India’s Spy Satellite Launch?
By Rajeev Sharma
April 30, 2012

India’s scientific and strategic community must be in seventh heaven with the playbook launch of Radar Imaging Satellite 1 or RISAT-1 on April 26, exactly a week after the successful launch of the Agni-V long range ballistic missile. Though RISAT-1 is a remote sensing satellite built and operated by the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), its strategic significance isn’t lost on the government.

The satellite, which took ISRO a decade to build, is a potential game changer. (Interestingly, RISAT 2 was launched before RISAT 1 after the original was delayed following the Mumbai attacks in 2008). Officially, it’s intended for natural resources management, agriculture planning, forestry surveys, flood forecasts, assessing glacial mass, monitoring paddy plantation and yields and generally assisting with India’s food security planning. Pictures from RISAT-1 will be used to estimate the number of hectares being farmed in India, to assess crop health and predict total yield.

But these are largely non-strategic, non-military applications. The question is why, when a satellite can spot the wreckage of a plane or count the number of trees in a given area, wouldn’t it be used to spot intruders entering Indian territory – especially when it will be able to track objects on the ground both day and night. It is, when all is said and done, a satellite with spy potential.

No government is expected to go on record saying that a remote sensing satellite can or does have military applications. But for the next five years – the anticipated lifespan of RISAT-1 – Indian territory will be better prepared for possible incursions.

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http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-...-anger-shifts-to-israel-and-saudi-arabia.html

Egypt's Popular Anger Shifts to Israel and Saudi Arabia
By Nicholas Noe & Walid Raad Apr 30, 2012 1:35 PM PT

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Egyptians are angry, say Arab commentators, and it’s not just because of unemployment, deteriorating security or the continued de-facto rule of the military.

Their ire is also very much connected to foreign policy, and specifically to the ties with two countries that have loomed so large in Egypt’s modern history: Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Both states took a beating in the Egyptian media this past week: Israel, over a controversial gas deal with Egypt that has been suspended, and Saudi Arabia over its arrest of a prominent Egyptian human-rights campaigner who was performing a religious pilgrimage.

In each case, Egyptian generals and their unelected allies in government have been forced to try to tame the conflicts, which are being fueled by a wide popular movement -- strongly backed by elected political parties including the Muslim Brotherhood -- to reassert Egypt’s dignity and prestige in the region.

The annulment of the contract leads to "the achievement of a definite popular wish to stop the exportation of gas to the Zionist entity,” wrote the columnist Wagdi Zeineddin in Al-Wafd, the Cairo-based newspaper of the liberal Al-Wafd party.

The deal to deliver Egyptian natural gas to the Israel Electric Corp. was signed in 2008 under ousted President Hosni Mubarak and accounts for 40 percent of Israel’s annual natural-gas usage.

It has long been condemned by Arab columnists because the sale price that the Mubarak government agreed to – allegedly thanks to huge bribes to the Egyptian-led gas consortium and government officials – is said to be well below market price.

Since last February, the pipeline that supplies gas to Israel, as well as to some Arab states such as Jordan, has been blown up more than a dozen times.

“We hope the decision will not be recanted and that the Egyptians’ joy will not be wasted or caused to go in vain,” said Zeineddin, who warned the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces against restarting gas shipments to Israel even at market price.

“Mubarak’s era was characterized by a submission to Israeli dictations, the implementation of Israel’s wishes and a subjugation to American pressures which prevented Egypt from constituting a source of defiance to Israel,” wrote the columnist Abdul Ghafar Shukr in the Al-Ahram daily, which generally supports the military council.

Under Mubarak, Shukr asserted, the Egyptian government avoided:

...any action which could be considered by Israel as harmful to it, whether at the level of direct Egyptian-Israeli relations or at the level of the Gaza Strip where Mubarak’s consecutive governments participated in the imposition of the blockade and the implementation of Israel’s conditions to enter it or exit it from the Egyptian side.

The annulment of the gas deal has revived "the spirit of Egypt’s position towards its historical enemy,” he concluded, “and we will not allow the killing of this spirit ever again.”

Equally delighted by the Egyptian decision, the Jerusalem-based Al-Quds wrote in an editorial that it signals changes that go well “beyond gas.”

“The issue has another aspect, deeply related to politics in light of the radical change taking place in Egypt since the fall of Mubarak and his regime,” it wrote.

Even though the armed forces council is keen to “calm its foreign fronts until the situation is stabilized at home,” sooner or later “change will come, and Egyptian-Israeli relations will no longer be as calm they used to be in the days of Mubarak.”

This could have positive consequences for the Palestinian struggle, the paper said, as Israel will want to end its occupation of Palestinian lands sooner to avoid provoking the wrath of the growing “revolutionary forces and Islamic trends” in surrounding states.

Although Israel has long been the target of Arab columnists, Saudi Arabia never faced large, sustained public criticism in Egypt during the Mubarak era.

This past week, however, there were raucous protests outside the Saudi Embassy in Cairo – it was eventually closed and the ambassador was withdrawn – which was accompanied by a graffiti and social-media campaign disparaging the Saudi king directly. Pundits chimed in to say they are fed up with how the Saudis treat Egyptian workers and how they treat Egyptians in Egypt.

The cause of the indignation was the arrest of the Egyptian lawyer Ahmed el-Gizawi upon his arrival in Saudi Arabia on April 17. The Saudi authorities eventually claimed Gizawi had been found with more than 20,000 Xanax pills hidden in his luggage, a grave offense.

Joseph Mayton, editor-in-chief of Egypt’s Bikyamasr.com, suggested that the real reason for his arrest was that Gizawi had recently filed cases against the Saudi government “over its refusal to take action to end the horrific conditions of Egyptian workers.”

The treatment of Egyptians in Saudi Arabia, he wrote in an opinion piece for the Beirut-based Al-Akhbar daily, has angered human-rights workers, labor activists and social commentators in Egypt for several years.

Mayton said any “reasonable observer” can see the holes in the Saudi case. “The weight of a bag carrying that much medicine would be enormous. Activists even calculated the expected weight of 20,000 pills to be much higher than the allotted weight permitted on a flight!”

Recounting the flood of social-media invective against the Saudis, he cautioned:

While the anger is understandable, attacking Saudi citizens for the ills of their government is counterproductive. Activists should focus their outrage toward the government and the powers that have arrested Gizawi and permitted the abuse of Egyptian workers to continue. This would allow for allies among the Saudi people to emerge that could assist in releasing Gizawi and help to reduce, and ultimately end, the dangers associated with working in the kingdom.

Either way, Mayton concluded:

...the Egyptian psyche has changed. Online, Egyptians are fighting against corruption across borders, attempting to hold their own government responsible for the well being of their citizens abroad, and more importantly, taking ownership over matters they perceive as infringing on Egyptian dignity. And it is no longer a one-off expression of frustration, but a concerted effort for change.

The era when “Arab despots entertained one another, oblivious to the masses, is over, at least in Egypt,” he said.

Still, unlike the widespread support for canceling the gas deal with Israel, the deteriorating relations with Saudi Arabia brought calls for caution among some politicians and commentators.

The Salafist An-Nour party, which subscribes to the Saudi brand of ultraconservative Islam, announced it would hold “love and appreciation” counter-demonstrations in support of the kingdom. That probably was met with relief by government officials desperate to ensure the imminent delivery of more than $1 billion in Saudi aid.

The columnist Samir Rajab, writing in the pro-military council Al-Jumhuriyah, was among those who chastised demonstrators.

“It is not acceptable that the demonstrators protesting outside the Saudi embassy in Cairo raise slogans carrying statements that insult the ruling system there or the king himself,” he wrote. Still, he directed some gentle criticism at the Saudi authorities over Gizawi’s arrest for an offense “which did not happen.”

Abdel-Beri Atwan, the editor in chief of Al-Quds al-Arabi, wrote that the dispute over Gizawi, in addition to serving notice to other states that Egyptians can no longer be trampled, sends “a message of warning to all the other Arab authorities that are humiliating Arab citizens because their governments are weak and corrupt and do not defend these citizens the way they should.”

That puts the Saudis in a bind, he said: “Gizawi’s release after all this commotion would be a problem and his arrest and lashing would be a greater problem. Had there been a just judiciary in Saudi Arabia, the picture would have been completely different.”

The Egyptians' call for justice and dignity both at home and abroad contradicts the theories of Western columnists such as Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, who just this weekend explained that the Arab revolts are the first popular movements in more than a century “not animated by foreign policy or anti-colonialism or Israel or Britain.”

Try to telling that to Arabs on Twitter… or, for that matter, to Egyptians protesting outside the Saudi Embassy.

(Nicholas Noe and Walid Raad are the Beirut correspondents for the World View blog. The opinions expressed are their own.)

To contact the writers of this article:

noe@mideastwire.com.

To contact the editor responsible for this article:

Lisa Beyer at lbeyer3@bloomberg.net or +1-212-205-0372.

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AndrewW 2 hours ago 1 comment collapsed Collapse Expand

At the end of the Day, the Egyptians main problems are not caused by their richer neighbors, Israel or Saudi Arabia. They are caused by their own massive over-population growth, of well over 1000% more Egyptians now than in 1900. Gaza muslims population growth is even faster, more than 1000% just since 1960. Their environment and arable land and roads and government buildings and bridges and other infrastructure can not keep up with populations that growth by 2X every 10 years, and 8X every 30 - 40 years. USA has same problem with Mexico below us with rampant over-population growth and poverty, though not as bad as Gaza and Egypt. Mexico however has the advantage of alot of excess population growth flooding into USA, and then Mexicans working here send money back home helping the Mexican economy. Egypt however, by becoming "more Islamic Militant" and picking disputes with its richer neighbors (Israel for technology and industry, and Saudi Arabia for oil Billions), is only going to harm economic development in Egypt --- and Egyptians will over time get poorer as it cuts itself off from technology and money of its wealthier regional neighbors.

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http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-...a-camp-david-accords-dead-and-buried-1.427402

* Published 01:27 01.05.12
* Latest update 01:27 01.05.12

Potential Egyptian president Moussa: Camp David accords 'dead and buried'
Amr Moussa, leading candidate in upcoming election, says there is 'no such thing' as the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt.
By Zvi Bar'el Tags: Egypt

The leading candidate in Egypt's presidential race, Amr Moussa, said on Sunday that the Camp David agreement between his country and Israel is "dead and buried."

At a mass rally in southern Egypt, Moussa said: "The Camp David Accords is a historical document whose place is on the shelves of history, as its articles talk about the fact that the aim of the agreement is to establish an independent Palestinian state."

Moussa went on to say that there is "no such thing" as the Camp David agreement. "There is an agreement between Israel and Egypt that we will honor as long as Israel honors it," he said. "The Jewish document that defines relations between Israel and the Arabs is an Arab initiative from 2002 whose advancement should be bilateral: step for step, progress for progress."

Moussa, who served ten years as foreign minister under former president Hosni Mubarak, differentiates between the Camp David Accords - which include the Palestinian articles - and the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. The Egyptian public does not necessarily make the same differentiation, however. For them, the Camp David Accords are seen as one whole, and all public discussion of them is seen as a test of the foreign policy that is expected of Egypt's presidential candidates.

In a visit to the west of Egypt two weeks ago, Moussa described the agreement as "ink on paper whose period of authority is over," without differentiating between the articles that deal with the Palestinians, and those that deal with peace with Israel.

Although Moussa is leaning on the support of some of the secular parties and activist groups that were the backbone of the January 2011 revolution, it is actually Islamist leaders that are talking about their commitment to the Camp David Accords.

The head of the Salafi Al-Nour party, for example, said in December that his movement is not opposed to the Camp David Accords, and that it is ready to negotiate with Israel.

Moussa has taken a tough line on Israel for many years. He designed Egypt's foreign policy regarding Israel's nuclear capabilities - a policy that calls for nuclear disarmament in the region - and he is particularly proud of his part in placing the Palestinian problem on the international list of priorities during his time as foreign minister.

However, criticism for the 76-year-old Moussa has come from those who are meant to be his supporters. One member of the Al Wafd party, for example, said that Moussa is the number one choice of the U.S., and that "even Israel does not express its concern over his election. He announced his intention to stand for the Egyptian presidency from the house of the Saudi ambassador in Egypt, and no one knows his sources of funding."

Jalal Amin, professor of economics at the American University in Cairo and a prominent leftist thinker, said, "Moussa is a remnant of Mubarak's regime ... How else can a man who served for ten years as foreign minister - a third of which was under Mubarak - be silent about what is happening in the country? What kind of person is this?"

It seems that in light of such criticism - and in an attempt to distance himself from the policies of the previous regime - Moussa is now embracing a critical stance toward the peace accords with Israel.

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* Zvi Bar'el Zvi Bar'el

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http://www.gloria-center.org/2012/0...on-will-change-the-middle-east-and-the-world/

How Egypt’s Presidential Election Will Change the Middle East and the World
By Barry Rubin April 30, 2012



What might well be the most significant election in Middle East history is about to happen yet the situation and its implications are simply not understood abroad. On May 23-24, with a probable run-off on Jun 16-17, the most important country in the Arabic-speaking world is almost certainly going to choose a revolutionary transformation that will ensure continuous earthquakes of war, suffering, and instability for decades to come.

Of the dozen candidates only three are important and the question is which of them will end up in the run-off.

–Muhammad Mursi, head of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party.

–Abdel Moneim Aboul Fatouh, a former Muslim Brotherhood leader who resigned to run for president.

–Amr Musa, a radical nationalist who combines being an anti-American, anti-Israel demagogue with some real experience in government and some sense of realism and restraint.

There are also, among the more serious of the also-rans, a leftist, an old regime supporter, three liberals, and another Islamist.

The mainstream Western view of the election is bizarre and very damaging. In this fantasy, Aboul Fatouh is portrayed as the liberal candidate. If he wins, everything will be just fine and dandy. You can go back to sleep.

What evidence is adduced for this picture? Basically, none. The idea is that his moderation was proven because he defied the Brotherhood to run for the office. Yet the reality is the exact opposite. The Brotherhood refused to run a candidate at a time when it was following a cautious strategy, wanting to show that it wasn’t seeking total power and could co-habit—at least for five years—with a non-Islamist president.

By declaring his candidacy, Aboul Fatouh was in fact taking a more radical approach. Later, when the Brotherhood felt more confident after winning almost half the parliamentary seats it became more aggressive.

Most important of all, Aboul Fatouh is the candidate endorsed by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Qatar-based anti-American, antisemitic hardliner. Qaradawi would never endorse anyone who was actually “moderate” must less “liberal.”

There are three factors likely to determine the first round:

–What proportion of Muslim Brotherhood (parliamentary) voters will support Mursi? Perhaps a quarter or more of the Brotherhood voters backed the group not so much because they wanted an Islamic state but because they thought the Brotherhood was more honest, would govern better, and so on. Will they stick with the Brotherhood for the presidency or will they go for Aboul Fatouh or even Musa?

–Having no candidate of their own who will the Salafi support? Since there goal is to provide a more radical alternative to the Brotherhood, some—but not all—of the leaders will probably go for Aboul Fatouh. But what about their voters who have almost no organizational loyalty—in contrast to the Brotherhood voters—and will presumably support the man they see as the one with the most radical Islamist vision. Few of these people will back Musa.

—Who will support Musa? There is no nationalist bloc in Egypt today. Might Musa emerge as the secularist candidate uniting those voters (only 25 percent we should remember) who don’t want Islamism? No. The Christians and liberals don’t look at Musa as their man and will probably split their vote among three competing liberal candidates who don’t have a chance.

The result may well be an Islamist versus Islamist run-off. In any event, it is likely that by the end of the year Egypt will have an Islamist president, parliament, and Constitution. Laws will be drastically altered, women’s rights disappear, and Hamas would be backed up if it attacked Israel.

Once in power, an Islamist government would eventually appoint similar people to run the military, the religious establishment, the schools, and the courts. Those who don’t like it will head for the West in droves.

The alliance with America would be over (whatever cosmetic pretense of friendship remained and despite how much money the Obama Administration pumped in. And the whole region will be sent a signal that this is the era of revolutionary Islamism and jihad at a time when America is weak or even—as many moderate Arabs believe—siding with the Islamists.

In the West, no one in power is prepared for this revolution, an upheaval that will rival or exceed the 1979 one in Iran for its impact.

About Barry Rubin

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, and a featured columnist for PajamasMedia at http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan)

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http://www.gloria-center.org/2012/0...nority-alliances-and-countered-minority-foes/

SYRIA’S 31 PERCENTERS: HOW BASHAR AL-ASAD BUILT MINORITY ALLIANCES AND COUNTERED MINORITY FOES
By Phillip Smyth April 27, 2012

As the Syrian revolution against Bashar al-Asad’s rule enters its first year, Asad appears to have a good command over Syria’s large and fractious minority community. Three of the most prominent minority groups include the Christians, Druze, and Kurds. Asad’s control of these groups was not happenstance but the result of a number of hard- and soft-power moves executed by the regime. These calculations did not simply involve direct internal dealings with said minorities, but also outreach to their populations living in neighboring states and abroad. Due to the regime’s many policies, minority support may continue for some time.

Our way of government is not identical with that which is pursued with such conspicuous success in highly civilised and settled countries like your own. We leave the various communities and tribes alone to settle their internal differences. It is only where tribe wars on tribe, religion on religion, or their quarrels stop the traffic on the Sultan’s highway that we interfere. What would you have, mon ami? We are here in Asia!” – An Ottoman governor in Syria to author Marmaduke Pickthall, late nineteenth century.[1]



INTRODUCTION



Minority alliances in the Middle East have been a constant reality for groups under threat from perceived “majority” interests. Most of these alliances were military in nature and often covert. Israel has reached out to Christians in Lebanon and Kurds in Iraq.[2] Berbers in Morocco have also engaged Israel.[3] In their shared effort to fight Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) entered into an alliance with the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA).[4] Yet in Syria, where minority Alawites dominate the government and find themselves in conflict with not only the Sunni majority but other minority groups, minority alliances take on a new precedence in their efforts to control the country.

Syria has been described as a “safe haven, in a region where religious minorities often struggle for survival.”[5] However, Syria is currently descending into what may become a sectarian civil war, with the mainly Alawi minority-run Ba’thi regime of Bashar al-Asad facing off against Syria’s majority, Arab Sunni Muslims. This Levantine state is morphing from a quasi-paradise into a boiling cauldron. The way the Asad regime gained and retained its increasingly important allies in the Druze and Christian communities, and a general quiescence from the Kurds, can be used to chart how long the regime can stay in power, in addition to establishing the solidity of Damascus’s important minority alliances.

It is well known that Syria’s ruling elite itself comes from a minority, namely the Alawi sect. It has also been asserted that because of the Alawite’s own precarious position vis-à-vis Syria’s Sunni majority that they are natural allies for most of Syria’s other minorities.[6] Through a mixture of patronage networks, fear of massacre at the hands of Sunni Muslims, and a wish not to cede power, most Alawites have remained loyal to their coreligionist rulers.[7] Though, support for the Ba’thists from other minority groups has not always followed this specific model.

Unlike other Arab Spring states, such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, Syria is home to a wide and diverse range of ethnic and religious minorities. These groups include the dominant Alawites, Druze, various Christian groups, Kurds, Shi’i sects, and small numbers of Yazidis. According to most estimates, the collective numbers for these minorities range between 25-36 percent of the Syrian population.[8] What is more, around 7-15 percent of the Sunni Muslim population is not Arab, but ethnically Kurdish.[9]

The minority position in Syria reflects the dire nature of most minority groups in the Middle East. The region often witnesses different sects forced to choose the uncertainty of a revolution or the stability of autocratic rule. Many minorities have looked at events in Iraq, which saw wide scale ethnic and sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing. The rise of anti-minority Islamists in Egypt has also provided an example to some minority groups of what could befall them in a post-Asad Syria. This contemporary fear, exploited by Damascus, has served as a great benefit to the regime.

However, fears of an Islamist takeover are not the only factors influencing minority support for Bashar al-Asad. Since the rule of Bashar’s father, Hafiz al-Asad, the Syrian regime has been cultivating links with minority groups in the hope of establishing easily manipulated allies to support the administration’s influence and grow the Ba’thi powerbase. According to an anonymous regime official, “there are 360 diplomats within the Syrian Foreign Ministry. Of these, 60 per cent are Nusayri [Alawite]. The number of Sunni diplomats does not exceed 10 per cent.”[10] Clearly, the Alawite sect has provided the regime with its backbone of support. Nevertheless, if the numbers are correct, this would necessitate that minority groups, other than the Alawites, are recognized as having an important place within the Ba’thi regime.

The Ba’th Party’s nationalist agenda of pan-Arabism has also affected how the regime engages minorities. Initially, Arabism was seen by some minorities as a way to secure relative safety and retain political influence in lands where they historically faced persecution. Concurrently, the same inclusive Arabism has also excluded certain groups like the Kurds or has disparaged other minority quests for self-identity by those that Arabists considered “Arab.” Doctrinaire Arabism would hardly allow for incorporating or accepting “separatist” ideals.

The Iraq War and the 2005 Syrian pullout from Lebanon also resulted in new awakenings among Syrian minority populations and weakened Arabism’s predominant position. In 2005, a spokesman for the banned Syrian party, the Assyrian Democratic Organization, told the New York Times, “n Syria, gradually it’s becoming safer to talk about minority rights and human rights… The interaction between minorities in Iraq and its neighboring countries really depends on how particular minorities view their own situation.”[11]

This new and undeniable reality caused the Asad regime to shift how it dealt with sects that openly embraced non-Arab identities. Nevertheless, while the Asad regime continues to push and reaffirm the primacy of Arabism, it has recognized the need to engage certain minority groups’ changing ideologies and identities. This has led to Asad playing a Janus-faced game, incorporating some non-Arab cultural and nationalist organizations into the regime’s Syrian narrative, while attempting vocally to reestablish Arabism’s dominance in Syrian affairs.

Syria’s unique and strategic place in the Middle East is another variable that has weighed on Ba’thi-minority relations. Syria’s minority groups are often geographically spread throughout many neighboring states. This has made it harder for Damascus specifically to court Syrian minority groups without addressing the concerns of their own diaspora or neighboring coreligionists. Syria’s near-abroad, hosts large numbers of minority groups on which the regime relies for internal support but also contains groups they view as threats. In Lebanon, Christians of many denominations form a large and powerful piece of the country. The political and religious leadership for the Druze, around three percent of Syria’s population, also lives in Lebanon.[12] Turkey and Iraq have large Kurdish populations. This has resulted in the regime engaging external organizations in an attempt not only to influence its own internal minority populations, but also pursue foreign policy interests.

Simply because the regime has consciously supported minorities with many high positions, this does not necessitate that all minority groups contain regime stalwarts. Some minorities and minority organizations have been seen as threats to the regime’s power. To deal with the multifaceted minority issue, Asad’s courtship and relations with Syrian minorities often demonstrate a Machiavellian cynicism. For many years, the Asad apparatus has sent mixed-messages; at times embracing certain groups with incentives, while using hard-power against the same groups later on.

As with many autocratic governments, Asad often engages in one practice while denying it or pinning the issue on an outside enemy. Historically, there is no denying that the Asad regime has pitted minorities against one another and against majority populations. This tactic has also been utilized during the current revolution. In a meeting of the U.N. Security Council, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted, “It appears as though Asad and his cronies are working hard to pit Syria’s ethnic and religious groups against each other, risking greater sectarian violence and even descent into civil war.”[13] Analyst Shashank Joshi wrote, “The Asad regime cynically uses Christian and Druze troops against Sunni targets.”[14]In response to these assessments, Asad’s official mouthpiece, the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported, “His Excellency… expressed… rejection of using religions as a tool to fragment countries, stressing that all religions call for love and reject division attempts, especially in our region.”[15] Despite fervent denials by Asad, there has been a long-term strategy to engage minority groups in bolstering the regime.



ASAD’S KURDISH DILEMMA



Damascus has had a long and tumultuous history with Syrian Kurds. The state plays host to a number of blatantly discriminatory practices punishing Kurdish business owners, enforced a policy that deprived hundreds of thousands of Kurds of citizenship, banned the teaching of the Kurdish language, and clamped down on Kurdish political activities.[16] In the summer of 2009, one Wikileaks cable reported, “Drought, unemployment, economic & cultural discrimination, political repression, arbitrary arrest, unexplainable deaths [by supposed government sponsored assassinations], and statelessness contributed to a miserable first six months of the Kurdish New Year.”[17] Later in 2010, Human Rights Watch reported that since Bashar al-Asad had taken power, no policies vis-à-vis the Kurds had changed from when his father ran the country.[18]

Despite the extremely hard conditions Syrian Kurds face, this has not meant that they were not engaged by the Syrian regime. Though, in the words of one journalist, “The Syrian authorities are unpredictable with the level and type of dissent they permit.”[19] Along with violent actions, and secretive engagement, the general course of action with the Kurds was one of imbalance; promises made but with little delivery. Bashar al-Asad was and is under no illusion that Kurds could be completely brought under his dominion. Through the use of force, Kurds could be kept at bay. Covert engagements with Kurds abroad and domestically were used to change the direction in which Kurdish political discourse was directed.

For Bashar al-Asad, the Kurds have presented the most pressing challenge to his maintenance of power in Syria. The regime’s legitimacy is predicated on its support for pan-Arab nationalism (Arabism), which specifically excludes the ethnically and linguistically dissimilar Kurds. Kurds also form a politically active compact minority that has sought autonomy in other locations they inhabit (such as Iran, Iraq, and Turkey).

Syria’s quest to gain domestic influence with the Kurds began with Hafiz al-Asad in the 1980s. In 1987, one Wikileaks cable stated, “Kurds form one of the important minorities of Syria and the ruling Alawis have reached out to them–as to minority Christians, Druze and Ismailis–to form the coalition which is needed to offset the great majority of Syrians, who are Sunni Arabs.”[20] Today, this alliance of convenience against Syria’s majority Sunni Arabs persists at a low level. Many Kurdish groups were initially upset with anti-regime Sunnis when they continued to push for recognition of Syria as an “Arab state.”[21] For many Kurds, this continuation of Arabism would be far more detrimental to their gaining of minority rights.

However, the issue of Arabism was minor when compared to renewed hopes for regional Kurdish autonomy. Asad’s difficulty with Kurdish self-determination rose significantly after the 2004-2005 creation of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in neighboring Iraq. This led Syrian Kurdish groups to cooperate together and push against the Syrian government. Asad took a multifold path. Prominent Kurdish regime critics were assassinated or jailed, rifts between Kurdish parties were exploited, and Damascus made a number of tentative promises to Kurdish groups.

In 2004, Kurds, showing Kurdish nationalist symbols, rioted after a soccer game in the northern Syria town of Qamishli. Responding to this clear challenge, the Syrian government killed tens of Kurdish demonstrators and arrested thousands.[22] In 2005, Shaykh Muhammad Mashuq al-Khaznawi, a prominent Kurdish Sufi cleric critical of Damascus, was reportedly kidnapped, tortured, and murdered by the regime.[23]

Around the same time, Syrian officials opened lines of communication with Kurdish political groups. According to a confidential U.S. embassy cable, “the SARG [Syrian government] made multiple promises in 2005 and early 2006 to resolve the Kurdish citizenship issue imminently, but concrete action has yet to been [sic] taken.”[24] In 2009, the regime enlisted the support of former Syrian parliamentarian Issam Baghdy to initiate secret contact with the Secretary General of the Kurdish Democratic Front (KDF), Abd al-Hakim Bashar.[25] The KDF is a coalition of nine left-wing Syrian Kurdish parties. In 2011, this number increased to 11 parties. The move was interpreted by the Kurds as Asad being serious about engagement. According to a leaked U.S. cable, and pointing to Damascus’s concerns, Baghdy asked Bashar these questions:
(1) What was the political relationship among Syrian Kurdish parties, as well as with parties in Turkey and Iraq; (2) What was the KDF’s position on the continuity of the regime; (3) What was KDF’s position on the unity of Syrian territory; (4) What was the KDF’s position on the Damascus Declaration; and (5) Was the KDF prepared for a direct dialogue with the SARG?[26]

Syria’s assistance to outside Kurdish organizations was another regime strategy to keep domestic Kurds under control. In Iraq, where the most politically active Kurdish groups are located, Asad smuggled arms and equipment to Kurds fighting Saddam Hussein.[27] Backchannels between Damascus and Iraq’s Kurds were kept open, even after the fall of Hussein. The net effect of these historical alliances and covert engagements with external Kurdish groups was beneficial for Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad.

Often, Iraq’s main Kurdish parties have their own Syrian branches. The Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria is closely linked to Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani. The Kurdish Democratic Alliance is closely linked to Jalal Talabani’s Iraq-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).[28] In 1975, the PUK was even allowed to open an office in Damascus. Because of these backchannels, Kurds seeking assistance from their Iraqi cohorts were denied. In 2009, a KDP political officer told one Syrian Kurdish activist, “We cannot support Kurdish parties in Syria,” while a PUK representative “rebuffed” the same Syrian activist’s calls for help saying, “We hope to have good relations in the future.”[29]

Foremost among these external groups with domestic influence has been the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK had been engaged in a guerilla war with Syrian adversary Turkey. Beginning in the early 1980s, the Syrians allowed the PKK to establish training camps in Lebanon’s Beq’a Valley and even hosted PKK leader Abdallah Ocalan in Damascus. This arrangement was officially ended in 1998, though it is rumored links between Damascus and the PKK have continued to persist.[30] According to some estimates, 20 percent of the PKK’s members, including the head of the PKK’s military wing, Fahman Husain (A.K.A. Bahoz Erdal) are originally Syrian.[31]

The PKK also established the Democratic Union Party (PYD) to retain its presence within Syria. Occasionally, the government would crack down on PYD members, but the party, even during mass protests, maintained a generally friendly approach toward the regime.[32] In addition, the PYD was an open critic of anti-regime dissident Mash’al Tammo.[33] Tammo was assassinated in October 2011, and some analysts surmised he was assassinated by the PKK.[34] The Turkish press reported, “15 soldiers of the Free Syrian Army… were captured by PKK forces near the Syria-Iraqi border over the weekend. The sources, who spoke to Today’s Zaman from the northern city of Qamishli on the condition of anonymity, suggested that the PKK may have handed over the soldiers to the Syrian military.”[35] In March 2012, the PKK responded to calls by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan who was pushing for the creation of a “safe-zone” for Syrian refugees on Syrian territory. According to Reuters, a PKK field commander stated, “The Turkish state is planning an intervention against our people… Let me state clearly, if the Turkish state intervenes against our people in western Kurdistan [Syria], all of Kurdistan will turn into a war zone.”[36]

Since early 2011, Kurdish protests have not materialized like those of their Sunni Arab neighbors. At the beginning of the demonstrations against the regime, Asad issued public pronouncements that certain Kurdish demands would be met. These included the repeal of Decree 49 (the ruling that often deprived Kurds of land ownership) and allowed for the issuing of citizenship for Kurds deprived of that right.[37] It has also been reported that “[t]he military crackdown has also been less harsh in Kurdish areas.”[38] These recent moves by Asad have lessened Kurdish pressure on the regime. Asad’s covert engagements of the external Kurdish community have also kept Kurdish groups from causing the regime problems. By taking the middle-path and not fully supporting or opposing the regime, Syrian Kurds hope that if Asad wins, he will follow through on his promises.



CHRISTIANS AND THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS



The most successful engagement program for the Asad regime has been with Syria’s Christians. As with many autocratic regimes, fear was often a selling point used by the regime to retain support. Traditionally, the Asad regime kept control of their Christians through proxies in their near-abroad via violence. While these tactics were retained, the Syrians sought to attain more legitimate external and internal Christian allies. Damascus also courted Christian organizations that were ideologically opposed to the beliefs of Syria’s rulers and supported a number of cultural programs. With the influx of Christian refugees from Iraq, the regime gained further de facto allies, and Christian acceptance.

Regionally, Christians are declining in population and political power. The dire situation of Christians in Iraq weighs heavily on many decisions made by the Christian communities within Syria. Many of these Christian groups share coreligionists of the same sect in Iraq. Currently, Syria is hosting over one million Iraqi refugees; of that number around 40 percent are Christian.[39] Many of these Christians come fresh from attacks and discrimination by Arab Islamists and Kurdish groups, making them predisposed to favor the stability of the Asad regime and natural allies against regime foes.

The Asad regime shares other elements in common with Christians. The same pan-Arabism endorsed by the Asad regime originally began life as an ideal among Christians.[40] Both groups also share a very real fear of Sunni Islamism, especially in the wake of the Iraq War and post-Arab Spring Egypt. Christians have also attained positions of importance. Replacing an Alawite, Greek Orthodox General Dawoud Rajiha was appointed as Minister of Defense in 2011.[41] Daniel Pipes notes that as a sect, Alawites have “by far the greatest affinity… with Christianity… ‘Alawis tend to show more friendliness to Christians than to Muslims.”[42]

Within Syria, Christians form a vibrant community. Their population is spread throughout the country, particularly in urban areas. Christians are broken into a number of sects, including the Greek Orthodox, Maronites, Syriac Orthodox and Catholics, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Armenian Catholics and Orthodox, and a small number of Protestants. Christians also maintain a strong economic presence in the country. Christian economic strength also plays into how it interacts with the regime.[43] With the stability of Pax-Asad protecting their livelihoods and allowing some modicum of normality for religious practices, Syrian Christians have come to back the regime, even if begrudgingly.

Nonetheless, for many Middle Eastern Christians, Syria’s Ba’thists would not constitute “natural allies.” During the 15-year Lebanese Civil War, Christian autonomy and power was crushed in Lebanon and thousands of Christians were killed by Syrian forces. Lebanese Christian leaders were repeatedly assassinated or politically countered by pro-Syrian forces. Further decreasing Asad’s viability as a “Christian ally” in Lebanon, was that the Syrian regime had initially exploited alliances with small Christian groups based on family connections or through the utilization of hard power.[44]

Despite the distrust many regional Christians have exhibited toward the regime, regional events have helped Asad. Even though the regime was forced out of Lebanon during the 2005 Cedar Revolution, Damascus did gain enormous influence among Syrian Christians via new Lebanese allies. Michel Aoun, a popular former Lebanese general and Maronite Christian, had fought Syria during the Lebanese Civil War. After years of exile he returned to Lebanon as leader of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). He then shifted to the pro-Asad realm in 2006, after his signing of an alliance with Asad-ally, Hizballah.[45]

With Aoun, the Syrians found a well-respected Lebanese nationalist who could legitimize Syrian policies. The move also disrupted any attempt to mobilize a united bloc of traditionally anti-Syrian Lebanese Christians against Damascus.[46] Since Aoun allied himself with the Shi’i Islamist Hizballah, his actions also created a potent Shi’i-Christian alliance. This alliance fed into part of Damascus’s new vision of a minority alliance.

The new alliance was welcomed by Christians supportive of Aoun who were hoping for a new era in Shi’i-Syrian-Christian relations. One Beirut youth official with Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement remarked, “We [Christians] are forced to be in this alliance. It’s a good one. The Sunnis are like al Qaeda and more numerous. Throughout history they have held down both the Shia and Christians. Assad isn’t occupying Lebanon and has moderated. We all face the same enemies to our existence.”[47]

Often in conflict with Damascus, the Lebanon-based Maronite community has 53,000 members living in Syria. Following the opening of links to Aoun and the further legitimization of Syria in regional Christian ranks, the Ba’thists began a number of small efforts to court the region’s Christians. Following a 2011 visit to Syria, Aoun stated, “[Christians must return to] our roots and get out of isolation… Our goal is to return to our environment, to our roots.”[48]

In 2006, the Syrian Ministry of Tourism began organizing Christian pilgrimage trips to the Aleppo area.[49] By September, 2010, Syria allowed the Maronite Church to hold a conference celebrating the 1600 year-old death of the church’s founder, Saint Maroun. The event clashed with the official Lebanese-based celebrations the Maronite Church was holding, and served as a symbol of Syrian power within the Christian community.[50]

Historically, Arab identity among Christians, especially in Lebanon, had a harder time taking hold. During the Syrian occupation of the country, Arab identity was promoted, but was often rejected. As a result, Lebanese Christians have often set an example for other Christians in the region for the adoption of a non-Arab identity.[51]

Almost immediately following the 2005 Syrian pullout, groups supporting non-Arab Christian identities found new life and regional influence.[52] In the aftermath of the Iraq War, calls for Christian autonomy in Iraq based on ethnic and religious differences from Arab Muslims and Muslim Kurds, grew louder.[53] This new reality was not countered by Damascus with its traditional proclivities of violence, but with a Janus-faced policy of rejecting Christian nationalism while absorbing some of its concepts into the official Syrian narrative.

Language has held an important place in Christian identity formation. For many Middle Eastern Christian churches and nationalists, the Aramaic language retains a significant importance. In their liturgy, the Maronite, Syriac Catholic and Orthodox, Chaldean, Assyrian (though, they call the language Assyrian), and Melkite Churches all use Syriac, the written version of Aramaic. These churches are collectively referred to as Syriac Christians and have adopted their own non-Arab ethnic identities ranging from calling themselves Aramean, Assyrian, or Chaldean.[54]

In addition to being the historical land once ruled by Arameans, Assyrians, and Chaleans, Syria contains one of the few Aramaic-speaking locations in the Levant, Ma’aloula. For Christian nationalists, the 7,000 Aramaic-speaking residents are living symbols of the ancient ethno-linguistic elements that were once commonplace in their cultural-cradle. However, after years of forced Arabization by the Ba’th Party, the language was slowly dying out. Under the reign of Hafiz al-Asad, the state had strictly forbidden the teaching of the Aramaic language.[55]

Things changed in 2004, when Damascus announced a program to help revive the Aramaic language in Ma’aloula.[56] The regime saw that increased attention to Aramaic and the town’s unique history and status could bring in tourist dollars. However, tourism was not the only reason for the program. The regime understood that the goodwill created from it giving attention to Aramaic and the culture could benefit the central government with Christians at home and abroad. Even openly anti-Asad Aramean groups, such as the Lebanon- and Sweden-based Aramean Democratic Organization, praised key members involved in the Syrian government’s Aramaic revival program.[57] Eventually, in 2007 the University of Damascus opened a branch in Ma’aloula to teach the Aramaic language. In the words of one Ma’aloula resident, “Thanks to President Asad, we even have an institute teaching it [Aramaic].”[58]

These moves were followed up by a visit to Syria from the Syriac Universal Alliance (SUA). The SUA is one of the largest organizations that pushes for Aramean self-determination. It is also firmly against the adoption of Arab identity–the same Arab identity pushed by Damascus–by ethnic Arameans.[59] When asked about Arabism’s effect on Aramean populations, SUA President Johny Messo noted:



Pan-Arabism turned out to be a failure for the Arabs, Muslims and Christians. It has affected the Arameans (Syriacs) in that some of us really believed that they would be accepted as equal citizens if they would adhere to this idea. Those who upheld this belief have been Arabicized to a noticeable extent or have been identifying themselves as Arabs. That is, they have forgotten their own Aramaic language at the expense of Arabic or one can notice the big impact of the Arabic language, culture and thought on those who still speak Aramaic. There are also cases of Aramean Christians who have relinquished their heritage and have decided to identify themselves as “Arab Christians” or, when they have abandoned their Christian faith, as “Arabs” who adhere either to Islam or to no faith at all. One should add, however, that the same is true for some “Turks” and “Kurds” today.[60]

As a counter to the anti-Arabism of Christian groups the regime wished to court, Asad attempted to combine Aramean culture into Arabism. Simultaneously, the move gave Arameans positive mention, while asserting their culture was an integral piece of Arabism:



I congratulate you here in Syria, which many Arabs call the “throbbing heart of Arabism.” But in order for the heart to throb, blood is needed, and you are the blood that arrives from all parts of the Arab body, carrying with it all the vital Arab components that supply power and stamina to the heart. And these components are based on two main things: The first is Islam, which is tightly and strongly bound to Arabism, which will never be separated from Islam. The second thing is Christianity, which emerged from our midst and was spread about the world in an Arabic language, that is, Aramaic.[61]

Other Aramean nationalist groups followed suit and showed favorable positions to Asad. In a 2009 letter to Bashar al-Asad, Gabriel Sengo of the Netherlands-based Aram-Nahrin Organization, outlined much of the advances (in addition to a few withering criticisms) Asad had made with Christian-Aramean nationalists:

We write you to express our gratefulness for your noble efforts to revive and strengthen the Aramaic language in the lands of the Aramean forefathers. This is a shining and commendable example to the entire Middle-East.

We wish also to underscore our appreciation for your hospitality to offer shelter to thousands of refugees from Iraq who have been forced to flee to Syria and other countries because of violence and insecurity since the start of the war in 2003.[62]

Later, in August 2009, SUA officials met with prominent Syrian leaders. These officials included the Patriarch of the Syriac Orthodox Church, Syria’s Minister of Culture, Minister of Information, and the pro-Asad Sunni Grand Mufti, Dr. Ahmad Hassoun.[63]

Despite all of the outward support from Ba’thi officials, the regime’s reasons for embracing distinct Christian cultural practices had more to do with using them as counterpoints against other internal threats. The lack of a geographic concentration for Christian groups makes it harder for nascent non-Arab nationalism to take foot, but still allows for these proclivities to be exploited. According to one Wikileaks cable, when a “senior official” with the Syrian Ministry of Culture was asked why the ministry was backing Syriac Christian culture, the official answered, “We have to do something to counter the influence of the Kurds.”[64]

Syrian officials also recognized how to exploit and benefit from intra-Christian tensions. In 2010, the Syrian government moved to clamp down on evangelical Christians. The Economist reported that “the main reason for the clampdown is that Orthodox and Catholic leaders, disgruntled by the success of these new churches, have complained to the government.”[65] The regime’s move allowed for the populous and more easily controlled traditional churches to have their interests served while increasing positive perceptions of the government among church leaders.

Even with all of the advances of goodwill made toward the Christian community, the regime still took a heavier-handed approach to dealing with some Christian political groups. Parties promoting liberal or reformist agendas often faced crackdowns. While it reflects certain pragmatism to use nationalist groups to voice regime-backed concerns, it also demonstrates the government had limits.

The Assyrian Democratic Organization (ADO), considered the Syrian branch of the Iraq-based Assyrian Democratic Movement (Zowa’a), is one such example. When ADO signed the 2005 reformist Damascus Declaration, it caused the group to suffer a number of government crackdowns.[66] In May 2011, the group’s Qamishili offices were raided by Syrian security forces. According to an ADO press statement, “the overwhelming majority of the individuals who were arrested did not participate in the protests today [May 20 protests against the regime].”[67]

Due to the different natures of other Syrian minority groups, the same model could not be applied to other groups. Despite the random crackdowns, Asad’s outreach to Christians has been successful and their alliance with the regime will be a continuing trend.



SYRIA’S DRUZE: ASAD’S FRIENDS BY NECESSITY



After almost a year of protests, a shift to support anti-Asad protesters by the primary (though based in Lebanon) Druze political leader, Walid Jumblatt, Syria’s Druze have not yet withdrawn support for Asad. According to the Emirati paper, The National, Suwaida the main Druze population center “is still seen as a bastion of at least tacit support for Mr. Al Asad’s regime, 11 months into an uprising against his rule.”[68] According to some reports, between 31 to 100 Druze have been killed fighting for Asad.[69]

Druze support for Asad appears to be predicated on the fact that the minority is but three percent of the population, making them easily quashed by any new Sunni-dominated government. Many Druze are also reliant on the state for employment. Asad’s tactics of marginalization while giving the Druze incentives, such as autonomy if his rule is supported, have also won support. When major Druze figures have backed Asad’s domestic foes, the Syrian dictator has moved quickly to consolidate and publicize foreign and domestic Druze support for his regime.

The esoteric Druze sect, an eleventh-century offshoot of Isma’ili Shi’ism, has firm roots inside Syria and like the Kurds and Christians has extensions into Syria’s near-abroad (namely Lebanon and Israel). As with the Kurds, the Druze also form a “compact-minority.” Within Syria, the sect is mostly found in the hilly and volcanic Jabal al-Druze (also known as Jabal al-Arab) region south of Damascus. Syria’s Druze are descended from settlers who arrived in the area from Lebanon in the early eighteenth century.[70]

Continued....

Continued.....

This minority is also noteworthy because of its strong beliefs in communal defense and willingness to defend militantly the sect’s interests. The Druze position has further complexity due to its religious practice of taqiyya (dissimulation). The Druze version of taqiyya “is not only the practice of pretending to follow the dominant religion… but also of joining the side that seems likely to win.”[71]

While Druze have their own distinct regional identity, unlike the Christian or Kurdish minorities, they did not develop a distinct ethno-nationalist ideology. Pan-Arabism, especially the Arabism espoused by the Ba’th Party, was welcomed by most Druze. Due to their geographic compactness, small population, and interlinked political and religious leadership, Syria’s Druze still maintain close links with their coreligionists abroad, especially those in Lebanon. This has served as both a benefit and threat to regime domination of the sect’s loyalties.

The martial Druze also have a long history of rebelling against central authority in Syria. From 1909-1910, Syrian Druze launched an unsuccessful rebellion for autonomy against the Sunni Ottoman authorities in the Jabal al-Druze region.[72] Druze also led the 1925-1927 Syrian nationalist rebellion against French Mandatory officials.[73] After the formation of the independent Syria in the late 1940s, Druze were “at first reluctant to join an independent state dominated by the Sunni establishment that they generally distrusted.”[74] In 1949 and 1954, the Druze revolted against the Sunni-dominated Damascus-based government. In the latter revolt, the Druze were suppressed using extreme force.[75]

While the Druze had trouble with Sunni politicians, this does not mean they didn’t have difficulties with the Asads. In the 1960s, the Ba’thi government that preceded Hafiz al-Asad’s was ruled by the Alawi Salah Jadid and Druze Salim Hatoum. In 1966, Hatoum along with some Druze army units attempted to take power from Alawi Salah Jadid. However, their plot was thwarted by Hafiz Asad, who threatened airstrikes. Hatoum was later executed and then Jadid was overthrown by Asad. As Hafiz al-Asad rose in power, from 1966-1970, Druze who once led “were expelled from the top echelon.”[76] This led to a slow reintegration process with the new Asad regime.[77]

Under Hafiz al-Asad, Lebanese Druze leaders who went against Damascus were assassinated or marginalized. The most infamous example was the 1977 murder of the main Druze political leader, the Lebanese Kamal Jumblatt.[78] The regime was also slow to work with its own Druze, and the minority did not gain any exclusive rights or privileged positions. Only in 1985, 15 years after Hafiz al-Asad’s ascension to power, did he allow Druze to attain leadership positions. Though, according to Robert Brenton Betts, “not in significant numbers or positions of influence where they could reasonably hope to threaten the dominance of the… Alawis.”[79]

These conditions remained the same throughout the rule of Bashar al-Asad. In November 2000, less than five months after Bashar’s ascension to power, Syria’s Druze demonstrated their unhappiness with the government. What began as intercommunal violence between Bedouin Arabs and Druze, quickly morphed into a Druze mini-revolt against the central government. The Druze reaction to Bedouin encroachment was not to vent all of their energy into retaliation against that group, but to burn down government buildings, blocking the main road from the Druze zone to Damascus, and demanding the government “provide protection.”[80] The Syrian government was later forced to pay restitution to Druze killed and wounded in the violence. Despite the violence, after Bashar al-Asad’s power had been solidified, the Druze could do little to counter the government.

Under the rule of Bashar al-Asad, Druze who have opposed the government-line still face repression and a reduced position within the Ba’th Party. Essentially, the Druze existed as token minorities. In 2009, when Asad selected a new cabinet, only one Druze was appointed.[81] Jabr al-Shoufi, a Druze signer of the reformist Damascus Declaration, was arbitrarily arrested in 2007 only to be released in 2010. He and other reformists were charged with “weakening national sentiment… [and] encouraging conflict among sects.”[82]

At best, the Druze did maintain their much coveted sense of autonomy, and Damascus’s response to the Druze was to give them space. When compared to their previous conflicts with Damascus, Asad provided unmatched stability. To demonstrate dissatisfaction with the regime, the most the Druze could do was to vote in fixed elections for those the regime did not fully support.[83] However, in an autocratic system, this had little effect. Nevertheless, the status quo was much preferred by many Syrian Druze.

With Walid Jumblatt’s call for Syrian Druze soldiers to disobey orders, Asad’s commanders, and his openly-declared support for Syrian demonstrators, the regime faced a new threat to its control over the marginalized but generally loyal Druze population.[84] In response, Asad has mobilized, leaned on, and publicized the comments made by his Druze allies in Lebanon. On November 1, 2011, Lebanese Druze parliamentarian, Talal Arslan met with Asad, bringing other prominent pro-Asad Druze political leaders and leading Druze religious leaders. This was repeated on December 8, 2011, when Asad met another delegation of Lebanese Druze religious leaders and Arslan.[85] During both meetings, Arslan stated the need to support the Asad regime.

Wiam Wahhab, leader of the Hizb al-Tawhid al-Arabi (Arab Unification Party), is widely regarded as one of Asad’s Lebanese Druze mouthpieces. Wahhab was employed by the regime to sow discontent with Jumblatt and build support for Asad among the Lebanese and Syrian Druze. Intimating a Druze sectarian backing for Asad, on February 13, 2012, Wahhab “proposed sending a delegation of Lebanese Druze religious leaders and politicians to the predominantly Druze region of Jabal al-Arab in Syria ‘to explore views on the best interest of the Druze community’ there.”[86] Later, Wahhab criticized Jumblatt’s backing of anti-regime elements by telling Jumblatt “not to bring the battle into the Druze community.”[87]

So long as Asad feels there is a legitimate threat to his control over the Druze, he will continue to use members from that community. This strategy exerts pressure on both Lebanese and Syrian Druze, assisting in the development of a narrative that Druze can only be secure with Asad.



CONCLUSION



Bashar al-Asad has specifically tailored his approach to numerous minority groups, based on their utility to his regime and on how he could best keep them within his fold. Working to appeal to, oppress, or pit minorities against each other and against the majority has been of extreme benefit for the regime. Engaging coreligionists and coethics abroad has also created a far more complicated and dynamic relationship within these minority communities. These further complications have only added to the influence Asad has been able to wield within Syria.

Even with major political leaders backing demonstrations, the pragmatic Druze will only move against Asad if it is certain that anti-Asad forces will win. Although Syria’s Druze were among the last to be engaged by Asad, they have recognized a value in staying quiet. This is a clear sign that any Druze moves will be predicated on how they can best retain the autonomy and safety of their community. While Asad did little to back Druze cultural interests, his support for their autonomy and enforcement of stability gave the group enough reason not to turn against his rule.

The fractious Kurds, longing for a more formal autonomy, have seen some of their major wishes granted by the regime. They too are playing the waiting game. Even after over 40 years of discrimination, Asad’s support to some Kurdish groups has created a mixed impression for Syria’s Kurds–one of an oppressor and ally. These opposing tactics have given rise to a Kurdish paralysis.

The destruction and oppression of the region’s Christians has also caused the group to back the proverbial “lesser of two evils.” Asad’s recent pushes with the community have built a form of loyalty from the community. Now Asad can pose as a more legitimate defender of Christian rights. With Asad, Syrian Christians have found security, access to political leadership, and a quasi-acceptance of their unique cultural attributes.

As those backing anti-Asad movements become more militant and Asad reacts with a heavier hand to counter them, minorities will do their best to remain out of the crossfire. The fact that minorities are attempting to remain neutral suggests some of Asad’s tactics to win the favor of these groups have been successful. In the wake of anti-minority Islamist takeovers in other post-revolutionary Arab states, some minority groups see that the only way to protect their hard-won stability and cultural recognition is by backing the devil they know. In this current environment, Asad will continue to hold sway among Syria’s minorities.



*Phillip Smyth is a journalist and researcher specializing in Lebanon and the broader Middle East. He travels regularly to the region. He has been published by the American Spectator, the Counterterrorism Blog, the Daily Caller, Haaretz, NOW Lebanon, and PJ Media.



NOTES

[1] Marmaduke Pickthall, Oriental Encounters: Palestine and Syria, 1894-5-6 (London: W. Collins Sons & Co. Ltd, 1918), p. 85.

[2] Moshe Ma’oz, Middle Eastern Minorities: Between Integration and Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1999), p. 32.

[3] Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Morocco’s Berbers and Israel,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 2011), http://www.meforum.org/2853/morocco-berbers-israel.

[4] Bülent Ceyhan, “Unearthed Confessions Suggest Link Between PKK, ASALA,” Today’s Zaman, April 21, 2009, http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=173076&bolum=100.

[5] Alistair Lyon, “Christians View Syria as Haven in Unstable Region,” Reuters, February 23, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/09/us-syria-christians-idUSTRE6582CQ20100609.

[6] Bassma Kodami, “To Topple Assad, It Takes a Minority,” New York Times, July 31, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/opinion/to-topple-Asad-it-takes-a-minority.html.

[7] Mariam Karouny, “Life After Asad Terrifying Prospect for Alawites Fearful of Bloodbath,” Reuters, February 3, 2012, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Mi...wites-fearful-of-bloodbath.ashx#axzz1nEn0xrYE.

[8] For higher minority estimates, see: CIA World Factbook: Syria, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html. For lower estimates, see: “More Violence Feared Under Assad in Syria,” UPI, September 28, 2011, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-N...ared-under-Assad-in-Syria/UPI-65131317247977/.

[9] Jeremy M. Sharp, “Syria: Issues for the 112th Congress and Background on U.S. Sanctions,” Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2010, p. 9.

[10] “Syrian Official Says Administration to Collapse in Six Weeks – Turkish Daily,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 17, 2011, http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/159121721. Note: The original article was featured as, Tolga Tanis, “Gone in Six Weeks,” Hurriyet, November 17, 2011.

[11] Katherine Zoepf, “Letter from Syria: Minority Activists See Beacon in a New Iraq,” New York Times, January 1, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/31/world/africa/31iht-syria.html.

[12] Tom Heneghan, “Syria’s Alawites, a Secretive and Persecuted Sect,” Reuters, February 2, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/02/us-syria-alawites-sect-idUSTRE8110Q720120202.

[13] Patrick Goodenough, “Clinton Accuses Asad of Setting Syrian Minorities Against Each Other,” CNS News, February 1, 2012, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/clinton-accuses-Asad-setting-syrian-minorities-against-each-other.

[14] Shashank Joshi, “Arab Spring: Nature of Armies Decisive in Revolutions,” BBC, June 28, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13941523.

[15] M. Nassr and H. Sabbagh, “President al-Asad to East Christians Assembly Delegation: Importance of Clergymen in Enhancing National Unity,” Syrian Arab News Agency, September 26, 2011, http://sana.sy/eng/21/2011/09/26/371715.htm.

[16] “The Kurds in Syria: Fueling Separatist Movements in the Region?” U.S. Institute of Peace, Special Report, No. 220 (April 2009), http://www.usip.org/files/resources/kurdsinsyria.pdf.

[17] “Six Month Check-Up: Kurds Ailing but Politically Motivated,” Wikileaks, August 2009, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09DAMASCUS620.html.

[18] Ian Black, “Syrian Human Rights Record Unchanged Under Assad, Report Says,” The Guardian, July 16, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/16/syrian-human-rights-unchanged-assad.

[19] Phil Sands, “Kurdish Dissidents Arrested in Syria,” The National, January 4, 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/kurdish-dissidents-arrested-in-syria.

[20] “Syria and News of a ‘New and Grave Move by the PKK’,” Wikileaks, July 10, 1987.

[21] “Syria’s Opposition SNC Outlines Post-Assad Vision and Reaches Out to Kurds,” al-Arabiya and Agencies, February 24, 2012, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/24/196755.html.

[22] James Brandon, “The PKK and Syria’s Kurds,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 3, The Jamestown Foundation, February 21, 2007, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1014.

[23] “Kurdish Unrest Erupts in Syria,” BBC, June 6, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4612993.stm.

[24] “Two Years After Qamishli Riots, Where Are the Kurds Going?” Wikileaks, March 9, 2006, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06DAMASCUS1058.html.

[25] “No Dividend on SARG-Kurdish Backchannel Talks,” Wikileaks, November 25, 2009, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09DAMASCUS826.html. It is important to note that Baghdy is a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. The party, which does not espouse Arabism, ideologically holds that Kurds are a constituent part of a “Greater Syria.”

[26] “No Dividend on SARG-Kurdish Backchannel Talks.”

[27] “SARG Director of the Political Security Department Sacked,” Wikileaks, March 3, 2009, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09DAMASCUS168.html.

[28] “No Dividend on SARG-Kurdish Backchannel Talks.”

[29] “Iraqi Kurds Rebuff Syrian Kurdish Activist’s Request for Cooperation,” Wikileaks, February 8, 2009, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09DAMASCUS114.html.

[30] Brandon, “The PKK and Syria’s Kurds.”

[31] Ibid.

[32] “Turkey’s Henchmen in Syrian Kurdistan Are Responsible for the Unrest Here,” KurdWatch, November 8, 2011, http://kurdwatch.org/html/en/interview6.html.

[33] Maria Fantappie, “Assassination so far fails to unite Syria’s conflicted Kurds,” The National, October 16, 2011, http://www.thenational.ae/thenation...so-far-fails-to-unite-syrias-conflicted-kurds.

[34] Ernest Khoury, “Kurdish Activists Seek Assurances to Fully Join Revolt,” al-Akhbar, October 21, 2011, http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/kurdish-activists-seek-assurances-fully-join-revolt.

[35] Ismail Avci, “Syrian Defectors captured by PKK, ‘Northern Syria’s Shabiha,’” Today’s Zaman, March 6, 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=273504.

[36] Jon Hemming, “Kurd Militants Threaten Turkey If It Enters Syria,” Reuters, March 22, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/22/us-syria-turkey-kurds-idUSBRE82L0UH20120322.

[37] Raslan al-Ibrahim, “Interior Ministry: 37,133 Applications for Syrian Citizenship,” Syrian Arab News Agency, June 22, 2011, http://www.sana.sy/eng/21/2011/06/22/354156.htm. Also see, Tony Badran, “Kurds and Sway,” NOW Lebanon, January 26, 2012, http://nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=357242.

[38] Phil Sands, “Assad: Friend or Foe of the Kurds?” The National, January 4, 2012, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/assad-friend-or-foe-of-the-kurds.

[39] “Iraqi Christians Refugees in Peril: October, 2007 Fact Finding Mission Report,” Religious Freedom Coalition, p. 9, http://www.rfcnet.org/pdfs/Iraqi Christians Refugees in Peril Final Mission Report.pdf.

[40] Daniel Pipes, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 45.

[41] H. Sabbagh, “President al-Assad Issues Decree Naming Gen. Dawood Rajiha Defense Minister,” Syrian Arab News Agency, August 8, 2011, http://www.sana.sy/eng/361/2011/08/08/362917.htm.

[42] Daniel Pipes, “The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria,” Middle Eastern Studies (1989), http://www.danielpipes.org/191/the-alawi-capture-of-power-in-syria.

[43] Hilal Khashan, “Arab Christians as Symbol: Disappearing Christians of the Middle East,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter 2001), http://www.meforum.org/4/arab-christians-as-symbol.

[44] The Frangiehs, a leading Maronite Christian family, run the Marada Party and have been allies of the Asads since their family patriarch Suleiman Frangieh was given refuge by the Asad family. See: Robert Rabil, Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, and Lebanon (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 60. Assassinations of Christian leaders not toeing the Asad line include the 1982 murder Bashir Gemayel, or more recently, the killing of journalist Gebran Tueni.

[45] “Memorandum of Joint Understanding between Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement,” Mideast Monitor, February 6, 2006, http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0602/0602_3.htm.

[46] “Shia-Christian Alliance Shakes Lebanon Politics,” Associated Press, June 2, 2009, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/darticl...middleeast_June19.xml&section=middleeast&col=.

[47] Author’s personal conversation with an FPM university official, Beirut, 2010. It must be noted that similar conversations were held between the author and other FPM members in 2008, 2009, and 2011.

[48] “Aoun from Syria: Time to Return to Our Roots, Get Out of Isolation,” Naharnet, February 9, 2011, http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/...e-to-return-to-our-roots-get-out-of-isolation.

[49] “Memorial Statue of St. Maroun Enters Maronite Church in Brad,” Syrian Arab News Agency, September, 20, 2010, http://jpsyria.com/en/news.php?id=2056.

[50] Elias Sakr, “Sfeir: No Syria Visit Until Maronites Ready,” The Daily Star, February 6, 2010, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Po...isit-until-Maronites-ready.ashx#axzz1nYpAVxhX.

[51] E-mail interview with Professor Joseph Saouk, September 12, 2011. Also see: Lee Smith, “Minority Interest,” Tablet Magazine, January 4, 2012, http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/87240/minority-interest/.

[52] Personal conversations with Christian NGO leaders and Christian political leaders, August, 2009.

[53] Nimrud Baito, “Autonomy and the Assyrians of Iraq,” Assyrian International News Agency, http://www.aina.org/articles/aataoi.htm.

[54] Heleen Murre-van den Berg, “Syriac Christianity,” in Ken Parry (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Eastern Christianity (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p. 250.

[55] Ian Black, “Endangered Aramaic Language Makes a Comeback in Syria,” The Guardian, April 14, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/14/aramaic-revival-syria.

[56] Mark Willacy, “Syria Launches Program to Save Aramaic Language,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio, October 24, 2006, http://www.abc.net.au/correspondents/content/2004/s1226140.htm.

[57] “Aram-Prize of 2004 to Malfono George Rezkalla in Maalula,” Aramaic Democratic Organization Web Site, http://www.aramaic-dem.org/English/History_culture/2.htm.

[58] Black, “Endangered Aramaic Language Makes a Comeback in Syria.”

[59] “The Mission of the Syriac Universal Alliance,” Syriac Universal Alliance Website, http://sua-ngo.org/mission.

[60] E-mail interview, November 28, 2011.

[61] Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), March 4, 2006. Quoted in Eyal Zisser, “What Does the Future Hold For Syria?” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 2, (June 2006), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue2/jv10no2a6.html.

[62] Gabriel Sengo, “Arameans of Aram-Nahrin Organisation Sent a Letter to the President of Syria, Dr. Bashar al- Asad on the Situation of the Aramean Indigenous People,” July 6, 2009, http://www.iraqichristians.org/English/Aram-Nahrin_Letter_President_Syria_6_7_2009.htm.

[63] “Damascus, Syria (Aug 2009),” photo album of the visit, Syriac Universal Alliance Website, October, 1, 2011, http://sua-ngo.org/node/328. The author had the opportunity to meet with SUA leaders in Lebanon after their visit to Syria.

[64] “Northeastern Syria: It’s More Than Just Unhappy Kurds,” Wikileaks, March 18, 2009, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09DAMASCUS209.html.

[65] “Syria’s Evangelical Christians: Don’t Try Too Hard,” The Economist, November 18, 2010.

[66] Bahia Mardini, “Al-Kam’h al-amni yud’ef al-muarada al-souriyya,” [“Security Forces’ Crackdown Weakens Syrian Opposition”] Elaf, April 20, 2006, http://www.elaph.com/ElaphWeb/Politics/2006/4/143087.htm.

[67] “Breaking News: Tens of Assyrians Arrested in Qamishly, Syria,” Assyrian Democratic Organization Website, May 20, 2011, http://en.ado-world.org/spip.php?page=imprimer&id_article=1639.

[68] Phil Sands, “Syria’s Druze Community: A Silent Minority in No Rush to Take Sides,” The National, February 22, 2012, http://www.thenational.ae/news/worl...ty-a-silent-minority-in-no-rush-to-take-sides.

[69] Bassam Alkantar, “Jumblatt and the Druze of Syria,” al-Akhbar, http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/jumblatt-and-druze-syria.

[70] Robert Brenton Betts, The Druze (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 75.

[71] Kais M. Firro, “The Attitude of the Druzes and ‘Alawis Vis-à-Vis Islam and Nationalism in Syria and Lebanon,” in Barbara Kellner-Heikele (ed.), Syncretistic Religious Communities in the Near East (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers, 1997) p. 87.

[72] Eugene L. Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 192.

[73] Nejla M. Abu Izzeddin, The Druzes: A New Study of Their History, Faith, and Society (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 1993), p. 222.

[74] Brenton Betts, The Druze.

[75] Joshua Landis, “Shishaklī and the Druzes: Integration and Intransigence,” in Thomas Philipp and Birgit Schäbler (eds.), The Syrian Land: Processes of Integration and Fragmentation: Bilad al-Sham from the 18th to the 20th Century (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998), p. 370.

[76] Eyal Zisser, Asad’s Legacy: Syria in Transition (New York: New York University Press, 2001), p. 18.

[77] Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2002), pp. 105-06.

[78] Marius Deeb, Syria’s Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 32.

[79] Brenton Betts, The Druze, p. 110.

[80] Eyal Zisser, “Syria,” in Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (ed.), Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. 24 (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2002), p. 543.

[81] “President Asad’s Cabinet Reshuffle,” Wikileaks, April 29, 2009, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09DAMASCUS309.html.

[82] “Unfair Trial of 12 Members of the National Council of the Damascus Declaration for Democratic National Change (NCDD),” Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, September 17, 2008, http://www.euromedrights.org/en/news-en/emhrn-releases/emhrn-statements-2008/3785.html.

[83] “Gauging Regime’s Level of Unhappiness with Low Voter Turnout,” Wikileaks, May 7, 2007, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07DAMASCUS423.html.

[84] “Jumblat: Lebanon Should Keep Quiet over Syria Instead of Proposing Solutions to Crisis,” Naharnet, January 23, 2012, http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/27579.

[85] “President al-Asad: Syria Is Strong,” Syrian Arab News Agency, December 9, 2011, http://www.dp-news.com/en/detail.aspx?articleid=105557.

[86] “Wahhab Suggests Sending Druze Delegation to Syria,” The Daily Star, February 14, 2012, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Po...-druze-delegation-to-syria.ashx#axzz1oOo3hTf3.

[87] “Lebanese Press Round-up: February 21st, 2012,” NOW Lebanon, February 21, 2012, http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=367075&MID=0&PID=0. See quotes from al-Akhbar.

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http://www.eurasiareview.com/30042012-egypt-who-will-win-presidential-elections-oped/

Egypt: Who Will Win Presidential Elections? – OpEd
Written by: VOR
April 30, 2012

By Konstantin Garibov

On May 23 and 24, Egypt will elect a new president. On April 30, pre-election campaigning started.
Some experts say that if the elections took place right now, they would most likely have been won by Amr Moussa, former Secretary General of the League of Arab States. At present, he is the most popular candidate.

Mr. Moussa is supported mainly by those who want stability and are worried about the increasing influence of Islamists in Egypt.

The second most popular candidate is Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, who has an education of a doctor and can be characterized as a moderate Islamist. Earlier, Abdel Fotouh occupied a high post in an Islamist organization called “The Muslim Brotherhood”. However, when he announced that he would run for presidency, he was expelled from the Brotherhood. At present, Mr. Fotouh is supported by an even more radical Islamist group, known as Salafia.

At present, a party formed by the Salafia movement, called Al-Nour, has the second largest number of seats in the Egyptian parliament.

After expelling Mr. Fotouh, the Moslem Brotherhood nominated Muhammad Mursi as their candidate for presidency. According to polls, at present, Mr. Mursi is the third most popular candidate.

Another candidate is Ahmed Shafik, who was the last prime minister under President Hosni Mubarak. At first, Mr. Shafik was not allowed to take part in the presidential race, for there exists a law in Egypt today which bans those who occupied high posts in the Mubarak government from running for presidency. However, Mr. Shafik appealed to a court, and the court made a decision in his favor.

Still, experts say that Ahmad Shafik has little chances to win.

“I believe that, most likely, the elections will be won by an Islamist,” Russian analyst Dmitry Bondarenko says.

“Radical forces are evidently obtaining more and more influence in Egypt,” Mr. Bondarenko says. “A number of laws, which the Egyptian parliament adopted recently, are evidence of that. The influence of Islamist forces in Egypt will most likely increase in the nearest future, they will put more pressure on the country’s authorities. Islamists want practically all spheres of life in Egypt to be ruled by shariat norms – and this idea is at present backed by many Egyptians.”

As you probably remember, Egypt’s former president Hosni Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011, forced to do so by mass protests. He handed his power over to some kind of a provisional government, consisting mostly of military people and called The Supreme Council of Armed Forcers.

It is expected that this transitional period will end on July 30, when the Supreme Council will hand the power over to the newly elected president and his cabinet.

About the author:

VOR

VORVOR, or the Voice of Russia, was the first radio station to broadcast internationally. On the air since October 29th 1929, VOR has been shaping Russia’s image worldwide and introducing Russia to the world and highlighting its opinions on global events

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Egypt boycott rushes a process that needs time
National Editorial
May 1, 2012

Egypt's Islamist-dominated parliament has, in theory, earned the right to make demands. With nearly three-quarters of the body's 498 seats now firmly under Islamist control, the mandate is clear. But in practice, Sunday's decision to boycott the People's Assembly for a week - in protest of the military government's continued grip on power - demonstrates a political brinkmanship that an Egypt in transition can ill afford.

Even the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Scaf) knows that civilian rule is inevitable - the generals are now trying to protect their sweeping economic interests and behind-the-scenes influence. This is a contest that will probably go on for decades.

For many in Egypt, and notably the Freedom and Justice Party that represents the dominant segment of the Muslim Brotherhood, change cannot come fast enough. The parliament's speaker, Saad El Katatni, said the boycott was meant "to safeguard the chamber's dignity" and find "a solution to this crisis". The promise to suspend parliament came after a night of violence in Cairo, in which one person was killed and dozens injured as demonstrators demanded an end to military rule.

In practice, the Brotherhood is positioning for long-term influence relative to the military, which makes political sense, but as a governing force, it needs some patience in dealing with the country's problems. The Islamists are far from alone in resenting the army's continued grip. But Egypt needs stability for its political transition, rather than immediate gratification. There will be plenty of time to renegotiate the military's role in Egyptian society, which it should be remembered was widely welcomed after the January revolution last year.

The presidential election begins on May 23, and Islamist-leaning candidates are among the favourites. That election, not to mention the drafting of a new constitution, is a crucial milestone before Egypt can deal with so many other issues, from the woeful economy to its new regional relations - not least to repair the recent rupture with Saudi Arabia.

Negotiating the transition will require a new level of compromise and negotiation. For their part, Islamist parties must recognise that the military will have a seat at the table, in some role or another.

Scaf's decision yesterday to reshuffle members of the cabinet to reduce tensions is a sign that the generals understand their delicate position. There are more conflicts to come, but this interim period is not the time to start a fight.

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Syria's new constitution has not weakened Baath Party's grip on power

Phil Sands
May 1, 2012

Legal changes two months ago were supposed to loosen the Baath Party's stranglehold on power. Instead, its grip remains firm. Phil Sands, Foreign Correspondent, reports

Related

* Comment History has a lesson for Assad: the Hama model leads to war
* ■ Suicide blasts kill nine in Idlib
* ■ Syria's referendum on new constitution
* ■ Assad calls vote on new 'democratic' constitution

Topic

* Syria unrest
* Syria

DAMASCUS // Promising rule of law, democracy and an end to the Baath Party's monopoly on power, Syria's new constitution has been heralded by regime officials as proof of real political change.

But two months after the new legal code was formally introduced in response to protests calling for reform, a Baathist official has acknowledged the party's grip remains undiminished. Lawyers say nothing has changed in the daily operations of ineffectual justice courts or to rein in the security services.

One of the key elements of President Bashar Al Assad's reform programme was scrapping the previous constitution's Article 8, under which the Baath Party was guaranteed political control of the country as "leader of state and society".

The latest constitution pledges multiparty democracy. To that end, about half a dozen new parties and more than 7,000 candidates have been approved by an interior ministry-led committee to contest the May 7 parliamentary elections.

However, doing away with Article 8 has done little, if anything, to weaken the Baath Party's institutional hold on the country it has ruled for decades, and party members anticipate a victory in next week's ballot will further enshrine its leading role.

"Now on the ground the Baath Party is ruling. It ruled between 1963 and 1973 without the need for Article 8 and [without Article 8], it is still ruling today," said a prominent Baath party official, speaking on condition of anonymity,

"The Baath party didn't give up its authority yet, and if the other sides want power they will have to take it from us in the elections or by force [of arms]," he said. "The Baath Party is still here. Let's see who wins the elections."

Technically the new constitution became active the moment it was approved in a national referendum on February 27. Officials put turnout then at 57.4 per cent, with opposition groups boycotting the vote in protest against on-going military operations against areas involved in the uprising.

Activists widely criticised the new constitution for further concentrating powers in the president's hands and giving him immunity from prosecution for any criminal act committed in office.

While all future Syrian presidents will be limited to a maximum of two seven-year terms of office, clauses allow for an unlimited extension if new elections cannot be held.

Mr Al Assad, whose second seven-year term of office will expire in 2014, is legally eligible for a subsequent 14 years - plus a possible extension - as Syria's leader because the constitution is not retroactive.

Umran Zaubie, a lawyer and Baath Party member, said the new legal framework would bring about profound changes to Syria's political system and assure "freedom, democracy and human rights", but that it was unrealistic to expect an immediate shift.

"The new constitution won't be implemented on the ground overnight, there is a line in the constitution that says all laws will have to be changed [to comply] within three years," he said.

"Real implementation in a political sense will begin after the [7 May] parliamentary elections, although a start has already been made, it will take time for it all to happen. It's absurd to say, 'there will be a new constitution tomorrow so everything will change tomorrow', it is not a small matter."

Mr Zaubie said he expected the Baath Party to remain a strong presence in Syrian life.

"There are three million Baath Party members, and there are maybe half a million in the opposition, if we are being generous with their numbers," he said. "That half a million wants to cancel the three million but it cannot, that is undemocratic. Let the real parties stand up in the elections and flex their muscles."

As with the constitutional referendum, opposition groups are boycotting the 7 May parliamentary election, refusing to field candidates or vote.

Anwar Al Bunni, a human-rights advocate and lawyer often found representing clients in Damascus' justice palace, said there had been "no change" in the way the legal system operated since the new constitution went into force.

"Anywhere else a new constitution would mean new guidelines for lawyers and courts, updated legal texts and documents, new instructions for judges, a review of work practices and procedures," he said. "In Syria we have none of that, it's all exactly the same as it was before, nothing has changed, not one thing, it's business as usual."

Mr Al Bunni, who last year completed a five-year prison sentence for political dissent, said legal codes were still being ignored as a matter of routine by the authorities.

"Under the new constitution the attorney general alone gives permission for arrests and to extend the period of detention for those being held and I can assure you that is not happening," he said.

"We are still ruled by the Baath Party and there is still gang rule, not rule of law."

Rights monitors say more than 25,000 political prisoners remain in detention, many held for months without charge.

Other lawyers involved in cases of detained opposition activists similarly described the legal system as an irrelevance, with real power held by more than a dozen branches of the secret police and security services.

"I went to the attorney general to ask about some arrests, to see the warrants only he can issue and he just said 'you've come to the wrong man'," recounted one lawyer.

psands@thenational.ae

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Power tussle in Egypt

/ 1 May 2012

Egypt is seized with a parallel decorum of governance. The newly elected parliament and the military junta are in a crisscross and nobody knows what the format of decision-making would be if this dual-track complicity goes on.

This is purely a power tussle. As a matter of fact, it is the army-run council that is calling the shots at the moment, and from foreign policy to economics, it is all military matrixes! How viable that could be in the long run, as empowerment of the masses is becoming a real issue, and Egypt is no more a subdued country in terms of politics and decision-making as it was under the tutelage of president Hosni Mubarak. Perhaps, this is the same thought that has compelled the parliament to put its foot down and call on the military to start packing.

The cabinet under Prime Minister Kamal El Ganzouri, a remnant of the yester regime, comes as a point of conscience for the elected representatives, who merely sit as ducks to legislate that could hardly see the light of the day. The demand on the part of House Speaker to tap the executive organ of the state and constitute a new cabinet and a prime minister from among the elected dispensation is quite justified. The military should heed to the call of the parliamentarians and invite the august house to seize the executive powers of the state, and bring to full circle the uprising that changed the course of history in the country.

The suspension of parliament session for a week in protest is a bad omen and could come to plunge the country in a renewed episode of political instability. This could provoke more violence on the streets that are already buzzing with agitation. This is a moment of leadership for the parliament and all the political parties to rally behind the cause of empowering the public institutions and ensure that the army conceded power to the people. The strategy should be one of dialogue, compassion and non-violence. At a time when the focus is on presidential duel, the stakes should not be raised so high that it gets to undermine the fundamental objective of change. A deal is in need of being stuck between the parliament and the military. It’s high for the ruling junta to call it a day and bow down in humility.

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Exclusive: China mulls guarantees for ships carrying Iran oil
Comments 7
By Alison Leung

BEIJING | Mon Apr 30, 2012 2:33am EDT

BEIJING (Reuters) - China is considering sovereign guarantees for its ships to enable the world's second-biggest oil consumer to continue importing Iranian crude after new EU sanctions come into effect in July, the head of China's shipowners' association said.

Tough new European Union sanctions aimed at stopping Iran's oil exports to Europe also ban EU insurers and reinsurers from covering tankers carrying Iranian crude anywhere in the world. Around 90 percent of the world's tanker insurance is based in the West, so the measures threaten shipments to Iran's top Asian buyers China, India, Japan and South Korea.

Global crude oil prices have risen nearly 20 percent since October, partly on fears over supply disruptions from Iran.

"(Ship) operators are worried that if the insurance issue cannot be resolved, they will not be able to take orders for shipping Iranian oil any longer," Zhang Shouguo, secretary general of China Shipowners' Association, told Reuters in a rare interview with foreign media.

"We have put forward our concern and related government departments are studying the issue."

Iran, OPEC's second-largest producer, exports most of its 2.2 million barrels of oil per day to Asia, and major buyers have yet to find a way around pending EU sanctions.

"We are paying great attention to this, the country has the need for oil and it's our responsibility to move the crude," said Zhang. "But we need a solution from the government so we can avoid such risk."

Like China, India and South Korea were also mulling sovereign guarantees for their tankers. Indian shipping firms indicated last week they would continue to transport Iranian oil even if limited insurance cover exposed them financially to a spill or accident.

Chinese insurers and shipowners would not take the risk on themselves and government intervention was necessary, Zhang said. Major ship insurer, China P&I club, told Reuters earlier this month it would not provide replacement cover for domestic tankers carrying Iranian oil.

Most of China's tanker fleet, owned by firms such as China Shipping, COSCO Group and Nanjing Tankers, were covered by European insurers, analysts said.

Most maritime insurers pool their coverage and tap into the reinsurance market when coverage exceeds $8 million. A typical supertanker - the biggest can ferry some 2 million barrels of oil - is covered for $1 billion against personal injury and pollution claims.

Several government departments were considering the industry's request, including the Ministry of Finance, China Insurance Regulatory Commission, Ministry of Transport and National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Zhang said. He did not say when a decision might be made.

Until recently, China was Iran's top customer, taking more than 20 percent of its crude exports but customs data last week showed China halved its Iranian crude imports in March compared with the same month in 2011.

On the broader shipping market, Zhang said he expected the troubled industry would return to a normal growth path in 2014. The freight market, which includes oil tankers, dry bulk ships and container vessels, has been in one of the worst downturns in recent memory due to an oversupply of vessels and slow global economic activity

(Editing by Randy Fabi and Ed Davies)

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April 29, 2012
Philippines Role May Expand as U.S. Adjusts Asia Strategy
By FLOYD WHALEY

FORT MAGSAYSAY, the Philippines — The squad from the United States Army’s 196th Infantry Brigade was moving quietly through the hills of Luzon Island when the staccato bursts of machine gun fire sent them into action.

About a dozen soldiers fired into the surrounding mountains, while a small contingent broke away to make a direct assault on the hidden gunmen. After a brief, intense gun battle, the squad cleared the area.

The firefight was part of joint military exercises whose message, at least in part, appeared to be clear despite proclamations to the contrary. The exercises included mock beach invasions along coastlines facing China, whose military buildup and territorial claims in the South China Sea have alarmed some of its neighbors and jumpstarted the United States’ military “pivot” to the region.

That American policy, which will include sending more troops and ships to the region, appears to have picked up speed in recent weeks.

On Thursday, Japan and the United States announced what was effectively a compromise on Okinawa that calls for thousands of Marines to leave for Guam and Hawaii in an attempt to allow others to remain on the strategic Japanese island despite local objections. And on Monday, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta will meet their Philippine counterparts in Washington, the highest level meeting after months of talks to expand the American military presence in the Philippines.

Ramping up the number of troops in the Philippines — even if they are rotating in and out from temporary bases — would still be something of a reversal for the nation after Philippine lawmakers years ago forced the closing of American bases, including the shuttering in 1992 of the Subic Bay Naval Station. The base, which had been a cornerstone of the United States’ military presence in Asia, was a casualty of some Filipinos’ sense that the facility served as a painful reminder of decades of American rule.

Such feelings still exist among some Filipinos; hundreds protested in Manila against the recent joint exercises and as talks in Washington approached, activists sent out a media alert of planned protests Monday near the American Embassy. (The alert included a fake government seal, labeling the Foreign Ministry a “U.S. satellite office.”)

But fear of a rising China has confirmed for many Filipinos — including President Benigno S. Aquino III — that the country needs an increased American military presence. A continuing standoff with China over Scarborough Shoal, in which patrol boats from both nations are positioned near the rock outcroppings, has added to concerns about the Philippines’ vulnerability.

“Washington and Manila seem destined to having much warmer ties than at any time since the fall of the Marcos regime,” James Hardy, the Asia Pacific editor for IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, said in an e-mail. “China’s increasing belligerence in the South China Sea is pushing the Philippines into the U.S.’s arms.”

A Congressional Research Service report published this month called the relationship with the Philippines “a key link in the evolving U.S. foreign policy ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ toward Asia, particularly Southeast Asia.”

Despite the closing of Subic Bay, the American military presence in the Philippines has grown in recent years. Beside the joint military exercises that occur annually, the United States keeps about 600 troops at a time in the Philippines, many of them trainers assisting in counterterrorism efforts in the south. The mission started the year after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorism attacks in the United States as the Bush administration sought to smother terrorist groups worldwide, especially those linked to Al Qaeda.

The renewed interest in building up military relations with the Philippines has been evident for months. In November, Mrs. Clinton traveled to Manila and proclaimed, on the deck of a United States warship in Manila Bay, continued military support for the Philippines. She also irritated the Chinese by referring to an area of the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea, a name used by the Philippines but not other nations. (The Scarborough Shoal lies within those waters.)

Several members of Congress have also visited the country in recent months to discuss military cooperation, including John McCain, Republican of Arizona, and Joseph Lieberman, independent of Connecticut, both senior members of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The political sensitivity over American troops in a former colony goes a long way toward explaining how carefully both Philippine and American officials have presented negotiations over possibly increasing military ties.

Raul Hernandez, a spokesman for the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, stressed in a recent interview that permanent United States military bases were not being considered.

“We are fine-tuning and readjusting our engagement,” he said. “We are talking about more frequent visits and more engagement with the United States, not about military bases. What is very sure, whatever arrangements are made, they will conform to our laws and our Constitution.”

That type of relationship, in fact, is emblematic of what American officials say the new “pivot” will mainly look like. Reflecting the stated need to shrink the military budget, and the difficulties in winning approval for permanent bases abroad, the new security strategy called for more rotational deployments.

In those cases, American troops would be operating on a temporary basis in other countries and live in less permanent facilities.

For those Filipinos sensitive to increased forces, there may not be much of a distinction between permanent and temporary.

A preview of what such arrangements might look like can be found on the southern island of Mindanao. At a Philippine military base in Zamboanga, a city there, several hundred members of the United States military have been serving on a rotating basis — for nearly a decade.

The Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines has a public affairs officer, a dedicated Web site and a mess hall outfitted by the same agency that stocks American military base dining facilities around the world.

The Zamboanga facility also has videoconferencing services for soldiers to communicate with their families.

In 2009, a Philippine Navy lieutenant, Nancy Gadian, told the Philippine Senate that when she was stationed in Mindanao, she had worked with the Americans serving there. She testified that the United States had built “permanent structures” at sites around the southern Philippines that are off-limits to the Philippine military. The United States consistently says it has no permanent bases in the country.

Though the Zamboanga facility has many hallmarks of an overseas base, its Web site says: “U.S. forces are temporarily deployed to the Philippines in a strictly noncombat role to advise and assist the AFP” — the Armed Forces of the Philippines — to “share information, and to conduct joint civil-military operations.”

While the details of a potential increase in the United States military presence have not been announced, there may be a clue in a recent business deal as to what may be about to happen. On April 18, a subsidiary of Huntington Ingalls Industries, a United States defense contractor, announced a deal to work with Hanjin Heavy Industries, which maintains a shipbuilding and repair facility at the former base at Subic Bay. That opens the door to large-scale servicing of United States military ships there for the first time in almost 20 years.

In a news release announcing the deal, Huntington Ingalls said the companies “will work together in providing maintenance, repair and logistics services to the U.S. Navy and other customers in the Western Pacific region.”

Related

*
In Crisis Over Dissident, U.S. Sends Official to Beijing (April 30, 2012)
*
U.S. Agrees to Reduce Size of Force on Okinawa (April 27, 2012)
*
Clinton Reaffirms Military Ties With the Philippines (November 17, 2011)

Hummm.....

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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/w...r-to-have-countercoup-as-goal.html?ref=africa

Loyalists of Mali’s Overthrown Leader Appear to Be Attempting Countercoup
By ADAM NOSSITER
Published: April 30, 2012

BAMAKO, Mali — Gunfire rang out over this West African capital Monday night as soldiers loyal to the president who was deposed in a coup in March appeared to be attempting a countercoup against the ruling military junta.

Shots could be heard coming from the Djicoroni paratrooper camp, where many of the loyalists troops who support Amadou Toumani Touré, the ousted leader, are based. Junta troops had blocked off the roads leading to the paratrooper base, and were ordering motorists and pedestrians back at gunpoint.

A junta soldier, running from the scene, yelled, “The camp paratroops are attacking us.” He was heard calling for reinforcements on his phone. Witnesses near the base, close to the United States Embassy here, said they had seen well-armed soldiers in armored vehicles driving past.

Elsewhere in Bamako, gunfire was reported around the area of the state broadcaster, a critical position, and the national television station failed to broadcast its regular news program.

The city’s international airport also appeared to be under attack. “The airport is being evacuated,” said Tieman Coulibaly, president of a handling company that works at the airport and a leading opposition figure. “The Red Berets are trying to take it,” he said, referring to the loyalist troops.

Fighting was also reported at Kati, the garrison village at the edge of Bamako where the military junta and its troops are based. “The soldiers told us to stay inside, and they are all in the streets now,” said Sidiki Keïta, a resident. “All the streets are occupied by the Green Berets” — the junta troops — “and they are looking for the Red Berets.”

Several junta spokesmen, reached by phone, refused to confirm that a countercoup was under way, underscoring the uncertain nature of the events. “There are confused reports that it was an attempt by the presidential guard to take back some parts of the city,” a diplomat in Bamako said Monday night.

Asked if a countercoup was unfolding in the city, a junta spokesman, Lt. Boubacar Coulibaly, said only: “This is what I have heard. I don’t have proof for now.” A high-ranking member of the junta, Capt. Adama Diarra, when asked the same question, said: “It’s false, it’s false! Now let me get back to work!” before hanging up the phone.

The junta seized power on March 22, overthrowing the democratically elected president and ending more than 20 years of democracy in this parched and baking land straddling the Sahara Desert. Shortly afterward, a rebel movement of Islamists and nomadic fighters took control of the country’s north, splitting Mali in half.

The junta, under international pressure, agreed three weeks ago to an interim government, with a president and prime minister. It appeared to have ceded power, but since then has shown increasing signs of not wanting to give it up, arresting many opposition figures, including Tieman Coulibaly, and demanding a role in shaping the country’s future.

Related

*
Mali Leader Finds Refuge in Senegal After Coup (April 21, 2012)
*
Reported Arrests in Mali Raise Questions About Junta (April 18, 2012)

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Deadly clashes in Mali between junta, presidential guard

(AFP) – 5 hours ago

BAMAKO — Mali troops behind a recent coup and the presidential guard loyal to ousted president Amadou Toumani Toure exchanged gunfire that sources said claimed several lives night.

Clashes were reported at the national TV and radio station and at the garrison town near the capital Bamako that is the headquarters of the rebel soldiers led by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo.

The resurgence of fighting dimmed hopes for a quick return to order in the west African country where the March 22 coup also allowed Tuareg rebels and Islamists to make large gains in the country's desert north.

The junta, under regional and international pressure, has allowed an interim government to take over but has kept making arrests, which witnesses said sparked the latest violence.

Fighting was reported at the national broadcaster, known as ORTM, a key target of the coup, as well as in Kati, the garrison town near Bamako that serves as the headquarters of the rebel soldiers.

The gunfights followed an attempt by junta loyalists to arrest a member of the presidential guard, or "Red Berets," witnesses said.

The US embassy reported the shooting on Twitter, writing: "Gunfire reported in ACI2000, vicinity of ORTM, and possibly other areas of #Bamako. U.S. Citizens advised to shelter in place."

An employee of the TV and radio station, which had been held by rebel soldiers since the coup, told AFP that "there were deaths" in the gunfight, without giving precise casualty figures.

Forces loyal to the junta were also attacked in Kati, although it was not clear by whom. "I am coming under fire," Samba Coulibaly, a member of the former junta, told AFP.

Another military source also said there had been shots fired and that civilians were leaving the town.

"Obviously, there is a coup against Sanogo" attempted by supporters of ousted president Toure, said a government source in a neighbouring country.

When the renegade soldiers staged their coup on March 22, shortly before scheduled elections, their power grab shattered the country's image as a democratic success story in the region.

Under diplomatic pressure from Mali's partners and military pressure from the advancing rebellion in the north of the country, the junta agreed to hand power over to Dioncounda Traore, the former parliament speaker.

Traore was sworn in as interim president on April 12, but the situation in the country has remained volatile.

In the north, an area the size of France is now in the hands of Tuareg separatist rebels, many of them battle-hardened and well-armed after serving as mercenaries in the Libyan conflict, and Islamist militias.

The regional grouping ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States, has mediated the handover to a civilian government and pressured the junta to return to the barracks, with mixed success.

The captain who led the coup, Sanogo, on Saturday rejected a decision by West African states to send troops to oversee the transition period, and their demand to have elections within 12 months.

A meeting that had been planned for Tuesday between an ECOWAS mediator, Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore, and a delegation of the former junta was cancelled, a source close to the mediators said.

The delegation of rebels would not come because an aircraft in which they had been due to travel "could not land in Bamako," as gunfire was exchanged in the city late Monday, the source told AFP.

Copyright © 2012 AFP. All rights reserved. More »

Related articles

* Mali soldiers fight to reverse coup in capital
Ahram Online - 3 hours ago
* Mali junta says in control amid counter-coup attempt
Jerusalem Post - 5 hours ago
* Anti-junta forces trying to force a countercoup in Mali, junta spokesman says
Washington Post - 13 hours ago

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http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17903479

'Counter coup' gunfight in Mali's capital Bamako
Video
30 April 2012 Last updated at 21:02 ET

Malian troops who launched a coup over the month ago and members of the presidential guard have exchanged fire in the capital Bamako, officials and witnesses say.

A junta spokesman said guardsmen loyal to ousted President Amadou Toumani Toure were trying to reverse the coup.

Local journalist Martin Vogl reporting from Bamako said clashes continued around the state broadcasting building and several other locations in the capital late into the night.

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http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/2012/04/30/fighting-erupts-in-mali/

Fighting Erupts in Mali
Posted Monday, April 30th, 2012 at 8:15 pm

Witnesses in Mali say heavy gunfire has broken out in the capital, Bamako, about a month after a military coup d'état.

The witnesses say the shoot-out on Monday involved troops who took part in the March coup and presidential guard members loyal to Mali's deposed president Amadou Toumani Toure.

A spokesman for the military government said the soldiers from the presidential guard are trying to stage a counter coup.

Witnesses tell VOA that presidential guard members have set up barricades at strategic points around Bamako. They say one of the sites where gunfire was reported is around the state broadcaster's main building.

State television did not broadcast its usual evening newscast on Monday.

On March 22, renegade soldiers seized power in Mali, accusing President Toure of failing to properly equip the army to handle a Tuareg rebellion in the north.

The new military government, under pressure from the regional bloc ECOWAS, later agreed to form a civilian transitional government to organize new elections.

Last week, Mali's interim leaders announced the formation of a new government that gave military officers three posts in the new government — defense, interior security and interior ministry. The rest of the 24-member government is made up of civilians.

Since the coup, Tuareg rebels fighting alongside the Islamist group Ansar Dine have captured three northern regions. The rebels declared an independent state, a move that was rejected by neighboring countries and the African Union.

PRC: Ousted Chinese leader played major role in wiretapping scandal - NY Times
Started by Housecarl‎, 04-25-2012 07:31 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ed-major-role-in-wiretapping-scandal-NY-Times

Blind Chinese Legal Activist Fled House Arrest reported to be under US Protection
Started by Housecarl‎, 04-28-2012 12:44 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...use-Arrest-reported-to-be-under-US-Protection
______

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http://www.scpr.org/news/2012/04/30/32240/two-crises-highlight-chinas-social-media-struggles/

Two crises highlight China's social media struggles
1:30 p.m. | By Louisa Lim | NPR

China is clamping down on social media as it grapples with a crisis over the escape of a high-profile dissident, apparently to U.S. protection. The case presents new difficulties for a Chinese leadership already struggling to deal with the scandalous downfall of a powerful politician, and it complicates U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to Beijing this week.

Yet China's use of social media in dealing with these two recent crises has been a study in contrasts.

There's a long list of forbidden terms on Chinese Twitter-like services, words for which searches are banned. In recent days, the list got longer still. Freshly banned words include "blind man," "U.S. Embassy" and "consulate," as well as "Chen Guangcheng," the name of the blind lawyer who escaped last week after 19 months under house arrest. Chen, who exposed forced abortions by local officials and subsequently served four years in prison, is believed to be under U.S. protection, though this is still unconfirmed.

Despite the ban, news of his escape was all over Weibo, China's biggest microblog service. Netizens were referring to him with code words such as "going into the light," which is a play on his name.

"Weibo now has become the public sphere of Chinese politics," says Michael Anti, a columnist who tracks Weibo closely. "It has become a market of rumors."

The Internet is making it harder for China to control messaging, he notes, but the government is becoming more sophisticated.

"Even rumors are not equal on Weibo," Anti says, adding that certain rumors are permitted, while others are deleted and their posters punished.

Such distinctions were clear recently, when powerful Chongqing politician Bo Xilai was sacked last month. Bo's name had been sacrosanct — no online criticism permitted — until a few months ago, when his former police chief tried to seek asylum in a U.S. consulate. Suddenly, unofficial accounts of the scandal were posted online, and not deleted. The saga took an even more dramatic turn when journalist Yang Haipeng announced on Weibo that the mysterious death of Englishman Neil Heywood was indirectly linked to Bo.

"I knew the news for about 10 days before releasing it," Yang says. "I didn't dare believe it. Then reliable sources told me about it again while we were drinking. They were from the legal world, and they didn't leak it on purpose."

Yang's post was not deleted, despite the sensitivity of the allegations. Days later, the government confirmed that Bo's wife, Gu Kailai, was a prime suspect in Heywood's death. Beijing seemed to be tacitly allowing the online demonization of Bo. Unconfirmed rumors swirled about his wiretapping of senior leaders, about massive corruption and that the motive for Heywood's murder might have been to stop him from exposing transfers of vast sums of money overseas.

Yang believes a disinformation campaign could have been under way. "At first, the government panicked because true news was coming out. Now they've calmed down," he says. "It's possible that they are releasing lots of false information on purpose to confuse people, so no one can tell what's real and what's false."

These rumors gave Beijing cover to move against Bo's followers inside the government.

"That's the typical Mao Zedong strategy: Mobilize the people against the local factions," says Anti, the columnist. "Weibo has already become a battlefield for public opinion. If it is a battlefield, they should occupy instead of destroy that."

But in the case of Chen, the escaped lawyer, the strategy has been completely different. The censorship machine has tried to deny his existence rather than allow his demonization. That could be because sensitive negotiations with the U.S. about his fate are ongoing.

Charlie Custer of the translation website ChinaGeeks.org says another factor could be that his case is more potent.

"The whole Bo Xilai thing is sort of like watching an opera or watching a movie. It's very entertaining and very interesting, but it doesn't cause the average person to think, 'Wow, that could happen to me,' " Custer says. "Chen Guangcheng comes from a rural, poor background, so he strikes a chord with a lot of people. Then seeing his family — these people who are completely innocent of anything — be arrested and held without trial or charges, that does resonate with a lot of people."

On the streets, many ordinary people are baffled by recent events.

"I don't believe anything," says a 50-something who gives his name as Mr. Sun. "Ninety percent of what you hear is lies. There's no truth anymore."

Such views highlight a real danger for Beijing. The government is trying its hardest to manipulate social media, but the truth is that the online world and official discourse have become parallel worlds, growing further apart day by day. And that widening gulf is undermining the government steadily every day.
Copyright 2012 National Public Radio. To see more, visit http://www.npr.org/.

Join our community: Like KPCC on Facebook and follow us on Twitter to get updates and talk about the day's news with other fans.

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http://www.news24.com/World/News/China-security-chief-down-but-not-out-20120430

China security chief down but not out
2012-04-30 13:06

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Beijing - Strike two against China's once invulnerable domestic security chief, Zhou Yongkang.

An audacious escape by blind dissident Chen Guangcheng is the second uproar this year to hit Zhou, who has expanded China's policing apparatus into a vast, costly and - now for all the world to see - a flawed tool of Communist Party control.

But even one of the biggest domestic security embarrassments in more than a decade is unlikely to knock him out before a party congress late this year that will appoint successors to him and other retiring leaders, said several experts.

The question will be whether his successor gets to rethink his legacy and rein in the domestic security establishment whose $110bn budget exceeds the People's Liberation Army's.

Chen outfoxed a cordon of guards and security cameras to flee home imprisonment in Shandong province in east China, escaping to what supporters have said is US protection in Beijing. His feat was a rebuff to Zhou's security forces and it threatens to turn into a standoff with Washington.

Zhou was already bruised by a scandal in Chongqing in southwest China, after that city's former police chief, Wang Lijun, fled into a US diplomatic compound in February for more than 24 hours.

Embarrassing setback

Wang revealed allegations of murder and corruption that have felled Bo Xilai, the ambitious Chongqing party chief who had courted Zhou as a patron.

The domestic security establishment was humiliated in 1999, when members of the Falun Gong spiritual movement held a surprise protest around the party leaders' compound in Beijing. Although smaller in scale, the two latest incidents are also embarrassing setbacks for the guardians of stability.

"All of the recent astonishing episodes - police brutality in Chongqing and Shandong, Wang Lijun's rise and his attempted defection to the US consulate, and Chen Guangcheng's adventurous escape - have revealed severe flaws of the Chinese security system," said Cheng Li, an expert on Chinese politics at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC.

"Zhou Yongkang, as the leader in charge of this functional area, deserves some blame," Li said in e-mailed comments.

But Li added that China's top leadership was extremely cautious and hesitant to fire more senior leaders, especially someone whose status was even higher than Bo.

Since 2007, Zhou has been the member of the Politburo Standing Committee - the party's core council of power - who steers the police, law and security agencies.

Hulking presence

The recent crises have intensified long-standing criticisms in China that Zhou's fiefdom has grown too powerful, unaccountable and yet incapable of meeting the party's expectations of defending social stability.

"You can't separate the case of Chen Guangcheng from Zhou Yongkang and his making stability preservation a national policy that has overridden all boundaries and rules," said Pu Zhiqiang, a lawyer in Beijing who takes on contentious cases about human rights and freedom of speech.

"This all comes down to Zhou Yongkang's policies for social control and domestic security, and this shows that in the end they can't work," added Pu, who said he hoped China's next leaders would rein in what they call the "stability preservation" apparatus after taking power from later this year.

Despite internet-fed rumours that Zhou could fall because of ties to the disgraced Bo, he remains a hulking presence in politics. His recent regular appearances and speeches appear intended to show he remains out of political danger.

Zhou, aged 69, must retire at the forthcoming party congress, and ousting him before then could fan panic discord at a vulnerable time, said Xie Yue, a professor of political science at Tongji University in Shanghai. Xie studies domestic security.

"It is rumoured that Zhou Yongkang has been under pressure internally, and the Chen Guangcheng incident offers more reasons to criticise him," Xie said in a telephone interview.

Living symbol

"But the priority is a smooth transition for the 18th Party Congress, and if Zhou Yongkang was ousted before then, that could be too much of a shock for the handover of power by the top levels of the Communist Party," said Xie.

For 19 months, Chen Guangcheng endured extra-judicial home jail in his village, a living symbol of the Communist Party's willingness to mobilise enormous resources to stifle the dissent and protest that it fears could challenge its power.

Chen, a self-schooled legal advocate who campaigned against forced abortions, had been held in his village home in Shandong province since September 2010 when he was released from jail for charges that he called spurious.

Chen's supporters have described a relentless effort to keep him locked up, while maintaining the official fiction that he was free. Squadrons of guards patrolled his Dongshigu village to keep him in and unwelcome visitors, including reporters, out.

A web of security cameras watched his home.

Officials told Chen they estimated well over $9.5m had been spent to keep him penned up, he said in a video released after his escape, adding that sum did "not include cash for paying off senior officials in Beijing".

Stability preservation

"It's clear just how serious the corruption was, and how badly money and power have been abused," Chen said in the statement addressed to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and carried on YouTube.

Chinese officials and police have refused to answer repeated questions from reporters about Chen and his comments.

His confinement was just part of a much larger "stability preservation" campaign to deter threats to party power. Chinese spending on police, militia and other domestic security arms will increase by 11.5% in 2012 to 701.8 billion yuan (about $111.22bn), according to the budget approved in March.

By comparison, China's defence budget for 2012 is 670.3 billion yuan (about $106.22bn).

The security spending surge has inflated the power of the police and militia forces under Zhou, an avid supporter of President Hu Jintao's campaign to strengthen "social management" and pre-empt unrest.

"Every province, every place has its own Chen Guangchengs, people who are kept under control and silenced without any legal basis or appeal," said lawyer Pu. "Chen Guangcheng was the most prominent example of this unfettered abuse of power."

Succession uncertainty

Echoing the views of many liberal supporters of rule of law, Pu said he hoped the setbacks to China's domestic security agencies would give the country's next generation of leaders impetus to tether their power more tightly.

Vice-President Xi Jinping is expected to replace Hu as party chief and president.

"The next generation of leaders can make a break, and use these incidents to make their case," he said. "The stability preservation sector is a powerful interest group, but if leaders are determined to change it, it won't be able to resist."

There is uncertainty about who will succeed Zhou as domestic security chief. He was a provincial leader with a background in oil, and his successor could be another provincial boss.

Still, the standoff over Chen's fate is unlikely to force leaders to fundamentally revise their entrenched security policies, said several experts.

"I'm not optimistic that there will be much change. The whole model of stability preservation is part and parcel of the mode of rule, not the work of just one man," said Xie.

"Zhou Yongkang will retire, but the stability preservation model will not."

- Reuters

Wowser; lots of news already.

Reading about Egypt I'm reminded that right after he was inaugurated, Zero's first call to a foreign head of state was to Mubarrak (who he later stabbed in the back of course). Remind me if I'm wrong. There was another Muslim connection too... Remember he spoke and it was on Egyptian radio and an Israeli who knows Arabic and monitors radio heard Zero saying on radio (translated into Arabic for the audience) that he is a Muslim?

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Barak: Nuclear Iran More Dangerous than Striking Iran

Defense Minister Ehud Barak meets foreign journalists, says
that as long as Iran poses a threat, all options are on the table.

By Elad Benari
First Publish: 5/1/2012, 5:15 AM
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/155310​

Defense Minister Ehud Barak warned on Monday that as long as Iran poses a threat to Israel with its nuclear program, all options are on the table.

Speaking with journalists from the Foreign Press Association and quoted by The Associated Press, Barak said, “I believe it is well understood in Washington, D.C., as well as in Jerusalem that as long as there is an existential threat to our people, all options to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons should remain on the table.”

“I have enough experience to know that a military option is not a simple one,” Barak added. “It would be complicated with certain associated risks. But a radical Islamic Republic of Iran with nuclear weapons would be far more dangerous both for the region and, indeed, the world.”

Barak dismissed the remarks by critics of a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, saying, “Parts of the world, including some politically motivated Israeli figures, prefer to bury their heads in the sand.”

By “politically motivated Israeli figures” he was likely referring to former Shin Bet head Yuval Diskin, who attacked Barak and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu at an open forum.

Diskin said that Netanyahu and Barak are “messianic” and “unfit to hold the reins of power. They give the public a false picture on the Iran question. They create the feeling that if Israel does not act, Iran will have a nuclear bomb, even though experts think that an attack on Iran will cause it to speed up the process of arming with nuclear weapons.”

Diskin was later supported by former Mossad Chief Meir Dagan. Former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert also implied that, like Diskin, he did not trust the current leaders of Israel to make the right decisions.

“You have to have full trust in the judgment of those who have to take decisions,” Olmert told CNN on Monday. “And you could understand from what I said that maybe something in my trust is lacking.”

Barak told the foreign journalists that time is running out for a strike, as “Iran's military nuclear program will be sufficiently developed and suitably concealed, rendering the facilities immune to surgical attacks.”

He also addressed the past year of upheavals in the Middle East that have overthrown several leaders and caused Islamist political parties to gain prominence.

“Israel has found itself sitting as an island of stability in a stormy sea, a sea in which the waves of radicalism are growing in strength,” Barak said.

“We urge Egypt to contain lawlessness in the Sinai Peninsula," he said, referring to the unstable security situation in the Sinai Peninsula since the ouster of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak last year. Terror groups have taken advantage of the situation to carry out terror attacks against Israelis and fire rockets at the city of Eilat.

“This is imperative in order to keep our two nations firmly on the path of peace, a peace that has contributed so much to so many for so long now,” he added.

Barak also addressed Syria, where a bloody 14-month uprising against President Bashar Assad is in progress.

“Whatever follows Assad's bloodstained regime will be greeted with Israel's extended hand of peace,”





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A Tiny Island Is Where Iran Makes a Stand

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during his visit to
Abu Musa,an island claimed by Iran and the United Arab Emirates.

By THOMAS ERDBRINK
Published: April 30, 2012
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/w...over-island-of-abu-musa-unites-iran.html?_r=1​

TEHRAN — For Iranians, whose country’s borders have shrunk in the past 200 years after wars and unfavorable deals by corrupt shahs, territorial issues are a delicate matter. So a renewed claim by the United Arab Emirates to the tiny island of Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf has touched a raw nerve.

But many here say that may just be the point.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his reactionary agenda tend to be unpopular among the urban middle classes, but he is enjoying a rare surge of support even in those inhospitable quarters in the growing dispute with Iran’s Persian Gulf neighbors — one that he touched off by making a surprise visit to the island last month, a first by an Iranian president.

Other Iranian politicians have rushed to embrace the controversy, aware of how it is playing at home.

A parliamentary delegation made a high-profile visit to the island on Sunday to observe Iran’s National Day of the Persian Gulf, a normally low-key event, which seems bound to further inflame the issue. Other legislators have called for the establishment of a Persian Gulf province, and want the Tehran street that the United Arab Emirates Embassy is on renamed Abu Musa.

For many Iranians, the dispute over Abu Musa, a four-square-mile spit of sand with about 2,000 inhabitants and surrounded by pristine blue waters, arouses strong nationalistic feelings at a time of general hopelessness over the devastating impact of a grinding economy, foreign sanctions and a feeling of unprecedented isolation. To that extent, it mirrors Iran’s nuclear program, which has also whipped up nationalistic emotions that Mr. Ahmadinejad has used to build support for the government.

“We Iranians continuously fight and disagree like a husband and wife during a nasty divorce,” Somaye Allahdad, 35, a Tehran homemaker who does not always agree with Mr. Ahmadinejad’s policies, said over a family lunch of traditional lamb kebab and sabzi, a sort of herbal stew. “But when someone tries to take away our child, we team up and face the threat.”

Mr. Ahmadinejad’s visit to Abu Musa, where he spoke to an audience of sun-tanned Iranian fishermen, prompted angry reactions from Arab states on the western shore of the Persian Gulf, which rejected his assertion that the island is occupied by Iran. That, too, may have been part of the plan, some Iranians believe.

“Be sure that Ahmadinejad saw those angry Arab reactions coming,” said Mrs. Allahdad’s aunt, who would not give her name. “He needs distraction from his internal problems.”

If that was the plan, it seems to be working. On Sunday, the Facebook page of the Saudi leader, King Abdullah, was closed after tens of thousands of Iranians had left the slogan “Persian Gulf forever” in the comments section of his latest post.

At Mrs. Allahdad’s lunch, several relatives, none of whom had voted for the president, debated loudly over his intentions, the continuing scourge of inflation and the effects of sanctions imposed by the West because of Iran’s nuclear program. But all concluded that Mr. Ahmadinejad had done the right thing by visiting Abu Musa.

Mrs. Allahdad spoke of her father, who died on the front lines during the eight-year war with Iraq when she was a young girl in 1981. “We defended every inch of our nation with our lives, and now we should give the Arabs our island? Over my dead body,” she said.

Tensions in the Persian Gulf have always run high, but with Iran jockeying for the position of regional power and recent weapons purchases by Saudi Arabia and the emirates worth more than $100 billion, the dispute over the island takes on added significance.

According to a 1971 memorandum of understanding between Iran and the emirate of Sharjah, the island and its energy resources are to be divided between the two. By agreeing to the pact, the tiny emirate prevented an invasion by Iran, which two days earlier had taken two other disputed islands, Greater and Lesser Tunb, which were even smaller and uninhabited.

Iran has stoutly defended its actions, saying all three islands were Iranian territory until Britain occupied them in 1908. The United Arab Emirates say most of the inhabitants of Abu Musa have been Arab for centuries. In 1980, the emirates took their claim to the United Nations Security Council, which rejected it. Most of the island’s infrastructure like roads and schools, including a university, have been built by Iran, and Abu Musa’s governor is Iranian.

One Iranian analyst sympathetic to the government said the ownership issue had surfaced now as part of the Western campaign to pressure Iran over its nuclear program, which it says is peaceful but the West suspects is a cover for developing weapons.

“The emirates are not acting independently in this matter,” said the analyst, Sadollah Zarei, 55, a columnist for the hard-line state Kayhan newspaper. “Bigger powers are behind this.”

He said the West was trying to raise the pressure on Tehran ahead of the second round of nuclear talks between Iran and world powers, scheduled for May 23.

“By driving up tensions in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. and their allies are trying to send a message to Iran: back down, or face pressure on other fronts,” Mr. Zarei said.

Whatever the reason for the resurfacing of the Abu Musa claims, many here agree the Iranian collective psyche can be wounded by even the smallest verbal threat to the nation’s territorial integrity. History has not smiled on Iran, which has lost territory in the Caucasus, Baluchistan, Afghanistan and Bahrain after wars with Russia and highly unfavorable land sales by a succession of shahs, among other things.

“In the past 200 years, our territory has been taken from us bit by bit,” said Mohammad Esmael Heydari, 68, a retired journalist. He also pointed out that the Soviet Union and Britain invaded Iran during World War II.

“Such incidents are not quickly forgotten here,” he said.

“We do not want to lose any more territory. No more.”

While the Persian Gulf is a handy motive for stirring up nationalist support, there is also an ethnic element to the appeal, as Mrs. Allahdad explained after lunch. “These Arabs pretend as if they rule the region, but they have no history, and no independence, like Iran,” she said. “They have no right to look down upon us.”

For three years, Mrs. Allahdad and her family lived on the Iranian island of Kish, where her husband was working. Mrs. Allahdad confided that in all that time she had never made an effort to visit Abu Musa, even though it was quite near. There was no point, she said, because she had been told it was a barren place where there was nothing to do.

“I don’t need to go there,” she said. “All that matters is that it is Iranian.”






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Olmert: U.S. Should Lead
Attack on Iran, Not Israel

Former PM Olmert says any military action against Iran should
be led by the U.S., hints he doesn't trust Netanyahu and Barak.

By Elad Benari
First Publish: 5/1/2012, 4:14 AM
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/155308​

Former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has said that if international efforts to halt Iran's nuclear program fail, any military action against Tehran should be led by the United States and not by Israel.

In an interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour which was recorded on Sunday and aired on Monday, Olmert said, “The last resort is a military action. And I prefer that it would be an American action -- supported by the international community -- if all the other efforts would fail.”

Olmert added that the U.S. government should decide on the extent and the scope of any military action, saying, “Israel certainly could be part of the effort, but Israel should not lead it.”

The former Prime Minister said there is no immediate need for military action against Tehran. “I know one thing: that the Iranian leadership has not gone beyond a certain line for the time being of developing the nuclear program. And that shows that they are at least thoughtful, which means that they are not rushing, but they are calculating their steps.”

In the interview, Olmert also responded to the harsh remarks made over the weekend by former Shin Bet head Yuval Diskin.

Diskin attacked Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak at an open forum, saying they are “messianic” and “unfit to hold the reins of power. They give the public a false picture on the Iran question. They create the feeling that if Israel does not act, Iran will have a nuclear bomb, even though experts think that an attack on Iran will cause it to speed up the process of arming with nuclear weapons.”

Olmert described as “quite unusual” the comments from Diskin and added, “I prefer to distinguish between the personal aspects of what he said and the substantial aspects of what he said. We don't think that the priorities are set in the right way. First priority, as I said, is cooperation with America from a respectful and serious and careful attitude and not trying to teach the president of America or preach to the president of America or blame the president of America, but rather cooperate with him.”

Olmert also implied that, like Diskin, he did not trust the current leaders of Israel to make the right decisions.

“You have to have full trust in the judgment of those who have to take decisions,” said Olmert. “And you could understand from what I said that maybe something in my trust is lacking.”

Asked if he does not have full trust in the Netanyahu government, Olmert replied, “Apparently.” He admitted he was “worried” that a preemptive attack on Iran could be a “terrible, terrible mistake for the security and the well-being of Israel.”

Olmert, who faces a series of indictments and court hearings on charges of bribery and abusing public trust, was recently the keynote speaker at the annual J Street conference. The organization describes itself as being “pro-Israel” and “pro-peace,” but many Jews believe that the organization actually undermines the interests of the State of Israel and Jewish people.

Only several days ago, J Street’s regional director said that in the event that war broke out involving Israel, J Street would not necessarily support the Jewish state.

When Olmert served as Prime Minister, he was determined to reach a peace agreement with Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. He went so far as to offer Abbas 94 percent of Judea and Samaria, a shared jurisdiction of Jerusalem, and allowing 5,000 PA Arabs who left their homes in 1948 back into Israel.

The details of Olmert’s offer were revealed several months ago in former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s memoir.






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For links see article source....
Posted for fair use....
http://news.yahoo.com/ap-exclusive-us-not-reporting-afghan-attacks-183525507.html

AP EXCLUSIVE: US not reporting all Afghan attacks
Associated PressBy ROBERT BURNS | Associated Press – 9 hrs ago

WASHINGTON (AP) — The military is under-reporting the number of times that Afghan soldiers and police open fire on American and other foreign troops.

The U.S.-led coalition routinely reports each time an American or other foreign soldier is killed by an Afghan in uniform. But The Associated Press has learned it does not report insider attacks in which the Afghan wounds — or misses — his U.S. or allied target. It also doesn't report the wounding of troops who were attacked alongside those who were killed.

Such attacks reveal a level of mistrust and ill will between the U.S.-led coalition and its Afghan counterparts in an increasingly unpopular war. The U.S. and its military partners are working more closely with Afghan troops in preparation for handing off security responsibility to them by the end of 2014.

In recent weeks an Afghan soldier opened fire on a group of American soldiers but missed the group entirely. The Americans quickly shot him to death. Not a word about this was reported by the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, as the coalition is formally known. It was disclosed to the AP by a U.S. official who was granted anonymity in order to give a fuller picture of the "insider" problem.

ISAF also said nothing about last week's attack in which two Afghan policemen in Kandahar province fired on U.S. soldiers, wounding two. Reporters learned of it from Afghan officials and from U.S. officials in Washington. The two Afghan policemen were shot to death by the Americans present.

Just last Wednesday, an attack that killed a U.S. Army special forces soldier, Staff Sgt. Andrew T. Brittonmihalo, 25, of Simi Valley, Calif., also wounded three other American soldiers. The death was reported by ISAF as an insider attack, but it made no mention of the wounded — or that an Afghan civilian also was killed.

The attacker was an Afghan special forces soldier who opened fire with a machine gun at a base in Kandahar province. He was killed by return fire.

That attack apparently was the first by a member of the Afghan special forces, who are more closely vetted than conventional Afghan forces and are often described by American officials as the most effective and reliable in the Afghan military.

Coalition officials do not dispute that such non-fatal attacks happen, but they have not provided a full accounting.

The insider threat has existed for years but has grown more deadly. Last year there were 21 fatal attacks that killed 35 coalition service members, according to ISAF figures. That compares with 11 fatal attacks and 20 deaths the previous year. In 2007 and 2008 there were a combined total of four attacks and four deaths.

ISAF has released brief descriptions of each of the fatal attacks for 2012 but says similar information for fatal attacks in 2011 is considered classified and therefore cannot be released.

Jamie Graybeal, an ISAF spokesman in Kabul, disclosed Monday in response to repeated AP requests that in addition to 10 fatal insider attacks so far this year, there have been two others that resulted in no deaths or injuries, plus one attack that resulted in wounded, for a total of 13 attacks. The three non-fatal attacks had not previously been reported.

Graybeal also disclosed that in most of the 10 fatal attacks a number of other ISAF troops were wounded. By policy, the fact that the attacks resulted in wounded as well as a fatality is not reported, he said.

Asked to explain why non-fatal insider attacks are not reported, Graybeal said the coalition does not disclose them because it does not have consent from all coalition governments to do so.

"All releases must be consistent with the national policies of troop contributing nations," Graybeal said.

Graybeal said a new review of this year's data showed that the 10 fatal attacks resulted in the deaths of 19 ISAF service members. His office had previously said the death total was 18. Most of those killed this year have been Americans but France, Britain and other coalition member countries also have suffered fatalities.

Graybeal said each attack in 2012 and 2011 was "an isolated incident and has its own underlying circumstances and motives." Just last May, however, an unclassified internal ISAF study, called "A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility," concluded, "Such fratricide-murder incidents are no longer isolated; they reflect a growing systemic threat." It said many attacks stemmed from Afghan grievances related to cultural and other conflicts with U.S. troops.

Mark Jacobson, an international affairs expert at the German Marshall Fund in Washington and a former deputy NATO senior civilian representative in Afghanistan, said attacks of all types are cause for worry.

"You have to build up trust when working with partners, and years of trust can be destroyed in just a minute," Jacobson said. No matter what the motivation of the Afghan attacker, "it threatens the partnership."

Until now there has been little public notice of non-fatal insider attacks, even though they would appear to reflect the same deadly intent as that of Afghans who manage to succeed in killing their foreign partners.

Gen. Mohammad Zahir Azimi, spokesman for the Afghan Defense Ministry, said the army has tightened its monitoring of soldiers' activities recently and, in some cases, taken action to stop insider attacks.

For example, "a number of soldiers" have been arrested for activity that might suggest a plot, such as providing information on army activities to people outside the military, he said. Some have been dismissed from the Army, but he did not provide figures.

U.S. officials say that in most cases the Afghans who turn their guns on their supposed allies are motivated not by sympathy for the Taliban or on orders from insurgents but rather act as a result of personal grievances against the coalition.

___

Associated Press writer Heidi Vogt in Kabul contributed to this report.

Robert Burns can be followed on Twitter at http://www.twitter.com/robertburnsAPThe U.S.-led military coalition in Afghanistan is under-reporting the number of times that Afghan soldiers and police open fire on American and other foreign troops.

For links see article source....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/04/aqap_confirms_comman.php

AQAP confirms commander linked to Osama bin Laden killed in drone strike
By Bill Roggio
April 30, 2012

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula confirmed that a senior leader was killed in a recent US drone airstrike in Yemen. The commander had trained in Afghanistan and served as a member of Osama bin Laden's bodyguard.

AQAP confirmed that the commander, Mohammed Saeed al Umda (also known as Ghareeb al Taizi), was killed in the April 22 drone strike on a convoy in the Al Samadah area, near the border of Marib and Al Jawf provinces. The terror group announced his death in a martyrdom statement that was released yesterday on jihadist websites. The statement was translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

"'Ghareeb al Taizi,' may Allah have mercy on him, ... was martyred ... with two mujahideen as a result of an American bombing in Samdah district of Marib," the statement said, according to SITE.

AQAP stated that Umda had served in Afghanistan, where "he was close to Sheikh Osama bin Laden, may Allah have mercy on him, and was in his special guard." Bin Laden's special bodyguard was also known as the Black Guard.

The terror group also said al Umda was on a US wanted list and had been detained by the Saudi government and then transferred to Yemen, where in 2006 he broke out of prison in Sana'a along with 23 AQAP leaders and fighters.

A Yemeni official told The Long War Journal on April 24 that al Umda was killed in an airstrike two days prior. The Yemeni official said that al Umda provided "logistical and financial support" and "commanded a number of AQAP military operations in Yemen." Al Umda has also been featured prominently in AQAP's propaganda, such as an interview posted on the Ansar al Mujahideen web forum in 2010.

According to the Yemeni government, al Umda had attended the Al Farouq military training camp in Afghanistan before the downfall of the Taliban regime in 2001. Al Farouq was one of al Qaeda's primary training facilities in pre-9/11 Afghanistan. Foreign recruits were shuttled to the camp, where they were given training on light arms and other basic instruction. Those who were selected for operations in the West or elsewhere were sent on to specialized training camps. Other recruits were selected to fight alongside the Taliban in al Qaeda's Arab 055 Brigade.

Al Umda was involved in the October 2002 suicide attack on the French oil tanker Limburg. He was convicted by a Yemeni court and imprisoned in 2005. In February 2006, he was among 23 al Qaeda operatives to escape from a Political Security Organization prison in Sana'a under suspicious circumstances. The Political Security Organization is known to support al Qaeda. After his escape, Al Umda was listed as the fourth-most-wanted man in Yemen.

The US has carried out 13 drone and conventional airstrikes in Yemen since the beginning of the year. Six of those strikes have taken place this month. From 2002 to the end of 2011, the US carried out just 16 drone and conventional airstrikes in Yemen.

The CIA and the US military have stepped up the targeting of AQAP leaders and fighters as the terror group is believed to be interested in striking inside the US. AQAP has taken control of vast areas in southern Yemen and has been waging an insurgency against the government under the banner of Ansar al Sharia.

For more information on US drone strikes in Yemen, see LWJ reports, AQAP commander thought killed in US drone strike, and Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2012.

For links see article source....
Posted for fair use....
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/04/suicide-bomber-assails-police-boss-convoy-kills-11/

Suicide bomber assails Police boss convoy, kills 11
On April 30, 2012 · In News
4:32 pm
Comments 43

KANO (AFP) – A suicide attack targeting a senior police official’s convoy on Monday has killed 11 people and wounded 20, a rescue source said, with the senior officer said to be unharmed.

Police said the attack in the Taraba state capital Jalingo saw a motorcycle ram into the police convoy amid a wave of similar violence attributed to Islamist group Boko Haram.

Police Anti-bomb officers work near the engine of the Jeep used by the suicide bomber that ravaged ThisDay Newspapers in Abuja on April 26, 2012. AFP PHOTO

Authorities provided an official death toll of three people, including two passers-by and the bomber, with a police motorcyclist wounded.

However, the rescue official put the death toll at 11, including a policeman, with 20 wounded.

“Eleven people died,” the rescue official said on condition of anonymity because he was not authorised to talk to the press. “One policeman was among them. There are 20 injured.”

In describing the attack, police spokesman Ibiang Mbaseki said “a bomber on a motorcycle rammed into the police rider (motorcycle escort). The bomb went off. The windshield of the (state) police commissioner’s car was shattered.”

There was no immediate claim of responsibility and police declined to name any suspects, though the attack was similar to others carried out by Islamist group Boko Haram.

“For now, we are not mentioning anybody as suspects,” said Mbaseki. “An investigation will be carried out to determine who was responsible.”

Taraba state has not been known to be targeted by Boko Haram, though the state borders others that have been repeatedly hit by such violence.

The alleged mastermind of a Christmas day attack on a church near the capital Abuja which killed at least 44 people was re-arrested in Taraba state in February after having earlier escaped from custody.

Speaking at the opening of a summit of the six-nation Lake Chad Basin Commission in Libreville, Chadian President Idriss Deby Itno called for the creation a joint regional force to battle the spread of Boko Haram.

“I am demanding the creation of a joint deterrence force. We have to make this decision here today,” he said. “Our basin is exposed to insecurity because of the permanent threat posed by Boko Haram.”

Officials and experts have repeatedly warned that Boko Haram may be building ties with Al-Qaeda and expanding beyond Nigeria’s borders to threaten the entire region.

Nigeria has been hit by near daily gun-and-bomb attacks, mainly in the country’s north, that have shaken Africa’s most populous nation and largest oil producer.

On Sunday, attacks on churchgoers in the northern cities of Kano and Maiduguri left a total of 23 people dead, security sources and an NGO have said.

Also Sunday, unknown gunmen shot dead three policemen on patrol in an ambush in northern Katsina state, a police spokesman said Monday.

Taraba is located along the eastern-central border.

Boko Haram’s increasingly bloody insurgency has claimed more than 1,000 lives since mid-2009. Police and soldiers have often been the victims, but Christian worshippers have also been targeted.

The group also claimed responsibility for a suicide attack at UN headquarters in Abuja which killed at least 25 people last August.

Boko Haram initially claimed to be fighting for the creation of an Islamic state in Nigeria’s north, but its demands and structure have become less clear in recent months.

It is believed to have a number of factions, some with political motives, as well as a hardcore Islamist wing. Criminal groups are also believed to have carried out violence under the guise of Boko Haram.

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20120501rb.html

Tuesday, May 1, 2012

Hands behind Sudan's war

By RAMZY BAROUD

SEATTLE — Once again Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir waved his walking stick in the air. Once again he spoke of splendid victories over his enemies as thousands of jubilant supporters danced and cheered. But this time around the stakes are too high.

An all-out war against newly independent South Sudan might not be in Sudan's best interest. South Sudan's saber-rattling is not an entirely independent initiative; its most recent territorial transgressions — which saw the occupation of Sudan's largest oil field in Heglig on April 10, followed by a hasty retreat 10 days later — might have been calculated to draw Sudan into a larger conflict.

Stunted by the capture of Heglig, which, according to some estimates, provides nearly half of the country's oil production, Bashir promised victory over Juba. Speaking to large crowd in the capital of North Kordofan, El-Obeid, Bashir effectively declared war.

"Heglig isn't the end, it is the beginning," he said, as quoted in the Wall Street Journal. Bashir also declared a desire to "liberate" the people of South Sudan from a government composed of "insects." Even when Heglig was declared a liberated region by Sudan's defense minister, the humiliation of defeat was simply replaced by the fervor of victory.

"They started the fighting and we will announce when it will end, and our advance will never stop," Bashir announced on April 20.

Statements issued by the government of South Sudan are clearly more measured, with an international target audience in mind. Salva Kiir, president of South Sudan, simply said that his forces departed the region following appeals made by the international community. This includes U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon's description of the attack on Heglig as "an infringement on the sovereignty of Sudan and a clearly illegal act" (Reuters, April 19).

A day before the hasty withdrawal, South Sudan government spokesman Barnaba Marial Benjamin claimed there had been no conflict in the first place. His statement was both bewildering and patronizing. He considered Sudan, which was then rallying for war to recapture its oil-rich area, a neighbor and "friendly nation," and claimed that "we have not crossed even an inch into Sudan" (Associated Press, April 19).

The fact remains, however, that wherever there is oil political narratives cannot possibly be so simple. Sudan is caught in a multidimensional conflict involving weapons trade, internal instabilities, multiple civil wars and the reality of outside players with their own interests. None of this is enough to excuse the readiness for war on behalf of Khartoum and Juba, but it certainly presents serious obstacles to any attempt aimed at rectifying the situation.

With a single act of aggression, a whole set of conflicts are prone to flaring up. It is the nature of proxy politics, as many armed groups seek opportunities for territorial advances and financial gains.

News reports already speak of a possible involvement of Uganda should the fledging war between Khartoum and Juba cross conventional boundaries. "As the possibility of a full-fledged war became unnervingly higher, General Aronda Nyakairima, chief of Uganda's defense forces, said that his army might be compelled to intervene if Bashir did overthrow South Sudan's regime," reported Alexis Okeowo in the New Yorker website (April 20).

Both Sudans are fighting their own war against various rebel groups. Despite the lack of basic food in parts of the region, plenty of weapons effortlessly find inroads to wherever there is potential strife.

In a statement published last July, Amnesty International called on U.N. member states to control arm shipments to both Sudan and South Sudan. It accused the United States, Russia and China of fueling violations in the Sudan conflict through the arms trade.

U.S. support for South Sudan is already well known. "The U.S. reportedly provided $100 million a year in military assistance to the SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Army)," according to Russia Today on April 19, citing a December 2009 diplomatic cable revealed by WikiLeaks.

According to political author and columnist Reason Wafawarova, U.S. interest in South Sudan is neither accidental nor motivated by humanitarian issues. He told Russia Today, "It would not be surprising if the U.S. is trying to capitalize on the vulnerability of South Sudan in its efforts to establish the AFRICOM base somewhere in sub-Saharan Africa."

Russia Today goes on to reference Sudan's Al-Intibaha newspaper for its reports on Israeli weapon supplies to Juba.

U.S. and Israeli military support for Juba is not a new phenomenon. Sudan's civil war (1983-2005), which cost an estimated 2.5 million lives, could not have lasted as long as it did without steady sources of military funding. While the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Jan. 9-15, 2011 referendum, and the independence of South Sudan in July were all meant to usher in a new era of peace and cooperation, none has actualized. Sudan's territorial concessions proved most costly, and South Sudan, destroyed and landlocked, was ripe for outside exploitation.

Both countries are now caught in a deadly embrace. They can neither part ways completely, nor cooperate successfully without a risk of war at every turn. Bashir also knows he is running out of options. While Khartoum has already "lost three-quarters of its oil revenue after the secession," according Egypt's Al Ahram Weekly, "now it is poised to lose the rest."

Naturally, a conflict of this magnitude cannot be resolved by empty gestures and reassuring statements. The conflict has been festering for decades, and war has been the only common language.

Powerful countries, including the U.S., Russia, China, but also Israel and regional Arab and Africa players exploited the conflict to their advantage whenever possible. In a recent analysis, the International Crisis Group in Brussels advised that a "new strategy is needed to avert an even bigger crisis." The crisis group recommends that the "U.N. Security Council must reassert itself to preserve international peace and security, including the implementation of border monitoring tasks as outlined by U.N. Interim Security Force in Abyei."

Expecting the Security Council to act in political tandem seems a bit too optimistic, however. Considering that the U.S. is arming and supporting South Sudan, and that Russia and China continue to support Khartoum, the rivalry in fact exists within the United Nations itself.

For a sustainable future peace arrangement, Sudan's territorial integrity must be respected, and South Sudan must not be pushed to the brink of desperation.

Rivalries between the U.S., China and Russia cannot continue at the expense of nations that teeter between starvation and civil wars. And whatever hidden hands that continue to exploit Sudan's woes now need to be exposed and isolated.

Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an internationally syndicated columnist and the editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is "My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza's Untold Story" (Pluto Press, London).

Hummm......

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http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20120430a2.html

Monday, April 30, 2012

Is it an Arab spring for new borders?

By SHLOMO AVINERI

JERUSALEM — Two things stand out in the Middle East since the Arab Spring began — one that happened, and one that did not. What happened was that for the first time in modern Arab history, authoritarian regimes and rulers were toppled, or seriously challenged, by popular demonstrations, not — as in the past — through military coups.

But what did not happen might be as important as what did. While dictators associated with military juntas were challenged overnight, the Arab Spring never came to the region's conservative monarchies. The dynastic rulers of Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states (with the exception of Bahrain) remain more or less firmly in the saddle, even though Saudi Arabia's regime, at least, is in many respects far more oppressive than were the former Egyptian and Tunisian regimes.

Of course, oil money helps to sustain autocracy, but this is not a factor in Morocco and Jordan. It appears that these monarchies enjoy a form of traditional authority that the region's secular nationalist rulers never had. Being descendants of the Prophet, as in Morocco and Jordan, or having custodianship of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina, as in Saudi Arabia, bestows a legitimacy on the countries' rulers that is linked to Islam.

The only monarchical regime that was seriously challenged during the Arab Spring was the Sunni ruling family in Shiite-majority Bahrain, where precisely this sectarian divide seems to have been the crucial ingredient in the uprising, which was then brutally suppressed with Saudi military help.

Yet, for all of the success epitomized by the protests in Cairo's Tahrir Square, bringing down a dictatorship is one thing — a drama lasting a few weeks — while the transition to a functioning, consolidated democracy is quite another. Here, a lengthy process is involved, and its success — exemplified in the post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe — depends on key preconditions.

Where these conditions exist — for example, a vibrant and autonomous civil society, as in Poland, or a strong pre-authoritarian tradition of pluralism, representation, and tolerance, as in the Czech Republic — the transition is relatively smooth. Where they are lacking or weak, as in Russia or Ukraine, the outcome is much more problematic.

Simply put, a rosy outlook for countries like Egypt cannot be assumed on the basis of exhilarating images on CNN or Al Jazeera, or the fact that masses of young, well-educated, English-speaking men and women are connected through Facebook and Twitter. The great majority of Egyptians were not in Tahrir Square, and many of them lack not only access to online social networks, but also electricity and safe drinking water. Democracy and free speech are not at the top of their agenda.

Egypt's silent majority also identifies with the authenticity represented by various Islamic groups, while principles of democracy and civil rights seem to them to be imported Western abstractions. So the tremendous victory of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Al-Nour Party in Egypt — as well as that of Ennahda in Tunisia — should come as no surprise.

A similar scenario could unfold in Syria, if and when President Bashar Assad falls from power, while both post-Gadhafi Libya and post-Saleh Yemen point to the difficulties that these countries face in constructing a coherent democratic regime.

Looking at Egypt's prospects realistically, one should not exclude the possibility that the two strongest forces in the country — the military and the Muslim Brotherhood — ultimately will find a way to share power. The Brotherhood's vision of democracy is purely majoritarian, not liberal: Winning an election, according to its spokespeople, permits the victor to rule according to his views. Minority rights, institutional checks on government power and human rights are entirely absent.

Another, more fundamental, dimension to current and future changes in the region may come into view as well. Most international borders in the Middle East and North Africa were drawn by imperial powers — Britain, France and Italy — either after World War I and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire (the Sykes-Picot agreements) or, as in Libya and Sudan, earlier. But in no case did these borders correspond with local popular will, or with ethnic or historical boundaries.

In other words, none of these countries, except Egypt, had ever been a discrete political entity. Until recently, their rulers had a common interest in keeping this Pandora's Box of borders tightly sealed.

That has changed, and we see the region's imperially imposed frontiers being called into question. In Iraq, the emergence of a de facto Kurdish autonomous region in the north has put an end to Saddam Hussein's centralized Arab-controlled state. With South Sudan's independence,the rest of Arab-dominated Sudan could face further division, with Darfur leaving next.

In Libya, the transitional authorities are finding it extremely challenging to create a coherent political structure that can unite two very different provinces, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, which were held together only by the Gadhafi regime's brutality. In Benghazi, there are already calls for autonomy, if not outright independence.

Similarly, Yemen's unity is far from assured. The divisions between its south and north, which had been two different countries — with totally different histories — until the Saleh dictatorship, are resurfacing again.

In a post-Assad Syria, the ethnic and religious fissures among Sunnis, Alawites, Druze, Christians and Kurds might equally threaten the country's unity. In his brutal way, Assad may be right that only his iron grip keeps the country together. And developments in Syria will undoubtedly have an impact on neighboring Lebanon.

The end of communist autocracies in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and even Czechoslovakia brought about a dramatic wave of state creation. Likewise, no one should be surprised if democratization in the Arab world, difficult as it might be, brings in its wake a redrawing of borders. How violent or peaceful this may be remains to be seen.

Shlomo Avineri, currently a professor of political science at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, was director general of Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. © 2012 Project Syndicate

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use......
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/britains-strategy

Britain's Strategy
May 1, 2012 | 0900 GMT
By George Friedman

Britain controlled about one-fourth of the Earth's land surface and one-fifth of the world's population in 1939. Fifty years later, its holdings outside the British Isles had become trivial, and it even faced an insurgency in Northern Ireland.

Britain spent the intervening years developing strategies to cope with what poet Rudyard Kipling called its "recessional," or the transient nature of Britain's imperial power. It has spent the last 20 years defining its place not in the world in general but between continental Europe and the United States in particular.

The Rise of Britain

Britain's rise to its once-extraordinary power represented an unintended gift from Napoleon. It had global ambitions before the Napoleonic Wars, but its defeat in North America and competition with other European navies meant Britain was by no means assured pre-eminence. In Napoleon's first phase, France eliminated navies that could have challenged the British navy. The defeat of the French fleet at Trafalgar and the ultimate French defeat at Waterloo then eliminated France as a significant naval challenger to Britain for several generations.

This gave Britain dominance in the North Atlantic, the key to global power in the 19th century that gave control over trade routes into the Indian and Pacific oceans.

This opportunity aligned with economic imperatives. Not only was Britain the dominant political and military power, it also was emerging as the leader in the Industrial Revolution then occurring in Europe. Napoleon's devastation of continental Europe, the collapse of French power and the underdevelopment of the United States gave Britain an advantage and an opportunity.

As a manufacturer, it needed raw materials available only abroad, markets to absorb British production and trade routes supported by strategically located supply stations. The British Empire was foremost a trading bloc. Britain resisted encroachment by integrating potential adversaries into trade relationships with the empire that they viewed as beneficial. In addition, the colonies, which saw the benefits of increased trade, would reinforce the defense of the empire.

As empires go, Britain resembled Rome rather than Nazi Germany. Though Rome imposed its will, key groups in colonial processions benefitted greatly from the relationship. Rome was thus as much an alliance as it was an empire. Nazi Germany, by contrast, had a purely exploitative relationship with subject countries as a result of war and ideology. Britain understood that its empire could be secured only through Roman-style alliances. Britain also benefitted from the Napoleonic Wars' having crippled most European powers. Britain was not under military pressure for most of the century, and was not forced into a singularly exploitative relationship with its empire to support its wars. It thus avoided Hitler's trap.

The German and U.S. Challenges

This began to change in the late 19th century with two major shifts. The first was German unification in 1871, an event that transformed the dynamics of Europe and the world. Once unified, Germany became the most dynamic economy in Europe. Britain had not had to compete for economic primacy since Waterloo, but Germany pressed Britain heavily, underselling British goods with its more efficient production.

The second challenge came from the United States, which also was industrializing at a dramatic pace -- a process ironically underwritten by investors from Britain seeking higher returns than they could get at home. The U.S. industrial base created a navy that surpassed the British navy in size early in the 20th century. The window of opportunity that had opened with the defeat of Napoleon was closing as Germany and the United States pressed Britain, even if in an uncoordinated fashion.

The German challenge culminated in World War I, a catastrophe for Britain and for the rest of Europe. Apart from decimating a generation of men, the cost of the war undermined Britain's economic base, subtly shifting London's relationship with its empire. Moreover, British power no longer seemed inevitable, raising the question among those who had not benefitted from British imperialism as to whether the empire could be broken. Britain became more dependent on its empire, somewhat shifting the mutuality of relations. And the cost of policing the empire became prohibitive relative to the benefits. Additionally, the United States was emerging as a potential alternative partner for the components of the empire -- and the German question was not closed.

World War II, the second round of the German war, broke Britain's power. Britain lost the war not to Germany but to the United States. It might have been a benign defeat in the sense that the United States, pursuing its own interests, saved Britain from being forced into an accommodation with Germany. Nevertheless, the balance of power between the United States and Britain completely shifted during the war. Britain emerged from the war vastly weaker economically and militarily than the United States. Though it retained its empire, its ability to hold it depended on the United States. Britain no longer could hold it unilaterally.

British strategy at the end of the war was to remain aligned with the United States and try to find a foundation for the United States to underwrite the retention of the empire. But the United States had no interest in this. It saw its primary strategic interest as blocking the Soviet Union in what became known as the Cold War. Washington saw the empire as undermining this effort, both fueling anti-Western sentiment and perpetuating an economic bloc that had ceased to be self-sustaining.

From Suez to Special Relationship

The U.S. political intervention against the British, French and Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956, which was designed to maintain British control of the Suez Canal, marked the empire's breaking point. Thereafter, the British retreated strategically and psychologically from the empire. They tried to maintain some semblance of enhanced ties with their former colonies through the Commonwealth, but essentially they withdrew to the British Isles.

As it did during World War II, Britain recognized U.S. economic and military primacy, and it recognized it no longer could retain their empire. As an alternative, the British aligned themselves with the U.S.-dominated alliance system and the postwar financial arrangements lumped together under the Bretton Woods system. The British, however, added a dimension to this. Unable to match the United States militarily, they outstripped other American allies both in the quantity of their military resources and in their willingness to use them at the behest of the Americans.

We might call this the "lieutenant strategy." Britain could not be America's equal. However, it could in effect be America's lieutenant, wielding a military force that outstripped in number -- and technical sophistication -- the forces deployed by other European countries. The British maintained a "full-spectrum" military force, smaller than the U.S. military but more capable across the board than militaries of other U.S. allies.

The goal was to accept a subordinate position without being simply another U.S. ally. The British used that relationship to extract special concessions and considerations other allies did not receive. They also were able to influence U.S. policy in ways others couldn't. The United States was not motivated to go along merely out of sentiment based on shared history, although that played a part. Rather, like all great powers, the United States wanted to engage in coalition warfare and near warfare along with burden sharing. Britain was prepared to play this role more effectively than other countries, thereby maintaining a global influence based on its ability to prompt the use of U.S. forces in its interest.

Much of this was covert, such as U.S. intelligence and security aid for Britain during the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Other efforts were aimed at developing economic relationships and partnerships that might have been questionable with other countries but that were logical with Britain. A good example -- though not a very important one -- was London's ability to recruit U.S. support in Britain's war against Argentina in the Falkland Islands, also known as the Malvinas. The United States had no interests at stake, but given that Britain did have an interest, the U.S. default setting was to support the British.

There were two dangers for the British in this relationship. The first was the cost of maintaining the force relative to the benefits. In extremis, the potential benefits were great. In normal times, the case easily could be made that the cost outstripped the benefit. The second was the danger of being drawn so deeply into the U.S. orbit that Britain would lose its own freedom of action, effectively becoming, as some warned, the 51st state.

Britain modified its strategy from maintaining the balance of power on the Continent to maintaining a balance between the United States and Europe. This allowed it to follow its U.S. strategy while maintaining leverage in that relationship beyond a wholesale willingness to support U.S. policies and wars.

Britain has developed a strategy of being enmeshed in Europe without France's enthusiasm, at the same time positioning itself as the single most important ally of the only global power. There are costs on both sides of this, but Britain has been able to retain its options while limiting its dependency on either side.

As Europe increased its unity, Britain participated in Europe, but with serious limits. It exercised its autonomy and did not join the eurozone. While the United States remains Britain's largest customer for exports if Europe is viewed as individual countries, Europe as a whole is a bigger customer. Where others in Europe, particularly the Germans and French, opposed the Iraq war, Britain participated in it. At the same time, when the French wanted to intervene in Libya and the Americans were extremely reluctant, the British joined with the French and helped draw in the Americans.

Keeping its Options Open

Britain has positioned itself superbly for a strategy of waiting, watching and retaining options regardless of what happens. If the European Union fails and the European nation-states re-emerge as primary institutions, Britain will be in a position to exploit the fragmentation of Europe to its own economic and political advantage and have the United States available to support its strategy. If the United States stumbles and Europe emerges more prominent, Britain can modulate its relationship with Europe at will and serve as the Europeans' interface with a weakened United States. If both Europe and the United States weaken, Britain is in a position to chart whatever independent course it must.

The adjustment British Prime Minister Winston Churchill made in 1943 when it became evident that the United States was going to be much more powerful than Britain remains in place. Britain's willingness to undertake military burdens created by the United States over the last 10 years allows one to see this strategy in action. Whatever the British thought of Iraq, a strategy of remaining the most reliable ally of the United States dictated participation. At the same time, the British participated deeply in the European Union while hedging their bets. Britain continues to be maintaining its balance, this time not within Europe, but, to the extent possible, between Europe and the United States.

The British strategy represents a classic case of a nation accepting reversal, retaining autonomy, and accommodating itself to its environment while manipulating it. All the while Britain waits, holding its options open, waiting to see how the game plays out and positioning itself to take maximum advantage of its shifts in the environment.

It is a dangerous course, as Britain could lose its balance. But there are no safe courses for Britain, as it learned centuries ago. Instead, the British buy time and wait for the next change in history.

Read more: Britain's Strategy | Stratfor

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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/30/al_qaeda_is_doing_nation_building_should_we_worry

Al Qaeda Is Doing Nation-Building. Should We Worry?
Yes. But not as much as you might think.
BY WILL MCCANTS | APRIL 30, 2012
Comments 15

A year after the death of its leader Osama bin Laden, according to al Qaeda's propaganda, the organization is closer to its most basic goal than ever before -- the establishment of Islamic states throughout the Muslim world. Al Qaeda has long failed miserably in this regard: Before the Arab Spring, the organization was better known for inviting the destruction of the Taliban state in Afghanistan, which al Qaeda's leaders considered to be the world's only true Islamic emirate, and for spectacularly overreaching in its failed attempt to create an Islamic state in Iraq. But by taking advantage of this chaotic moment in the Arab world and merging with a powerful insurgency in the Horn of Africa, al Qaeda is once again taking a shot at its own version of nation-building.

These efforts to create states -- usually called "emirates" in al Qaeda parlance, though they often don't merit the label -- have largely occurred on the periphery of the Arab world. In Yemen, al Qaeda front group Ansar al-Sharia controls several towns and moves freely in a large swath of territory in the country's south. In al Qaeda-controlled towns, the organization provides basic services and implements Islamic law -- although with a lighter touch than al Qaeda in Iraq. Better still, its clever propaganda wing regularly distributes interviews with the locals about how great things are going. In a recent video about the restoration of electricity in the area around the Ansar al-Sharia controlled town of Jaar, the interviewer asks a local man, "How is it working for you now?" "Wonderfully!" the man replies.

In Somalia, the militant group al-Shabab, or perhaps just a faction thereof, recently received al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri's blessing to become a full-fledged affiliate of al Qaeda. However, Zawahiri may have partnered with al-Shabab just as it begins its decline: Although the Somali militant group still controls a large part of the country, it has lost ground in the past few months in fighting against Somali and international forces. Al-Shabab is not known for its good governance, but it has recently tried to score propaganda points by funneling food aid to its starving population.

A group aligned with al Qaeda, Ansar al-Din, has also managed to capture territory in northern Mali with the stated intent of establishing an Islamic state there. Its members have flown the black flag of the Islamic State of Iraq, an al-Qaeda front group, over the captured town of Timbuktu. Based on media reports, its members have been less forgiving of transgressions of Islamic law than their fellow travelers in Yemen. Nevertheless, they are still providing basic services, like policing and medical supplies.

Al Qaeda's gains warrant serious attention, but they do not represent a shift away from the group's "far enemy" strategy targeting the United States to a "near enemy" strategy targeting local regimes. For al Qaeda, the two are not mutually exclusive.

The two-pronged approach was put forward most forcefully by Abu Bakr Naji, an al Qaeda theoretician whose real identity is unknown. Naji's 2004 book, The Management of Savagery, argues for the efficacy of forcing Western nations and their local allies to overreach in their response to terrorism, which exhausts their resources and increases those of al Qaeda by creating fertile ground for recruiting new members and raising funds. At the same time, Naji argues that al Qaeda's supporters should put aside any theological differences with their Sunni coreligionists and work with them to capture territory in areas where there are security vacuums, win over the population by providing basic services, and establish proto-states that can network with one another to become emirates (fully-functioning states where Islamic law is applied) and then finally the caliphate (the Islamic super state).

There's evidence that Zawahiri agrees. In 2005, when the head of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Abu Musab Zarqawi, was waging a sectarian war against Iraqi Shiites and beheading civilians, bin Laden's then deputy largely echoed Naji's advice in a letter to Zarqawi. Zawahiri urged the AQI leader to build a broad base of political support so the mujahideen could be ready to work with local elites to establish an emirate after expelling the Americans from Iraq. (He neglected to say anything about providing basic services, although he did urge Zarqawi to win over the masses with whatever means that are Islamically acceptable.)

Zarqawi's followers, however, failed to heed Zawahiri's advice, instead harshly imposing Islamic law in the few areas they controlled, trying to force their allies to bend the knee, and establishing the "Islamic State of Iraq," which was ridiculed by a significant number of al Qaeda's intellectual allies for not actually being a state.

In the regions where al Qaeda has been most successful in establishing nascent states, Naji's blueprint is well known. The Saudi incarnation of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was the first to publish installments of The Management of Savagery online. In Somalia, a journalist friend of mine who has interviewed members of al-Shabab told me that Naji's book is very popular with members of the militant organization. This is not to say that these al Qaeda affiliates are slavishly following Naji's game plan -- the idea of provoking one's enemy to overreach and exhaust itself while trying to capture territory in security vacuums is not terribly original. But it indicates that al Qaeda and its affiliates do not view the destruction of its enemies and the creation of Islamic emirates as a linear process. It is a matter of what opportunities present themselves and what capabilities the organization has to exploit them.

There are two enduring problems with al Qaeda's strategy of incite and conquer. The first is the problem visited on the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 2001. How do you protect a new emirate if you incite a foreign power to invade it? Al Qaeda needs conflict with Western powers to bolster its reputation and resources, but often finds it unable to defend itself from the inevitable repercussions. It's a conundrum from which the organization has not been able to extricate itself: It could unilaterally declare an end to its war with United States and its allies, which would present some interesting policy choices for Washington. But by doing so, al Qaeda would lose its primary selling point and excommunicate itself from the company of the global jihad movement it helped create. As for the United States and its allies, it is hard to imagine they would believe such a declaration or tolerate the existence of a proto-state that declares its allegiance to the organization that killed more than 3,000 Americans on 9/11.

The second problem is that the only land that can be "conquered" is in countries where the state is weak and tribal politics are paramount. Controlling land and governing people requires greater involvement in local politics than merely securing a safe haven. Thus, it makes Shabab and AQAP vulnerable to shifting tribal loyalties. The problem is not intractable; Naji cites the precedent set by the Prophet Mohammad to justify buying tribal allegiances. "When we address these tribes that have solidarity [amongst their members] we should not appeal to them to abandon their solidarity," he writes. "It is more preferable to change the trajectory of the solidarity so that what it will be set upon the path of God, especially since they are prepared to sacrifice for the sake of the principles and honor which they believe in. It is possible to begin doing so by uniting the leaders among them with money and the like."

But allegiances that can be bought can be sold to others. In Iraq, for example, the decision of the Sunni tribes in Anbar to stop working with al Qaeda ended the organization's pretensions at state building. Even if the tribes are not strong in the areas al Qaeda controls now, Naji is right to worry that other elements can fill the void left by the weak or collapsed state. Good governance is key, and at least in Yemen the organization is going to great lengths to show the world that it will not repeat the mistakes of al Qaeda in Iraq by abusing the local population. But al Qaeda's refusal to renounce its war on the world means it can provide no lasting security in the territory it holds -- a reality that will, over time, wear on its local allies.

Al Qaeda's control of territory, in any guise, is a shot in the arm for its beleaguered followers and a small step toward its goal of establishing Islamic emirates. But let's get real about al Qaeda's gains: These are not yet states by any stretch of the imagination, regardless of the terror organization's propaganda. AQAP holds a few towns in southern Yemen and the Shabab's grip on its land is loosening. Set next to the near collapse of al Qaeda Central in Pakistan, the broad Islamist rejection of al Qaeda's model of an Islamic state, and al Qaeda's failure to reduce U.S. influence in the region, the organization's control of territory in weak or collapsed states is little more than a silver lining amid some very dark storm clouds for the global jihad.

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AHMAD GHARABLI/AFP/Getty Images
SUBJECTS: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, AL QAEDA, TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, MIDDLE EAST, ARAB WORLD


Will McCants is a Middle East specialist at CNA and adjunct faculty at Johns Hopkins. He is the author of Founding Gods, Inventing Nations: Conquest and Culture Myths from Antiquity to Islam.

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marty martel
marty martel

The problem with Will McCants’ analysis is that Al Qaeda is NOT dead in Pakistan and is about to make spectacular comeback with the return of Taliban rule in Afghanistan imposed by Pakistani State while tired and financially broke US looks for an hasty exit with the help of that very Pakistani State. The desperation of US was on vivid display last Sunday, April 29, 2012 when US deputy national security advisor John Brennan was telling CNN that US ’will bring Al Qaeda to justice with the help of its partner Pakistani State’ while a Pakistani State official was confirming that Al Qaeda has chosen a new leader named Farman Shinwari from a town called Lantikotal in Khyber agency. Clearly so-called US partner Pakistani State was not rushing or making attempts to arrest new Al Qaeda chief even though it knew where he is residing. How can Al Qaeda be ’collapsing’ in Pakistan when Pakistani Army and ISI will NOT abandon it for any amount of US money as reported by none other than former US ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson in a secret report to US State Department in August, 2009? Amb. Patterson had no reason to mislead her own government and her own State Department.
4 hours agoReplyLike
Puller58
Puller58

Come now. These clowns are too delusional to do much more than shake down the locals for what they can get. Think of Al Queda as a psychotic Mafia.
10 hours agoReplyLike
BrandtHardin
BrandtHardin

One year after Bin Laden’s death and over 10 years since 9/11, American citizens are still blindly allowing their civil liberties to be taken away one piece of legislation at a time. How much freedom are we willing to sacrifice to feel safe? Under the guise of fighting terrorism, the Patriot Act was adopted WITHOUT public approval or vote just weeks after the twin towers fell. A mere 3 criminal charges of terrorism a year are attributed to this act, which is mainly used for no-knock raids leading to drug-related arrests without proper cause for search and seizure. The laws are simply a means to spy on our own citizens and to detain and torture dissidents without trial or a right to council. You can read much more about living in this Orwellian society of fear and see my visual response to these measures on my artist’s blog at http://dregstudiosart.blogspot.com/2011/09/living-in-society-of-fear-ten-years.html
13 hours agoReplyLike
Clint1
Clint1

Here is the veiw from an ex-CIA station chief in Kabul ---



http://www.huffingtonpost.com/graham-e-fuller/global-viewpoint-obamas-p_b_201355.html



-- Military force will not win the day in either Afghanistan or Pakistan; crises have only grown worse under the U.S. military footprint.

-- The Taliban represent zealous and largely ignorant mountain Islamists. They are also all ethnic Pashtuns. Most Pashtuns see the Taliban -- like them or not -- as the primary vehicle for restoration of Pashtun power in Afghanistan, lost in 2001. Pashtuns are also among the most fiercely nationalist, tribalized and xenophobic peoples of the world, united only against the foreign invader. In the end, the Taliban are probably more Pashtun than they are Islamist.



-- Occupation everywhere creates hatred, as the U.S. is learning. Yet Pashtuns remarkably have not been part of the jihadi movement at the international level, although many are indeed quick to ally themselves at home with al-Qaida against the U.S. military.



-- The U.S. had every reason to strike back at the al-Qaida presence in Afghanistan after the outrage of 9/11. The Taliban were furthermore poster children for an incompetent and harsh regime. But the Taliban retreated from, rather than lost, the war in 2001, in order to fight another day. Indeed, one can debate whether it might have been possible -- with sustained pressure from Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and almost all other Muslim countries that viewed the Taliban as primitives -- to force the Taliban to yield up al-Qaida over time without war. That debate is in any case now moot. But the consequences of that war are baleful, debilitating and still spreading.



-- The situation in Pakistan has gone from bad to worse as a direct consequence of the U.S. war raging on the Afghan border. U.S. policy has now carried the Afghan war over the border into Pakistan with its incursions, drone bombings and assassinations -- the classic response to a failure to deal with insurgency in one country. Remember the invasion of Cambodia to save Vietnam?



-- The deeply entrenched Islamic and tribal character of Pashtun rule in the Northwest Frontier Province in Pakistan will not be transformed by invasion or war. The task requires probably several generations to start to change the deeply embedded social and psychological character of the area. War induces visceral and atavistic response.



-- Pakistan is indeed now beginning to crack under the relentless pressure directly exerted by the U.S. Anti-American impulses in Pakistan are at high pitch, strengthening Islamic radicalism and forcing reluctant acquiescence to it even by non-Islamists.

Only the withdrawal of American and NATO boots on the ground will begin to allow the process of near-frantic emotions to subside within Pakistan, and for the region to start to cool down. Pakistan is experienced in governance and is well able to deal with its own Islamists and tribalists under normal circumstances; until recently, Pakistani Islamists had one of the lowest rates of electoral success in the Muslim world.
15 hours agoReplyLike
danielserwer
danielserwer

Given the difficulties of nationbuilding, maybe we should be glad they are taking on the burdens. It ties them down and makes them responsible for delivering services. How much energy will be left for the far enemy? The local population may suffer, but if so they are in the best position to shove Al Qaeda out when they want.



Daniel Serwer

www.peacefare.net
15 hours agoReplyLike
Conversation from Twitter
azelin
azelinfrom Twitter

@DaveedGR Lia wrote a great paper on it in 2011 for the ISA annual conference. @will_mccants
10 hours ago
DaveedGR
DaveedGRfrom Twitter

@azelin Good to know, thanks. I'll have to ask him for a copy. @will_mccants
10 hours ago
Andrew_Zammit
Andrew_Zammitfrom Twitter

@DaveedGR @azelin @will_mccants He put a draft up online: https://t.co/jQEC9JCr
9 hours ago
DaveedGR
DaveedGRfrom Twitter

@Andrew_Zammit Thanks! @azelin @will_mccants
9 hours ago
Kinematikz
Kinematikzfrom Twitter

@intelwire @will_mccants @FP_Magazine at least as much as when americas is trying to do nation building
15 hours ago
zivjeli
zivjelifrom Twitter

@will_mccants Seems as if al Qaeda only has a chance a village building, rather than nation building. Appreciate your perspective.
15 hours ago
will_mccants
will_mccantsfrom Twitter

@zivjeli HAHAHA. very well put
15 hours ago
BlogsofWar
BlogsofWarfrom Twitter

RT @will_mccants Al Qaeda Is Doing Nation-Building. Should We Worry? - my thoughts in @FP_Magazine : http://t.co/OJLYldwu
15 hours ago
will_mccants
will_mccantsfrom Twitter

@intelwire thanks brudah. it's that time of year again. if i can make it through next 2 days w/out saying sth idiotic, i'll be pleased
15 hours ago
intelwire
intelwirefrom Twitter

@will_mccants Well, this is something very significant and interesting that has not been discussed much. Nicely done.

Hummmm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articl...h_of_geopolitics_does_it_all_add_up_to_g_zero

The New Math of Geopolitics: Does It All Add Up to G-Zero?
A conversation between Ian Bremmer and David Rothkopf.
INTERVIEW BY DAVID ROTHKOPF | APRIL 30, 2012
Comments 4

Ian Bremmer is a force of nature. He has built a successful global consulting business called the Eurasia Group. He is a respected writer and commentator. He blogs. He tweets. He globe-trots. And his latest book, Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World, is already deservedly making a major impact. He is an intense guy with a probing mind and an easy laugh. I like him. And part of the reason I like him is that one can disagree with him and still be his friend. He is an enthusiastic debater. In fact, he thrives on the give-and-take, and he welcomes having his theories tested and finding ways to nuance them. This is the sign of the best, most secure minds. It is also essential if your business is forecasting global developments, because the business of anticipating outcomes in international affairs is a great deal more like impressionism than it is physics. There are facts, to be sure, but there are so many and they recombine into so many possibilities that the end product produced by even the sharpest observers is often more about perspective and context than immutable laws and pure patterns of facts.

His new book is well-written, pithy, and full of great insights. I also agree with his central thesis that we are at a moment of ineffective global institutions, inward-looking major powers, and weakened international leadership. But his conclusion that this implies a "G-Zero" outcome is, in my mind, a step too far. My view is more that the current turbulence will result in a return to the kind of balance of power world we have seen for most of history. And I think the United States will continue to frequently lead the prevailing international coalition. However, we will also increasingly see a coalition of emerging powers play an important role in shaping key outcomes (as it already has on global trade, climate change, and important regional issues.) We also differ on the United States and China: Ian thinks the two are more likely to be rivals than allies. I think the relationship is more likely to be more complex, interdependent, and difficult to characterize in traditional terms. Then again, these are the kind of differences that make a conversation like the one I had with Ian about his book so interesting and fun. Excerpts follow.

FOREIGN POLICY: Let's start with the thesis. You talk about Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World. What do you really mean by a G-Zero world? At first glance the term "G-Zero" means no leadership. Is that what you mean?

IAN BREMMER: No. What I mean is that for the time being, we have no global leadership. After World War II was over, we had a fairly long period of globalization that was clearly U.S.-led -- driven by American vision, priorities, capital, and institutions. That was certainly the case when we talked about the G-7, the World Bank, the IMF, and the Security Council.

I believe we are now experiencing a period of creative destruction in the geopolitical environment and that going forward there will be no more U.S.-led global institutions. We will have either U.S.-led institutions that aren't global, or global institutions that aren't U.S.-led. Or conceivably we'll have neither if actors continue to keep their focus overwhelmingly on domestic affairs much more than is normal, as they have been since the 2008 financial crisis.

We put the G-20 together, which is a legitimately important concept, but it remains almost entirely aspirational. It hasn't produced significant movement on global agreements on trade, financial regulation, currency, or any of the other issues that the world needs. We are in the G-Zero.

FP: Let's break this down into a couple components of the thesis. One of them is no more U.S.-led institutions. Why not? What has changed for the United States?

IB: We can certainly have U.S.-led institutions. I think it's going to be very interesting to see to what extent the United States decides that it wants to move towards true U.S.-led institutions that aren't global. On trade you can make the argument that the United States has already given up on U.S. global leadership. The beginnings of the TPP -- the Trans-Pacific Partnership -- show a recognition that while we're not going to be able to get a lot of countries on board that really don't agree with us about some fundamental economic and political values, we can bring a smaller group of like-minded countries and players.

We haven't done that yet with the World Bank. On the World Bank we're still basically saying, "We want the organization to run more or less the way it used to." We want global participation in principle, but we're clearly dragging our feet on giving other countries much more influence. We certainly want the Americans to still run it. That's a recipe for ineffectiveness. So the question will be: Do we want to actually have a truly global bank that the U.S. will play a lesser role in, or do we want to kick countries out and have a U.S. bank with some allies that won't in any way represent the world? We haven't decided that yet.

I don't think this is about decline. I personally don't believe the United States is a "declining power." But I also think it's an irrelevant question. Whether or not you think the U.S. is in decline, the U.S. is not going to bail out Europe. Whether or not the U.S. is in decline, the U.S. is not going to forcibly remove Assad from power in Syria right now. Or take the lead on a global climate deal. Or, in my view, bomb Iran. This has less to do with America's ability to project power than it does with the prioritization of what's happening domestically in the United States coupled with what's changing around the rest of the world. American decline is a convenient, narcissistic formulation -- that it must all be about us. But in reality the G-Zero is much more complicated than that.

FP: Let's test the theory against the recent past. You could argue that NATO is working differently, but it's evolving into an institution that's able to tackle new issues, whether it's out-of-theater deployment in Afghanistan or getting involved in Libya and coming up with a new way to tackle problems. You could argue that while the IMF was less relevant five years ago, it's centrally relevant now, and that while its mission has changed from the restructuring of developing countries to doing some restructuring in the developed world, the group that's at the center of it and driving the discussions looks a lot like the group before. You could also argue that other multilaterals are still operating with the old rules, whether it's the World Bank or the WTO. So what's changed? Where should we be looking for the clearest signs of this G-Zeroness?

IB: I wouldn't say there's a sudden wholesale break in any of these institutions, but I would argue that each of them is playing a much less significant role. Specifically in the case of NATO, it was never playing a global role. NATO was always a more limited organization than that. And in that sense, NATO was the kind of organization that is much more capable of being right-sized, and we saw this in terms of Libya -- in many ways the exception that proves the rule. You had [Muammar al-] Qaddafi, who was despised by literally everyone, including the Iranians and the Saudis, which is actually pretty hard to pull off in a Middle East context. And it was only after the Arab League and the GCC were calling on someone to do something, and after the sanctions, and after the BRICS, that the United States finally did say, "OK, we'll support some level of intervention." But not a single U.S. troop was killed. Limited capital was expended. And of course, as soon as Qaddafi was removed, there was very little on-ground involvement. So the ability to create a new Libyan state that has any sort of viability and sustainability is much more of a challenge as a consequence. And NATO clearly is not playing and not prepared to play anywhere near that kind of a role in a country that's more contentious, as we're seeing in Syria right now, or as you might see in a place like Bahrain or Yemen. Unfortunately, that list is getting longer and longer. I suspect it will continue to.

On the IMF/World Bank, it's very interesting to see the BRICS talking about their desire to create their own development bank, something that many folks including [outgoing World Bank chief] Bob Zoellick are very skeptical of. I would argue that [U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy] Geithner's recent comments about Europe, basically saying, "Sorry, Europeans, you're basically on your own. You guys are more than capable of handling whatever needs to be done to get out of this crisis," is very different from the way that the United States historically responded to the Asian financial crises, the peso crisis, the ruble crisis, and other economic crises. It's not remotely credible to think that the United States would do more of that. That's only in small part because we're in an election period. It's more because the U.S. needs to focus on getting its own house in order, particularly in the eyes of its own population. An increasingly large percentage of the American population believes that they don't benefit from globalization as they did historically, or they feel like the U.S. should not be the global policeman.

So it's not that the IMF or NATO or the World Bank are irrelevant organizations. Rather, over the course of the period of U.S.-led globalization, these organizations all had a much more explicit role in leading and defining global architecture than they do now. The tipping point was the 2008 financial crisis, in part making America and its allies much more domestically focused, in part emboldening emerging markets that came out of that financial crisis much stronger, but also in terms of putting to question the values that stood behind those U.S.-led institutions. Those values were, in some ways, shown to be not as upstanding and more prone to breaking -- and certainly less worthy of evangelizing in the more narrow views of a country like China or Russia -- than otherwise had been believed.

FP: OK. So let's then look at it from a slightly different perspective, because those institutions continue to exist and what you've described in the wake of 2008 suggests a variety of different kinds of alliances developing at varying speeds. But isn't it then possible to draw the conclusion that we're not really in a G-Zero world but that, as we have been through most of history, we're in a balance-of-power world, in which it's going to be G-something on one issue and G-something else on another issue, regional groupings on regional issues, different international groupings depending on the interested major players on different global issues?

You talk about the rise of the emerging powers like the BRICS, and while they're not a cohesive group on everything, when a couple of them pull together -- as they've done on trade, climate change, Iran, and Syria -- it influences things, just as when the developed powers pull together they still carry a lot of clout. So maybe it's not that the G-20 is functional, but that components within the G-20 do end up having a decisive role to play.

IB: It's possible that that's a world we are evolving toward, but we're not there now. What we're experiencing right now, and have been experiencing since 2008, is really the breaking of the old order. And the new order, whatever it might be -- and it might well be a flexible, regional order that you described -- hasn't manifested itself yet.

Right now the focus of key economies is overwhelmingly domestic. That is certainly true in Europe because of the profound and historic nature of the crisis they're presently experiencing. It has been true to a great degree for Japan, where they've had 17 prime ministers in 22 years. And it's clearly more true with the United States now than it has been at any point in the past several decades. It's also true for China. China wants to have veto power. They want to be able to say, "No, we don't like these rules or institutions or norms or policies that are being brought down by the Americans." But they also absolutely reject taking some of that responsibility and accountability themselves. That's why they're so opposed to the idea of a G-2. I agree that the Russians and Chinese and others can have influence on places like Iran, but at this point that influence is negative. It's not a proactive and a constructive influence. You really have to struggle to find constructive and proactive policies or institutions that are actually being built from the ground up by emerging-market states along with developed states.

I agree with you that G-Zero is not really sustainable. I don't believe that this is a lasting world order; something will replace it. So the question is, what is that something? I think that is still open for debate. There are two questions you need to answer to understand what the eventual world order will evolve into. One is, what's the relationship between the world's two most important economies, the U.S. and China? Is it relatively harmonious, or is it much more zero-sum and confrontational? And the second question is, how much do other countries matter? Will Europe be a meaningful player on the world stage, or will it absolutely not? And will India? Will other major players matter in the world?

As of right now, there's still a lot of uncertainty in those two fundamental questions, which means that geopolitics has become unmoored. There are a lot of countries in play. And it's not clear whether we'll end up with a bunch of different groupings for different sorts of issues or whether we'll move into an environment that's more of a G-2, where the United States and China will dominate agendas globally, with certain areas where they agree that will be the ones that we actually see movement and progress [on], and others where you'll just get absolutely nothing. Those are two very different sorts of environments.

FP: Well, let's take those for a moment. You talked about the U.S.-China relationship, and you say it's unclear whether it's going to be zero-sum and more of a rivalry or adversarial, or whether the interdependence between the two countries is going to have them moving in line. Isn't it possible that you can have both?

This is not a relationship in the zero-sum sense that the U.S.-Soviet relationship was, where one loses and the other gains, because of the huge economic interdependence between the two of them. China doesn't have a big global agenda that is yet at odds with the United States' agenda, and in fact China has no history of international adventurism. Isn't it possible that you can have two giants joined at the hip by economic interests and occasionally disagreeing over important geopolitical interests?

IB: The answer is of course, yes, it's possible, and the question is how possible. It is easier to have that kind of a relationship when the global economy is growing at a healthy clip. When folks are fighting over commodities that are increasingly scarce in an environment where climate change is hitting and an environment where economic growth is more problematic -- in particular where the Chinese no longer believe that being able to export toward the United States is viable for them in the long term because they don't believe as much in the sustainability of the American economic model -- then that potential erodes.

Before the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S.-China relationship had some zero-sum elements, but was largely win-win. The financial crisis changed that. It's more zero-sum now, certainly in the eyes of the Chinese leadership, than it is actually win-win. And I think it's moving farther in that direction.

FP: What's the evidence of that?

IB: There are a few areas. The first is the nature of the relationship between Chinese state-owned enterprises and state-influenced organizations, and multinational corporations based in the United States. The U.S. corporations increasingly are having problems with market access. They're competing with increasingly strong Chinese state-owned and influenced corporations that desperately need improved technology to get up the value chain, but can't develop it themselves. As a consequence, they're using their state leverage to grab it. In my view, the most important lobby in the United States that has supported a very strong relationship between the U.S. and China has been the industrial lobby. It was overwhelmingly pro-China before 2008, but that's changed dramatically in the last four years. I wouldn't say it's overwhelmingly negative now; I would say it's mixed. But it is trending negative.

A second element is the hard security relationship. And here I'm talking less about the Middle East -- where the Chinese are being somewhat obstructive but largely don't have a dog in the fight -- than I'm talking about the East China Sea or South China Sea. To the extent that the Obama administration has developed a doctrine over its first three-plus years, I focus on two issues. The first is economic statecraft, particularly in that big speech by Hillary Clinton in October, which focuses mostly on China's rise and state capitalism and what the U.S. does to respond to it. The second is the U.S. pivot towards Asia. And that pivot is, "We welcome China's peaceful rise, as long as they behave the way we want them to." If they don't behave the way we want them to, then our pivot is a hedge. What does a hedge mean? Well, a hedge looks an awful lot like Chinese containment. That's certainly the Chinese understanding. It's the view of many of America's allies in Asia as well. And this is creating a more zero-sum relationship, as well as tensions over countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, and even Myanmar.

Continued......

Continued......

The final point is cybersecurity. Despite all of our concerns about needing to engage in austerity and cutting back in American military spending, that's certainly not the case in cyber. And in terms of industrial espionage and attacks directly against American government institutions and private-sector institutions, this is an area where there's effectively a war going on between the U.S. and China.

There are certainly aspects of the U.S.-China relationship that are and will continue to be very much defined by mutuality. If the American economy were to implode, that would be horrible for China; the converse is almost equally true. At the broadest level, there is a mutually assured economic destruction between the two countries. But then I would make a pretty strong argument that the U.S.-China relationship is deteriorating. And as a consequence, I'd make a fairly strong bet that the relationship is going in a negative direction. But I don't think it's definitive.

FP: Another of the points that you made was whether or not Europe is going to be a player or not. Clearly Europe is in the midst of problems right now. Of the scenarios that seem to be there for Europe, one is Europe ends up strengthening itself at the end of the crisis because it realizes it's all in it together, and you actually end up with a more centralized system, monetary plus fiscal union. Another one is that Europe spins off some of its weaker economies, but a core Europe -- Germany, France, the Northern Europeans -- remain tightly integrated and stronger as a consequence of it. But you don't hear a lot of scenarios in which Europe as a whole becomes a nonfactor. In your equation there, though, that's critical. What's your outlook?

IB: Many of those scenarios where Europe becomes a nonfactor come from Britain. There's always a level of hand-wringing of, "Oh, is Europe relevant on the global stage?" It's not growing anymore; there's no competitiveness; even in Germany some of the numbers are making its economy look a little softer. But I think the likelihood of significant spinoffs from Europe is very, very low. If you ask me to bet, I would say in three to five years it's still much the same Europe. I don't think a single country is actually going to leave. But I also think that while there is going to be agreement on a fiscal compact, it's unlikely that we will see fiscal union. Certainly in terms of the core European states, they will not be giving up major sovereignty and won't allow a fiscal compact with real teeth that ensures a level of fiscal harmonization to go along with their single currency. That means that while governance is improving in Europe and while European institutions are getting larger and are getting more well-funded despite all the austerity, that ultimate governance in Europe will still be lacking. Still, I would argue that Europe is going to be a relevant player on the global stage. There are a number of emerging markets out there -- particularly India over the medium term, given its demographics and the nature of its economy -- that are going to become much more important, especially because China is going to face so many serious internal challenges.

FP: Let's look at this world for a second. China's a key player. The U.S. is a key player. Europe is still a key player. Japan's a very large economy, and it ends up being a key player. Russia has got a lot of nuclear weapons, so it can't help but be a key player. India's got a billion people and a fast-growing economy; certainly at least regionally it's a key player. Brazil is the key player in South America. When you do the math on this, you might have four or five countries from the original G-7, and you'll have the four BRICs. And so you're going to have, as the most important votes at almost every issue, eight or nine countries closer to Bob Zoellick's idea of a G-14. There will be a handful of countries that are going to be at the center in every case. Is what you're really talking about a lack of cohesiveness and a lack of clear leadership in this group?

And then as the second part of that question: Your book title talks about winners and losers in a G-Zero world. When we talk about this being a transition period, I'm wondering if what you're really saying here is that the losers are the people who are currently running these countries rather than which countries are going to play the central role.

IB: First of all, in the environment you describe, the United States and China will absolutely be by far the most important single countries. And even if Europe is relatively strong, Europe is not a country, and therefore its ability to act in a meaningful way on a global stage is limited, unless you were to believe that we're really going to get unified European governance. That's a very low-likelihood outcome over the next five to 10 years. If the U.S.-China relationship continues to move in a more negative direction, then you're right. You have a significant group of relatively important players, but nothing gets done at the global level. And nothing gets done because it's a large group of countries with the two most important players actually agreeing on relatively little. And so global institutions -- call it the G-20, call it the G-14, call it what you want -- is not going to be where the action is. And the action then will evolve regionally where India will play a significant role, Russia will play a significant role, China will play an overwhelmingly significant role, all in their own regions.

What is interesting about that kind of a world is that regions will come together. This is not just going from globalization writ large to globalization writ small. Regions will cohere for very different reasons. Europe is much more formalized. It's more voluntary. It's about common economic and political values at its core. In Eurasia, it's not. It's somewhat more coercive. It's more informal. It's driven by Russia. And it's much more on the basis of energy relations and security. In the Middle East, it's actually driven by a bunch of countries. It's Saudi Arabia; it's Iran; it's Turkey; maybe over time it will be Egypt again. And these countries have very different preferred outcomes. The mode of integration is actually fragmentation in the Middle East because what really drives each of these countries is much more sectarian than it is common economic or political values.

And then if you go to Asia, you have an environment where China's doing most of the integrating on economic issues, especially as it gets much larger. It's becoming a superpower much more economically than in any way militarily. And yet the United States, from a political and security perspective, has much more of a draw on most of the countries in the region. And so it's a very different environment geopolitically. It's a more inefficient environment in some parts of the world going through a lot more conflict. And therefore when I think about winners and losers in that environment, it will be countries that are able to avoid getting captured by just one of those models, because, frankly, optionality becomes very important -- the ability to hedge. I call these pivot states.

I wouldn't consider the existing class of leaders writ large to be losers in this environment. Certainly in the United States, in a G-Zero environment where the volatility is much greater, a lot more folks will be turning to the United States. That will be true geopolitically in the same way that you've recently seen America's Asian allies turning to the U.S. on security issues.

And I've got to argue that in Europe we've had a period of time where we've seen quite effective leadership -- look what happened to the Italian government. That's turned around in a short period of time, precisely because the crisis was so great that it was forced upon them. That is the kind of leadership that we haven't seen in Europe in a long time. I suspect we won't see much more of it because the crisis is ebbing away; it's not as urgent as it was six months ago.

In the United States, we saw that both President Bush and President Obama were very, very capable of displaying really serious leadership in a short period of time, when it looked like the U.S. economy was truly in danger. But as soon as that passed, we went back to very ineffective governance. I suspect if we had another crisis of the same magnitude, both Obama and Romney would be up to the task. But barring that, our expectations are going to be low.

The United States is actually a comparative winner in a G-Zero world, in the sense that it's big, it can grow, and it's resilient. In an environment where people are scared about outcomes and there's a lot of volatility, more people turn to the U.S. The danger is that takes away any sense of urgency around this environment, and it means the U.S. just won't be investing in its future.

Not just in terms of dealing with the deficit, but also in terms of helping to structure and create what will be the central world order, because clearly if the period of geopolitical creative destruction began in 2008, from the U.S. perspective, that's actually an advantage. If we had waited another 10 years for the financial crisis, the comparative U.S. power position would have been more problematic. It would have been harder for the United States in 2020 to really play a fundamental role in helping to shape what the next global architecture or regional architecture would look like. Right now we still have a lot of capacity to do that, but there's very little incentive politically within the U.S. There's very little sense of urgency, and I think that's a challenge for us.

FP: Why 2008? Why not 2001, when the United States decided it was going to place a $2 to $3 trillion bet investing in wars that it couldn't win? Or the end of the Cold War, or earlier with the material rise of China and some of these other emerging powers? Isn't this a longer-term thing and harder to pinpoint to one particular turning point?

IB: You're absolutely right that you can point back over 30 years' time. We had U.S.-led global architecture coming out of World War II -- Bretton Woods, U.N., IMF, World Bank, all of that. But starting in 1978, when China really starts to expand, for me that's the point where we begin to see the underlying shift in the global balance of power from the U.S. toward China, from developed toward developing world, from debtor states toward creditor states. And at any point over that 30 years you could say, "Wow, you've got an architecture that reflects one sort of order, but your underlying balance of power increasingly doesn't reflect that, so shouldn't we do something about it?" But of course the response is, no one was going to do anything unless there was a shock to the system that was sufficiently great that compelled action.

And there were shocks. There was of course the collapse of the Soviet Union in '91. There was 9/11 a decade later. But those shocks were not great enough to have anyone fundamentally question the international architecture, particularly given that the United States from an economic perspective was still doing quite well through all of that. The 2008 shock was the first one that was big enough to really bring it all down and necessitate adaptation.

FP: How is this different from the past? We've had different G-groupings over time. But when you look at when the G-5 was dominant, or you look at the height of the Cold War when there was division between two power blocs, or you look at the period when the G-7 was dominant, it all looks pretty similar. We didn't have a cohesive world. Everybody didn't agree on everything. There were periodic conflicts; there were periodic financial crises. There were periodic outbursts of trade conflict. Powers ebbed and flowed even within these periods and acted in their self-interests in a way that was not entirely predictable. So how [is the] transitional period of the last 10 years going to look different from the preceding 10 years?

IB: You answered some of that when you asked, "Hasn't this been going on for a long time?" There've been trade issues before. There've been conflicts before. There've been times when the U.S. was challenged by Japan. But all of those were headline issues, while the present is much more tectonic. In the last world order, you can talk about the creation of the G-6 that quickly became the G-7; and then Russia was added, the G-8 -- there are all of these different Gs. But throughout that entire period, we were still talking about the U.S.-led global architecture that came after World War II. That's the last time we had a fundamental ordering of the world. And when the Soviet Union collapsed, that was a big deal to be sure, but it didn't change U.S.-led globalization. All it did was it made U.S.-led globalization faster. The fall of the USSR created 15 new countries that you could suddenly invest more in. From that perspective, it was a hastening of a global process that was already well in place.

The tectonic shift is the one where a whole host of countries with very different political and economic priorities, a whole host of poor countries in many cases with very different values and different political and economic systems, were rising up and did not agree with the notion that they were going to support U.S.-led global architecture. That's been coming for a long time, but only came to roost globally with the 2008 financial crisis. So I don't think that new world orders are created on a headline basis. They come infrequently. Creative destruction happens in the global marketplace all the time. You're an independent bookseller, and then Barnes & Noble comes along, so you adapt or you die. Or you're Barnes & Noble; Amazon comes along; you adapt or you die. It happens all the time. It rarely happens in the geopolitical environment. I would argue that the last time it really happened was after World War II. I think it's happening now. And that's really where I see the shift.

FP: Based on that, let's look at just the next 10 years. Tell me some of the headlines that we are likely to see in the next 10 years that are manifestations of this new world order.

IB: The manifestations of the G-Zero will be greater conflicts that major powers just don't agree upon in any way. So we see more and growing breakdown around bigger security issues as they emerge in the Middle East. We're seeing it right now in Syria, and I suspect we will see much more of that in the Middle East. I suspect we'll see much more zero-sumness in confrontation between the U.S. and China over its allies in Asia.

We'll also see the emergence of local powers playing a much more defined (though not always constructive) role in their own regions. That may be Russia reasserting a strong amount of direct power over its periphery. We will likely see stronger decision-making and regionalization in Latin America, although I'm interested to see how Brazil will emerge playing that role, given that Brazil is in so many ways not of Latin America the way Latin Americans think of themselves.

And then the other question in the headlines: Will we start to see the BRICS becoming more cohesive? I'm skeptical, but it's a possibility. They've certainly been meeting an awful lot. They haven't done very much, but if the United States becomes much more focused on smaller organizations that involve its key allies, there could be a response from the BRICS.

It would also be very interesting to see to what extent there will be a strengthening of the Gulf Cooperation Council in responding to crises in the Middle East. We could see the emergence of more political, economic, and military interventions coming from that organization, which historically has been ineffectual and divided.

FP: Is there something that we haven't covered that you'd like to cover?

IB: Over the course of the last 30 years, we've spent so much time thinking about the rise of emerging markets. That's where we're putting all of our money. But in a G-Zero environment, which is fundamentally more volatile, that means your risk-adjusted returns for anything you want to do are slowing down. There will be the same level of global growth, but we'll have more risk around it.

That means that we don't look at growth in the same way. We think about growth and resilience together, so we shouldn't be thinking about emerging markets as a group because some emerging markets are much less resilient than others. You want to think about that group of countries, some emerging and some developed, that actually have resilience. They have options. They have the ability to adapt in a very different and much more fluid geopolitical environment. And I think that's important for countries, what I call the pivot states, and it's important for companies too. So over time government leaders will be more interested in having the capacity to pivot, because they'll see that strategically that's what they need to do. Over the last 30 or 40 years, you didn't need to pivot; you just needed to make sure that you were taking advantage of U.S.-led globalization and profiting from it as well as you possibly could.

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SUBJECTS: DEVELOPMENT, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, ECONOMICS, UNITED NATIONS, DIPLOMACY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, DEMOCRACY, BARACK OBAMA, EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA


David Rothkopf, CEO and editor at large of Foreign Policy, is author of Power, Inc.: The Epic Rivalry Between Big Business and Government -- and the Reckoning That Lies Ahead.

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The BRICS were established as a geo-diplomatic forum - for complimentary reactions against impositions of the U.S and Britain (and at times France, depending who is president). 2008 Lavrov talked to Celso Amorim about the idea, then both went to the Chinese, who were initially reserved. Then India signed up, and lately South Africa (which had already been linked with Brazil and Indian in IBAS - the forum of the "South"). Outside the geo-diplomatic realm - the only noteworthy links are economical between China and Brazil, and Russia and China. Russia and India maintain strong mutual defense development projects. The BRICS will probably increase their geo-diplomatic cooperation in international arenas - such as the UN. At present the "independence" of Latin America is on a knife-edge: If the U.S. and its NATO"Partners" remain economically and financially fettered, and continue to be "tied" up in the Near-Middle-East-Afghanistan - then Latin America with UNASUR and CELAC might achieve a state of "independence" from the U.S. :The next couple years may prove decisive...
8 hours agoReplyLike
neax
neax

oil has a place in politics , but politics has no place in oil when economies are faultering on the brink. oil routes are not for negotiation. and with the economic condition of the west and europe oil must flow at the cheapest possible price or things are going to stall quickly. so if this is the case , is there any other policy that would unit nations of the same concern.

oil routes will be secure. how much is a loaf of bread , well its now more than half the price of a gallon of gas in a nation that has plenty of both . WHY ?
13 hours agoReplyLike
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presscorps3
presscorps3from Twitter

@EurasiaGroup @djrothkopf @ianbremmer @aflcio at intersection today. huge vacancies, auto, and strip mall. Equals Zero w/o GINS new process!